

**The Ukrainian Security Dilemma:**  
*Is neutrality an answer?*

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Lokaverkefni til MA-gráðu í alþjóðasamskiptum

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Stjórn málafræðideild

Félagsvísindasvið Háskóla Íslands

Júní 2012

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Reykjavík, Ísland 2012

## **Summary**

The institution of neutrality has been exposed to unprecedented changes in the security environment. Developments in the system of international relations have led to the evolution of the very concept of neutrality.

To reach full understanding, neutrality needs to be examined in theoretical, historical and practical perspectives. At the level of theory, the traditional realist approach has been replaced by the constructivists' ideas of identity, norms and values. In historical and practical terms, the cases of neutral Sweden and Finland provides examples for the non-aligned Ukraine of how effective the model of neutrality has been in solving the dilemma of national security.

The conclusion is that a policy of 'penetrating neutrality' is most likely the best security option for Ukraine. Institutionalized and internationally recognized, such neutrality will allow Ukraine to preserve its national security and national identity, while maintaining pragmatic and constructive cooperation with the great powers - the EU, NATO and Russia - for the foreseeable future in a changing world.

## Preface

The idea of exploring neutrality did not come from out of the blue. The author is a citizen of a country that has been trying to find its place on the world political map for twenty years, but has yet to realize its potential power. Between the time of admission to *alma mater* and the time of graduation, Ukraine managed to redirect its foreign policy twice. The reasons for this behavior have been numerous, but the author himself would like to understand the nature of Ukrainian foreign policy thinking. Thus the idea of writing this thesis was born.

Another feature providing motivation to engage in issues of neutrality was the fact that the scientific schools of Ukraine and Western Europe use different approaches to interpreting the geopolitical and institutional phenomenon of neutrality. When approaching this crossroads of opinions, it took much effort to gather the 'puzzles' of neutrality into a comprehensible picture.

Among friends who are also interested in security issues, there were those who commented that neutrality is a highly theoretical concept and has nothing to do with practical implementation in real life. There is a modest hope that some of them will change their mind after reading this paper.

This master thesis is the final assignment in the MA studies of International Relations at the University of Iceland. It accounts for 30 ECTS credits and the instructor was Alyson Bailes, Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Iceland.

I want to express my thanks to my Ukrainian supervisor Nina Gavrylova for her high standards in analytical skills.

A special admiration for the professionalism, work capacity and breadth of the heart I would like to express to Alyson Bailes, who motivated and supported me comprehensively in writing this work and inspired my ventures into the security realm within the overall studying process.

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## **1 Introduction**

The system of international relations is subject to constant transformation. Modern political science is faced with an urgent need to review the changing conditions in international relations, particularly in the field of international and national security. The drastic changes in the international system associated with the events of the past twenty years have radically changed the structure and the character of international relations. At the same time, the processes of globalization, which transform all spheres of life including international relationships at many levels, have become the dominant trend of the new system. Globalization has deeply influenced the character of the problems of security by changing, among others, the traditional understanding of the primacy of military threats and by providing new insights into more modern, wider and less exclusively state-centric dimensions of security.

Under the new conditions, the question of effective mechanisms for assuring national and international security becomes an extremely topical issue. The aspects called in question include the concept of neutrality, which has already undergone significant changes in the way it is viewed in international jurisprudence and in the theories of international relations. The concept of neutrality as an international legal institution has gradually been losing its traditional content, and neutral states that chose neutrality as a model of national security are now obliged to re-examine its principles and seek to endow it with new meaning, consonant with contemporary challenges.

The fate of neutrality in the modern world is one core theme of the present study, and the other is the specific case of Ukraine. With the end of the bipolar system of security in the Euro-Atlantic space and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet republics gained independence and with it, a sovereign right to pursue their own foreign policy ambitions. In the process they fully accepted all the responsibility and all the risks associated with the maintenance of their national and regional security. Ukraine - as one of the most developed republics of the former Soviet Union, and with the world's third largest nuclear arsenal left on its territory - suddenly faced a difficult dilemma over ensuring national security. Professing the principles of the inviolability of national sovereignty,

Ukraine chose not to join any single military or political bloc, but followed the concept of non-alignment which it saw as an alternative to the use of force and an escape from the era of ideological confrontation between the great powers.

Ukraine made its choice, however, at a time when globalization had greatly complicated the system of international relations, and the concept of non-alignment had lost its value in many people's eyes. On the one hand, not being a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Ukraine was left with no guarantee of security from Russia and its allies. On the other hand, not being a member of the European Union (EU), Ukraine could not play the same role in a non-military security community and in supporting European peace, security and stability as most of the European neutrals now do.<sup>1</sup> Ukraine in the twenty-first year of its independence thus remains in a kind of security vacuum, and needs to finally solve its national dilemma: either to confirm a policy of non-alignment that implies a deficit of security and isolation from the system of international relations; or to define a clear foreign policy vector following the example of the European neutral states, and fully use its capabilities for conflict management at the regional and global level, while maintaining and strengthening its national security through deeper cooperation.

With the extension of the European integration processes to the military and foreign policy spheres,<sup>2</sup> the problem of developing new approaches to the concept of the institution of neutrality has become particularly important. Given the controversial nature of the problem of national security, Ukraine's position and future choices can be illuminated by looking at the experience of the policy of neutrality on the part of Sweden and Finland, two states that broadly follow a non-aligned or non-allied course in contemporary international relations. The choice of each of these countries for use in comparisons is dictated by a number of circumstances.

Sweden is one of the oldest recognized neutrals, and *vice versa*, Finland is one of the youngest ones. In a geographical sense, Sweden and Finland are both

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<sup>1</sup> The neutral/non-allied states of Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden are now all in the EU and Switzerland has a close treaty relationship with the EU including membership of Schengen.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and, since 1999, a Common Security and Defence Policy within the European Union framework.



European neutral countries. Finland, like Ukraine, was a part of Tsarist Russia, and after its independence kept a common frontier with Soviet Russia and nowadays with the Russian Federation. Sweden also had a long common boundary for centuries with the Russian Empire and therefore was subject to the permanent geopolitical influence of the Russian power, like Ukraine and Finland. The main reason for maintaining a policy of neutrality in the case of Sweden and Finland was, in fact, their geographical proximity to Russia and the existence of the geopolitical confrontation between East and West.

Today, Ukraine is also located on a strategic and civilisational frontier between the Pan-Slavic World with its continuing struggle to consolidate under Russian leadership, and the Euro-Atlantic space under the leadership of the United States. It shares with both the other states the fact of common cultural roots with Russia, and some scientists say even more about the close genetic relationship of the Finno-Ugric peoples and the Russians. Each of the three countries under comparison thus has a common history with Russia; each fought at some stage in history against Russian interventions; each lost the struggle under the conditions prevailing in an international system built on the principles of realism and neorealism, but has consolidated or won its sovereignty under a new understanding of international affairs built *inter alia* on constructivism. Today, while preserving their non-allied status, Sweden and Finland are very active participants in international relations, particularly in the realm of security and conflict management on the European continent and in the global dimension.

Last but not least, the size of a state matters. Ukraine is a far larger state than either Finland or Sweden, in many senses; yet in relation to Russia, Sweden, Finland and even Ukraine are all relatively small states. At the same time - when measured against other neighbours - Sweden is the biggest state in the Baltic region, while Ukraine is one of the biggest states of the Black Sea region, the biggest state of the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, and simply the biggest state within the Russian neighbourhood. A *prima facie* argument could thus be made that if Sweden as the biggest actor in its region can survive in a condition of neutrality, Ukraine could also be the biggest in its region while following the elements of a neutral policy.

The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to consider the practicality of the institution of neutrality as a potential solution for the Ukrainian national security dilemma, in the light of a general analysis of neutrality past and present, but more particularly of the experience of Sweden and Finland. The main research question is: can the concept of neutrality provide effective mechanisms for the national and regional security of Ukraine in today's globalized system of international relations? To answer this question, the thesis is divided into two separate sections. The first section covers three chapters and is dedicated to the general issues of neutrality in the international system. Thus Chapter 2 addresses the concept of neutrality and its historical transformation into an institution of international law with a variety of types and legal norms, as well as the role of neutral countries worldwide in the development of new principles of neutrality in contemporary international relations. Chapter 3 reviews historical changes in the concept of neutrality in the light of the major theories of international relations - realism vs. constructivism. Chapter 4 explores Sweden's and Finland's historical experience of the policy of neutrality in their interaction with the great powers, one of which was Russia, and uses their examples to present the new vision of the concept of neutrality that has been evolving in the post-Cold War era.

The second part of the thesis includes two chapters devoted to the problems and the whole concept of security of Ukraine in the international system. In Chapter 5, the historical landmarks of the desire of the Ukrainian peoples to establish an independent and sovereign state are analyzed, up until independence in 1991. Chapter 5 outlines the foreign policy of independent Ukraine aimed at creating its own security strategy, with Ukrainian peculiarities, under four successive presidents and in interaction with key strategic partners - Russia, the EU and NATO. Finally, in Chapter 6, the modern problems of Ukraine are presented and recommendations are made – based on Swedish and Finnish as well as Ukrainian experience - for the effective resolution of Ukraine's national and regional security dilemma, in particular by proposing guidelines for the further development of Ukraine's relations with Russia, NATO and the EU.

The expected conclusion is that the concept of neutrality continues to demonstrate its vitality, flexibility and efficiency. Ukraine must define its status in

terms that clearly and unambiguously relate to an established model of neutrality, and take the consequences of that status, while moving in the Western direction in terms of political, economic, civilisational and social norms. Thus having solved the 'East-West' dilemma, Ukraine, following the example of the two other non-allied states, will be left facing a 'West European' vs. 'Euro-Atlantic' dilemma symbolized by the choice of eventual NATO and/or EU membership. In our view, Ukraine is not ready to participate fully in the European integration processes, but can utilize formula of cooperation with all the powers while adopting the elements of the European experience in establishing the national state. The concept of the 'penetrating neutrality' corresponds with the role of Ukraine in a changing world.

One of the hypotheses are to be tested in this thesis is that if Ukraine remains neutral, it can help to relax the tensions all over the region - and more broadly to ensure the security of the Baltic-Black Sea region. This will not only preserve the stability and security in the region, but also reduce the need for and risk of possible hostile political manoeuvres by Russia against the other regional states, as well as potential attempts by Russia to mobilize neighbouring states against Ukraine.

## **2 Definitions, types, principles and historical development of the concept of neutrality**

The idea of neutrality has never been an independent concept in jurisprudence, but rather developed in response to the phenomenon of war. It is true of many rules of international law that their origins may be traced back to ancient Greece and Rome. It is also true that some ideas of neutrality find counterparts long before the dawn of the Christian era. But ideas of neutrality and its historical precursors in the ancient times must be viewed very carefully, not least because there was neither such a thing as a family of states, nor any universal regulatory power at that time to provide a way of validating the stance of neutrality.<sup>3</sup> There were indeed actors who sought to avoid any kind of conflict or participation in war. However, belligerents were not inclined to recognize a neutral 'third side', because they had a realist perception of the world as divided into friends or

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<sup>3</sup> Philip C. Jessup, *Neutrality : its history, economics and law 1935-193*, vol. 1, New York, 3-4.

enemies. Therefore often belligerents were not able to recognize such an uncertain position or stance as neutrality. As Efraim Karsh states, 'the general attitude towards the neutral state was one of intolerance and principled reluctance to recognise neutrality as a legitimate political opinion'.<sup>4</sup>

## **2.1 Historical development of the concept of neutrality from the Middle Ages until the 20th century.**

For real-world purposes, the ideal type of neutrality may be summed up in the following definition: 'in an international conflict, a policy is more neutral the less it interferes in the conflict, the more equally it benefits or harms the parties concerned, and the less it affects the outcome of the conflict'.<sup>5</sup> International neutrality has however taken on a number of different terminologies and distinctions over time and the aim of this paper is not to cover all of them. Rather we shall focus on those that are most important in historical retrospective and in the contemporary system of international relations.

Today neutrality is widely recognized as a status and attitude of a state arising from its abstention from a participation in a war between two other belligerents or groups of states; the maintenance of impartiality when dealing with states at war; and the recognition of the state's neutral status by the belligerents, according to customary law and international conventions or treaties. The main principles of neutrality include also defending neutrality and an abstention from military policies. A neutral state is neither allowed to initiate war nor to provide assistance to belligerents in a war.<sup>6</sup>

In his outstanding work on international law, Lassa Oppenheim, considering neutrality in ancient traditions, confirms this:

Since in antiquity there was no notion of an International Law, it is not to be expected that neutrality as a legal institution should have existed among the nations of old. Neutrality did not exist even in practice, for belligerents never recognized an attitude of impartiality on the part of other States. If war broke out between two nations, third parties had to

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<sup>4</sup> Efraim Karsh, *Neutrality and small states*, London; New York : Routledge, 1988, 14.

<sup>5</sup> Harto Hakovirta, *East-West conflict and European neutrality*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Jessup and Deak, *Neutrality. Today and tomorrow*, 4<sup>th</sup> vol, p.8, 158.; Hakovirta, 56-9.

choose between belligerents and become allies or enemies of one or other.<sup>7</sup>

In his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides, a Greek historian and father of political realism, employs various descriptions for non-participants, describing them as *ekpodon histantes amphotois* (“those standing aloof from both sides”), *symmachoi ontes medeteron* (“those who were allies of neither side”), or even utilizing some phrases related to the modern concepts of positive security, like *hoi hesychian agontes* (“those remaining at peace”).<sup>8</sup> Robert A. Bauslaugh, referring to Thucydides, concludes that in the ancient world “[n]eutrality [was] used, abused, declared, rejected, subverted, and in the end required as an obligation for the future, which amounted to a tacit acknowledgement that further conflict was likely, if not inevitable.”<sup>9</sup>

In the feudal system, suzerainty, rather than sovereignty, was the dominant chord. The feudal duties of princes left no room for choice between the alternatives of belligerency and neutrality. The only way vassals could choose in this period of chaos and violence was to seek abstention from conflict by resisting the demands of their lords or, alternatively, substituting conflict with their own lords for a conflict with the lords’ enemies.<sup>10</sup> The Catholic Church was another power within the feudal system that influenced the perception of war as a just and faithful act against the enemies of religion: thus there could be no neutrality ‘in a conflict between God and the foes of God’.<sup>11</sup>

Despite the chaotic system of international relations in the Middle Ages, the situation regarding the status of neutrality began to change. In this age, neutrality was largely developed due to the establishment of state naval forces.<sup>12</sup> One of the prominent instruments aimed at promoting the concept of neutrality is the document known as *Consolato del Mare*<sup>13</sup>. This great compilation of

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<sup>7</sup> Laurent Oppenheim, *International Law*, vol.2, 7<sup>th</sup> ed., ed. H. Lauterpacht (New York, 1952), 624, representing a long tradition.

<sup>8</sup> Robert A. Bauslaugh: *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece*, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1991, preface, xx

<sup>9</sup> Bauslaugh, 140

<sup>10</sup> Jessup and Deak I, 5.

<sup>11</sup> Jessup and Deak I, 6.

<sup>12</sup> Jessup and Deak I, 15-6.

<sup>13</sup> See *Consolato Del Mare*. Zarmosa, M. Tomaso

Mediterranean Sea law rejected the right of belligerents to use the property of neutrals at sea,<sup>14</sup> at the time when the Great Geographical Discoveries caused the most enormous and rapid rise ever in intercontinental maritime trade. But this document, as well as many others, fell short of establishing a comprehensive legal system with a distinction of rights between belligerents and neutrals.

Even so, it is an interesting fact that the nature of neutrality in maritime wars was more accepted and developed than in land wars. One might attribute this to the dependence of the European countries on international and intercontinental maritime commerce. While maritime commerce of the belligerents was exposed to attack, neutral states enjoyed normal trade relations with other neutral states as well as with belligerents. In the era of international maritime trade, emerging and already very significant for the state's economy, the position of neutrality was a good precondition for building up an economic power.

In fact, as is often argued, the uncertainty over neutrality's limits at this time created a fruitful situation that both neutrals and belligerents could exploit in their different ways. The neutrals learned to interpret the policy of neutrality in the way that proved most profitable in any given political situation. They came up with a variety of forms of neutrality, ranging from non-alignment in a conflict to the charging of fees for the non-participation of a neutral army on the side of one of the belligerents. This policy of adaptation to the situation led neutrals to sign bilateral agreements with other states to reduce or avoid conflict. The first official document which declared the principles of neutrality was promulgated by the King of France, Charles VI, in response to the struggle between the rival papacies of Rome and Avignon. This successful step by the French King encouraged other states to follow, and by the end of the fifteenth century there were a number of decrees, contracts and bilateral intergovernmental agreements between states that became a solid foundation for further development of the concept of neutrality.

One of the founders of modern political science, Niccoló Machiavelli (1469–1527), in his outstanding masterpiece *The Prince*, recognized the existence of neutrality but gave a very unfavourable assessment of the neutral state:

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<sup>14</sup> Karsh, 14

A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy, that to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in hand, court his fate.<sup>15</sup>

Neutrality as an international institution, however, appeared only in the seventeenth century. The modern international legal system could not exist until the emergence of the modern state. The conclusions of the Peace of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Years' War are associated with the emergence of the first international system defining interconnections between modern nation-states and with the development of institutions of international law, including neutrality.<sup>16</sup> One of the consequences of the Peace of Westphalia was that it led to the recognition of the independence and neutrality of Switzerland from the Holy Roman Empire.

Hwang, the author of *The neutralized unification of Korea in perspective*, defines neutrality by reference to the dialogue between Count Tilly and the Swedish king:

In 1623, Tilly said, "No neutrality: this is a question of obedience," and Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, once asked, "What then is neutrality? I don't understand it. It means nothing."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Nicoló Machiavelli, *The Prince*, CHAPTER XXI How A Prince Should Conduct Himself As To Gain Renown.

<sup>16</sup> Jessup and Deak I, 4.

<sup>17</sup> In K. Hwang, *The neutralized unification of Korea in perspective* Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, cop. 1980, 12.

Hwang then refers to a number of other prominent scholars and public figures who expressed an understanding of neutrality typical for the Europe of the 17th – 19th centuries. In his 1625 book *De jure belli ac pacis*, published in Paris (English: *On the Law of War and Peace*) the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) for example linked it to his famous concept of justice, saying:

... it [was] duty of neutrals to do nothing to strengthen those who are not prosecuting an unjust cause, or which may impede the movements of him who is carrying on a just war... But if the cause is a doubtful one they must manifest an impartial attitude towards both sides, in permitting them to pass through the country, in supplying their troops with provisions and in not relieving the besieged.”<sup>18</sup>

Regarded as a foundational work in international law, Grotius then made an attempt to explore comprehensively the legal status of war. He pointed to the stance neutral states have to adopt in the conflict. Grotius made a distinction between different types of conflicts – where the identity of the just and unjust sides was either certain or uncertain. Given a certain type of belligerent, the neutral state should not diminish the capacities of the just side nor increase the power of the unjust side. Conversely, if the neutral state was not able to find out clearly which of the belligerents was just and which unjust, it might avoid any kind of attitude to them, retaining its impartiality in the conflict<sup>19</sup>. According to Grotius, neutrality was not a synonym of non-alignment or impartiality. Moreover, the neutral state had a natural obligation to support the just belligerent.<sup>20</sup>

The main problem of neutrality in the seventeenth century was the determination of proper behaviour by the neutral state in the conflict. There were neither supranational organizations, nor other super-powers that could have enjoyed an exclusive authority to define just and unjust actors and, accordingly, to direct the behaviour of the neutrals in a war. It was the neutral state itself that

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<sup>18</sup> Hwang, 12-3.

<sup>19</sup> See Grotius, *De jure belli ac pacis*, lib. Iii, cap. Xvii, sec. iii. English translation from ed. of 1646 by John D. Maguire. “The Classics of International Law,” No.3.

<sup>20</sup> The theory and practice of neutrality in the twentieth century, 34-35.



determined its position towards belligerents and conflict as a whole, basing itself<sup>21</sup> on a value judgement that was not necessarily correct by definition.

Cornelius Van Bynkershoek (1673-1743), a Dutch jurist and legal theorist who contributed to the development of international law, particularly in the Law of the Sea, utilizing the concept of justice and injustice, argued:

The justice or injustice of a war affects a common friend. It is not for him to place himself as judge between the two belligerents who are the one and the other his friends.... If I am neither on one side nor the other, I cannot aid the one in such a way as will hurt the other.<sup>22</sup>

Emer de Vattel (1714-1767), more than a hundred years later than Grotius, noted:

Neutral nations, during a war, are those who take no one's part, remaining friends common to both parties, and not favouring the armies of one of them to the prejudice for the other.<sup>23</sup>

As can be seen from these examples, the definition of neutrality has been subjected to constant change, absorbing new rules and new content, as well as – importantly – a new attitude to the very institution of neutrality by belligerents. Nowadays, in the conditions of globalization and collective security, neutrality is also undergoing significant changes, while continuing to exist as a full-fledged international legal institution.

Finally, in his *International Law (1911)* Frederick Smith (1872 - 1930) stated that:

neutrality [was] the condition of states which stand aloof from a war between other states; they may continue such pacific intercourse with belligerents as will not consist of giving direct aid to either side in the prosecution of the hostilities. The essential significance of neutrality

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<sup>21</sup> The discussion of 'just' and 'unjust' wars dominates the work of Grotius. Grotius was influenced very much by the spiritual teachings of the Church. According to these, abstention from participation in a 'just' conflict was not favourable, echoing the ideas of ancient Greeks which included the principle 'participate in a conflict or be banished from the country'. Nevertheless, Grotius was forced to move from theological and moral criteria towards realistic and material ones.

<sup>22</sup> Hwang, 13.

<sup>23</sup> Hwang, 13.

lies in the negative attitude of holding aloof, and not in the positive attitude of offering impartial treatment of the adversaries.”<sup>24</sup>

The most fruitful period of development in neutrality was the eighteenth century. The international situation made it necessary to establish a strict theoretical and practical framework defining the obligations of neutrals and belligerents. The prominent jurists Bynkershoek and Vattel contributed to the theory of international law. Vattel’s definition of neutrals in wartime, though not internationally accepted, described them as ‘those who take no one’s part, remaining friends common to both parties, and not favouring the armies of one of them to the prejudice of the other’.<sup>25</sup> The concept of impartiality, so common in the seventeenth century, also became more regulated and restricted. It came to be largely accepted that partiality or impartiality had to be defined with the signing of an agreement prior to the war, under which the neutral state could refrain from giving assistance or offering other support to the belligerents.<sup>26</sup>

As mentioned above, in the seventeenth century neutral states enjoyed a certain advantage by being able to decide case by case how to behave and whether to support any party in the conflict. However, in the eighteenth century, when they had to define their relations with more and more powerful belligerents, the last say shifted to the military actor. In these conditions some neutral states made an attempt to secure their neutral status and adopted a new policy of so called ‘armed neutrality’.

In the Nine Years' War (1688–97), which is also often called the War of the Grand Alliance, or the War of the League of Augsburg, great powers violated in many ways the neutrality of Sweden and Denmark. Therefore, in March 1691 Sweden and Denmark adopted a policy to overcome their previous mutual distrust. They signed a treaty of armed neutrality for the protection and increase of their maritime trade as neutrals in the North, preventing the war.<sup>27</sup> In doing so, Sweden and Denmark decided to adopt mutual countermeasures against external aggression, even though this risked leading into the very war that they, as neutrals,

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<sup>24</sup> F. Smith, *International Law*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed., rev. and enl. By C. Phillipson (London, 1918). 293.

<sup>25</sup> Launerpacht, *Oppenheim’s international law*, 626.

<sup>26</sup> Karsh, 15.

<sup>27</sup> Bromley: *The New Cambridge Modern History VI: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688–1725*, 650–51

sought to avoid.<sup>28</sup> In the last resort, France and Louis XIV stopped violating their neutrality and finally recognized the neutrals' commercial interests.<sup>29</sup> Generally speaking, the recognition of the rights and rules of neutrality was shaped at that time primarily by economic and, not least, political specificities.

Evolving from customary law, neutrality was institutionalised primarily during the late eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century.<sup>30</sup> Significant steps towards the development of the concept of neutrality were undertaken twice – in the early 1780s, when Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Austria, Portugal, Sicily and Russia joined together to protect their commerce and founded a union, known as 'The First League of Armed Neutrality'; and twenty years later, in 1800, when Russia, Prussia, Sweden and Denmark established the 'Second League of Armed Neutrality'.<sup>31</sup> The First League demanded permission for neutral ships to trade with belligerents in their ports and coasts and to be allowed to transport goods belonging to one of the belligerents in a neutral ship without a risk of being attacked. On 9 July 1780 Denmark, aiming to protect and to secure its right for maritime trade, signed a convention<sup>32</sup> with Norway and, what is more importantly, with Russia, embracing the principles of the League of Armed Neutrality. One of the very core principles was that 'free ships make free goods'.<sup>33</sup> The main initiator of this convention within the First League was Denmark, which intended to placate Russia and Britain while avoiding trade

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<sup>28</sup> Cohn, *Neo-neutrality* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1939), 21-2.

<sup>29</sup> Wolf: *The Emergence of the Great Powers: 1685–1715*, 43

<sup>30</sup> Bo Petersson, *The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality in Europe. A study of Soviet Political Language. The Swedish institution of international Affairs*. 1990, p.4.

<sup>31</sup> It was a highly controversial League. The contradictory nature of the role and very existence of the First League lay in the presence of manipulative actions and interests by all parties who participated in the League, as well as those that were the reason for its creation. For instance, the League's principles were not honoured by Britain, while Russia used its membership not to protect the interests of Denmark, but to maintain its own international prestige, which it strongly needed at that moment. (For more, see *The First League of Armed Neutrality* by Frederic P. Miller, Agnes F. Vandome, McBrewster John, 2010, 76 p.; *Napoleon: From 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, 1799-1807* by Georges Lefèbvre; *The Royal Navy in European Waters during the American Revolutionary war*, 123-129). Some researchers are inclined to attach a great importance to the League in the development of the concept of neutrality, shifting the emphasis from the political to the economic field (see, for example, Karsh 17).

<sup>32</sup> See the Danish-Russian-Norwegian Charter of 9 July 1780

<sup>33</sup> See more information on this principle here: *Neutral rights – Free Ships make Free Goods*, NY Times, 1854

[http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-](http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=FA0713F63E59157493C1A9178DD85F408584F9)

[free/pdf?res=FA0713F63E59157493C1A9178DD85F408584F9](http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=FA0713F63E59157493C1A9178DD85F408584F9)

relations with France and Spain. Russia's Empress Catherine the Great agreed to sign this convention, but mainly with a view to boosting Russia's international prestige. Simultaneously, in conversation with a British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, the Empress said that she would not fight over such a thing as the 'League of Nullity'. Nevertheless, Denmark achieved its goal and increased its maritime trade with Norway.<sup>34</sup> Another new step was to provide for the warships of different neutrals to be tasked with protecting the interests of all. The Second Armed League did not add much to the rights of the neutrals, but forbade boarding a neutral ship if there was no contraband.<sup>35</sup>

The total impact of these successive Leagues was very significant. The activity of the Leagues contributed to the development of the concept of neutrality in its modern interpretation. They provided the principles for the Declaration of Paris (1856) with regard to the rules applied in maritime wars. They demonstrated that neutrality is not necessarily a passive policy, but rather active and one that is able to reject the use of force. Finally, the Leagues put an end to the debates about the impartiality and the relevance of value judgements. In doing so, the Leagues promoted a new meaning of neutrality under which the neutral could avoid showing a preference for one side, and behaved with total impartiality towards both belligerents.<sup>36</sup>

The latest and most prominent document on neutrality in the eighteenth century was the American Proclamation of neutrality, issued by George Washington on 22 April 1793. In this text, Washington stated:

...the duty and interest of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers:

I have therefore thought fit by these presents to declare the disposition of the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid toward those powers respectively, and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United

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<sup>34</sup> David Syrett, *The Royal Navy in European Waters during the American Revolutionary war*, 123-129.

