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Building a New Tomorrow

-International Peacebuilding in Kosovo-

Bergþóra Silva Hólm

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Supervisor:
Dr. Jónína Einarsdóttir, Professor of Anthropology, Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, University of Iceland.

Student:
Bergþóra Silva Hólm
021275-3879

Ágrip

Við lok kalda stríðsins urðu átök milli ethniska hópa sýnilegri sem kallaði á nýja nálgun hvað varðar friðar- og öryggismál. Árið 1992 kynnti Boutros Boutros-Ghali, þáverandi framkvæmdastjóri Sameinuðu þjóðanna, til sögunnar hugtakið friðaruppbygging sem svar við frekari aðgerðum á átakasvæðum. Friðaruppbygging felur í sér margvíslegar aðferðir til að koma í veg fyrir átök. Andstætt fyrri aðferðum til að skapa frið þá felst friðaruppbygging í því að alþjóðasamfélagið tekur þátt í uppbyggingu landsins eftir að átökum líkur og reynir að finna rót vandans. Friðaruppbygging hefur hlotið ýmsar viðurkenningar og er orðin ein mest notaða aðferðin til að leysa stríðsátök á 21. öldinni.

Markmiðið með þessari ritgerð er að rannsaka hvernig friðaruppbyggingin hefur verið innleidd í Kosovo, út frá sjónarhóli alþjóðlegra aðila sem vinna í landinu með því að kanna þeirra álit. Ég mun leitast við að svara spurningum eins og hvernig starfseminni sé háttað hjá þeim alþjóðlegu stofnunum sem aðilarnir vinna hjá? Og telja þeir að innleiðingin hafi borið árangur?

Rannsóknin byggir á þriggja vikna vettvangsrannsókn í Pristinu, höfuðborg Kosovo, í júlí 2010. Gagna var aflað með viðtölum og þátttökuathugun. Þátttakendur eru sjö fulltrúar alþjóðastofnana í Pristinu og fjórir fyrrum íslenskir friðargæsluliðar á Balkanskaganum. Rita og annarra gagna um viðfangsefnið eins og varðandi átök, friðaruppbyggingu og sögu Balkanskagans var einnig aflað og þau notuð við rannsóknina.

Rannsóknin leiðir í ljós að alþjóðlegir aðilar í Kosovo starfa samkvæmt hugmyndafræði friðaruppbyggingar, til að mynda með því að innleiða lýðræði og styrkja stofnanir. Hins vegar virðist vera skortur á, til að mynda samskiptum og mælingum, stefnumótunin er ekki sérsniðin að hverju tilfelli fyrir sig og það hefur ekki tekist að koma á lýðræði sem tryggir rétt allra þjóðernishópa. Fyrir vikið virðist árangur af friðaruppbyggingu í Kosovo vera hægfara og því ekki eins árangursríkur og hann gæti verið.

Leitarorð

Balkanskaginn, Júgóslavía, Kósóvó, átök, friðaruppbygging, alþjóðasamfélagið, alþjóðastofnanir, þróunarfræði.

Abstract

By the end of the Cold War conflicts between ethnic groups became more visible, which demanded a new approach towards peace and security issues. Boutros Boutros Ghali, UN Secretary-General at the time, introduced the term peacebuilding in 1992, as an answer to the need for further involvement in post-conflict societies. Peacebuilding refers to various methods and strategies aimed at preventing conflicts. Unlike previous peace operations peacebuilding gets involved in domestic issues and tries to get to the roots of the causes. The concept of peacebuilding has gained widespread recognition and has become the most used peace operation in the 21st century.

The objective of my study is to examine the implementation of peacebuilding in Kosovo, through the eyes of the international actors, working in the country, by exploring their opinion. I will seek answers to questions like, how do the international organizations they work for operate? And do they think the implementation of peacebuilding has been successful?

The methodology of the study is based on three weeks fieldwork in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, in July 2010. Methods used are semi-structured interviews and observation. The participants are seven international actors in Pristina as well as four former Icelandic peacekeepers in the Balkans. Literature and other resources, which cover subjects such as conflicts, peacebuilding and the history of the Balkans, were gathered and used as data.

This study comes to the overall conclusion that the international actors in Kosovo work in accordance with peacebuilding, for example, by establishing democracy and strengthening institutions. However, there is a lack of, for instance, communication and measurements; the strategies are not tailored to each case and creating multi-ethnic democracy has not been successful. As a result the peacebuilding process in Kosovo has been slow and not as successful as it could be.

Key words

Balkans, Yugoslavia, Kosovo, ethnic conflict, peacebuilding, international community, international organizations, development studies.

Foreword

This thesis represents 60 ECTS of my Master of Arts in Development Studies at the University of Iceland. The research has been supervised by Jónína Einarsdóttir, Professor of Anthropology at the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences at the University of Iceland. I express my sincere gratitude for her guidance, encouragement and patience throughout this study.

I am very grateful to my niece Helena Sigurgeirsdóttir Hólm who accompanied me to Kosovo to baby-sit my son, while I was doing interviews and gathering data for the research. Without her support it would not have been possible for me to take my son with me on this trip. I would also like to thank her for keeping me company both in Kosovo and on our road trip in the Balkans. My niece Guðlaug Sigurgeirsdóttir also deserves gratitude and a big hug for her proof-reading. I would also like to thank my parents, Guðlaug Hjaltadóttir and Þorkell G. Hólm, for their support and encouragement.

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Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to my loving son, Aðalbjörn Snævarr Hólm.

Abbreviations

CSDP   Common Security and Defense Policy

DAC   Development Assistance Committee

DFO   Department of Field Operations

DPKO   Department of Peacekeeping Operations

EU   European Union

EULEX   European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

FRY   Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

G8   Group 8

IMF   International Monetary Fund

KFOR   Kosovo Force

KJA   Kosovo Judges Association

KLA   Kosovo Liberation Army

KPC   Kosovo Protection Corps

KPS   Kosovo Police Service

KSF   Kosovo Security Force

KVM   Kosovo Verification Mission

LoGo   Local Government Programme

MTA   Military-Technical Agreement

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs   Non-Governmental Organization

OSCE   Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PBC   Peacebuilding Commission

RPP	Reflecting on Peace Practice
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNKT	United Nations Kosovo Team
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UNSCR	Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization

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Figure 1: Map of Kosovo

Introduction

The end of the Cold War was pivotal in bringing about a drastic change in global peace and security, while also challenging human welfare. The threat of conflict on an international scale had decreased, but regional and ethnic conflicts on the other hand increased requiring the building of a sustainable and lasting peace (Paris, 2004).

Former United Nations Secretary-General, Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, recognized the need for a different approach towards peace and introduced the term peacebuilding in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Post-conflict peacebuilding is a broad concept, which refers to various methods and strategies aimed at strengthening peace, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict after initial fighting has ceased. These operations include for instance, building legal and human rights institutions, security, and effective governance. To be successful, peacebuilding activities require cooperation in planning, coordination, and commitments at both local and international levels (Lederach, 1997). Over the years peacebuilding has gained widespread recognition and has become the most used peace operation in the 21st century (Søbjerg, 2006).

The international peacebuilding journey started in Kosovo in 1999, when NATO stopped the air campaign, and Resolution 1244 was adopted by the United Nation Security Council on 10th of June 1999. Since then the government in Kosovo has gained increased control, and in February 2008 Kosovo declared independence. The international community has been focussing on issues like, security and rule of law, governance, human rights, democratic development, and improving the standard of living (Ruecker, 2000). The United Nations, NATO, and the European Union play a vital role in these areas in helping to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict and to assist building a sustainable peace.

Lederach (1997) argues that it takes people at least as long to get out of a conflict as it does to get into one. The Serbs and Albanians share a long history of fighting over Kosovo, which makes the peacebuilding process a long time commitment at both local and international levels. It is a long journey and no one can say for certain when it will end. The Balkan history is full of violence and great tension between the ethnic-Serbs and ethnic-Albanians. It is home of two ethnic groups, who both claim that they are the first inhabitants in Kosovo. This past has left a lasting demographic and emotional effect on Kosovo and its inhabitants (Judah, 2008).

The objective of my study is to examine the implementation of peacebuilding in Kosovo through the eyes of the international actors working in the country by exploring their opinion. I will seek answers to questions like, how do the international organizations they work for operate? And do they think the implementation of peacebuilding has been successful?

I chose Kosovo as my fieldwork and peacebuilding as my subject because I wanted to go to a field, which has gained experience in peacebuilding. Kosovo is a country where peacebuilding has been practiced since 1999, which makes it a good place to study. It is also a place where new approaches have been used for the first time, for instance, regarding the participation of NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations.

This study uses qualitative methods, including semi-structured interviews and observations. The main research was conducted in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, for three weeks in July 2010, where I interviewed seven international actors. It is also based on observations, where I used my eyes and ears as research tools to get a better feeling for the field. I also conducted three interviews in Iceland and one in Sarajevo, Bosnia, with former Icelandic peacekeepers in the Balkans.

The study includes six main chapters. The first two chapters outline the theoretical basis for the research by discussing theories about ethnic groups in conflicts and peacebuilding. These theories are used as a bridge between the theories and the conclusion of the research analyzes. Chapter three gives an overview of historical moments that have effected Kosovo in one way or another and led up to the conflict that occurred in the 1990s. The chapter also discusses the Kosovo war and the involvement of the international community. The international organizations my interlocutors work for are also introduced. In the following chapter, I discuss why I chose Kosovo and peacebuilding as my field and topic, and describe the methodology of the research. Chapter five reveals the results of the research, in the following chapter I discuss the research findings in relation to the theories, and finally the main conclusions are introduced.

Chapter 1 Ethnic Groups in Conflict

While some ethnic groups can live together within the same nation in peace, others are more likely to get into conflicts. Ethnic conflicts have become more visible since the end of the Cold War and the reasons are believed to range from regime changes to the demand of minority rights. This chapter will discuss the changes in war methods and ethnic groups in terms of identities, conflicts, causes, and reconciliation.

1.1 Old and New Wars

In the 1990s Kaldor (1999) noticed, when researching the war in the Balkans and later when she visited Nagorno-Karabakh in the Transcaucasian region, that there were similarities between these wars, which helped her understanding what was happening, for instance, in the Balkan war. To distinguish these wars, in the 1990s, from the wars from earlier era, Kaldor decided to refer to these wars as New Wars and Old Wars. According to Kaldor (2005), it is important to understand the difference between the so-called New Wars and the Old Wars to be able to both manage and understand them.

What has been referred to as Old Wars are wars that were fought before the Cold War in the 20th century. In line with Clausewitz's stipulation, these wars were well-defined with the support of the population, where the front line of the war was perceptible and fought by men in uniforms (Tilly, 1990). Kaldor (1999) maintains that Clausewitz's definition of war is actually war between states for identifying political ends, i.e. state interest. Kaldor (2005) adds that it was the state's obligation to protect its territory from being attacked. This legitimatized the state, which therefore could progressively, for instance, manage organized violence and thus prevent the formation of private armies. However, increased mobilization of the states, and the advance of science and technology to kill, brought increased destruction. As the Second World War came to an end, Kaldor (2005) argues, Old Wars ended and New Wars rose to the surface.

Although the end of the Second World War was believed to bring peace in Europe, another type of war emerged, namely the Cold War (Kaldor, 2005). The Cold War lasted until late in the 20th century and the end of it is believed to have created new types of wars. The opposite of the Old Wars these New Wars are ill-defined, do not act out within a certain geographical area, and lack the support of the population (Kaldor, 2005). Since the New Wars do not gain much support from the population, fear and hate are used as bait to win the people over. The

war is no longer pointed against a foreign enemy, but against the civilian population itself, and is controlled through ethnic cleansing, displacement, mass murder, and forced migration. According to Kaldor (2007), these New Wars have to be understood in the context of the process known as globalization which made changes to war. These wars are fought for political goals, which base politics on identity rather than territories, the war tactics have changed to methods like guerrilla or terror, and economic status has changed the way wars are funded.

Gurr (2001) agrees with Kaldor in some ways and believes that the end of the Cold War created a power vacuum and political insecurity that needed to be filled. The New Wars are caused by this uncertainty that took place post-Cold War, where new states were born and minority groups demanded recognition and independence. However, Gurr argues that even though the appearance of war changed as the Cold War came to an end it was not the Cold War itself that made the difference, but rather that the difference is in the ethnic groups identities or the hatred between them. These New Wars were only made more visible with the end of the Cold War, although the transformation can be traced to the 1960s. Kalyvas (2000), in line with Gurr (2001), believes that the end of the Cold War revealed this new type of war and is therefore skeptical about the theory that civil wars have changed post-Cold War, as Kaldor (2007) mentioned above.

Kaldor (1999; 2005) argues that even though it is not easy to set up a timeline for when certain types of wars occur it is important to distinguish between them. Hence, so-called New Wars are not entirely new and have been fought in the Old War period or at least had some similarities with the old ones. Kalyvas (2000:4-5), however, does not agree with Kaldor's distinctions between Old Wars and New Wars and believes the distinctions is not warranted. Kalyvas has listed the main differences that can be distinguished between these wars. Old Wars were well-defined and motivated by ideological causes, whilst New Wars are motivated by ethnic hatred. Old Wars erupted because of popular grievances however; New Wars are motivated by greed and loot. Old Wars were based on popular support, whereas New Wars are fought by political actors with no popular basis. And finally in most of the Old Wars violence was controlled and centralized, whereas in New Wars the violence is in most cases, gratuitous, senseless and decentralized. Kalyvas argues that even though there is a need to distinguish between wars to analyze and understand them, it is not a good way to divide them up into two separated parts such as Old Wars and New Wars, as these wars may overlap and/or affect one another. He also points out that this distinction between the Old Wars and

New Wars is not always based on comparisons on careful empirical research and believes there are other factors than ideology that needs to be focussed on, such as how a civil war affects its nature and shape (Kalyvas, 2000).

1.2 Ethnic Groups

An ethnic group is a group of humans who share identities through common elements like history, race, or culture (Smith, 2000). However, such elements constructing any one group can also trigger ethnic conflict between different groups. To avoid future conflicts the ethnic groups have to change.

1.2.1 Ethnic Identities

Ethnic groups can exist over time, change, and even disappear as both Barth (1996) and Eriksen (2002) have identified. However, Smith (2000) argues that ethnic groups are a community of members, who share common interests and identity. These ethnic communities can be characterized through elements such as territory, name, language, religion, and culture, which will be further discussed below.

According to Smith (2000), a nation is a territory or a homeland to a population, which shares common myths and memories, as well as economy, duties, and rights. The territory state is thought to be a distinction factor determining if a nation exists or not, and the basis of economic and political structures, which are fundamental elements of ethnic groups and nations. Eriksen (2002) believes that ethnic groups, which are characterized by symbols that define their identity, control the nation-state. Ethnic nationalism can evolve within a nation, which is a movement based on shared identity, common history and culture that are determined to maintain, for instance, the identities of its members or the nation. According to Eriksen (2002), the ideology behind nationalism explains and justifies a nation's existence and why nation and state should be as one.

For a group to be able to identify themselves it is important for them to have a name, but also elements that can give them a common character, which usually include common descent and shared historical experiences (Gurr, 1993). Language is one of the identities that can characterize ethnic groups and according to Cohen (1996) language and race are a large part of how groups and their identity develop. Language is also believed to be more enduring and stronger than other identity factors. Religion is another factor of identity that can contribute to

characterize ethnic groups. According to Stavenhagen (1996), religion is a strong source of group solidarity in multiracial societies. The more religion is integrated with other aspects of the social life it becomes an important factor of ethnicity.

According to Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744 – 1803), a German philosopher, history, with its memories and sentiments, has made the common humanity different and divided them into separate cultures (Calleo, 1995). Smith (2010) shares Herder's thoughts and emphasizes that the myth of the origin of the group is an important factor in how the ethnic groups and identities evolve, gain trust, and whether the group's members are proud regarding their uniqueness. Human beings need to be recognized as individuals and be able to feel safe. Through culture people can find their identity and security in elements like system of values, symbols, and shared customs.

Identities do not always evolve from the ethnic group itself. Shared identity can emerge from institutions, of the nation or the state, and become legitimate to the members of the society, or the groups within the territory. In that case identities are being created and an attempt is made to make the identity valid to the group through elements such as economics or politics (Smith, 2010). That does not mean that identities stay unaltered as long as the ethnic group exists. If the identity is considered not to be effective, because of, for instance, social or political changes, the ethnic group will adapt to new situations. However, drastic changes, such as in political regimes, can create insecurity in identity shaping, which can lead to misunderstanding and even fear for the future (Smith, 2000).

1.2.2 Causes of Ethnic Conflicts

Nordstrom (2004) and Cashman (2000) have reflected on what war is and believe it is a confusing phenomenon that can be difficult to understand. They claim it is not possible to take one single theory to explain war. According to Cashman (2000), each theory of war is a piece to the puzzle of what causes war, as causes of war can be at several levels of analysis. For example, on individual level, small group level, governmental level, and so on. He also concludes that each theory of war adds to our understanding of how peace can be maintained. Jeong (2000) agrees that it can be difficult to point out one single factor. It is rather interacting factors within the structure of the state and the institutions that cause conflicts. However, by analyzing the causes of conflicts, we become more likely to understand the causes of past conflicts, and thereby able to avoid future conflicts (Abdallah, 2001).

Underlying causes can be categorized into factors such as structural, political, economical, and cultural, although they may overlap (Sriram & Nielsen, 2004). This will be further elaborated on briefly below.

1.2.2.1 Structural Factors

Eriksen (2002) points out that there is seldom only one ethnic group within the nation; usually the nation is composed of more than one ethnic group. In some cases the minority group is not accepted in the nation or even excluded from it. Discrimination like that, or unsolvable issues about aspects that involve everyone in the nation, can lead to internal ethnic conflicts. These minority groups belong to a different ethnicity and have reached a point where they do not think their governing structure can solve their problems about issues like politics, culture, economics, or territory (Brown, 1993). How the relationship between the ethnic groups has evolved through time is also an important factor of whether ethnic violence will erupt. If their history contains many memories or myths of ethnic violence, it is likely to be used later by political leaders to justify their action or even to blame the minority group for the nation's structural problems (Gurr, 2001).

Rupesinghe (1998) argues that conflict may occur within a society when structural imbalance is created. This can occur when imbalance of power is created between people or groups, so that one group dominates another. Such imbalance can affect the quality of life of the minority group by creating inequality regarding resource distribution, access to medical assistance, and education, or by preventing participation in politics. According to Brown (2001), societal changes can also cause conflict between minority and majority groups. For example, new technology, better education, and the media can raise awareness of how different groups of people stand in the society.

According to Lake and Rothchild (1996), open ethnic conflicts can result from competition between ethnic groups, the loss of state legitimacy to its people, fear for its own security, or if the ethnic groups are progressively trying to destroy the peace within the state. The state then can become too weak and loses its ability to settle the dispute between the ethnic groups, leading to their fear for survival and for their safety. As a result the state may weaken and it becomes more difficult for it to try and resolve the problem, which increases the possibility of conflict. To reduce the risk of conflict it is important to have strong institutions, especially when there is ethnic inequality within the state (Burton, 1997).

1.2.2.2 Political and Economic Factors

Brown (2001) considers nationalism a political factor and a strategy for politicizing ethnicity, which can cause ethnic conflict as extreme as genocide if political ethnicity is the only relevant identity. This can occur if structural changes in political and economic factors fail. The result can lead to identity crisis and a rise in nationalism if members of the ethnic group believe they are threatened. In that case it is better to attack before being attacked. According to Horowitz (1985), the rise in nationalism can be connected to democratization in modern societies. Multi-ethnic societies can face difficulties when a former, undemocratic, regime is changed to a democratic one, especially in the early stages. If the old regime consisted of forced assimilation, political discrimination, or other elements that made one ethnic group dominate the others, the transformation can be problematic. The problems between the ethnic groups will surface and need to be addressed.

