



The Success and Failure of Humanitarian Intervention

From the end of the Cold War to the War on Terror

Jón Michael Þórarinnsson

Lokaverkefni til BA-gráðu í stjórnmálafræði

Félagsvísindasvið

Júní 2013



HÁSKÓLI ÍSLANDS

The Success and Failure in Humanitarian Intervention

From the end of the Cold War to the War on Terror

Jón Michael Þórarinnsson

Lokaverkefni til BA-gráðu í stjórnmálafræði

Leiðbeinandi: Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir

Stjórnmálafræðideild

Félagsvísindasvið Háskóla Íslands

Júní 2013

Ritgerð þessi er lokaverkefni til BA-gráðu í stjórnmálafræði og er óheimilt að afrita ritgerðina á nokkurn hátt nema með leyfi rétthafa.

© Jón Michael Þórarinsson 2013
091273-3149

Reykjavík, Ísland 2013

Útdráttur

Þessi ritgerð fjallar um þá velgengni og þau mistök sem hafa átt sér stað í íhlutun af mannúðarástæðum með sérstöku tilliti til Operation Provide Comfort sem átti sér stað á árunum 1991 til 1996 í norður Írak og því hjálparstarfi sem hefur átt sér stað í Afghanistan frá innrás Bandaríkjanna 2001. Verkefni íhlutananna tveggja var að taka hvor í sínu lagi á mjög svipuðum aðstæðum. Tryggja þurfti öryggi fórnarlamba langvarandi stríðsátaka jafnframt því að veita þeim verulega neyðaraðstoð þar sem aðgangur að nauðsynjavörum var vægast sagt lélegur. Samstarfsmisbrestir milli þeirra aðila sem hafa undanfarin ár tekið þátt í mannúðaríhlutuninni í Afghanistan kalla eftir svari við spurningunni „hverjir eru framtíðarmöguleikar vopnaðra og óvopnaðra neyðaraðstoðar aðila á samvinnu og samlífi við vinnu sína á átakssvæðum?“ Með því að bera saman tilfellin tvö er stefnt að því læra af velgengni jafnt sem mistökum þeim sem gerð hafa verið í íhlutun af mannúðarástæðum með því að líta á hvert tilvik fyrir sig með aðstoð fjögurra fræðilegra nálgana. Fræðilegu nálganirnar fjórar eru kenningar í alþjóðastjórnámálum, siðfræði, alþjóðalög og velgengni hvers verkefnis fyrir sig. Hvert þessara fræðilegu hjálpartækja hjálpar þannig við að búa til heildstæða mynd af þeim áhrifum sem lágu að baki velgengni og mistökum í tilfellunum tveim.

Niðurstöður sýna að það er ekki einungis hægt að finna ásættanlega nálgun að samstarfi vopnaðra og óvopnaðar þátttakenda í íhlutun af mannúðarástæðum heldur er það ljóst að slíkt samstarf er að mörgu leiti nauðsynlegt. Flest undirstöðuatriðin fyrir vel heppnað samstarf ólíkra aðila á átakasvæðum er að finna í Operation Provide Comfort tilfellinu. Slæm áhrif pólitískrar eiginhagsmunagæslu einstakra ríka er þó að finna í báðum tilfellunum og „Stríðið á hendur hryðjuverkum“ virðist hafa gert hinum ýmsu þátttakendum í íhlutun af mannúðarástæðum erfitt fyrri að þjóna hlutverki sínu í stríðshrjáðu umhverfi.

Abstract

This thesis examines the successes and failures of humanitarian intervention in the cases of Operation Provide Comfort in northern-Iraq which lasted from 1991 to 1996 and the post-Taliban regime humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan, which started in 2001 and is still ongoing. The challenges of each intervention in turn were similar. With the victims of war in each case needing to feel secure in their homes, while at the same time requiring aid in areas suffering from extended periods of conflict and lack of access to basic needs. The recent failures of cooperation of the various actors engaged in humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan pose the research question: “is there a way for forcible and non-forcible humanitarian actors to coexist and cooperate in a humanitarian environment?”. By comparing the two cases presented in this thesis, lessons are learned by looking at each scenario through the focus of each of the four different theoretical approaches presented herein. They are international relations theory, ethics, legality and success of mission. Each theoretical factor is analyzed with regards to each of the two cases, in order to draw forth elements of success and failure and their possible effects on the future of humanitarian intervention.

Results show that there is indeed, not only a way forward for the cooperation of armed and un-armed actors in humanitarian intervention, but also a dire need for those actors to coexist. Most of the guidelines for successful cooperation can be found in the success of northern-Iraq. Self interested politics of the different states did however have an adverse affect on both cases and the War on Terror seems to have distorted the function of the different humanitarian actors almost irreparably.

Formáli

Þessi ritgerð er lokaverkefni mitt til BA prófs í stjórnmálafræði við Háskóla Íslands og er hún metin til 12 eininga (ECTS) af 180 eininga grunnnámi. Leiðbeinandi minn var Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir og er ég henni afar þakklátur fyrir frábæra leiðsögn og gott samstarf við vinnslu ritgerðarinnar. Einnig vil ég þakka Valgerði Snæland Jónsdóttur, Sigrúnu Ernu Geirsdóttur og Jónatan Þór Halldórssyni fyrir yfirlestur ritgerðarinnar, hvatningu þeirra og stuðning. Að lokum vil ég þakka Þóri Guðmundssyni, sviðsstjóra hjálparstafssviðs hjá Rauð kross Íslands, fyrir að vekja athygli mína á umræðuefninu og vísa mér á mikið magn upplýsinga varðandi þau vandamál sem alþjóðlegt hjálparsamstarf stendur frammi fyrir.

Table of Contents

Abstract	4
Formáli	5
Introduction	7
1. Theoretical approach	9
1.1 International relations theory	9
1.2 Ethics	14
1.3 Legality	16
1.4 Success of mission	18
2. Case study	20
2.1 Northern Iraq - Operation Provide Comfort	20
2.2 Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom	24
3. Findings	29
Conclusion	34
Bibliography	36

Introduction

Free and independent media outlets along with the World Wide Web have imposed upon people all over the world, knowledge and understanding of human suffering in all its forms at the push of a button. Authoritarian states face an increasing multitude of problems trying to coerce minorities or those out of favor with the government, whose cries for help can be heard throughout this “new world” of true global interconnectedness. Responding to the demands of their people, liberal democratic governments can no longer stand idly by without a damned good reason while other states commit atrocities upon their own people. Due to the end of the Cold War and as a result of an ever more globalized world order, the ideals of liberal democracies and advances in human rights allowed for the militarized application of humanitarian intervention. Some call the 1990’s the “golden age” of humanitarian intervention. Whether that is truly the case or whether humanitarian intervention is still going through the initial stages of its development remains to be seen. In the mean time it is quite clear that the application of humanitarian interventions is far from perfect and lessons need to be learned from past failures and successes.

This thesis addresses the concept of humanitarian intervention as a collaborative effort of state, UN and non-governmental actors attempting to protect and give aid to foreign nationals from man-made violence. This thesis is an attempt to answer the question: “Is there a way for forcible and non-forcible humanitarian actors to coexist and cooperate in a humanitarian environment?” Two cases of humanitarian intervention were chosen in an effort to answer the research question. At the dawn of the “golden age” of humanitarian intervention Operation Provide Comfort was mostly successful in providing aid to refugee Kurds in northern-Iraq through the cooperation of a military coalition on the one hand, and UN and non-governmental aid agencies on the other. A decade later Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the resulting humanitarian intervention was mostly unsuccessful in doing the same. Whether it was the interference of the War on Terror or if other factors were at play, the cooperation of the different humanitarian actors seems to have led the whole intervention in Afghanistan astray. The fact remains that the ongoing intervention in Afghanistan seems at present day to be doomed to suffer the branding of ‘failure’.

Four theoretical building blocks are used in order to illustrate the reasons behind the success and failure of cooperation in each intervention in turn. These are international relations theory, ethics, legality and success of mission. ‘International relations theories’ allow for the explanation of state actions. The question of ‘ethics’ demonstrates the need for a consensus on

the values adopted within the intervening forces, as well as the need for a broader consensus between those engaged in a long term intervention and the recipients of humanitarian assistance. Through the question of ‘legality’ this thesis examines whether or not states should continue to engage in humanitarian intervention, while the question of ‘success of mission’ portrays whether or not the approaches adopted by the intervening actors are truly applicable for future cooperation in humanitarian interventions.

