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Global Citizenship

Jakob Regin Eðvarðsson
Lokaverkefni við Hug- og félagsvísindasvið

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Jakob Regin Eðvarðsson
Lokaverkefni til 180 eininga B.A.-prófs
á Hug- og félagsvísindasviði
Leiðbeinandi: Jón Haukur Ingimundarson

Ég lýsi því hér með yfir að ég einn er höfundur þessa verkefnis og að það er ágóði eigin rannsókna.

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Jakob Regin Eðvarðsson

Það staðfestist hér með að lokaverkefni þetta fullnægir að mínum dómum kröfum til B.A.- prófs á Hug- og félagsvísindasviði.

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Jón Haukur Ingimundarson

Ágrip

Þessi ritgerð fjallar um hugtakið heimsþegnrétt og sögulegt samhengi þess frá tímum stóísku heimspekinganna í Grikklandi, í gegnum upplýsinguna á 17. öld og fram til dagsins í dag. Við munum skoða hugtakið þegnrétt náið og hvernig sumir fræðimennum hafa deilt um notkun þess í heimsvíðu samhengi. Rætt verður um áhyggjur af því að hugtakið sé of fjarlægt venjulegu fólki, sem almennt er með hugann við það sem er nær því. Við könnum líka hvernig þeir sem eru fylgjandi þessu hugtaki trúa því að sameiginlegur skilningur og sameiginlegt siðferði meðal hinna ólíku þjóða, trúarbragða og annarra stríðandi fylkinga sé gífurlega mikilvægt hugtakinu um heimsþegnrétt og forsenda fyrir varanlegum friði. Þáttur í hugmyndinni um heimsumlykjandi siðferði er aukin áhersla á skyldur til jafns við réttindi sem hingað til hafa fengið mesta athygli í fræðum um mannréttindamál. Við munum skoða nokkrar forsendur heimsþegnréttar og komast að lokum að þeirri niðurstöðu að það sé mikilvægt að ætla sér ekki um of í spádómum um framtíðina heldur leggja áherslu á það sem er að gerast núna og beina því í farveg sem leiðir til sem mestrar farsældar fyrir alla íbúa jarðarinnar.

Abstract

This essay concerns itself with the concept of global citizenship, its historical context from the time of the Greek stoics, through the Enlightenment period into modern times. We'll look closely at the term citizenship itself and how there has been some contention concerning the use of the term at a global level. Concerns that the idea of global citizenship is elitist and out of touch from regular people, who are far removed from the global arena, will be examined. We'll look at how the proponents of global citizenship believe that common understanding and a common ethic among the differing nations, religions, and other traditionally competing entities is essential to the concept of global citizenship and to any lasting peace. As part of a global ethic there is an emphasis on responsibilities to be put into balance with rights which have so long been emphasized in human rights literature. We will look at some prerequisites for a functioning global citizenship and finally we conclude that it is important not to overreach in our estimation of future possibilities but rather focus on current development and direct them in a manner that benefits all human kind.

Þakkarorð

Þetta er búið að vera langt og strangt ferðalag að klára þessa ritgerð og mig langar að þakka leiðbeinanda mínum Jóni Hauki Ingimundarsyni fyrir sína óþrjótandi þolinmæði og hjálp og föður mínum Eðvarð T. Jónssyni fyrir þá óbilandi hvatningu og þann stuðning sem hann hefur sýnt mér í gegnum þetta ferli.

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Introduction

Throughout known history mankind has always sought to use the best systems it could for survival and community. At one time we, i.e. mankind, lived as hunter gatherers in small groups with which we placed our identity. Later we learned to farm and in many cases our groups grew and therewith our locus of identification. In latter times we learned to identify ourselves as nations or ethnic groups. And today we face the prospect of living in a world that has so integrated itself that nearly no nation[1] would willingly, or without severely affecting its economic and social interest, choose to sever its ties to this transnational web of relations. This thesis is concerned with looking at the historical circumstances surrounding this development both past and present and how it relates to our current global conditions. We ask the question whether it is timely and useful for us to consider global citizenship as a possible solution to many of our social, economic and ecological problems and we especially look at the facets of global ethics and the political issues surrounding the conception of global citizenship.

Before we consider the concept of global citizenship we must first understand the idea of cosmopolitanism, the basis on which any conception of global citizenship would have to stand. Cosmopolitanism, or kosmou-polites as it was originally known, literally means citizen of the cosmos, i.e. citizen of the world. As a concept it first sprang up in ancient Greece as a response by Diogenes to Aristotle's statement that 'man is a political animal', i.e. that man is primarily a member of a political community – in Aristotle's case this referred primarily to the city state – and in another instance Socrates famously replied "I am a citizen of the world" when asked to what country he belonged (Dower, 2003).

Cosmopolitanism was first seriously developed as a theory by the Stoics and its time of influence ranged approximately from the third century BC to the second century AD. When the ancient Grecians started coming into contact with outsiders to a greater degree than before a natural consequence was the need to define the relationship between natives and 'aliens.' The thinking of the Stoics was that men lived primarily in two communities, the local political community which was theirs by accident of birth and then the great human community, a community united by speech and reason, which

[1] Even nominal exceptions such as Cuba (in the past) or, especially, North Korea still have transnational ties vital to their well being.

followed universal moral laws that had their source in a divine ruler. This did not mean however that they wanted to abolish the local forms of government but as Martha Nussbaum says “Their point was even more radical; that we give our first allegiance to no mere form of government, no temporal power, but to the moral community made up by the humanity of all human beings” (Dower, 2003:23). As Bhikhu Parekh (2005) puts it:

> For the Stoics social, cultural, linguistic and other differences were contingent, arbitrary, and devoid of moral significance. What really mattered was humanity, which all human beings shared in equal measure and represented their true nature or essence. All human beings were members of a universal polis, and hence fellow-citizens (p. 16).

Cosmopolitanism in the past has sometimes been considered a metaphysical (or spiritual) philosophy that seemingly did not have any direct bearing on practical living. In recent times due to such developments as globalization through information technologies, improved transport, increasingly extended human networks etc., cosmopolitanism has gained a practical value it has not had in many people’s minds in previous eras. The belief in the inherent value of all human beings and in the idea of a global moral community linked with a greater knowledge of world conditions and a new capacity to act at a distance has led to people finding numerous applications for this understanding (Dower, 2003).

Is Cosmopolitanism Elitist?

One feature prominent in Stoic thought was the idea that real membership in the world community was limited to the wise. The Stoics believed that true harmony could be achieved by developing moral virtues and that through wisdom and by adopting the right social structures the harmonization of the interests of men would be possible (Dower, 2003). Though it is clear that Stoic cosmopolitanism arose in a specific cultural climate the sense that cosmopolitanism is elitist has remained an issue of contention in modern debates concerning it. There is a current of thought that holds that cosmopolitanism does not concern regular people but is the domain of philosophers and select well to do (Furia, 2005).

In an article Peter Furia (2005) takes a look at these concerns. He finds that despite the charge of elitism being a longstanding accusation against cosmopolitanism there has been no real effort to answer this claim empirically. Furia therefore makes the effort to do that using the 1999-2002 World Values Survey (WVS) and the 2004 Inter-university Survey on Allegiance (ISA). Furia explains that WVS is a broad survey – the WVS covers 74 countries comprising 80% of the world's people – but not very deep, meaning that its questions do not probe deeply people's attitudes towards cosmopolitanism. The ISA on the other hand is a rather narrow survey (comprising the United States only) but with a considerable amount of depth constituting about 80 questions devoted to the various aspects of cosmopolitanism (Furia, 2005).

The claim that cosmopolitanism has mainly survived as an idea within academic circles and is a doctrine which only rationalist political philosophers would embrace has been espoused by such names as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, J.G. Herder and Edmund Burke among others. A more modern critic, Benjamin Barber, states that "Diogenes may have regarded himself a citizen of the world, but global citizenship demands of its patriots levels of abstraction and disembodiment most men and women will be unable or unwilling to muster" (Furia, 2005:333).