Lake and Rothchild (1996) argue that resources, jobs, government contracts, and other economic factors, can cause ethnic conflict. If resources are scarce a competition can rise along ethnic lines, especially in multi-ethnic societies were ethnicity is an important identity factor. This happens if the majority uses its power to discriminate against the minority by using inequality and repression. This can increase the possibility that one ethnic group gets more access to the state's resources and corruption can evolve. If the institutions are weak and problems like these surface the chances of negotiations become limited (Burton, 1997; Collier & Hoeffler, 2000).

1.2.2.3 Cultural Factors

Culture can lead to disputes between different cultural groups and turn to violence, as it defines the ethnic groups and distinguishes them from one another. However, according to Rupesinghe (1998), cultural violence is not easy to define, as it regards identity and symbolism, but can lead towards violence of hate.

If a minority group believes that they are being discriminated against, because of race, culture, or other identity factors and are denied of educational opportunities, using their language, or religious freedom, the likelihood of ethnic conflicts increases (Brown, 2001). According to Horowitz (1985), the history of different ethnic groups within one state can create such bad memories that it can affect the future relationship between the groups and lead to ethnic hate.

Collier and Hoeffler (2000) argue that hatreds, which can be the cause of the conflict, are only visible in societies that are multi-ethnic or multi-religious. The hatred is believed to stem from grievances, such as economic or political inequalities, and differences between the ethnic groups, regarding such phenomena as religion or language. For example, the reason why language can cause ethnic conflicts is that minority groups are often forbidden to use their language, for instance, in the media, schools, or other public places (Brown, 2001). However, not everyone accepts the explanation that grievances between ethnic groups can lead to conflict. According to Lake and Rothchild (1996), the history of grievances between ethnic groups shows that is not always the case.

Huntington (1993) argues that different civilizations are more likely to fight each other in the post Cold War era than during the Cold War. After the Cold War ended there was more interaction between different civilizations, religious identities became more visible, and the demographic and economic landscape changed. Therefore, Huntington argues, the clashes of civilizations are usually conflicts between individuals with different views of things, such as religion. However, Huntington did not take into consideration that each civilization block is made up of individuals with different identities. Huntington's theory has been criticized for reasons like that it is based on flawed and circumstantial evidence and for simplifying the world (Henderson, 2005). One of the critics of Huntington's theory is Fox (2002), who constructed his own study of the period 1989-2002, and opposes Huntington's theory. What Fox (2002) found is that conflicts between civilizations are less common than non civilization conflicts. Therefore, it is more likely that conflicts occur within the same civilization.

Identity, like language or religion, is considered to be a valuable factor to the individuals of an ethnic group; however, identity per se does not lead to conflict. Most of the present conflicts are rooted in nationalism and ethnic clashes when factors such as dominance and historical differences collide (Varshney, 2003). The possibility is greater if the structure of the state is weak and cannot provide security. Humans need to feel safe and therefore they identify with structures that can provide them security (Giannakos, 2002).

When ethnic clashes lead to conflict, identities can change, and usually harden, during a war. The people involved give more attention to their identity and it becomes much more relevant to them than before the conflict began. Those who do not belong to the same identity group become the enemy, and those who do gain a tighter bond. In that way the ethnic conflict can consolidate the identities by making them harder and more relevant to the ethnic group.

However, this increased awareness in the ethnic groups owns identity in contemporary ethnic conflicts does not need to be permanent, as the groups are only trying to get recognition for their own existence (Kalyvas, 2008).

1.3 Reconciliation

When a conflict comes to an end a reconciliation process needs to take place to minimize the possibility that conflict will erupt again. It is also important, if the reconciliation is to be effective, that all ethnic groups involved are truly committed to the process and willing to sit down and truly settle their differences, a process which should not just involve the groups' leaders. Both during the conflict and the period before the conflict erupted, emotions such as anger, hatred, and fear have cut deep into the ethnic groups, something which needs to be addressed (Bar-Tal, 2007; Rouhana, 2001). For that reason Bar-Tal (2007) believes it is important for the ethnic groups to build a relationship for a more peaceful future.

There are many factors that need to be taken into consideration in the reconciliation process. Bar-Tal (2007) and Rouhana (2001) have mentioned some factors that the ethnic groups need to address for successful reconciliation. Bar-Tal's (2007) emphasis on the importance, and essence, that reconciliation needs to involve everyone in the society and transformation needs to take place. That includes new symbols, values and opinion, to create new goals, beliefs, attitude and emotions. These elements then require that the rivalling groups develop and show interest in each other. That is, by getting to know each other, understand each other's history, recognize, respect and accept each other's identities, develop trust between the groups, and forgiveness. Bar-Tal (2007) believes, that if these factors are taken into consideration in the reconciliation process it can make the foundation for the groups to understand each other, accept each other's differences and past. That can also result in less fear, anger and hate between the groups and that more positive emotions will take their place. All these elements can prevent conflict in the future.

Rouhana (2001), for the most part, agrees with Bar-Tal (2007) on which changes need to be made in a society for reconciliation to bear fruit. However, Rouhana (2001) does not focus much on forgiveness, as the ethnic groups are, in his opinion, not supposed to have to ask for forgiveness. He believes that it is not possible for anyone to force someone to forgive, especially if the person is not ready. Rouhana puts more emphasis on the importance for the ethnic groups to gain justice, take responsibility for their actions, acknowledge each other,

and on active structural and political changes. He believes that such elements are more likely to automatically lead to forgiveness of the past and acceptance of it.

For the ethnic groups to be able to believe in the changes and not fear for the future, the changes need to be implemented into the institutions where the groups' rights are protected and basic human needs are satisfied (Tidwell, 1998). The state also needs to put an effort into involving the minority representatives in public affairs and to build coalitions. If the minorities' demands are not met, or they are not included in decisions about structure building, it can lead to insecurity on the behalf of the minorities (Lake & Rothchild, 1996). According to Gurr (2001), ethnic groups that are included in decision making and face few barriers to participate in politics are more likely to use methods like protest, rather than rebellion, to show their grievances.

According to Lake and Rothchild (1996), reconciliation is an ongoing process, which hardly ever has an end solution. However, it is possible for the minority groups to seek to acquire security, respect, and access to resources, in an attempt to minimize the possibility of ethnic conflict erupting again. In that case ethnic groups could live together in harmony, however, factors such as regime changes are always a possible and a feared factor. Therefore, there will always be a possibility that violence will break out in multi-ethnic societies and the only thing that can be done is to minimize that risk.

In some cases it is always a possibility that foreign intervention is needed when human rights are violated, especially when spillover affects or economic problems are likely. In those cases the standards used to settle the dispute are universal, as the future relationship between the ethnic groups is, in summary, based on equality and human dignity (Gurr, 2001).

1.4 Summary

The way a society is organized can create the root causes of conflict. Any society, which is organized so that some people are treated unequally and unjustly, is likely to erupt into conflict, especially if its leaders do not represent all factions of the society. Reconciliation plays an important role in reforming an unequal and unjust society, so conflicts will be rare. In the next chapter peace operations will be introduced, in which the emphasis is on peacebuilding.

Chapter 2 Peace Operations

Peace operations, before and during the Cold War, were essentially one-dimensional activities, approaches involving international negotiation and conflict resolution. These operations focussed more on tangible achievements or failures than human rights or political, economic, and social resources (Savir, 2009; Richmond, 2002). The end of the Cold War marked a pivotal point regarding approaches in terms of peace and security. Instead of embracing democracy, ethnic tension was on the increase, states were collapsing, and the political landscape was fragile. Russia and the United States of America (USA) were no longer willing to devote themselves to the failing states, which led to increased violence across former communist states from Yugoslavia through the Caucasus to central Asia. These wars were fought within the countries in the name of identity, culture, or religion with a risk of spillover affect, refugees, and an increasing threat of terrorist and criminal networks. These risks were believed to become a threat to the global stability, which increased the demand upon the United Nations (UN) to take an alternative approach towards peace operations (Smith, 2003; Paris, 2004).

These risk factors, mentioned above, accounted for 94 percent of all armed conflicts fought in the 1990s, and called for new peace operations (Paris, 2004). According to Biersteker (2007), the post-conflict states are particularly vulnerable environments, and almost 50 percent of the time countries revert back to warfare within the first five years of a peace settlement. Deep-rooted resentment and fear often lingers among the local population, even after the initial fighting has stopped. In addition, general economic distress, weak or non-existent governmental institutions, and severely damaged physical infrastructure, often exacerbate the already volatile situation in these states. There was a need for immediate post-conflict peacebuilding, lead by international actors with the means and the capacity to assist in easing the tense situation, and prevent the conflict from escalating into a regional or global problem (Philpott, 2010).

2.1 Peacekeeping

The first major peacekeeping operation was deployed in Egypt (UNEF) in 1956 and became the most used approach during the Cold War. Like other peacekeeping operation this first one was initiated by the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) together with the General Assembly, which monitored cease-fire or patrol neutral buffer zones between former

combatants, without using force or interfering in the domestic politics (Weiss, 2009). There was no interfering in domestic affairs because the permanent members of the UNSC were generally opposed to involvement on their own behalf and their respective allies and client states. The only exceptions before 1989 were in former Belgian Congo in the early 1960s and later with the United Nations Security Force in Western New Guinea.

Peacekeepers were supposed to be neutral observers, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel, and frequently also civilians. These actors were working together under a united mandate, which the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) together with the Department of Field Operations (DFO) were in charge of. The DPKO's mandate was to plan, prepare, manage, and direct UN peacekeeping operations, in order for them to achieve the mission objectives (Utenriksdepartemented, 2004; United Nations Peacekeeping, 2011; Paris, 2004).

2.2 Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a term that first entered the field of peace studies in 1975 in Johan Galtung's work *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding* (Miall et al 2011). However, it was not until Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then UN Secretary-General, introduced the term peacebuilding in 1992 in his *An Agenda for Peace,* that peacebuilding gained recognition in the field (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Peacebuilding approaches were developed as a defense against armed conflict in the 1990s, as the end of the Cold War called for new thinking in conflict resolution. The growing threat of internal conflict, and attention towards growing identity tensions within states, led to a new UN peace mission to stop human suffering, and peacebuilding was an answer to that need. Because of this increasing awareness peacebuilding has become one of the most authorized peace missions in the 21st century (Søbjerg, 2006).

The peacebuilding concept involves a more complete approach than peacekeeping. It takes action to identify and support structure, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict by rebuilding the infrastructure of the war-torn nation (Ponzio, 2007; Søbjerg, 2006). It can involve a number of activities, including conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. The overall aim of peacebuilding involves rebuilding and reconstructing governance structures and institutions, the capacity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), creating security, establishing law

and order, improving education, the health system and the economy, assisting refugees and soldiers, stimulating political discussion, making strategy plans and social organizations across any gender, ethnic, or religious groups (Lederach, 1997:20, 82-83; Søbjerg, 2006; Ruecker, 2000). For instance, the UN peacebuilding activities include drafting or amending constitutions, implementing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes, channeling urgent humanitarian assistance to communities, facilitating transitional justice systems, strengthening state institutions and the delivery of public services, fostering an independent civil society and media organizations, placing the security sector under democratic civilian control, and organizing elections (Ponzio, 2007).

As peacebuilding involves identifying the underlying sources of conflict within a war-torn state, which requires a thorough understanding of local conditions, the task ought to be locally owned. According to Paris (2004) this is the most effective way of meeting the needs of a country or region, in order to be able to address the real roots of conflict, and thereby change the things that triggered the conflict in the first place, and to prevent violence from occurring again in the future.

The actors who are involved in the peacebuilding process need to know their role and the methods that are used in each case. Especially since the term peacebuilding and the operation have received criticism. This will be elaborated further below.

2.2.1 Actors

The task of post conflict peacebuilding involves both local and international actors. Each one has a role in building peace and they need to work together with trust to succeed. Such actors might be UNSC, UN's specialized agencies, Grassroots organizations, NGOs, Foreign Governments, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) (United Nations, 2002; Anderlini, 2000).

Lederach (1997:38-52) divides the peacebuilding actors into three levels, or a pyramid. First, there are the top level actors, who are, for example, political, religious or military leaders. These are the most visible actors in the society, and without support from the state they cannot expect much support from the international community. Next in line are the middle range actors, who can be respected individuals, because they occupy formal positions in, for example, education, business, agriculture or health. There can also be actors with strong networks such as religious groups, academic institutions, or NGOs. The actors in this category

have one thing in common: they have close connections with the top level actors and the grassroots' level. The middle range actors are not bound by a special movement, statement, or position, and are therefore flexible in their movements and actions. The third and last group of actors works at the grassroots level. They are, for example, leaders in local communities, NGOs, or indigenous groups. What characterizes this group is the actors' own knowledge of the local context and politics.

When it comes to work on a specific operation it is important to identify everyone who should be involved from the bottom up, to gain more understanding and knowledge about the process (Rothstein, 1999:228). Therefore, an ideal team of peacebuilding actors should be a mixture of Lederach's (1997) pyramid, where a fieldwork brings together distinguished groups of people. For example, there is a great use of NGOs, because their network extends further by far into the post-conflict zone than the external actors', and the grassroots organizations can give an inside knowledge to what the locals want and thereby their thoughts. It is therefore important for the external actors to maintain good communication with, for instance, various local groups, to ensure that all actors understand the role of the peacebuilding mission and use everyone's connections to solve the problem (Eguren, 2001; Richmond & Carey, 2005).

External actors should be provided with basic preparation before arriving at the field. According to Truger (2001), the preparation should include three stages: general preparation, task specific preparation, and mission-specific preparation. Not everything can be learned beforehand and some knowledge can only be gained once on the job. Those experiences should, however, be accessible to the next actor arriving at the field, to learn from previous experience. The actors involved not only have to consider the field they are entering, but also that they are most likely going to work with people with various cultural backgrounds and different ideas on how to approach the problem solving.

2.2.2 Methods

After the Cold War the peacebuilding operations needed a clear strategic vision and mandate for the actors involved, as they had to go beyond problem solving. To do so, it is important to have a strategy plan and to know which tools are effective in which circumstances for a successful implementation (Truger, 2001).

2.2.2.1 Strategy

In peacebuilding the strategy plan needs to be tailored to each case and there are a few things that can influence the strategy making. For example, concepts or visions, like institutions, which translate these concepts into action through rules and laws. Resources, like money, equipment, or personnel, that are needed to finally carry out the concepts in line with the rules and procedures of the institutions. A successful peacebuilding strategy has three characteristics:

1. It combines aims and means in the area of peacebuilding, and outlines the conceptual foundation, the institutional arrangements, and the required resources to be pursued;
2. It outlines the cooperation necessary between actors on specific tasks;
3. It provides a vision that can be implemented (European Parliament, 2010).

Organizations like the UN and the EU are aware of the need to implement a peacebuilding strategy into their current peace-enforcement operations and to allow other actors in the field, like NGOs and local groups, to plug into their procedures and structures (Tschirgi, 2004; Ponzio, 2007). However, Ponzio (2007) asks valuable question about the UN and the EU involvement and the framework of peacebuilding strategy. How flexible can an operation be when decisions are made at the UN or the EU headquarters far away from the field? According to Ponzio (2007), local strategic planning exercises are a far better means of empowering local counterparts than efforts in New York. Local exercises are also likely to analyze better and reflect the core peacebuilding priorities of the country. However, organizations like the UN can only be as effective as the member states allow them to be (European Parliament, 2010).

2.2.2.2 Tools

Peacebuilding actors can choose between various sets of tool methods to prevent conflict and build peace. Examples of such tools are: policy tools, liberal market democracy, market-oriented economics, and military tools.

Policy tools operate on conflict sources and manifestations by manipulating different kinds of influence – "carrots" or "sticks". Tools can be implemented through different organizations, some of which are sponsored by actors outside a region in conflict, some by national governments, and some locally. Tools vary in the aspects of conflicts they address and in their

effectiveness and expediency in achieving results. Some policy tools aim directly at immediate triggers of conflicts, such as an ethnic group leader using hostile rhetoric. Others target potential sources of conflict, for example, antipoverty programs intending to rectify disparities in resource distribution and living standards. To assist practitioners in considering a tool's applicability to a particular situation they encounter, and in implementing chosen tools, tool profiles are organized according to a consistent set of elements (Lund, 2001).

According to Paris (2004), liberal market democracy and market-oriented economics, which are heavily rooted in the democratic peace theory, have been the primarily used as tools to prevent conflict from occurring again, ever since the end of the Cold War. This has generated a growing pool of criticism from certain academic communities, which question liberalism as the "winning" method. Reychler (2001) is one of those who believes in these tools, and states that non democratic societies are more likely than democratic environments to enter into violence.

When military tools are used, they need to be integrated in collaboration with the civilians from the earliest stage. This implies not only joint planning of concrete missions, but also the strategic planning for peacebuilding contingencies. Moreover, preventive policies and the knowledge of the regional and political context need to be integrated into mission planning at its earliest stage. This will allow not only defining the objectives of a short-term intervention, but also of a long-term engagement as well as handling over of power from one actor to the other. This will also include exit and transition strategies among military, police and other instruments (European Parliament, 2010).

2.2.2.3 Timeline and Evaluation

Peacebuilding operations need to be monitored and have timelines of interventions and exit strategy, as conflict transformation is all about change. This is to determine whether there are any setbacks or failures in a particular intervention (Tschirgi, 2004). According to Lewer (1999), interviews, questionnaires, focus groups, or even a workshop, are approaches that can give evidence about how the operations are functioning, and how these interventions can influence the overall conflict.

The peacebuilding actors are not the only ones who should monitor their project. The peacebuilding institutions have also been evaluated for example by d'Estree, Paffenholz, the Utstein study, and the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) (Spurk, 2008). According to Spurk

(2008), studies made by these institutions show in most cases the opposite of what should have been achieved. Instead of thorough planning at the beginning and knowing which data should be collected for measurements later on, peacebuilding projects often lack a proper analysis, do not have an explicit intervention strategy, the goals are too general and therefore not measurable, and often there is a weak connection between conflict analysis and the intervention itself. Usually, it is difficult to evaluate one project, as it can have multiple effects and influences on other factors. According to Woodrow and Chigas (2008), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines advise evaluators to look at the big picture to identify important constraints or effects at the level of the overall system. There are indicators that some kinds of linkages are important for strengthening the aggregated impacts of peacebuilding, such as, if the project is connected to a larger peacebuilding strategy, if country-level initiatives account for regional/international dimensions of the conflict, or link to efforts that do.

Woodrow and Chigas (2008) argue that those in the peacebuilding and conflict prevention field have a responsibility to account for their effects, including the immediate and tangible contributions and the longer-term impacts on projects into the future. Without effort to understand the connection between the project's work and the wider conflict, programmes that have good results but make no discernible difference on the conflict will continue, thus undermining the overarching purpose of peacebuilding.

2.2.3 Criticism

Despite good intensions the term peacebuilding and the operation have received criticism. Many scholars believe the term is too broad and confusing and as a result the actors use it as they believe is right and according to their purpose (Philpott, 2010). During the 1990s this confusion caused most of the international-governmental and NGOs to publish their own definition and guidelines. It caused increased confusion and coordination problems in a complex, multidimensional field with different institutions and actors across a wide range of areas (Søbjerg, 2006; Ruecker, 2000; Newman, et al, 2009; Barnett, et al, 2007).

Others have been skeptical about what peacebuilding means in practice, as it refers to various methods and strategies aimed at preventing violent conflicts from escalating again (Philpott, 2010). Paris (2004), for instance, questions the widespread opinion that democracy and capitalism are the best means of rebuilding a state. The reason why is that both systems thrive on competition and the post-conflict environment is often at a fragile stage and needs stability.

According to Ponzio (2007), the most successful missions on behalf of the UN since the end of the Cold War have succeeded in helping a country to build stable and democratic governing institutions, including an independent judicial system, to mediate competing domestic interests and to address the root causes of a conflict. The democratic method is however rarely simple to implement or inexpensive.