The conclusion shows that there is indeed not only a way forward for the cooperation of armed and un-armed actors in humanitarian interventions, but also a dire need for those actors to coexist. Self interested state-politics had an adverse affect on both cases presented in this thesis, but the way forward is found in a clearer mandate for each of the actors involved.

This thesis is a bibliographic research paper. Most of the dominant sources used herein consist of books on international relations or those directly relevant to the subject matter. Additionally, peer-reviewed articles published in scientific journals and internet information published by the various aid organizations were used in order to grasp a deeper understanding of the issues at hand. The structure of this thesis is as follows; the next chapter presents four theoretical building blocks used in order to develop a clearer understanding of the successes and failures of humanitarian intervention. In the second chapter two cases of humanitarian intervention are brought to light and in the final chapter the theoretical framework is used to examine the reasons behind those successes and failures. At the very end a conclusion is drawn.

1. Theoretical approach

The decision of meddling in other states' business through some form of intervention should not be taken lightly nor should elements taken into consideration be simplified. However, some of the sources used in this thesis use various derivative theories of general theories. In order to accommodate the short frame of this thesis all these different variations will be put under the same hat of their "parent" theories. Two of the four building blocks used herein, international relations theories and ethics, will therefore endure a somewhat simplified approach. The other two, legality and success of mission, need no such special consideration.

The international relations part is based on the two opposing grand theories on international relations, namely realism and liberalism. For the sake of simplification, realist theories, in this thesis, encompass not only classical realism but also derivative approaches such as structural-realism and pluralism. These in turn describe developments made on the realist point of view relevant to the subject matter. The derivative developments directly related to the liberal point of view, and relevant to this thesis are, liberal-institutionalism, idealism, humanitarianism and solidarism. These three as well as the classical approach will hereafter be referred to as liberal theories.

Sufficient for this thesis and the most applicable opposite approaches to ethics are those of moral-relativism and the opposite approach moral-absolutism. The derivative theories, such as moral-pluralism for moral-relativism and utilitarianism, moral-absolutism and others for moral-universalism, will therefore, for the sake of simplification, be referred to by the name of their "parent" theories.

The two main themes of legality are the opposing viewpoints of restrictionism and counter-restrictionism. The advent of liberal-cosmopolitanism has presented the third and perhaps the most important advocate to the legal debate of humanitarian intervention.

The narrative for success of mission used in this thesis is derived from the book, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: the Conditions for Success and Failure* written in 2007 by Taylor B. Sayblot.

1.1 International relations theory

The realist approach to humanitarian intervention is based upon the core tenets of realism, namely statism, survival and self-help. According to realist theories the state is the sole legitimate representative of the people it represents and is therefore the only institution that should be allowed to demonstrate authority over the people of any given state. As a result of

this realist view of the state, statism has a major impact on the way realists think of the international arena. According to realist theories international politics is based on a state of constant anarchy where each and every country only recognizes itself as the highest authority given the lack of any real sort of “world government”. It is therefore each state’s highest duty to ensure its own survival, which in this overwhelming state of anarchy is far from assured. In this race for survival the highest goals are those of increased power, respective to other states, and all the various national interests of each state. As a result of the first two realist principles self-help ensues where each state actor is constantly preoccupied with its own security and well-being and should never trust other actors, whether they be other states or international institutions, to help in the pursuit of its own well-being.^{1,2}

The tenets of realist theory crystallize the realist case and arguments against the feasibility of humanitarian intervention. It is generally not in the best interests of any sovereign state to interfere in the affairs of any other state. Sacrificing resources, soldiers and security for the sole purpose of allegedly helping out citizens of another state is therefore not a part of the self-interested agenda of any sovereign state. Any instance of humanitarian intervention according to realists is thus just a hoax or some form of deception brought about by ulterior motives on behalf of the intervening state.^{3,4} The intervening actor or actors are thusly disingenuous in their humanitarian efforts unless the intervention should serve some clear interest that they might hold as dearly as their possible calculated losses. Another realist argument against the application of humanitarian intervention is based on the statism element. Realist theories argue that governments cannot claim the moral right to sacrifice their own citizens in order to deal with the suffering of other nation’s citizens. If then a breakdown of the political structure of any given nation has occurred it is the duty of that state’s citizens, and in particular that states political leaders, to deal with the mess on their own.^{5,6}

These national interests become self evident in historical examples such as Hitler’s claim that an invasion into Czechoslovakia, at the start of the Second World War, was necessary for the

¹ Dunne, Tim, Brian C. Schimdt. 2008. “Realism” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 92-93.

² Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 527-528.

³ Dunne, Tim, Brian C. Schimdt. 2008. “Realism” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 92-93.

⁴ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 527-528.

⁵ Dunne, Tim, Brian C. Schimdt. 2008. “Realism” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 92-93.

⁶ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 527-528.

continued survival of the German speaking population within that country's borders. The lack of an unbiased supra-national institution, from the realist perspective, gives more powerful states an opportunity to take part or initiate humanitarian actions as a cover for other national interests. In this context realist theories even propose that any sort of legalizing of humanitarian interventions would not only weaken the idea of sovereignty but mainly support stronger nations in their efforts to meddle in the affairs of less powerful ones under the guise of "righteous" intervention. Realist theories therefore argue that selectivity determines each state's will to participate in humanitarian intervention. This becomes clear in similar situations where similar moral determinants should carry similar decision making processes but instead result in unequal approaches. An example of this is a comparison of states' actions in the cases of Kosovo and Darfur. Under the flag of NATO western powers united to tackle problems in their own back yard during the dissolution of former Yugoslavia but completely neglected a much more dire, although politically and morally similar situation, in far away Darfur province.^{7,8}

Closely knitted to realism's anarchistic view of the world stage, yet another factor emerges as an argument against humanitarian intervention. Realist theories advocate that since self-interests dominate the international sphere there is no real consensus on when to engage in humanitarian intervention. The possible morals and values that each actor proposes as the reasons for any kind of intervention vary greatly. This absence of agreement on what state of human suffering is a necessary catalyst for intervention might lead to stronger states attempting to impose their morals and values upon weaker ones.⁹

The undisputed contenders to realist approaches in international relations are liberal theories. Liberal theories have in a way brought their domestic approaches to governance and adopted them to the international sphere. The liberal approach is at its most basic a fourfold guide to the freedoms of the individual. These four tenets are in a way not only a description of the necessary elements of liberal-democracy, but also make the core assumption that democracy is the leading way of governance. The first tenet describes the rights to education, access to free press and religious tolerance. The second one states that any legislative authority is subordinate to its citizens and must under no circumstance abuse their rights. The last two

⁷ Dunne, Tim, Brian C. Schimdt. 2008. "Realism" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 92-93.

⁸ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. "Humanitarian intervention in world politics" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 527-528.

⁹ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. "Humanitarian intervention in world politics" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 527-528.

tenets describe the importance liberal theories place on commerce and ownership. The third tenet places ownership of property as the core feature of liberty, and lastly the fourth tenet describes the importance of a free market separate from government control.¹⁰

These basic principles often put liberal theory at odds with itself. Liberal theories tend to debate between the rights to own property, free of institutional involvement, or everyone's right to equality, supported by strong institutions. When it comes to international relations, liberal theorists have through the centuries embraced the idea of institutions being the essential component to harmonious human existence. Although liberals have on numerous occasions through history proposed the establishment of a supra-national government in the hope of creating 'perpetual peace', this does in no way imply liberal democracies are less aggressive towards those states that do not embrace the liberal democratic approach as their form of governance.¹¹

In the era of an increasingly globalized world the four liberal tenets of, equality in the eyes of the law, democratic governance, liberty and a free market have survived by the development of international institutions. The institutions in question however have been subject to various degrees of longevity and success, in promoting those liberal guidelines. The lack of the more powerful nation's willingness to participate in the League of Nations proved to be that experiments downfall and realist self-interest continued to dominate the international arena. With the advent of the Cold War that followed the Second World War, the UN experiment seemed for a long time to be going nowhere in the promotion of liberal ideals. The increased development of cooperative multinational agencies and other associations, within and apart from the UN system, has however led to the cost of disengaging in international cooperation to be higher than actual participation, for most nations, resulting in the increase in worldwide interconnectedness. Liberal theory has in this light been able to successfully promote liberal democracy and "westernized" human rights as the most successful way of governance. The strong commitment of those scholars and politicians that advocate liberal theories in an increasingly globalized world has paid off in the post Cold-War era. The United Nations charter has limited the power of realist idea of sovereignty and various advances in the development of international human rights agreements have led to the strengthening of the liberal world view. Other liberal non-governmental actors such as Amnesty International have

¹⁰ Dunne, Tim. 2008. "Liberalism" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 110.