If we possess democratic respect for majority opinion then, suggest the critics, ignoring the parochialism of the many would be normatively undesirable as well as impractical. Furia explains that many of the criticisms of formal-institutional cosmopolitanism, i.e. that global political action is unfeasible, have been answered by contemporary scholars and by the ever-expanding transnational IGO's and NGO's. However critics argue that ordinary people still remain parochial in their views of cosmopolitanism. If true, Furia relates, the claim of elitism possesses both normative and practical significance. Furia organizes the charge into the following three categories,

a) Cosmopolitanism appeals to almost no one but the rationalist philosophers who articulate it
b) Cosmopolitanism is systematically likely to appeal to privileged individuals
c) Cosmopolitanism is systematically likely to appeal to privileged societies (Furia, 2005:331).

Furia found, by treating these claims as empirically testable hypotheses, that none are strongly supported by the available data (Furia, 2005). In his paper Furia makes a distinction between moral cosmopolitanism and political cosmopolitanism, simply put

this distinction marks the difference between ethical cosmopolitanism (defined by expressing primary identification with the world as a whole) and institutional cosmopolitanism (defined by confidence in the United Nations).

By using WVS data Furia finds that 'moral' cosmopolitanism is clearly a minority ideology since only 7.8% of respondents felt they belonged primarily to "the world as a whole", i.e. 1 in 12. But actually that means that, theoretically at least, the world over, about 500 million people claim this ideology. This clearly goes beyond a few isolated philosophers. Additionally to these 7.8% another 8% chose the whole world as their secondary locus of belonging (Furia, 2005).

As regards 'political' cosmopolitanism global publics show much stronger cosmopolitan tendencies. This was measured by enquiring about people's confidence in the United Nations, in their respective regional institutions (e.g. European Union) and in their national parliaments. It is very interesting to note that people's confidence in the UN surpassed their confidence in regional and national institutions, 52.4% of respondents expressed either "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the UN, 46.1% in their regional institutions and 41.8% in their parliaments. Of course some of this difference may be explained by difference in people's expectations of these institutions. Nevertheless these results indicate that people are far from inimical to the idea of transnational community as some critics assert. Furia adds that confidence in an institution may not necessarily mean that people would be willing to submit to its decisions or expend economic and political capital, among other things, on its behalf (Furia, 2005).

The second criticism of cosmopolitanism's proposed elitism is that those who hold it as a personal ideology are not so called real-world constituency but ostensibly privileged individuals. In this case Furia uses education, wealth and ethno-racial privilege as criteria, as these have been used to criticize cosmopolitanism's "eliteness."

Furia's findings are indeed fascinating. Using the WVS he finds that education and wealth together explain at most 2% of the overall variance of individuals' tendency to identify with the world as a whole. Furthermore wealth actually has a negative relationship, i.e. the richer you are the less likely to identify with 'moral' cosmopolitanism than if you are poor (though it should be noted that the relationship is weak). There is also a slight positive relationship between education and 'moral' cosmopolitanism. Similar results are found when looking at 'political' cosmopolitanism (income and education jointly explaining 0.5% variance) so, as Furia mentions, if we are

to put a label on cosmopolitanism it would be that it belongs to the "educated poor" but truly these result show that cosmopolitanism does not belong to the domain of any one group (Furia, 2005).

Using the ISA (Inter-university Survey on Allegiance) Furia looks at the effect of ethno-racial privilege on cosmopolitanism (defined as 'universalism' in the survey). Here the results are equally astounding in that they contradict completely the criticisms mentioned at the outset. All three privilege criteria are negatively related to universalism, in Furia's words "universalism is at least as appealing to the uneducated as to the educated and more appealing to the poor and to ethno-racial minorities than it is to Caucasian-Americans and the American rich" (Furia, 2005:349). The same is applicable when examining to whom 'multinationalism' appeals. When only looking at education there is a slight positive relationship but when looking at privilege we again see negative relationship when using class or ethnicity and race as measures (Furia, 2005).

Again, using the WVS, Furia finds that there is no basis in hypothesis 3, that cosmopolitanism is systematically likely to appeal to privileged societies. Using per capita national income and membership in the 'culturally privileged West' as measures (additionally to more complicated measures) Furia found that neither had significant effect on attitudes towards cosmopolitanism. He found that only one privileged country made it to the top five most morally cosmopolitan societies and that no privileged country was among the top five most politically cosmopolitan countries. The data shows that there is no link between privilege and attitudes towards cosmopolitanism and that generally poor countries are more favourable to cosmopolitanism than rich, Latin America being a notable case of high favour towards cosmopolitanism. In conclusion of his paper Furia finds that, while preliminary due to there not being many similar studies in this field, all three hypothesis appear untrue and that cosmopolitanism is not elitist (Furia, 2005).

What is Citizenship?

According to the Encyclopædia Britannica citizenship is defined as a:

> relationship between an individual and a state in which an individual owes allegiance to that state and in turn is entitled to its protection. Citizenship implies the status of freedom with accompanying responsibilities. Citizens have certain

> rights, duties, and responsibilities that are denied or only partially extended to aliens and other non-citizens residing in a country.[2] In general, full political rights, including the right to vote and to hold public office, are predicated upon citizenship. The usual responsibilities of citizenship are allegiance, taxation, and military service (Citizenship, 2011).

Citizenship is the most privileged form of nationality and is distinguished from it by its political character. As a concept it first arose in ancient Greece within the towns and city-states and was applied to male property owners. The Romans were the first to use citizenship to distinguish the residents of Rome from those of conquered territories – though, eventually, they would expand it to comprise all free inhabitants of the empire. Naturally citizenship conferred important legal privileges within the empire. Citizenship disappeared from practice in the west during the middle ages and returned in part during the renaissance though citizenship as we know it today primarily has its origins in the French and American revolutions of the 18th century (Citizenship, 2011).

In conjunction with the above the Westphalian agreements of 1648 contributed to creation of nation-states as we know them. The Peace of Westphalia as it is known, ended the Thirty Years' War and the Eighty Years' War and led to the international system of states and their territorial sovereignty (Peace of Westphalia, 2011). Through the effect of Westphalia citizens are issued passports, borders are controlled, access to labour markets is controlled by the states as well as access to economic markets, and migration depends on the Westphalian notions of territorial sovereignty. Citizens going outside these boundaries, illegal migrants for instance, risk losing the protection their citizenship affords them and therefore risk unlawful exploitation and deportation and are denied benefits of proper citizenship. National militaries, generally, rely on active citizenship, people joining through reciprocity. Non-democratic countries equally offer their citizens certain rights which outsiders are not afforded, such as, eligibility for government positions and rights of movement (Falk, 2002).

Citizenship as a concept is considered to have three elements or dimensions. The first is the legal dimension which comprises rights; civil, political and social. The second one is citizens as political agents who actively participate in society's political structures and the third is citizenship as membership in a political community which acts as a source

[2] Obviously citizenship, despite its lofty ideals, does not secure that all the citizens of a country enjoy the benefits the title nominally ensures nor does it guarantee equal status in a practical sense.

of an individual's identity. There are two main models that define any discussion about citizenship; the liberal model of citizenship and the republican (Dominique, 2009).

Liberal citizenship as we know it developed from the 17th century onwards and shares a distant relationship to Stoic cosmopolitanism in the sense that it was developed from the basic dispositions or laws of human nature, the difference being that its individualist stance meant that its laws or rather duties were primarily "negative" in nature: the rights and responsibilities are mainly geared towards the preservation of the rights of others, such as their right to life and property, obedience to the law and generally not interfering with other people's enjoyment of their rights. Central to the liberal model of citizenship is the balancing of rights and responsibilities in order to preserve the autonomy of the individual. The republican conception of citizenship does not deny the importance of rights and responsibilities but places more emphasis on the idea of active citizenship. An active citizen takes part in shaping the future direction of his or her society through political debate and activism. This conception concerns itself less with the legal status of the citizen (though also an integral part) and more on the civic virtue part of it (Dominique, 2009; Miller, 1999; Parekh, 2005).