Most of the peacebuilding operations during the 1990s had mixed results. According to Paris (2004:15), between 1989 and 1999, fourteen major operations were deployed to territories, which had recently experienced civil conflict, performed by international actors, who used the "liberalization" method. These operations took place in Namibia in 1989, followed by missions in Nicaragua 1989, Angola 1991, Cambodia 1991, El Salvador 1991, Mozambique 1992, Liberia 1993, Rwanda 1993, Bosnia 1995, Croatia 1995, Guatemala 1997, East Timor 1999, Kosovo 1999, and Sierra Leone 1999. According to Paris, only two of these peacebuilding operations were successes, Croatia and Namibia, two were failures, Angola and Rwanda, and the remaining operations fall somewhere between these two extremes. According to Charles Call and Susan Cook, out of eighteen conflict-affected countries, where the UN sought to facilitate political transformations between 1998 and 2002, thirteen were still classified as authoritarian regimes in 2002 (Ponzio, 2007).

As a response to the criticism and in order to strengthen the peacebuilding operations and combine all actors involved, the UN established a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in December 2005 (Søbjerg, 2006). The PBC is supposed to build bridges between partners both within the UN system and to other peacebuilding actors with political leadership, additional funds and expert advice (Ponzio, 2007). It was followed by the *Brahimi Report* commissioned by the UN Secretary-General in 2000 to address existing weaknesses of the UN with regard to peace and security issues. The report addressed several of the apparent shortcomings in past UN peace operations and highlighted the fragmented nature of global peacebuilding efforts. The panel noted a fundamental deficiency in the way the international community, including the UN, had conceived of, funded and implemented peacebuilding strategies and activities (United Nations, 2000). However, the PBC is only a consensus-based advisory body, a status which, according to Weiss (2009), forms one of its weaknesses. It is dependent on the General Assembly and the UNSC for authorization to act and therefore lacks flexibility as the UN is known for being slow moving, overcomplicated, confusing, and bureaucratic. In order for the PBC to be effective it needs to be able to make fair and balanced decisions unaffected by the hidden agendas of powerful UN member states.

2.3 Summary

In this chapter I have introduced the operations of peacekeeping as well as peacebuilding, which became new addition to the peace operations in the 21st century.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are both peace operations, however, with different emphases. While peacekeeping tries to stop an armed conflict without any further involvement, peacebuilding requires involvement in domestic affairs. Peacebuilding operations are more multidimensional, and its focus on the roots of conflict and humanitarian issues has gained more attention.

However, peacebuilding has been criticized both as a term and for the methods it uses. Some claim that peacebuilding is whatever needs to be done to gain lasting and sustainable peace, and that no matter what action is taken it can be defined in the concept of peacebuilding. For a peacebuilding operation to succeed the actors involved must be both international and domestic, they have to select conflict strategies which are tailored to each case, and have a clear goal regarding how they will end the violence and how they will maintain the peace. To do that theories are required to analyze, identify indicators, and collect data.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the implementation of peacebuilding in Kosovo, through the eyes of the international actors in the country. In the next chapter I will introduce the fieldwork setting.

Chapter 3 Fieldwork Setting

Fieldwork for this research was conducted in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, in July 2010 for three weeks. This chapter describes the fieldwork setting, and moments in the history of the Balkan area, which have had an impact on how Kosovo has evolved into the present time. These moments are for instance the Ottoman period, the creation of former Yugoslavia, and the relationship between the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo. This chapter also addresses the Kosovo war, in 1999, in terms of consequences, peace negotiation, international invasion, and peacebuilding. Finally the international organizations in Kosovo, which are involved in this thesis, will be briefly introduced.

The Republic of Kosovo is a landlocked area of total 10,908.1 km² in Southeast Europe surrounded by Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia as border countries (Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2008). In April 2011 the inhabitants were estimated to be 1.7 million, with ethnic Albanians being 88 percent of the population, 7 percent were ethnic Serbs, and the remaining 5 percent are divided between Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, and Turk. There are two official languages in Kosovo, Albanian and Serbian, and the main religions are Muslim, Serbian Orthodox, and Roman Catholic. The 9th of April 2008 the Kosovo Assembly approved the constitution and it came into force the 15th of June 2008 (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

Kosovo's citizens are the poorest in Europe, with an average annual per capita income of approximately $3,300. With roughly 45 percent of the population unemployed, according to official figures, migration and black market activity are key concerns. Most of Kosovo's population lives in rural towns outside of the capital, Pristina. Inefficient, near-subsistence farming is common, the result of small plots, limited mechanization, and lack of technical expertise. Natural resources are coal, lead, zinc, chromium and silver (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

3.1 The Ottoman Empire and Kosovo

Kosovo was the administrative and cultural center of the medieval Serbian state, ruled by the Nemanjić dynasty for 200 years, from 1190 to 1389. In 1389 Serbia lost Kosovo into the hands of the Ottoman Turks in the famous Battle of Kosovo. The Serbian forces, led by Prince Lazar, were defeated, which led to some 500 years of Ottoman ruling from 1455 until 1912 (Judah, 2008).

The Ottoman Empire did not only enjoy peaceful times during their 500 years of ruling. Ottoman forces participated in wars, which had several consequences. In 1689 the Habsburgs invaded the western Balkan and captured Niš and Kosovo only to lose it again into the hands of the Ottoman force two months later in 1690. A war arose again between the Habsburgs and Ottoman in 1716 and again in 1736-9, which was more between the Albanians, Christians, and Orthodox Slavs in Kosovo and Skopje (Anscombe, 2006). The Serbian and Ottoman Turks were also occupied in wars in 1877 and 1878, which was followed by movements of many Albanians relocating into neighboring countries. After the war Serbia was given control over Niš, Prokuple, Kursumlia, Vranje, and Leskovas at the 1878 congress of Berlin (Johnston & Eastvold, 2004; Cirkovic, 2004).

In 1889, even though Kosovo was still under the Ottoman Empire, the new Serbian state, which received independence at the congress of Berlin in 1878, established a direct link between them and its medieval predecessors (Judah, 2008). In that same year, Ottoman Turks lost the Russo-Ottoman War, and one of the terms of the peace accord was to give the Serbs control of Mitrovica and Pristina in Kosovo, while the rest of Kosovo remained under the Ottoman rule. Is was not until after the Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913, when the Ottoman Empire came to an end, that Serbia got full control over Kosovo (Jansen, 2008).

By the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Albanian League moved towards autonomy, became anti-Christian, and encouraged ethnic cleansing, which led to more Serbs leaving Kosovo and moving into the north of Serbia (Jansen, 2008). The Serbs did not accept these changes and according to Anscombe (2006) the Serbians aimed at increasing the Serbian population by migrating away all the Albanians from Kosovo. The Ottoman Turks were responsible for the immigration of Albanians during the Ottoman Empire, after Serbia lost the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. In return Serbia made a deal with Turkey to take the Albanians back. However, World War II started before Serbia could send the Albanians out of Kosovo.

3.2 Ottoman and Ethnicity

According to Anscombe (2006), even though the Ottoman Empire was aware of the ethnic variety in the region it was not important to the Ottoman Imperial Government, because it was not believed to have any practical importance. The Ottoman Empire was more concerned about religion, and tried to get as many converted to Islam as possible. It was not until the 19th century, when nationalism arose in the Ottoman area, that ethnicity was seen as a threat to the stability in the Ottoman Empire and national movements started to evolve. One of them was

the League of Prizren, which only operated during 1878–1881, but is considered to have had a major impact on the awakening of a national identity amongst Albanians. The main goal was to unify all the Albanians of the Ottoman Empire to gain autonomy and greater cultural rights (Judah, 2008). In 1943 the second Prizren League was established, with delegates from all Albanian territories including Kosovo. The goal was to create a unified Albanian state including Kosovo, which Yugoslavs objected (Jansen, 2008).

In the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire was starting to lose its power and nationalist movements in the Balkans saw that as an opportunity to break free, which later led to war. These were the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, wars between the Ottoman Empire and Montenegrin but later Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece joined in the wars. Together they drove the Turks out of Kosovo and following this, Macedonia and Albania declared independence. Even though these Balkan countries joined together as allies and fought to win the Ottoman Turks, Serbia later turned against the Bulgarians and occupied all of Kosovo as well as Macedonia. Serbia regained control over Kosovo after the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 until they lost it into the hands of the international community in the Kosovo war in 1999 (Erickson, 2003).

There is a disagreement between the Albanians and the Serbs on which ethnic group the Ottoman era affected the most. According to the Serbs they fought alongside the Habsburgs against the Ottoman during the first war. When the Habsburg army decided to withdraw its forces, thousands of Serbs left and were invited to settle down in Hungary, and Albanians took their place in Kosovo. The Albanians claim that since they are descendants from the Illyrians and Dardanians, the earliest inhabitants in Kosovo, they were always the majority group in Kosovo, and when the Habsburgs war against the Ottoman ended, many of those who fled to Hungary were Albanians (Anscombe, 2006).

3.3 Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia has been formed several times and been a host to heterogeneous ethnic groups. This arrangement has more than often ended with violence, changing borders and nation members.

3.3.1 Yugoslavia: Creation to Dissolution

At the end of World War I, a war that first broke out in the Balkans in June 1914, Yugoslavia was created for the first time, as the hope was to create a single state and cut loose from foreign powers. However, these nations were heterogeneous societies with different historical background: Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo were a part of the Ottoman Empire (Vojnić, 1995). This first creation was followed by the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, which included Serbs (which also included Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Muslims from the Balkan area), Croats and Slovenes as well as two non-Slav minorities, Albanians and Hungarians (Gallagher, 2005; Tomasevic, 2001). Kosovo was a part of this Kingdom, because at the time it was ruled by Serbia and the majority of Kosovo were Albanians. Serbia wanted to change that by forcing the Albanians to emigrate into Turkey. The Serbian emigration plan did not follow through, because of the Second World War. The Albanians that stayed in Kosovo were discriminated against by the Serbs and, for example, were not allowed to receive education in their own language (Malcom, 1998).

The vision of the Slavic nations of becoming a united Slavic state was not strong enough, which can be attributed to the nations that formed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The nations were at different levels regarding social, economic, cultural, and political development, and for that reason the ethnic structure became very complex. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia fell apart when Nazi Germany and its Axis allies attacked it in 1941 in World War II (Janjić, 1995; Tepavac, 2000).

Two leaders emerged after the German invasion in 1941. One was the General Dragoljub (Draža) Mihailović, who led the Chetniks, a faction of Serbian irregular forces loyal to the exiled King. The other one was Marshal Josip Broz-Tito, who directed the Partisans under Communist political control. Tito had promised to create a new Federal Yugoslavia with equality amongst the people. However, Serbia was not ready to accept communist government and Tito had to win Serbia over in order to be able to keep his promise. To do so, Kosovo was sacrificed for political reasons and given back to Serbia, but it had been promised that it should be autonomous "Peasant Republic of Kosovo" (Jansen, 2008; Tepavac, 2000).

Yugoslavia was created again in 1943 as the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia by the Yugoslav Partisans resistance movement in World War II. In 1946, when Tito came to power and the Communist government was established, it was renamed the Federal People's Republic of

Yugoslavia. In 1963 the name was changed again to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and lasted until the wars of the 1990s. The nations representing this Federation were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia, which in addition included autonomous provinces of Vojvodina, Kosovo and Methodia (Judah, 2008).

Yugoslavia was created for the last time in 1992, which only included the Republics of Montenegro and Serbia, along with Serbian autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. This was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and lasted until 2003, when it was renamed as the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which dissolved when Montenegro declared independence in 2006 (Judah, 2008). Most of the former Yugoslavia nations have joined or applied for membership in the EU. Slovenia has become a member of the EU, Croatia[1] and Macedonia are candidate countries, and Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo, under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, are potential candidate countries (European Union, 2011).

3.3.2 Former Yugoslavia Constitutions and Kosovo

There have been several constitutions made in former Yugoslavia, which have marked the faith of who had the control of Kosovo. The 1946 constitution recognized five nationalities within the Yugoslav Federation: Serb, Croat, Slovene, Montenegrin and Macedonian. Albania did not belong to Yugoslavia, and Kosovo was an autonomous region under the Federal and not Serbia, at least in the beginning. Two years later Tito cut all ties with Stalin and since Albania was loyal to Moscow, Yugoslavia ended diplomatic relations with Albania and thousands of Albanians were arrested (Jansen, 2008).

The 1953 constitution reduced autonomy for Kosovo even more and Albanians became greatly oppressed. A few years later, more specifically in 1956, there was a resurgence of Albanian nationalism and the Yugoslav government tried to disarm them. In the 1963 constitution Kosovo was placed under Serbian authority. However, in the 1974 constitution Kosovo became an autonomous province and was made an equal constitutional element of the Federation as one of eight Federal units, more importantly equal to Serbia. A lot of money was now going into financing development in Kosovo, and as the birth rate among poor

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[1] On 23rd of January 2012 Croatia agreed to join the EU in a referendum. If the EU member states agree to the member Agreement Croatia will become an EU member in 2013.

Albanians increased, more money was needed to support the people. This led to increasing resentment towards Albanians and Albanian nationalism grew stronger whilst the loyalty towards Yugoslavia decreased (Jansen, 2008).

3.4 Albanians vs. Serbians

Judah (2008) states that in order to understand the history behind Kosovo it is important to learn about the leading actors in the story, the Albanians and the Serbs, both of whom claim they are the rightful "owner" of Kosovo.

3.4.1 Inhabitants of Kosovo

There are various differences between the Albanians and the Serbs. According to Judah (2008), the Serbs belong to the Orthodox Church and they identify themselves with their religion. Even though Serbia was ruled by the Islamic Ottoman Empire, few of them converted to Islam. According to Anscombe (2006), one of the reasons why Serbs resented Ottoman and the majority did not convert to Islam can be traced to the legend of Lazar, a prince who led the Serbian forces in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 against the Ottoman Turks. He was considered to be true to his faith and the Orthodox Church used his story to prevent Serbs from converting to Islam. The Albanians were different from most inhabitants of other Balkan countries. They did not have their own church when Ottoman invaded and most of them converted to Islam. Since the Albanians were scattered in many places in the Balkans, and communication between them was difficult, they did not really have many identities to relate to. The one thing all the Albanians had in common was their language, which contributed to their common identity (Judah, 2008).

Throughout the history of Kosovo there have been arguments about who came first to the area, the Albanians or the Serbs. According to the Albanians, they are direct descendants of Illyrians and Dardanians, who are believed to have been the earliest inhabitants in Kosovo before the Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenians), who started to invade in the middle of the 6th and 7th century. However, according to Jansen (2008), Serbian scholars claim that Albanians appeared on the scene in the early Middle Ages as a result of intermarriage between Nomadic Shepherds and unromanized Remnants of Illyrians and Dardanians from Thrace. Although there were some Albanians in Kosovo during the Middle Ages, the vast majority were Serbs, and Kosovo was believed to be the center of their medieval Kingdom. The Serbs also believe

that the name of Kosovo, which has Slavic roots and means *Blackbird*, indicates that they were the first to arrive in Kosovo (Jansen, 2008).

The Albanians and the Serbs have throughout history often changed places as those forming the majority in Kosovo (Jansen, 2008). The shift in the population groups began to change after the arrival of Ottoman and can be traced to different occasions affecting the migration and emigration in and out of Kosovo. The Serbs have, for instance, been in constant movement. For example, when the Ottoman arrived in Kosovo in the 14th century the majority of the population is believed to have been Serbs, or at least an Orthodox Christian population (Judah, 2008). In the late 17th century Serbs left Kosovo in large numbers as a result of military victories of the Ottoman Turks, and the Great Migration of the Serbian population began. As a result, the region of Kosovo became under-populated with available fertile land, which attracted some Christian and Muslim Albanians to settle down in Kosovo (Jansen, 2008).

Many Serbs also fled Kosovo because of the wars, i.e. the Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913, both of the World Wars, and the wars in the 1990s. Others moved because they did not want to live under the control of Tito and the Communist party or obtained better opportunities elsewhere, both within the Balkans and farther abroad (Judah, 2008). In most cases, educated Serbs left Kosovo and poor Albanians moved in (Jansen, 2008).

The fight goes on to the present time about who came first and the streets of Kosovo reflect this fact. According to Judah (2008), statues of Serbian Kings and Heroes once stood where there are now statues of Albanian heroes like Skanderbeg, Albania's most important national hero, who died in 1468. Another image is the Albanian flag, which is everywhere in Kosovo. Ibrahim Rugova, a Kosovo-Albanian leader, who died in January 2006, had an idea about how to settle the discussion about the origin of the name of Kosovo, simply by renaming Kosovo and call it *Dardania*, after an ancient Illyrian tribe (Judah, 2008).

3.4.2 Ethnic Tension

The tension between the Albanians and the Serbs can be traced back hundreds of years, and with each establishment of former Yugoslavia the tension increased. For instance, the entire republic of the Yugoslav Federation, except Bosnia-Herzegovina, was dominated by a single national group. This multi-ethnic composition created a certain awareness of national problems among the leaders, which were treated with silence on the surface. Underneath, an

ethnic conflict was about to break loose, both within and between the Republics and the Federal as a result of a tension, which can be traced, for example, to the social and political changes introduced by the Communists (Nečak, 1995; Janjić, 1995; Vojnić, 1995). Dimitrijević (1995) argues that Yugoslavia has in fact never been a true Federation, rather a state governed by its centralized Communist Party with Tito as the most important decision maker.

Despite ethnic tension Tito managed to keep the tension between the heterogeneous ethnic groups under control. That was about to change when he died in 1980, and the Cold War was in its final phase, with nationalism starting to rise in the Balkans. In 1981, Albanian students demonstrated against the bad facilities at Pristina University in Kosovo, and the frustration was turned against the Serbs and Montenegrins. The demonstration soon spread over the nation and became more than just demonstration against the educational system. The Serbs fled as the intolerance between Albanians and Serbs kept on increasing as the Albanians extremists wanted an ethnically clean Kosovo (Jansen, 2008).

All this tension and violence made the Serbian population stand up and demand action against the Albanians. In 1987, the Serbian government proposed to take away Kosovo's autonomy, even though they did not have the authority to do so as it was under the Federal, and not Serbian, authority. The Serbian constitution was changed, redefining Kosovo as a region in Serbia. At that point Serbia was acting more according to nationalism than federalism (Jansen, 2008; Anscombe, 2006).

Slobodan Milošević used the rage among the Serbs to act against Albanians, when he became the President of the Federal Republic of Serbia in 1989. He appealed to memories like the Muslim oppression and the Great Migration to intensify the hate and resentment against the Albanian people (Jansen, 2008; Anscombe, 2006). These actions were taken despite the fact that the Serbian Parliament had adopted *A Program for Achieving Peace, Freedom and Equality in Kosovo*. It was an effort for all ethnic groups in Kosovo to live together in peace, but at the same time the Albanian separatists were identified as the main threat to this goal. Some believe that this was one of the first steps towards the Kosovo war during 1998-1999, and as a result Serbia lost Kosovo into the hands of the international community (Jansen, 2008; Anscombe, 2006).

Gallagher (2005) argues that all the trouble, between the ethnic groups in Kosovo, started when foreigners began to invade the area. For example, when Ottoman Turks invaded,

religion became more important and made a wider gap between the Muslim Albanians and the Orthodox Serbs. With each battle and conflict nationalism grew stronger amongst both sides of the parties involved, and identities were found within heroism and tales and in the end it became difficult to distinguish between false memories and the historical truth.

3.5 The Kosovo War

The tension between Albanians and Serbs had been escalating for some time before the war broke out in the 1990s (Balabanova, 2007). Not everyone agrees on when the pre-war tension began, leading to the NATO air bombing in 1999. Some affirm that the region has been unstable for centuries and after several wars and conflict periods a power vacuum had taken place. The creation of former Yugoslavia's and all the constitutions that were made never really reflected on the ethnic problem in the area (Wolff, 2003). Others do not trace it that far back, only to the rising of nationalism among Albanians in Kosovo in the 1980s, the day Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) made their first public appearance in 1997, or when Milošević withdrew the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 and replaced it under Serbia (Behnke, 2002). However, Behnke (2002) points out, that it does not give the right picture of the situation to claim the framework of the conflict is, for instance, from 1989 to 1998, when Milošević altered the status of Kosovo. It was just one piece in the process that led to the Kosovo war in 1999.