¹¹ Dunne, Tim. 2008. "Liberalism" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 111-113.

also done their part in promoting the liberal “global society”. The global society envisioned by early liberal thinkers is no longer a simple question of collective security but often times a question of the use of intervention to promote liberal ideals, with human rights and democracy at the forefront, for all of humankind.¹²

The promotion of liberal institutions and regimes, with all their principles, regulations and procedures, has led to increased cooperation between states as well as non-state actors. Human rights conventions and the increase in humanitarian bodies of law being drawn up have not only prompted an increase in non-state actors on the humanitarian arena but also solidified the United Nations and other intergovernmental institutions role as the authoritative assemblies when it comes to humanitarian intervention.¹³

In the light of the fact that liberal theories are the prime advocate for the importance of humanitarian intervention it is interesting to note that even liberal scholars have pointed out an objection to intervention as well as the fact that liberal intervention strategies have at times turned out be nothing short of imperialism in disguise. According to the liberal tenets mentioned earlier, states are the products of the informed consent of their peoples. This leads liberal theories to argue that the only way a country can achieve democracy is from within and that any attempt to pressure democratic and human rights change from without is bound for failure either sooner or later. This would lead any attempt at humanitarian intervention to require permanent action lest the lack of liberal perspective persists unchanged after the intervention desists. US foreign policy during the Bush administration is a prime example of imperialism in the guise of liberal intervention. State security and the advancement of free markets are easily promoted through some sort of expansion by means of liberal humanitarian intervention. That being said, it might be important to remember that most international institutions and regimes suffer from a colossal democratic deficit and the best example of this are the five permanent veto seats in the UN Security Council (UNSC).^{14,15}

¹² Dunne, Tim. 2008. “Liberalism” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 114-119.

¹³ Weiss, Thomas G., and Cindy Collins. 1996. *Humanitarian Challenges And Intervention: World Politics And The Dilemmas Of Help (Dilemmas in World Politics)*. Oxford: Westview Press, 15.

¹⁴ Dunne, Tim. 2008. “Liberalism” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 118.

¹⁵ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 528.

1.2 Ethics

Given the obvious that any form of intervention is always a case of an effort made by foreigners, the question of the applicability of global ethics becomes increasingly important. Fortunately there is an ongoing debate, between those that favor moral-universalism and those that adhere to moral-relativism, on exactly that issue. The underlying question between the two camps begs the question whether or not there are any common underlying moral values between peoples of different states or if values and norms differ from one place to the next. That being said, as with most human endeavors, especially those conducted across cultural boundaries, there is no realistic scenario where one should feel pressured to adhere to only one set of the rules suggested at the get go.¹⁶

Moral-relativists argue that moral values are simply the norms and customs of any given society wherever they may be, not only on the planet but with concern for various historic contexts as well. As such the view of moral-relativists clearly undermines the very idea of there being any room for global ethics. Moral diversity in different places over different time periods, according to relativists, clearly demonstrates that there is no one golden set of moral values or rules apart from those developed by all the different human societies and cultures. An example of this would be the question of torture and whether torture could ever be justified. Some believe that torture can never be justifiable and others believe that given the right circumstance, for example terrorist attack being carried out unless the right intelligence is procured, torture would be absolutely justifiable. Moral-relativists claim that such examples clearly exclude the possibility of there being any universal morality or any universal set of values to speak of at all.¹⁷

If this assertion of moral-relativists holds, then norms and values are in no way comparable from one culture to the next. This assertion leads to the realization that no set of cultural values is better than any other. It does however leave any group of people stuck within the values framework they are born into and gives little leeway for other cultures to introduce different values into foreign societies. On the other hand this attitude towards values and morals does present an alluring amount of tolerance between societies.¹⁸

The lack of universal values proposed by the relativist model does however leave a huge gap of applicability in the modern globalized world. The fact that ethics revolves around the idea

¹⁶ Widdows, Heather. 2011. *Global Ethics: An Introduction*. Durham: Acumen Publishing, 31-32.

¹⁷ Widdows, Heather. 2011. *Global Ethics: An Introduction*. Durham: Acumen Publishing, 31-34.

¹⁸ Widdows, Heather. 2011. *Global Ethics: An Introduction*. Durham: Acumen Publishing, 33-34

of right and wrong seems to fade into an essentially pluralistic world in the eyes of a relativist, where different approaches to values need not be argued or discussed at all. This might make moral-relativists almost skeptics when it comes to questions of morality of actual actions in the international arena and thereby making their point of view redundant. It does however still leave moral-relativism on the opposite side of interventions based on the moral values of any intervening forces or organizations.¹⁹

The opposing ethical claim is that of moral-universalism. Moral-universalists believe that at the very least some values and norms that are found to be common across cultural boundaries. Although these common morals might even be approached slightly differently by various human societies, universalists also adhere to the view that there is plenty of space for dialogue on ethical values and morals between different cultures. Moral-universalists also claim that even though cultural differences do exist, that alone does not guarantee that both sides are correct in their adopted morals or norms. An example of this often used by universalists is that of the creationist versus the evolutionist view of human history and development, especially in light of modern research and evidence to support the evolutionist viewpoint.²⁰

Moral-universalists propose several arguments against the relativist approach. One such universalist argument is that relativists fail to realize the difference between values and customs. Customs might vary greatly from one society to another even though the underlying morals might be practically the same. An example would be the difference in funeral arrangements from one society to the next, the honoring of the dead being the underlying moral value. Another universalist argument is the question of moral change, since feelings and attitudes have historically proven themselves to be the catalysts for change of the cultural norms. Relativists claim that one set of moral rules is just as good as the next, that right and wrong must be accompanied by geographical and historical norms.²¹ If that were the case then what becomes of instances such as the American colonials that eventually stopped using the double-standards, applied to the once separate cultures of colonials versus natives and slaves, appealing instead to some sort of common humanity, acknowledging common values and norms across cultures. The final universalist argument relevant to this thesis is the claim that moral-relativism might be obsolete given the state of interconnectedness in the modern world. The universalist view states that most civilizations on the planet have at one time or another

¹⁹ Widdows, Heather. 2011. *Global Ethics: An Introduction*. Durham: Acumen Publishing, 35-36.

²⁰ Widdows, Heather. 2011. *Global Ethics: An Introduction*. Durham: Acumen Publishing, 31-33, 37.

²¹ Widdows, Heather. 2011. *Global Ethics: An Introduction*. Durham: Acumen Publishing, 32, 38-40.

expressed their own ideas on what the world should be like. Intercultural communication on various values and norms is therefore already a reality and the human race in essence already shares some of its common values.²²

1.3 Legality

Just as with international relations theory and ethics, legal approaches offer arguments for and against humanitarian intervention. Much like international relations and ethics the issue of legality depends on the question of human rights on the one hand and issues of the state on the other coupled with international law, including several United Nations Charters and agreements. For this thesis however three, somewhat different approaches, should be considered.^{23,24}

The legal argument against humanitarian intervention is the view of restrictionists, that the UN Charter's ban on the use of force, except in self-defense or when the UN Security Council (UNSC) gives its authorization, should be adhered to at all times. Restrictionists essentially agree with moral-relativists in their world view of the multitude of diverse societies that do not share a common attitude towards rights and wrongs. Furthermore restrictionists are convinced that international rules make allowances for these differences to co-exist without interfering with or violating the rights of their neighbors. The rules that make allowances for this world view, restrictionists believe, are found within the legal ramifications of the UN Charter of 1945, specifically Article 51 which clearly states the ban on the use of force except in self-defense or as direct result of a resolution by the UNSC.^{25,26}

Restrictionists argue that if these international agreements were no longer to be used as the guiding light for international relations a state of utter anarchy would ensue seeing that nations would relentlessly attempt to pressure other nations into accepting their way of life and values as the only acceptable ways of statehood. Similarly to the realist arguments of Hitler's invasion into Czechoslovakia in 1939, restrictionists also fear that a concrete legalization of humanitarian intervention would lead to catastrophic abuse of such justifications. It is also the view of restrictionists that any kind of intervention legislation is

²² Widdows, Heather. 2011. *Global Ethics: An Introduction*. Durham: Acumen Publishing, 32, 38-40.