There are two distinctly republican features of citizenship, says David Miller (1999), willingness to defend the rights of others of the political community and to promote its public interests, and playing an active role in the formal and informal arenas of politics primarily as a way of expressing commitment to the community and identifying with it and seeking to influence it – making sure that what is done is ideally done in the name of all of its citizens. Though it would be easy set the two models up as rival conceptions they can in fact be very much complementary to each other since liberal citizenship must sometimes be secured by exercising republican citizenship, or in other words liberal rights must sometimes be secured by using one's political rights (Dominique, 2009).

Does the Term Citizenship Meaningfully Translate to Global Relations?

One critic of the term global citizenship is David Miller (1999). He finds, working from the framework of republican citizenship,[3] that by removing the term citizen from its national boundaries it is being rendered meaningless; any attempts to apply it globally are either utopian or fail to grasp the meaning of citizenship. Though he is not a proponent of 'realism,' which assumes a strict analytical separation between politics within and amongst states (Realism vs. Cosmopolitanism, 1996), he determines that despite there being international obligations of justice, creating transnational practices of citizenship is not the way to discharge those obligations.

Miller admits that the concept of citizenship is contested, on one the one hand there are rival interpretations of its meaning carrying different normative implications and on the other there is the concern that even modern nations with their millions of citizens are too large for citizenship to function as it ideally should, the argument being that the natural scale for genuine citizenship to flourish would be city states such as the like of Athens and Renaissance Florence. Miller does not pursue this latter argument though he feels that it makes a stronger point than does the concept of world citizenship (Miller, 1999).

Miller claims that there is a danger that with larger nations follows an increase of 'free riders' who will use the work of other citizens to get off easy from being active participants in society. The larger the population the more likely this is to occur which is why Miller feels city states are better suited for active citizenship. However new social situations have in the past few hundred years led to the development of national citizenship despite any such reservations.

> The nation as a focus of identity and allegiance appeared on the scene when increasing mobility and more effective means of communication, especially the printed word, made it possible for large aggregates of people to conceive of themselves as members of communities with a specific cultural character that set them apart from their neighbours (Miller, 1999:67-68).

In the city state, which Miller sees as the ideal venue for citizenship, there was a closeness that meant that free riding became very difficult and that citizens could "gather

[3] According to Miller republican citizenship is the framework generally used by proponents of cosmopolitanism.

face to face under the shade of an oak tree to make laws." (Miller, 1999:68) Since modern social realities make this an impossibility, common nationality must instead be the source of trust and loyalty that citizenship requires. National identities in turn emerged as a by-product from the interplay between groups competing for power and when established provided a venue for the cooperation of large masses of people. Miller's proof for this argument is that we will find no (democratic) states whose members lack such a common identity. Citizenship is, as Miller puts it, a valuable status and states would "naturally wish to restrict its possession to those who identify themselves with the nation and are carriers of the right cultural identity…. To give citizenship rights freely to all-comers is to risk undermining the conditions of mutual trust and assurance that make responsible citizenship possible." (Miller, 1999:69)

In a similar vein to Miller, Ulrich Preuss finds the concept of 'earth citizenship' derived from shared dependence on earth's resources meaningless. He says that citizenship implies intensified duties of social solidarity and moral obligations towards one's fellow citizens as a restricted group. If the term citizen is applied to all humanity it becomes a mere synonym since belonging to the human race does not mean that you will have a common understanding of rights, duties, etc., as this understanding is created in communities. Communities, he says, exist only as a plurality because time and space limit possible human interactions (Thompson, 2001).

There are some critics that reject the ethics of cosmopolitanism. These critics doubt the existence of universal values or principles of justice. They find that the ideals of cosmopolitanism are based on western political institutions and depend on the dominance of those institutions and therefore cosmopolitan values can not claim universality. Others claim that the ideals of universal rights and justice are too far removed from the real moral motivations of individuals which are bounded to the community they identify with, be it tribe, nation, religious community or any other such group. And in any case those who do acknowledge universal rights are likely to think themselves justified in giving priority to their own communities and their values (Thompson, 2001).

Some critics doubt that centralized institutions are a solution to global problems and even go so far as saying that they would be detrimental to existing communities, cultures and values. Though many of these critics see many environmental problems as global in scope they feel that globalization is a threat to the environment and human cultures. Arran Gare for instance sees the strengthening of the nation-state and the

advocation of ‘a kind of nationalism’ as the best way to mobilize people to protect the environment against harmful global tendencies as cosmopolitanism does not have the power to rally people in the same way. Other critics have gone even further in suggesting decentralization into localities would best serve the environmental needs of our planet (Thompson, 2001).

To recap the main objections so far seem to be that citizenship functions best in small to medium sized nations and that to spread the concept over larger masses is to undermine the efficacy of what it means to be a citizen and in addition to this citizenship gains its value through its being restricted to groups and being in effect a restricted commodity. Also that the values of cosmopolitanism are western and non-universal and that universal values are too rarefied for the average person to identify with them. And finally that global centralized institutions and globalization are more harmful than beneficial to the environment and human cultures.

Response to Criticisms

Although these are on the face of it valid criticisms, deeper probing shows us that there are other facets to the idea of global citizenship. The reason why citizenship may translate well into the global arena, and indeed the reason why we must actively encourage this transition, is that if we are to deal with the problems of modernity, problems which are global in scope and need global solutions, we must needs adapt to a global way of thinking. As history has proved time and time again the human animal is a supremely adaptable creature and its ideas and structures can certainly be adapted to new conditions.

Miller and likeminded thinkers stipulate that there is clearly a feeling that a common identity is needed for citizenship to be viable as a concept. In order for people to be able to feel solidarity with their fellow citizens there must be, according to Miller and Preuss among others, a common culture and a nationalistic ideal so that they may show solidarity in their undertakings. However, as Thompson argues, it is not clear why citizenship has to be defined in terms of limited particular communities since even within national communities time and space limit people’s relations and they still somehow manage to think of themselves as fellow citizens (Thompson, 2001). We already know of examples such as the United States which show that it is definitely possible for a diverse aggregation of people to be united under a common banner and a set of common ideals,

i.e. life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It is difficult to think of an example more remote from Miller's exalted city states. With 313 million inhabitants of various cultural heritage and religious background in a landmass spanning 9,8 million square kilometers (about 3,8 million sq. miles) we can safely say that the part of the objection to global citizenship - which states that citizenship loses its value as it is spread over large geographical distances and among extreme numbers of peoples - is challenged by mere existence of the United States. The USA has as of yet not seen the need to split itself into a smaller set of nations but has instead functioned as major political power in the world with its diverse population of 50 states essentially embracing one nationality (CIA, 2011).

The reasoning that the value of citizenship lies in it being restricted to a set of people with some sort of claim to it, be it through birthplace or ethnicity, creates a false dichotomy between global citizenship and national citizenship. To think that national citizenship would lose its meaning if we were to embrace a global citizenship is on par with saying that because there are national governments city, county or regional governance is unnecessary, and that's without there actually being any kind of real world government on the horizon (although mechanisms of global governance abound).

Thompson (2001) points out that the problem in the case of those who advocate a stronger nationalism and/or decentralization is that they want to have their cake and eat it too. These critics, despite their parochial views, are not opposed to intercommunity cooperation or cooperation at the global level but in their focus on the local above all else they lose sight of the fact that local and national loyalties may not always be compatible with the solution of global or even regional environmental problems. At this scale people would feel themselves justified in refusing to sacrifice their local or national interests for the sake of global objectives.