3.5.1 Consequences

The actions taken by the Albanians and the Serbs in the 1980s and 1990s had consequences, which led to increased tension between those two ethnic groups. The Kosovo Albanians responded by electing Ibrahim Rugova as President in 1992, who wanted to take peaceful action against Serbs, and later Kosovo declared independence. The Kosovo Albanians had to pay their price as the Serbian government responded by giving Kosovo Albanians limited access to the school system. The Albanian language was no longer an official language of the province and the Albanian-language newspaper, *Rilindja*, was banned as well as other broadcasts in Albanian (Balabanova, 2007; Daskalovski, 2003).

Rugovas popularity began to decline in 1995, when he failed in the prelude to the Dayton Agreement[2] to make the international community take into account the situation in Kosovo,

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[2] For more information on Dayton Agreement, visit UNMIBH website at:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmibh/background.html

which was then not mentioned in the Agreement. According to Behnke (2002) the reason Rugova insisted on a non-violent strategy against Serbia's oppression was that he believed the international community would find a settlement for Kosovo, but instead they were left behind. In 1997, students in Pristina were the first to protest against Rugova's peaceful policy, after Kosovo was neglected in the Dayton Agreement, making posters asking why Europe would not come to their rescue (Pettifer & Vickers, 2007). Many Albanians started to believe that non-violent strategy was not working, which gave KLA, founded in 1991, an opportunity to stand up and fight for Kosovo's stability and prosperity and to liberate it from Serbian oppression (Balabanova, 2007).

The armed campaign of KLA escalated slowly until the beginning of 1998, when both KLA and the Serbian Security Force took their actions to another level (Daskalovski, 2003). Among the reasons was the killing of an Albanian schoolteacher in November 1997 and later when the Serbian Security Force attacked two villages and killed several people in the beginning of 1998. Albanians started to demonstrate again in Pristina, asking the international community to help them. In the meanwhile KLA forces increased their attacks on the Serbian forces and the Serbian government treated the KLA as a terrorist organization, which needed to be terminated for good (Pettifer & Vickers, 2007; Isakovic, 1999).

3.5.2 Peace Negotiation

As the conflict escalated, more and more people were displaced, both internally in Kosovo and externally, or lost their lives in the fight. It had come to the point that neither party was able to start or maintain a conflict-resolution and make peace (Oberg, 1998). As the tension grew stronger between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, international parties tried to settle their differences. Peace dialogue was used to resolve the dispute between the Albanians and the Serbs to reach an agreement to lay down their weapons and maintain the peace. However, some argue that the international community already failed to prevent the violence when the Dayton Agreement in 1995 was made without mentioning Kosovo (Jansen, 2008). According to Behnke (2002), the reason that the situation in Kosovo was not taken into account was that the United States (US) was in a hurry to get Milošević to sign the agreement and stop the war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

The international community became concerned in 1998, as the conflict escalated, about humanitarian consequences and the risk of spillover effect (NATO, 1999). According to Daskalovski (2003), the international community may have lacked the internal coherence and

coercive pressure to engage in successful conflict prevention. As the conflict escalated in 1998 only a small window was open for the Contact Group[3] to find a common ground with new negotiating parties. The KLA was now at the negotiation table instead of Kosovo's elected government. This made the position of the international community more difficult, as the KLA's commitment to achieve independent statehood for Kosovo clashed with international determination to preserve existing borders and to find a solution within them (Wolff, 2003).

In May 1998, the US appointed Richard Holbrook, the chief mediator of the Dayton Agreement, to be the head negotiator in trying to settle the dispute in Kosovo. Christopher Hill, the US Ambassador to Macedonia, was named the US special envoy to Kosovo. Meetings were held with KLA representatives in Switzerland and Rugova, along with other Kosovo Albanian officials, traveled to Washington in the end of May 1998 to meet the Clinton administration to seek support for the cause of Kosovo Albanians. On the 1st of June 1998, Rugova met with the UN and requested either UN or NATO support (War in Europe, 2011).

The negotiations did not produce any results and the escalation of the conflict led to the adoption of UN Security Resolution (UNSCR) 1199[4] in September 1998. UNSCR 1199 called for cease-fire by both parties to the conflict and referred to possible further action if measures demanded in the resolution were not taken. On the 24th of October 1998, in addition to previous resolution, a new resolution, 1203, was made, and was followed with a threat of NATO air strikes. The result was the agreement in October 1998 by Holbrook with Milošević and KLA, which included among other things a partial withdrawal of Serbian Security Forces and an unarmed OSCE mission (known as the Kosovo Verification Mission or KVM) to verify the cease-fire (Roberts, 1999; Pettifer & Vickers, 2007). This October agreement fell apart in January 1999, when the Serbs killed ethnic Albanians in the village of Recak. These actions led to the conclusion by the NATO member states that no political settlement for Kosovo would work unless it allowed for deployment of a substantial NATO led force (Roberts, 1999).

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[3] The Contact Group is composed of United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Russia and has an interest in policy developments in the Balkan.

[4] For more information on Resolution 1199 and 1203, visit UN official website at:
www.search.un.org/search?q=1199%201998&output=xml_no_dtd&client=UN_Website_en&num=10&lr=lang_en&proxystylesheet=UN_W
ebsite_en&oe=UTF-8&ie=UTF-
8&sort=date%3AD%3AL%3Ad1&ud=1&exclude_apps=1&site=un_org&ip=157.150.185.24&access=p&entqr=3

On the 6th of February 1999, NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, began negotiating with both sides in Rambouillet near Paris. The Kosovo Albanian delegates agreed to the disarmament of the KLA, the deployment of a NATO protection force for a three-year period, and the establishment of joint Serbian-Albanian civilian institutions and a referendum on a final settlement for Kosovo at the end of the three years (Pettifer & Vickers, 2007; Roberts, 1999). On March 18th 1999, the Albanian, American, and British delegations signed what became known as the Rambouillet Accords[5], while the Serbian and Russian delegations refused. On March the 23rd the Serbian assembly accepted the principle of autonomy for Kosovo and the non-military part of the agreement. The Serbian side objected to the military part of the Rambouillet agreement, particularly appendix B that foresees free access to all of Serbia for NATO troops, which is characterized as NATO occupation (Woodward, 2001). Peace negotiation attempts ended when the Serbian Parliament rejected the agreement (Pettifer & Vickers, 2007).

3.5.3 International Invasion

On the 24th of March 1999 NATO forces began their bombing campaign and continued until the 10th of June 1999, this was known as the Operation Allied Force. The aim of the attack was to defend human rights on the premise that ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were suffering massive displacement, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide from the hands of Serbian Security and Paramilitary forces (Dauphinee, 2003; Balabanova, 2007). It was a war of ethnic cleansing and destruction of homes, religion, and historic monuments between two different ethnic groups, who were considered to be a threat to international peace and security. For that reason the international community believed they needed to take action. However, the decision to act early and by threatening military force was to not repeat previous mistakes like for example, in Bosnia (Woodward, 2001).

The peace negotiations kept on despite the air campaign. A month after the bombing started and yet no results were in sight, the question of how to end the war was raised at the NATO Summit in Washington. An idea about ground invasion came up without ever being implemented (Balabanova, 2007). In May 1999 the Group 8[6] (G8) put forth a political solution that called for an international civil and security presence in Kosovo. This would be authorized and adopted by the UN, without any mentioning of NATO, and by the

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[5] For more information on Rambouillet Agreement, visit The State Department website at:
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html

[6] Group 8 refers to eight nations - France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Japan, United States, Canada, and Russia.

establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo approved by the UNSC (Kim, 1999). A peace framework delivered to Belgrade by the Russian and EU envoys was accepted on the 3rd of June 1999 by Milošević. However, the peace framework indicated NATO participation as the single command over the international security presence. It also called for the withdrawal of all the Serbian Security Forces from Kosovo and the KLA was to be demilitarized (Pettifer & Vickers, 2007; Roberts, 1999).

A 50.000 joint NATO and Russian peacekeeping force was to oversee the implementation and provide security for the safe return of all refugees and displaced people. However, the UNSCR 1244[7] did not say what Kosovo's future status should be. It reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while at the same time calling for a political process to determine Kosovo's status. The key difference between the Rambouillet Accord and UNSCR 1244 was that the latter did not set a time limit on the international civilian administration and did not specifically mention a referendum on the final status. The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) faced the task of establishing an entirely new administration from scratch. There was no police, no customs service, and no judiciary system in place (Pettifer & Vickers, 2007; Roberts, 1999). The Kosovo crisis, at least for its military engagement, was over.

3.5.4 Peacebuilding in Kosovo

Even though the war was over the US Administration and its NATO allies had to deal with a complex situation in Kosovo after the Serbian force had left. The end of the conflict saw the entry of a strong international peace mission, led by the Kosovo force (KFOR) and UNMIK (Daskalovski, 2003).

In June 1999, UNSCR 1244 initiated the peacebuilding process for Kosovo. Despite a lack of detail, UNSCR 1244 nevertheless planted much the same normative seeds as the Dayton Agreement. The main text of the resolution stressed that the international civil presence had the role of protecting and promoting human rights, and assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced people to their homes in Kosovo. The implications of this requirement were to restore the pre-conflict multicultural society in Kosovo, such as it had existed (with about 90 percent of the population being ethnic Albanians). Further, to establish

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[7] For more information on Resolution 1244 and UNMIK, visit UNMIK website: www.unmikonline.org/pages/default.aspx

a democracy was part of the international community's intention for Kosovo's future (Latawski & Smith, 2003).

The post-war challenge met by the international community was no longer ending the campaign by the Serbian Security Forces against Kosovo Albanians', but establishing security and building institutions in Kosovo where institutions has existed either underground or as part of a oppressive system for decades. This had been both an opportunity to build institutions that are more viable for Kosovo, and a stumbling block for stabilizing the post-war political situation (Daskalovski, 2003).

Malcom (1999) argues that even though the Albanians and the Serbs have fought several wars, none of the conflicts are related to religion. He claims that it is easier for the general public to believe that the war in the 1990s was ethnic conflict, considering the tension in the past and the cultural differences when it comes to religion, language and origins. The Albanians in Kosovo are politically mobilized and religion has never played any role and no Islamic political movements exist among them. The religion plays a bigger role on the Orthodox side, which uses religion to justify Serbian action. The conflict in the 1990s was rather a creation at the political level, especially by Milošević, who dragged innocent people into it. Malcolm's (1999) argument is that Albanians and Serbs were allies in many of the battles, for example during the 1389 Battle of Kosovo and during 1737, when the Austrian army invaded Kosovo.

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, which Serbia does not recognize, believing that Kosovo's action violates international law. However, in 2010 the International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled in favor of Kosovo (International Court of Justice, 2010). Not everyone has recognized Kosovo's independence, although most of the EU and the UN members have done so (The Economist, 2010).

In addition to the UN in Kosovo, a host of other international organizations have shaped, and continue to shape, the post-war development of Kosovo, such as NATO, EU, UNIFEM, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, UNOPS, and USAID. These organizations will be briefly introduced below as they are a part of this thesis.

3.5.4.1 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Since the Kosovo war ended on the 10th of June 1999 NATO[8] has lead a peace support operation in Kosovo in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area. These involve a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin. That was followed by the adoption of UNSCR 1244 and the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence on the 17th of February 2008 the Alliance reaffirmed that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244, unless the UNSC decides otherwise.

On the 20th of June 1999 the Serbian force withdrawal was complete and KFOR was well established in Kosovo, and the air campaign was formally terminated. KFOR is a multinational force under unified command and control with the participation of both NATO and non-NATO nations. KFOR tasks regard, among other things: assistance with the return or relocation of displaced people and refugees; security and public order; security of ethnic minorities, which is done for example by regular patrols near minority enclaves[9], check points and escorts for minority groups; border security; and law and order. Throughout Kosovo, NATO, and KFOR continue to work with the authorities, mindful of its operational mandate. KFOR is both cooperating with and assisting the UN, the EU and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic, and peaceful Kosovo.

3.5.4.2 The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)[10] is a deployment of EU police and civilian resources to Kosovo and the largest civilian mission ever launched under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It was approved by the UNSC in 2008 and works under the general framework of Resolution 1244.

The EULEX mission is to develop and strengthen an independent and multi-ethnic justice system and a multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free

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[8] For more information on NATO, visit its official website: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm or http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm

[9] An ethnic enclave is an ethnic community which retains some cultural distinction from a larger, surrounding area.

[10] For more information on EULEX, visit its official website: www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/front/

from political interference and adhering to internationally recognized standards and European best practices.

Not everyone has taken EULEX presence with open arms, even EU members, like Spain, do not take part in this mission, because of the question of its legality. The EU has also been divided on whether to recognize an independent Kosovo without international and Serbian approval. In 2008 the EU accepted the demand of Serbia not to implement the plan of Ahtisaari through EULEX and decided to be neutral regarding the status of Kosovo. On the other hand EULEX will be accepted by Serbia and the UNSC.

In August 2009, the EULEX mission was subject to violent protests organized by a group called *Vetevendosja* (Self-Determination) in reaction to EULEX's police cooperation with Serbia and its actions in Kosovo. There was resentment towards the EU mission for exercising its powers over Kosovo, while mediating between the state and Serbia. Policies that concentrate on crisis management, rather than resolution, as well as the pursuit of ethnic autonomy and its overly broad mandate over Kosovo's governance is the stem of the discontent with the EU mission.

3.5.4.3 United Nations Development Fund for Women

United Nations Development Fund for Women[11] (UNIFEM)[12], established in 1976, is the Women's Funds at the UN. It provides financial and technical assistance to innovative programmes and strategies; to foster women's empowerment and gender equality. UNIFEM does this by placing the advancement of women's human rights at the centre of all of its efforts.

UNIFEM has been in Kosovo since 1999 with the aim of supporting women to claim their rights, and it has also focussed on facilitation partnership for the capacity building of women's organizations and government institutions. By doing this UNIFEM has for example supported the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) through capacity building activities for achieving Gender Equality; trained women about their rights as citizens and voters and authorities to raise awareness of gender issues; brought together the government civil society to prepare a Plan of Action for the Advancement of Gender

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[11] For more information on UNWOMEN, visit its official website: www.unwomen.org or www.unkt.org

[12] In January 2011 UNIFEM merged into UNWOMEN along with INSTRAW, OSAGI and DAW. It will remain UNIFEM in this thesis.

Equality; commenced the implementation of the new project (2008) *Women Building Peace and Human Security in Western Balkans*; and supported women's engagement in peacebuilding processes. To be able to do all this the programs are implemented through the support and cooperation with governmental institutions, civil society and other relevant stakeholders, such as Ministries in Kosovo, Agency of Gender Equality, UN Agencies, EULEX, NATO (KFOR), Kosovo Security Force (KSF), Kosovo Women's Lobby, and Kosovo Judges Association (KJA).

3.5.4.4 United Nations Development Programme

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)[13], founded in 1965, is the UN global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience, and resources to help people building a better life. UNDP works with governments and people on their own solutions to global and national development challenges.

UNDP was among the first development organizations to help tackle emergency problems in Kosovo in 1999, which ended in 2001 and was transformed to long term development. UNDP's main goal in Kosovo is to assist various private institutions and the public sector to recover after the war. By doing so UNDP Kosovo addresses the challenges and helps through four practice areas: Democratic Governance and Environment; Security and Rule of Law; Economic Development; and Social Inclusion. For UNDP to reach its goal UNDP works with local institutions, governmental and non-governmental sectors, to strengthen them by implementing projects based on human rights principles.

3.5.4.5 United Nations Human Settlements Programme

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)[14] is the UN agency for human settlements, and was established in 1978. It is mandated by the UN General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all.

Since the end of the war in Kosovo in 1999, UN-HABITAT has provided technical support in drafting a new system and legislation framework for planning the assisting of the post-conflict transition from the former centralized, and a top-down planning system towards an inclusive,

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[13] For more information on UNDP, visit its official website: www.undp.org or www.unkt.org

[14] For more information on UN-HABITAT, visit its official website: www.unhabitat.org or www.unkt.org

participatory and multi-disciplinary approach to planning. The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008 makes Kosovo's institutions responsible for building democratic and law-abiding structures, passing supporting legislature and building capacities of civil servants. This relates also to spatial development and gradual adoption of European standards and international principles for sustainable urbanization and good urban governance. The resolution of property issues and incorporation of informal settlements in local development plans continue to be an important factor in creating sustainable urban settlements in Kosovo.

UN-HABITAT's initial interventions in Kosovo were focussed on the establishment of institutions to work with property issues as the Housing and Property Directorate, the Kosovo Cadastre Agency, the Institute for Spatial Planning within the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning and building capacities for efficient management of local governments through LoGo (Local Government Programme) and Municipal Support Programme. Through UN-HABITAT's support, a new planning system has been developed and institutionalized at the central and municipal levels.

3.5.4.6 The United Nations Office for Project Services

The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)[15] was established in 1974 as part of UNDP and became an independent, self-financed organization in 1995. UNOPS provides support services to UN agencies, international financial institutions, governments and non-governmental organizations. It customizes its services to individual client needs, offering everything from one-time stand alone solutions to long-term project management.

UNOPS has been in Kosovo since 1999 helping its clients achieve their goals in areas such as humanitarian relief and recovery, local economic development, education, governance, health, environment, justice, mine action and post conflict rebuilding of infrastructure and livelihoods.

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[15] For more information on UNOPS, visit its official website: www.unops.org or www.unkt.org

3.5.4.7 United States Agency for International Development

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)[16] is a United States Agency for International Development with headquarters in Washington D.C. and field offices around the world.

USAID has been assisting Kosovo since 1999. The main goal is to help developing the private sector with the aim of increasing sales and employment for the long-term growth of local enterprises; reducing reliance on imports; and developing an improved business operating environment. USAID has also been involved in establishing basic governing institutions, most significantly the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and embedded technical staff at every level of Kosovo institutions. USAID has increased overall funding in education and youth programming under the 2010-2015 Strategic Plan. Education and entrepreneur development programming is closely interlinked with broader goals in economic growth and democratic consolidation.

3.6 Summary

In this chapter I have described the setting at which fieldwork for the study took place. I described how the past, regarding Kosovo, has left a lasting demographic and emotional effect on Kosovo and its inhabitants. I have also reviewed possible reasons for the Kosovo war. Further, how the international community attempted to prevent this war, with negotiations as well as with threats induced by the UN and NATO. This chapter has also included the NATO air campaign period and the aftermath of the war. In the next chapter I will introduce the methods and methodology used to perform this research.

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[16] For more information on USAID, visit its official website: www.usaid.gov or www.usaid.gov/kosovo/eng/

Chapter 4 Methodology

Choosing the field and topic of this thesis was not difficult. The subject came to me in a course I took at the University of Iceland, *Stríðsátök og Friðarferli*, taught by Professor Jónína Einarsdóttir, my supervisor. I wrote a paper about peacebuilding and I knew I wanted to learn more about this topic. I chose the Balkan area as my setting for fieldwork, because it is a field which has gained experience in peacebuilding, after the war in the 1990s. To narrow the Balkan area down I decided to focus on Kosovo, where peacebuilding has been practiced since 1999. Kosovo is also a place where new approaches have been used for the first time, for instance, on behalf of NATO, the EU, and the UN. Therefore I decided to focus on NATO, EULEX, the UN, and other international actors, from organizations such as UNIFEM, UNOPS, UN-HABITANT, UNDP, and USAID, for this thesis. Those international organizations are just a few of many in Kosovo. The objective of my study is to examine the implementation of peacebuilding in Kosovo, through the eyes of the international actors working in the country, by exploring their opinion. I will seek answers to questions like, how do the international organizations they work for operate? And do they think the implementation of peacebuilding has been successful?

In this chapter I will describe the field and the qualitative method I chose to use in this research for data gathering. I will also touch on how I have analyzed the collected data.