<sup>35</sup> Karsh 17.

<sup>36</sup> Karsh 17 (taken from Lauterpacht's *Oppenheim's international law*, 629-30; Cohn, *Neutrality*, 26. ).

States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition.<sup>37</sup>

This Proclamation contributed to the concept of neutrality, including the obligations and rights of neutrals, embedding these in the very principles of American law. The adoption of the Proclamation was the foundation stone of the American international legal framework and it marked the beginning of the 140-year history of American neutrality in international relations.<sup>38</sup>

The American declarations contributed to the concept of neutrality, but the state of relevant legislation was still far from being perfect. European countries had already experienced neutrality, with all its pros and cons, but the rights and duties of neutrals were still not integrated in international law. The necessity of universal and comprehensive legalisation and institutionalisation of the concept of neutrality led to numerous international conferences dealing with neutrality, of which the most important were the conferences in The Hague in 1899 and 1907, where the concept of neutrality was institutionalized in the famous Hague Conventions.

The nineteenth century, beyond the long series of American Declarations of neutrality, also contributed to the development of neutrality through two great events: the Paris Conference held on 16 April 1856, and the neutralization of Switzerland and Belgium in 1815 and 1839 respectively. At the Congress of Vienna Switzerland proclaimed the status of the permanent neutrality, while the great powers guaranteed Swiss territorial integrity. Belgium became neutral twenty-five years later. The importance of the neutralization of these countries lay in the formal judicial recognition of the concept of neutrality by the great powers, providing guarantees of the integrity of the neutral states, and creating a right to adopt neutrality as a model of national security. All such guarantees were set out

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<sup>37</sup>See the text of Proclamation here:

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65475&st=&st1=#axzz1p0OlP4xZ>

<sup>38</sup> The American Proclamation of neutrality made by George Washington expired in 2 years, but led to the proclamation of the Neutrality Act of 1818, which brought all previous statements on neutrality together and summarized them; the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which was actually intended to neutralize interference by the Old World in the politics of the New World (despite the popular idea that it declared the hegemony of the US in the Americas); and Woodrow Wilson's Declaration of 1914 on the maintenance of neutrality in the WWI.

in the peace treaties together with a wide complex of rights and duties of neutral states and belligerents.

The Paris Declaration (or The Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law), signed at the end of the Crimean War (1853-56), formalized the relationship between belligerents and neutrals regarding shipping on the high seas as well as recognizing the right of neutrals on commerce. The main points relating to neutrals were as follows:

- The neutral flag covers the safe transport of belligerents' goods, with the exception of contraband of war; and
- Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.<sup>39</sup>

The Paris Declaration led to the anchoring of the concept of neutrality as an institution of international law.

The next step that led to the ultimate institutionalization of neutrality as a feature of international law was taken in 1899 and 1907 at the Hague international peace Conferences, initiated respectively by Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and the American President Theodore Roosevelt. The First Hague Convention included some rights and obligation of neutrals and belligerents<sup>40</sup>, but the full definition of all aspects of neutrality was undertaken at the Second Hague Conference of 1907. The aim of the Conference was to expand upon the First Conference, focusing principally on naval warfare and the regulation of the rules of war, and the rights and obligations of neutrals.

To this day, the Hague Convention V<sup>41</sup> and the Hague Convention XIII<sup>42</sup> are seen as the source for the rights and duties of neutrals in case of naval war and war by land, thus providing a comprehensive institutionalization of neutrality. It

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<sup>39</sup> Ronzitti, Natalino (1988). *The Law of Naval Warfare: A Collection of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries*. Martinus Nijhoff. p. 64, 65. ISBN 90-247-3652.

**1.1.1** <sup>40</sup> *See Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II); July 29, 1899 – Article 14, 54, And Section IV. On The Internment Of Belligerents And The Care Of The Wounded In Neutral Countries; Laws Of War: Adaptation To Maritime Warfare Of Principles Of Geneva Convention Of 1864 (Hague, Iii); July 29, 1899, Article 1, 3, 6, 9.*

**1.1.2** <sup>41</sup> *Convention Respecting The Rights And Duties Of Neutral Powers And Persons In Case Of War On Land*

**1.1.3** [http://Avalon.Law.Yale.Edu/20th\\_Century/Hague05.Asp](http://Avalon.Law.Yale.Edu/20th_Century/Hague05.Asp)

<sup>42</sup>The Rights And Duties Of Neutral Powers In Naval War  
[http://Avalon.Law.Yale.Edu/20th\\_Century/Hague13.Asp](http://Avalon.Law.Yale.Edu/20th_Century/Hague13.Asp)

should be noted, however, that rules concerning aerial war were not specified in the Conventions as aviation was not developed at that time, and indeed such rules have not been adopted to this day.<sup>43</sup> The logical approach for aerial wars is therefore to apply and extend the principles of these Conventions by analogy.

The concept of neutrality continued to evolve during the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. The First and the Second World Wars brought their contribution to the development of international law and international security. The notion of collective security that emerged in the 1940s has since been cited as a reason to curtail the role of neutrality or to demonstrate its insolvency nowadays.

In 1961 the Non-Aligned Movement was founded in Belgrade, established by Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Ghana, and Indonesia, with the purpose to preserve the national independence, sovereignty and security. They advocated for the middle course in the developing world between the Eastern and Western blocks during the Cold War. In 2011 the movement includes 120 member states.

Non-aligned states cooperated within the UN and OSCE, participating in the peacekeeping missions on behalf of international community. For instance, India as one of the most prominent non-aligned states fights not for the realist purposes, but promotes the constructivists' ideas, making peacekeeping efforts in Korea, Congo, Egypt and Haiti.

## **2.2 The types of neutrality**

While varying definitions of neutrality have thus far been traced through a historical sequence, they may also be classified as different types or variants of the status, some or all of which may be recognized at different times, and which may exist concurrently as applying to different states. In his *East-West conflict and European neutrality*, Harto Hakovirta distinguishes three major types of neutrality that underlie the varying forms observed: occasional, permanent and conventional neutrality. Hakovirta argues that the understanding of neutrality in the medieval period of time corresponds to the *occasional* (temporary, ordinary,

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<sup>43</sup> Bo Petersson, *The Soviet Union and peacetime neutrality in Europe : a study of Soviet political language*, Gothenburg : MH Publishing : Utrikespolitiska institutet, 1990, 4.

simple, ad hoc) *neutrality*. According to him, occasional neutrality is ‘the original form of neutrality... in a particular war between other states... The international law of occasional neutrality applies to any neutral state that remains neutral in a war, regardless of its prior policies. On the other hand, occasional neutrality in a war does not commit a state to neutrality in another war or to any rules of conduct in peacetime.’<sup>44</sup>

As we have seen, in the late 18th- early 19th century the institution of neutrality evolved dramatically and it was in fact at that time that the term of ‘*neutrality*’ began to be used as such, replacing definitions that had been used earlier.<sup>45</sup> The commercial losses of neutral states in the maritime trade forced them to create their own armed alliances, thus, pursuing the development of so called *armed neutrality*.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, a clear concept of neutrality as total abstinence from interference in war became established. Hakovirta highlights this second type as *permanent (eternal, perpetual) neutrality under international law*,<sup>47</sup> or *de-jure neutrality*.<sup>48</sup> He argues that once choosing the path of neutrality, such a state must avoid such ties and policies as might call in question its neutrality in war.

A permanent neutral in this sense undertakes never to take part in others' wars, while retaining the right to self-defence and to possession of necessary protective equipment, as well as the possibility of signing defensive alliances. One of the specific forms of permanent neutrality is *neutralization*.<sup>49</sup> Neutralization involves establishing neutrality by the action of other states according to the

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<sup>44</sup> Hakovirta, 9.

<sup>45</sup> In international practice, a variety of names were used for the concept of neutrality. In Italy, it was a common notion of *amici, pacati*, in medieval Germany *stillesitzen*, *geruwet sitzen* (Germany of the 14-15th centuries) or *unparteilich sein*, *Unpartyschung* (16th century). Writers use the classical expression: *medii in bello, neutrarum partium*.

<sup>46</sup> This is a specific form of neutrality, built on military deterrence and armed defence. See more here: Phillips and Reede, vol.2, 91-111; *Armed Neutralities - League of the armed neutrality* <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Armed-Neutralities-League-of-the-armed-neutrality.html#ixzz1p0csysWT>

<sup>47</sup> Hakovirta, 9-10.

<sup>48</sup> Hener Hanggi, *ASEAN and the ZOPFAN concept*, INSTITUTE OF Southeast Studies, Singapore, 1991, 3.

<sup>49</sup> Concerning permanent neutrality and neutralization see: Efraim Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 26-7.



wish of the neutralized state itself<sup>50</sup> or for the benefit of the neutralizing powers, even if such act is accomplished against the will of the neutralized state.<sup>51</sup>

The idea of permanent neutrality is somewhat controversial, particularly as regards the issue of respect for this policy by the great powers in their dealings with vulnerable states. However, the indisputable fact remains that the spread of permanent neutrality in the 19th century marked a period of reduction of military tensions in Europe, beginning with the reduction of conflicts between small states.

The third – *continuous, conventional neutrality without an international legal basis, also called de-facto neutrality and traditional neutrality*<sup>52</sup> – is a recurrent type of neutrality.<sup>53</sup> The states that practise this status are neutral in their day-to-day politics, but they are not willing to proclaim their neutrality according to international law. This conventional neutrality is more informal than permanent neutrality, and reflects specific developments and interpretations within the countries that make use of it.

Reference may also be made to other 'terms like *total* vs. *partial*, *absolute* vs. *differential*, and *inflexible* vs. *flexible* neutrality [that] refer to the way in which extent to which a permanently or otherwise neutral state adheres to or deviates from full and consistent neutrality'.

Finally, to draw an entire picture of the diversity of types of neutrality, it is necessary to mention two other concepts related to the types of neutrality – *neutralism*, or *non-alignment*. Both terms were in common use among Third World countries in the 20th century, and emerged as a reaction to national liberation movements and the decolonization process. To avoid confusion

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<sup>50</sup> See the case of Switzerland 1815 here: Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, Gay M. Hammerman, A documentary history of arms control and disarmament, T. N. Dupuy Associates, Michigan University, 1973, 629 p.

<sup>51</sup> This status was accorded to Belgium (1831), The Republic of Cracow (1815), and Luxembourg (1867). Permanent neutrality was also shared by IS THIS WHAT YOU MEANT? Savoy (1815), the Ionian islands (1863, various international straits (the entrance to the Black Sea from 1856 to 1870, the Straits of Magellan and the Suez Canal - in the sense that they cannot be transformed into a theatre of war, being intended solely for peaceful relations between nations and available to military ships of all nations), river facilities - for international navigation ( see the European Commission and its work on the lower Danube here: Edward Krehbiel, "The European Commission of the Danube: An Experiment in International Administration", *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXIII (March 1918), 18 p.

<sup>52</sup> Ogley, *The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century*, 33-60.

<sup>53</sup> Hakovirta, 10.

between neutrality and neutralism, it should be understood that the main purpose of neutralists was not to solve dilemmas of their own security situation within the region, but rather to commit themselves to cooperation with other Third World countries for the restructuring of the entire system of international relations.<sup>54</sup>

Neutralism originated and developed under the influence of the global confrontation between the USSR and the USA in the mid-20th century. In contrast to the European neutrals, neutralists relied on moral and ideological categories. Furthermore, neutralism did not oblige the adoption of a neutral policy at wartime, thus, leaving an alternative of being not impartial in a specific conflict.<sup>55</sup> And if we define a policy of neutrality as a range of foreign policy principles, manifested in international politics and established on an international legal basis, than neutralism by contrast becomes just one of the tactics or instruments of general foreign policy, aimed at implementing specific tasks and achieving certain goals without the obligation to be neutral or impartial between belligerents.

As can be seen, the phenomenon of neutrality has manifested itself in a broad complex of forms and features that are either directly related to the principles of neutrality as an institution of international law, or that reflect other positions similar to neutrality in their implications for foreign policy, but differing in their ideological and legal basis. Having considered the most significant historical landmarks of neutrality as an international legal institution, and the main variants of the concept of neutrality, this section will be completed by reviewing the rules, rights and obligations of neutrals.

### **2.3 Rights and obligations of neutrals**

As mentioned in the very beginning of this chapter, the first significant attempt to institutionalize neutrality was made in 1856, when the Declaration of Paris on maritime warfare was signed. The main principles of this Declaration were codified in the V and XIII Hague Conventions of 1907. The V Convention dealt

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<sup>54</sup> Hakovirta, 11-3.

<sup>55</sup> Karsh, 27-9.

with land warfare, while the XIII Convention considered the rights and obligations of neutrals in naval warfare<sup>56</sup>.

According to the Hague Convention *V respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land*, belligerents are not allowed to penetrate the territory of neutral powers, or to use it for moving troops, convoys or military munitions. In turn, neutrals are prohibited from forming corps of combatants on their territory that are designed to fight against one of the belligerents, thus preserving their impartiality in warfare. However, neutral persons have the right to leave the neutral state and join the forces of a belligerent. It is noteworthy that the Hague Convention V does not expressly prohibit the cooperation of a neutral state or private companies with belligerents in the transportation or export of products, but it allows this possibility only if a neutral state accords equal treatment to both belligerents. If belligerents try to violate these rules, a neutral state has right to resist even by force.

The Convention further states that if the troops of one of the belligerent countries seek asylum in neutral territory, a neutral country must intern these forces and provide them with provisions, shelter, clothing and implementation of other primary needs. However, such belligerent forces have a strict duty not to leave the neutral territory before the end of the war without the neutral state's permission. Otherwise, logically, the neutral state's assistance for the forces will be perceived by the other belligerent as a violation of the principles of non-participation in a war and of impartiality between all the parties. The convention also includes special provisions that shall apply to the sick and wounded in a war. The neutral state is thereby obliged to give them transit over its territory, as well as to provide the necessary services on its own territory. In the latter case, recovered patients are not allowed to leave the neutral territory before the armistice.<sup>57</sup>

The Hague Convention XIII *concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War* harmonized the divergent views of belligerents and neutrals on naval war. Similarly to a land war, belligerents in a naval war have to respect

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<sup>56</sup> Bo Peterson, 4-7.

<sup>57</sup> Hague Convention V *respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land*

the neutral status of a state, while abstaining from any kind of violation of neutrality in neutral waters. This Convention on naval war echoes all the provisions of Convention V. Along with these provisions, a neutral state is obliged to exercise great vigilance to prevent misconduct by one of the belligerents.

As in Convention V, the neutral state is obliged to apply the same conditions towards both belligerents, but if one of them – say, belligerent A - violates the principles of neutrality, a neutral state has the right to refuse the interning of all belligerents' ships in its ports. In this case, however, a weakness of the Convention XIII can be seen, since it violates the core principle of parity of treatment towards belligerents. If a neutral state after the violation of neutrality by belligerent A has revised its policy and decided not to make its maritime territory available to both belligerents, this will be unfair with regard to belligerent B which has not violated the neutral principles. In such a case, belligerent B is entirely dependent on the arbitrariness of belligerent A. Moreover, a neutral state itself is placed in a complicated situation by such a difficult dilemma.

Another feature of the Convention XIII is its relative "democracy" in relation to the belligerents. Thus, a neutral state should allow passage through its waters for belligerent warships. Warships can also enter neutral ports to restore their seaworthiness and then are free to leave the neutral territory. The simultaneous presence in port or at anchor of military ships of both belligerents is thus a possibility. It is also required from a neutral state to provide the necessary amount of fuel for a warship to reach the nearest port of a state it belongs to.<sup>58</sup> Apart from the Hague Convention, there are some other documents that are of great significance in the international law on neutrality, especially the Convention VII relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships, the Convention XI relative to Certain Restrictions with regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War and the Convention XII relative to the Creation of

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<sup>58</sup> The Hague Convention XIII *concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War* On the duties of neutrals see more: Alfred Verdross, *The Permanent Neutrality of Austria*, 18-9; Jessup, *Neutrality*, vol.1, 249-60; Phillips and Reede, vol.2, 27-55 ,136-139, 170-209; Turlington, vol.3, 92-3, v-vi; Jessup, vol.4, 4, , 21-5, 121-154, 178.

an International Prize Court. These Conventions complement the legal framework of the institution of neutrality.

#### **2.4 Conclusions on the definitions, types, principles and historical development of the concept of neutrality**

At the risk of repetition, an attempt will be made to summarize the most important points from this chapter. First and foremost, the concept of neutrality is an indivisible part of the phenomenon of war, but not an independent concept regarding peacetime. Though some ideas of neutrality existed in the ancient times, there was no system of international relations with a family of states and no contemporary understanding of international law. The concept of neutrality began to develop in the context of maritime law in the Middle Ages due to the establishment of naval forces, the Great Discoveries and the extension of international trade and commerce. However, neutrality as an international institution appeared only in the seventeenth century with the emergence of the modern state and the Westphalian system of international relations. The underdeveloped concept of neutrality in the seventeenth century was based on the customary law including value judgements and concepts of justice and injustice in warfare. The most fruitful period of neutrality was the period of the late eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The impetus for the development of neutrality was the period of armed neutrality under the First and Second Leagues of Armed Neutrality which, in turn, generated the modern principles for the Declaration of Paris - the first contemporary conference on maritime law - and put an end to the debates about impartiality and value judgements in the law on neutrality. Another prominent step in the development of neutrality was made by Americans in the American Proclamation of neutrality. The neutralization of Switzerland and Belgium also contributed significantly to the institution of neutrality. Finally, the Hague Conferences summarized the entire corpus of international law to date and legalized and institutionalized the concept of neutrality in universal and comprehensive terms, including the duties and rights of the belligerent and neutral parties; they lacked only statements on the position of neutrals in aerial wars.

The attitude towards neutral countries has also varied during history. From violation, rejection and abuse in the ancient times and in the Middle Ages, neutrality became widely respected as an international institution. Different historical conditions produced various types of neutrality, extending its meaning and the modes of implementation. Occasional neutrality, typical of the Middle Ages, was replaced by armed neutrality and later by permanent neutrality that went hand in hand with a reduction of military tensions in Europe. Then conventional neutrality came onstage, having become the most “classical” type of neutrality.

As will be seen, neutrality can be interpreted in many senses and is thus a flexible concept. Indeed, in the twentieth century a further range of new types of neutral policy has appeared, such as neutralism and non-alignment. They do not replace classic neutrality and have different roots from this concept. Neutralism and non-alignment developed as a reaction to national liberation movements and the decolonization process and were related to moral and ideological categories, rather than to security policy as for traditional neutrals. In the following chapters, further attention will be dedicated to these specific forms of policy, in particular given their relevance for the idea of non-aligned status for Ukraine in international relations at the present stage. Today neutrality is widely recognized all over the world, though one might argue that the modern processes of globalization and emergence of collective security have been diminishing its significance. Notwithstanding significant changes, neutrality remains a full-fledged international legal institution.

But what are the preconditions of these significant changes in the concept of neutrality? Which theories of political science are capable of explaining these conceptual shifts? How is the concept of neutrality interpreted by the major theories of international relations - realism v constructivism? And what future do the theories predict for neutrality? The next chapter is entirely dedicated to the examination all these crucial questions

### 3 Theoretical Approaches to Neutrality

As the previous chapter showed, international relations and the international system are in the process of constant transformation. Political science is faced with the imperative necessity of understanding the changing conditions in the area of international security. There are drastic changes in the global balance of power that affect the development of international relations. In these conditions, very important questions arise about the mechanisms of national security. Many of those mechanisms are not able to solve the problems of security due to globalization and so-called 'new threats' (i.e. local and regional conflicts, international terrorism, activation of radical and extremist movements, weapons of mass destruction, etc.), that increase the degree of interdependence between states and create a need for common policy making within the international community.

New conditions have called in question the effectiveness of current concepts of national security. One of these concepts, central in this paper, is *neutrality*, traditionally associated first and foremost with non-participation in wars. This concept is gradually losing its original content. The question of whether new approaches to the concept of neutrality can be developed, or of whether the concept must be discarded, has become particularly important after the collapse of the bipolar elements of European security and the enlargement of European integrated organizations dealing with military and foreign policy. Against the background of these controversial aspects of the re-conceptualization of neutrality, the main purpose of this chapter is to consider the respective impacts of the theories of realism and constructivism on the concept of neutrality.

The utopian aim of the study of Social Sciences is to arrive at a complete theory that comprehensively interprets and explains every case in the history of neutral policy – from the ancient times, through the Middle Ages and until nowadays. The *key research question* in this chapter is a very modest one by comparison, asking simply how the concept of neutrality is understood by the major theories of international relations - realism vs. constructivism. In the first part of this chapter, the realist approach towards explaining and understanding this concept is demonstrated. The second part explores, against the background of

changes in the international system with the end of the Cold War, how constructivists interpret the meaning of the norms of neutrality. The main *hypothesis* to be tested in the present chapter can be stated as follows: *a state's maintenance of neutrality as a model of national security can be explained by constructivist terms of identity, endogenous values and norms; while the realist approach is no longer able to explain neutrality adequately in the post-bipolar era of international relations.*

### 3.1 Neutrality and realism

Western states for many centuries have accepted and complied with an international institution of neutrality in order to mitigate the scope and destruction of war. Until very recently, the major theory that explained neutral behaviour by a state was realism, with its key concepts of the balance of power, bandwagoning and use of force as an expression of national sovereignty. When looking at the concept of neutrality, realists argue - as Daniel A. Austin puts it - that "[neutrality] is also an expression of state sovereignty, consists of the *removal* of force, territory, issues, and resources from the scope of conflict in order to constrain the use of force."<sup>59</sup>

#### 3.1.1 Realists' approach to neutrality

There are two major debates on neutrality within the mainstream realist approach: the '*balance of power*' and the '*agent-structure*' perspectives

##### *The 'balance of power' perspective*

The theory of realism postulates that power and the distribution of power explain international outcomes and behaviour of units, and that weaker and smaller states do what they must while great powers act as they will in the international system. In *Anarchic orders and balances of Power*, the realism theorist Kenneth Waltz develops the theory of the *balance of power*, defending the position of Hans Morgenthau, and stating that among states, the state of nature is a state of war

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<sup>59</sup> Daniel A. Austin, "Realism, Institutions, and Neutrality: Constraining Conflict through the Force of Norms," *Commonwealth: A Journal of Political Science* 9, no. 3 (1997-1998): 37, <http://www.pahouse.us/CJPS/issues/details.cfm?vol=9&art=3>



(Waltz, 1986). As Karen M. Devine argues, “for neo-realists, the principal determinant of state behaviour is the underlying distribution of material capabilities across states in the international system, a determinant that gives states their animating *survival* motive, which in turn drives balance-of-power competition”.<sup>60</sup> The international system, then, is one of *self-help* and *insecurity* in which units worry about their *survival*.<sup>61</sup> Realists interpret neutrality as a natural expression of a state’s interest to preserve its sovereignty in a state-centred, unfriendly, self-help environment.<sup>62</sup> The assumption is that neutrals are more likely to survive when they do not join greater powers’ position in war.

### *The ‘agent-structure’ perspective*

The second debate is about ‘agent-structure’ relations. The theory of realism provides much more insight into structure than agency and does not consider the interdependence of those two elements. Realists perceive domestic policy as having little or no meaning at the international anarchic level and focus on the nature of the international system rather than the perspective of the units that shape it.<sup>63</sup> Given this classical view that categorizes units by their roles within the structure, it is not surprising that the concept of neutrality is characterized negatively as a *passive, weak, isolationist, irrational and immoral institution*.<sup>64</sup>

Weak states on this view have no influence in international relations. However, they have two foreign policy choices: either to join an alliance (or bandwagon) or to declare neutrality in the hope of being left alone. The theory of realism hypothesizes that weaker states choose neutrality as a model of national security, and that such states are typically located at the border of the spheres of influence of the major poles of power. Superpowers may coerce weak states into adopting neutrality (as the USSR coerced Austria and Finland at the end of the

<sup>60</sup> Karen M. Devine, “The Myth of ‘the Myth of Irish neutrality’: Deconstructing Concepts of Irish Neutrality using International Relations Theories,” *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 17 (2006): 8

<http://www.jstor.org/pss/30002101>

<sup>61</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power,” in *Neorealism and its Critics* ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 100-2.

<sup>62</sup> Kate Morris and Timothy J. White, “Neutrality and the European Union: The case of Switzerland,” *Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution* 3, no. 7 (2011): 105, <http://www.academicjournals.org/JLCR/PDF/pdf%202011/Sep/Morris%20and%20White.pdf>

<sup>63</sup> Devine, above n 6, 7-9.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid 16.

Second World War) or small states can voluntarily adopt the neutral model (as in the case of Sweden and Ireland).<sup>65</sup>

### *Complementing the historical retrospective*

The historical perspective on neutrality may also be re-interpreted in the light of realist discourse. At the outset, neutral states were liable to be seen as small, weak, isolationist, irrational, immoral and passive actors in the international system also because neutrality was seen as an *exogenous* phenomenon, determined by external factors and powers rather than a voluntary choice of the neutral state.<sup>66</sup> For example, the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War defined the neutral island of Melos as a weak actor. When Melos rejected Athenian protection, and preferred neutrality, this choice was understood as an irrational one: “so blinded as to choose the worst.”<sup>67</sup>

Neutrality continued to be seen as problematic and immoral until the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when religious and imperial unity was demanded. The neutral model of national security was often weak and liable to be violated by belligerents that believed in Hobbes’ *bellum omnium contra omnes* <sup>68</sup>. The ability to stay neutral was dependent upon geostrategic considerations rather than any formal rights of neutrals. In the inter-war period, the failure of the League of Nations to protect weak states from great powers led to a certain popularization of neutrality policy. Neutrals were charged with immorality because of their indifference to the fate of others and their separation of ethics from the politics of their own survival, particularly with respect to the Holocaust.<sup>69</sup>

During the Cold War, the concept of neutrality changed its content but could still be interpreted in realist terms. As a balancing tool for those wishing to stay between or outside the dominant blocs, neutrality allowed some small states to act as mediators and bridge-builders.

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<sup>65</sup> Jessica L. Beyer and Stephanie C. Hofmann, “Varieties of Neutrality: Norm Revision and Decline,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 46, no. 3 (2011): 287-8, doi: 10.1086/599247.

<sup>66</sup> Christine Agius, “Transformed beyond Recognition? The Politics of Post-neutrality,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 46, no. 3 (2011): 372, doi: 10.1177/0010836711416960.

<sup>67</sup> “The complete writings of Thucydides : the Peloponnesian War” (1951): 331–5.

<sup>68</sup> Thomas Hobbes in his “Leviathan” describes the state of nature as a ‘war of all against all’.

<sup>69</sup> Henry I. Sobel, “Neutrality, Morality, and the Holocaust,” *American University International Law Review* 14 (1998-9): 207.