²³ Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. June 2006. "The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur." *Journal of Military Ethics* 5, no. 2, 145-146.

²⁴ Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. June 2006. "The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur." *Journal of Military Ethics* 5, no. 2, 146-147.

²⁵ Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. June 2006. "The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur." *Journal of Military Ethics* 5, no. 2, 146-147.

²⁶ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. "Humanitarian intervention in world politics" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 524.

utterly un-necessary, given that states have historically avoided legal humanitarian claims when engaging in war and instead referred to Security Council resolutions or Article 51 of the UN Charter.^{27,28}

The legal ramifications upheld by the counter-restrictionist camp is based upon the moral-universalist assumption that different societies have indeed come to an agreement on a variety of issues concerning human rights and values. Counter-restrictionists argue that it is the right of states, although not the duty, to uphold those morals and human rights, with intervention where and if necessary. Therefore counter-restrictionists argue in cases of gross human rights violations by governments, intervention is justified in light of international treaties and that human rights are under the protection of the UN Charter.^{29,30}

The counter-restrictionist argument of the importance of human rights is derived from Articles 1(3), 55 and 56 of the UN Charter which state the importance of universal protection of human rights wherever violation of said rights might be encountered. This importance is clearly written into article 1(3) as one of ultimate aims of the United Nations international institutions. In cases of humanitarian emergencies counter-restrictionists therefore argue that humanitarian interventions are exempt from the ban on the use of force stated in Article 51 of the Charter, in fact stating that human rights trump the need for sovereign security in the international system. Counter-restrictionists have also suggested that the UNSC severely lacks the capabilities to deal with humanitarian crisis and thus an exemption to the charter should be facilitated in order to allow individual states to intervene in such cases of their own accord.³¹ On the other hand another point of view also proposed by counter-restrictionists suggests that further treaties might not even be necessary at all. This argument claims that humanitarian intervention does not in any way abuse state rights described in Article 2(4) referring to territorial integrity, which has always been left intact post-intervention, and political independence, which survives intervention albeit sometimes adhering to different rules and ideals.³²

²⁷ Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. June 2006. "The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur." *Journal of Military Ethics* 5, no. 2, 146–147.

²⁸ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. "Humanitarian intervention in world politics" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 527.

²⁹ Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. June 2006. "The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur." *Journal of Military Ethics* 5, no. 2, 147.

³⁰ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. "Humanitarian intervention in world politics" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 524–526.

³¹ Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. June 2006 "The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur." *Journal of Military Ethics* 5, no. 2: 147.

³² Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. "Humanitarian intervention in world politics" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 524–526.

The final legal argument relevant to this thesis is the one proposed by liberal-cosmopolitanism which focuses on the irrefutable rights of the individual and differs from the counter-restrictionist argument by adding the duty of foreign actors to intervene in humanitarian crisis. The idea of statehood in the eyes of liberal-cosmopolitanism is one that is based around the duty to protect its citizens, failing to do so results in the loss of sovereignty. This liberal-cosmopolitan idea resulted in the document on “the responsibility to protect” adopted by the 2005 UN World Summit.^{33,34}

The responsibility to protect is based on a fourfold approach, the ‘just cause threshold’, the ‘precautionary principles’, a ‘right to authority’ and ‘operational principles’. The ‘just cause threshold’ allows for intervention to commence in order to ‘prevent large-scale loss of life’ or ‘large-scale ethnic cleansing’. The ‘precautionary principles’ demand that the intervening forces abide by the principles of an intervention having the ‘right intention’, which is to end human suffering and promote human rights and the principle of the intervention being a clear case of a ‘last resort’. The ‘precautionary principles’ also state that only ‘proportional means’ must be used and that there must be a ‘reasonable prospect’ that the intervention will have the desired effect. The ‘right authorities’ to promote humanitarian intervention are generally those of the United Nations, and mainly the Security Council which should address all such concerns promptly and without taking into account self-interests. And finally the ‘operational principles’ to be used must be clear cut, well coordinated, adequate to the task at hand and focused on the protection of the population, not the defeat of the state.^{35,36}

1.4 Success of mission

The ultimate aim of a humanitarian intervention is simply to save lives and success is therefore essentially to be calculated by the numbers of individuals saved compared to no intervention taking place at all. However, to determine how many lives have really been saved faces a multitude of problems in actual interventions scenarios where reliable data is often hard to come by. The “number of lives saved” is therefore more useful to the average

³³ Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. June 2006. “The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur.” *Journal of Military Ethics* 5, no. 2: 148.

³⁴ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 524-525.

³⁵ Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. June 2006. “The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur.” *Journal of Military Ethics* 5, no. 2: 147.

³⁶ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 524-526.

politician trying to justify her actions and decisions than any theoretical approach when it comes to determining the actual success of a humanitarian intervention.³⁷

When the decision has been made to actually take part in or carry out a humanitarian intervention, governments must decide between engaging the warring parties or assisting the victims of said humanitarian crisis. In attempting to accomplish their goals governments stand before four different strategies to humanitarian intervention. The first two of, ‘helping with the delivery of aid’ or the ‘protection of aid operations’ might be seen as defensive approaches. The other two possibilities require more offensive applications of military forces and focus on, ‘saving victims of conflict’ or ‘defeating the warring parties’. These four approaches must be used to various degrees in support of each other. The phrase “well fed dead” was accurately coined during the NATO intervention into Kosovo, where the allied forces managed the two defensive strategies but utterly failed to deliver on the offensive ones.³⁸

Using these four choices in unison allows the success or failure of a humanitarian intervention to be evaluated by three simple questions. The first is whether or not the intervention managed to properly address the cause of suffering by the victims involved. That is, where the victims needs met concerning food and shelter, etc? The second is whether victims and warring parties, were correctly, and proportionately, addressed. That is to say were the victims proportionately cared for in their greatest hour of need and where the warring parties correctly engaged and stopped before, for example, engaging in atrocities such as genocide. And the last question is whether or not the four strategies suggested above were effectively executed and integrated to accomplish the desired outcome of the intervention.³⁹

The next chapter addresses two very different cases of humanitarian interventions that will shed some light on the recent developments in humanitarian intervention. In the discussions chapter the four theoretical building blocks discussed here will then be used to analyze those two cases, shedding some light on the various factors that have resulted in the drastic decline in security for aid workers in recent years.⁴⁰

³⁷ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 30-34.

³⁸ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 39.

³⁹ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 43.

⁴⁰ Stoddard, Abby, Adele Harmer, and Morgan Hughes. December 2012. “Aid Worker Security Report 2012: Host States and Their Impact on Security for Humanitarian Operations.” Humanitarian Outcomes: 2.

2. Case study

The two cases presented in this thesis are those of the Kurdish crisis of 1991 in Northern-Iraq, resulting from the first Gulf War, and the still ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, resulting from the US War on Terror. At first glance these interventions might not seem applicable or even compatible. They were however chosen for the different kinds of impact they had on the nature of humanitarian intervention in general. More specifically they were chosen for the impact they had on the nature of the relationship between the various state and non-governmental actors, which have for the past two decades engaged in humanitarian interventions.

2.1 Northern Iraq - Operation Provide Comfort

Since the medieval ages a large population of people, calling themselves Kurds, has been living in the mountain regions of modern day Turkey, Northern-Iraq and Iran. In 1991 the Kurds numbered some 20-25 million people, 10-12 million living in Turkey, 5-6 million in Iran and somewhere between three and four million in Iraq. Nationalist movements of the Kurdish people began to emerge in the last two decades of the 20th century, and since then the Kurds have been making claims for an independent state, without success. These claims have been met with various degrees of resistance in the above mentioned countries, even to such extremes that during a part of the 20th century the Kurds were forbidden by law to speak their own language in Turkey and Iran. During the 1980's the Kurdish population in Iraq suffered greatly at the hands of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi government, mainly due to retaliatory tactics used by Hussein to punish the Kurds for their support of Iran during the Iraq-Iran war.⁴¹

During the first Gulf War in 1991 Kurdish Nationalist forces managed to make considerable advances against the Iraqi army in the northern part of Iraq.⁴² Apart from the nationalist agenda of the Kurds they had been encouraged by the USA to stage a rebellion against Saddam Hussein's regime in the north while Shiite forces were encouraged to do the same in the south. Despite Iraq's overwhelming defeat at the hands of Coalition Forces in Kuwait, where they lost around 200 thousand troops, most of their airpower and large amounts of war

⁴¹ Olson, Robert. September 1992. "The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes In..." *Third World Quarterly* 13, no. 3: 475-477.