4.1 Ethnography

Ethnography is a systematic approach to learn about the social and cultural life of, for instance, communities and institutions through a formal process. The origins of the term lies in the 19th century Western anthropology and it was used to describe isolated communities or cultures, usually outside the Western world. In the beginning of the 20th century the importance of ethnography increased within anthropology and ethnographic fieldwork has become central to anthropology studies (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007:1; LeCompte & Schensul, 2010; Travers, 1997).

Fieldwork is a fundamental part of ethnographic studies, and for anthropologists, ethnographic fieldwork involves documenting people's beliefs and practices from the people's own perspectives. Barnard and Spencer (1996:195) state that the researcher selects a field and setting where there are unanswered questions or outstanding problems in the body of comparative anthropological theory. Whilst these theories and issues may bring

anthropologists to the field, anthropologists must find the ethnographic research methods best suited to connecting with participants in ways that disentangles their proposed research questions from the greater context of the fieldwork site.

Ethnography contains a variety of methods, quantitative and qualitative (e.g. from questionnaires to semi-structured interviews), but qualitative methods are predominant within anthropology (Barnard & Spencer, 1996). Ethnography involves observing, recording, and writing about social relations, making notes about places and cultures where the aim is to get in-depth knowledge about a group, a situation, or a process. The methods used depend on what the field setting has to offer (Frohlick & Harrison, 2008:7; Esterberg, 2002:29; Inda, 2005:1).

Given the nature of the data gathering methods, mentioned above, a considerable amount of effort and time will have to go into processing and analyzing them. In all these respects, ethnography is a demanding activity, requiring diverse skills, including the ability to make decisions in conditions of considerable uncertainty. The final output of an ethnography research is the written report, with the final analyzes of the phenomena the researcher has been investigating (Barnard & Spencer, 1996). According to Rice and Ezzy (2005), the best way of getting this knowledge is simply by being in the field.

Influenced by the ethnographic approach, I choose Pristina, the capital and the largest city of Kosovo, as the setting for my fieldwork. Pristina is located in the north-east part of the country and most of the inhabitants are Kosovo Albanians. I entered the field in July 2010 and stayed there for three weeks, while gathering data. The main focus was on the semi-structured interviews I conducted with international actors within the field of peacebuilding. Even though three weeks are perhaps not a long time in a field I used my time wisely. I observed the setting to get more sense of the field and wrote field notes about what I came across.

4.2 Collecting Data

Richards (2005) is concerned with the compilation of data and fitting data to the research task. The researcher has to explore the possible ways of compiling data within a setting and to select methods that will combine to ensure that the data will be sufficiently rich, complex, and contextual to address the questions and support the required analysis. Taylor and Bogdan (1998) argue that the researcher, who conducts a qualitative study, cannot be sure what literature might be relevant until the research is completed.

When preparing for my fieldwork I gathered relevant literature about the history of the Balkans, Kosovo, peacebuilding, and ethnic groups in conflict to gain more understanding about the subject. I read information I gathered from web-pages, articles, and books. I then made an interview guide to help focussing the interview to make sure key topics are explored (Esterberg, 2002:94; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998:105). I also conducted two interviews in Iceland with former Icelandic peacekeepers in Kosovo. To receive answers to my questions and gain more understanding about the peacebuilding phenomena I decided to use qualitative methodology i.e., semi-structured interviews and observation. In my semi-structured interviews the goal is to explore a topic more openly and to allow interviewees to express their opinions and ideas in their own words, to get more insight into the interviewees' thoughts about the subject (Esterberg, 2002:36, 87, 93). This method also enables the researcher to learn about events and activities that cannot be observed directly (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998:89).

4.2.1 Interviews

I had not made any appointments with international actors prior to my arrival to Kosovo except UNIFEM, which one of the former Icelandic peacekeeper I interviewed before I traveled to Kosovo got me in touch with. I wrote down the names of the international organizations I came across in Pristina, and as soon as I came back to the hotel I sent e-mails to request interviews. Most of the organizations I contacted are members of the United Nations Kosovo Team (UNKT), and I obtained their e-mail addresses from the UNKT web-page. Not everyone replied however; those who did and agreed to give me an interview, apart from UNIFEM, were NATO, EULEX, UNDP, USAID, UN-HABITAT, and UNOPS.

The locations of the interviews were in all cases chosen by the interviewees. Most of the interviews took place in their workplace, three in a coffee house, and one at the University of Iceland. Before all the interviews began I explained to the interviewees what the study is about and gave them examples about certain themes; however, I emphasized that I wanted to learn about their experience and opinions. The interviewees were also told that they could stop the interview at any time or refuse to answer any question, which actually never occurred (Esterberg, 2002:101-102; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998:102). I also asked for permission to use a dictaphone during the interview, and everyone except two gave their permission. One of the interviewees did not want to, due to the institution policy, and the other one preferred that I took notes. I transcribed the tapes as soon as possible after the interview; however, I did not

finish all of them until I came back to Iceland. Four interviews were conducted in Icelandic and seven in English. The duration of the interviews varied from 30 minutes to an hour. According to Esterberg (2002:45), it is important to maintain confidentiality and protect the privacy of the research participants. That is why all the interviewees will remain anonymous and be given fake names in the study. Total numbers of interviews conducted are eleven, seven in Kosovo, three in Iceland, and one in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As with all research methods there are limitations to interviewing. The researcher has to be aware that what people say during an interview is not necessary always their true thoughts or opinions (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998:91). Even though I did not stay longer than three weeks in the field I decided to conduct observation alongside with the interviews. Thereby I could get additional information about the setting.

4.2.2 Observation

It can be useful to use observation to gain more understanding of a particular setting. By observing in a focussed way in the natural settings the researcher becomes the research instrument and can get a first-hand experience by using all his senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch (Esterberg, 2002:35, 58-59, 61).

My observations were aimed at getting more understanding of the setting, using my eyes and ears. As I arrived to Pristina and walked down the streets I could sense the presence of the international community. Marked Cars, NATO troops in uniforms, and marked buildings are everywhere. I also noticed that Pristina looks like a construction field, EULEX and UNMIK with an X written over it had been sprayed on some of the walls and many of the stores sell fake products. Pristina also appeared to me as a lively place with friendly inhabitants and an environment that feels safe.

4.3 Analyzing Data

When the researcher has gathered data s/he has raw material in her/his hands, which cannot speak for itself. For the data to be meaningful the researcher has to analyze the qualitative data, which generally involves several stages (Esterberg, 2002:79, 152).

4.3.1 Organizing Qualitative Data

It is not always appropriate to wait with analysis of data until the data gathering is finished, as new questions can arise during the data collection. Therefore the data collection and analyzes go hand in hand, throughout participant observation, in-depth interviewing, and other qualitative research. The researchers are constantly theorizing and trying to make sense of their data (Esterberg, 2002:79; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998:141).

Data analysis is a creative process of finding meanings and the first thing there needs to be done is to arrange or organize the data. The researcher should read the field notes, interviews, transcripts, and other documents over and over again, until s/he knows the data well and is ready to engage in intensive analysis. The data then needs to be searched for themes or patterns (Esterberg, 2002:153, 157; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998:142-143).

I did not start to analyze the data formally until the data gathering was finished although I was always thinking about what information I had gathered and if it made any sense. When my formal analyzing started I organized the data and read it time and a time again, until I was ready for the next stage.

4.3.2 Coding

Researchers attempt to gain a deeper understanding of what they have studied and to continually refine their interpretations by coding. Researchers also draw on their firsthand experience with settings, informants, or documents to interpret their data. Coding and sorting data enables the researcher to analyze together all data relevant to a theme, concept, or proposition (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998:141, 156). In developing open codes, it is important to understand the particular themes and categories that can be seen in the data. After a while of open coding, some recurring themes should begin to emerge and the researcher should see what kind of themes might develop and be most helpful in shaping the analysis (Esterberg, 2002:158-159, 168).

Although it is good to begin coding as soon as possible after the fieldwork or data collection is completed, I did not begin coding right away. I did not begin to code until a few months after I arrived back in Iceland. I used the coding technique where I cut up a copy of the interview transcript as well as the field notes into pieces and marked each piece with a code (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998:142; Esterberg, 2002:161).

The following themes and sub-themes, all connected with the government in Kosovo, emerged from the analysis:

1. Operations; *international strategies for Kosovo, projects within specific framework, and measuring the success*;
2. Interaction; *foreign power, the locals, and communication platform between international actors*;
3. Ethnic groups; *separation, education, and future conflicts, independence, and the EU*.

4.4 Summary

As has been observed in this chapter ethnographers multitask when it comes to conducting a research. A number of things have to be taken into consideration such as levels of design, the nature of the data, entering the field, analyzing the data, and deciding on what method to use. The research design is created by the researcher, who aims to make sense of the data and answering the research question. Taylor and Bogdan (1998:160) argue that the findings depend on who the researcher is and how s/he sees the world. In the next chapter I will present the results of my research.

Chapter 5 Results

In this chapter I will present my results, which are based on my interpretation of the interviews and my sense of the setting. There is one main thread through the interviews and that is the government in Kosovo. All the themes in my data are connected to the government in one way or another. I will use the Ishikawa Fishbone Diagram from Quality Management to visualize the themes and sub-themes, as it can be seen in figure 2 (Flouris & Lock, 2008:57). The main themes are Operations, Interaction, and Ethnic groups.

Figure 2: The main themes and sub-themes that emerged from the analysis

A total of eleven international peacebuilders were interviewed for this project. All of my interlocutors have been given fake names and I will not reveal which organization they work for. In this thesis my interlocutors will be called; Anna, Catherine, Daniel, Elizabeth, Ellen, Linda, Michael, Nick, Richard, Ruth, and Sarah.

Figure 3: Pristina, the capital of Kosovo.
Photo: Helena Sigurgeirsdóttir Hólm

I will begin this chapter by briefly introducing my field, Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, and my interlocutors. Then I will introduce each theme and sub-themes. The government is not a main theme, it is rather

what all the other themes have in common, and, therefore, issues related to the government will be described through the themes. Finally, I will summarize the main findings.

5.1 Pristina and the Interlocutors

It was not difficult to notice that Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in Europe and the war

Figure 4: Sidewalk down town Pristina
Photo: Helena Sigurgeirsdóttir Hólm

in 1999 as well as the economic status has affected the country. For instance, the landscape is dusty, sidewalks have potholes and the vehicles are not always in good condition. The economy is also poor and it is quite common that the stores are selling forged commodities. There is a small shopping street in the town center selling similar items, forged goods like: handbags, belts, sunglasses, DVD, and other accessories. Some of the DVDs had not even been released in the cinema yet. In contrast, a mall,

located outside the center of Pristina, is a modern building. Some of the restaurants and international organizations' buildings are old and others are new.

Pristina is also a lively place, the coffeehouses and restaurants are nearly always crowded and

sometimes there are concerts on the high street. Many people are at the coffeehouses and the restaurants which are quite many considering that about 40 percent of the people are unemployed.[17] Some of my interlocutors confirmed that many go abroad to work and were concerned about corruption and illegal activities. However, Linda told me that the crime rate is very low in Kosovo and I could even leave my son somewhere in the street without him being kidnapped, I decided, however, just to take her words on that. She also told me that she has

Figure 5: Constructions on Bill Clinton Boulevard
Photo: Helena Sigurgeirsdóttir Hólm

colleagues from other places in Europe that feel safer in Kosovo than in their own country. Nick and Daniel agreed with Linda on how safe it feels in Pristina and that there is little criminal activity.

Even though Pristina does not have many green places and the capital looks like a big construction place, a park has been built with a playground for the children and a restaurant, quite far from the center of Pristina, with financial support from the EU. However, the guests

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[17] See World Bank (2011:2, 6-7).

have to pay to enjoy the Park. The landscape outside Pristina is beautiful and when driving from Pristina to Macedonia you see green mountains and a river leads you the way. On the other hand, if you want to listen to music on the radio while you travel you have to accept that most of it is from the late 1980s. "It is like the reality is on hold, and time is trapped since before the war in Kosovo", as Elizabeth put it.

The international community has been present in Kosovo since the end of the war in 1999,

Figure 6: Peacekeepers in uniforms down town Pristina
Photo: Helena Sigurgeirsdóttir Hólm

some of the international organizations have even been longer or since the Bosnian war in the early 1990s. This presence is very visible: as I walked from the hotel I stayed in, and to the center, I would pass several international organizations; many of the guests at the coffee houses and restaurants spoke English and according to their conversations, which I sometimes overheard, they were international actors or diplomats. Cars marked UN, EULEX, NATO, and from other organizations are also frequent on the streets, as well as peacekeepers in uniforms. The international community also held meetings at the hotel I stayed in on several occasions during my stay.

All of my interlocutors in Pristina, except two, are international actors and they all have one thing in common: building peace in Kosovo. Most of the organizations my interlocutors work for were located in the center; however, two were further away. Nick told me that one organization can be scattered in many different buildings around Pristina. One of the reasons is that the houses they have available are not big enough for the whole operation.

The field of work varies between my interlocutors. They are involved in projects like urban planning, helping refugees returning to their homes, law and order, security, gender equality, training public employees, and helping other organizations with the material they need. However, according to all of my interlocutors, the overall goal is to support the Kosovo government, whether it is to implement strategy plans, train the police, judges, and prosecutors, or making sure that public information are all true and legal, and that nothing goes missing.

For the organizations to be able to practice in Kosovo and carry out their activities, they need funding, which they receive from various sources. One of the organizations is completely self-financed and gets funding through the projects it is working on. Another has its own trust fund

and also gets money from bilateral donors. Still another receives funds from a private donor, as well as from multinational funding. One said that it depends where the money comes from, usually from different governments and also some call money from New York. However, three of my interlocutors told me that they received funds from the organization headquarters or the home government. One of them even said that funding were not a problem, they had enough money. According to my interlocutors, the sources of funding and the identity of the donors can affect how the projects are carried out and which ones are chosen.

5.2 Operations

In order to operate in a post-war environment like Kosovo, the international community needs to create an appropriate strategy, which can be international, and have a clear vision about the selection of projects. On the other hand, it appeared to be less important to evaluate the final output. These are among the impressions my interlocutors gave me when they talked about strategy making, projects, and evaluation.

5.2.1 International Strategies for Kosovo

According to my interlocutors most of the strategies the international actors apply in Kosovo are developed elsewhere, although my interlocutors argue that the situation and the government in Kosovo are taken into account when the plan is made. However, in the end it seems like the international strategies prevail when it comes to strategy making, or are at least the most dominant factor.

The strategies in use at the organization Linda works for, according to her, are linked to two main strategies. The first one is elaborated for every four years and is the global strategy for the organization and is revisited and monitored every two years. The second one is a UN Country Team strategy, which is a framework for all UN agencies and its development is based on the need of the country. This is made so the UN agencies will act as one to ensure comprehensive approach and cooperation. However, the main strategy is the Country Team strategy, which depends on the main priorities of the government and the national strategy. The development of the strategy is basically some kind of combination of a few strategies, addressing the legal framework, and it also depends on the projects and who the donors are. Linda claimed that there is a clear mandate for the projects, which is made every two years, which makes it easy for new employees to know what to do when they come to work. Usually

the project has already started and the employee will finish the job and is given all the information that is needed about what to do and what is expected from the project.

Linda argued that most of the strategies that are carried out in Kosovo are cases of copy/paste strategies from the international community. Both Linda and Ruth claimed that the organization they work for is the first one that has made a strategy plan, which is prepared by the locals and with the Kosovo need in mind. A group of people came together to work on the strategy for a gender equality national action plan and according to Linda and Ruth the action plan "was shared all around the world" as a good example of how to make a strategy for Kosovo. According to Linda the problem, as so often with strategies in Kosovo, has been with the implementation. There was a lack of knowledge regarding how to use this strategy and let it flow into the governmental system. This was the only example I heard of, where the strategy was completely made inside Kosovo and by the locals.

Nick was the only one who believed that the strategy for the organization he works for is not made under the influence or through the lenses of peacebuilding, even though the field of work can be classified in such a way. According to him, his organization has a mandate that the Security Council set up for the mission and the strategy is then relatively easy, as it comes from a clear mandate. Nick said: "for example if the task is for institution building, first it is figured out what the institution needs to develop and then it is made sure that the work flows from the mandate". Usually, a plan is made for everything that needs to be done in Kosovo and then the government needs to sign the plan, which it is an agreement on how the organization would work. However, this kind of an agreement has not been made because of the specialty of Kosovo; the government does not work completely independently. The strategic plan is basically four to five years and then the assignment is evaluated and a new plan is made.

Catherine told me that the national government has its own strategy of legislation, now, a so called action plan. This is an overall guidance, which is called the European Partnership Action Plan and is some kind of guiding instrument from the EU. The organization itself does not have a special strategy for Kosovo; instead it takes into account the strategies of the Kosovo government, which is appropriate for each project that the organization is working on. According to Anna, the organization she works for does not work according to a specific strategy as they only provide material to other organizations.

The organizations both Daniel and Richard work for are under the authority of the UN, Resolution 1244. Daniel argued that the mission is clear; it is to secure the environment so the public is safe and to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic, and peaceful Kosovo. The mission is updated according to how stable the situation is and the relationship between the ethnic groups. Richard's organization is in a similar field of work and they have clear strategic objectives to help the Kosovo Rule of Law Institutions to progress. For instance, towards sustainability, accountability, and to develop the Kosovo Rule of Law Institutions as multi-ethnic organizations; help the Kosovo Rule of Law Institutions adhere to internationally recognized standards; and to ensure that the Kosovo Rule of Law Institutions adhere to European best practices.

The organization Ellen works for is no exception when it comes to strategy making and implementing it through the projects. The strategy plan is made within the organization headquarters far away from Kosovo and the employees then use the strategy to implement projects into Kosovo society. However, she claimed that Kosovo's best interest is always kept in mind.

5.2.2 Projects within Specific Frameworks

When the international community arrived in Kosovo after the war in 1999, a search for projects took place and the identification of where they were most needed. Elizabeth claimed that the construction for the Kosovo-Albanians happened so fast in the beginning after the war that there was not much need for material assistance. The international community then started to support rebuilding good governance and chose thematic projects to focus on.

The international actors I spoke with work according to strategies that focus on specific issues and find their projects within that field. Daniel, Ellen, and Richard all argued that their mission in Kosovo is specialized and they only focus on certain projects. Those projects are believed to serve the purpose of Kosovo's best interest and secure safe environment. These projects regard what the international community believes is the best way to reach their ultimate goal, that of building peace and security.

Sarah and Ruth both claimed that in the beginning, when the office had just opened in Kosovo in 1999, they could work more freely as the operation was slowly forming and finding its place in the society. After some time the operation became more solid and the projects were found within specific fields. Elizabeth argued that all the projects have self-evolved within

their field and that they involve such factors as good governance and training people from the public sector. After the gender equality law passed, the organization has supported different activities and slowly been figuring out where they can help the most by supporting both the government and civil society. These involve areas like economics, police, military, and local organizations.

Nick claimed that his organization finds its projects in different ways and that it depends if the locals are involved or not. There are both local and international project managers and where the local project managers work they know the situation quite well and their knowledge and experience can be relied on. Nick concluded that they work in a broad area like economic development and government justice and security and are always open to other areas.

The area Anna's organization works in strives to find the best employees, for other international organizations, that are available, both international and local. One of the projects they are working on is to train judges and prosecutors. During the war many judges and prosecutors fled and in some cases these positions were taken over by people, who were not properly qualified. Anna gave the example that for a judge to work in the Supreme Court fifteen years of experience would be required for the job. However, if there is not a judge available with that amount of experience, a person with for instance twelve years of experience may be offered the position. It is up to the organization to decide whether twelve years of experience is enough or if they need to find another solution, and everyone has to reapply for the position. This project started in 2008 and is in its last phase and nearly finished. The reason this has taken so long is that the organization does thorough background checks on employees to assure that no war criminals or rapists are appointed. Further, prospective employees have to take technical exams and an ethnic exam. Following this, an independent commission of judges, senior lawyers, and international actors, review the applications, exams, and background checks with the view of appointing a person for the role. When all this has been done they recommend the top ones for the position to the government. They can only recommend who they believe is the best for the job, as they work alongside of the Kosovo Minister of Justice. Anna added that this can often be quite difficult, because they do not have many to choose from, they are as many as they are, as she put it.