In the post-cold war era, according to the logic of realists, weak and small states should no longer need a neutral ‘shelter’ as they are no longer exposed to any superpower conflict and are able to choose a foreign policy agenda more independently.<sup>70</sup> However, neutral states continue to exist, and this fact problematizes realists’ perception of neutrality. Many European states in the present secure environment retain their neutral model of national security and continue to reject membership in military organizations and alliances; thus, they decline to participate in the realists’ *balance of power*. Nevertheless, Aguis (2006: 36-37) contends that realists have still tried to make neutrality fit their theory by emphasizing that neutral states were following their own *state-centred* interests.<sup>71</sup> Following the logic of the Waltz’ ‘distribution of capabilities across the units’,<sup>72</sup> realists can interpret the concept of neutrality as the capability of a given unit to participate in shaping the structure. However, recognizing the capability of neutrality to influence the system, realism erodes itself, as can be seen in Devine’s statement:

Neutrality is the opposite of a typical policy followed by a small state. Given its narrow power base, one would assume a tendency on the part of the small state, particularly while confronting a great power, to try to balance its inherent weakness by drawing on external sources of strength. Neutrality is the opposite situation: one in which the small state, of its own accord, chooses to rely exclusively on internal sources of strength rather than on powerful allies.<sup>73</sup>

Such arguments suggest that, while convenient for interpreting most historical developments in neutrality, realist theory with its terminology of balance of power and national survival is no longer adequate to explain this concept appropriately.

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<sup>70</sup> Morris and White, above n 8, 105.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Waltz, above n 7, 80-1.

<sup>73</sup> Devine, above 6, 19.

### 3.2 Neutrality and constructivism

The alternative, constructivist reading of neutral norms has come into its own with the end of the Cold War and the widening of the security agenda in a globalizing world, where the realists' state-centric approach to security is no longer viable or desirable.<sup>74</sup>

#### 3.2.1 *Post-bipolar reality in the international system*

##### *Security changes*

The concept of neutrality has been revised along with changes in the external environment. The security environment changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War, when the threat from potentially aggressive superpowers decreased or disappeared. The disintegration of the old structure of international relations has led to the gradual development of a new, post-bipolar, system of international relations.<sup>75</sup>

At the beginning of the third millennium, humankind experiences new challenges. Transnational organized crime, international terrorism, and illegal drugs are serious threats to the safety of citizens in many states and regions. In addition, weapons of mass destruction are another major problem that is compounded by creating new types of weapons – biological, chemical, and historically well-known nuclear weapons. The population of third-world countries is growing, and this leads to mass migrations that in turn can become a source of a conflict. Territorial disputes also remain a potential source of protracted conflicts, primarily over the use of the natural resources - water, oil, fisheries, minerals and more. Ethnic and religious conflicts are also dangerous due to their deep historical roots.<sup>76</sup> The shift towards these internal and transnational threats from the traditional dangers of inter-state war is an important promoter of further change in the meaning of neutrality. Today, neutrality and non-alignment are increasingly losing their traditional concrete content. These principles are no longer able to

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<sup>74</sup> Agius, above 12, 370.

<sup>75</sup> Igor Ivanov, "International security in the era of globalization", *Russia in global affairs* 1 (January – March 2003), accessed 30.11.2011, <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/2/1954.html>

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

guarantee national security, because the nature of threats has changed.<sup>77</sup> Threats have become globalized and the degree of interdependence has increased.

#### *Failure of realism to explain neutrality*

Realists argue that when the international system changes, neutral states change their security strategies as well.<sup>78</sup> They have no doubt done so, but not in the direction of using their freedom to join alliances as the theory would expect: thus confirming that the emerging pattern cannot be fully captured by the realists' focus on power and the distribution of capabilities.<sup>79</sup>

In contrast to the realists' approach, many European states continue to practise neutrality as the model of national security. Moreover, there are new states that have adopted neutrality, such as Turkmenistan and Moldova, while Ukraine recently proclaimed non-aligned status. Over the time the concept of neutrality has changed, and nowadays it gains meaning greater than a simple security strategy. At this time in history, internal factors also need to be considered when examining the *behavioural intentions* of a state. As Jessica L. Beyer stresses, "norm formation and change depend as much on the trace of the norm's ontological existence and neutral states' '*internal*' factors, as they do on the traditional realist-emphasized '*external*' actors and influences".<sup>80</sup>

#### *Institutional changes and norm revision*

In addition, institutional changes that are related to the global changes of structure have altered the context for explaining the purpose of neutrality in today's world. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has become less a defence but more of a political organization, a community of 'shared values'<sup>81</sup>, that aspires to play as a global actor and is using most of its military energies in external crisis management, while the EU has re-shaped itself as a political entity with more active participation in military operations and peacekeeping missions. Six European neutrals now participate in the EU project while retaining their neutral

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<sup>77</sup> Laurent Goetschel, "Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept?" *Coop. Confl.*, 34(2): (1999): 121.

<sup>78</sup> Waltz, above n 7.

<sup>79</sup> Beyer and Hofmann, above n 11, 288.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid 289.

<sup>81</sup> Agius, above n 12, 377.

status, although they not only hold membership, but also subscribe to the values of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); they also take part in the peacekeeping missions and operations within NATO's Partnership for Peace all over the world. In the post-Cold War era, these institutional developments do not necessarily conflict with the revised norms of neutrality.<sup>82</sup> This point has been debated within some EU neutral states especially over developments in CSDP that commit states to be involved in military actions outside their borders and, thus, create a potential conflict with historic conceptions of neutrality.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, the emphasis on European *shared identity* also works to embed institutional values of the EU and NATO into identities of neutral states.<sup>84</sup>

As part of this evolution, most European neutral states have redefined the notion of neutrality as military non-alignment or non-membership of mutual defence alliances. These narrow definitions open new opportunities for neutral states, leading to more voluntary framing of the norms of neutrality and to options for conducting their foreign and security policy in such a way as to allow the use of force in military operations, other than for self-defence.<sup>85</sup> The concept and meaning of neutrality have evolved "from a purely legal concept to a broader political concept that allows more ambiguity regarding the relationship between neutrality and membership in an international organization[s]..."<sup>86</sup>

Devine sums up the consequences for the theoretical understanding of neutrality in the following quotation:

"[T]he differences in the nature of the concepts of neutrality [are] presented, i.e. a 'true', measurable fact v a possible, flexible process; external v internal dynamics; wartime v peacetime concepts; passive v active concepts... The IR paradigm ... ha[s] a significant role in drawing conclusions on the existence and credibility of ... neutrality... i.e. the neorealist factors of balance-of-power, protective umbrella and the primacy of military power v the social constructivist factors of identity, the role of sub-state agents and public support."<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Beyer and Hofmann, above n 11, 292-3.

<sup>83</sup> Morris and White, above n 8, 104.

<sup>84</sup> Agius, above n 12, 377.

<sup>85</sup> Beyer and Hofmann, above n 11, 292-3.

<sup>86</sup> Morris and White, above n 8, 105.

<sup>87</sup> Devine, above n 6, 13.

In short, fundamental changes in the international order have caused a new theoretical paradigm, and constructivism claims to be a ‘new-age’ major theory that explains and understands the current institution of neutrality, considering this concept in an entirely new way.

### **3.3 Constructivists’ approach to neutrality**

#### *The elements of constructivism and neutrality*

Constructivists have played an important and crucial role in developing a contemporary meaning of neutrality. Rejecting the legal notion of neutrality that has been previously emphasized by realists, constructivists stress ideological, political and cultural dimensions of this concept.<sup>88</sup> Social constructivism is placed in opposition to realism, rejecting key principles of realism.<sup>89</sup> In contrast to realists, social constructivists build a more *human-centred* concept of neutrality.<sup>90</sup> The central issue for constructivists is the consideration of norms, values, and identity as social forms. In a constructivist reading, these variables constitute actors’ preferences, and actors perform based on logic of appropriateness.<sup>91</sup> Devine presents the social constructivist approach as one that “emphasizes agent, understands structure in cognitive rather than exclusively material terms, considers identity and interests as important variables and views the international order as a construction of actors”.<sup>92</sup> Neutrality is considered as a non-state agent that includes the elements of national identity and preserves this identity. This approach contradicts the traditional realists’ approach of providing neutrality in foreign policy. A state’s neutralist attitude to war and military alliance is a feature of the identity of the state in international affairs. Rejecting the idea of realistic ‘*realpolitik*’, constructivists emphasize the role and influence of public opinion, movements, interest groups and industrialists as active participants in the concept of neutrality. The character of neutrality is not exogenous as realists indicate, but based on endogenous domestic and internal - choice.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Morris and White, above n 8, 105-6.

<sup>89</sup> Devine, above n 6, 9-11.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>91</sup> Beyer and Hofmann, above n 11, 289-90.

<sup>92</sup> Devine, above n 6, 11-2.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, 17-8.

In contrast to realists, constructivists look to *domestic factors* to explain neutrality policy, because “understanding the public’s conception of neutrality is essential to understanding neutral state’s foreign policy choices, since it is so embedded in public identity and opinion”.<sup>94</sup>

#### *Academic, political and public debates*

The end of bipolarity and new security demands can partly help explain the move of Western neutrals towards European integration, as a choice “focusing on the dynamics of interaction and norm exchange between member states, as well as the deepening of shared values and (European) identity, with the EU regarded as a civilian or normative power”.<sup>95</sup> Defining security in terms of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ security, constructivists point to the demonstrated ability of the neutrals to influence European security integration through their *expertise* in ‘soft security’ measures.<sup>96</sup> For instance, in the context of EU membership, neutral states influence pan-European process by norm exchange, transferring the national security practices to the EU level. Actively participating in the European project, neutral states promote a different profile for the EU as a security actor.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, as has rightly been remarked, neutrals today can play an increasingly valuable role in organizations and institutions. They possess a valuable role in international institutions like the UN and OSCE all the way through the post-WWII period. What is new now is not their ability to help (and represent) international security institutions as such, as their willingness to enter into deeper forms of internally intrusive integration even in the security field. The idea of neutral participation in the security field was well-crystallised in bridge-building, mediation, ‘technical services’, independent ideas and proposals.<sup>98</sup>

There are active debates within political, academic and public circles about these developments. *Political circles* have encouraged (except of some leftist and far right parties) proactive participation by their neutral states in European

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<sup>94</sup> Beyer and Hofmann, above n 11, 289.

<sup>95</sup> Agius, above n 12, 371.

<sup>96</sup> Neutral states legitimate organizations and play the role of mediators and norm entrepreneurs, drawing attention to humanitarian issues. See Christine Ingebritsen (2002) “Norm Entrepreneurs. Scandinavia's Role in World Politics”.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid 380.

<sup>98</sup> Hakovirta, 212-245.



security cooperation, refusing to be held back by the norm of neutrality and/or reinterpreting its ethical content in a way that permits or even demands greater interventionism. *Academic circles* expect that, in time, neutrality as military non-alignment will be abandoned. In *public circles*, neutrality has its supporters and opponents, and both actively debate within their societies on the feasibility of the policy of neutrality, arguing in terms of what sort of actor they wish to *become*.<sup>99</sup> It is revealing that the public's concept of neutrality has remained relatively stable and generally unchanged as the basis for positive attitudes towards neutrality where these exist.<sup>100</sup>

### *Revision and resurrection of neutrality*

The constructivists' endogenous explanation of neutrality links to fundamentally different interpretations of neutrality and identity.<sup>101</sup> This approach helps to demonstrate how 'good' and moral the concept of neutrality can be, by moving beyond the notion of the self-serving passive actor to active internationalism, inspired by domestic norms and values.<sup>102</sup> From the constructivists' point of view, neutrality is just a different *type of actor* in the international system, concerned with normative values as much as material interests, and connected to identity. The *strong link between neutrality and identity* seems to lie in the fact that "agents cannot act without an identity; thus, if neutrality was the profile of the foreign and security stance of an agent, then neutrality must be related to how that state regards itself and its interests".<sup>103</sup>

When explaining a state's continuing attachment to neutrality, constructivists take into account the *domestic factors* that emerge from a state's *history* and *identity* to determine the meaning and policy of neutrality in a specific context. For instance, joining the EU does not necessarily affect the sense of neutrality.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Agius, above n 12, 371.

<sup>100</sup> Karen Devine, "Neutrality and the Development of the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy: Compatible or Competing?" *Cooperation and Conflict* 46, no. 3 (September 2011): 337-8, doi: 10.1177/0010836711416958.

<sup>101</sup> Agius, above n 12, 372-3.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid 375-6.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Morris and White, above n 8, 105-6.

Neutral states themselves have had and are still continuing a lively debate at all levels on certain issues related to their relationship with international organizations. As a rule, neutrality plays a restrictive role in decision-making processes towards processes of cooperation or integration in political and defence projects. Most commonly, neutrality is a very important, or even crucial, factor in the adoption of a certain decision, because this concept is attached to a state's national identity, as mentioned earlier. Such a prominent role of neutrality makes it a “*national symbol or emblem of identity*, which connects citizens to the state itself”<sup>105</sup> and demonstrates the sovereignty of the state.

Finally, as will by now be clear, “[n]eutrality ‘is what states make of it’”.<sup>106</sup> Having unique historical and cultural perspectives, neutral states have developed different meanings for neutrality that fit their individual foreign policy agenda. Consequences arising from the deconstruction of the traditional meaning of neutrality are now leading to the re-conceptualization of the institution of neutrality and the formulation of new understandings of its principles and role in influencing and shaping the system of international relations. This process is however also likely to go at different speeds in different neutral countries and may well lead them to different practical conclusions.

### **3.4 Conclusions on theoretical approaches**

Scholars for a long time ignored or minimized the contributions that neutral states make in the international community. Realists have failed to appreciate the importance of a state's identity as the decisive factor of neutrality policy, especially when neutrality shifts from an occasional to a permanent condition. Instead, they have stressed the importance of material capabilities of the state. By these standards neutral states were considered as weak, isolationist, immoral and passive entities. However, neutrality is not simply a foreign and security policy option – it contains deeper resonance and meaning that has implications for how states understand themselves as actors in the international system and what their

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid 107.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

identity is about. It is now clear that any researcher must consider non-realist theories, and above all constructivism, as an aid to the understanding of neutrality.

The examination of neutrality in a constructivist framework has shown that neutrality in the post-Cold War era, and in relation to institutional cooperation, is not an anachronism. Overall, there has been a revision in the norm of neutrality that moves it towards the narrower understanding of neutrality as non-alliance or neutrality in war. Neutrality has been re-conceptualized by agents playing a complex strategic role in evolving elements of security and defence policy.

Historically neutrality was an effective mechanism for protecting national security, but this has changed with the drastic security changes since the end of the Cold War. Today neutral states are active in the international security, defence and political space. They act as mediators, norm entrepreneurs, experts in soft security issues, and often as an obstacle to some supranational institutional initiatives. This fundamentally new role of neutrals has forced theorists to reconsider realists' 'bad' image of neutrality, and it has been re-conceptualized in positive terms. Constructivists' human-centred concept with its focus on norms, values, identity and domestic factors construes neutrality as a 'national symbol or emblem of identity' and as an element of national sovereignty. Political, academic and public debates underline the importance and viability of this concept. Finally, the hypothesis appears to hold good that *a given state's maintenance of neutrality as a model of national security can be explained better in constructivists' terms of identity, endogenous values and norms, than by the obsolete realist approach.*

In Chapter 4, an attempt will be made to illustrate the theoretical conclusions drawn in this Chapter with the practical cases of the most prominent neutrals – Sweden and Finland.

## **4 Case-studies of neutrality in Europe: Sweden and Finland**

Sweden and Finland have very different historical pasts. Over several centuries, Sweden experienced its heyday, decline, and eventual return to prosperity; from a mighty empire that dictated the agenda, it became a neutral country that cautiously manoeuvred between the interests of the great powers. Finland, without a tradition of statehood, had nothing to lose in the whirlwind events of the twentieth century, but found its place in the sun, following Sweden in becoming a neutral independent state. Chapter 4 focuses primarily on how these two neutrals not only survived but have also found a decent niche on the international stage.

### **4.1 The neutrality of Sweden in historical retrospective.**

Considering the neutrality of Sweden, it is very logical to look at the origins of this policy. Sweden is one of the oldest followers of the policy of neutrality. So far, researchers into Sweden's foreign policy have not reached consensus with respect to the first date or the first document that marked its neutral status: but many of them are inclined to believe that Sweden was seen as a neutral power already in the first half of the 19th century. In its foreign relations, Sweden has always been a relatively stable state formation. The fact that Sweden was not occupied in 1523 and the fact that it did not take part in any wars after 1814 clearly illustrates the stability of its position.

Throughout the 17th century, Sweden remained one of the key military players on the continent, holding Norway and Finland. The political map of the 17th century shows that the Swedish Empire at its high point consisted of a number of states, or parts thereof. It included Russian territories, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Northern Germany and Denmark (see figure 1).

Sweden was at war during this period with Poland, Denmark, and finally Russia. It participated very actively in the Thirty Years War<sup>107</sup> and fought against the strengthening of the Holy Roman Empire. The active foreign policy of

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<sup>107</sup> One of the stages of the Thirty Years' War even got its name from a Swedish intervention (1630-1635), in which 150,000 soldiers participated under Swedish command, making it one of the largest armies of the age. See War in Theory and Practice: The legitimization of Swedish intervention in the Thirty Years War, *The Historical Journal*, 45,3 (2002), Cambridge University Press, 499-523. Doi:10.1017/S0018246X02002522,

Sweden's rulers largely determined the religious and political balance of power in Europe that was established then and has lasted until today.

However, during the Great Northern War, which broke out in 1700 and continued until 1721, Sweden lost its status as an Empire and a great power – with the turning point at the Battle of Poltava in 1709 - and lost most of the conquered lands, giving way to the newborn mighty empire of Tsarist Russia. It would take a further hundred years, however, for Sweden to declare its neutrality.

**Figure 1.** Swedish Empire in 1660<sup>108</sup>



The first sign of the Swedish adoption of neutrality could be considered as its participation in the First and Second Leagues of Armed Neutrality. However, the so-called armed neutrality was not an ideological concept in the foreign policy of Sweden, but was used rather as a tool to achieve practical goals within the Leagues. In addition, Sweden continued to position itself as a military power.

A key stage in the establishment of the principle of neutrality in Sweden's foreign policy occurred during the Napoleonic Wars in the early 19th century, especially in 1809-1814. During this period, Sweden ceded Finland to Russia (in 1809), and in 1810 King Karl XIV Johan tried to move the traditional policy of military intervention on to a new track of neutrality policy. As a result of the Napoleonic Wars Sweden lost one third of its territory, and finally adopted a new policy called *The Policy of 1812*<sup>109</sup> - based on close relations with Britain and Russia - which contrasted with its previous course. Sweden still entertained hopes

<sup>108</sup> Sweden: Swedish empire, 1660, Map, from *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, accessed March 27, 2012, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/media/3664/The-Swedish-empire-in-1660>

<sup>109</sup> This policy was devised by Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, one of the marshals of Napoleon, who was initially selected as Sweden's crown prince and later became King Karl XIV Johan.

of the return of some former territories, including Norway; therefore, it became Russia's ally in the Napoleonic War of 1812. Sweden was fighting against France and Denmark over the next two years and finally achieved the cession of Norway as a result of the Treaty of Kiel (January 1814). Six months later, the provisions of this Treaty were recognized by all participants at the Vienna Congress of 1814-15.

During 1814 -1885 Sweden's main threat was the Russian Empire from the East, and the more powerful British Empire from the West. Any kind of confrontation between these two empires could force Sweden to choose sides and this simply turns it into one or another empire's vassal. Therefore, neutrality became the safest way out of the situation. There are at least four important dates that gradually built up the neutral image of Swedish foreign policy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

In his *Images and strategies for autonomy: Explaining Swedish Security Policy Strategies in the 19th century*, Ole Elgström summarizes various dimensions of Sweden's security policy choices in the period between 1814 and 1885 as follows:<sup>110</sup>

- (1) The overall and predominant Swedish strategic orientation was non-alignment, *inter alia* marked by a series of unilateral declarations of neutrality.
- (2) Sweden tried, however, within the framework of non-alignment and more or less throughout the whole period, to adapt to the great powers by employing both balancing and accommodative strategies.
- (3) The dominant non-alignment orientation was on a few occasions partially abandoned in favour of considerations of joining great power alliances (...).
- (4) In order to adjust to external forces, the policy of neutrality was asymmetrical, or unbalanced, at times.

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<sup>110</sup> Ole Elgström, *Images and Strategies for Autonomy: Explaining Swedish Security Policy Strategies in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, the Netherlands, 41-2. [http://books.google.is/books?id=CvDg93ucc6EC&printsec=frontcover&hl=ru&source=gbs\\_ge\\_summary\\_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=The%20overall%20and%20predominant%20Swedish%20strategic%20orientation%20was%20non-alignment%2C%20inter%20alia%20&f=false](http://books.google.is/books?id=CvDg93ucc6EC&printsec=frontcover&hl=ru&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=The%20overall%20and%20predominant%20Swedish%20strategic%20orientation%20was%20non-alignment%2C%20inter%20alia%20&f=false)

(5) The policy of neutrality changes in terms of meaning, principal determination and resolve.

It should be emphasized that Sweden was never the initiator of the policy of neutrality, but turned to it only when the potential external threats occurred. The first such occasion when Sweden declared neutrality unilaterally in relation to hostilities occurred in 1834, when the conflict of interests in the Middle East between Britain and Russia emerged. There was a risk of the Baltic Sea becoming a theatre of operations, so neutrality appeared to offer the best guarantee of the inviolability of Swedish territorial integrity.<sup>111</sup>

For the second time, neutrality proved a useful concept in the Crimean War of 1853-1856. At the beginning of the war Sweden made a similar Declaration of Neutrality to that it had proclaimed twenty years earlier. Further, Sweden could have been drawn into two Danish-Prussian Wars of 1848-1851 and 1862, but fortunately for the state's ill-equipped army, the Swedish Riksdag did not declare war in either case and once again supported the policy of neutrality.<sup>112</sup> King Charles XV when he took the throne in 1860 reiterated Sweden's neutral foreign policy.

A Russian-British crisis erupted for the third time at the end of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The Swedish Parliament forced the King to reaffirm the intention of Sweden to remain a neutral power.

Finally, for the fourth time, Sweden had to demonstrate its balancing act between Britain and Russia in 1885, when there was a threat of war due to the Pandjeh Incident in the Central Asia.<sup>113</sup>

As can be seen, by the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Sweden had clearly defined its neutral status, and largely thanks to it, had maintained its territorial integrity and stable relations with the dominant powers of the West and the East. A period of established peace in the Baltic region also contributed to the strengthening of

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<sup>111</sup> For the same reason Sweden guaranteed free passage of warships through the Baltic Sea.

<sup>112</sup> In this case, from 1848 to 1851, Swedish troops were landed in Jutland. In 1863, the King offered 20,000 soldiers for the defence of Schleswig, but it caused a storm of protest in the Riksdag and the King was forced to withdraw from the war. - See more: Rolf H. Lindholm, *Sveriges neutralitet*, Juridiska Föreningen i Lund, 1987, 38-39).

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.* 41-3.



Swedes' conviction that neutrality had become an integral part of political reality and the main guarantor of their national security.

In the 20th century, Swedish neutrality was tested twice - in the First and Second World Wars. However, the nature of conflict changed. One of the dominant powers (Germany) became friendly to Sweden, while the other pole represented by the Entente included both Russia and Britain, powers that had historically caused difficult tensions for Sweden. As a result, neutral Sweden during the First World War was characterized as 'benevolent' to Germany. In other words, while Sweden proclaimed strict neutrality towards everybody, it made concessions to Germany. This can be explained by the fact that cultural and scientific ties with Germany were very strong.<sup>114</sup> However, the mere proclamation of neutrality in the post-war period was not enough to protect national interests. The Swedish government was well aware of this and therefore aimed to conduct a balanced policy with the leading powers of the Versailles system, as well as with the outsiders. In a period of increased Nazi sentiment in Germany, Sweden became increasingly attentive to London's position on foreign policy issues, and supported the appeasement policy towards Germany.<sup>115</sup>

An ideal base for realization of the national interests and promoting neutrality was the League of Nations. Sweden hoped to use its neutrality to mediate between the winners and losers in the First World War. It was a serious attempt to establish a new Swedish place in world politics, but it failed. In the

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<sup>114</sup> Particularly Swedish conservatives and, to a lesser extent, liberals, who held the majority in the Riksdag, were sympathetic to the German government, so the Swedish government was pro-German. When Sweden's neutrality is described as benevolent towards Germany, the case of the closing of the Kogrund channel in the summer of 1916 is meant. Foreign Minister Knut Wallenberg, a representative of the Conservative Party, held negotiations with the Germans on the closing and mining the Kogrund channel in exchange for the extension of approval for the export of Swedish timber products to Germany. Such an agreement would provide a strategic advantage for Germany in the Baltic Sea. The Allies issued a sharp criticism of this treaty, accusing Sweden of partiality in the war (Lindholm, 40-1; Oppenheim, *International law: A treatise*, 503). Thus, the Swedish Conservative government was not entirely in good faith in carrying out the duties linked to neutrality. Later, following democratic reforms, the anti-militarist-minded moderate social-democratic generation came into power, and finally adopted the full principles of neutrality in Swedish politics.

<sup>115</sup> This policy was explained not only by the fact that the sympathies of Sweden belonged to the German people, but the existence of the Soviet Russia and Stalin, perceived as a strategic adversary of Sweden. See more: Christian Leitz, *Sympathy for the devil: neutral Europe and Nazi Germany in World War II*, New York University Press, 2001, 51; Tingsten H. *The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden: 1918–1939*. L., 1968.

beginning Sweden advocated very actively the dissemination of the ideas of the League of Nations. However, after the Abyssinian crisis of 1935, Sweden revised its attitude to the League of Nations because of League's institutional weakness and helplessness in the post-war settlement of conflicts. Collective security became illusory. This caused Sweden's rapid disenchantment with the League and increased isolationist sentiment among the Swedes.

It was clear that in case of war, neutrality alone was not a reliable foundation for national security. This understanding led the Swedish government to the idea of creating the concept of regional co-operation with the Baltic countries, Scandinavian neighbours, and the former neutrals (Belgium and the Netherlands). In the period from 1933 to 1939, more than 10 meetings at foreign minister level were held along these lines in Scandinavia, with special emphasis on the declining effectiveness of the League of Nations and the search for forms of cooperation based on the principles of neutrality. It was hoped that such regional cooperation could fill the security vacuum in the region in the event of failure of the League of Nations. However, later events showed that the Scandinavians were unable to arrive at a universal common denominator in the matter of security. This could be explained by the fact that individual Nordic countries preferred to seek security guarantees through cooperation with the great powers, and not within regional cooperation. Moreover, the establishment of the regional bloc would call for significant financial resources, which no one had enough at the time, except for Sweden. Thus, despite putting a huge effort to find a common solution, Swedish diplomats failed to resolve all the contradictions between the Scandinavians.<sup>116</sup>

The only way to preserve national security and maintain Swedish neutrality became an independent defence policy. A clear tendency can be seen towards major increases in Sweden's military expenditure during the pre-war period and in the Second World War.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> See more: Wilhelm M. Carlgren, *Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*. St. Martin's Press, 1977. 257 p.

<sup>117</sup> *Sveriges Militära Bedredskap 1939-1945*, Militärhistoriska forlaget, Militärhogskolan, 1982 ISBN 91-85266-20-5

Maintaining neutrality and an independent defence policy was costly for Sweden in other ways. Despite the efforts of Sweden to remain neutral during the Second World War, its policy was many times criticized by the Allied forces. When Nazi Germany in 1940 demanded the freedom of transit for its soldiers and weapons through Sweden, Sweden did not resist these demands, fearing the same fate as neighbouring Norway, occupied in 1940. However, Sweden tried to carry out *smart* politics. It proposed that Germany should use its territorial waters for military transit instead of rail, so as to avoid direct violation of the Hague Conventions.<sup>118</sup> However, it is fair to note that Sweden pursued a very humane border policy towards occupied Norway.<sup>119</sup>

Another source of violation of neutrality was Sweden's large-scale trade with the Reich. The economy of Sweden until 1943 was focused on the needs of the Nazis' New Order.<sup>120</sup> Sweden supplied to Germany timber, ball bearings, foodstuffs, and, finally, vital high-grade iron ore and other scarce materials.<sup>121</sup> At the end of the war the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, had to return about 13 tons of Belgian and Dutch stolen gold, obtained from the Nazis in return for the export of Swedish goods.<sup>122</sup> However, further steps helped to dispel Sweden's image as the collaborator of Nazi Germany, although the Prime Minister Hansson, reflexively fearing German invasion, continued to foster trade with Germany until the middle of 1944.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> However, before concluding a joint Swedish-German communiqué on 5 August 1943, Sweden, represented by the Social Democratic Prime Minister Hansson, continued to ignore the Nazi troops' transit through its territory (Lindholm, 43). A textbook example was the transit of 163rd Infantry Division to attack the Soviet military forces in the Hanko peninsula (Finland). For more cases of German military transportation carried out through the territory of Sweden, and in its territorial waters see Leitz, 56-63.

