Promotion of Human Security in EU External Policy

Inga Cristina Campos

Lokaverkefni til MA-gráðu í alþjóðasamskiptum

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Leiðbeinandi: Alyson Bailes

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Útdráttur

Tilgangur þessa lokaverkefnis er að beina athygli að hugtakinu mannöryggi og hlutverki þess í utanríkisstefnu Evrópusambandsins. Mannöryggi sem hugtak snýr í stuttu máli að því að öryggi fólks er mikilvægara öryggi ríkja. Ítarlega verður farið yfir hugtakið sjálft, tilkomu þess í umræðuna og umhverfið sem það varð til í. Einnig verða þær tvær skilgreiningar mannöryggis sem mesta athygli hafa fengið greindar og staða hugtaksins borin saman við hið hefðbundna öryggishugtak þar sem öryggi ríkja er meginmarkmið. Til þess að greina hlutverk mannöryggis innan Evrópusambandsins verða grundvallarskjöl sambandsins skoðuð sem og tilurð Lissabon samningsins. Að lokum verða átökin í Líbýu og viðbrögð Evrópusambandsins við þem greind með mannöryggi að leiðarljósi.

Meginniðurstaða ritgerðarinnar er sú að mannöryggi er sannanlega til staðar í utanríkisstefnu Evrópusambandsins og í almennri nálgun þess á öryggis og friðarstjórnun. Ljóst er að Evrópusambandið skilgreinir öryggi ekki aðeins sem hefðbundið öryggi ríkja og að mannöryggi hefur haft áhrif á þróun öryggisstefnu þess. Margar tilvísanir í hugtakið má finna bæði í skjölum sem og í orðræðu sambandsins en enn hefur þó ekki verið minnst á hugtakið sjálft í opinberum skjölum. Því má segja að Evrópusambandið aðhyllist mannöryggi að flestu leyti nema að nafninu til, í orði en ekki á borði.

Lagt er til í niðurstöðum að sambandið fari eftir þeim meginráðleggingum sem bornar eru fram í hinni svokölluðu Madrídarskýrslu, að Evrópusambandið skuldbindi sig að hugtakinu mannöryggi að fullu. Það myndi auka lögmæti sambandsins á sviði friðar-og öryggismála sem og þjóna sem mikilvægur þáttur í mótun skýrrar og beinnar stefnu þess í utanríkismálum.

Abstract

The main aim of this master thesis is to analyse the concept of human security and its role within the framework of EU‘s external policy. Human security revolves around the notion that security of individuals is more important than that of states. The concept of human security will be analysed in detail, its two main definition identified and its origins as a new approach to security explored. The concept will be compared to the traditional security concept which has security of states as a main goal and then the two main dimensions of the human security will be explored. To explore human security within the conceptual framework of EU policies, relevant EU documents and the Lisbon Treaty will be analyzed. Finally EU's role in the Libya crisis and its response to the crisis will be investigated through a human security focus.

The main conclusion is that there is strong evidence indicating that human security does play a role within the EU, in its general approach to crisis management and that human security has affected the development of its external policy. It is apparent that the EU has realized that security is not only based on the traditional state definition. Aspects of human security are present in various EU's statements, decisions and discourse but the concept has never been explicitly voiced or drafted in EU's official documents. Thus, it can be stated that, though the EU clearly follows a human security agenda, a full commitment to the concept of human security has not been made.

In the conclusions a full commitment to the concept of human security by the EU as seen in the Madrid report is recommended. This would serve as an important factor providing the EU with a direct and clear strategy in crisis management and enhance its legitimacy as a global actor in crisis management.

Preface

My thesis corresponds to 30 ECTS credits and is written in the discipline of International Relations at the University of Iceland under the supervision of Alyson Bailes. I have been interested in the notion of security since working for the Directorate for International and Security Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Reyjavík. It was later, in a course taught by Alyson Bailes, A Secure Europe in a Better World, that my interest in the security and foreign policy in the framework of the EU was motivated. During that course I decided to find a subject and a current issue within the topic of Europe as a global actor in international relations to take on in my master thesis.