⁴² Olson, Robert. September 1992. "The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes In..." *Third World Quarterly* 13, no. 3: 485.

supplies, the Iraqi military quickly managed to halt and push back the rebel forces. For the Shiites in the south this “fool’s errand”, even though encouraged by the US, got little or no support from Coalition Forces, and resulted in the Shiia population in southern Iraq suffering the wrath of Saddam Hussein for many years to come.^{43,44}

In Northern-Iraq the Kurds suffered even more dire action by the Iraqi forces. The Iraqi military even went so far as to threaten the use of poisonous gas, just as they had done in the 1980’s, to eliminate any remaining Kurds that refused to leave Iraq for good. The Iraqi military proceeded to advance into Kurdish towns and cities, killing some 20.000 Kurds and capturing an additional 100.000. As a result of that horrific statement and the advancing Iraqi forces a stampede of about one and half million Kurds rushed for the nearest borders all in a matter of only a few days. Just over a million Kurds hurried for the Iranian border while about 400.000 headed for the Turkish border.⁴⁵

The UNSC responded with Resolution 688. The aim of resolution 688 was not meant to stop the human rights violations carried out by the Iraqi forces per se. Instead it saw “the massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers... threaten international peace and security in the region.”⁴⁶ France, Britain and the USA started making plans to instigate “safe zones” for the Kurdish refugees. As a result Iran, for fear of those “safe zones” being forcefully created within their own borders, accepted over a million fleeing Kurds across their borders and with the help of the Iranian Red Crescent and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (which only handled logistics), set up temporary refugee camps. The supplies received by the Kurds in Iran were however insufficient and during the crisis about 23.000 of them died due to that fact.^{47,48}

The Turkish authorities on the other hand stopped the Kurdish refugees at their borders and refused them access and asylum. During the cold winter months of 1991 the Kurdish refugees started to die by the hundreds every single day in the mountainous region just outside the eastern borders of Turkey. Although initial media reports told the western public that about

⁴³ Olson, Robert. September 1992. “The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes In...” *Third World Quarterly* 13, no. 3: 485.

⁴⁴ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 47.

⁴⁵ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 47.

⁴⁶ Frelick, Bill. Spring 1997. “Unsafe Havens.” *Harvard International Review* 19, no. 2: 40.

⁴⁷ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 49.

⁴⁸ Olson, Robert. September 1992. “The Kurdish in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes In...” *Third World Quarterly* 13, no. 3: 475–499.

1000 Kurds were dying every day in the Iraqi mountains, it is now approximated that around 400 refugees died per day due to acute pneumonia and digestive diseases, before help finally arrived. And help did arrive, but only after two months of media frenzy over the situation, the US secretary of state, James Baker, visiting the refugees and Turkey calling to its NATO allies for help resolving the situation.⁴⁹

Claiming that they were within the scope of UN Resolution 688 French, British and US forces secured a “safe zone” in northern-Iraq. Politically this had two major impacts on the region. The Kurdish refugee “threat” to Turkey was avoided and the Iraqi authorities were seriously undermined by the NATO forces essentially sanctioning the creation of an autonomous region for a politicized as well as militarized Kurdish faction that was essentially hostile to the Iraqi regime. The operation, under various different names, lasted from April of 1991 to December of 1996 and was at the start hugely effective in providing much needed aid to the refugees. It did however go through various stages, which suffered various degrees of success, in the eventual attempt of bringing the Kurds back to their homes.^{50,51,52}

Before UN and non-governmental humanitarian aid agencies arrived in the mountains of the Turkish-Iraqi borders, NATO military personnel had already managed to supply the Kurdish refugees with basic nutrition, tents and blankets. In the first weeks after arriving on site military engineers even managed to set up proper sanitation facilities as well as giving the refugees access to clean water. When humanitarian aid agencies arrived at the refugee camps the military operation was very effective in working closely with non-governmental aid agencies, providing them with logistical assistance. This cooperation even managed to deliver more aid than the UNHCR throughout the crisis.⁵³

The idea of “safe zones” poses a certain contradiction to the ideological framework of the western liberal societies that took part in the operation. The individual freedoms that have long been held high by those western societies included them striving to ensure the right for anyone to leave their country of origin if they so desired. In an attempt to protect Turkey's interests, in this first humanitarian crisis after the Cold War, these same western societies,

⁴⁹ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 47-50.

⁵⁰ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 49-50.

⁵¹ Frelick, Bill. Spring 1997. “Unsafe Havens.” *Harvard International Review* 19, no. 2: 40.

⁵² Abell, Nazare Albuquerque. December 1996. “Politics, Migration and Intervention.” *Peace Review* 8, no. 4: 535.

⁵³ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 49-50.

reversed their rhetoric to that of “the right to remain”.⁵⁴ As a result the next step of the operation, after the refugee situation had been stabilized, the NATO forces proceeded to enlarge the “safe zone” pushing the Iraqi military back from the conquered Kurdish villages and cities, in order to get the refugees safely back to their homes.⁵⁵

In order to address the new agenda the military forces of Operation Provide Comfort quickly grew to around 15.000 heavily armed ground forces along with some 100 military aircraft, from eight countries. In light of overwhelming military superiority of the invading NATO forces both the Iraqi military and the Iraqi secret police withdrew without ever engaging the enemy. When the Kurdish cities of Zakho and Dahuk had been secured, Kurdish refugees from both the Iranian and Turkish border camps quickly returned to their homes. After the retreat of the Iraqi forces the Iraqi government signed a Memorandum of Understanding which allowed the UN to provide humanitarian assistance to Kurds and the NATO forces that had engaged in Operation Provide Comfort were replaced by a UN guard contingent (UNGCI). This in fact created a “de facto” Kurdish autonomous region in the northern part of Iraq, clearly without the consent of the Iraqi government.^{56,57}

The UNGCI was undermanned and disproportionally armed for the task at hand. However some 7000 NATO forces were stationed in Turkey as reserve and in order to maintain the no-fly zone over the Kurdish autonomous region. The UNGCI managed to act as a deterrent to bandits and other random attacks by Iraqi forces. They did however on several occasions retreat from their posts in the face of more serious violence and were ill prepared to protect non-governmental aid agencies working in the region. The UN refused to work towards legitimizing Kurdistan as a nation and even though the Kurds held general elections in 1992 various rival groups within the Kurdish population had started to fight amongst themselves by 1994. The political instability and the imposed embargo by the Iraqi government made it all the more difficult to rehabilitate the Kurdish people.⁵⁸

The initial phase of Operation Provide Comfort was as mentioned earlier hugely successful in providing much needed aid to those Kurdish refugees that found themselves in dire need of aid in the winter of 1991. At least some 7000 people were saved from dying of starvation,

⁵⁴ Abell, Nazare Albuquerque. December 1996. “Politics, Migration and Intervention.” *Peace Review* 8, no. 4: 535.

⁵⁵ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 50-51.

⁵⁶ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 50-51.

⁵⁷ Abell, Nazare Albuquerque. December 1996. “Politics, Migration and Intervention.” *Peace Review* 8, no. 4: 535.

⁵⁸ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 50-52.

exposure and disease. Even though it is harder to assess how many were saved by the protection afforded to them by the NATO forces it is safe to say that the “safe zone” created a much greater security to the Kurdish population than being stuck between the “two” hostile armies of Iraq and Turkey. That being said the UN “safe zone” and the NATO no-fly zone that was eventually created only covered about half of the region inhabited by the Kurds in Iraq and as mentioned before the UN troops of UNGCI were only partly successful in securing that area.⁵⁹

The safety the Kurds did enjoy, was not all-encompassing for other reasons as well. State interests of NATO nations played their part in killing the Kurds as well. Even though they were relatively safe from Iraq, the Kurdish people suffered at the hands of the Turkish military which claimed to be attacking Kurdish rebels acting on Turkish soil but engaging those rebels in their Iraqi based strongholds on several occasions. In 1995 for example the Turkish airforce conducted strikes on several such Kurdish strongholds while NATO no-fly zone fighter jets were conveniently “grounded”. Turkey also established a military outpost within Iraqi borders after engaging in a large scale attack on the Kurds, and overall are said to have killed some 20.000 Kurds in the process. Ironically, as already mentioned, this is the same number as the Iraqis are said to have killed in 1991.^{60,61}

2.2 Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom

Afghanistan is a country that has never really been conquered by an outside military force yet has suffered greatly through the ages at the hands of foreign military campaigns. Sometimes the aim of these military campaigns was to finally conquer Afghani land but at other times Afghanistan served simply as a battle ground for opposing imperialist armies seeking to show off their military prowess to other colonial empires. Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century both played their parts in trying to exert their power and play imperial politics on Afghanistan soil, an enterprise called by the British at the time, “The Great Game”. In later years other countries such as Pakistan have joined in the “fun”, and even though the “old game” was done, Russia occupied Afghanistan throughout the 1980’s.⁶²

⁵⁹ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 50-51.