<sup>119</sup> Thanks to its tolerant immigration policy, Sweden managed to save eight thousand lives of Jewish refugees and forty-four thousand of Norwegians, as well as thousands of children from Finland who avoided the consequences of war and occupation by getting a residence permit in Sweden. See more here: Werner Rings, *Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe, 1939-1945* (Doubleday, 1982), 174.

<sup>120</sup> Leitz, 54, 64-75. For instance, in 1943 46% of total Swedish exports were directed towards Germany.

<sup>121</sup> Leitz, 53. By some estimates, one-third of the raw material needs of the German war industry was provided by Sweden - See more in Leitz, 70 -1.

<sup>122</sup> Associated Press wire, "Report: Sweden Accepted More Nazi Gold Than Previously Known" (January 21, 1997); Leitz, 69-70: gold of total value of SEK 105 million.

<sup>123</sup> Leitz, 75, 183-4; Jonathan Petropoulos, *Co-Opting Nazi Germany: Neutrality in Europe during World War II. Dimensions: A Journal of Holocaust Studies*, Vol 11, No 1, 1997, [http://www.adl.org/braun/dim\\_14\\_1\\_neutrality\\_europe.asp](http://www.adl.org/braun/dim_14_1_neutrality_europe.asp)

Thus, *smart* exceptions from a policy of strict neutrality and adaptation to the realities of war allowed Sweden over a critical period to avoid the ravages of war and to ensure its national security, while also demonstrating how flexible and adaptable a policy of neutrality could be.

After the Second World War, neutrality finally became an integral part of the Swedish perception of the world and a key element of its national identity. According to the Swedish researcher Wilhelm Agrell, “Swedish neutrality was first and foremost an emotional concept ... neutrality meant trying to stay out of serious trouble and still being able to speak up”.<sup>124</sup> Quoting the Report of the 1970 Parliamentary Defence Enquiry, Agrell describes a formula of non-alignment in peacetime:<sup>125</sup>

- The military should not give the impression of being linked to a great power;
- • In case of war, Sweden must be able to meet the requirements of the Hague Convention;
- • Sweden should avoid binding foreign-policy cooperation that could directly or indirectly jeopardize the ability of the country to remain neutral in an armed conflict.

Therefore Sweden tried to avoid participation in international cooperation, with the exception of the United Nations.<sup>126</sup> Sweden did not seek to join the EU and other multilateral organizations, taking the view that the Rome Treaty could limit national sovereignty of Sweden. Instead, Sweden chose to build a strategy of bilateral relations on the basis of military cooperation - as, for example, in the failed discussions over creating a Nordic military pact with Denmark and Norway in 1947-1949. However, Sweden’s political conception of neutrality did not always coincide with its military policy, especially during the Cold War. The political course could be most accurately described in terms of “non-participation in alliances in peacetime aiming at neutrality in the event of war”.<sup>127</sup> When

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<sup>124</sup> Wilhelm Agrell, “Swedish neutrality: stumbling into unknown past” in *Small States inside and outside the European Union. Interests and Policies*, ed. By Laurent Goetschel, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1998: 181-2.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 183.

<sup>127</sup> Jo rgen Weibull, *Swedish history in outline* Stockholm: Swedish Institute, 1993: 136.

Denmark and Norway joined NATO in 1949, however, Sweden switched to relying on secret cooperation with the United States and Britain for its ultimate military survival. The Swedish High Command had personal ties with American and British counterparts and lobbied for Western reinforcement in case of any invasion threat from the Soviet Union.

In 1952 and later, Sweden signed arms transfer agreements with the United States, seeking a kind of U.S. national guarantee of its security.<sup>128</sup> The state's partiality towards Western European integration and support of American initiatives in defence policy within NATO in Europe can be traced very clearly during the height of the Cold War, and involved a real risk in terms of how the Soviet Union might react to such Swedish partiality and double standards.<sup>129</sup>

Analyzing the degree of transparency of Sweden's foreign policy at this time, one can see a conscious difference in handling the respective interests of the U.S. and the USSR. The main subjects of discussion between Sweden and the USSR in the context of neutrality policy were issues related to violation of maritime sovereignty and, to a lesser extent, of Swedish air space. Both American and Soviet submarines made use at times of Swedish waters, and in many cases this did not remain unnoticed by Sweden. However, the nature of interaction with the "big violators" varied: while Sweden had a double-track policy towards the U.S. it dramatically opposed any unauthorized Soviet attempts to violate Sweden's maritime space. As a rule, the Soviet midget-submarines in Swedish waters were considered as "preparatory stages in military operational planning".<sup>130</sup> Twice in the 1980s, this Soviet-Swedish debate became acute - in 1982 and 1983, but it then evaporated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and

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3 <sup>128</sup> Facts about Sweden's cooperation with the United States emerged in the 1990s. Among other things, it became known that neutral Sweden had received security guarantees from the Eisenhower administration in the 1960s, in exchange for permission to allow transit for secret U.S. "Polaris" nuclear missile submarines in the Skagerrak. See more here: Tuomas Forsberg & Tapani Vaahtoranta, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied: Finnish and Swedish Policies on the EU and NATO as Security Organisations*, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Helsinki, Finland, 2000: 7-13.

<sup>129</sup> Agrell, 184-8. About one-third of Sweden's military air bases were equivalent to COBs (co-located bases) similar to those operated by the United States in Norway, inasmuch as they met the U.S.'s technical standards; and some experts wondered why the U.S. and Sweden should be cooperating in this area.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid*, 190.

the disappearance of the military threat from the East.<sup>131</sup> On the other hand, Sweden at times supported the Soviet Union in matters of disarmament, while being very critical towards President Reagan's nuclear policy.<sup>132</sup>

If Sweden in some regards placed the fundamental principle of credibility of its neutrality at risk, it compensated by its high achievements in the conduct of a constructive global peace policy and contributions to détente between the blocs. In parallel with its earlier approach to the League of Nations, Sweden in the Cold War successfully used its influence within the UN in the debate on disarmament, and supported conflict resolution in third world countries both by mediation and proportionally large contributions to peacekeeping: thus consolidating the country's neutral image in the international arena, and enriching the general practice of neutrality with the new elements.

Thus, the neutrality of Sweden could be seen as the best way of solving a very difficult 20<sup>th</sup>-century dilemma: to strengthen national and regional security while containing the ambitions of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the Baltic region. Further developments in Swedish policy after the end of the Cold War are discussed later in this chapter.

## **4.2 The neutrality of Finland in historical retrospective**

The key task of the foreign policy of any small state is to preserve its sovereignty and independence, and the state may adopt various models of security accordingly. Finland, as a relatively young nation, experimented with different models. Ultimately, the dominant model of Finland's security has become the concept of neutrality.

Similarly to Sweden, Finland did not immediately become a neutral state. It did not even gain full statehood until 1917, although its distinct national identity can be traced back at least to the proclamation of the Swedish Constitution of 1772 by Gustav III (the establishment of the autocracy), or the strengthening the

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<sup>131</sup> Ciro Elliott Zoppo, *Nordic Security at the turn of the twenty-first century*, University of California, Los-Angeles, Centre for International and Strategic Affairs, Greenwood Press, 1992: 115-9.

<sup>132</sup> Agrell, 190; Zoppo, 115-133. Interestingly, on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the researchers of Swedish foreign policy often used the conditional mood to describe the different scenarios under which the realities of Swedish defence and foreign policy could diminish the credibility of its neutrality. But none of these scenarios was realized.

power of the Swedish King in 1789<sup>133</sup> Prior to its eventual independence Finland was ruled by two powers - Sweden and Russia, thus its earlier history can be divided into two periods: those of Swedish and of Russian governance. Swedish rule lasted 659 years. It began in 1150, with the strengthening of royal power in Sweden itself, and with the advent of the Catholic Church, and continued until 1809, when Sweden lost to Russia, signing the Treaty of Fredrikshamn under which Finland passed completely under Russian rule.

As can be seen, Finland experienced enormous Swedish influence, being under its power up to six times longer than under Russian rule. For several centuries, Sweden colonized the northern regions of Scandinavia, including Finland within its frontiers of the time, and centralized an imperial economy based on the established system of the feudal rights. Sweden also controlled most of the higher administrative and judicial posts. The nobles experienced almost absolute power and therefore often abused it, what ultimately caused the uprising of Finnish farmers. Sweden also undertook successful attempts to enforce Swedish as the language of officialdom, and thus the Swedish language became the most popular one in large towns. In the 16<sup>th</sup> century, further steps in centralization provoked a storm of protest by the Finns, and therefore a new form of governance was introduced - an aristocratic oligarchy. In the early 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Finnish elite fully absorbed Swedish customs and language, which affected their sympathies towards Sweden, while in the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century a separatist sentiment began to mature among the Finnish political elite.

Russian rule began in 1809 and lasted 108 years until 1917, when Finland finally gained its full independence. The territory became known as the Grand Duchy of Finland and at first was granted considerable autonomy. Questions related to the army, taxes, coinage, and the establishment of the ruling council came under the jurisdiction of the local Diet. However, Tsar Alexander I refused to convene the Diet, and it was not convened under Nicholas I either. During that period, Finnish culture and science began to develop and was accompanied by a wave of national consciousness. There was a strong demand for democratic reforms in society, and Alexander II began to actively pursue them. In particular,

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<sup>133</sup> Jason E. Lavery, *The History of Finland*, Greenwood Press, 2006: 52-3. ISBN 0-313-32837-4.

the tradition of the Diet was restored, with its legal competence, while the use of the Finnish language in official proceedings increased. However, from the 1890s onwards, Nicholas II began to pursue a policy of Russification of the Grand Duchy. During the years that followed, up to the end of the First World War, a series of attempts were made to eliminate the autonomy of Finland and integrate it more closely into the Russian Empire. Thus, the Russian language was declared the third state language, with the Swedish and Finnish. The authority of the Diet was in effect abolished, and laws for Finland were adopted by Russia. Attempts were made to include Finnish armed forces into the Russian army, while reprisals were carried out against Finnish separatists.

This policy of Russification combined with growing instability in the Russian Empire led to the rise of the Finnish national movement, the main idea of which became a struggle for independence. Subsequent events favoured the implementation of this *idée fixe*, and finally, on 6 December 1917, Finland gained its independence by a bloodless way.<sup>134</sup>

**Figure 2.** Finland in 1920-1939<sup>135</sup>



<sup>134</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*. Oxford University Press US, 2008, 224 p. ISBN 978-0-19-923767-8.

<sup>135</sup> *Finland, 1920-1939*, Map, from WHKMLA Historical Atlas, accessed March 30, 2012, <http://www.zum.de/whkmla/histatlas/scandinavia/haxfinland.html>



However, the attainment of independence did not mean that Finland was no longer of interest to Russia.<sup>136</sup> Independent Finland continued to be considered by the Russian political elite as a part of a large Russian project. As a result of the Finnish Civil War, white monarchists came to power in January-May 1918, whose primary purpose was to prevent the possibility of power being seized by the red forces that dominated in Soviet Russia. Finland as a very young nation experienced a power crisis, because it had never possessed traditions of statehood and a realistic understanding of what mattered in foreign policy.<sup>137</sup> The monarchists who gained power mistakenly pinned their hopes on the monarchical system of government and tried to enlist the support of the German emperor in opposition to Russia. Thus, Finland in the First World War joined the side of Germany and thereby made the first mistake in its independent foreign policy, being in the camp that lost the war and was also unfriendly to Russia.

Further resistance to Soviet Russia was more successful. The next attempt to defend Finland's rights was the first Soviet-Finnish War (1918-1920), in which Finns annexed the former Finnish areas from the Soviet Russia, due to the Civil War and the First World War.

In the early interwar years, facing the alternative of neutrality or an anti-Russian position, Finland chose the second option not least because of "the self-esteem, created by the newly-won independence"<sup>138</sup>. It continued to cooperate with Germany while developing relations with the Baltic countries and Poland, and signed a series of secret agreements to protect its national security in case of a Soviet attack, which on paper built up into an unprecedentedly powerful regional bloc. But it soon became clear that the development of relations with the countries of the East European buffer zone was futile, because these nations had even greater territorial issues with Russia. Like Sweden, Finland saw cooperation with the League of Nations as another instrument for preserving its territorial integrity. However, membership in the League of Nations did not meet Finnish

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<sup>136</sup> It is noteworthy that Russia allowed territories under its control to gain independence only in times of disaster – the first time with the collapse of the Russian Empire and secondly with that of the Soviet Union. Such unique moments occur rarely; therefore they create high stakes and a major responsibility for small nations to adopt their foreign policy agenda independently.

<sup>137</sup> Urho Kekkonen, *Neutrality: The Finnish position*, ed. By Tuomas Vilkuna, Heinemann, London, 1970: 110, 162.

<sup>138</sup> Kekkonen, 19, 109.

needs because Finland could not conclude a nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union so long as the latter was not a member of the League; Finland was able finally to sign a nonaggression pact only in 1932, extending it in 1934 for ten years.<sup>139</sup>

Ironically, this time coincided with the most obvious institutional failures of the League of Nations, so Finland was left alone again with its territorial issues. In search of allies, Finland knew that Sweden was not able to give adequate protection; Germany, having lost in the First World War, became one of the reasons for the weakening of the League of Nations and its main violator; and the Soviet Union has already demonstrated its territorial claims. In this situation the only option remained the policy of neutrality. In 1935 the Finnish government announced a *de facto* policy of neutrality and refused to impose sanctions against the aggressive Italy in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War on these grounds. However, the new policy did not solve Finland's problems.<sup>140</sup> Relations with its Eastern neighbour were deteriorating, especially after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August 1939, in which Germany essentially betrayed Finland as its ally by including Finland in the Soviet zone of influence. Following the example of Sweden, Finland began an intense militarization; it created its own navy, equipping it by battleships and other warships. Internally, Finland pursued a consistent policy against communism, and inhibited the activity of the Communist Party.

The dramatic events of the war period finally turned Finland's military political strategy back again by 180 degrees in the direction of neutrality. These events were the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 and the continuation war of 1941-1944.<sup>141</sup> Finland again lost in the war, having supported the German side against Russia. In turn, the Soviet Union as a member of the victorious Allies gained the historical, political and legal basis to seek to deprive Finland of sovereignty. In 1948, The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual

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<sup>139</sup> Treaty of Non-Aggression and Pacific Settlement of Disputes between the Soviet Union and Finland, concluded on January 21, 1932 <http://www.histdoc.net/history/nonagen1.html>.

<sup>140</sup> Kekkonen, 22.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 25-31.

Assistance (FCMA) was signed<sup>142</sup>, which did not give Finland explicit security guarantees from the Soviet Union, but declared Finland's desire to stay outside conflicts between great powers. In practice, this meant that Finland would not participate in organizations that posed a potential threat to the Soviet Union. Indeed, Finland did not even accept U.S. conditions for joining the Marshall Plan, following the position of the USSR.<sup>143</sup> In addition, though entering into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Bank, Finland participated only in their economic programs and abstained from political participation, so as not to arouse Soviet suspicions that it was plotting with the West. Thus, the Treaty of 1948 was both a starting-point for a more lasting Finnish neutrality and a factor pushing Finland towards a very particular interpretation of that status.

Finland became a fully neutral country in 1955, when the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from the Finnish territory. The peculiarity of Finnish neutrality was the fact that it was neither based on legal commitments, nor was it an ideological concept.<sup>144</sup> Finland's foreign policy was officially termed as an active and peaceful policy of neutrality. In practice, the better Finland was able to convince the Soviet Union of its serious intent to maintain neutrality, the more space opened up for it to build closer cooperation with the Western world.<sup>145</sup> In the same year, 1955, Finland joined the UN<sup>146</sup> and the Nordic Council, thus returning from its temporary isolation to the international scene. The flexible interpretation of neutrality enabled the country to participate in a wide range of economic cooperation with the West, notably through the European Free Trade Organization (EFTA), of which it became an associative member in 1961.

Like Sweden, Finland's active neutrality included support for international peace initiatives, aimed at creating favourable conditions for the development of

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**3.1.1** <sup>142</sup>*The Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Finland*

**3.1.2** [http://heninen.net/sopimus/1948\\_e.htm](http://heninen.net/sopimus/1948_e.htm)

<sup>143</sup> Karsh, 139.

<sup>144</sup> Kekkonen, 90; Peterson, 12; Max Jakobson, *Finnish Neutrality, A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War*, Hugh Evelyn, London, 1968, 116 p.

<sup>145</sup> Kekkonen, 89.

<sup>146</sup> This became possible when the USSR agreed to it.

other small states. One of the key pillars of Finland's foreign policy was the concept of a Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (Nordic NWFZ).

Another pillar of neutrality was the state's participation within the UN in arms control and disarmament initiatives. Here Finland found a good role for itself. Over the next decades, Finland repeatedly acted as an inspirer and a follower of the initiatives on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Finland also widely participated in the UN peacekeeping missions. Since 1956, more than 31,000 Finns have taken place in UN efforts to alleviate world conflict.<sup>147</sup>

The third pillar of the Finnish policy of neutrality was an active initiative to host the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), leading to the signing of the CSCE Final Act in Helsinki in 1975. The broad support of the international community for this initiative clearly demonstrated the legitimacy of Finnish neutrality and its institutional importance.

During the Cold War the term of Finlandisation began to be used, with negative connotations, to refer to Finland's policy and the limitations imposed upon it by the Soviet Union. In reality, however, Finland transformed its difficult situation into an excellent opportunity to preserve its national sovereignty and security by balancing between the great powers, and thereby winning a wide international room of manoeuvre in the cultural, economic and political dimension. President Urho Kekkonen himself, giving a speech in Washington, underlined that neutrality was the most acceptable way to maintain security and was based primarily on the historical development of Finland.<sup>148</sup> In addition, Finland's neutrality helped to maintain stability in the broader Northern region,<sup>149</sup> and thus, according to Kekkonen, was a concept useful not just for both Finland

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<sup>147</sup> Kari Hoglund, FINFO: Finnish Contribution to Peacekeeping, [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6208~v~\\_Finnish\\_Contribution\\_to\\_Peacekeeping\\_.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6208~v~_Finnish_Contribution_to_Peacekeeping_.pdf)

<sup>148</sup> Kekkonen, 87.

<sup>149</sup> Christine Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs. Scandinavia's Role" in *World Politics in Small States in International Relations*, University of Washington Press, 2006: 275.

and the Soviet Union, “but also to the international policy of conciliation, especially in Northern Europe”.<sup>150</sup>

### **4.3 The neutral policy of Sweden and Finland in the post-Cold war era**

In the previous sections the main reasons for countries’ adoption of neutrality have been considered, as well as the trials they faced in the process. In this section, it will be shown how the situation of European neutral countries has changed in the post-bipolar international system. Having described the major trends in international relations at the present stage, we shall see how these trends affect the neutrals nowadays in practice and how the roles of Finland and Sweden have developed in regional, European and global politics.

Geopolitical changes, globalization and the switch of attention to ‘new threats’ all help to explain why Sweden and Finland have ceased to position themselves as neutrals, and officially became known as non-allied states.<sup>151</sup> As argued above, Finland and Sweden experienced different historical development and therefore pursued different policies during the two world wars and the Cold War: but nevertheless, they have defined their current security policies in a similar way. Both describe their policy as being military non-allied in peacetime and neutrality in wartime.<sup>152</sup>

The concept of being outside military organizations is itself now seen in a new way: if during the Cold War non-alignment was seen as a tool for survival in a bipolar world, today it is rather an instrument that permits cooperation with NATO in peacetime and holds open the possibility of military help from NATO in case of war.<sup>153</sup>

If during the Cold War neutral and non-allied states took part in military cooperation only within the UN, seeing peacekeeping as a special case, developments since the fall of the Berlin Wall have radically changed their

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<sup>150</sup> Kekkonen, 66-7.

<sup>151</sup> Hanna Ojanen, *Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP*, Institute for Security Studies – Western European Union, January 2006: 5. <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ011.pdf>

<sup>152</sup> Forsberg & Vaahtoranta, 19.

<sup>153</sup> Risto E.J. Penttilä, “Non-alignment – Obsolete in Today’s Europe?” in *European Security Integration: Implications for Non-alignment and Alliances*, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1999 184 - 5)

attitude to NATO. New challenges have changed the face of NATO itself, shifting it from the basic function of collective defence towards cooperation with its former enemies within the new-established Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).<sup>154</sup> The possibility of ad hoc cooperation with NATO in defence planning and peace missions in some sense puts non-allied states in a better position than members of NATO, because they do not have to participate in case of a war in defence activities. At the same time, the alternative of cooperation with the CSCE (now OSCE), which might appeal more to neutralist public opinion, has become less viable given the gradual marginalization of that organization and its failure to launch any military peace operations.

The most important step taken by both Sweden and Finland<sup>155</sup> was their entry to the European Union in 1995, whereby they joined the Common Foreign and Security Policy and four years later, helped design a European Security and Defence Policy.<sup>156</sup> Finland and Sweden had already taken part in purely European defence cooperation by becoming Observers in Western European Union, and observers and later members in the WEU's armaments fora, the Western European Armament Group (WEAG) and Western European Armament Organization (WEAO).

Both are now members of the EU's European Defence Agency (EDA) which has taken over arms collaboration work, and Sweden plays a prominent role because of its sizeable arms industry. In 2003 both states influenced the final draft of the new European Security Strategy "A Secure Europe in a Better World".<sup>157</sup> In March 2004 they joined in a political declaration promising mutual assistance to any EU member state hit by a major terrorist strike or natural disaster, and in 2007 they accepted the formalization of this obligation (as Article

<sup>154</sup> Gunilla Herolf, "The Role of Non-aligned States in European Defence Organisations: Finland and Sweden" in *European Security Integration: Implications for Non-alignment and Alliances*, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1999: 143-8.

<sup>155</sup> Teija Tiilikainen, "The Finnish Neutrality – its Forms and Future" in *Small States inside and outside the European Union: Interests and Policies*, ed. By Laurent Goetschel, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 1998: 169-79. **Tiilikainen** argues that Finland entered the **EU following Sweden's example** (p.171).

<sup>156</sup> Herolf, 149.


4 <sup>157</sup> The former Swedish Prime-minister highly estimated pros of this security strategy in interview to Guardian, Ian Black, EU aims to secure better world 2 December 2003

5 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/12/eu.worlddispatch>

222), as well as a mutual military defence clause (Art. 42.7), in the EU's new Treaty of Lisbon. However, the effect of the latter clause was weakened by words allowing member states to keep their specific defence policies, a clear reference to the non-allied status of Sweden and Finland among others.

As for NATO, Finland and Sweden received observership in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which later became Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In 1994 they both joined the PfP, and entered PfP's Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1995. For West European states, membership in these organizations was not seen as an intermediate stage to join NATO but rather as a tool to spread security and stability.<sup>158</sup> However, this close cooperation was not the result of wide public consultation in either country and would not necessarily receive strong public support, given the still widespread scepticism in public opinion about NATO membership and disapproval for some particular NATO and U.S actions.<sup>159</sup> Public opinion on NATO has varied in recent years, but the tendency remains negative within both Swedish and Finnish societies (See Figures 3, 4).

**Figure 3.** Sweden's public opinion on membership in NATO<sup>160</sup>




<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 149-150.

<sup>159</sup> Gunilla Herolf, "The Nordic countries and the EU-NATO relationship: further comments" in *The Nordic countries and the European Security and Defence Policy*, ed. by Alyson J. K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf, Bengt Sundelius, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 2006: 69-70; see also Juho Rahkone, *Public Opinion, Journalism and the Question of Finland's Membership of NATO*, *Nordicom Review* 28 (2007) 2: 81-9.

<sup>160</sup> *Swedish Trends 1986-2010*, ed. by Sören Holmberg, Lennart Weibull och Henrik Oscarsson, SOM Institute, University of Gothenburg: 67.

[http://www.som.gu.se/digitalAssets/1342/1342504\\_swedish-trends-1986-2010.pdf](http://www.som.gu.se/digitalAssets/1342/1342504_swedish-trends-1986-2010.pdf)

**Figure 4.** Finland's public opinion on membership in NATO<sup>161</sup>




If over a long period neutrality remained an axiom of foreign policy in Finland and Sweden, the debate intensified after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, when the former non-Russian member states joined NATO, as well as after the entry into NATO of the Nordics' closest neighbours - the Baltic States. As a rule, the political elite in both countries takes a more progressive view of cooperation with NATO, while the value attached to neutrality in society more generally remains high. Recent surveys indicate lower support for NATO in Swedish and Finnish opinion than for the common EU defence policy. One of the most important arguments of the NATO supporters is the high cost of maintaining the policy of neutrality in comparison with the military spending of NATO member states, but this is rather a myth as expressed in the following figure:

<sup>161</sup> Opinions on Security Policy, Autumn 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2011. Tampere: Finnish Social Science Data Archive; MTS Survey statistics report 2010, the Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI), Bulletins 1/2010, Figure 10.  
[http://www.defmin.fi/files/1686/MTS\\_Survey\\_statistics\\_2010.pdf](http://www.defmin.fi/files/1686/MTS_Survey_statistics_2010.pdf)



Figure 5<sup>162</sup>



This figure shows a drastic difference in military spending between the European aligned and non-allied states: there is a block of NATO states that spends several times more than the neutrals do.

As for the practical military policies of Sweden and Finland, both have made increasingly active contributions to crisis management outside their national borders<sup>163</sup> notably in the programs of IFOR and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) within NATO; in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), ISAF and peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, Georgia, India, Pakistan, the Middle East, etc. within the UN; and in peacekeeping tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Croatia within the WEU. Peacekeeping activities within these organizations are aimed at peaceful settlement of crisis situations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as at the fight against international terrorism; a clear reflection of how security priorities have changed within the relevant defence organizations.

With regard to stability building, Finland and Sweden contribute to this mainly in the Baltic region, by helping to manage the complex of problems related, firstly, to the geographical proximity of Russia and the Baltic membership in NATO, and secondly, to the problems of the Baltic Sea pollution as well as differences in economic well-being of the region, organized crime and border

<sup>162</sup> SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, SIPRI milex data 1988-2010. <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>

<sup>163</sup> Pentilla, 183.

issues. Cooperation on these issues is pursued through local groupings such as the CBSS and BEAC which also include Russia, and in which Sweden and Finland play the role of bridge-builders with the EU.<sup>164</sup> Finland also initiated in 1997 to create the EU's Northern Dimension Initiative for working with Russia, Norway and Iceland, and it was implemented in 1999 when Finland held Presidency in the EU.<sup>165</sup>

Finally, speaking about the strengths and weaknesses of European non-allied states, including how influential they are in NATO, one can note several points. First, not having membership in NATO, Sweden and Finland suffer from a reduced role in decision-making, especially on issues that go beyond the limits of their non-allied status. Secondly, being relatively small states, they are limited in their ability to take part in the comprehensive decision-making and problem-solving processes. On the other hand, Finland and Sweden have significant weight in relative terms. First, they make a proportionately high contribution to peacekeeping activities within NATO, connected to the unique role and perception of Sweden and Finland in Europe and in the world. Second, these countries are the largest contributors to stability and security in the Baltic region, representing the importance of expertise and partnership in this region while avoiding giving provocation to Russia through their decisions (so far) to stay out of NATO.<sup>166</sup>

Thus, the international situation after the Cold War does not seem to have decisively pushed these states towards joining NATO, but rather enriched the arguments for being non-allied. Sweden and Finland are unlikely to radically change their international status any time soon. Relying on NATO as the only instrument for ensuring their national security and stability would rather weaken that security and national sovereignty and would limit their role as bridge-builders

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<sup>164</sup> Alyson J. Bailes, "The European defence challenge for the Nordic region" in *The Nordic countries and the European Security and Defence Policy*: 7-9; see also summarized information on the defence activities in the table *Non-EU security institutional relationships of the Nordic countries*, 18; Herolf, 151-5; Ingebritsen.