The reason for choosing to make the concept of human security a focal point in my thesis was that I find the concept fascinating. The concept is an attempt to conceptualize the changing nature of security of the post-Cold War era which the traditional state security concept was not able to explain. It emphasises the security of individuals and that protecting and securing people should be the main focus of crisis management which has aroused an interesting intellectual debate surrounding the questions: who is the main object of security and the main provider of security. The role of human security within the European Union's external policy has been interesting as the EU, in its response to the changed security environment, has clearly made efforts to incorporate the concept of human security but has however avoided making a full commitment to the concept.

I would first and foremost like to thank my supervisor Alyson Bailes, for her invaluable guidance and assistance while writing this thesis and during my studies and second, I want to thank my family and especially my husband, Hannes Sigurjónsson and our two children, Hekla Rán and Hilmir Páll for their patience and support.

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1. Introduction

There is no arguing with the fact that there has been a transformation of the structure of international relations since the cold war ended, from a bipolar to a multipolar system. This has had an extensive impact on the security policies created and implemented by the European Union (EU), among others, and has forced the EU to rethink its security role and to find a new approach to security, better equipped to deal with this new security environment (Sira & Gräns, 2009, p. 1).

In addition, the EU's approach to security has been influenced by the complex processes and outcomes of globalization which has had the impact of making the world a smaller place. As Kaldor and Glasius point out: 'the security of Europe can then only be assured through a global approach to security and through tackling the regional conflicts and failing states that are the main source of 'hard' security threats to Europe.'(Kaldor & Glasius, 1996, p. 1).

Consequently, important questions related to who is the main provider of security; the state, international agencies or transnational organizations, as well as who is the primary object of security; the state or the individual, have been continuously raised and debated. Human security as a concept first appeared within the academic discourse that arose within International Security Studies in this new environment, as its focus shifted from the traditional security analysis, where military capabilities determinate threats, to a wider and deeper understanding of what constitutes a threat and to whom.

The idea of human security is an attempt to conceptualize the changing nature of security. It recognizes that 'the security of one person, one community, one nation rests on the decisions of many others, sometimes fortuitously, sometimes precariously, and that policies and institutions must find new ways to protect individuals and communities' (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 3).

There have been several changes in the EU's approach in responding both to specific contemporary threats and to the different security environment. One essential change has been an effort, in practice as well as in theory and discourse, to incorporate the dimension of human security. In the EU's case, a major driver of this change in approach has been a response to the changed nature of conflicts in the world, and to the way they impact Europe's own interests and responsibilities. So-called 'new wars', different from the traditional state-to-state wars, have become more common since 1945 while the numbers of the latter have fallen.

Table 1 - Armed conflict type trends (Buhaug, Gates, Hegre & Strand, 2007)



The distinction between human rights violations by states, abuses by non-state actors, and conflict between armed combatants has become blurred as much of the violence in intra-state conflicts is inflicted on civilians. These wars also spill over borders and involve both global and local actors (Kaldor & Glasius, 1996, p. 14). A Kaldor and Glasius point out:

> The whole point of a human security approach in EU policy is that Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity. National borders are no longer the dividing line between security and insecurity: insecurity gets exported. (Kaldor & Glasius, 1996, p. 16).

The implications of such conflicts, and other serious internal violence, for Europe itself are two-fold: direct impacts such as refugee flows, disruption of trade, or threats to European citizens abroad and their investments; and the general damage done by conflict, both to the peaceful world system that Europe needs for its survival and prosperity, and to European

norms relating to human rights, rule of law and peaceful resolution of disputes. In the context of the EU, the human security approach encompasses a variety of concepts and concerns, including crisis management, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and transitional justice.

1.1. Purpose and research questions

The purpose of this thesis is first and foremost to analyse the concept of human security within the foreign policy of the EU. At first glance, the human security idea can seem a simple one, a straightforward concept where the focus is on individuals instead of states. But this is far from reality; human security is a deeply complex concept with many meanings. It is a security concept which has caused the international community and policy makers to view security in a different way and has changed the focus from that of states to that of individuals.

This thesis will analyse the concept of human security and explore whether and how it is playing a role within the external policy of the EU. This is done by analysing different documents, concerning both the CSDP framework and EU's role in Libya.