The organization Catherine works for decided to concentrate more on secondary citizens that live in so called enclaves[18] outside Pristina. Catherine pointed out to me that "even though

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[18] Enclaves are the areas of Kosovo where Serbs form a majority.

there are many construction sites in Pristina it does not mean that all of them are development sites. Some of the constructions are development sites, however; there are whole areas, especially outside Pristina, where the situation is very difficult, because a lot has been built without giving any thought to schools, public spaces, agriculture, and places for public meetings or even permission for the constructions. Instead, the land has been self divided and sold and this has caused organizational problems". The organization Catherine works for is trying to change this by getting the locals involved and train them so they can organize and understand how to determine the best solution in harmony with the environment.

It seems as though there is limited flexibility for the international actors, when it comes to finding a project. The strategy sets out the framework, and then the projects are found. Within that framework the international actors focus on specific areas to work on, according to the organization specialty.

5.2.3 Measuring Success

To be able to know how successful a project is, or if there are any barriers for it to succeed, there is a need to measure or evaluate the performance. During the time of former Yugoslavia a lot of money was put into Kosovo and many believe the same is done now by the international community.[19] Most of my interlocutors had their opinion about why there is a lack of evaluation, measurements or any kind of follow up on projects.

According to Elizabeth, in 2003 there was an evaluation made to assess whether the organization she worked for should be closed down. The result indicated that there has been some progress, although not enough, and therefore the organization should remain open. Elizabeth claimed that evaluating the projects is difficult and perhaps if there was an evaluation now, ten years later, there should be some visual progress, she explained:

> I think that it is very difficult to evaluate the performance in a project like this. I think it takes a long period of time until it is visible. Yes, well it is possible to evaluate how many individuals have received some kind of training or gained special knowledge from certain projects. You can get this information by saying that x many lawyers are supposed to have specialized in, for example, gender equality. But you can't really evaluate how many of these lawyers, who were trained, work, for example, within the justice affair system, some were

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[19] See Jansen (2008).

judges, other were lawyers within different ministries, and perhaps involved in law making. It needs a long time for this knowledge to get through.

Ruth explained to me that when she came to Kosovo and started to work on a project that had already started, the first thing she did was to evaluate the status to realize what had been done, what was currently happening in Kosovo, and what the main barriers were that stood in the way of the goal. She also emphasized local ownership and that the project should be a work performed and owned by the locals. According to Ruth and Sarah, the main problem when working on a project is that there seems to be limited will for the ethnic groups to work together. They did not see how it would benefit them to work together; they obviously saw each other as competitors. To begin with, courses were held by the local authorities with, for instance, people from the public sector, media, and NGOs. Courses were also held among judges and lawyers so that they would have the knowledge to enforce the gender equality law and so that there were also people from the government, who obtained further knowledge so the project could flow through the system. Although the gender equality plan was made and adopted by the government, which claimed it to be the public plan, there was not financial capacity to implement it into the office of gender equality until the international community put money into the office. For real changes and progress to be made there need to be social changes and these kinds of changes take a long time in a society that has experienced conflicts. However, Ruth believes that the biggest problem is that the follow up and monitoring is not in place. The reason has to do with the donors, who only want headlines. There are exceptions, but to succeed, the projects have to be monitored so it is possible to react to what is going wrong. This kind of work needs patience, which the international community often does not have.

Linda claimed that there are a lot of gaps, which need to be filled, in order to gain more success than during the past ten years. She also thought the priorities are not right and the government in Kosovo is trying too much to follow in the footsteps of the international community at the expense of human rights. Linda explained it to me:

> For example, the development of structure, the laws, the way that the process was not much and they started to apply their strategy which however was not possible to apply, because it was brought from another Western country. The priority of the government is more hard construction than soft, women are not a priority so they are not seeing it should be going, you know, be side by side so

there are lot of things that should be done differently. Government is reflecting the exactly international attitude they are when we talk about human rights instruments or norms and standards of UN level there are few of them but when we come to the implementation of it at the national level it is not a priority, not a priority for UN. It's the same with the government, they have lots of laws but the implementation is very limited.

Nick thought that the development has been very slow in Kosovo and one of the reasons is corruption, which seems to be present on every level of the society. There are, for example, bribes to make political influence; and sometimes a job cannot be done unless the person is from the right political party and in some cases documents go missing in the courthouse. The international community is, according to Nick, trying to change the political culture to secure and teach the locals about open competition and these sorts of activities. It can take a long time, because this is how activities have functioned in Kosovo. It has been based on a kind of clan relationships and lots of jobs are tied to these sorts of relationships. However, despite unwanted activities like corruption that are slowing down progress in Kosovo, there is not much effort put into evaluating the projects. According to Nick, this is how the evaluation process should be:

Well, in every project there should be an evaluation, so whenever you develop the project you need to know what you want to accomplish in the project. Then you should have baselines that measure what and then after implementing the activities you try to accomplish those outputs and you need to take snapshots of what is happening and then hopefully at the end of the project you have a final evaluation of it to determine whether you have in fact implemented and accomplished what you set up to accomplish, well in theory, yes.

However, as Nick described, in reality projects are not followed up, for which there are various possible explanations. According to Nick, one reason is that when a new project manager arrives he often has different ideas about how the project should be done, which can lead to disputes among the employees. That can result in baseline there is no longer valid and in cases where this happens it is the project manager's responsibility to outline a new baseline, which he may or may not do. Another reason Nick mentioned for the projects not being followed up is the cost of measuring the outcome of a given project. He gave an example:

If one of your projects is to make awareness of domestic violence so what you need is a baseline that says currently only 18 percent Kosovo understand the definition of gender based violence. Then you can come up with all sorts of other questions and who is going to do that survey and often then you have to hire a company. They will call 1200-1300 people with these questions or go to their houses with questionnaires or whatever and then come up with the report. When they have done that all, how much does that cost, 10.000 euro or 9.000, I don't know how to budget it, and once you have done that and you've done your comparison, after that you have to do another survey. Only 18 percent in Kosovo knew what gender based violence is and now 32 percent know and we can use that in our project, where you can say you know other things that can have happened that explains why people understand it better than before. That new survey will cost another 9.000-10.000 euros and theoretically you should do another one six months or a year later to see how much people remember, what was your really long term impact and do your assessment right after and see how much you have increased it. Talking about impact you have to look two years, three years down the line to see how much really we raised public awareness about gender based violence and in a year do it again, kind of public opinion survey, another 9.000 euros and then you are up to 27.000 euros for one output, for measuring one output.

Nick stated that they try to do what they can, and use, for example, snapshots, to measure how the project is evolving. This, however, depends on the individual projects and what they are trying to accomplish, which is then reported in the organization's quarter reports.

The organization Anna works for is more into supporting other organizations and providing them the supplies they need. Therefore, the organization has no projects to evaluate. Nevertheless, Anna had given the situation in Kosovo some thought and the success that has been gained since the end of the war in 1999. This is what Anna thought:

Compared to 1999, when the bombs were falling here in Pristina, then, of course, things are lot better. I don't know what you compare better than what, for example, in the eighties many people were poorer, but they had better services. Well, it depends on who you talk to, they may have had better schools at the time or better something or not. It all depends on where you want to

make your comparison, like, just before the war or in the sixties when there was some kind of development going on, in the seventies and then the war came, the UNMIK arrives, there is a lot of money, but benefiting the majority of the people.

Catherine claimed that there is no need to measure the progress of the projects they are working on. The work is visual so it is easy to monitor the projects, she claimed. In most cases the progress is buildings or helping the locals to implement their solutions and get education to take over the projects. The progress can also be seen in open spaces, and if they are safe, clean, have streetlights, and so on.

According to Richard, the success of the mission will ultimately be measured against the strategic objectives, Judiciary, Police, and Customs. Each programme has certain performance measures or indicators that are designed for monitoring the project, whether it is a quantitative or a qualitative way. The data or information is then analyzed every six months, to evaluate both the current performance and to reveal if there are any barriers, which need to be overcome. Daniel claimed that they update the mission regularly to see whether the situation is more stable. According to him, the process has been successful and the environment has become more secure so they are reducing their levels and the locals are taking over more and more. Nevertheless, according to Nick, there has not been much progress in the area of rule of law.

All my interlocutors agreed that building peace takes time in a society that has been through conflict and it is a matter of opinion when the job is finished. Most of my interlocutors had not set up a specific timeline for when they will leave Kosovo. Most of them believe it will take two or three generations or more to finish the job. One even argued that there will always be some kind of intervention in Kosovo, just like in Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro.

5.3 Interaction

One factor that facilitates successful peacebuilding is active communication and learning from previous mistakes and successes of similar projects. Furthermore, the international community also needs to consider the situation in Kosovo, when determining the future, and not just applying standardized procedures from itself. These are among the subjects my interlocutors mentioned, when they discussed the impact of foreign power, the locals in Kosovo, and the communication between international actors.

5.3.1 Foreign Power

When the war in Kosovo ended in 1999, the international community entered on a large scale into the country. Elizabeth and Ruth claimed that following the war, thousands of NGOs and other international organizations came to Kosovo with pockets full of money, and were eager to help. If they did not find a present NGO or organizations that they could give money to, for a certain project, they created an agency around the project. Most of the interlocutors agreed that the international community has an obligation to help those who need help. However, in the case of Kosovo it came to a point when too many were doing the same thing without any cooperation or knowing what kind of assistance was needed. Most of the organizations and NGOs were following the headlines and as soon as those were no longer printed, they moved on to the next "headline" country. Michael agreed with Elizabeth and Ruth, and said that many within the international community in the Balkans, were surprised to learn that the organization he works for was opening an office, when most of the others were closing theirs down. Linda explained the post-war situation to me:

> Imagine, after the war when all the refugees were turning back by foot, walking back into Kosovo from the neighboring countries. It was not just the people from Kosovo who were returning, the international community was also entering. So you can imagine the chaos, maybe 53.000 KFOR troops, NATO, UNMIK maybe more than 20.000 and almost 400 international NGOs. It was almost more international people entering and there was no electricity, no water, nothing, just insecurity.

The entering of the international community did have an impact on the locals in Kosovo, who were confused and angry after the war. Elizabeth claimed that the locals resented the UN in the beginning and the relationship between them became that of love/hate. Kosovo wanted the money from the international community, but did not want them to have all the power over Kosovo. However, the power over Kosovo got into the hands of UNMIK, which just took the authority. Anna argued that this has never happened before, perhaps though in East-Timor, although in a slightly different way. She claimed that under normal circumstances a UN mission needs an invitation from the government, but in the Kosovo case the UN just entered because of Resolution 1244. The government of Kosovo could not do anything without the approval of UNMIK, whether it regarded passing a law or something else, as UNMIK was the government. Anna claimed that perhaps UNMIK still is in charge in the present, although in

reality it is not supposed to. According to Daniel, the international community entered Kosovo so quickly just to keep some respect and dignity after they had failed in Bosnia and before that in Rwanda.

The government of Kosovo has, with the help and support of UNMIK, grown stronger and gained more experience in each ministry for them to be able to take over, since they declared independence in 2008. According to Anna, Daniel, Elizabeth, and Linda, UNMIK started in 2006 to transform the power to the local people, except in some areas, which are still under the supervision of UNMIK or EULEX; for instance, subjects that concern the rule of law and security. Linda stated that UNMIK and other administrations should finish the job they started: to create a multi-ethnic democracy and peace. The ones Linda meant are those who are or have been in charge and supported the rebuilding and renovation of the Kosovo government, as well as interfering in Kosovo's future. This has been a difficult task, as the government structure in Kosovo was complicated when UNMIK took control after the war. In the 1990s the Albanians established a parallel state alongside the Serbian regime that ruled Kosovo from Belgrade. Therefore, there was a need for political development, and with help from UNMIK, a new administrative framework, like the Transitional Council and the Provisional's Administrative Council of Kosovo, were set up. This was to strengthen the government structure in order to establish a multi-ethnic democratic government.[20]

Although the international community, which has the power, reports that they act in accordance with Kosovo's best interest, Linda said she did not believe that. Linda, for example, argued that after the independence declaration of Kosovo, the government had to review most of the work the international community had done, as it was most often copy/paste strategies from the international community and did not necessary apply to the Kosovo conditions. Not everyone agreed with Linda, who thought that the standards that, for instance, the UN is using to help the government of Kosovo, are mixed between the UN standards and what is considered to be best for Kosovo. Anna explained to me:

> The UN did not just come and say, we are coming to work and use our standard, you know, it is just minimum standards they use when it comes to human rights and respect etc. This is our job but, of course, you cannot do anything unless you work with the population. I think that listening to what people want and what they say and taking that into account and the cultural

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[20] See Cohen (2000).

value, the history, who is who, who is related to whom, this is very, very important and has been done very well here.

In Daniel's opinion, the international community has been doing a good job, but has also been interfering in things that they should not be. For example, he believes that the international community was trying to create new identities or symbols for the Kosovo people. Daniel gave an example about the Kosovo flag. He claimed that the International community believed that for the Kosovo community to start over again, after they declared independence, they needed a new flag, a flag that everyone in Kosovo could relate to. There was a contest in flag making; however, the UN demanded that the flag represent Kosovo's multi-ethnic society. Muhamer Ibrahimi won the contest with a flag that is not unlike the EU flag. It is blue with a golden landmark of Kosovo and above it are six golden stars. Each star represents an ethnic group in Kosovo: Albanians, Serbs, Roma, Bosniaks, Turks, and Goran (Makedonian). Daniel claimed that the international community was trying to make a new identity, he claimed the flag represents, for the Kosovo people that they do not really relate to. I noticed that the Kosovo flag is very visible in Pristina; nevertheless, the Albanian flag is, in most cases, next to it.

UNMIK is not the only foreign power in Kosovo and since UNMIK began transferring the power to the locals another big power has come to the surface. According to Linda, the one with the most power in Kosovo is the EU, because they have the funds. Linda added that there have always been big powers in Kosovo, and in the Balkan area, trying to decide the future for the Balkan people:

> When the Balkan future was decided in the Bismarck times, big powers defined the borders. Bismarck wanted to satisfy everyone, for example Russia. So to save Prussia or the German position the people in the Balkan were pushed not to live with each other, but to live near each other and to rely on big powers and that was followed by five wars. Because, for example, Serbia relied on Russia, but Croatia relied on Austria and Hungary and you know all of this was somehow big power pushing and their interest and in the end all these decisions were not to satisfy the need of the people. The last war here was in the end of the 20th century and again people are relying on big powers. The history is now, look USA is supporting Kosovo and Russia is supporting Serbia. All these blocks show how big powers work, for the sake of security, not democracy.

5.3.2 The Locals

My interlocutors spoke at length about the locals in Kosovo and how important it is to keep them informed about what kind of projects are being implemented and what outcome is expected from the projects. According to Ruth and Sarah, the international community is first and foremost in Kosovo to help rebuilding the country after the war and the locals deserve to be able to follow the projects there. Catherine also believed it is important to work with the locals and keep them informed about the projects to avoid misunderstanding as possible. She gave an example about a project that the organization was working on. Because of lack of communication about the project the locals were starting to demonstrate, because they did not know what was going on. Catherine, however, believed this has been changing because of increased communication between the international community and the locals. The media has also started to show more interest in the projects and has become more active in reporting about current projects and following up on older ones. Richard claimed that the locals have access to everything his organization is doing. Their webpage gives information about all the projects they are involved in, their goals, and where they stand. Richard was not the only one who relies on the internet to get information out to the people in Kosovo, even though, as Daniel pointed out, accurate information about the internet use of the locals are not available. There is no guarantee, therefore, that information via the internet will reach the majority of the inhabitants in Kosovo.

It appears that under the surface, the international actors I spoke to and the locals do not all have much respect for one another, which I also sensed when walking around in Pristina. When the war ended and the international actors entered Kosovo it was difficult for the locals not to be affected by the present of the international community or not have any kind of contact with them. Most of my interlocutors felt that the people in Pristina are very kind

Figure 7: Graffiti sprayed on a wall outside the center of Pristina
Photo: Helena Sigurgeirsdóttir Hólm

and believed that they appreciate what they are doing in Kosovo. Ellen, a local working for an international organization, was the only exception, she said: "yes they are very kind at least on the surface, you never know when that will change".

I did not interview any locals; nevertheless, I noticed that the inhabitants in Pristina are very friendly, but not all of them seem to like the presence of the international community. I came

across, both in the center and outside the center, graffiti where EULEKSPERIMENT had been sprayed on walls and sometimes EULEX and UMIK[21] with an X over was sprayed on the walls as well. My interlocutors commented on the graffiti and most of them did not give much thought to it. Daniel and Richard both agreed that those who sprayed these graffiti on the walls were those who benefit the least from the presence of these foreign agencies; "it is just a minority group", they said. However, the majority can

Figure 8: Graffiti sprayed on a wall in Pristina
Photo: Helena Sigurgeirsdóttir Hólm

appreciate the work of the international community and it was Daniel and Richard's feeling that these would like for them to stay. Daniel believed that the locals dislike EULEX more than UNMIK. According to him, EULEX had made some house searches that the locals did not appreciate and many of them thought that EULEX were interfering too much in domestic affairs. Nick and Anna thought it was just some youngsters or gangsters, who did not know what they were doing. Anna explained:

> A lot of people doesn't want it because they don't understand it; they want to have their own free country fully country like everybody else and don't want the UN here. But that is the people on the street and youngsters saying like 'go - we are free and independent now'. But I think in terms of people who make the decisions, who have to say, what happens here, they all understand in some instances they do need the UN to assist but again this assistance may come less and less necessary and when the government becomes more and more able to take on their own affairs they will. I don't think that there is this bad feeling or that this impression that you know, the UN is supporting this community and from a higher level of politics it is very clear that we are here to do a job.

Ellen disagreed with most of my other interlocutors, and believed it is a group of separatists and they should be taken seriously. If nothing is done she thought it could only lead to bigger problems later on and slows down the peacebuilding process and progress.

The graffiti issue was not the only matter that created the impression that some of the interlocutors felt they were somewhat above the people of Kosovo. It appeared that the international actors looked down on the inhabitants, as though the locals needed their help,

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[21] UMIK stands for UNMIK

because they were not able to think logically themselves. Nick and Richard claimed that, since the West moved in very quickly, the people of Kosovo had to adapt to a new system of logical thinking, which they were not used to. Nick and Richard believed that when the people of Kosovo were growing up the society had not taught them logical thinking, which is important to learn. Nick also explained to me that some of his local colleagues do not think that they need international actors to help them. Nick's response to that was:

> If they are capable of doing it why do they need us? We could then just close the doors and they could all go and work for the government, but, of course, that would not go and make anyone happy either because the government paycheck is 200 euros a month when they can get 1.200 euros a month from us. So, I mean, none of us is going to be happy either way.

Although there seems to be some kind of contempt between the locals and the international community, Anna still believed that they relate to each other and care, because they have a common goal: building a new tomorrow for Kosovo.

5.3.3 Communication Platform between International Actors

There seems to be an effort to build a communication platform between the international actors in Kosovo, especially between those who work within the UN. However, the international actors I spoke with seem to think differently about the importance of such a platform and how much communication is needed between international actors, within various organizations.

The situation in Kosovo is believed, according to Anna, to be unique and very different from that in most countries that have experienced war. Nick agreed with Anna and said that what is interesting about Kosovo is that the international actors tend to stay for a long period of time, which can benefit the peacebuilding process, as the actors get a good insight into the situation in Kosovo. The main reason is, according to Nick, that the mission is not as stressful as the one in Afghanistan or Iraq, for instance, where the international actors have to leave because the environment is too stressful. Anna and Sarah also claimed that the mission in Kosovo is easier in many ways than in other countries after a war. Indeed there was great need and many people who suffered. However, the people of Kosovo, who fled during the war, did not travel far; they went to the neighboring countries and came back very quickly. The international

actors were also able to communicate as the electricity came back soon after the war, which made the organizing process easier.