As an example we may look at the Sellafield Nuclear facility, formerly known as Windscale, located on the coast of the Irish sea in Cumbria, England. This facility was in operation from 1956 until 2003 (although the decommissioning will take many years) and during that time many "unplanned operational events" or, in layman's terms, accidents occurred. Over the period of its operation there were a number of accidents that led to off-site releases of radioactive material – the most famous of which was a nuclear fire in October 1957. This lead to the pollution of the Irish sea and its surroundings, and to radioactive drift clouds that were detected in Belgium, Germany and Norway. In addition to this the practice of ocean disposal of radioactive waste into the Irish sea has led to the detection of such radioactive waste by the coast of Norway in seaweed and lobster

populations (Luttrell & Appleby, 1993; Webb, Anderson, & Gaffney, 2006; Views and News from Norway, N.D.).

As a result of all this there has been both regional and international response against the nuclear facility and in fact Norway has for many years campaigned for its decommission. At the same time if we look at the local conditions we see that the nuclear facility is integral to the job market of Cumbria as it is one of two major employers in the area. For more than 50 years Sellafield has employed the inhabitants of Cumbria and in the 2002 to 2003 financial year its level of employment was 12,100 people. Looking at national interests in the past, Sellafield served as Britain's first weapons grade plutonium-239 production facility and served its national military agenda as well as being a commercial nuclear power station. Although Sellafield started its decommission in 2003 we can see that the conflict between local and national loyalties on the one hand and international interests on the other, kept the site open for 50 years despite 21 serious incidents over this period - not counting minor accidents (Centre for Regional Economic Development, 2005; Luttrell & Appleby, 1993; Webb, Anderson, & Gaffney, 2006).

This example illustrates the essential dissonance of the honorable ideals of those who wish to empower the local communities and strengthen national identities when those ideals are taken out of the global context. Although the above may be an extreme example we can imagine similar situations such as the local issues of industrial and vehicular pollution, the logging of trees and then the worldwide problem of global warming; local use of natural resources, overfishing, and the global impact of such use, depopulation of fish stock affecting other countries. There are seemingly countless other such examples which show that there needs to be a balance between the needs of the local and the global if there is to be sustainable prosperity for either one.

Rights and Responsibilities: Ethics in Practice

As human beings we all stand in a variety of relationships – whether to our parents, spouses, children, siblings, friends, colleagues, neighbours, fellow citizens or fellow religionists – all of which, however they may have come into being, are regulated by norms and involve mutual claims and duties. Moral conduct generally consists in recognizing these norms and discharging our responsibilities towards these claims and

duties. A question arises then when we are faced with individuals, outsiders, with whom we have no recognizable form of relationship and who therefore stand outside any regulating norms of behavior. There may not even be any common interests from which we may derive familiar claims and duties. How are we to respond to these outsiders? Without norms, claims or duties what is to stop us from treating them as we wish, harming or even killing them? Such moral vacuums were not uncommon in the past in self-contained and isolated communities. However as contacts with outsiders became more frequent general norms were needed to structure the relations between locals and outsiders and to establish a clear system of claims and duties (Parekh, 2005).

The first well-documented attempts to create such norms and derived claims and duties were in the Roman empire which brought together different societies and engendered the movement of considerable amounts of goods and people across social and territorial boundaries. We already discussed in some detail how the Stoics were the first to systematically address these questions but it bears repeating that they considered all humans to be primarily members of a universal moral community, with the common powers of speech and rationality uniting them, and secondly members of particular societies. In these terms we are all members of a natural community and as civil laws governed the relations between members of a political community the principle of natural justice, a principle not derived from consensus but from human nature itself, governed those between human beings. To act according to these principles was to express one's common humanity with others. These principles were such as the equality of all human beings, refraining from harming others, keeping promises and contracts as well as respecting the property of others (Parekh, 2005).

During the rise of Christianity stoicism went through a second stage of development and transformation which I will not examine in detail here. Suffice it to say that it gained a wholly divine character in that its authority was derived from divine command and perhaps distinguished itself by going further than before in its duties of care, mutual help, benevolence, love and placing much emphasis on altruism. The "Enlightenment" of the 17th century represents the third stage of stoicism and its secularization. Natural law again gained much prominence and an ideal of human nature was made the source of principles of universal morality. However the enlightenment philosophers' conception of human nature differed from the Stoics in that it included not only reason but also common needs and vulnerabilities. The language of natural rights was now individualist and focused on rights rather than duties. This stemmed from the

idea that all humans desired self-preservation, liberty, means to the satisfaction of their basic needs. Since all civil authority was, in the view of these philosophers, socially derived it was argued that "human beings were naturally free and independent, masters of their lives and owners of their powers and capacities" (Parekh, 2005:17). Thus as independent individuals freely seeking their interests all human beings enjoyed certain rights called natural rights due to their being derived from the basic laws of human nature. These were such rights as those to life, liberty and property. These natural rights entail a duty in others to respect these rights and as such are negative in nature, i.e. the right to life means that one has a duty not to harm others but since there are no positive duties there is no obligation to help someone who is starving or in need (Parekh, 2005).

It is interesting to note that that during the French revolutionary parliament of 1789 – in which the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen' was made and which laid forth and reaffirmed the doctrine of inalienable rights – and while the declaration of rights was being drafted, a controversial debate arose about making a declaration of the responsibilities of man (*Declarations des devoirs de l'homme*). The thought was that if a declaration of the rights of man be proclaimed then it should also follow that there be a declaration of human responsibilities. After three days of debate a vote was cast with 433 in favour of the demand but 607 against it (Küng, 2002).

Most international covenants and agreements today, including the UN Declaration of Human Rights, are based on this liberal conception of universal morality. This means that the universal principles of morality which these agreements lay down take the individuals as the primary moral agents and endow them with certain rights which then generate claims on the state. The duty to establish and protect these rights is exclusively the responsibility of the state and all citizens direct their claims to it. Outsiders have no positive duty to help establish these rights or make possible the exercise of them but do have a duty to respect those rights and not interfere with them. Members of poor societies have no right, whether they are starving or experiencing injustice, to demand the help of other societies or expect them to share surplus resources with them. Bikhu Parekh points out that these declarations of human rights, lay down principles of universal morality in the shape of rights that all human beings should be able to enjoy but which remain bound or limited by the statist perspectives that put the responsibility for realizing these rights solely on individual states (Parekh, 2005).

Despite this the UN declaration marks a new stage in the development of a statement on universal morality – the fourth in the historical evolution of universal

values. Never before have official representatives of the majority of the world's nations, representing the majority of its peoples, come together to ratify such a document, a document which represents a shared ethical perspective to which the peoples and nations of the world can appeal, trusting the official status of the document given its association with the UN and its member states (Parekh, 2005).

The world of today is very different from the war weary world in which the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was made. We are today far more interdependent than we have ever been in the past. Technological advances in transport and communication mean that all societies are connected together in a global pattern of interaction and integration. Space has shrunk and news travel instantly between the far reaches of the world. Countries are becoming less and less homogenous in their make-up due to constant migration between the nations of the world, each group within a society linking it beyond its borders to distant lands. Events in one country can affect the rest of the world, economic troubles spread between lands and neither diseases or environmental damage are bound by borders. In effect we have already in many ways become a global country which has only yet to consolidate itself.

Hans Küng's view is that the 21st century will not be a European-dominated century, as the 19th was, nor an American century, as was the 20th, nor even will it be an Asian century as some are predicting. The 21st century will not be an age of imperialism and hegemony nor should it be an age of clashes between civilizations but it should be a World century in which we strive "for a commonwealth of all nations in which wealth is truly common", for a universal civilization (Küng, 2002:133).

There are of course many challenges to a world century in which universal civilization would have a chance of formation. A prerequisite for peace is that the religions of the world make peace among themselves as there can not be peace among the nations and civilizations if there is not peace among the religions which still hold much influence within most countries today. The challenge to this is a fundamentalism that has its roots in social misery and which rears its head in many if not all of the religions. Because of this there needs to be dialogue between the religions if there is to be peace among them. The challenges to real dialogue among the religions are certain dogmatic differences which become barriers to understanding between them. Hans Küng feels that "a global ethic, an ethical minimum common to all religions, cultures, civilizations" can and ultimately must be a real alternative to dogmatic disputes "because there will be no new world order without a global ethic" (Küng, 2002:134).