<sup>165</sup> David Arter, Small State Influence within the EU: The Case of Finland's 'Northern Dimension Initiative', *Journal of Common Market Studies* vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 677-97, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-5965.00260/pdf>

<sup>166</sup> Herolf, 160-2.

and mediators.<sup>167</sup> Instead they have so far preferred a broader, more flexible and secure set of tools, which they have successfully used in today's realities.

#### **4.4 Conclusions on the neutrality of Sweden and Finland**

Analysis of the foreign policy of Sweden and Finland has shown that these countries had a different historical background, leading to differences in their foreign policy that were manifested primarily in the implementation of the policy of neutrality. Sweden always relied on its own capabilities, and never considered seeking a guarantee from any particular large power as a means of protecting her national interests; this decision saved her from the two world wars.

In its own way, the Finnish experience has also shown that relying solely on the assurances of the great powers does not make sense. Instead, Finland after 1945 pursued its own active policy, built on the skilful balancing of the interests of great powers and a clear and coherent strategic foreign policy based on the concept of adequate security, effectively defending neutrality.

While this understanding came to the newly independent Finland much later than to Sweden, after the Cold War both countries arrived at a similar model of being non-allied, which gave them new opportunities to find their niche in the world. The adoption of neutrality, and then its gradual conversion into a more narrow definition of non-alliance, has allowed these countries to maintain their national security, and eventually also to help preserve regional and global stability and security.

Considering the new wave of Russian political revival and strategic self-assertiveness, the way that Sweden and Finland have remained true to the principles of being non-allied while rebuilding their concept of security in accordance with the current realities may once again be seen as a fortunate solution in terms of the balance and stability of their region. They faced, as Ukraine does, an acute dilemma of acceding to the European or to the transatlantic world. Their foreign policy demonstrates a clear preference for the European vector – as reflected in EU rather than NATO membership - and sympathy for the

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<sup>167</sup> Johan Eliasson, Traditions, Identity and Security: the Legacy of Neutrality in Finnish and Swedish Security Policies in Light of European Integration, European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 8 (2004) N° 6: 10, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-006a.htm>

development of a non-polarized and inclusive European security system. In this fact, combined with the fact that such policy choices have maintained rather than undermined Sweden's relative weight within the Baltic region, one can see the most valuable lesson to be learned by Ukraine.

But how different are historical and geopolitical prerequisites for Ukraine's neutral foreign policy? How to avoid a destructive choice between Russia and NATO? Is it possible for Ukraine to create a solid basis for national and regional stability and security by means of a neutral or non-allied foreign policy in case of Ukraine? This will be discussed in the remaining part of the paper.

## 5 Ukraine in the system of international relations and the problems of its non-alignment

One of the important events of the 20th century in Europe was the creation of an independent Ukraine, as part of wider changes in the international system. The main catalyser for the formation of Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the politico-military confrontation between East and West. These conditions faced Ukraine's foreign policy with a difficult choice, liable to affect stability and security not only at national level, but also in the region and world as a whole. Guided by the geopolitical realities of the last decades of the 20th century, as well as by a rich historical experience, Ukraine opted for non-alignment. This chapter attempts to describe and analyze the historical and geopolitical factors that led to this non-aligned status, as well as to identify the peculiarities of the Ukrainian non-alignment.

### 5.1 Ukraine in historical retrospective

Originally, the word “*ukraina*” meant ‘borderland’, ‘homeland’ or simply territory, land.<sup>168</sup> The most probable etymology of this word is the link with the word ‘principality’, that is a kind of inner territory. Geopolitically, however, the logic of Ukrainian statehood arose in a different way. Ukraine emerged not as a territorial unit of another power, but as a separate entity. For the first time the word ‘Ukraina’ appeared in the Primary Chronicle (1187)<sup>169</sup>, during the period of feudal fragmentation of Kyivan Rus, and quickly spread in informal usage. The term ‘Ukraina’ came into general usage, including foreign sources, in the 16th century.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Vasmer's *Etymological Dictionary*, s.v. “Украина,” accessed April 19, 2012, <http://starling.rinet.ru>

<sup>169</sup> *Hypation Chronicle*, s.v. “Оукраина,” accessed April 19, 2012, <http://litopys.org.ua/ipatlet/ipat28.htm#r1187>

<sup>170</sup> For example, this area was called the ‘Ukraina’ in a letter of the Turkish Sultan Suleiman to the Polish king Sigismund Korybut (1564); later Ukraine was mentioned in the Pact of Stephen Báthory, Hungarian Prince of Transylvania, the King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania (1580); and finally, the name of Ukraine was widely circulated in the Ukrainian folklore - in songs, proverbs, tales, dealing with the national liberation and the cultural phenomena of the 16<sup>th</sup> - 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. Ukraine began to be used in the sense of the state populated by Ukrainian ethnos. See: Y. Rudnytsky, *The word and the name of “Ukraine”* [In Ukrainian] (Winnipeg, 1951).

The outstanding Ukrainian historians Volodymyr Antonovych, Michael Hrushevsky, Natalia Yakovenko and Orest Subtelny agree that the Ukrainian nation was formed over thousands of years previously in the territory of the modern Ukraine.<sup>171</sup> The progenitors of Ukrainians were the representatives of the Cucuteni-Trypillian culture, the Neolithic archaeological culture that inhabited the territory of Ukraine in III millennium BC.

Looking ahead to the full span of Ukrainian history, it can be said that Ukraine emerged and developed under the 'curse' of strategic resources. The main motive for the struggle for the territory of Ukraine was and is its very favourable geopolitical and economic transit location; therefore the struggle for Ukraine is largely a struggle for the control over the trade routes and trading interests of the Ukrainian elites.<sup>172</sup>

In the 5th century, according to the widespread legend, Kyiv was founded, becoming the biggest city in Europe by the 11th century, and in the 9th century the Kyivan Rus was established, becoming the biggest and very powerful European medieval monarchy with a political and cultural centre at Kyiv<sup>173</sup> (see figure 6). The zenith of Kyiv's power falls in Prince Volodymyr's and Yaroslav's reign (978 - 1054), when Ukraine accepted Christianity (988) and established close ties with the most powerful European rulers. The power of Kyivan Rus was then split into the principalities, including the Western Duchies of Galicia and Volodymyr, but waned with the advent of feudal strife in the 12th century and

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<sup>171</sup> Here and further a brief history of the Ukrainian statehood is illustrated on the basis of the following scientific publications: Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus* in 9 volumes [in Ukrainian], <http://litopys.org.ua/hrushrus/iur.htm>; Natalia Yakovenko, *The Outline of the History of Ukraine from Ancient Times to the End of the XVIII century* [in Ukrainian], <http://history.franko.lviv.ua/PDF%20Final/Jakovenko.pdf>; Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Essays on the History of Ukraine: Formation of the Modern Ukrainian Nation* [in Ukrainian], <http://history.franko.lviv.ua/PDF%20Final/Grycak.pdf>; Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history*, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1994).

<sup>172</sup> For example, an old Slavic Kyiv connected trade route from the Varangians to the Greeks, while the Great Silk Road passed through Ukraine to Europe. The history of the Middle Ages was permeated by the interests of the Ukrainian merchant families. Cossack Hetmans after Bohdan Khmelnytsky's reign advocated first and foremost for the protection of their economic privileges. Ukraine of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was a country of merchants and patrons and their trade industrial relations. Not surprisingly, the Ukrainian elite nowadays is still full of representatives of big business groups and oligarchic clans, and the way of their thinking is caused by the historical transit past. (On this topic see: Kost Bondarenko, "La Cosa\* Nostra," *Ukrainian Pravda*, 16 February 2012 [in Ukrainian], <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/02/16/6958801/> (\* used ironically. In Ukrainian, la Cosa is homonym of a goat – *koza* [koza]).

<sup>173</sup> Indicative that Kyiv to this day is often referred to the 'mother of Russian cities'.

was destroyed in the 13th century by the Mongol invasion (the Golden Horde), lasting more than two and a half centuries. The Kyivan Rus was replaced by the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia, which lasted until the mid-14th century and fell under Lithuanian, and later Polish, rule in the 14th century.





From the 14<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> centuries Ukraine was largely under European influence from Poland and Lithuania. During that time Ukrainians, oppressed from the West by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and from the East by the rising principality of Moscow, or Muscovy, began to consider themselves as a distinct people; and since then the idea of the national liberation struggle of Ukrainian people became one of the main discourses in the history of Ukraine.<sup>175</sup>

Since the 16th century Ukraine became known on the European political map as the Zaporizhian Sich,<sup>176</sup> which was governed by the Cossacks (free men, 'adventurers', 'outlaws'). The Zaporizhian Host, and later the Cossack Hetmanate, became the personification of Ukrainian statehood and of the national liberation struggle of Ukrainians against Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman domination. The victory in the national liberation war of 1648-1654 under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky led to the signing of the controversial Treaty of Pereyaslav, which eventually turned Ukraine into a colony, divided between Poland and Russia. The Cossacks continued to fight against Russia with the support of Sweden in 1709, but failed in the Battle of Poltava. Finally, the Zaporizhian Sich was destroyed during the reign of Catherine II in 1775.<sup>177</sup>

In 1793, when Poland was divided, most of the Ukrainian territory merged with the Russian Empire, while Western Ukraine was absorbed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The political style of the Russian Empire showed itself in the denationalization and Russification of Ukraine, where strict limits were enforced on the development of Ukrainian culture and the use of the Ukrainian language in public life, provoking a new wave of struggle for re-establishing the Ukrainian nation-state.

The First World War led to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and coincided with the Russian revolutions in February and October 1917 that destroyed the monarchy and the Russian Empire *per se*. It created an excellent

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<sup>175</sup> One of the main features of Ukrainian history is that it is riddled the nation-centred ideas and the struggle for freedom and independence. The national liberation struggle appeared even before the formation of the nation. The nation-centred approach is criticized in modern historiography, in particular, by Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, but it remains the dominant approach in Ukrainian historiography.

<sup>176</sup> Actually, the first Sich emerged even long time before - in the late 15<sup>th</sup> century, namely in 1492.

<sup>177</sup> D. Yavornytsky, *History of Cossacks*, in three volumes [in Ukrainian] (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1991).

opportunity for Ukrainian independence. In 1917, a new-established National Ukrainian Assembly proclaimed the Ukrainian Nation's Republic (UNR), and in 1918 it proclaimed the independence of Ukraine. In the same year, Western Ukrainians proclaimed the West Ukrainian Nation's Republic (WUNR), independent from Austria-Hungary, which lasted only eight months. At that time, Ukrainians were fighting against various powers, such as German, Austrian and Polish forces, the Red Army of Bolshevik Russia and the White forces of Lieutenant General Denikin, but were ultimately unable to defend their statehood. A part of Western Ukraine passed to Poland, while the rest of the area was proclaimed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1922.

In the 1930s, the processes of collectivization caused an agrarian crisis, aiming to exterminate the social foundations of Ukrainian national identity. Hundreds of thousands of wealthier peasants, or so-called 'kulaks', were identified as class enemies and deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan, while tens of thousands of kulaks were simply executed. In 1932-1933 Stalin's rule led to the crime of the century - Holodomor, or Ukrainian Holocaust, a man-made genocide-famine, which destroyed more than eight million ethnic Ukrainians (estimates vary from 1.8 to 12 million) and threatened the biological survival of the Ukrainian nation.<sup>178</sup>

Dissent in the circles of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and their attempts of Ukrainisation also led to the massive repression and executions of the most prominent representatives of Ukraine in order to avoid separatism<sup>179</sup>. An egregious event was the elimination of a whole generation of the talented writers and thinkers of the 20-30s, known as the 'Executed Renaissance'. The cumulative number of deportations of the socially active segment of Ukrainian society totalled more than 300,000 people in the interwar years.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> Decision of the Court of Appeal of Kyiv in a Criminal Case on the Fact of Committing Genocide in Ukraine in 1932-1933 [in Ukrainian], <http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1265039604>

<sup>179</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. "Ukraine," accessed April, 19 2012, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine>

<sup>180</sup> Stanislav Kulchitsky, "Demographic Losses in Ukraine in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century," *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, no 39 (2004) [in Russian], [http://zn.ua/SOCIETY/demograficheskie\\_poteri\\_ukrainy\\_v\\_hh\\_veke-41261.html](http://zn.ua/SOCIETY/demograficheskie_poteri_ukrainy_v_hh_veke-41261.html)

Western Ukraine was annexed to the Ukrainian SSR in 1939, when Poland was divided between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia as a result of the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Western Ukraine first supported the Germans in the Second World War, hoping for reciprocal support for Ukraine's aspirations for independence, but when German intentions towards Ukraine became clearly aggressive, it fought against both the Soviet and Nazi forces with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army known as UPA.<sup>181</sup> During the Second World War Ukraine was the most devastated republic in the world and suffered the loss of eight million Ukrainian lives, having second biggest demographic losses after Russia. Taking into account all the demographic losses of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the natural population of Ukraine today would amount to 100 million people.<sup>182</sup>

The victory of the Soviet Union meant liberation from Nazism for the rest of the world and the second wave of Stalinist repression for Ukraine. The Soviet machine focussed first on the foreign policy interests of the Soviet empire, and least of all on the interests of the people. The Chernobyl tragedy of 1986 was not only an environmental and economic catastrophe, but also a textbook example of Soviet bureaucratic negligence and ineptitude.

Then came the surprise collapse of the Soviet Union. On 16 July 1990 the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament) of Soviet Ukraine adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, which declared the "state sovereignty of Ukraine as supremacy, independence, integrity and indivisibility of power within the state's territory, as well as independence and equality in external relations".<sup>183</sup> The Declaration led to the proclamation of independence on 24 August 1991, and on December 1, a referendum formalised the independence of Ukraine *de jure*. The borders of Ukraine acquired modern shape as shown on the map below.

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<sup>181</sup> P.T. Firov, *History of the UPA: Events, facts, documents, comments. (Lectures)*. (Sevastopol: SevNTU, 2002) [in Ukrainian],  
<http://lib.rus.ec/b/181401>

<sup>182</sup> Kulchitsky, above n13.

<sup>183</sup> Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (1990) [in Ukrainian],  
<http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/55-12>)

**Figure 7.** The map of modern Ukraine



Thus, Ukraine has been an independent nation for almost twenty-one years. As the second largest republic in the Soviet Union, Ukraine even earlier called for attention. Today it is clear that Ukraine as the geographically largest European country, situated in the centre of Europe, with forty-five million people and a medium-strong economy (see figure 8), needs a clear national strategy both for its own and Europe's stability and security.

**Figure 8.** Basic facts about Ukraine, 2012 (estimates start after 2010)<sup>184</sup>

<sup>184</sup> International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011: *Report for Ukraine and European Countries*,

Subject descriptor	Territory, km <sup>2</sup>	Estimated population, m.	GDP*, (US\$ b.)	GDP per capita, (US\$)	GDP based on PPP valuation of country GDP (US\$, b.)	GDP based on PPP per capita GDP	Total investment (% of GDP)
<b>Ukraine</b>	603,550	45.326	184.899	4,079.32	347.311	7,662.52	24.102
<b>Position in Europe (out of 44 states)</b>	The largest in Europe	8	22	38	12	40	11

\*All data are represented in current prices. GDP = Gross Domestic Product; PPP = Purchasing-Power-Parity.

With independence Ukraine gained sovereignty and full authority, but simultaneously it was burdened with responsibility and faced with a difficult question: which model of national security could best preserve and maintain its sovereignty?

Ukraine's search was influenced by prevailing historical experience of interaction with the neighbouring powerful states, while within the country it was hard to identify a clear idea of the nation during such a short period of independence. Many might see the results as a period of missed opportunities. Others point to a sacralisation of sovereignty, conditioned by historical experience, that in turn led to a rejection of comprehensive security cooperation with the external powers. All of these factors are reflected in the conception of Ukrainian non-alignment, to which the following section is dedicated.

## 5.2 Ukraine's policy choices in 1991-2012

The proclamation of independence of Ukraine was one of the consequences of a substantially shifted balance of power in international political and security space. Independent Ukraine found itself alone with the whole complex of problems inherited from the Soviet Union, the most severe of which was the fact that Ukraine had interrupted its nation-building experience for many decades and

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[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2010&ey=2012&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=941%2C946%2C911%2C137%2C962%2C122%2C912%2C181%2C913%2C124%2C921%2C943%2C963%2C918%2C138%2C142%2C964%2C182%2C960%2C968%2C423%2C922%2C935%2C128%2C942%2C936%2C939%2C961%2C172%2C184%2C132%2C915%2C134%2C174%2C144%2C146%2C944%2C176%2C186%2C178%2C136%2C926%2C112%2C967&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CNID\\_NGDP%2CLP&grp=0&a=&pr.x=75&pr.y=14#download;](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2010&ey=2012&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=941%2C946%2C911%2C137%2C962%2C122%2C912%2C181%2C913%2C124%2C921%2C943%2C963%2C918%2C138%2C142%2C964%2C182%2C960%2C968%2C423%2C922%2C935%2C128%2C942%2C936%2C939%2C961%2C172%2C184%2C132%2C915%2C134%2C174%2C144%2C146%2C944%2C176%2C186%2C178%2C136%2C926%2C112%2C967&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CNID_NGDP%2CLP&grp=0&a=&pr.x=75&pr.y=14#download;)

Basic Facts about Ukraine, Consulate General of Ukraine in New York,  
[http://www.ukrconsul.org/BASIC\\_FACTS.htm](http://www.ukrconsul.org/BASIC_FACTS.htm)

centuries. The UN was perhaps the only international organization in which Ukraine had occasionally reminded the world of its existence; such gestures were far from a real assertion of the state's interests during the Soviet period. However, Ukraine could now not avoid developing and implementing a set of new policy guidelines aimed at restoring Ukraine's historical status as a European state.<sup>185</sup> In 1991 Ukraine solemnly declared "its intention to become in the future a permanently neutral state, taking no part in military blocs and holding to three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons".<sup>186</sup>

The first step in developing the foreign policy concept became the national doctrine called "Basic Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy", adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 2 July 1993. With the adoption of this document, Ukraine signalled its active and full-scale entry into the world community. According to the foreign policy doctrine, the main directions of foreign policy were identified as bilateral interstate relations, participation in the European regional cooperation and in UN activities, and in the newly created Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) under the leadership of Russia. The document identified the countries and groups of countries with which Ukraine intended to develop its primary relationships, notably with the neighbouring countries and EU-NATO member states, as well as with countries in Asia, Asia-Pacific, Africa and Latin America.<sup>187</sup>

Ukraine's foreign policy has been subjected to review several times, and its content depended not only on the external environment, but also on the domestic

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<sup>185</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A plan for Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (1995), accessed 19 April 2012, <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20047017?uid=3738288&uid=2&uid=4&sid=47698901230837>

<sup>186</sup> Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, Section IX; The Law of Defence of Ukraine on 06.12.91, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine [in Ukrainian], <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-12>

This Law is also stated that Ukraine is committed to neutrality and to the maintenance of the three nonnuclear principles.

<sup>187</sup> Resolution of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "Basic Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy," the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (1993) [in Ukrainian], <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3360-12>;

Konstantin Grishchenko, "Outside of the Chess Board: A pragmatic agenda for the Ukrainian foreign policy", *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, no. 27 (2010) [in Ukrainian and Russian], [http://dt.ua/POLITICS/poza\\_mezhami\\_shahivnitsi\\_pragmatichniy\\_poryadok\\_denniy\\_ukrayinskoy\\_i\\_zovnishnoyi\\_politiki-60748.html](http://dt.ua/POLITICS/poza_mezhami_shahivnitsi_pragmatichniy_poryadok_denniy_ukrayinskoy_i_zovnishnoyi_politiki-60748.html);

political conjuncture. To date, the foreign policy has gone through four major phases:

- August 1991 - mid-1994 - Leonid Kravchuk's restoration of the state;
- mid-1994 - 2004 - Leonid Kuchma's non-alignment and multi-vector policy;
- 2005 – early 2010 - Viktor Yushchenko's Euro-Atlanticism;
- April 2010 - to date - Viktor Yanukovych's non-alignment and balance.

**The first phase** is associated with the presidency of L. Kravchuk (1991-1994) and was characterized by the wide international recognition of Ukraine as an independent state.<sup>188</sup> By that time, Ukraine has joined the Charter of Paris for a New Europe,<sup>189</sup> becoming in 1992 a member of the CSCE (OSCE) and other security international organizations (see below figure 9).

At the same time, the inter-state relations between Ukraine and Russia began to deteriorate due to economic, territorial and political differences. These differences were a serious threat not only to Ukrainian national interests, but also to international stability and security, because both states had one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. Therefore, the primary task of the international community and Ukrainian administration became the acquisition of a nuclear-free status by Ukraine. On 14 January 1994 a Trilateral Statement was signed by the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and the USA in Moscow, making Ukraine the first country in the world to voluntarily renounce the world's third largest nuclear weapons arsenal. By securing guarantees in return from the USA, UK and France as well as Russia (and later China), this deal protected the state's non-aligned status.<sup>190</sup> Nevertheless, Kravchuk's approach to the problems of national security provided no overall solution for the problems with Russia.

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<sup>188</sup> The first countries that recognized Ukraine's independence became Canada and Poland, not least because they have very numerous, influential and successful Ukrainian diasporas.

<sup>189</sup> *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*, Paris, 1990  
<http://www.osce.org/mc/39516>

<sup>190</sup> Trilateral statement by the presidents of the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine - Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk, Moscow, Russia, January 14, 1994 - The Trip of President Clinton to

**The second phase** (mid 1994 - 2004) coincides with the presidency of L. Kuchma. Foreign policy was redefined as a ‘multi-vector policy’, consisting of the development of pragmatic and balanced international relations in different directions, without a particular orientation towards a specific country or a group of countries. It mirrored the geopolitical position of Ukraine as a country located between East and West – between Russia and the USA. One achievement of this multi-vector policy was the establishment of a strategic partnership with the United States, although the intensity of Ukrainian-American relations decreased

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Brussels, Prague, Kyiv, Moscow, Minsk, and Geneva, January 9-16, 1994, US Department of State Dispatch accessed April 19, 2012,  
[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1584/is\\_nSUPP-1\\_v5/ai\\_15184081/pg\\_2/?tag=content;coll](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_nSUPP-1_v5/ai_15184081/pg_2/?tag=content;coll)



**Figure 9.** Relationships of Ukraine with security organisations

Organisation	Status	Year of the beginning of cooperation
Commonwealth of Independent States	Observer, charter is not ratified	1991
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe <sup>a</sup>	Member	1992 (CSCE) → 1995 (OSCE)
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	Member	1992 (NACC) → 1997 (EAPC)
Partnership for Peace	Member	1995
Central European Initiative <sup>b</sup>	Member	1995
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative	Observer	1996
Non-Aligned Movement	Observer	1996
GUAM Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development	Member	1997
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe <sup>c</sup>	Observer	1999
Council of the Baltic Sea States	Observer	1999
Black Sea Naval Force (BLACKSEAFOR)	Member	2001
Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue	Member	2006
Foreign military forces in country	Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol (Crimea) on a basis of temporary lease.	1783 – 2042, with the possibility of further extension by 5 years.

<sup>a</sup> Ukraine will hold chairmanship in 2013

<sup>b</sup> Ukraine holds Presidency in 2012

<sup>c</sup> It was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council in 2008. Ukraine is neither an observer, nor a member of this Council.

NACC = North Atlantic Cooperation Council; CSCE = the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

with the advent of the George W. Bush administration and the review of U.S. military doctrine, according to which American attention shifted from Eastern Europe towards the Middle East. As for the European direction, Ukraine gained membership in the Council of Europe (1995), and intensified relations with the EU by signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994 (entering into force in 1998). In addition, Ukraine began to build partnerships with Third-world countries.

As figure 9 illustrates above, Ukraine demonstrated high interest in cooperation within numerous international security organisations. This second phase of its policy was also rich in participation in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation

ventures, including the signature of all main documents on non-proliferation of nuclear weapon as shown in the figure 10.

Furthermore, Ukraine participated in conflict management missions all over the world, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and other troubled areas. In doing so, Ukraine concretized its national policy of peace.

**Figure 10.** Party of Ukraine in institutions and treaties on nuclear security<sup>a</sup>

Institution/treaty	Status
<i>International Organisations</i>	
Conference on Disarmament (CD)	Member
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Member
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	Member
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation Preparatory Commission	Member
<i>Nuclear Treaties</i>	
1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)	State Party
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)	State Party
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)	State Party
IAEA Safeguards Agreement	Yes (INFCIRC 550)
IAEA Additional Protocol	In force 1/24/06
Nuclear Safety Convention	State Party
Joint Spent Fuel Management Convention	State Party
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	State Party
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005)	State Party
Antarctic Treaty	State Party
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation	State Party
Proliferation Security Initiative	Participant
CEF Treaties <sup>b</sup>	State party (1992; 1993; 2000)
Budapest memorandum <sup>c</sup>	State Party
<i>Non-proliferation Export Controls</i>	
Zangger Committee	Member
Nuclear Suppliers Group	Member
Australia Group	Member
Missile Technology Control Regime	Member
Wassenaar Arrangement	Member

<sup>a</sup> Ukraine Treaty memberships,

[http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/ukraine.pdf?\\_=1316536553](http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/ukraine.pdf?_=1316536553)

<sup>b</sup> CEF Treaties (or CFE = Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) include the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the 1992 CFE-1A Agreement and the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the 1990 Treaty (CFE-II)

<sup>c</sup> This international agreement was signed between Ukraine and the U.S, the UK and Russia on non-nuclear status of Ukraine in 1994. The Agreement includes the guarantees of security and sovereignty of Ukraine.

Kuchma stepped up cooperation with NATO in military, political, defence and security spheres, creating a NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) in 1997 and the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine (NIDC). He also deepened cooperation by signing the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan (2002).<sup>197</sup>

Relations with Russia during that period were characterized by the ‘trade wars’ and complications regarding the status of Crimea and Sevastopol, historically belonging to the Russian Empire, but transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. The culmination of Kuchma’s diplomacy was the signature of a comprehensive Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the countries in Kyiv (1997).<sup>198</sup> The agreement resolved the issue of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, as well as economic disputes. In 2003, a territorial conflict broke out around the island of Tuzla, which was unleashed by Russia in order to put pressure on Ukraine over the settlement of the status of the Kerch Strait and the Azov Sea. However, the conflict was frozen in the same year.

The multi-vector policy involved a highly complex system of balancing, manoeuvrings and compromises that made it possible to solve or freeze inter-state conflicts with Russia, while demonstrating to the international community that Ukraine had become a contributor rather than a consumer of security and stability.