Even though the international actors were able to communicate, not everyone believed that they took advantage of that. Ruth and Linda claimed that it is amazing how little the organizations communicate with each other and how they want to take the credit for all the work, which does not favor local ownership. Linda also claimed that there is a lack of communication between the EU and the UN. She gave an example about a meeting between her organization and the EU, where the advocate from the EU said: "sorry but we are not involved with the UN on that issue so we cannot help you". Linda argued that this lack of collaboration and communication is also sending the government different and confusing messages. She claimed that every decision is very politicalized; that, for example, in Kosovo there are representatives from USA, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Kosovo government. Everyone is just doing their job without communicating with each other and that sends different messages, when the main goal is to support the government of Kosovo. Richard and Daniel, however, both claimed that the communication between those organizations that work within the same area is quite good and does not need improvement.

Catherine shared the same view as Richard and Daniel and thought the communication between the international organizations is good and they are even being improved; she said:

> There is something called the UNKT, which are all UN agencies so it is UNCR, UNDP, UNIFEM, WHO, UN-HABITAT just to mention a few and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) also have presence here and so there is cooperation for something that is called joined programming. We are now working together on a development plan for all UN agencies to come together to create some kind of a program, which would be about implementation and guide our work.

Anna claimed that there are informal discussions between them and EULEX on subjects that they are both involved in. She added that the mission is so different from the others that there is not really any communication, in terms of projects, between them and other UN organizations even though they are a part of UNKT. However, Anna believed the organization she works for is working to help the people in Kosovo and they try to avoid doing the same work twice over, which should be possible as all the UN organizations have a clear mandate.

Nick had a different view regarding the subject of communication. He believed that it all looks good in theory, how communication and cooperation should be, even though reality is different. He claimed that there is an effort being put into something called One UN, which means that all the UN agencies should be working more closely with each other; however, it is still a working process. In Nick's opinion there is not much of an overlap when it comes to similar projects within the same sector, carried out by different organizations. Nevertheless, he thought it is always possible to refine the communication process between international actors working in similar areas; for example, to learn from their different experiences. Nick gave an example about a juvenile justice project that United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has been working on for a long time and has gained experience within that subject. Nick's organization is now working on a project regarding probation service, which is not exactly the same subject as the UNICEF project. However, in Nick's opinion they can learn from UNICEF, about where they have gone wrong and what has gone well, to facilitate their work. According to Nick, this communication platform has not yet been established, but he hopes it will be in the near future.

5.4 Ethnic Groups

During my stay in Pristina, I did not experience or really get the feeling I was in a multi-ethnic society. For all I know, I only met Kosovo-Albanians, the majority of Pristina's population, most of whom are Muslims. It was quite rare to see a woman wearing a veil, or any other religious signs, that could distinguish her from the Orthodox Serbs. Perhaps the street signs were the only visual things, as they were all both written in the Albanian and Serbian languages. One reason why the Albanians tend to have a more relaxed view of religion than most other Muslims might be that the majority of Kosovo Albanians are of Sunni Muslim background with a stronghold of the liberal, Sufi, Bektashi sect, regarded as heretical by Orthodox Muslims.[22] My interlocutors also told me that the Muslims in Kosovo are rather liberal and that Islamic extremism is not common.

Ethnic groups were a topic that all of my interlocutors talked about and believed needed more attention, weather it was in relation to the separation between the Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs, education, future conflicts, independence, or the EU.

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[22] See Judah (2008).

5.4.1 Separation

Although the population in Kosovo is now living a time of peace, peace has not, according to Ellen and Linda, been built between the ethnic groups. My interlocutors believed it will take a long time before the ethnic groups can live together in Kosovo and not just side by side. After the conflict in 1999, there was a very high nationalism among the Albanians and resistance against Serbia, because of what they did during the war. Catherine, Elizabeth, and Ellen claimed that this has changed in some ways, the ethnic groups have stopped killing each other and they can be true to themselves and their identities, without any harassment. Catherine said: "no one denies each other religious rights and it is not dangerous anymore to speak, for example, the Serbian language on the streets of Pristina". Catherine added that she can sometimes hear the Serbian language on the street and no one seems to mind. However, as Catherine pointed out, it is a different issue how the Kosovo-Serbs think about Kosovo-Albanians and how safe they feel in a Kosovo-Albanian environment and vice versa.

Elizabeth was the only one of my interlocutors, who believed that not much has changed since the international community entered Kosovo in 1999 and that the international community has failed in many ways. Her argument was that the Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs are still living separate lives and they live even further apart now than before the conflict. Most of the Kosovo-Serbs live in enclaves; one of them is just a few minutes outside Pristina and is called Gračanica. Elizabeth mentioned that the people in Gračanica seldom visit Pristina and, for example, when a woman gives birth to a baby the birth certificate is received from Belgrade, Serbia, along with most other public services they need. Even employment paychecks sometimes come from Belgrade and they use the Serbian Dinar as their currency. I visited Gračanica once during my stay and the only thing that looked different was a Monastery, which was guarded by KFOR and the Serbian flag had replaced the Albanian one. Another enclave is in Mitrovica, which is closer to the Serbian border. A river runs through the city and divides it into north Mitrovica, where Kosovo-Serbs live, and south Mitrovica, where Kosovo-Albanians live. Catherine and Daniel claimed that neither Kosovo-Serbs nor Kosovo-Albanians ever crossed the bridge of the river to visit the other side.

My interlocutors are all concerned with these enclaves; these places divide the ethnic groups up with invisible walls like they are living in two different countries. There is no contact between them or intermarriage, according to Catherine and Ellen. I often saw wedding cars during my stay and all of them had the Kosovo flag and the Albanian flag, which indicated

that it was Kosovo-Albanian newlyweds. When I visited Gračanica, I only stayed there for a short period of time, not long enough to get the feeling I was in another country. According to Catherine, Daniel, Elizabeth, and Richard, it is a negative development that the ethnic groups live separate lives in Kosovo and will only call for trouble for the next generations, who will grow up thinking that this separation is normal and will think in terms like "us" and "them". Anna, Catherine, Daniel, and Ellen maintain there is a lot of effort towards bringing the Kosovo-Serbs back; however, there are other issues that need to be considered. It is not enough to help the Kosovo-Serbs to return, it is necessary take into account work, school, everything that involves daily activities and how free they feel within Kosovo. This is also a question of freedom; freedom to go out of the house and walk the streets no matter if it is an Albanian or Serbian environment.

There are other factors which can make it more difficult for Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians to interact. According to Catherine and Ellen, the ethnic groups have different identities that can make it harder for them to integrate. They speak different languages, they have different religion and different culture. These factors can make it difficult for a Kosovo-Serb to work, for example, in Pristina without any knowledge of the Albanian language, since most of the inhabitants in Pristina are Kosovo-Albanians. However, Catherine believed that the real risk of what could happen if the ethnic groups communicate, or would like to establish a life together, is unknown, as they do not travel to each other's residential areas. It is also a question of how much the ethnic groups in Kosovo are willing to help themselves, by making Kosovo a home for both ethnic groups, where they can live together.

In the opinion of Daniel, Elizabeth, Linda, and Richard the differences between the ethnic groups are not the only reason why they live separate lives. They claimed that a couple of them can be traced to politics and natural resources. Linda stated that the government of Kosovo is trying their best to support integration of ethnic-Serbians into Kosovo society. The Kosovo constitution development is based on minority rights and in the Parliament some minimum of seats belongs to minority groups. The government is also supporting ethnic dialogue, which has not been very successful. Some of my interlocutors claimed that they try as well to create dialogue between the ethnic groups, for instance, through a special radiobroadcast.

According to Nick, there has been a tension between politicians and the population of Kosovo for a long time. For instance, the Serbian government in the late 1980s, early 1990s, and mid

1990s would decide which industry to invest in, and if they felt like it they would fire all Albanians and hire Serbs from Belgrade to work in their place. The regime was almost like a monastic government, even on a local level, and around that time the Albanian parallel authorities were developing schools, healthcare, and other services they needed. After the conflicts in the 1990s the Kosovo-Albanian authorities expected the ethnic groups to adapt very quickly and "get to the trusty surface", as Nick put it, which has led to a fair amount of resentment. Most of the Kosovo-Serbs do not desire to use the service provided by the Kosovo-Albanians. Therefore they have implemented, with the support of the government in Belgrade, their own parallel governing. However, if the Kosovo-Serbs choose to use the service available in Kosovo the Belgrade authority might pressure them not to do so. Nick explained to me further:

> The thing is it is a part of a political culture. You got the Executive of Kosovo very strong and the reason it is very strong is that for many many years the people did not trust the government, because of the situation here. So you have a recent history of the people going against the state, against the government, and then suddenly over night you say you have to trust the government and that kind of lingering, we did not pay taxes, we did not do this, we had our own healthcare system, we have our own education system which is separate and now all of a sudden we're supposed to trust the government.

Catherine and Linda agreed with Nick and believed there is still some negative political interference and what needs to be done, after some cutback, is for the Serbian government to stop using the Serbian population in Kosovo for political ends. Elizabeth claimed that when politicians and people from the Orthodox Church in Serbia visit Kosovo, they give speeches in public places within the enclaves. These speeches emphasize the importance of Kosovo being a part of Serbia, because Serbia does not want to lose Kosovo. Linda also claimed that the Kosovo-Albanians keep the past alive by reminding the government, and those in charge, that there are still people missing out there, especially by putting up pictures of missing people on the fence in front of the Parliament. The problem, according to Linda, is that time after time some peace is achieved, just enough to stop the conflict, but the roots of the problem are never explored closely.

Natural resources are another factor my interlocutors mentioned as a reason that the ethnic groups live separate lives. In the north of Mitrovica, where the Kosovo-Serbs live, there are

mines with natural resources and Serbia does not want to lose them, according to Elizabeth and Ellen. My interlocutors told me about a rumor, which has been going on within the international community in Kosovo, about the borders between Serbia and Kosovo. The rumor includes that as Serbia is unwilling to give up the mines, one way to settle the dispute is to change the border. The north side of Mitrovica would become a part of Serbia and the south part would still be in Kosovo. In this way Serbia would be willing to let Kosovo go. However, the Kosovo-Albanians then wanted to change the borders anyway. There is a place in Serbia, to which many Kosovo-Albanians fled during the war and have not returned from back to Kosovo. The demand on behalf of Kosovo-Albanians was to move the borders so this place would belong to Kosovo. The international community did not agree to these arrangements and the border between Serbia and Kosovo will most likely not change, according to Richard.

Despite the separation between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo and despite the fact that the Kosovo-Serbs do not recognize Kosovo independence and consider themselves as Serbs living in Kosovo, there have been small changes recently in the right direction. According to Catherine, Ellen, and, Linda some changes took place after the last elections, at least in some of the enclaves. These changes can be seen in more effort to participate in politics, although in Serbia this has brought trouble to the Kosovo-Serbs. Some of the Kosovo-Serbs have even changed their car license plate, from a Serbian one to a Kosovo license plate. Catherine added that perhaps it was necessary for the Kosovo-Serbs to change the license plates for practical reasons, as it was sometimes difficult for them to travel inside Kosovo. Catherine believed that these are signs that the Kosovo-Serbs are making decisions about their future and have a better attitude towards the government of Kosovo, but still there is a long way to go.

5.4.2 Education

With invisible walls surrounding the enclaves, most of the public services that the inhabitants of Kosovo need have become separated. Among these services is the educational system, which also plays its part in separating the ethnic groups, according to my interlocutors.

Before the conflicts in the 1990s, the Albanian school system in Kosovo was underground, which changed after the conflicts ended.[23] However, I heard a rumor that the education in

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[23] See Kuhn and Dragidella (2007:408); UNICEF (2010).

rural areas among the Kosovo-Albanians is still in some way underground, and takes place at the mountains and is not brought by educated teachers. Even though my interlocutors do not directly work in the field of education, they were also concerned about the education system and believed one of the latent problems is that some of the educational system is underground, even though efforts have been made for improvements.

According to Daniel, Nick, and Richard the inhabitants of Kosovo are among the youngest population in Europe, where about 50 percent are under the age of 25.[24] With such a young population it should be important to establish a good educational system to invest in the future. However, according to Nick and Richard, because of the crisis situation after the war, the importance of a good educational system was ignored as it was believed more important to make the environment more stable, before investing in the educational system. Daniel and Nick claimed that because of lack of action in the educational system some of the system went underground and the educational model that was used for many years was to memorize, a repeat after me system, and not based on logical reasons. Daniel and Nick told me that even some of the universities are not even authorized to graduate students and the students know they are receiving worthless diplomas; however, they choose to study. The people of Kosovo want to study and they do what they need to fulfill that desire. Some of the students are able to get out of Kosovo to gain a master's degree abroad, which is important according to Nick. He believed that the schools in Kosovo are not based on logical reason, and teaching critical and logical thinking is very important, especially if the students choose a profession like, for example, within the police force. Ellen believed that much has been done to improve the quality of the educational system, especially within the universities. The international community has been helping to strengthen the syllabus and what kind of basic courses are thought in certain subjects, like in the Department of Law. Elizabeth thought that the international community only gives assistance to the Department of Law because they want to influence the students and make sure they will learn the same thinking in law as students in their own country. However, Nick added that it will take time to establish a good educational system and it still needs some serious work in Kosovo.

The educational system, however, has been recovering slowly for the past few years, but the main problem, according to Catherine, Elizabeth, and Nick, is the lack of school buildings and school equipment. Therefore, the school system is overcharged and the students have to take

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[24] See UNICEF (2010).

shifts as there is not enough space and the school classes' periods are shortened, which reduces the quality of the education. Most schools run at least three shifts and some four, and when the students are lucky there are only two shifts, for example, grades 1-7 in the morning and 8-12 in the afternoon.

After the conflict in the 1990s and the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the schools were split up by ethnicity; if you spoke Albanian you went to an Albanian school, if you spoke Serbian you went to a Serbian school and so on. This development, according to Elizabeth, Ellen, and Linda, is a risk for the future of Kosovo in the long run and will slow down the peacebuilding process, especially when it comes to reconciliation between the ethnic groups. Elizabeth and Ellen believed that if the ethnic groups interact from an early age, for example within the education system, they will learn to live together in peace and harmony and not as strangers living side by side in Kosovo. The problem, however, as Catherine pointed out, is that the Albanian and Serbian people speak different languages so it can be difficult for them to share a classroom. She told me that some of the schools are shared by the ethnic groups even though they do not attend the same classrooms. It is uncommon though, as most of the Serbian population attends school within their enclaves. Nick and Richard shared Catherine's opinion and added that the problem is also that the Kosovo-Serbian teachers do in some cases not have a contract with the Kosovo government, instead they receive their paycheck from Belgrade, Serbia. The Kosovo government does not recognize this arrangement so the interaction between the ethnic groups is to some degree prevented by politics.

5.4.3 Future Conflicts, Independence and the EU

Conflicts in the future, the declaration of independence of Kosovo, and the present and future relation between Kosovo and the EU were topics my interlocutors spoke of as related subjects.

Despite the separation and non relation between the ethnic groups in Kosovo, none of my interlocutors thought the history of conflict will repeat itself again. Catherine said that there is nowhere to return to as the situation has permanently changed. The international community is in Kosovo and will prevent any major conflict from happening. Therefore, there is no real danger of conflict within Kosovo, especially since the Serbs are no longer physically threatened by anyone, and it is very unlikely that they will invade Kosovo to protect the Serbian enclaves. Another reason is, as both Catherine and Daniel told me, that Serbia is applying for the EU. However, it is impossible for the Serbian government to acknowledge

Kosovo's independence. They have been through too much history of resentment and violence, and the nationalism in Serbia is too heavy. According to Catherine and Daniel, the rumor is that since Serbia cannot recognize Kosovo's independence for political reason, such recognition will be one of the EU requirements for Serbia joining the EU. As Catherine claimed, in that case politicians in Serbia can say to their people: "you all want to join the EU however, the EU demands that for us to be able to join we have to recognize Kosovo's independence. It is best for Serbia to join the EU, we may lose Kosovo, but we will be a part of a bigger unit instead, the EU". This could be a part of stopping future conflicts between the ethnic groups within Kosovo; however, it will not necessarily make peace between them. Nonetheless, it would be a step in the right direction, according to my interlocutors.

Even though my interlocutors did not believe that conflict will break out again, they were concerned about the north part of Kosovo, where Mitrovica is located. Anna and Catherine believed, that in the north of Kosovo, conflicts could escalate and become a problem, but that it depended on the response of the community, whether the people wanted to start the conflict again or keep on the path toward reconciliation. According to Catherine, some minor conflicts might be triggered by the fact that the inhabitants of north Mitrovica, who are Serbs, do not recognize Kosovo's independence and instead believe that Kosovo is a part of Serbia. This is one of the reasons why minor conflicts have occurred in the post-conflict period and most of them in Mitrovica, according to Catherine, Daniel, and Richard. They believed the reason might be that there the Albanians and Serbs live closer together, than they do, for example, in Pristina, and that Mitrovica is closer to the Serbian border, which may also influence how the ethnic groups interact with each other. In 2004 and 2010 there were demonstrations in Mitrovica, which the international community had to get involved in. In 2010 was the first time that the Kosovo-Serbs were supposed to vote in Kosovo elections, rather than in Serbian elections, and the Serbs did not want to participate. In 2004 some children drowned, and there were a lot of speculations about what really happened, and the ethnic groups blamed each other. All my interlocutors concluded that much more effort needs to be put into the communication and relation between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians. If nothing is done, minor conflicts will continue and there will never be a real peace. To prevent conflict in the future current conflicts need to be settled first. The ethnic groups may have put down their weapons, but peace has not been built between them.

As mentioned before, Serbia and the Serbian population within the enclaves in Kosovo do not recognize Kosovo's independence, which was declared in 2008. They are not the only ones,

as neither the UN nor all the EU countries have recognized Kosovo's independence, as was also stated by Catherine, Ellen, Richard, and Sarah. The Serbian government claimed it was illegal for Kosovo to declare independence and reported it to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. I was in Pristina when the ruling was made on the 22^{end} of July 2010. I followed the news on television. The ruling was in favor of Kosovo and I expected some kind of celebration in the streets. However, it was just like another ordinary day, it was like no one cared. When I asked the staff, at the hotel I stayed in, about the importance of the ruling, one of them said: "it is nothing to celebrate we always knew that we did not do anything wrong. The other former Yugoslavia countries have declared independence without any problems, so why can't we"? The staff members were not the only ones to have these thoughts; two of my local interlocutors also shared their view. Daniel told me that there had been some preparation regarding security on the day of the ruling, but, however, there was not so much demonstration or violence in the places they expected there would be.

Without recognition from the UN Security Council, Kosovo is not a legal state and cannot apply for EU membership, according to Elizabeth and Catherine. In Catherine's opinion Kosovo will not gain recognition as an independent state in the near future. She claimed that within the EU there are countries like Spain and Greece, that have not recognize Kosovo independence, and are unlikely to do so. The reason, in Catherine's belief, is that if countries within the EU, themselves dealing with minority groups that long for independence from their own country, they cannot recognize the independence of Kosovo. As soon as they would, domestic minority groups would say that now they cannot refuse them their independence. Elizabeth added that Russia is also a Serbian alliance and would probably use their veto in the UNSC if there would be a voting on Kosovo's independence.

Despite the lack of recognition as an independent state, the government in Kosovo and the international community are doing everything they can to prepare Kosovo for EU integration. Linda and Anna claimed that the EU is a carrot that will stop the fighting even though they do not focus on human rights or reconciliation between the ethnic groups. Elizabeth also claimed that the EU does not really have a clear strategy when it comes to reconciling multi-ethnic societies that have experienced conflict. All of my interlocutors except one believed that Kosovo is not going to join the EU, even though it will be recognized as an independent state. There is too much corruption and illegal activity going on, and it would take the country a very long time to change. Richard was the only interlocutor, who believed that, just like its neighboring countries, Kosovo would apply for the EU in the near future.