⁶⁰ Frelick, Bill. Spring 1997. “Unsafe Havens.” *Harvard International Review* 19, no. 2: 40.

⁶¹ Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 47.

⁶² Róisín, Shannon. January 2009. “Playing with Principles in an Era of Securitized Aid: Negotiating Humanitarian Space in Post-9/11 Afghanistan.” *Progress in Development Studies* 9, no. 1: 16–17.

In modern day Afghanistan another kind of “great game” is being played out.⁶³ This time the “game” started out in the USA in September of 2001. A global terrorism network, controlled by the late Osama Bin Laden, launched terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001. The obvious reasons behind the attacks were Bin Laden’s loathing of US imperialistic tendencies in the Middle East in the modern day globalized era. Using the advance of modern globalization to its full potential, Bin Laden succeeded in his goal of terrorizing the US. Despite the actual casualties of the attacks not being that great, some 3000 people died in all four attacks (in comparison some 30.000 children are estimated to die of hunger related causes every day)⁶⁴, the US response was not at all disproportionate to the effect of the attacks. In the aftermath of the attacks the horrified US public, many of whom had seen the attacks live on TV, cried out for action which made it easy for the Bush administration to launch its “War on Terror”. Given the way in which the terrorist attacks were conducted it was clear to the US authorities from the start that this threat could not be fought back using traditional warfare or the foreign policies of the Cold War era.^{65,66}

The War on Terror first struck in Afghanistan in November of 2001.⁶⁷ The initial reason for the invasion was to flush out Osama Bin Laden and strike at the Taliban terrorist supporters in a war of self-defense.⁶⁸ The US authorities however also claimed a humanitarian purpose to their invasion. In a message to the Afghani people President Bush said the “the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and its allies. As we will strike military targets, we’ll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan”. But the humanitarian vision of the Bush administration did not stop at President Bush’s promise to the Afghani people.⁶⁹ In a statement given by the then Secretary of state Collin Powell, he depicted humanitarian NGOs as “force multipliers” and spoke of them as “members of the ‘combat team’” that were aiding the coalition forces in the War on Terror. This statement essentially militarized all

⁶³ Róisín, Shannon. January 2009. “Playing with Principles in an Era of Securitized Aid: Negotiating Humanitarian Space in Post-9/11 Afghanistan.” *Progress in Development Studies* 9, no. 1: 17.

⁶⁴ Smith, Steve, John Baylis, Patricia Owen. 2008. “Introduction” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to internal relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 2.

⁶⁵ Cox, Michael. 2008. “From the cold war to the war on terror” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 83-84.

⁶⁶ Smith, Steve, John Baylis, Patricia Owen. 2008. “Introduction” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to internal relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 2.


⁶⁷ Hoffman, Michiel, Sophie Delaunay. March 2010. “Afghanistan A Return to Humanitarian Action.” *Medecines Sans Frontieres*: 1.

⁶⁸ Cox, Michael. 2008. “From the cold war to the war on terror” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 84.

⁶⁹ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 531-532.

humanitarian efforts engaged in those countries affected by the War on Terror.⁷⁰ The result of these statements remains blatantly obvious in light of the effect The War on Terror has had on the security of aid workers actively engaged in the field as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1.



Aid Worker Security Database, www.aidworkersecurity.org

71

This US attitude towards humanitarian aid being part of the military, did not only affect aid workers on the ground but also resulted in aid organizations in general being viewed as the lapdogs of the western imperialistic war machine. The support of western democracies to engage in humanitarian interventions was difficult to muster in the 1990's. After the War on Terror began many feared that the blatant disregard of humanitarian principles by the US and their allies might make future humanitarian interventions altogether impossible. Other more optimistic voices hope that the War on Terror will lead to an increase in humanitarian interventions stating that within the 'new norm' the protection of human rights and national security can more easily go hand in hand.⁷²

The lack of US commitment to humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan is also easily argued by looking at three facts of how the invasion was conducted and its aftermath. The US conducted the invasion relying greatly on support from Afghani groups hostile to the Taliban, called the Northern Alliance. This tactic was originally aimed at reducing casualties to US forces and risks to the US forces in general. This strategy did however lead to manipulation of the US agenda by those Afghani allies which on numerous occasions decided to direct US forces to target competing factions and groups, which were totally unrelated to the Taliban cause. This

⁷⁰ Olsson, Christian. December 2007. "The politics of the apolitical: private military companies, humanitarians and the quest for (anti-) politics in post-intervention environments." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 10, no. 4: 332-361.

⁷¹ Stoddard, Abby, Adele Harmer, and Morgan Hughes. December 2012. "Aid Worker Security Report 2012: Host States and Their Impact on Security for Humanitarian Operations." Humanitarian Outcomes: 2.

⁷² Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. "Humanitarian intervention in world politics" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 531-532.

often resulted in US forces massacring innocent civilians they were led to believe were enemy combatants.^{73,74} Less than two months after US forces started their military campaign in Afghanistan the US forces and their Afghani allies had routed the Taliban and were now in control over most of the country. Prior to that “victory” the UN, along with several Afghani factions, had already held a conference in Bonn on deciding a path to the future for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. The result of the Bonn meeting was supposed to be a UN/US led reconstruction effort in cooperation with a newly established interim government. This agreement was later ratified by UN Resolution 1386 which additionally called for the creation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to support the interim government in their reconstruction efforts.⁷⁵ The second deviation from the original US promise of willingness to take part in humanitarian efforts is evident in their refusal to take part in the ISAF mission. This was the US decision despite the Bonn meeting stating that the reconstruction effort was to be led by the UN and the US. On the other hand in 2005 the primary mission of ISAF followed in the footsteps of the US, straight from its original mandate, and ISAF forces instead started to fight the Taliban resurgence. Already by 2004 the US commitment to humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan had all but dissipated, which leads to the last example of the broken US humanitarian promise to the Afghans. While allocating some \$18.4 billion to development aid, in a much better off Iraq, in 2004 the US only allocated \$1.77 billion to similar projects in Afghanistan.⁷⁶

It was obvious right from the start of Operation Enduring Freedom that the aid military forces were providing to the Afghans was insufficient and that the approach being used was undermining the necessary neutrality of relief agencies. Already by mid November 2001, both the UK based aid agency Oxfam as well as the World Food Program had reported famine related deaths in the more inaccessible parts of the country. The necessity of there being a clear line drawn between the military and unaffiliated humanitarian aid groups was clearly articulated both by the UN and the various US aid agencies as early as 2001 and 2002. However, the self-interested actions of the US armed forces, dropping supplies as a means to advertise their good intentions, and the resulting criticism the military received from the various aid agencies may have only resulted in not just blurring the lines between the two but also obscuring the function of each actor in turn. To start with, the military forces in Afghanistan did not understand that the function of aid agencies is not simply the distribution

⁷³ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 532.

⁷⁴ Sloan, Stanley. January 2010. “Nato in Afghanistan.” *UNISCI Discussion Papers* no. 22: 35.

⁷⁵ Sloan, Stanley. January 2010. “Nato in Afghanistan.” *UNISCI Discussion Papers* no. 22: 35.