The third stage in the foreign policy of Ukraine began with the coming into power of pro-democratic and pro-western ‘orange’ politicians led by V. Yushchenko (2005 – early 2010). Yushchenko radically revised the non-aligned multi-vector policy, while declaring a policy of comprehensive Euro-Atlantic integration, contrary to the earlier stated intent of Ukraine to become a permanently neutral state in future. This integration policy was focused on joining NATO with the further integration into the EU. EU cooperation was developed on the platform of the Eastern Partnership (EP) within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), established in 2009. Its main objectives include the strengthening of relations with the Eastern EU member states, as well as

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<sup>197</sup> NATO-Ukraine Action Plan in Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine [in Ukrainian], <http://ukraine-nato.ukrinform.ua/ru/nato/cooperation/plan.php>

<sup>198</sup> Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (1998) [in Ukrainian], [http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643\\_006](http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_006)  
English version is available on [http://zakon.nau.ua/eng/doc/?code=643\\_006](http://zakon.nau.ua/eng/doc/?code=643_006)

improvements in Ukraine's legislative, economic, and administrative systems and in the energy sector.<sup>199</sup>

In 2005 the Intensified Dialogue with NATO was established as the last stage prior to starting an accession process, and in 2008 a highly controversial formal statement about the possibility of creating a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine was signed by the then President Yushchenko, then Prime-Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and then Speaker Arsenii Yatsenyuk.<sup>200</sup> However, at the Bucharest NATO summit (2008), Ukraine was not granted a MAP, although there were affirmations of the state's accession to the Alliance in the future. This coincided with an active phase of Russian policy in the post-Soviet space<sup>201</sup>, as well as domestic political instability in Ukraine.

In relations with Russia, the Black Sea Fleet issue significantly worsened border relations and the problems of cooperation in the energy sector were also exacerbated. The consequence of these problems was the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine (2005-2006) and the subsequent 'gas war' (2008-2009), which resulted in a dramatic drop in the Ukrainian economy and the undermining of wider European energy security.<sup>202</sup>

Ukraine by this time no longer perceived the CIS as a serious and effective structure and raised the question of the revival of the GUAM, expressing state's willingness to become a regional leader. In particular, the "Yushchenko Plan" was launched to try to resolve the protracted Transnistrian problem, but it was not carried through. Another regional initiative (in cooperation with post-revolutionary Georgia) became the establishment of the Commonwealth of Democratic Choice (CDC) in 2005, bringing together a 'community of democracies' of the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea – Ukraine, Georgia, Romania,

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<sup>199</sup> Many Ukrainian experts nevertheless call the EP a dead end, because in their view it does not aim at the process of integration into the EU

<sup>200</sup> Alyona Hetmanchuk, "Letter of the Three to NATO," *Glavred* (2008) [in Ukrainian] <http://ua.glavred.info/archive/2008/01/16/150512-1.html>;  
Volodymyr Kravchenko, "The letter of the Three," *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, no.2 (2008) [in Ukrainian] [http://dt.ua/POLITICS/list\\_troh-52522.html](http://dt.ua/POLITICS/list_troh-52522.html)

<sup>201</sup> Here the Russo-Georgian War of August 8, 2008 is primarily meant as one of the symbols of the Russian 'resurrection' in foreign policy.

<sup>202</sup> Valerii Mazur, "Broken decade or lost pyatiletka?" *Svitohlyad* [in Russian], <http://www.svitohlyad.info/article.php?id=4586>

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Macedonia. However, the organization proved to be unviable.

In economic policy, Ukraine became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2008.<sup>203</sup> Prior to this, in December 2005, the EU recognized Ukraine as a country with market economy.

Revanchist V. Yanukovych's election victory marked **the fourth phase** in the state's foreign policy (April 2010 - to date). He turned his back on Euro-Atlantic integration and solemnized non-alignment in the Law of Ukraine "On the basis of domestic and foreign policy" (2010) that replaced the Law of 1993.<sup>204</sup> Following the provisions of the new "National Security Strategy" (2010)<sup>205</sup>, he began to correct *de jure* the course of cooperation with NATO. He abolished the NUC and the NIDC. However paradoxically, *de facto* Yanukovych not only preserved but, compared with Yushchenko, significantly intensified the contacts with NATO with a view to "domestic reforms in Ukraine in security, defence, economic, legal and other fields".<sup>206</sup> Even more ironic, Ukraine continues to implement the Annual National Programme (ANP) (forming part of the MAP), although the prospect of membership in NATO has been removed from the Law "On the basis of national security of Ukraine" (in 2011). In addition, Ukraine is the only country that takes part in all NATO operations.<sup>207</sup>

Yanukovych at the beginning of his presidency normalized interstate relations with Russia. The most resonant event of his presidency to date has been signing the Russian-Ukrainian Naval Base for Gas Treaty (more known as the Kharkiv Pact) in April 2010, which extends the presence of the Russian fleet base

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<sup>203</sup> The path of Ukraine into the WTO, Ukraine and the World Trade Organisation, <http://wto.in.ua/index.php?lang=en&get=4>

<sup>204</sup> The Law of Ukraine "On the basis of domestic and foreign policy," the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2010) [in Ukrainian], <http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411-17>

<sup>205</sup> National Security Strategy "Ukraine in a Changing World," National Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Ukraine [in Ukrainian], <http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/project-Litvinenko-dcd38.pdf>

<sup>206</sup> Yanukovych eliminated the NATO-Ukraine Commission, TV News Service TSN [in Ukrainian], <http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/yanukovich-likviduvav-komisiyu-zi-vstupu-ukrayini-do-nato.html>;

Jaroslav Dovhopol, "Ukraine-NATO: what next?" Ukrainian Pravda (2011) [in Ukrainian], <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/10/31/6717340/>

<sup>207</sup> The history of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Participation in Peacekeeping Operations, Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=peacekeeping&lang=en>

in Sevastopol until at least 2042 with the right of prolongation, and discounts Russian hydrocarbons prices.<sup>208</sup> However, today it is clear that the Pact merely fired up Russian appetites. Russia immediately offered a package of proposals for Ukraine, including the control of the Ukrainian Gas Transport System (GTS), similar to the conditions for Belarus (Belarus does not control its GTS anymore), which drew protest reactions from the Ukrainian political elite.

In the European direction, Yanukovych returned to the principles of non-alignment combined with European integration. He rejected the possibility of Ukraine's participation in the Belarus-Russia Union State, as well as integration into the latest version of Russian multilateral geopolitical and economic projects (the Common Economic Space and the Customs Union).<sup>209</sup> As fruits of this policy, on 30 March 2012 Ukraine and the EU initialled a political part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA), as well as an economic part, which includes provisions for the establishment of the EU-Ukraine Free Trade Area.<sup>210</sup> However, Ukraine's further European integration process is likely to face political as well as practical obstacles, as European officials do not want to imply tolerance for a series of political persecution inside Ukraine.<sup>211</sup>

In the field of international security, Yanukovych is faithfully fulfilling Ukraine's commitments to replace highly enriched uranium in power generation with low enriched. Relevant agreements were signed at the Washington Summit (2010), where Yanukovych was named "the highlight of Obama's nuclear

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<sup>208</sup> The Draft Law on Ratification of the Agreement between Ukraine and Russian Federation on the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2010) [in Ukrainian],

[http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb\\_n/webproc4\\_1?pf3511=37584](http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb_n/webproc4_1?pf3511=37584)

<sup>209</sup> Comprehensive Assessment of the Macroeconomic Effects of Various Forms of Deep Economic Integration of Ukraine and the Member States of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space within the EurAsEU: Executive Summary of the Report, Eurasian Development Bank (EABR),

[http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/reports/Ukraina\\_doklad\\_eng.pdf](http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/reports/Ukraina_doklad_eng.pdf)

<sup>210</sup> Foreign Ministry: Ukraine and the EU Initialed the Association Agreement, *the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency UNIAN*,

<http://www.unian.net/news/495181-mid-ukraina-i-es-parafirovali-soglashenie-ob-assotsiatsii.html>

<sup>211</sup> This refers principally to the resonant politicised case of the ex-Prime Minister and leader of opposition Y. Tymoshenko and the ex-Interior Minister Yury Lutsenko).

summit”,<sup>212</sup> and fully implemented nuclear commitments prior to the Seoul Summit (2012).

Ukraine has finally been beginning to develop relations with Latin America, India, China, Southeast Asia and the Middle East (especially with Turkey).

Summing up the results of Ukraine’s foreign policy, it is important to note that Ukraine has become an unquestionably independent and sovereign state. It has persisted in its foreign policy objectives geared towards a European future. However, policy execution under all the presidents has remained characterized by a pendulum effect and the lack of a unified concept of national security and foreign policy. Every new president builds up a brand new doctrine. This adversely affects the international image of Ukraine as well as the stability and security in the state and the region.

Yet even if Ukraine’s experience in building a model of national security is not perfect, it has made a significant contribution to the theoretical understanding of the concept of non-alignment, proving its viability in a specific historical moment. The question of why Ukraine has used different approaches to the interpretation of its non-alignment, and to what degree it has reflected so far the normal theoretical understanding of non-alignment, is taken up in the following section.

### **5.3 Features of the Ukrainian non-aligned model of national security**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine suffered from a security vacuum. The Warsaw Pact, which had been the security umbrella for Ukraine, was proclaimed disbanded (1991), and was not replaced by any international security organization that would have been competent to take on the burden of Ukrainian problems. The situation was even more complicated due to the geopolitical location of Ukraine next door to a powerful, albeit weakened, Russian neighbour. The complex of these factors placed Ukraine before the dilemma of choosing its foreign policy stance, especially in relation to Russia, among the

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6 <sup>212</sup> Jackson Diehl, “Ukraine's new president the highlight of Obama's nuclear summit,” the Washington Post (2010),

7 [http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/04/ukraines\\_new\\_president\\_the\\_hig.htm](http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/04/ukraines_new_president_the_hig.htm)  
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alternatives '*alliance - non-alignment – belligerence*'. A post-Soviet Ukraine duly opted for the model of non-alignment in foreign policy.<sup>213</sup> What was the reason for this choice?

Notwithstanding the general statement made in the theoretical chapter above that since the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations, neutral states have stopped utilizing the principles of realism in their foreign policy, it is worth stressing that – on the contrary - the origins of Ukraine's non-alignment were based solely on the concept of neo-realism. These reasons included the concepts of the *balance of power* and *bandwagoning*, as Russia attempted to engineer the return of Ukraine to Russia's post-Soviet sphere of influence. Finding itself suddenly in a *self-help* and *insecure* situation, Ukraine was driven by a strong *survival* motive. In such circumstances, for Ukraine as well as for the whole international community, it was important to perceive an *impartial* Ukraine with a *middle position* in the interests of *avoiding fighting*.<sup>214</sup>

In addition, as stated in the theory of neutrality, a weaker state typically chooses neutrality when it is located at the border of the sphere of influence of the major local pole of power.<sup>215</sup> Ukraine was not an exception to this rule.

Another provision stipulates that non-aligned status is a precondition to building up maximum economic power. Indeed, the political elites of Ukraine during all its history have largely been represented by big business, and have closely linked the national interest to their economic interests. This practical motive has made it very important to maintain good relations both with the Russian and Western businesses.

Originally non-alignment was a basis for the deconstruction of defence and political ties with Russia.<sup>216</sup> Indeed, the Declaration of Sovereignty 'secured' the

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<sup>213</sup> In our opinion, it would be better to characterize the Ukrainian neutral status as a *non-allied* rather than *non-aligned*. Non-alignment *per se* is an ideological concept, and Ukraine has never been guided by such motives but rather oriented itself towards the Old World states, underlining its ultimate intention to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures. However, to avoid complexity and confusion in interpretation of the Ukrainian status, we will adhere to the generally accepted terminology.

<sup>214</sup> See references to K. Waltz' and K. Devine's in Ch.3.

<sup>215</sup> For example, see the case of Finland and Sweden in Ch.4; Austria as a neutral state has also bordered with the Russian pole of power, neighbouring with the Warsaw Pact military alliance.

<sup>216</sup> Sergei Lozunko, "Ukraine has not Proclaimed Neutrality, but its Non-alignment is Openly pro-NATO," *Gazeta 2000*, no. 33 (569) (2011) [in Russian], <http://2000.net.ua/2000/derzhava/realii/75063>



impossibility of Ukraine's participation in the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security (1992) and of full membership in the CIS.<sup>217</sup> However, in the "Basic Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy" adopted in 1993, Ukraine admitted a possible deviation from non-alignment in favour of joining the European security structures based on the OSCE, NATO or the WEU. This idea was further actively utilized by the pro-Western 'orange' political wing. Looking from the heights of the past twenty years, all these peculiarities make it possible to suppose that the terms of the Declaration of Sovereignty were not so much a strategic, but tactical device to make possible a balancing position that would gain time for strengthening Ukraine's economy and sovereignty.

But why has Ukraine not chosen other forms of neutrality? Ukraine chose the device of non-alignment, because it was the most natural, effective and timely policy for adaptation to the new political and geopolitical situation. Non-alignment offered a more flexible and appropriate framework, for instance, for resolving the issues related to the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation; formal neutrality would have made it contrary to the political and legal status of Ukraine to allow the continuation of foreign military forces and bases on its territory. In addition, non-alignment allowed Ukraine to express more freely its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Such a status did not require a complicated process of *de jure* recognition by other states, and did not require from Ukraine any specific steps for its maintenance.

This is why the idea of non-alignment took shape most fully during the presidency of Kuchma. A cleverly constructed multi-vector and non-aligned policy allowed him to maintain good relations with Russia, Europe, and the USA and to gather political and economic dividends. But how has the content of Ukraine's non-alignment changed in more recent stages?

Comparing Kuchma's and Yanukovich's presidencies, it can be seen that non-alignment has been changing and getting a new constructive content. This, firstly, has been caused by the changes in the external environment, as will be seen in the remaining chapter. Today Ukraine has already completed the necessary minimum in terms of building up its statehood. The threat of absorption in

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<sup>217</sup> Though Ukraine was one of the three founding countries (together with Russia and Belarus), it did not ratify the CIS Charter, holding observer status.

Russia's field of integration in the form of a reconstructed USSR or the CIS has disappeared. It has been replaced by the alternative options of joining the Russia-led Customs Union vs. EU's FTA, and in the future the Eurasian Union vs. the EU, alternatives that are no longer as critical for the preservation of Ukrainian statehood as they may have seemed earlier. In addition, the active peacekeeping record of Ukraine concretizes the policy of peace, so that Ukraine's position can hardly be called passive, weak, isolationist, irrational or immoral.<sup>218</sup> It is safe to say that for the second time (with the elections of 2010) Ukraine has declared its non-alignment voluntarily, not under direct coercion by a superpower, thus following the kind of identity choices envisaged by constructivism. However, a '*neo-non-alignment*' of Ukraine is increasingly losing its initial content, and many experts are inclined to see elements of hypocrisy in the non-aligned policy, since Ukraine has never been so actively cooperating with NATO as nowadays. Moreover, Ukraine has not revoked any earlier document relating to its strategic relations with the Alliance. Today Ukraine considers its type of neutral status, in practice, through the prism of 'national pragmatism' as coming down essentially to military non-membership in defence organisations.

One of the most, if not the most important aspect of Ukraine's non-aligned status today is that the neutrality and peace policy have become an important feature of the Ukrainian national identity. Social constructivists have already proved by the cases of other European neutral countries (e.g. Switzerland and Ireland) that neutrality is considered as a concept, which includes the elements of national identity and preserves identity.<sup>219</sup> As for Ukraine, given such a short period of statehood, the national identity has not yet had opportunity to establish itself to the same degree as in other European neutral countries. Ukraine is still fraught with a critical mass of dividing factors, including civilisational, mental and political dividing lines (e.g. West - South-East; pro-Russian – pro-Western; Ukrainian-speaking – Russian speaking; Ukrainian Orthodoxy – Russian Orthodoxy, etc.). In these circumstances, the idea of neutrality can act and has already partially acted as a national idea, a cornerstone in the development of the Ukrainian national identity. Together with this, there is a potential risk that

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<sup>218</sup> Devine, above n. 71 (Chapter 2).

<sup>219</sup> For the constructivist framework and approach on neutrality see Chapter 3.

engagement in large political projects under the globalization process may erase the fragile national identity of Ukrainians. Our final chapter will discuss how Ukraine can gain from neutrality in this context as the largest European would-be neutral.

It should also be noted that the non-alignment can no longer be viewed as a panacea for the national security of Ukraine. It is a mistake to believe that non-alignment can allow balancing infinitely between the interests of great powers, just as it would be reckless to perceive non-alignment as the *only* way to preserve and protect the national interests. If non-alignment was a brilliant tool for tactical planning, strategically it is a dead-end model for the development of the Ukrainian state. In fact, non-alignment rather marks an absence in the political status of the country that may equate in practice to a lack of guarantees from the international community. With no institutionally secured political status, Ukraine, in case of an external threat, does not fall either under the juridical status of a neutral state or that of an allied state. The only guarantees that Ukraine has obtained are those given in the context of nuclear disarmament are given by the USA, UK, France, Russia and China, but these guarantees are of doubtful value in case of a conflict against Ukraine involving one of these parties.

Thus, the peculiarity of Ukrainian non-alignment feature lies in its pendulum nature, with various narrow and more flexible interpretations being used to maximize short-term economic and political benefits at minimum cost. It conveys a tangible tactical advantage, but causes hidden strategic loss.

#### **5.4 Conclusions on Ukraine in the system of international relations and the problems of its non-alignment**

Since the Golden Age of Ukrainian statehood under Kyivan Rus, Ukraine lost independence for centuries without ever completely losing its national aspirations, and while remaining both historically and geographically a European country. This was confirmed with the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations, when Ukraine declared its sovereignty and the principle of non-alignment in the foreign policy, while professing the principles of European integration. Independent Ukraine developed a multi-vector concept of relations with Russia and the West, following the principles of manoeuvring and

balancing. However, its foreign policy has depended not only on the exogenous, but also on the domestic and endogenous environment: almost every Ukrainian president has turned its orientation by 180 degrees. In the latest phase, the policy of forced Euro-Atlanticism has clearly collapsed while the dominant model has remained the moderate policy of non-alignment. This policy even more effectively allows Ukraine to pursue its Euro-Atlantic aspirations (short of NATO membership), as well as to limit the integration appetites of Russia while maintaining if not friendly, then at least not hostile relations with the 'big brother'. Thus Ukraine ensures stability and national security.

The non-alignment of Ukraine has no ideological colour; this is a purely pragmatic concept. One of the most powerful driving forces of the Ukrainian non-alignment has been the tactical thinking of political elites associated with obtaining short-term economic benefits, reflecting the way they conceive the national interests of Ukraine. Thus non-alignment is not an ideological posture, but based on a neorealist conception of the balance of power and survival in the self-help system. At the initial stage of modern statehood this status indeed provided a good remedy for Ukraine's 'security head-ache', bringing political and economic dividends at a lower level of risk. Today, however, non-alignment no longer provides a versatile tool for solving the larger problems of national security because it does not provide a protected institutional status as formal neutrality would. In fact, by maintaining non-alignment, Ukraine appears unprotected in face of modern threats. Therefore the main task for the political elites should be to develop a concept of national security that would meet the modern realities and national interests of Ukraine in a changing world.

The next, and the last, chapter will analyze which model can be the most advantageous for Ukraine in the long term, and what behaviours Ukraine should build up and implement in relations to its key strategic partners - Russia, the EU and NATO.

## **6 A new security model for Ukraine in a changing world**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ukraine entered the 21st century with a status of non-alignment. This status in its many diplomatic variations of 'multi-vector policy' and 'strategic balance' helped legitimize the Ukrainian state while distancing it from the Russian joint past. However, the attachment of the political elite to particular version of this status could, at first glance, mean distancing the solution of Ukraine's geopolitical and security dilemma into an uncertain future.

At the same time, the emergence and intensification of new threats are challenging the Westphalian primacy of the state and its supremacy in the implementation of domestic and foreign policy, creating among other things a real danger to the national security of Ukraine. Combined with the desire of certain states and military-political alliances to reconsider their place in the world, and *inter alia* rewrite the rules of the game against Ukraine, this adds to the range of challenges for the government. It calls for developing and implementing a fundamentally new foreign policy concept, relying on a concrete model of national security, on its relevance to the contemporary realities and on consistency in its implementation.

Non-alignment alone is no longer an effective tool to guarantee national security. Despite the natural desire of the political elite to keep the non-alignment *status quo*, this does not discharge Ukraine from liability for solving its geopolitical and security dilemma: the choice between Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian integration with preservation of military non-alignment, or the acquisition of membership in a military alliance, or full neutrality.


In this context, the experience of the European neutral countries persistently shows that, in contrast to non-alignment, neutrality in its modernized form remains an effective model of national security. Starting from the objective need to solve the Ukrainian security dilemma, this chapter analyzes the current problems of Ukraine in the context of its interaction with the great powers, and, ultimately, an attempt to formulate a new model of national security based on the experience of neutral Sweden and Finland.

## **6.1 The modern concerns of Ukraine**

The modern problems of Ukraine arise from the presence of external and internal trends that are a potential source of threat to national security. These factors are described in detail in the National Security Strategy of Ukraine (2010). First, they include the global external negative trends that are threatening the stability and the national security of Ukraine. Among them is the risk that increased competition between the world's centers of power could be expressed through the use of military pressure, the crisis of the international security system, and the weakening of the role of international security institutions. The phenomenon of the emergence of quasi-states that pose a direct threat to the sovereignty of the state and are a powerful catalyst for regional separatism has repeated itself, most recently with the territories that seceded from Georgia in 2008. Numerous reports from leading research institutes show the increasing trend of militarization in some parts of the world and in particular, the growing problem of nuclear disarmament. The unresolved problems of terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and human trafficking are now supplemented by entirely new threats such as cybercrime and the rapid intensification of the role of inter-connectedness in its impact on national security.

Second, the regional security environment around Ukraine is deteriorating (see figure 11). Potential threats include, above all, the intensification of the Russian 'zone of geopolitical responsibility', which takes the form of provoking the escalation of conflicts in the Black Sea-Caspian region, bringing destabilization and as a result, increased militarization to the area.

**Figure 11.** Map of potential and actual conflict-prone areas inside and outside of Ukraine



Meanwhile the USA has returned to the idea of the National Missile Defense (NMD) in Eastern Europe, but in a way that does not provide room for a wider European debate on the issue, including the participation of Ukraine. This puts Ukraine in a difficult situation and could actually lead to its transformation into a potential buffer zone between the nuclear interests of Russia and NATO. Other

regional threats to Ukraine include the frozen conflict over Transdnistria on its south-western border. There are a number of further regional problems, such as the uncertainty of the issue concerning national boundaries around the Black and the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait (in particular, the 'frozen conflicts' around the island of Tuzla), and the absence of an agreed state demarcation line with Russia. Such territorial issues complicate the fight against transnational threats. In Ukraine, there is a foreign military naval base – the Russian Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol - which is a source of political tensions within the country and in its relations with Russia, and which rests on an imperfect legal base.

The internal problems of Ukraine complete the picture of national security. It is generally agreed that the concept of sovereignty in domestic policy has broken down in the post-Westphalian system. In Ukraine, there are a number of factors that impede its full development and thus, the country's progressive integration into the global community. Among them, first and foremost is the crisis of state power, manifested in its progressive corruption and the poor quality of the political elite, its questionable moral character and value characteristics, as well as the elite's umbilical connection with business interests that undermines the system. All this affects the confidence and cynicism of ordinary Ukrainians towards the state's governmental institutions, particularly the judicial system and, in general, the political development of the country.

The second factor is the deterioration of economic security against the background of the global financial and economic crisis. The stagnation of the Ukrainian economy together with the influence of the external economic situation, the increase in external debt, low efficiency of utilization of material resources, extreme exhaustion of industrial and communications assets, foreign monopolization of Ukrainian strategic sites and the domestic monopolization of production all combine to exacerbate Ukraine's image problems, as well as its economic transformation, and stand in the way of its European integration. This situation also has a negative impact on demographic processes in Ukraine, whose population has decreased by seven million over the past twenty years. At the level of energy security, a series of gas conflict with Russia has failed to serve as a



stimulant to the strong diversification and economization of energy and is the main bone of contention in contemporary Ukrainian-Russian problems.<sup>220</sup>

At political level, there has been a decline in democracy and freedom of speech – reflected for example in the phenomenon of self-censorship in the mass-media. While the current government does not seem interested to intervene in artistic and cultural activities, political persecution continues to be seen as the key to the survival of an established political regime. There are also many problems within Ukrainian society. Twenty years after independence, there are still the dividing lines: civilisational (Westernization vs East/Eurasianism), mental, cultural and linguistic (Ukrainians, Russians, Crimean Tatars), political (sharply conflicting political preferences), regional (separatism in Galicia, Transcarpathia, Donbass, Crimea, heated by Russia, Turkey and Romania), and confessional (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church vs. the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate).<sup>221</sup> The whole range of the national problems in Ukraine has a negative impact on Ukraine's development as measured by the most important international indexes (see figure 12): notably reducing or delaying its chances of participation in the European integration projects.

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<sup>220</sup> National Security Strategy of Ukraine, 2010, The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, <http://cs.cirs.kiev.ua/en/component/content/article/47-discussion/98--2010-2015-.html>

<sup>221</sup> Myhailo Shevchenko, The Problems and Main Areas of development of the national security of Ukraine under geopolitical informational confrontation, *Social and legal issues*, [http://www.nbuv.gov.ua/portal/soc\\_gum/Vnaou/2009\\_3/Schwtcenko.pdf](http://www.nbuv.gov.ua/portal/soc_gum/Vnaou/2009_3/Schwtcenko.pdf)

**Figure 12.** Position of Ukraine in international indexes

Index (year)	Politico-civil dimension					Socio-economic dimension				
	GPI (2011)	CPI (2011)	PFI (2011- 2012)	DI (2011)	FW (2012)	HDI (2011)	HPI (2009)	IEF (2012)	SL I (2006)	EFWI (2009)
Position in Europe	31/42	44/44	42/47 'difficult situation'	36/4 4 'hybrid regime'	'Partly free'; 'electoral', but not 'liberal democracy'	42/4 7	35/4 4	44/44 'repressed'	40/ 41	44/44
Position in the world	69	152	116	79		77	95	163	17 4	125

HDI = Human Development Index; GPI = Global Peace Index; HPI = Happy Planet Index; SLI = Satisfaction with Life Index; CPI = Corruption Perceptions Index; DI = Democracy Index; IEF = Index of Economic Freedom; PFI = Press Freedom Index; EFWI = Economic Freedom of the World Index; FW = Freedom in the World.

*Sources:* Human Development Report 2011. Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All, URL <<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/>>; Institute for Economics and Peace, Economist Intelligence Unit (2011). "Global Peace Index: 2011 Methodology, Results & Findings", URL <<http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/2011/2011%20GPI%20Results%20Report.pdf>>; Abdallah, S., Thompson, S., Michaelson, J., Marks, N., Steuer, N. *et al.* (2009). The Happy Planet Index 2.0. New Economics Foundation, URL <<http://www.happyplanetindex.org/public-data/files/happy-planet-index-2-0.pdf>>; University of Leicester (27 July, 2006). "University of Leicester produces the first-ever 'world map of happiness'", URL <[http://www.eurekalert.org/pub\\_releases/2006-07/uol-uol072706.php](http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2006-07/uol-uol072706.php)>; Transparency International (2011). "Corruption Perceptions Index", URL <<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/>>; "Democracy Index 2011". *Economist Intelligence Unit*, URL <[http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy\\_Index\\_Final\\_Dec\\_2011.pdf&mode=wp](http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_Final_Dec_2011.pdf&mode=wp)>; *Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprisings and their Global Repercussions*, Freedom House, URL [http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline\\_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf); 2012 Index of Economic Freedom, *The Heritage Foundation*, URL <<http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking.aspx>>; *Reporters Without Borders*. Worldwide press freedom index 2011-2012, URL <<http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html>>; Gwartney, James; Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall (2011). "Economic Freedom of the World: 2011 Annual Report Complete Publication", Fraser Institute, URL <[http://www.freetheworld.com/2011/reports/world/EFW2011\\_complete.pdf](http://www.freetheworld.com/2011/reports/world/EFW2011_complete.pdf)>.