The development of a universal civilization does not mean the homogenization of cultures or religions. Despite the reordering of human affairs inherent in the process of globalization there is an unfathomable diversity of language, history, custom, belief etc. among the peoples of the earth that will not and should not be eradicated in order to create peace. Küng's idea of universal civilization means universality in the technological, economical, political, and, perhaps most importantly, the ethical dimension. As Küng says, "in this time of globalization of markets, technologies and medias we need also the globalization of ethics" (Küng, 2002:134).

Küng points out that a measure of how thinking about global ethics has increased is that in 1991 (when he published his book Projekt Welthethos) there were hardly any documents from world organizations on global ethics to which he could refer. In 1998 there were three important documents which called for a global ethic not only by dealing with human rights but with human responsibilities as well.

These three documents were: 1) *Our Global Neighbourhood* by the UN Commission on Global Governance (Küng, 2002:136-137), which calls for a neighbourhood ethic based on the golden rule – "People should treat others as they would themselves wish to be treated" – and states that "rights need to be joined with responsibilities" for the "tendency to emphasize rights while forgetting responsibilities" has "deleterious consequences". Finally this document calls for the international community to unite in support of a global ethic of common rights and shared responsibilities which would hopefully lead eventually to "a global charter of civil society – that could provide the basis for all to agree on rules that should govern the global neighbourhood." 2) *Our Creative Diversity* by the World Commission on Culture and Development (Küng, 2002:137) finds that collaborations can be made easier and the conflicts between people of different cultures and interests diminished if they learn to see themselves as "bound and motivated by shared commitments." In turn a global ethic must gain its content from "the cultural resources, the insights, emotional experiences, historical memories and spiritual orientations of the peoples." 3) *Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities* by the InterAction Council (Küng, 2002:137-138), which is made up of former presidents and prime ministers, finds that global problems demand global solutions which should be based in ideas, values and norms which all cultures and societies hold in respect. The document is meant to bring freedom and responsibilities into balance so that a fuller sense of responsibility may allow freedom itself to grow and thus inducing a move away from "freedom of indifference" to "freedom of involvement."

> Better social order both nationally and internationally cannot be achieved by laws, prescriptions and conventions alone, but needs a global ethic. Human aspirations for progress can only be realized by agreed values and standards applying to all people and institutions at all times (*InterAction Council;* in Küng, 2002:138).

What we glimpse in these three accounts besides an increased interest in global ethics is that there is also an increased emphasis on moral responsibilities to accompany human rights. Küng examines this idea and finds, among other things, that all rights imply responsibilities but not all responsibilities follow from rights. For instance, even though journalists and newspapers have the state-protected right to report freely, this right does not engender the responsibility to do so in a truthful, fair and objective manner. The same can be said for other rights such as the right to property which does not entail the responsibility to not use property in an anti-social manner, or to go even further the right to a free conscience does not oblige a person to act in accordance to his conscience (Küng, 2002).

So from this Küng finds that rights imply certain responsibilities which are legal obligations (termed 'perfect' obligations) but that not all responsibilities follow from legal rights. These are termed 'imperfect' obligations in that they have a wider meaning and are ethical obligations such as obligations of conscience and love (or even simple customs) based in human insight which can not truly be enforced since that would be breaching the freedom of thought and conscience itself (Küng, 2002). The conclusion that Küng draws from this is the following:

> No comprehensive ethic of humanity can be derived from human rights alone, fundamental though these are for human beings; it must also cover the human responsibilities which were there before the law. Before any codification in law and any state legislation there is the moral independence and conscious self-responsibility of the individual, with which not only elementary rights but also elementary responsibilities are connected (Küng, 2002:141).

Küng explains that the distinction between law and ethics has momentous consequences since "law and ethics are not a priori identical but can fall apart" (Küng, 2002:141). In politics this means that when a treaty is made there may not necessarily be the ethical will to enforce it which is what happened in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The fundamental principle of international law, 'treaties are to be observed', or *pacta sun servanda,* depends very definitely on the ethical will of both parties (Küng, 2002)

> ’Quid leges sine moribus?’ runs a roman saying: what is the use of any laws if no morals, no moral inclination, no obligation of conscience stands behind them? What is the use of a peace treaty which only exists on paper, which has not found its way into human heads and, since it is not just a rational event, into human hearts? There is no overlooking the fact that the realization of peace, justice and humanity depends on the insight and readiness of human beings to give the law validity. In other words the law needs a moral foundation! (Küng, 2002:142).

Based on the above Küng makes the statement that a better world can not be created or enforced by laws alone, that commitments to human rights presupposes an awareness of responsibility and obligations for which the head and heart must be addressed at the same time and that law has no permanent existence without ethics (Küng, 2002).

A Theoretical Framework for Global Ethics and Cross-Cultural Dialogue

Ethics is arguably the oldest Western academic discipline having its roots in the earliest Western philosophy. Plato’s description of it is that ethics “is no small matter, but how we ought to live” (Widdows, 2005:74). Ethics is generally a large part of how we think about things and as such is prominent in any discussions about politics or issues. Addressing issues and politics using ethics as a methodology has not until recently been thought appropriate and was generally eschewed by polite society. According to Booth, Dunne and Cox, “a point of view emphasizing the unity of politics and ethics would have struck many students and practitioners of international relations over the years as misconceived” (Widdows, 2005:75).

Since the period of the Enlightenment ethics as a discipline has branched extensively, developing into specialties and separate disciplines. Philosophy in general started to emulate the methodology of science and as a result there arose a skepticism about ethical values, their universality and their being inherent to the human being. This led to a division of theory from practice and in turn a reduction in the sphere of ethics.

> The division of the theory from the practice of ethics meant that ethics, as presented by philosophers, tended to be descriptive and analytical rather than prescriptive and

> practical…. In this manner the sphere of ethics was vastly reduced, rendering philosophers inarticulate on the fundamental questions of ethics, those key practical questions of how we ought to live (Widdows, 2005:76).

There has been a revival of ethics in the last few decades, the discipline seeing the return of philosophers to the field of moral philosophy, tackling practical issues and becoming involved in the broader public aspects of ethics. One sign of the renewed vigour of ethics is the emergence of many fields of 'applied ethics', that is, of fields of ethics which deal with practical matters as well as theoretical ones such as medical ethics, business ethics and environmental ethics. Taken together these may be seen as a step towards global ethics since none of the dilemmas raised by modern scientific and technological advances, which these fields are dealing with, can adequately be addressed by one community or nation-state. Heather Widdows asks the question 'why ethics' when in the past we've often looked to alternative political, cultural or religious frameworks and methodologies for guidance (Widdows, 2005).

One response is that traditional sources of morality do not function properly in modern society and that they not only fail to address new moral dilemmas but also traditional moral dilemmas. According to Taylor and Widdows (2005:77), this view is now broadly accepted as a fair description of religious value frameworks in the modern world. An argument for how this has come about is that because Christianity is no longer the 'official religion' in the West; it can no longer function as a shared moral source in a secularized pluralistic society which embraces competing value frameworks and belief systems. However, as Widdows explains, this paints a simplified picture since it is unlikely that Christianity has anywhere at any point in time been universally accepted or its moral framework absolute. In addition to this there have been many places and occasions in the past where Christianity has had to compete with differing belief systems yet this did not undermine the shared sense of values among the populace - an example of such a state could be the period between the 8^{th} and 15^{th} century in Spain during which Christians, Jews and Muslims lived together in relative peace and prosperity (Widdows, 2005).