⁷⁶ Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 532.

of foodstuffs and blankets, but also for example a means for the warring parties to communicate through a third independent party. As for the military, international humanitarian law stipulates that the warring parties “incur an active humanitarian responsibility when occupying a foreign territory”.⁷⁷ Only when the warring parties fail in their duties to provide adequate aid are humanitarian aid agencies required to step in, and above all the aid agencies in question must stick to being absolutely neutral in their administration of their function. In the midst of the War on Terror this was not to be the case.⁷⁸

The principles that allow the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies a universal protected status in conflict areas are articulated by the International Red Cross Conferences and describe the principle of neutrality as the fundamental building block of the protection they receive in carrying out their functions. The question of neutrality became a huge problem for many aid agencies as well as UN efforts in Afghanistan. The UN relief effort clashed with the UN continued effort of branding the Taliban as supporters of terrorist organizations, which in turn branded the UN aid workers as part of the occupying forces. While the UN relief groups had their own problems things were becoming harder still for the ground staff of non-governmental aid agencies. The non-governmental aid workers continued to proclaim themselves as completely neutral on the ground in Afghanistan while their superiors back in the western world continuously claimed to support the War on Terror by any and all means.⁷⁹

The situation in Afghanistan is still far from adequate and the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) reports that Afghanistan is still the second largest ICRC aid recipient, second only to Somalia, after 11 years of reconstruction efforts.⁸⁰ As a result of the years of conflicting functions of military and aid personnel the ICRC also reports that the average Afghani would have a hard time explaining the concept of humanitarian aid.⁸¹

These two very different cases seem to show that the advances of humanitarian intervention seem to have gone somewhat astray. That is precisely the subject of the next chapter of this thesis which focuses on comparing the theoretical framework proposed above to the harsh realities of modern day humanitarian interventions.

⁷⁷ Stockton, Nicholas J. September 2002. “The Failure of International Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan.” *Global Governance* 8, no. 3: 265-267.

⁷⁸ Stockton, Nicholas J. September 2002. “The Failure of International Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan.” *Global Governance* 8, no. 3: 265-267.

⁷⁹ Stockton, Nicholas J. September 2002. “The Failure of International Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan.” *Global Governance* 8, no. 3: 267-270.

⁸⁰ ICRC. June 2012. “Annual Report for 2011: a Year of Complex and Unforeseen Crises”.

⁸¹ Terry, Fiona. March 2012. “The International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan: reasserting the neutrality of humanitarian action.” *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 881: 188.

3. Findings

There are obviously stark differences between the two cases of humanitarian intervention presented in this thesis. One case was as clear cut a humanitarian intervention as there has ever been, the other an ill-defined outburst of retaliation with an additional role of humanitarian intervention as a means to further strengthen the support for a global war against terrorism. One served, for the most part, the interests of victims of war; the other served, for the most part, imperial interests in an ever increasingly interconnected world. Both cases of armed action were carried out by NATO forces and/or powerful advanced western liberal democracies taking on the role of “world police”, fighting injustice in less advanced and less powerful countries. Both instances relied heavily on the cooperation of both military forces and unarmed humanitarian aid organizations, but with very different emphasis on the way that cooperation was approached or facilitated.

It might be argued that both cases of military action resulted in political success. Operation Provide Comfort managed, to a certain degree, to protect the Kurdish population from certain death. By doing so the western powers managed to appease the western population, that had followed their dire situation closely through western media, and the international community that partly blamed the First Gulf War for the entire situation. In Afghanistan the US clearly managed to rally support for the War on Terror far beyond what it could ever have hoped for, despite at times clearly standing in the way of the humanitarian action they promised the Afghani people in the beginning.

In northern-Iraq it took France, the UK and US two months to overcome the realist interests of statism. The public outcry for helping the Kurds in their hour of need, finally became loud enough for the strongest NATO states to be willing to sacrifice their own soldiers and resources. Western Public opinion coupled with their allegiance to the liberal need for collective security, as Turkey requested help in dealing with the situation, finally convinced the allies to take action in northern-Iraq. It would be farfetched to claim that the NATO led intervention was entirely based on selfish interests, as is the only way for states to behave according to the realist approach. However the actions, or rather inaction, of Turkey, and most definitely UN Resolution 688, seem to be wholly based on a realist agenda. Turkey feared an uprising within its already rebellious Kurdish population and instead of addressing the refugee situation UN Resolution 688 seemed to fear wider instability in the region if the Iraqi and Turkish Kurds were allowed to intermingle.

There are however other liberalist views that seem to have been instrumental in the intervention in northern-Iraq. Given the televised nature of the crisis it was quite easy for the allies to achieve a consensus on what action to take. Even so without the assistance of the UN acting as some sort of world government, the intervention would have never taken place, despite Resolution 688 having been quite liberally interpreted.

With the successful cooperation of the various states, UN and non-governmental actors the liberalist approach seemed for a time to have gained considerable ground, especially with the advent of the 1992 democratic elections in the Kurdish autonomous region. However the anti-intervention liberal argument, claiming that liberal values must come from within lest the intervening forces be prepared to stay indefinitely, seem to have held their ground. Democratic elections were held but the factions involved did not hold long to their newfound sense of liberalism. The UNGCI forces may not have been numerous enough or focused enough on creating a lasting democratic state in northern-Iraq for any sort of actual democratization to take place in Kurdistan. Very few other national interests seem to have been involved, apart from NATO assisting their allies and making sure that the First Gulf War didn't actually end in the disastrous demise of the Kurds.

The invasion into Afghanistan, on the other hand, is realism at its best. Statism reigned supreme in the light of no international government addressing the terrorism problem, and the will to sacrifice resources and personnel only in the case of addressing a national emergency seemed to have come naturally to the US. The invasion was a clear cut case of self interest and the need to protect one's own people. The only way forward for the US was to pursue the realist self-help element and deal with the situation themselves. This is made even clearer by the "point and shoot" approach adopted by the US, seeing that the terrorist organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks, was far from operating solely out of Afghanistan.

The realist argument that there was no real universal consensus on which action to take, in the aftermath of threats such as the 9/11 attacks, is however obviously not applicable in the case of the invasion into Afghanistan. And it might be considered doubtful that the humanitarian promises of the Bush government were at all necessary for a coalition to form on the War on Terror being fought in Afghanistan. With regards to the two UNSC veto seats that usually oppose western interference with the rest of the world, Russia and China, they only saw this as an opportunity to brand their own opposition forces as terrorists to be brought to justice through a universal War on Terror. It is therefore unclear whether the UN resolutions that

resulted from the Bonn conference in 1992 would have been any different had there been no claim of a humanitarian agenda to begin with.

However, the Bush administration clearly changed the rules relating to humanitarian intervention in their favor. Making sure that the population of Afghanistan knew where the aid they were receiving came from, the US attempted to win the hearts and minds of the Afghans. The harsh realities of a prolonged armed conflict with the resurgent Taliban and other factions, instead resulted in the Afghans only remembering better who started the current mess they find themselves in. Even though the intervention in Afghanistan has had dire consequences for the future of humanitarian interventions in general, as well as the cooperation of the various actors engaged in humanitarian scenarios more specifically, the War on Terror only served to strengthen the resolve of the western liberal democracies to continue to treasure their collective security in the future.

The coalition forces managed to reach an ethical consensus in both cases even though it is quite obvious that such ethical consensus is not universally linked to the people of those states that were the recipients of each humanitarian intervention in turn. Even though the Kurds fight for their own independent state, and the Kurdish elections of 1992 might indicate there being some common values with their western allies, the differences are even clearer. The failure of the Kurds to adopt proper pluralistic democratic practices and the lack of willingness of the west to endorse the creation of a sovereign Kurdish state demonstrate this most blatantly. Even though the west has shown itself to be adamant in promoting western liberal values in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom the same can be said for the Afghanistan scenario. Despite the west's continued endorsement of liberal democracy in post-Taliban Afghanistan, the Afghani people have shown opposition to the ideals of pluralistic democratic governance similar to the Kurds.

As to the question of successful humanitarian interventions with regards to ethics, the key to success might rely more on the an ethical consensus on values, rights and wrongs, being conducted within the cooperating actors of the intervention, instead of there being the greater need for common values among those receiving humanitarian assistance and those giving it. The shared aims, goals and values of those involved in helping out the Kurds seem to have fared much better at going hand in hand than in the case of Afghanistan. There the ethical clashes of aid agencies and the armed forces involved in the intervention seem to have played a major part in lack of success and lack of consensus as to the proper course of action to assist the Afghans get back on track. The varied favoring of aid delivery, reconstruction,

development and democratization seem to have blurred the consensus of moral values between the distributors and the receivers even further, as well as between aid agencies and the military. When the US takes the position of aid delivery only being right if the sub-deliverable is the also an advertisement of US kindness, any sort of moral consensus becomes almost impossible to detect. With this in mind it becomes absolutely clear that the ethical approach used by the US is not one of any sort of universalist thinking that there might be some sort of common humanity.

The most interesting finding concerning the question of legality is that apparently in both cases mentioned in this thesis, the general conclusion of the intervening forces seems to be the attitude that 'where there's a will there's a way'. To put it another way, the intervening states seem to cover behind the restrictionist argument that UN Charter Article 51, which states a ban on the use of force except in cases of self-defense, reigns supreme until permission is given by the UNSC to intervene. As for the restrictionist argument that further legislation allowing for humanitarian intervention by some pre-decided rules and regulations, the Bush administrations claim of humanitarian intent seems to further strengthen those fears.