Under these conditions, the preservation of non-alignment is threatened not only by excessive conservatism (failure to adapt), but also the explosion of the whole range of problems. An interpretation of non-aligned status in foreign policy that fails to face up to the new global, regional and domestic challenges for national security is also not conducive in reforming all the spheres of Ukrainian life in order to enhance the image of a stable and prosperous Ukraine.

Actualizing the need to find new ways in solving the national dilemma, I would like to quote from an interview with a well-known Ukrainian political expert Vadym Karasyov:

"Today, the current government has no scope. It does not have a project. It has no strategy. This is a tactically balancing Ukraine, which goes on even days to Brussels, on the odd - to Moscow, and is balanced by messages inside Ukraine in order that one part of Ukraine would not suspect that you have been sold to Moscow, while the second part of Ukraine would not suspect that you have been sold to Brussels ..."<sup>222</sup>

This quotation stimulates a number of questions that are not rhetorical. How should Ukraine be positioning itself vis-a-vis the great powers? What is Ukraine trying to do and what reaction does it get from the international organisations? Is there any international organisation/great power that can actually help to solve Ukraine's security problems? These are the key questions that will be the focus of the remaining part of this chapter.

## **6.2 New horizons in Ukraine's relations with Russia, NATO and the EU.**

In terms of large-scale transformations Ukraine has been standing on the verge of a new reality. It was extremely important for the country to discard euphoria about its role in the world and its strategic partners, and finally move on to a more concrete and pragmatic dialogue with the outside world.

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<sup>222</sup> Lana Samokhvalova, Karasev: Yanukovych is the first of the presidents agreed that we need to catch up with Russia, UNIAN, <http://www.unian.net/rus/news/news-367225.html>.

#### 6.2.1 *Ukraine-Russia: strategic neo-pragmatism*

The National Security Strategy of 2010 aims at the "formation of a new model of strategic partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation based on a balance of national interests ... search for common approaches on the formation of a new pan-European collective security system ..."<sup>223</sup> The choice regarding Ukraine's positioning towards Russia is the nation's biggest challenge due to a wide range of problems and centuries of shared history, which still affects the reality.<sup>224</sup>

Analyzing the nature of the external environment, Ukraine is important for Russia's strategic position in economic, political and military respects, while its intermediate geopolitical situation provides the Central European bridge between Russia and Western civilization. Such factors dramatically increase the importance of Ukraine in the Russian geopolitical concept. It is possible to sense that often Russia needs Ukraine more than Ukraine needs Russia and more than Europe needs Ukraine. Russia after its chaotic transition has returned again to the idea of 'gathering the lands.' For this purpose it uses the modern concept of integration, imitating European integration processes. In fact, the main purpose of the Customs Union, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the Common Economic Space (CES), CIS, CSTO and other abbreviations is the post-imperial geopolitical complexes in Russia. Ukraine understands the nature of the new unions and is wealthy enough to refuse such integration.<sup>225</sup>

Ukraine simultaneously faces the task of Europeanization and integration into Europe, while strengthening relations with Russia. In turn, Europe, in the context of Ukrainian-Russian relations, is less interested in Ukraine as an EU Member State

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<sup>223</sup> National Strategy, Art.4.2.5.

<sup>224</sup> For example, statistics of the distribution of Ukraine's population by age have shown that three quarters of the current population were born and have been living in the Soviet Union, and only a quarter of the population was born during the collapse of the Soviet Union and in independent Ukraine.

<sup>225</sup> Moscow does not rule out that the center and the historic character of the Eurasian integration can be a city of Kyiv, but it still does not attract Ukraine. After such integration the result would be the subjection of Ukrainian strategic industries to Russia - aerospace, chemical, metallurgical; Ukraine's gas transportation system, Naftogaz, the Ukrainian agricultural products and, in particular cereals (Russia has repeatedly proposed to create a "grain OPEC" - see Bondarenko, n.172.

because of its cluster of unresolved issues with the powerful Eastern neighbor.<sup>226</sup> Therefore, Ukraine's interest in normalizing relations with Russia also suits the interest of foreign actors. At the same time, excessive rapprochement between the two countries would neither correspond to Ukraine's national interests, nor the expectations of the West. This aggravates the problem of balancing Ukraine's foreign policy and deepens its strategic uncertainty and stagnation.

Analyzing interstate politics, it is necessary to understand the nature of relations between the two countries. Russia is the largest and the most powerful neighbor and the main trade partner of Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians have relatives in Russia and speak the Russian language, Russian culture and values are widely shared by many of those close to the Russian identity.<sup>227</sup> For most of those concerned Russian is “a psychological marker of identity and worldview”.<sup>228</sup>

For all these reasons, whenever a Russia-Ukraine dispute arises, it becomes a national problem of Ukraine, whether in political, economic, humanitarian, energy, or territorial dimensions. Every time that Ukraine fails to respond or does not consent to a Russian proposal, it coincides with the fall of the share of Ukrainian economy in the Russian market, as well as with an information war and cooling down the interstate relations. If Ukraine dares to enter the conflict on equal terms, the probability of defending its positions is very unlikely. Moreover, the gas conflicts each time lead towards a weakening of Ukraine's negotiating position and

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<sup>226</sup> Kostyantyn Gryshchenko, Beyond the chess board: A pragmatic agenda for the Ukrainian foreign policy, *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* [in Ukrainian], [http://dt.ua/POLITICS/poza\\_mezhami\\_shahivnitsi\\_pragmatichniy\\_poryadok\\_denniy\\_ukrayinskoyi\\_zovnishnoyi\\_politiki-60748.html](http://dt.ua/POLITICS/poza_mezhami_shahivnitsi_pragmatichniy_poryadok_denniy_ukrayinskoyi_zovnishnoyi_politiki-60748.html)

<sup>227</sup> Incidentally, Putin estimated the absence of linguistic barriers as a significant asset in integration, unlike in the European integration. According to the Ukrainian population census (2001), the majority (67.5%) considered Ukrainian their native language, while Russian was the second most popular (29.6%).

<sup>228</sup> Kostyantyn Gryshchenko, Strategic balance as a chance to Ukraine in a multipolar world, *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, 2012 [in Ukrainian], [http://zn.ua/POLITICS/strategicheskoe\\_ravnovesie\\_kak\\_shans\\_ukrainy\\_v\\_mnogopolyarnom\\_mire-98501.html](http://zn.ua/POLITICS/strategicheskoe_ravnovesie_kak_shans_ukrainy_v_mnogopolyarnom_mire-98501.html).

a rise in energy prices. But when Ukraine makes concessions, the appetites of Moscow increase dramatically.<sup>229</sup>

Even if its economic dependence on the Russian market and energy are a troublesome constraint, Ukraine's close and intensive trade relations with Russia can hardly be viewed as negative per se.<sup>230</sup> Ukraine cannot afford to break off relations with Russia on trade, from which it gets a third of its national budget. In addition, such a break would provoke a cultural and separatist rebellion in South-Eastern Ukraine exposed to the new Russian imperial mythology.<sup>231</sup>

However, Ukraine objects in principle to being integrated into the Russian Eurasian space, the center of which is, of course, Moscow. This would not only automatically mean a significant loss of sovereignty, but would also run contrary to the European historical choice of the Ukrainian people. Naturally the question arises: how Ukraine should position itself in relation to Russia?

As things stand, the only solution for Ukraine is the path of normalization and pragmatism in relations with Russia while preserving the vector towards European integration. There is a need to set aside the emotions that lead to excessive politicisation of the related questions.

Sufficient political will is required to find a balance that distances Ukraine from Russia to the extent needed to avoid damaging its evolution as a European nation-state. Precisely in order to make this possible, anti-Russian rhetoric must be avoided. The practice of the post-revolutionary period showed the inconsistency of playing on the contradictions between Russia and the West, not least because their relations are no longer the dominant trend in international relations.

Rather than anti-Russian, a pro-Ukrainian rhetoric must be re-established in all spheres of life in order to maximize the conditions for continuing Ukrainisation, such as development of the Ukrainian language, literature, music and culture in

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<sup>229</sup> This happened after the signing of the Kharkiv Agreements to extend the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory. Immediately after, Putin delivered a package of proposals for Ukraine to join the Customs Union with Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan and to concede mutual control of the gas-transport system.

<sup>230</sup> Gryshchenko, no. 226

<sup>231</sup> Bondarenko.

general.<sup>232</sup> This will help to breed a new Ukrainian patriotic society with European values and a strong national identity, which will in turn be the most reliable guard of Ukrainian statehood and prosperity. It should generate a fundamentally new political elite, which will solve many problems between the two countries.

At the same time, it is necessary to be sensitive to the phenomenon of a post-imperial new Russian nationalism, which helps the formation of Russia's own statehood. In a mirror-image of Ukraine's solution, the resulting anti-Ukrainian rhetoric from Moscow needs to be transformed into pro-Russian rhetoric. A renewed Ukrainian political elite should clearly articulate the position of Ukraine as a constant and pragmatic partnership, but not a fraternal, irrational and emotional one, extending the concept of generally valid "norms" in the Ukrainian-Russian relations.<sup>233</sup> This extended "norm" is particularly relevant given the extension of Putin's rule in Russia and his National Security Strategy of Russia-2020, which explicitly aims at reviving Russia's its global and regional influence.<sup>234</sup>

Ukraine is a large country by European standards, and it would feel very uncomfortable being defined only by its role in any given multilateral integration project. Rather, the emergence of elements of a pro-Ukrainian ideology will enrich the European political reality and should contribute to the disappearance of dividing lines in many dimensions. It can at the same time overcome the 'ostrich' version of non-alignment and serve the interests of the national security of Ukraine. The concept of strategic partnership with Russia based on neo-pragmatism is thus just one facet of the new Ukrainian paradigm, and can be

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<sup>232</sup> In contrast, Yanukovich has reduced the number of Ukrainian schools in favour of Russian-speaking, and returned to dubbing films into Russian, while in Moscow the Ukrainian Library was closed. The highly controversial Minister of Education and Science Dmytro Tabachnyk is far from reflecting a constructive pro-Ukrainian educational paradigm with his anti-Ukrainian attacks, the reduction in studying the Ukrainian language in schools, and the revision of certain requirements for teaching the history of Ukraine.

<sup>233</sup> Grishchenko, no. 228.

<sup>234</sup> Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020, NATO Defence College, <http://www.conflictstudies.org.uk/files/RusNatSecStrategyto2020.pdf> For its implementation 23 trillion rubles allocated to finance a new military paradigm. This is a potential threat to the security of Ukraine.

complemented with a new positioning of the Ukraine towards other geopolitical forces that define state's existence.

#### *6.2.2 Ukraine and NATO: from periphery of integration to epicenter of cooperation.*

Another important aspect of the Ukrainian security paradigm is the adjustment of the role and place of NATO in relations with Ukraine. In the 1990s, the most important interests of NATO in Ukraine were questions of military security in the realm of disarmament. In the 2000s, after Ukraine left the club of nuclear states, NATO's interests shifted from the military to the political plane.

The relations between Ukraine and NATO are more about interests and less about problems. The practical interests of Ukraine are stated in the annual national program of Ukraine-NATO cooperation, which has been produced since 2009 following decisions taken at the NATO summit in Bucharest. These programs offer a guide for Ukraine on how to reform its armed forces. They cover important aspects of cooperation on political, economic, resource, defense and military issues, the issue of security and legal issues. Beyond this practical level, however, it is important to understand the main motivations of Ukraine in its willingness to cooperate with NATO. Typically, Ukrainian proponents of Euro-Atlantic integration talk about the inevitability of strengthening the regional and global role of Ukraine in connection with entering into a collective security system. A common view is that NATO will become a springboard for entry into the EU, as it was the case in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>235</sup>

However, in practice the political and general norms attached to NATO membership norms coincide with EU requirements, the difference lying in the extra military requirements on one side and wide range of non-military standards on the other. This implies that Ukraine could accelerate the development of democracy and increase the pace of development in the social sphere without integration into NATO, by focusing rather on direct dialogue with the EU in the framework of existing programs.

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<sup>235</sup> Andrii Ryzhenko, Ten "yes" on Ukraine's accession to NATO, Maritime State [in Ukrainian], [http://fleet.sebastopol.ua/morskaderzhava/index.php?article\\_to\\_view=131](http://fleet.sebastopol.ua/morskaderzhava/index.php?article_to_view=131)



Another argument used to justify close cooperation with NATO, is the disputable contention that Ukraine can thereby strengthen its political independence from Russia, a point that will be discussed later in detail.

NATO also constantly reiterates its desire to see Ukraine within the Alliance one day. What are its reasons? Ukraine is a geographically and geopolitically important country in which a large military potential is concentrated, together with important transit routes. The Ukrainian gas transport system is still the main player in the supply of transit of Russian gas to Europe, and thus plays an important role on the revenue side of the Russian economy. The control of the GTS would trump NATO's dialogue with Russia. Ukraine's membership in NATO would also strengthen the West's position in the Black Sea region, which America has declared as an area of interest. If Ukraine completes the expansion of NATO in a South-East European direction, it will expand the capabilities of NATO influence in this area automatically. It is also an extremely convenient area for placing the American and European missile defense systems.

The countries of the Visegrad Group, as well as the Baltic countries are interested to see Ukraine in NATO, in order to shift the West-East buffer zone from their borders to the eastern borders of Ukraine. In geographical terms, this means that the present buffer states of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania would transfer this status to a sole country - Ukraine, thus moving the line of tension some 1,300 kilometers from their boundaries. In addition, there are several NATO states, with which Ukraine has experienced the territorial disputes in the recent past. A striking example is the dispute between Ukraine and Romania (initiated by Romania) about the continental shelf, which was resolved only after the mediation of the Hague International Court. The conflict in Transdnistria remains frozen and could be the source of disputes in future between Ukraine, Russia and Moldova. In Ukraine's Transcarpathia and Crimea provinces there have been cases of issuance of Russian and Romanian passports to Ukrainian citizens.

In practice, NATO is not in a position to solve the national problems of Ukraine at the present stage. First and foremost, Russia continues to perceive

NATO not as a partner, but rather as a foreign competitor, or as Putin has said "at least as an enemy." Therefore, Ukraine's accession to NATO would be seen as a provocation and would bring unpredictable reactions from Moscow, which since 2008 has been taking a particularly tough line on its geopolitical interests in the former Soviet Union space - as shown both in actions and statements. As seen at the Bucharest summit when the NATO message turned cool on Eastward enlargement, the Russian position is in practice accorded primary strategic importance by the leading Allied states.<sup>236</sup>

If Ukraine were to become the Alliance's South-eastern frontier, the frozen conflict over Tuzla would be an even more serious destabilizing factor in the national security of Ukraine and could in turn mean instability for NATO's new south-eastern flank. Russia could use provocation against Ukraine through third countries or in cooperation with them. This might be expressed in the form of economic pressure (at least, Russia would be likely to suspend its economic cooperative contracts that favour Ukraine), as well as in energy policy, where there would also be negative consequences for the recipients of Russian energy supplies to Europe. Further, as NATO's Southern border would come right up against Russia's own territory, it is likely that Russia would make active efforts to place on Ukraine's borders increased armed forces and elements of its own missile defense system, thus creating a new strategic dividing line and possibly provoking a local arms race and militarization of the neighbouring territories. This can lead not only to a decrease in security, but also to the loss of Ukraine's supposed attractiveness for foreign investments and other expected economic benefits from joining NATO.

In addition, in case of a conflict with Russia or its allies, Ukraine would have to provide military assistance to its NATO allies, something that seems hard to contemplate and could even be felt as immoral with regard to the Russian nation. The tensions in the Black Sea region would be heightened, and problems in Russian-Turkish relations would be exaggerated by the presence of naval and

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<sup>236</sup> James Sherr, *The Age of Modest Expectations*, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 2010 [in Ukrainian], [http://dt.ua/POLITICS/epoha\\_skromnih\\_ochikuvan-61567.html](http://dt.ua/POLITICS/epoha_skromnih_ochikuvan-61567.html)

air bases of NATO. The problem of the Black Sea Fleet's continued presence on Ukrainian territory would become unsurmountable.

Finally, inside Ukraine there is no consensus on NATO membership. Society is highly polarized on this issue against a general backdrop of increasing NATO-skepticism. Joining NATO would thus mean undermining the social stability and the Ukrainian statehood.

There is no united opinion on Ukrainian membership inside NATO either. Despite the fact that NATO "respects the choice of Ukraine" in adopting non-alignment, there is a Central-East European bloc of countries who advocate the immediate accession of Ukraine. There is also a bloc of sceptics, among whom Germany and France retain the strongest positions. The German position is understandable because of Berlin's reluctance to destroy the strategic relationship with Russia in the sphere of economy and energy; it does not reject the potential membership of Ukraine, but only in the distant future.<sup>237</sup> As for France, it has historically directed its scepticism about the Ukrainian foreign policy since the Versailles-Washington system. Today, against the loss of French positions in Germany, the core direction in its foreign policy since post-war era, France is trying to develop relations with Russia and is not willing to cross the road to Russia's interests, in particular, in the issue of Ukrainian joining NATO.<sup>238</sup> Thus, membership in NATO is not able to make an effective mechanism for resolving the dilemma Ukrainian security.

In this situation, there is a natural question: what recipe does need Ukraine on the issue of cooperation with NATO? There are no comprehensive answers of the political elite nor the expert community in Ukraine. It is clear that NATO will remain a priority in the field of the Ukrainian security, as obvious, that further dialogue should be based not on the basis of integration, but 'cooperation' and

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<sup>237</sup> Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, paragraph 23, [http://www.summitbucharest.ro/en/doc\\_201.html](http://www.summitbucharest.ro/en/doc_201.html)

<sup>238</sup> James Sherr, NATO helps Ukraine to become stronger and thus becomes stronger itself, *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, No,14, 2008.

'development of the constructive partnership'<sup>239,240</sup> between Ukraine and NATO in order to bring Ukraine to the Euro-Atlantic standards; and this has been the merit of the President Yanukovich. His 'appeasement' towards Russia is reflected in the fact that Ukraine wants to be embedded into the system of European security with Russia. This rhetoric underlines Ukraine's interest in preserving the regional stability and the national security. It would also demonstrate the emerging active and responsible role of Ukraine in the creation of a pan-European security system.

In addition, Ukraine's rejection of the Euro-Atlantic ambitions promotes cooperation between NATO and Russia in building up a new security system.

Following the case of Sweden and Finland in international mediation, Ukraine may enter into the epicenter of international politics and to maintain political independence, while taking the role of the 'building site' in the European security architecture between Europe and Russia.

Last but not least, Ukraine should actively promote the preservation of a nuclear-free zone on its border and promote a zone free of the missile defence systems. At the time when the entire history of independent Ukraine is permeated by successive steps to the attainment of a nuclear-free status, the support for nuclear initiatives of NATO and Russia to build nuclear zone in Central and Eastern Europe is a direct source of threats to increase the likelihood of the regional conflicts. It also contradicts the non-nuclear aspirations of Ukraine.

Finally, Ukraine has to come to the understanding that success in the foreign policy is not only about the degree of reform of the army, but also and sharing the European values and norms.

Thus, shifting the debate from the legal and political issues of the integration towards the high-quality constructive cooperation, Ukraine will preserve the parity of interests between NATO and Russia, contributing to the elements of stability in the national and regional security. The main idea in the future relations with NATO that will allow Ukraine to come from the 'gray zone' should be the idea of

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<sup>239</sup> Gryscenko, 221

<sup>240</sup> (Нейтральный статус Выход? Ловушка? Или неординарный геополитический ход? <http://2000.net.ua/2000/forum/puls/74734> Данная статья вышла в выпуске №29-30 (566) 15 - 21 июля 2011 г. )))

Ukraine's active mediation between NATO and Russia in building a new model of European security.

6.2.3 *Ukraine - EU: from the utopian integration towards the pragmatic cooperation.* European integration has been *idee fixe* of Ukraine with the adoption of Ukraine's National Security Strategy in 1993. Ukraine has adjusted its interests in the National Security Strategy of 2010 as follows:

"Creating the institutional foundations of Ukraine's integration into the common European space, e.g. through sectoral integration into the EU structures, **the expansion** of opportunities for cooperation in the format of the EU initiative "Eastern Partnership", **the further development** of mutually beneficial partnership with the European Free Trade Association and its Member States, creating general conditions for full membership of Ukraine in the EU as a reliable guarantee of its security ... deepening the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the EU, its Member States on the basis of economic integration and political association, the signing the Association Agreement, **creation of deep and comprehensive free trade, liberalization** of visa regime in order to the abolition it in future. Other priorities include the implementation of the agreement on Ukraine's accession to the European Energy Community, **the participation** of Ukraine in the implementation of tasks within the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. "(Strategy 2010).

In simple terms, the European Union is the most successful economic and political integration association in the world and is located directly at the borders of Ukraine, which objectively causes a close cooperation. Thus, the EU is already the largest foreign trade partner of Ukraine (33% of trade turnover, which even exceeds the external economic indicators of Ukraine's cooperation with Russia) In addition, EU membership for Ukraine opens the four freedoms - freedom of movement of people, goods, capital and services, and freedom of movement is the main one for Ukrainians. It is also important that the European Union - is not only of a high level club life, but also a set of values and standards in the mentioned areas. It is believed that the successful implementation of these guidelines will determine Ukraine's rapid modernisation and preserve its national identity. Opponents of European integration in Ukraine believe that it poses a threat to the fall of non-competitive economy in general and the ruin of business in

particular. They note that the major exporting industries (metallurgy, agriculture, heavy industry (aeronautics, automotive)) do not hold and the prospects for the European market. However, the voice of Ukrainian EU sceptics is weaker than, for example, skeptics of the other candidate countries (like in Iceland and Norway) who perceive the EU as a threat to their sovereignty, national identity and democratic deficit.

What lies at the heart of the EU interest in cooperating with Ukraine? First, the EU has positioned itself as a democratic project. The idea of a democratic and free Ukraine is a European idea. It seems that the EU mission is not only in solving domestic problems, but also in supporting the development of democratic institutions and authorities in the neighboring countries and in the global dimension. Otherwise, the EU from the 'democratic leader' will turn into a 'democratic ghetto'. Secondly, the EU is interested in a very powerful 45-million state with a potentially large market equal to the greater European states. Third, with the right approach to the use of energy resources in Ukraine, the EU energy security will be strengthened, therefore Ukraine participates today in European energy policy.<sup>241</sup> Fourth, Ukraine is one of the largest exporters of grain and in the future may become a crucial component of the European food security. Moreover, the Europeans are interested in Ukraine's transit capabilities, through which energy flows from Russia to Europe, together with major highways. Another important factor is the fact that Ukraine shares borders with four EU member states, which have a common border of 1,500 kilometers. In light of the exceptional importance of migration policy, Ukraine is a strategic factor in the migration to EU security; a kind of filter migration on the eastern borders of the EU. Moreover, even if Ukraine does not enter the EU, Europe is interested in politically and economically stable Ukraine, which does not threatens EU's boundaries. The EU is also interested in the fact that there is no environmental and nuclear dumping, as well as uncontrolled arms sales on its borders. Finally, in the

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<sup>241</sup> Ukraine has large resources of coal, gas, shale, significant reserves of electricity and nuclear power.

long term, internal migration flows with a noticeable participation of Ukraine will be conducive to the inflow of labor to an aging Europe.

However, the EU-Ukraine dialogue contains many problems that have been lasting and will last for a long time. First, when asked about the possibility of Ukraine's accession, the EU expressed such a possibility in the misty figures, speaking of the membership as a long-term objective. Since 1994, four presidents have worked with 12 prime-ministers in the European direction, but after 18 years of cooperation, Ukraine does not know the approximate date of its entry, it does not know even the likelihood of such entry. This leads to the idea of a systemic failure towards the course of European integration<sup>242</sup> What does not allow Ukraine to go to Europe? The main problem is that the state's neo-Soviet elites failed to transform European rhetoric into action. Still the major problems in the Ukrainian society remain corruption in all organs of government, dependency of judicial system, low standards of democracy, socio-economic development, fundamental freedoms and the supremacy of law. (Examples include the reinstatement of the 1996 Constitution with the centralization of power in the hands of the president; restrictions of freedom of assembly; intimidation of journalists; making changes to electoral law in order to artificially increase the representativeness of the ruling Party of Regions in the city councils all over Ukraine; and finally, along with other political persecutions, imprisoning the leader of opposition Yulia Tymoshenko in Kharkov prison and beaten recently. In addition, the examples of the deterioration of the political climate are well illustrated by the return of "ghosts dark past" in the policy - for example, return of Viktor Medvedchuk, one of the most influential actors of Kuchma's rule. that does not contribute to the constructive solution of primary problems and leads to the Ukraine's political past.) . We must also note that in some cases Europe, namely the European Parliament, Council of Europe, as well as some diplomats (e.g. the diplomatic row with the representative of the European Commission in Ukraine José Manuel Pinto Teixeira, who expressed openly they political views, violating the Vienna Convention on diplomatic neutrality) served almost as a second tribunal,

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<sup>242</sup> <http://hvylya.org/analytics/geopolitics/14148-zachem-nam-eta-evropa.html>.

evaluating the judicial system of Ukraine. Sometimes it may seem that the EU finds the blunders of the Ukrainian government to make an additional reason in deterring the European aspirations of Ukraine. In addition, describing the EU-Ukraine legal framework, one can see the asymmetry of commitments made by signatories.

Within the EU a block of countries formed that do not want to see Ukraine in the EU in the medium term. One could assume that the new EU countries should be opposed to Ukraine joining as a potential rival for the financing of social programs from the European funds (such as Spain). However, the new EU countries are extremely interested in the membership of Ukraine.

In contrast, the richest EU countries are unprepared to absorb Ukraine. France, as already stated, has always been pro-Russian oriented, so it does not take decisive steps towards the Ukrainian integration into Europe. Germany has already changed its point of view, but remains its scepticism. It does, in fact, apply to all potential candidates in the EU, since the German taxpayers are the major donors of the EU policy convergence. In addition, the acception of each new EU member state is accompanied by rising inflation and a large influx of cheap labor force from the East.

As for Russia's position, it seems comfortable with the idea of Ukraine to be a part of Europe as long as this idea does not take the form of implementation. It is very natural that Russia is not interested in a full European integration of Ukraine, as this will leave unfulfilled Russian geopolitical, economic and political ambitions.

In addition, the EU has a number of objective problems. The EU today is primarily focused on the economic crisis. The crisis has hit the euro zone, a very core of the EU idea, so all the financial power is concentrated in resolving the consequences of the crisis. In addition to financial consequences, the crisis exposed contradictions between prosperous North of the EU and economically troubled South, against the West-East axis. Another reason is the emergence of the implications of the Arab Spring and the lack of strong leadership and absence of



strategy for the Middle east region. In addition, the EU has not yet had time to adapt to the realities of the EU-27.

Another reason is an institutional trap that can lead the EU into the fact that the entry of 45 million people completely changes the political configuration in the European Parliament. Ukraine will receive approximately the same number of votes as France and Italy do. It will enter the club of the big EU states, together with Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland. It will radically change the balance of political forces in the EU in favour of the Eastern bloc countries. In light of the political, military, economic and financial power of the large countries in Europe and the possibilities of Ukraine, such a reconfiguration is unlikely to be implemented. Therefore, the EU in the institutional form in which it exists today, is not able to absorb the Ukraine.

Therefore the proposal to Ukraine to acquire a 'privileged status' and a 'special partnership' well explains the absence of a clear strategy for the country, that, in turn, frustrates Kyiv.