Widdows feels that it is the introduction of liberal democracies that tipped the scale against blanketing moral frameworks. Referring to Christianity in Europe for example, she says that traditional sources of moral authority were not affected by the 'mere existence of competing world views', such as Islam and Judaism in the middle

ages, but that through the new paradigm of modernity they can not compete with the ideology, structure and values of liberal democracy. She even goes so far as to call them incompatible; however, I believe that what she means by this is that absolutist moral frameworks are incompatible with liberal democracies since they are themselves in a way absolutist and intolerant of competing systems. On the other hand non-liberal democracies, such as Islamic states, continue to endorse all encompassing (religious) value frameworks (Widdows, 2005).

Liberal democracies do not endorse any specific conceptions of right living but provide a framework within which any conception of right living can be chosen. Ostensibly the overarching value of liberal democracies is tolerance which is implemented in the political and moral spheres. Endorsing any one conception of right living is antonymic, so to speak, to the values of liberal democracies, however, simply by asserting tolerance and following the general framework which is part and parcel of the concept of liberal democracies they must implicitly and explicitly create exactly such a conception since, in order to promote and preserve tolerance in a society, laws and regulations as well as unwritten rules are made to oppose intolerance and attempts to impose a competing absolute value system – the only exception to this is if the competing absolutist value system is itself based on the same values as liberal democracy. It can be said that the basic prescription of liberal democracies is that all should comply with the laws of societies "which mediate between different views and essentially protect the rights of individuals and groups to engage in their chosen way of life" (Widdows, 2005:78). As such they promote a pluralist and multicultural way of life (Widdows, 2005).

From the above Widdows derives the notion that in a liberal democracy traditional sources of moral authority, such as religion, are untenable as shared sources of moral value – again I can only translate this as meaning religion in its absolutist and prescriptive form since both in liberal and non-liberal democracies people do use religions as shared sources of moral value, the difference between these is that the former permits little or no acknowledgement of other value systems as legitimate in their own right. This leads to religion being relegated into the private sphere and to the weakening of other forms of moral authority (Widdows, 2005). As Bhikhu Parekh puts it, "In order to consolidate itself both politically and ideologically and to create an individualist moral and political culture, the state set about dismantling traditional institutions, communities

and ways of life, with liberals providing the necessary ideological justification" (Parekh in Widdows, 2005:78).

With all this said, liberal democracies are far from being homogenous in their constitution, France for instance is very explicit about its liberal secular values and therefore is not multicultural. Despite this and other differences between liberal democracies their core values are in agreement but are rarely, if ever, explicitly stated. A corollary of this is that liberal democracies have a difficulty in justifying their value judgments, such as are made when making laws and regulating behavior, and their consequence and impact are not completely understood. Widdows finds that if liberal democracies are to be able to articulate the logic of their position and able to effectively engage in moral debate then they must find a way to discuss value in the public sphere as this can become a problem within borders, in establishing order and governance, and in global communications affecting international relations and policy making. Without being able to express its values in a logical way liberal democracies are neither able to engage in clear dialogue when dealing with dissent within its borders or when dealing with absolutist values systems whether within or without their borders nor able to comprehend or sympathize with these other value systems thus precluding communication. Widdows finds that this lack of understanding of both its own value system and that of others has lead to the failure of advocates of liberal democratic values to understand that the system they are advocating arises out of a particular moral framework in a particular socio-political context. This leads to a tendency to view the values they espouse as universal rather than values from one of many moral frameworks. Many have criticized human rights and its moral assumptions in this light and the resulting debate has exemplified the lack of defense, arguments and proper dialogue concerning liberal democratic ideals. Such rights, critics (such as those espousing Asian values) claim, are particular, individualist and Western in origin rather than universal and thus a form of imperialism (Widdows, 2005).

This is where the question Widdows sets forth 'why global ethics' becomes relevant. Ethics being well established in the intellectual and public life of liberal democracies makes it well suited to provide the theoretical analyses of the underlying values of liberal democracy and the basis of their unmasking as well as of the assumptions behind them. As such it provides an inclusive language for communication between and across differing value systems and perspectives using the familiar language of ethics to frame the various positions and thus enter into public moral debate. By

clarifying the assumptions behind liberal democratic values its framework is removed from a rarefied atmosphere in which no real dialogue can take part and put on a level where reciprocal debate and compromise is possible. If global ethics is to be prescriptive and engage in the ethical debates of our time then the aim of communication across belief and value frameworks can not simply be to gain understanding of alternative views, since this would amount to no more than a form of relativism, but in the context of globalization it needs to be able to find compromises and discover a more substantive global ethics (Widdows, 2005).

The process of striving towards a more substantive, inclusive and universal global ethics is a creative and fluid process defined by remaining always provisional and flexible, and being continually under construction and redefinition. In order to avoid being reductionist, vague or falling into any similar traps a universal conception of values must, if and when we reach such a shared ethical framework, always be contextual, taking into account the values and beliefs, as well as economic, social and political factors, that affect and embody local ethics and, at the same time, the local must be understood in the global context. This conceptual framework ought to preclude any kind of homogenization of valuable cultural heritages while providing a value system that is unified in its diversity without falling into moral relativism (Widdows, 2005).

If we quickly take a look at the study by Shalom Schwartz, professor of psychology in Jerusalem, we'll see that, as a proof of principle, we can find common ground between all different cultures on the premise that we all share a similar understanding of values as goals in society even though we may not always agree on their importance in each case. Schwartz has composed a list of universal motivational values based on empirical cross-cultural research. These universal values are defined as 'desirable trans-situational goals which serve as guiding principles in the life of a person.' The following four statements are implicit in the definition of values as goals.

1) They serve the interests of some social entity [sic]

2) They can motivate action, giving it direction and emotional intensity

3) They function as standards for judging and justifying action

4) They are acquired both through socialization to dominant group values and through the unique learning experiences of individuals (Alkire, 2002:170-171).

This list was compiled by doing 200 surveys in 64 countries involving over 60,000 respondents. The following comprehensive set of universal values are identified from this data:

> **Power** (social status, prestige, control or dominance over people and resources)
> **Achievement** (personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards)
> **Hedonism** (pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself)
> **Stimulation** (excitement, novelty and challenge in life)
> **Self-direction** (independent thought and action – choosing, creating, exploring)
> **Universalism** (understanding, appreciation, tolerance, protection for the welfare of all people and for nature)
> **Benevolence** (preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact)
> **Tradition** (respect for, commitment to and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide)
> **Conformity** (restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations and norms)
> **Security** (safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self) (Alkire, 2002:171)

Though seemingly simplistic, this list is of importance in that it shows the basic unity of human thought all over the world. It does not follow that all cultures necessarily share all of these values nor that they are all of the same importance to all people but Schwartz makes the claim that the values of any person or culture can be understood by a person of another culture in relation to the above categories. This means that there is a basis of understanding between all cultures even if they may disagree on some of the values. Without this basic understanding there could be no communication between different cultures. Although they are too general to be useful as a set of global values due to the possibility of interpretation and conflict between the values themselves they show us a basis of commonality from which we can work.

Global Problems and Ethical Responses to Them

In Peter Singer's book *One World* he discusses the ethical dimensions that he feels are compelling us to take new ethical outlook on world governance and the responsibility of nations towards each other. He wants us to go beyond the Westphalian system of governance – "states exercising power within their own borders and governing the world between them through international co-operation in the society of states." (Dower, 2003:151). He uses as an example of this old outlook the words of President George W. Bush where he stated, in March 2001, that his government would not do anything that could harm the U.S. economy "...because first things first are the people who live in America" (Singer, 2002:1-2). Singer also refers to the words of President Bush Senior at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro: "The American lifestyle is not negotiable" (Singer, 2002:2). Both of the quotes are referring to the effects of carbon emissions and the lack of desire on the part of the American president to compromise on the quality of living in the U.S.A. of its citizens for the sake of preventing, or at least lessening, the effects of global warming. Over time the effects of global warming will lead to unpredictable changes in weather patterns, loss of land due to flooding and the displacement of millions of people (Singer, 2002).