For Kosovo to be able to carry on into the future, it needs recognition of its independence for many reasons, according to Catherine, Elizabeth, and Sarah. One is that the inhabitants do not want to be identified by their brutal past, but want instead to participate in the international community. Another reason is regarding foreign investment, which Kosovo needs to rebuild the country and for better prospects. As long as Kosovo is not an independent state, foreign investors find it risky to invest in Kosovo. Daniel pointed out that once again the future of Kosovo comes down to politics.

5.5 Summary

In this chapter I have introduced the main findings from my data during my fieldwork in Kosovo. I began the chapter by introducing Pristina, my interlocutors, and then I presented the main themes.

The first theme I introduced is operations and its sub-themes: international strategies for Kosovo, projects within specific framework and the measuring of success. Within this theme my interlocutors explained their strategy-making, which, in most cases, is influenced by international strategies of the international organizations. Not all of my interlocutors agreed, whether international strategies served Kosovo's best interest. Nevertheless, all of them believed they have Kosovo's conditions in mind. The projects my interlocutors are operating flow from the strategies and are within a specific framework, which they believed will help Kosovo's recovery after the war and the rebuilding of the country. However, in most cases there was a lack of evaluation to explore if the projects are as effective as intended. My interlocutors gave various explanations for this, such as it was too expensive to measure the output.

The second theme is interaction and its sub-themes: foreign power, the locals and a communication platform between international actors. Apparently, according to some of my interlocutors, the locals thought that too often foreign power tried to decide the future for Kosovo; however, that if they are going to stay, whether it is UNMIK, the EU or someone else, they should do their job properly. The international interlocutors think, for example, that the UN takes the best from their operations and then consider what Kosovo needs, and they do not see any problem with that. Even though the international community sometimes steps out of line, as in the case of influencing how the Kosovo new flag should look like, that serves to reflect the multi-ethnic nature of Kosovo.

My interlocutors seemed not to have much respect for the locals, both regarding how they think and what they believe in. However, all of them thought it was important that the projects keep the locals informed about what was being done, and why, in order to avoid misunderstanding. There is a need for communication between the international community and the locals, and the international actors also need to communicate among themselves. My interlocutors have different opinions about the importance of increasing the communication among them. Nevertheless, most of my interlocutors believed that there is a lack of communication among organizations, which can slow down the peacebuilding process, as it sends out different messages to the community and the government. Most of my international interlocutors argued that those who needed to communicate can do so without any problems. From what my interlocutors told me the UN, for example, is creating a communication platform only within UN organizations and not between various organizations, working within similar fields.

The last theme is about ethnic groups and its sub-themes: separation, education and future conflicts, independence and the EU. All of my interlocutors were worried about the development of the enclaves in Kosovo and thought they are isolating the ethnic groups from each other. The main problem is that they do not interact, despite efforts of the government of Kosovo to increase dialogue between them. None of my interlocutors came up with a solution or a theory on how to solve this problem. However, they believed that distrust between the ethnic groups, politics, and natural resources, play the biggest role in keeping the ethnic groups apart. This separation can have adverse effects in my interlocutors' opinion. One of them looks to the educational system, which, in most cases, is separated between the ethnic groups and needs a lot of improvements to be able to give a quality education to the young population of Kosovo. My interlocutors were concerned that the separation within the educational system could increase the distance between the ethnic groups and slow down the process to get them to interact more.

Even though my interlocutors did not think that the situation in Kosovo will return to the situation as it was before the war in 1999, because of the presence of the international community, for instance, they are concerned about the north part of Kosovo, where minor conflicts have taken place. Some of my interlocutors argued that for the ethnic groups to be able to reconcile, the international community would need to find the roots for the dispute.

There are some issues that my interlocutors believed can stand in the way of Kosovo's success in the future. The lack of recognition of Kosovo's independence can, in my interlocutors' opinion, be harmful in the long run. It will be difficult to get foreign investment, Kosovo can not apply for the EU, and this can affect the reconciliation between the Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians, even though it will not perhaps make peace between them. It can also be detrimental to their image, which they would like to change, according to one of my interlocutors.

In the next chapter I will discuss the findings of my research in the light of the theoretical framework. Then I will present my conclusion and answer my research questions.

Chapter 6 Discussion

In this thesis I aimed to examine the implementation of peacebuilding in Kosovo through the eyes of international actors working in the country. I have presented literature reviews of ethnic conflicts, peacebuilding, and the historical background of both the Balkans and former Yugoslavia in relation to Kosovo. Furthermore, I have introduced how the scene was in Kosovo prior to the war in 1999, and the way the international community approached the situation both during and after the war. In addition, I have presented the methodological approach to the study and the findings from interviews with international actors in Kosovo.

The war in Kosovo was characterized by factors that Kaldor (2007) has pointed out, such as, for instance, fear and hate caused by politicians, power vacuum, and nationalism (see also Jansen, 2008; Anscombe, 2006; Wolff, 2003; Behnke, 2002). To build up peace again in Kosovo after the war, the international community applied the most frequently used peace approach in the 21st century, namely peacebuilding (Søbjerg, 2006).

One of the tools within peacebuilding, which international actors have been using since the end of the Cold War, in order to build peace in post-war countries, is to establish democracy with strong institutions (Paris, 2004). Although not everyone believes in this method, Reychler (2001) has claimed that a democratic environment is less likely to turn to violence than a non-democratic society, and according to Ponzio (2007), the UN missions, which use the democratic approach, have been the most successful ones, which he points out is evidenced going as far back as to the end of the Cold War. However, Horowitz (1985) has pointed out that when there is a change in regime, like, for instance, when democracy is established, the situation can be difficult, and even violent, at the beginning of the process. Especially if the society had allowed discrimination and other elements that made one group dominate the others. With the transformation, problems that need to be solved can reach the surface.

The peacebuilding mission in Kosovo aims at establishing democracy, like Latawski and Smith (2003) claimed, and those who I interviewed work with that in mind, by establishing strong institutions and securing the environment. Reducing the risk of conflict is an important factor, especially when there is ethnic inequality within the state (Burton, 1997). There have been some setbacks and violence in the north of Kosovo, close to the Serbian borders post-conflict 1999. Perhaps this has been because of the democratic transformation and unresolved

problems that are reaching the surface, as Horowitz (1995) has pointed out can happen. However, the international actors I interviewed only try to make the environment in the north of Kosovo secure and are not involved in trying to find out the roots of the problem to eliminate it. Kosovo has been through changes of regime before, where the problems that reached the surface were not resolved, which has led to more conflicts (Nečak, 1995; Janjić, 1995; Vojnić, 1995). With this knowledge of former Kosovo history in mind, one would expect that the international actors in Kosovo would make use of this knowledge, while attempting to build peace for the future. Especially, as Gallagher (2005) and Wolff (2003) have stated, that since the problems between the ethnic groups, both during the Ottoman period and during the times of former Yugoslavia were never reflected on they, therefore, have affected the identity shaping and caused more violence later on.

The international actors try to identify where the need is in Kosovo by operating according to strategies. For the most case, the strategies in use in Kosovo are linked to a higher authority, which makes all the decisions. Those strategies are then linked to, for example, a global strategy, the Country Team Strategy, the donor, or the government of Kosovo, sometimes even many at the same time. It is evident that the strategies used in Kosovo are not tailored to Kosovo's needs, nor do local counterparts share in the decision-making; this, however, is recommended to be able to analyze and better prioritize the needs, as well as for operations to be successful (Truger, 2001; European Parliament, 2010; Ponzio, 2007). I only heard of one strategy-making that was completely made inside Kosovo and by the locals. Others seemed to be, in most cases, copy/paste from the Western countries and the EU, a tool that international actors sometimes use (Gurr, 2001). However, all the interlocutors claimed that the strategies were made with Kosovo's best interest in mind, although the strategies are supposed to ensure, for instance, that "European best practice" is upheld.

Each of my interlocutors claimed that the organization they work for is specialized, and focusses on specific areas of work within their projects. In most cases, the expertise of the locals is not used nor are they kept involved, when projects are developed or chosen. If the international actors have a local project manager they use them for a project, whenever suitable. According to my interlocutors, the international community emphasizes the project they believe to be the best way to reach their ultimate goal, that of building peace and security. Most of the international actors aim for a better trained people, who work in the public sectors, mostly concerning law and order, and security. The purpose is to train the locals to take over the project, but not really to have them involved in any other way. That

does not favor local ownership or bottom up approaches, which is one of the best ways to meet the needs of the country and get to the roots of the problem (Boulding, 2001; Eguren, 2001; Richmond & Carey, 2005; Rothstein, 1999; Paris, 2004).

The lack of strategic coherence, evaluation, and communication, amongst the international actors is quite alarming. Lack of overall strategic coherence could be one of the reasons for weak performance of the international actors. My interlocutors thought that progress in Kosovo was slow and success is lacking. For instance, too many gaps needed more work and some even said there was too much corruption in the governance. There also seemed to be a gap between strategic planning and multifunctional implementation. Like some of my interlocutors said, it is one thing to make a new law, the difficult part is to implement the law into the institutions. Tidewell (1998) has pointed out that for changes to be made and be believable they need to be implemented into the institutions, where the group's rights are protected and basic human needs are satisfied. That does not always seem to be the case in Kosovo. Strong institutions are important within states with ethnic inequality to avoid conflicts in the future (Burton, 1997).

There seems to be a lack of monitoring and measuring the success of a project and a lack of a specific time line and of an exit strategy, which is an important factor when building peace (Tschirgi, 2004). The outcome may be visible, like, for example, a school building or a park; however, there seems to be less concern about the overall effect of a project through the community and not much will to evaluate it. Measuring progress in a conflict environment is a way to evaluate outcomes and making it possible to trace progress across phases. This makes it possible to trace gradual change of the operation, judge if the outcome is positive, single out the role of cooperation and integration in the convergence of many aspects to produce outcome and provide the project with the necessary tools (Tschirgi, 2004). Most of my interlocutors believed that it is difficult to measure or evaluate projects in the short term, the real changes can, according to some of my interlocutors, only be seen in the long run. However, if the project is not worked the right way, from the beginning, there may not be any results to be seen in the long run. As a result it can affect the success of the projects.

There seemed to be limited communication and cooperation amongst the international actors, for instance, calling meetings to discuss problems and taking action as soon as a decision has been reached. Not everyone I interviewed believed there is a need for this, as most of them are very specialized and there does not seem to be much duplication or overlap, as some of my

interlocutors put it. One of the crucial parts of a successful peacebuilding process is that all the actors involved know their role and communicate with each other (Anderlini, 2000; Biersteker, 2007; Søbjerg, 2006). The peacebuilding regime in Kosovo reflects a lack of cooperation and coordination among actors, most of them seem to focus only on their own projects. My interlocutors did not even agree on how much they communicate or cooperate with each other. According to some of them, there is some effort in progress with organizations within the UN to cooperate more with each other. That, however, does not include cooperation between various organizations, working within the same sector.

Awareness has been raised about different issues and the projects, so as to avoid demonstrations, misunderstandings, and to keep the locals informed. The most common way of awareness-raising is via the internet, which the majority of the people in Kosovo may not even have access to. So who are the information for, the locals or the politicians in Kosovo? According to my interlocutors, the locals, who can appreciate the international actors' stay, are those who benefit the most.

One may wonder if this is for Kosovo's best interest, or if the EU and Westerners' ways are being forced onto Kosovo? Many of my interlocutors were preoccupied with the EU and good governance and believed that what is done aims at helping Kosovo to integrate into the EU, even though Kosovo is not a recognized independent country and can therefore not apply for the EU. One has to wonder then whose interests are being served. Is it just to prevent conflict from escalating again in the future and have the spillover effect, which has increased since the end of the Cold War (Paris, 2004; Philpott, 2010; Tschirgi, 2004). One of my interlocutors even accused the government in Kosovo of following in the footsteps of the international community at the expense of human rights. Going back to the end of World War II, human rights are supposed to be one of the characteristics of operations, with the UN as one of the key actors, when it comes to humanitarian issues (Kaldor, 2005; Richmond, 2002).

During my fieldwork I was told about rumors; one was that the EU would make Serbia recognize Kosovo to be able to join the EU. I then saw a news article where the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, told Serbia that it must normalize ties with Kosovo if it wanted to join the EU. The Serbian President, Boris Tadic, responded that Serbia did not intend to bring a new conflict into the EU (BBC News, 2011). The other rumor is about the mines in north Mitrovica, mineral resources that can lead to conflicts (Caselli & Coleman, 2006). Perhaps big powers are once again trying to decide the future for the Kosovo people as to how to make

peace between Serbia and Kosovo, as some of my interlocutors claimed. But, what if it is true, as Gallagher (2005) has mentioned, that the interference of big powers in the Balkans can lead to new problems. Hopefully the international community will solve problems that arise between the ethnic groups in Kosovo, thus preventing further conflicts, so the ethnic groups in Kosovo can live together and not separated.

When conflict has ended, reconciliation plays an important role in reforming an unequal and unjust society, in order to diminish the probability of conflicts in the future. Both Bar-Tal (2007) and Rouhana (2001) have claimed that it is important for the ethnic groups in conflict to get to know each other, and understand what happened, in order to be able to reduce the anger and fear. This can be accomplished, for instance, by communication between everyone involved in the society and by creating new symbols. My interlocutors were all concerned about the separation that still exists in Kosovo, post-conflict 1999, and about the lack of interaction between the ethnic groups.

Some of my interlocutors have created space for dialogue between the ethnic groups, in order to raise awareness about different issues. This they have done through a special radiobroadcast and meetings; pointing out that minority rights are even in the constitution, the government is doing their best, according to my interlocutors. Still there is little effort towards reconciliation, so I am not convinced that the effort towards getting the ethnic groups to communicate is working. The most effort seems to be towards creating the same balance between the ethnic groups as pre-conflict and towards bringing the ethnic-Serbs back safely to Kosovo, to the enclaves, where they live separate lives from the ethnic-Albanians (Latawski & Smith, 2003).

Although my interlocutors did not work in education, they emphasized the importance of a good education system. In Kosovo the system appears to function badly, separating the ethnic groups. Is this because the international actors have failed? Perhaps the focus has only been on ending the fighting, with no-one stopping to think about what is most important, namely the roots of the conflicts (Fouskas, 2007). This separation can slow down the peacebuilding process and even create problems in the future. Instead of bringing the ethnic groups together so that they can learn from an early age to interact, and be around each other and feel secure, they are held separate with invisible walls, as some of my interlocutors claimed. Even after the fight is over, the ethnic groups experience anger, hate, and other unsolved feelings, which can maintain group identity or uphold symbols from the past no matter if they are true or not.

The streets of Pristina reflect that following past wars where statues of Serbian heroes have been replaced by ones of Albanian heroes (Bar-Tal, 2007; Judah, 2008).

Smith (2000) and Eriksen (2002) have argued that each ethnic group is a community of members, who for instance, share common interests and identities. Furthermore, if for instance minority groups are discriminated against, nationalism can arise amongst them to maintain the minority identities. However, the ethnic-Serbs and ethnic-Albanians do not share the same identities or culture (Judah, 2008). Bar-Tal (2007) has pointed out that it can be necessary to create new identities or symbols, which can be different between ethnic groups, for instance, in order to make them feel more secure. These identities can even emerge from institutions as long as the identities are believable and fulfill the ethnic group's need for security after changes in political regime, for example (Smith, 2010). My interlocutors were trying to change the political culture in Kosovo by reducing corruption, strengthening institutions, and creating new identities and symbols. Although the Kosovo flag was created a few years ago, it seems not to be successful; perhaps the inhabitants do not relate to the flag or they need more time to adjust to it (Brown, 2001; Eriksen, 2002; Miall et al, 2004). As my interlocutors pointed out, social change can take a very long time.

However, among the ethnic groups, identities like religion and languages, which differ among the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, seem to be accepted in present time. These identities are a big part of group identity and discrimination against them can cause conflicts (Cohen, 1996; Gurr, 2001; Judah, 2008; Brown, 2001). One reason could be that the groups do not interact that much, so they do not come across it every day. As one of my interlocutor said, what would really happen if the ethnic groups would visit each other and communicate more? Would they then be so tolerant? Although identity factors like language or religion are important to the individuals of an ethnic group, they do not necessarily lead to conflict. Most of the present conflicts are rooted in nationalism and ethnic clashes, especially when factors such as dominance and historical differences clash (Varshney, 2003; Malcom, 1999). The international community should concentrate on these factors, not only trying to create new identities for the ethnic groups to share or secure environments.

Conclusions

The aim of this study was to examine the implementation of peacebuilding in Kosovo through the eyes of some international actors. I wanted to know how the international organizations operate and if the implementation of peacebuilding has been successful. To achieve this I interviewed eleven international actors, in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, in Reykjavík, the capital of Iceland, and in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzigovina. These interviews gave me a view of what my interlocutors thought about the peacebuilding process in Kosovo and I combined that with the views of scholars.

Peacebuilding gained acceptance after the end of the Cold War, and is referred to as the third generation of peace operations. The difference from the former generations of peace operations is that peacebuilding gets involved with domestic affairs. In this way the international community can help the host country to strengthen the structure of the society by getting at the roots of the causes. It has even been pointed out that, with the right reaction, peacebuilding can prevent conflict from occurring in the future. Therefore, to ensure a high degree of success peacebuilding needs to be approached carefully. Implementing strong accountability measures for the peacebuilding regime as a whole will provide international actors both with a framework for their actions and a clear understanding of the consequences if they fail (Ponzio, 2007; Paris, 2004; Tschirgi, 2004; Woodrow & Chigas, 2008).

The term peacebuilding has been criticized for being too broad and confusing, and as a result it is not always clear what kind of operations can be defined as peacebuilding projects (Philpott, 2010). One of my interlocutors even doubted that his organization was working in accordance with peacebuilding terms, even though the projects they were working on could be defined in such a way. In addition, getting involved with domestic affairs, as peacebuilding does, is relatively new for the international community, and perhaps more time is needed to adjust and more studies needed to learn from the existing peacebuilding efforts. As Lederach (1997) has argued, it can take people at least as long to get out of a conflict as it does to get into one. With regard to the history and the relationship between ethnic-Serbs and ethnic-Albanians, the peacebuilding process can last for a long time in Kosovo.

More than a dozen peacebuilding operations have been operated since the 1990s and Kosovo is one of them. According to Paris most of these operations have failed, one reason is that the international community rushed in post-conflict with their own solutions to the problem

(Philpott, 2010). My interlocutors agreed with him and believed that the peacebuilding operation in Kosovo has failed in many ways and the implementation, for instance, regarding new laws, has not always been successful. However, not all of my interlocutors thought that using international solutions to the problem in Kosovo was the reason they have failed, in some ways, dealing with the situation.

The international organizations my interlocutors work for operate according to strategies. When it comes to strategy making and process evaluation my research indicates that the international peacebuilding in Kosovo has made the same failure as Spurk (2008) has pointed out. There is lack of communication, lack of measurements and clear goals in the beginning of a project, there is in place an explicit intervention strategy and in most cases there is no clear exit strategy. It also appears that foreign powers are implementing their own believes about how a stable and peaceful environment is most successful, without actually getting into the real causes of the conflict. There appears to be little effort or a lack of success in creating multi-ethnic democracy, as the ethnic groups still live separate lives. My interlocutors believed that these factors can slow down the peacebuilding process in Kosovo. This can only mean that the peacebuilding process in Kosovo is not as successful as it could be.

Nevertheless, there are some positive factors. Kosovo has not reverted back to warfare, which often happens within the first five years after a conflict has stopped, and international actors seem to be implementing a democratic society, which is more likely to stay out of conflict by strengthening the institutions (Biersteker, 2007; Ponzo, 2007). Lederach (1997), Ruecker (2000), and Søbjerg (2006) have claimed that the overall aim of peacebuilding is to rebuild and reconstruct governance structures and institutions, create security, establish law and order, assist refugees, assist and make strategy plans, facilitate transitional justice systems, and to stimulate political discussions, all of which seems to be the aim of my interlocutors as well. However, without a clear mission to reach the ultimate goal these measures become difficult to achieve (European Parliament, 2010).

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