Although the same might not be entirely true for the case of northern-Iraq, anyone would be hard pressed to see the counter-restrictionist claim as legitimate in the case of Afghanistan. That there is any sort of agreement between different societies on a variety of issues concerning human rights and values, seems to be completely lost on the warring parties still fighting over Afghani soil. On a similar note the nations involved in both interventions presented in this thesis make no claims what so ever to be guided by the human rights clauses of the UN Charter. That being said the liberal cosmopolitan ideas presented within the 'responsibility to protect' document, which only gained UN recognition in 2005, seem to provide a clearer path for future interventions taking into account the shortcomings and successes of the past.

The initial phases of Operation Provide Comfort in northern-Iraq were unquestionably hugely successful. The armed forces not only delivered much of the aid and support needed to the Kurds themselves but also helped facilitate logistics operations of the aid agencies involved. The cooperation of NATO and aid agencies in northern-Iraq even seems to have been more successful than the aid provided to the relatively safe Kurdish population inside the Iranian borders, which was delivered by aid agencies alone. The initial phase of protecting the Kurds on the Turkish-Iraqi borders was extremely successful as well. The Turkish and the Iraqi attacks on the Kurds in the aftermath of the initial intervention should probably not be seen as

a failure on the part of the intervening forces seeing as that conflict had been ongoing prior to the intervention and continued well after the intervention ceased in 1996. The initial focus of Operation Provide Comfort also seems to have been on track with regards to offensive engagements. To begin with a small “safe zone” around the refugee camps was secured and after stabilizing the refugee situation the Iraqi forces occupying Kurdish villages and cities were pushed back in order for the Kurds to move back home. But more than that the successes on the ground in northern-Iraq had a follow up on the UN level and deals were made with the Iraqi government in an attempt to create a lasting peace between the Kurds and the Iraqi government.

In Afghanistan it seems obvious that the War on Terror always came first, and as a result any and all humanitarian considerations came second. Right from the start issues of famine and the dire straits of a large part of the population were ill-addressed if addressed at all. In the eyes of the armed intervention forces defeating the resurgent Taliban and other anti-governmental forces clearly got in the way of them properly addressing the real victims of the conflict. The collaboration between the armed forces and aid agencies was also affected by the War on Terror and the delivery of aid and the protection of aid operations seem to have been lost on both the ISAF mission as well as many of the aid agencies. This is especially true with regards to the actions of the staff supporting the aid missions from its headquarters “back home”. As a result aid agencies and militaries failed to adhere to the guidelines put forth by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies which should have made it easier for non-affiliated operations to achieve their goals on the ground. As a result the “unaffiliated” status of independent aid agencies has been permanently compromised.

The success of Operation Provide Comfort should clearly have been used as a template for future humanitarian interventions such as the intervention that went hand in hand with Operation Enduring Freedom. True enough, there were some issues that severely affected the final outcome of the Kurdish situation, especially with regards to Turkey’s attitude towards the Kurds and their allies’ indifference to those conflicts of interests. But lessons could have been learned from the failures of the operation as well. Whether nothing was learned from the situation in northern-Iraq or if the War on Terror has been the catalyst in blurring the aims of humanitarian operations, it remains to be seen if future interventions will be able to learn from the failures and successes in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to answer the question: “Is there a way for forcible and non-forcible humanitarian actors to coexist and cooperate in a humanitarian environment?” The need for cooperation is self evident. Armed forces lack the expertise and the independence to address all those suffering through any sort of a humanitarian crisis on their own. Armed forces are also severely constrained in any attempt to conduct successful humanitarian interventions all on their own by the politics “back home”. Any prolonged intervention scenario apparently leads politicians to eventually pursue self-interested agendas and through years of sending their “boys and girls” into a conflict zone the original public support becomes public adversity. As for aid organizations the question of security for aid workers as well as for those in need, is ever looming. There is an obvious need for protection of those fleeing conflict and there is also a need for those that have had to flee their homes to eventually return home in safety.

The case of northern-Iraq clearly shows that there is a way for armed and unarmed actors to coexist and cooperate in humanitarian operations. The case of Afghanistan, on the other hand, clearly demonstrates that political agenda can get in the way of such cooperation, resulting in the failure of all parties to conduct humanitarian intervention successfully. In Afghanistan the relationship between successful ways of conducting reconstruction, development and aid work with the addition of fighting of rebel forces, need to be clearer. If future missions are to be successful different tasks need to be made clearer and the different actors, armed and unarmed, need to stick to their own functions, of security and logistics on the one hand and independent assistance on the other.

Lessons from both cases need to be learned. In the face of the global threats that liberal democracies experienced after the 9/11 attacks, aid organizations must remain vigilant to the need, indeed the *necessity*, for independence and total lack of affiliation in order to be able to conduct their missions successfully. At the same time state actors must help facilitate such independence, while at the same time working with aid organizations where applicable, as well as providing any and all aid they can on their own.

During the writing of this thesis it was encouraging to see that a great deal of study has already been done on the subject matter. Organizations as well as academics seem to be fully aware of the dire situation modern day humanitarian intervention finds itself in. Due to the short frame of this thesis a lot of stones were left unturned. In the future a closer look at the successes of humanitarian cooperation of armed and unarmed actors in Afghanistan should be

examined. Successes of cooperation in other humanitarian interventions should also be examined. However academic research is never enough to bring about much needed change and so state policy as well as the non-governmental aid organizations functions need to be addressed in accordance with the failures and successes of past and present interventions. Ways towards successful cooperation must be found lest humanitarian interventions become an outdated, failed concept.

Bibliography

- Abell, Nazare Albuquerque. December 1996. "Politics, Migration and Intervention." *Peace Review* 8, no. 4: 535-540
- Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. "Humanitarian intervention in world politics" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 522-541. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. June 2006. "The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur." *Journal of Military Ethics* 5, no. 2: 144-160.
- Cox, Michael. 2008. "From the cold war to the war on terror" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 70-89. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dunne, Tim. 2008. "Liberalism" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 108-122. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dunne, Tim, Brian C. Schimdt. 2008. "Realism" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to international relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 90-107. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Frelick, Bill. Spring 1997. "Unsafe Havens." *Harvard International Review* 19, no. 2: 40-45
- Hoffman, Michiel, Sophie Delaunay. March 2010. "Afghanistan A Return to Humanitarian Action." Medecines Sans Frontieres. Last viewed January 7, 2013.
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2010/MSF-Return-to-Humanitarian-Action_4311.pdf.
- ICRC. June 2012. "Annual Report for 2011: a Year of Complex and Unforeseen Crises". Last viewed January 7, 2013.
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/annual-report-2011-news-2012-06-25.htm>
- Olsson, Christian. December 2007. "The politics of the apolitical: private military companies, humanitarians and the quest for (anti-)politics in post-intervention environments." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 10, no. 4: 332-361
- Olson, Robert. September 1992. "The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes In..." *Third World Quarterly* 13, no. 3: 451-454.
- Róisín, Shannon. January 2009. "Playing with Principles in an Era of Securitized Aid: Negotiating Humanitarian Space in Post-9/11 Afghanistan." *Progress in Development Studies* 9, no. 1: 15-36

- Seybolt, Taylor B. 2007. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sloan, Stanley. January 2010. "Nato in Afghanistan" *UNISCI Discussion Papers* no. 22: 34-55
- Smith, Steve, John Baylis, Patricia Owen. 2008. "Introduction" In *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to internal relations*. 4e., ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 0-13. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stockton, Nicholas J. September 2002. "The Failure of International Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan." *Global Governance* 8, no. 3: 265-271.
- Stoddard, Abby, Adele Harmer, and Morgan Hughes. December 2012. "Aid Worker Security Report 2012: Host States and Their Impact on Security for Humanitarian Operations." Humanitarian Outcomes. Last viewed January 7, 2013.
<http://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/resources/AidWorkerSecurityReport2012.pdf>.
- Weiss, Thomas G., and Cindy Collins. 1996. *Humanitarian Challenges And Intervention: World Politics And The Dilemmas Of Help (Dilemmas in World Politics)*. Oxford: Westview Press.
- Widdows, Heather. 2011. *Global Ethics: An Introduction*. Durham: Acumen Publishing.