The ethical paradigm that has generally directed our world's nations is the one of protecting the interests of one's own citizens first – as evinced by the words of both Bush Junior and Senior. This was the guiding principle in the NATO intervention in Kosovo where, in order to protect its own troops, the intervention consisted solely of aerial bombardment. This ethical paradigm may be said to be the strongest hindrance to the direct intervention of nations in situations where their interests are not at stake, leading to such incidents as the ethnic cleansing episodes of Rwanda, Serbia and lately Sudan (Singer, 2002).

This attitude has come under some criticism. Romano Prodi said, as a response to the statement of Bush Junior, "if one wants to be a world leader, one must know how to look after the entire earth and not only American industry" (Singer, 2002:3). Timothy Garton Ash said in condemnation of the self-serving policy of the U.S., referring to its policies in Kosovo, "It is a perverted moral code that will allow a million innocent civilians of another race to be made destitute because you are not prepared to risk the life of a single professional soldier of your own" (Singer, 2002:3). Singer cites a report by the

UN on the 1994 genocide of Rwanda that 2,500 trained military personnel with the proper mandate could have saved 800,000 lives (Singer, 2002).

Janna Thompson finds that the "present world political order is not conducive to the solution of global environmental problems" and that "political boundaries, and identifications and attitudes associated with them, encourage moral parochialism" (Thompson, 2001:136). A global ethic – appropriate to global citizenship – consists mainly of two components, first a set of universal values and norms that apply to all people everywhere and secondly a norm of global responsibility in which agents must promote, in principle and as possible, what is good anywhere in the world or oppose what is bad (Dower, 2003).

When people talk of being global citizens they are making a statement about their ethical relationship to the world. That they have obligations towards its peoples and its environment. Beyond this it is a statement of human compassion. This is why people generally respond with feelings of distress when confronted with pictures of starving children from other parts of the world. As a result of this feeling of global responsibility such organizations as Greenpeace, Amnesty International or SOS Children's Villages to name a few, have come into being. Although the motivation to protect the environment and its inhabitants is common to all who call themselves global citizens, its expression can differ considerably, from everything to donating to charities to civil disobedience. So, even though they share the same ethical foundation, not all global citizens will agree on how it is expressed, i.e. in violence for example. Just as the citizens of a nation state may disagree on a variety of matters but are still able to work together on the common ground of their shared values (Dower, 2002).

An example of such concerted action is the 1996 the legal opinion delivered by the World Court stating that, with one qualification, possessing nuclear weapons is illegal. This opinion would not have been sought by the UN if thousands of ordinary people had not signed 'declarations of public conscience' pressuring the UN to seek the opinion (Dower, 2002). We act in accordance with our belief that we are global citizens. As such we promote the values we believe in our daily life be they non-violence, human rights and so forth. "The key element here is the idea of active support for the community one belongs to – in this case, the global community" (Dower, 2002:149).

In accepting a global ethic one ultimately accepts a loyalty to it and the moral community it affirms. However, this does not mean that the individual must reject his ties to his or her local or national community. It does mean that a person must balance duties

and responsibilities towards his local community and state with his felt responsibilities towards the global community and on occasion these may conflict (Dower, 2002). As an extreme example of this might be a white skinned individual in South Africa during apartheid who would have had to make the choice to either follow his state's policy of discrimination or to follow the global ethic expressed through the world's human rights literature as well as through the majority opinion of the world's nations and their inhabitants at the time, both of which meant accepting and affirming the human rights of black people and possibly suffering the consequences thereof.

There are certain elements of human well-being common to all and valued in all communities, such as nutrition, health, shelter, security and so on. These elements are generally known as human rights which we posses in virtue of our common humanity and which are not subject to variable conventions of laws and communities. Corresponding to these rights is the duty to respect and uphold these rights. For global citizens the duty of helping those who suffer goes beyond looking at those in your close vicinity but becomes a global obligation (Dower, 2002).

A problem arises when we consider that not all may agree on the universality of values due to post-modernistic or relativistic thinking about values or, more seriously, such universal values and their imposition may be considered a form of proselytism or cultural imperialism. Some may find that values are communitarian in nature, i.e. based in social conventions, or that they are not timeless truths discovered by reason but that they emerge through convention, consensus and negotiation within and between societies (Dower, 2002).

Probably very few countries in the world, if any, adhere completely to the values proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but most seem to be working towards the goal of achieving them however slowly it may seem. Generally not many countries can be considered having achieved adequate levels of equality between the sexes but this is generally admitted to be the case. On the other hand there are countries that show no real desire to follow many of the values of the declaration, such as Saudi Arabia in which women are forbidden to drive for example. Nigel Dower suggests that we may get past our differences as to the nature of values if we find a common core of values accepted in any society which we deem to be universal. These may come to be accepted through the convergence of interests and by processes of negotiation, thus we may come to a shared set of common principles and norms to the mutual advantage of all peoples (Dower, 2002).

> Cosmopolitan ideas and schemes have persisted throughout the centuries, sometimes emerging with particular vigour, as in the years after the first world war…. As global problems, particularly environmental problems, intensify, it is natural to suppose that cosmopolitanism should become a more popular and credible ideal. It is a perverse feature of our times that both cosmopolitan ethics and schemes of governance are widely regarded with suspicion or hostility, especially by environmentalists (Thompson, 2001:137).

Dower points out that what may be considered global problems for one group would not be so considered by another. This is due to a problem being "only a problem relative to a set of values, and people's values differ" (Dower, 2003:19). Thus global warming is generally considered a global problem due to its all pervasive nature while the control of patents by rich companies may only induce ire in those who stand to lose from its exclusivity. An example of this would be those suffering of diseases in the developing countries not able to afford expensive medicines that could be made cheaper were it not for the patents (however, as Singer (2002) points out, medical companies have in many cases been forced to relinquish their patents in developing countries due to the overarching need). Despite this Dower believes that the desire to confront these global issues does not solely, and often not at all, stem from the need for self preservation but, as in the case of world poverty, the feeling that these problems ought to be tackled. As Dower points out world poverty does not directly affect the rich countries but because it is an evil that offends our moral values we find that "it is something that ought to be alleviated by our collective efforts" (Dower, 2003). Dower (2003:19-20) sets forth a useful measure of what defines a global problem:

a) It is a problem caused by people (or events and processes) from all parts of the world.
b) It is a problem that requires the coordinated efforts of many actors from all parts of the world, particularly governments of countries, to solve.
c) It is a problem for significant numbers of people throughout the world.

Dower mentions that though these three elements apply to most cases they may not apply straightforwardly to all cases. Terrorism for instance is, for the most part and depending on the definition, caused by a small number of agents from a specific area of the world. Additionally Dower makes the observation that what makes a global problem is not who did what but the global ethical perspective. There is an ethic being appealed to when we

say that certain evils need to be tackled at a global level. The idea of global citizenship has emerged in part as a response to global problems and as a result of individuals becoming empowered by the technological progress of the modern age. People are increasingly committing themselves to the idea that human beings matter everywhere and as a result putting that commitment into action (Dower, 2003). Janna Thompson envisions this leading to and necessitating the development of transnational mechanisms for the improvement of the life of the poor and needy:

> Traditional cosmopolitanism is based upon the moral premise that all individuals deserve respect as autonomous agents and have a moral right to freedom of conscience and association. Most contemporary cosmopolitans recognize that to solve problems of poverty and inequality it is not enough that individuals respect each other's liberty. Something must also be done about the structural and transnational causes of environmental damage and poverty, and this is likely to entail cooperation on a large scale, transfer of resources from the rich to the poor, and extensive limitations to the scope of individual freedom and the independence of communities (Thompson, 2001:140-141).

Thompson points out that difficulties arise when trying to determine what political institutions or international agreements can cope with the existing problems of the world, in redefining what justice requires of us and what citizenship means in this changed paradigm of responsibility. One way of defining cosmopolitan citizenship, Thompson tells us, is to use the modern conception created in the 20th century that citizenship means possessing civil and political rights but also encompasses social rights, rights to benefits and services that make the individual capable of autonomy. Others go even further in listing rights, such as environmental rights – the right to clean air, water, and so on (Thompson, 2001).