Analysis of the problems in the relations between Kyiv and Brussels give a clear signal about the need to change the foreign policy rhetoric of the European romanticism towards the European pragmatism. Despite the differences, and the impracticability of some requirements in the short term perspective, Ukraine cannot afford to retreat from the European vector of development. The era of great enlargement of the EU comes to an end. In this regard, Ukraine should be more concentrated on the real problems. At this stage, these issues include the signature of the Association Agreement and the establishment of visa-free regime. If Ukraine is able to achieve this soon, it will be the largest achievement in the history of Ukrainian independence.

At the same time, Europe has understood that Ukraine is neither geographically or in terms of population, nor in the economic and legal norms able to fulfill the requirements of the existing format of the EU. The metaphor of the policy of 'open door' is actually an euphemistic metaphor for politics of 'open gates' and 'ruined walls'. If Ukraine and Turkey enter the EU, its architecture must be radically revised. The Easternisation of Europe and move to the mainland

with a change in the existing architecture is inevitable and already happening, and it is a chance for Ukraine's participation in the European project. (<http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/page20-532.html>). Ukraine's geopolitical objective is to show the EU that it has no monopoly on Europe, which *per se* accommodates a much broader concept. If Europe would come to this understanding, then it would provide a logical process of completing the building of the EU till the edges of the European geographical boundaries. It will entail the accession of Ukraine and its transformation into a key floor to change the European architecture of the new Europe. <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/page20-532.htm> This will allow Ukraine not only upload EU policies, but also download the new fundamental rules, taking into account the national interests. Ukraine will be able to pour a new 'Euro-Atlantic Blood' in the EU. In addition, Europe understands that Ukraine today is not ready to the post-national format. To begin with, Ukraine needs to assert state's national identity, interrupted by the Soviet past, and then to enter the EU as a sovereign European nation-state. In this interim period, the the adequate implementation of European guidelines and the extraction of best practices and values of the EU will help Ukraine to develop.

The path to the EU is not a tactical maneuver to gain immediate benefits, but the strategic benchmark of domestic and foreign policy. The most optimal model in the context of European development for Ukraine is the existence as an Eastern European nation-state, but not as a member of supra-national organizations that will narrow the phenomenon of Ukraine. At the same time, while selecting the utopian European benchmark, Ukraine must be pragmatic, not only with the EU, but also with Russia to ensure the smooth convergence between Europe, Russia and Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine and the EU should reconsider their relations mutually with the strategic long-term prospects that, in turn, will lead to correcting the integration dialogue towards the pragmatism, stability and security.

### **6.3 A new model of the national security: is neutrality an answer?**

In previous sections we have analyzed the interests and concerns of Ukraine, together with its main strategic foreign partners, and tried to answer the question on how Ukraine should build its future course with them.

Here we will focus on how equal opportunities of Ukraine, Sweden and Finland in providing the neutrality policy. A summary of all these factors will result in a strategic plan for Ukraine on how to develop a new national security concept.


#### *6.3.1 Similarities and differences of Ukraine compared to Sweden and Finland.*

The first and foremost characteristic, shared by all three countries, is the dualistic history during which these nations have felt a threat from both East and West dating back to the Middle Ages. The nature of such threats coming from the West was multifaceted, just as different were the countries which presented them. In contrast, threats coming from the East were more homogeneous, since they originated exclusively from Russian in all its different variations.

The figure11 illustrates the most influential external powers during the historical development of the neutral countries.

However, if we compare the degree of influence from the East, there is clearly a manifested similar between Finnish and Ukrainian positions. The same mechanisms that Russia applied for the governance of Finland during the 18th and 19th centuries, it applied successfully to Ukraine. This was evident from the attempts of assimilation and Russification, as well as active intervention in the internal politics and economic bind to the Russian market. In the first half of the 20th century, these countries' attempts to defend the independence ended with wars initiated by Russia. The policy of forced economic integration was particularly active during the Soviet period and was carried out fairly.

**Figure 11. The main foreign policy constants of the neutrals**



All three countries are active participants in international security. However, institutionally fixed and clear course of neutral Sweden and Finland has allowed them to achieve great success in the international and European politics, in contrast to non-aligned Ukraine's, involved only in peacekeeping. It seems necessary to mention the Finnish model of neutrality, called in the Cold War the policy of 'Finlandisation'. Its main principle was: with the Soviet Union – as long as necessary, with the West – as much as possible.<sup>243</sup> Finlandization allowed the Finns that fought on the German side to avoid the fate of Eastern Europe during the difficult postwar years and to ensure its national security and economic growth while preserving the values and identity. At the same time pay for such a model became part of the donation to the Finnish sovereignty, manifested in the fact that the Soviet Union intervened in the internal politics of Finland, as well as where approval was required for its foreign policy. However, this did not prevent Finland to play the role of democratic bridge between East and West, because it was a part of CSCE in Helsinki (1975). Another example of Finlandization is the so called *Ostpolitik* of German Chancellor Willy Brandt of Germany, which is thus somewhat softened the Soviet position about the issue of the German reunification. A third example is considered to be a series of concessions to Moscow by Paris and Berlin with regard to Russians' controversial

<sup>243</sup> [http://pda.inosmi.ru/op\\_ed/20100810/161997372.html?all](http://pda.inosmi.ru/op_ed/20100810/161997372.html?all)

contemporary geopolitical behavior and problems of democracy in the country in exchange for the energy security in Europe.

Due to its mild compromise policy Finland has achieved international recognition, along with Sweden, as a mediator, norm entrepreneur and expert in soft security issues. This allows both countries to compensate for peripheral geographical location and actively influence the present and future of the European security, welfare, and the environment of the EU.<sup>244</sup>

Returning back to the broader points when introducing similarities between Sweden and Ukraine, both states are the biggest in their regions (except of Russia): Sweden is a dominant country of the Baltic region while Ukraine is the largest state within the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, and simply the biggest state within the Russian neighbourhood. Ukraine has all chances to become the largest European neutral country in the history of Europe.

In decision-making process, Ukraine can strengthen its position thanks to its neutral status by creating *ad-hoc* coalitions of non-allied states in the window of opportunity to increase share in certain matters, as it instituted in the practice decision-making in the EU.

The more the EU will expand to the East, the more important is the geographical position of Ukraine in civilisational terms. The EU will certainly change its legislation and reshape the institutional structure that will allow a neutral Ukraine, following the case of Sweden and Finland, to become an active participant in the development of a new architecture of the EU.

In the future it will be possible to create a group of the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea states that are neutral, which will include Ukraine, Sweden, Finland, as well as tending to neutrality Moldova and possibly Belarus. This zone will mitigate potential tensions between NATO and Russia, but will not perform the function of the buffer and the transit bridge. It will be a construction site of East and West. The role and place of Ukraine, unique in its close linguistic and cultural

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<sup>244</sup> (See more on the role of Sweden and Finland in mediating negotiations between East and West since 1945 and they role in building new security institutions in Europe norm entrepreneurs, Ingebritsen, 273-291 Ingebritsen; 191 in Goetschel).

nature with respect to both civilisations (the Ukrainian language has the closest relationship with the Bilorussian (84% of general lexicon), Polish (70%), Slovakian (68%) and Russian (62 %) languages), with Ukrainian central geopolitical configuration, cannot be overstated.

All three countries have extensive maritime borders of the strategically important for the Russian Federation Black and Baltic Seas for the Russian Federation, as well as for NATO and the EU. The combined diplomatic efforts of the neutral countries will considerably strengthen their role and influence in these regions than if each country has its position separately on matters relating to environmental, transit, economic and military aspects of the sea and the region.

However, there are substantial differences in climate and relief. Sweden and Finland are the Nordic countries, which causes difficulties to conquer and control them. On the contrary, Ukraine has more favourable climate for interventions that has historically manifested itself in a large number of the conquerors on this territory.

In the military aspect, the Scandinavian neutrals and Ukraine are the largest participants in the export-import arms relations among all the neutral countries, and ahead of many allied countries on indicators in the military sectors (see figures 12, 13, 14).

**Figure 12.** Position of the neutral states in arms exports from the top 100 largest exporters, 1991-2011

Supplier	Rank among neutral states	Rank 1991-2011	Rank 1990- 2010	1991-2011 <sup>245</sup>
Ukraine	1	9	11	7 929
Sweden	2	11	12	7 481
Switzerland	3	14	14	5 084
Finland	4	28	30	714
Austria	5	34	34	502
Moldova	6	35	36	471
Malta	7	79	77	10
Ireland	8	84	87	5
Liechtenstein	9	0	0	0
Neutrals' total				<b>22</b> <b>191</b> (4.43 % of world total)
World total				<b>500 728</b>

As the table shows, Ukraine is the largest supplier of arms exports among the neutral states, and among the ten largest arms suppliers in the world (It is adjacent to the rating of arms exports to Italy and Israel). Therefore it is highly incorrect to call Ukraine weak and defenseless state.

Export neutrals are divided into three groups. The first group consists of Ukraine, Sweden and Switzerland; the second - Finland, Austria and Moldova, and the third includes rest of the neutrals (Malta, Ireland). This gives Ukraine additional chances to become the leading neutral nation in the world. Ukraine has exported most of weapons, to Pakistan, significantly affecting the balance of power in the region in 1997-99, surpassing the share of the USA, France and China.

Nowadays Ukraine remains one of the three leading arms exporters in Pakistan. A significant proportion of Ukrainian defense production is in Algeria, Azerbaijan and China.

<sup>245</sup> These figures are SIPRI trend-indicator values (TIVs) expressed in US\$ m. at constant (1990) prices  
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database  
[http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export\\_toplist.php](http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php)

**Figure 13. Position of the neutral states in arms imports from the top 200 largest exporters, 1991-2011.**

<b>Recipient</b>	<b>Rank among neutral states</b>	<b>Rank 1991- 2011</b>	<b>Rank 1990- 2010</b>	<b>1991-2011<sup>246</sup></b>
Finland	1	27	26	5 318
Switzerland	2	36	35	3 532
Sweden	3	45	43	2 396
Austria	4	55	55	1 635
Ireland	5	97	98	232
Malta	6	138	133	46
Moldova	7	158	161	19
Liechtenstein	8	0	0	0
Ukraine	8	0	0	0
Neutrals' total				<b>13</b> <b>178</b>
World total				<b>500 728</b>

(2.63  
% of world  
total)

<sup>246</sup> Figures are SIPRI TIVs expressed in US\$ m. at constant (1990) prices



**Figure 14.** Basic facts<sup>247</sup> about the military sectors of the neutral countries

	Ukraine	Sweden	Finland	Switzerland	Austria	Ireland
Armed forces personnel	304 000	28 600	32 000	28 000	40 000	12 000
Personnel (% of total labor force)	1.22	0.61	1.17	2.6	1.01	0.48
Manpower fit for military service (age 15-49)	19 162 258	3 621 774	2 030 651	3 159 121	3 065 806	1 649 189
Conscription, Service age and obligation	Yes: 18-25 years; 9-18 months	Yes: 18-47 years; 7-8-12-15 months	Yes: 18-60 years; 6-9-12 months	Yes: 17/18/19-26 years; 260 days: 18 weeks of mandatory training, followed by seven 3-week recalls over the next 10 years	Yes: 16/17-35/50 years; 6 months	No. Voluntary: 16/17-25/27/35 years; 12 years max.
Number of employers in arms production	200 000	28 000	10 000	8 000	3 000	..
Weapon holdings	9 520 000	1 970 000	2 260 000	2 432 000	1 218 000	112 000

.. = not applicable;

Source: Military stats: Ukraine, Sweden. Finland, Switzerland, Austria, and Ireland in NationMaster.com ; CIA the World Factbook

<sup>247</sup> Most recent facts according to nationmaster.com

Ireland is the only neutral country without obligatory military service.

Importers are also divided into three groups. The leaders here remain Sweden and Switzerland, and Finland topped the list. However, Ukraine does not import weapons, in what appears a short-sighted strategic position of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the high lack of funding to the Ukrainian armed forces. Ukraine needs to invest more in the import of the newest military equipment, following the example of Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. It will not provoke other countries to intervene the country. It is necessary to take into account that Ukraine is literally surrounded by the powerful military countries: in addition to Russia, Ukraine has a sea neighbour, Turkey that possesses constantly increasing armed potential.

Reflecting the position in the military sectors, Ukraine exceeds the quantitative indicators in 10 times, while on the quality indicators it is not weaker than some other neutrals (such as in funding for military and defense sphere). In addition, low GDP, and morally and physically outdated Soviet weapons exacerbate the problem of the defense. The low military expenditures are mainly used for maintenance of personnel and not invested in the modernisation of the armed forces to the extent sufficient to ensure the national security of Ukraine.

Speaking about the possibility of integration of its military potential towards NATO, it must be noted that the electoral support of NATO in all these countries remains low; the majority of voters prefer actually to cooperate with NATO without institutional integration. In all the countries there are some politicians, who wish to see their state as a part of NATO, but this prospect is not on the agenda of any one country, because NATO is not a panacea for the neutrals in solving the problems of the national and regional security. However, in practice Sweden and Finland are covered by NATO even without membership due to the architecture of US nuclear deterrence. The other practical difference is that both states have joined the EU and enjoy great existential security and identity reinforcement through that.

In addition, Sweden and Finland are surrounded by a semi-ring of the NATO countries, including the Baltic ones. On the contrary, Ukraine is in a security vacuum in conditions of the potential threats – domestic and regional.

Continuing to analyze the characteristics of these states, it can be noted that there is a tendencial phenomenal similarity between Finland and Ukraine. Both countries had very limited space for the civilisational development for a long time. Both countries are located in the buffer zone of the Western and Eastern geopolitical influence. In both countries, represented by several Christian denominations, including Orthodox, they coincide with cultural and ethnic differences within countries.

But both of the states have also 'semi-differences'.

This is foremost reflected in the national economy. The economy of Finland and of Ukraine has the same regional unbalances associated with the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation. In addition, the Finnish economy has experienced first decline due to a fall of the Russian Empire and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Finland was deprived of the largest foreign trade partner - Russia. Similarly, Ukraine's economy was subjected to the tests after the Soviet collapse, when it lost access to the markets of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), which included Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

But unlike Ukraine, Finland managed rapidly to fill the economic vacuum, and become less dependent economically, while Ukraine is firmly tied to Russia's infrastructure, manufacturing standards, the energy sector and markets in the long run.

Describing differences in the economic identity, Finland, like Sweden, is the bearer of post-industrial informational trends with the elements of sustainability, energy conservation and social comfort. In contrary, Ukraine is an industrial economy with elements of raw materials periphery and the problems of the high depreciation of production assets in terms of technical backwardness and low innovation depreciation of production assets. This reflects one of the fundamental differences between the realities of these countries.

Finally, the most significant difference between Ukraine and Finland is the issue of the national identity. The processes of the national identity took place a long time in Finland, and Ukraine. However, the national identity issue was never

so acute for Finland as for Ukraine. The key difference is that Finland's different leaders are far more

consistent - and cautious - in interpreting and developing the foreign policy status. This in turn could be because they have no underlying ambiguity of identity and culture vis-a-vis Russia; Finns are just Finns and they will never be at risk of being assimilated to Russia, but neither of going to extremes just to prove they are different.

Unlike Finland, the Ukraine has not yet formed a national identity, and this is that is particularly visible among the political elite. The lack of the national identity manifests in the foreign policy concepts of the Ukrainian presidents, realizing the opposite strategy, and sometimes going to extremes. Ukrainian weak 'identity immunity' so far unable to withstand attacks from Russian informational space.

In addition, the most significant role is played by Russian-speaking population factor in the South-Eastern Ukraine, part of which seeks to maintain strong ties with Russia, sharing the most intimate identity. Russian ethnic minority exceeds the total amount of all other minorities and the Russian language as a language of minority is used more than any other minority languages. Moreover, on the political agenda remains popular electoral wishes of gaining dual citizenship, giving the Russian language the status of a state language, along with Ukrainian, as well as integration into the Russian geopolitical structures. This is due to the rise of a new mythology of Russian Eurasianism, foreign policy and economic successes, the infantile need for a strong leader, as well as nostalgia for the Soviet past. In addition, very special bursts of Russia's popularity is manifested in the periods of the Russia's resonance in international arena.

Guided by the idea that the preservation of the national identity is a national idea of Ukraine; that NATO will not solve the national and regional problems of Ukraine; as well as the fact that integration into the EU in the medium term is likely to undermine the immature identity, it is possible to assume that the Ukrainian solution can take some ideas from the Finnish one, but the choice of foreign status should take place freely, without external pressure, on the basis of Ukraine's sovereign will. The same is true of sovereignty in domestic

policy. Such a precedent has already been in the history of independent Ukraine in matters of acquisition of a nuclear-free status. The final section briefly presents a potential 'Ukrainian security model'.

### *6.3.2 A new concept of Ukraine's national security*

In order to really achieve a new role for Ukraine, a development of a conceptual framework for model of the national security is required. The political life of Ukraine experienced the 'multi-vector' policy and Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as clearly declared non-alignment. However, on the basis of the analysis it becomes clear that the most appropriate model for the national security has become a model of neutrality.

The experience of the last century has shown that the concept of neutrality is a viable model for national security. You can even talk about neutrality as some kind of filter that protects the country from the negative consequences of the confrontation of external forces. It is a heaven in which the country can concentrate on solving domestic problems, which is an important precondition for successful European integration.

It should be recognized that even the current model of the non-alignment has low quality, because its principles are not declared in the Constitution, but only in the other laws of Ukraine, which can be easily changed.

In modern Europe, several successful models of neutrality are presented in the context of relations with great powers and alliances, in particular, Swedish and Finnish neutralities. Based on the numerous evaluations and comparisons, Finnish neutrality is the closest model of development applicable to the Ukrainian realities.

Today, the leading Ukrainian security experts offer a range of the models of neutrality for the development of the foreign policy of Ukraine.

They refer to the geographic range, considering the model of relations with the countries of the EU and NATO. They cite the example of Polish and Turkish model. The Polish model is constructed on the basis of modernisation according to the EU criteria while simultaneously integrating into the EU. The Turkish model also aims to modernise the state, but is in an uncertain future membership. Ukrainian situation in terms of the unclear prospects certainly closer to the

Turkish. However, it is mistakenly to offer a Turkish version of the development, based only on the categories of membership in the EU. As another alternative, the experts suggest Finlandization of Ukraine, referring to the experience of Finland, which showed that following certain principles in the policy can remain stable and prosperous island, even in the face of fierce opposition bloc. However, with regard to issues of sovereignty, the modern Ukraine is much more protected from the influences of the external and internal policy from the side of Russia than the post-war Finland, so the holding of the neutral rate does not become an obstacle in the implementation of prudent national self-interest and pragmatism, together with aiming at consolidating the society, developing economic and defense security. In this case the main guarantee of the national security is the OSCE, and in the future - membership in the CSDP, following the example of Finland and Sweden. In addition, it will be difficult to say who dominates the impact on domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine. This will help to avoid the fate of similar situation with Transnistria.

In addition, the declaration of neutrality, and a shift of emphasis from the EU integration processes towards the cooperation in the comprehensive modernization of Ukraine, will remove the diplomatic tension between the EU and Ukraine, and avoid a headache in the formation of a strategy for Ukraine.<sup>248</sup>

Finally, when talking about the content of the concept of neutrality, few types are appeared. One of the examples is the concept the '*sufficient neutrality*' or '*adapted neutrality*', the essence of which is actually not much different from the non-alignment. It allows to institutionalize a neutral status. It imposes a ban on party in politico-military blocs, but does not prevent the development of foreign economic and political trends that will integrate into Europe and develop the comprehensive relations with Russia, and thus ostensibly determine Ukraine's rightful place in the world.

However, such an interpretation of neutrality and Ukraine's place in it is somewhat superficial, since the success of Ukraine is not only the stability of its relationship with the EU, NATO and Russia.

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<sup>248</sup> <http://hvylyya.org/analytics/geopolitics/14148-zachem-nam-eta-evropa.html>

Other experts believe that the '*active neutrality*' is the best solution for the Ukrainian security dilemma. It includes the same features of balancing as the 'adapted neutrality' contains, but adjusted for the fact that Ukraine should develop relations with NATO and the EU with a view to the distant prospect of entry into these organizations. At the same time Ukraine is given to the role of the state, which cooperates with the centers of European and Atlantic integration within the various programs, declaring itself as a 'diligent pupil'. Ukraine downloads policies and standards of these associations with the same prospects of gaining membership.

A weakness of this concept is the fact that Ukraine and the EU are considered in a static stance. However, international developments inside and outside the EU and NATO is a good reason to predict a significant reconfiguration of this integration associations in the near future. However, evaluation of the role and changing conditions for Ukraine is not given.

Finally, in recent times a more accurate model of neutrality has appeared - 'penetrating neutrality'.<sup>249</sup>

This type of institutional neutrality recognizes institutionalisation of neutrality, but is a very flexible foreign policy tool. First, it must be recognized as an institution by the international community (especially the UN, which made a precedent for the recognition of the neutrality of Turkmenistan, the OSCE, and military alliances -NATO and SCTO.) This is the core difference of the 'penetrating neutrality'.

The main characteristic of the content is the principle under which Ukraine takes all that it benefits from any single international agreement (like Switzerland). However, it does not tend to any modifications or alliances and integration, so as not to jeopardize the fragile national sovereignty and identity. This will allow Ukraine grow as a European nation-state, which then independently decide whether it is interested to integrate into the post-national and supranational projects.

Another task for Ukraine is a motivation of the cooperation with the external powers by expanding the opportunities in a changing world, with the already

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<sup>249</sup> [http://dialogs.org.ua/dialog.php?id=10&op\\_id=268](http://dialogs.org.ua/dialog.php?id=10&op_id=268))

existing rich potential. This can become a successful geopolitical premiere of Ukraine. At the same time, the penetration is not a neutral celom of the Ukrainian development. It can also be measured by time-bound. Thus, like the Ukrainian non-alignment, acting as a guard of national sovereignty, the *penetrating neutrality*, which absorbed all the best from the experience of the neutral countries, will be a solution for the national dilemma of Ukraine and will go down in political theory called 'Ukrainian model' of neutrality, synonymous with successful neutrality in foreign policy.

#### **6.4 Conclusions on the new security model of Ukraine in a changing world**

The emergence of new threats undermines the basis of the Ukrainian non-alignment. Along with this, the experiences of Sweden and Finland have demonstrated that neutrality remains a successful political concept in a modern world. Having traced similarities and differences between the Scandinavian neutral countries and Ukraine, the main discovery is that these three states have many features in common. Yet, at the same time, there are major differences which do not allow Ukraine to blindly copy the Swedish and Finnish model of neutrality.

The domestic problems of Ukraine, as well as the peculiarities of its relations with the great powers (EU, NATO and Russia), are adjusting to allow the foundation of a Ukrainian model of neutrality, which would allow it to maintain a healthy tone in its relations with all the actors and yet without integration into the existing projects – a premature and dangerous step for a fragile Ukraine.

On the basis of the analysis of the different models of neutrality, we can conclude that the concept of 'penetrating neutrality' is the most accurate model of the Ukraine's foreign policy and the most appropriate response to the dilemma of Ukrainian national security.



## **Last words on the phenomenon of neutrality**

At the beginning of this thesis a very ambitious question was raised: can we, considering the institution of neutrality, argue that the concept of neutrality provides effective mechanisms for the national and regional security of Ukraine in a changing world? In the process of studying the phenomenon of neutrality, it turned out that this is an extremely complex concept, which demands different modes of analysis. After analysing the theoretical approaches regarding the nature of neutrality; 'challenging' it in the concrete cases of Sweden and Finland; and analyzing its potential applicability to Ukraine, we must conclude that neutrality is a very sophisticated phenomenon that has entered into international law and interacted with the realities of a changing world for a long time. Neutrality is not just a 'lifeline' - it is a respectable and successful model of development that makes its own contribution to stability and security.

The historical and contemporary experiences of the non-allied Sweden and Finland consistently demonstrate that neutrality is a viable element of national security. Like any intelligent organism, neutrality has evolved throughout the development of international relations. From a weak and unprotected status, it gradually gained institutional and legal force, and by the early 21st century has become a highly flexible, highly moral and intellectual concept. Continuing to modernize its principles, it has been transformed from the legacy of weak actors into an advantage for successful and prosperous countries. In Europe today, it is very difficult to find a neutral country that faces serious security problems or which has a low position in international comparison. All this makes the concept of neutrality extremely attractive to countries that have not been able to articulate their values and principles in foreign policy. Such countries often tend to have problems related to a lack of national identity. Quite naturally, they are faced with a number of dilemmas. One of them is whether it is necessary to participate fully in international relations, or whether it would be more secure to stay remote from international processes.

If it is considered worthwhile to contribute to international development, to what extent can a state then integrate into modern globalised society if it feels a threat of losing elements of its identity through the integration process? Obligated to

choose between sovereignty and influence on international processes, states are faced with the challenge of controlling the degree of dependence they are prepared to concede to supranational entities.

The question arises as to which model of national security can best provide a country with a harmonious balance of influence between domestic and external powers while not threatening statehood. Countries with a strong military and economic potential have a wider range of appropriate models for national security. In contrast, countries that have serious problems and lack capacity to maintain their sovereignty have relatively little choice; nor can the available options, as a rule, fully meet their expectations on security. At the same time, thanks to changes in the international system and especially the new forms and roles of institutions, modern countries have a unique opportunity to actively participate in international affairs while simultaneously filtering external threats to their sovereignty. It is not difficult to guess that neutrality is precisely one such model, which helps safeguard a country from the painful dilemmas of national security.

Of course, a huge responsibility and a high level of organization is incumbent upon a state that wants to reap the fruits of the neutral concept in its foreign policy. In order to receive benefits, you must first plant the tree of neutrality and carefully guard it. Each neutrality tree grows in a different way, and the fruits of it are correspondingly different. Everything depends not only on climate and troublesome neighbours, but also on the owner, who can create the defining conditions for growth of the tree.

It also happens that a tree may be planted by all the right rules, but the owner forgets about to care about it. Such a tree is transformed into a wild wood, and its fruits will also be wild. Does anyone want to take the germ of this tree and plant it himself? Or will such a man rather go to a garden with fertile trees?

Ukraine is a garden that has survived after more than a dozen owners. Whoever came to the Ukrainian garden – everybody ate the fruits from the trees, but few people cared about the garden's upkeep. Therefore many trees have stopped bearing fruit in terms of foreign policy.

Today the garden has finally found its gardener – the independent Ukrainian people. Yet twenty years has not been enough to turn Ukraine into a successful country with a strong position in foreign policy and a seamless national identity. Ukraine is still looking into the gardens of its neighbors, trying out what it may be able to get from some or all of them. In tactical terms this may seem profitable, but at strategic level there is a risk of Ukraine falling into the role of the proverbial grasshopper which ‘has been just singing all the summer’ but has stored up nothing to eat for the winter. Today, when Ukraine is facing new challenges added to the old ones, it is high time to solve its national dilemma; and the basis for a successful option is already present.

Based on the characteristics of other European neutral countries, as well as analysis of historical, theoretical and civilisational factors, we conclude that neutrality is the most adequate model of national security in a changing world. A policy of ‘penetrating neutrality’, in our view, is the overall solution of Ukraine’s problems related to the geo-political influence of Russia, the integrative pressures from Europe and the security influence of NATO. Such a policy would still leave Ukraine between East and West, between NATO and Russia, but no longer between Scylla and Charybdis.

In trying to resolve the dilemma of Ukraine this thesis has offered answers to certain questions. But it also opens up new questions that still need to be explored for those interested in issues of neutrality. What will happen to neutrality in the future? How it will be upgraded? Will there be a better alternative to neutrality? Which model will offer best protection for the present non-allied states in face of the emergence of new threats? And will such real-life developments be reflected in the theoretical and institutional understanding of neutrality? The answers to these questions will lead to a fundamentally new understanding of the foundations of international relations in general and the concept of security in particular.

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