Thompson makes the point, especially illuminating in trying to understand the motives behind establishing a global citizenship, that individuals are not merely autonomous actors pursuing their own interests. Most people also regard themselves as participants in what could be called a 'generational continuum.' They see themselves as members of a family, as participants in a community or culture – and thus as the inheritors of a tradition or heritage which they expect to pass on to their successors. Most people value their heritage – even though they may object to some features of it – and see themselves as responsible for ensuring that their successors will be able to appreciate it.

As she says, most people are concerned for the well being of their children and grandchildren and want them to be able to enjoy the goods inherent in the environment (Thompson, 2001:142).

Janna Thompson sets out three requirements that cosmopolitanism must satisfy if it is to quell the complaints of its critics and carry the responsibility the proponents of global citizenship desire it to bear:

a) Its ethical values must be universally acceptable.
b) These values must be the basis for a transnational solidarity and capable of motivating individuals to cooperate for the sake of solving global problems to the degree that, given good reason, they would be willing to sacrifice personal, local and national interests for the sake of people of the world as a whole.
c) Finally they must lead to the creation and development of institutions that provide political and economic means for resolving global problems without undermining particular or local relations that people value (Thompson, 2001).

Thompson believes that the notion of world citizenship may be able to fulfill these requirements. Citizenship implies duties as well as rights, a willingness to sacrifice for your fellow citizens, to cooperate for the sake of common good. It also implies membership in a political society and institutional embodiments of that citizenship. Thompson feels that if the idea of being a world citizen can be made attractive and intelligible it can be made the moral basis for future environmental global governance. Derek Heater considers whether responsibility for the planet may not be made a basis for world citizenship and Fred Steward thinks that the adoption of universal values and a global identity is needed if we really recognize our common dependence on nature (Thompson, 2001).

The Rise of Environmental Ethics on the Global Scene Over the 20th Century

There has been an exponential rise of national environmental protection activities over the 20th century. Though environmental issues are generally very far from having been solved or even addressed and the problems so far have outdistanced the solutions the nation-states have taken on an increasing portfolio of responsibilities towards the natural environment and many associated activities seem to have slowed their rate of degradation (Frank, Hironaka and Schofer, 2000).

Frank et al. (2000) found that there has been an exponential growth during the twentieth century in 'the embrace of responsibility for the natural environment by nation-states.' They found this by examining five indicators over almost a hundred year period, i.e. the cumulative numbers of national parks and protected areas; chapters of international environmental nongovernmental associations – such as the World Wildlife Fund; state memberships in intergovernmental environmental organizations; environmental impact assessment laws; and national environmental ministries. Frank et al. suggest that the nation-state has become environmentalized in that a whole set of policies, once invisible in state organizations, now have become standard. The point isn't that states have become completely dedicated to environmental protection, rather that a new dimension of state responsibility has emerged. "Debates now are no longer about whether to protect the global environment but how it should be protected" (Haas in Frank et al., 2000: 97).

Before 1900 there were fewer than 40 national parks in the world, located mainly in the United Kingdom and its colonies. In 1907 there were parks on every continent and in 1990 there were listed more than 7,000 national parks throughout the world. Country chapters of international environmental nongovernmental associations, such as the International Council for Bird Preservation founded in 1922, have also seen a marked increase during the twentieth century. As Frank et al. mention, "such chapters represent citizen mobilization on environmental issues, embodying change in national polities more precisely than change in national states" (2000: 97). The development of intergovernmental environmental organizations, which represent official state mobilization around environmental issues, and the increase of state memberships in such organizations has provided the parameters of action for the global commons (oceans,

rivers, atmosphere, etc.) and established to an increasing degree standards of conduct within national borders. An early example of such intergovernmental organization is the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 1911 composed of some of the major powers of that time (United States, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia). Today there are 58 countries on the governing council of the United Nations Environment Programme, considered the major intergovernmental environmental program and which has the broad mission of providing environmental policy leadership within the world community (Frank et al., 2000). Environmental assessment laws have grown from 1 in 1969 to more than 50 in 1990 and, starting in 1971, national environmental ministries were established in 109 countries by 1995 – being especially encouraged into existence by the two United Nations conferences on the environment in 1972 and 1992. What this development shows is that over the twentieth century nation-states have become increasingly accountable for the protection of nature (Frank et al., 2000).

Global institutionalization of the nation-state as the protector of the natural environment has not only meant a change in the concept of "nation-state" but also of "environmental protection" which has come to mean the preservation of the global ecosystem rather than the conservation of local natural resources. In this development attitudes have shifted from being a sacred fiat to being a rational approach to human self-preservation where "every aspect of nature is reformed into an element vital for human survival" (Frank et al., 2000:109). Through institutionalization in world society environmental protection has become more global and thus protective activities are seen to affect and be a part of a worldwide whole (Frank et al., 2000).

In conclusion Frank et al. find that the exponential increase of environmental protection activities and organizations are not just in response to domestic degradation and the rise of affluence, though these may play some part, but in larger part a response to a 'global redefinition of the responsibilities of the nation state.' Frank et al. (2000) emphasize large-scale structural processes, in which domestic factors appear more as mechanisms of change rather than independent causal forces.

In concrete terms, we see global social forces at work when national parks appear in Nepal, when a chapter of the International Council for Bird Preservation opens in The Gambia, when Mexico joins the International Whaling Commission. With these activities, nation-states embody global institutional forms, which themselves have become more universal over time (Frank et al., 2000:111).

Conclusion

When looking at the criticism laid at the feet of global citizenship I found that there is an insistence to compartmentalize humanity into separate and alien entities. We don't know what direction the concept of global citizenship will take in the future in terms of governance but it is an undisputed fact that the reality that surrounds us has made us all the members of a mutually dependent global community which is continually becoming more integrated not only economically but technologically, socially and ethically as well. It is a strange tendency of man to so lose himself in the technicalities of a concept that its ideas, having once made the world more understandable, now become prison bars of the mind, preventing him from seeing clearly how the outside world has changed. To recycle a famous saying, citizenship was made for man and not man for citizenship.

There is a tendency for theorists to overreach when making statements about global citizenship and its future. Today we are simply looking at global citizenship as a development of human relations in a interconnected world both through individuals and through institutional mechanisms. To make any absolute statement about the future prospects of global citizenship and, as a corollary, global governance would be a fruitless exercise as we can not know what developments the world will go through in the next 50 years, let alone the next 100 or 1000 years. We should focus on the developments as we can see them today and try our best to steer and utilize them in a manner that provides the most good for all.

I believe, as many of the theorists quoted in this paper seem to do, that dialogue between the nations and their peoples will bring us ever closer to an ideal of global civilization we can all agree on, a common ground for us to consult within. It seems to me, looking at the historical trend, that we can expect that there will continue to be integration between the world's peoples and its ideologies which will create something we may not even be able to imagine yet. However there is the danger that if we are not able to dismiss our differences by learning to understand each other and engaging in dialogue, that we will have to learn the hard way to live with each other. If it took two world conflagrations to induce in men a peace seeking attitude in Europe, what will it take for peace to come to the whole world?

These final words and succinct summary instill however a hope of what is to come in future years:

> The horrific experiences of two world wars which gave birth at first to the League of Nations and then to the United Nations; the frequency with which world leaders, particularly in the decade of the nineties, have met and agreed on the resolution of global issues; the call for a global order that issued from the participation of these leaders in the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations; the multiplication of organizations of civil society that focus attention on a variety of international concerns through the operation of an ever-expanding network of activities; the widespread debates on the need for global governance and numerous organized efforts towards world peace; the emergence of international tribunals; the rapid developments in communications technology that have made the planet borderless -- these are among the voluminous evidences of a momentum toward peaceful international relations that has clearly become irreversible (Bahá'í International Community, 1999).

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