The main research questions are therefore as follows:

- *First, what is human security and what does it incorporate? How does the concept differ from the traditional security concept where states are the main objects?*
- *Second, to what extend does the concept of human security play a role in the common foreign, security, and defence policies of the EU?*[1] *Is the notion of human security visible in EU documents and if so what impact has the concept has on policy making and on missions?*
- *Third, to what extent has human security been a part of EU's crisis management in Libya? Have relevant documents and the EU discourse leading up to and during EUFOR Libya and EUBAM Libya displayed a human security approach?*

This thesis argues that the EU has avoided any concrete linkage to the notion of human security but that, in reality, there are many human security aspects to be found within

[1] This thesis does not explore the possible contribution of the EU's development assistance, humanitarian disaster relief, and other more specialized policies to the goals of human security, although these would certainly be relevant to a comprehensive assessment.

the EU's external policies. By a thorough analysis of different documents, both relating to the CSDP in general and in the case of Libya, many references to and reflections of the concept will be detected.

1.2. Methodological framework

1.2.1. Qualitative research methods

In this thesis a qualitative research method will be used as it is the most efficient way to explore the research questions. The thesis will be based on a literature study, with the emphasis on understanding the concept of human security, both in the context of security theory and in terms of its role within EU external policy. Given the breath of the topic, there are a number of sources to work with, and by searching and analyzing relevant documents and articles the intention is to establish a suitable selection of leading academics who are currently taking part in and developing the discussion of human security within EU foreign policy. The thesis topic has been addressed by exploring official EU documents, various academic articles, speeches, reports, summit declarations and the facts on EU missions. These sources together constitute a sound basis for this thesis.

1.2.2. Gathering resources

The fact that such a broad range of literature exists, in the security studies field, on human security and the European Union is a reflection in itself of the fundamental changes taking place in the area of International Relations. The vast array of literature makes it important to keep a tight focus on the subject in hand. On the other hand, literature on EU's role in Libya is scarce and most of it comes from EU sources; therefore it is important to read these with a critical mind.

1.2.3. Limitations

As Hart points out, concepts cannot be assumed to have a universal definition (Hart, 2008, p. 81), and the concept of human security has various interpretations - often summed up as ranging from a broad to a narrow perspective - that make it difficult to pinpoint its meaning exactly. It is a difficult concept and as such it also has its critics. Finally, by using only written

documents and articles as references, the gap between the author and the reader is wide and this makes the possibility of multiple reinterpretations more likely (Hodder, 1994, p. 394).

1.3. Thesis outline

The first chapter will analyse in detail the concept of human security and investigate its origins as a new approach to security. It will compare the concept to the traditional security concept where the state is the main object of security. Furthermore it will give an overview of the different aspects of human security, covering the two main approaches of the concept - one narrow and one broad - and the theoretical debate surrounding the concept. This will be done in order to establish a thorough understanding of the concept before proceeding to analyse its role and consequences within the relevant EU policies. The chapter will then conclude by comparing the two approaches to human security.

The second chapter will explore human security within the conceptual framework of EU policies. To do this, three significant documents will be examined: the European Security Strategy, the Barcelona report and the Madrid report.[2] Further, the chapter will analyse the Lisbon Treaty to see whether it has brought any changes that further promote human security within the EU's external policies, and if so, in what aspects.

Chapter three will take a close look at EU's role in crisis management, exploring the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the EU's strengths and weaknesses in the field of security. Finally, it will analyse EU's external security policies and discourse within the CDSP to explore if there is any commitment to the concept of human security. The six principles of human security proposed in the Madrid report will be used as guidelines for this.

Chapter four is a case study where the EU's role in crisis management during the recent Libya crisis is explored. The two missions EUFOR Libya and EUBAM Libya will be

[2] Albrecht, et.al. (2007). *A European way of security: The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background Report.*

Albrecht, et al.(2004). *A human security doctrine for Europe: the Barcelona report of the study group on Europe's security capabilities*. Amouyel, A. (2006). What is Human Security? *Revue de Sécurité Humaine / Human Security Journal, 1,* 10-23

European Union. (2009). *European Security and Defence Policy: the civilian aspects of crisis management.*

discussed and special attention given to relevant documents and discourse to see whether the notion of human security can be found. As in chapter three, the human security principles from the Madrid report will serve to highlight the aspects of human security in relevant documents.

The fifth and final part offers conclusions and recommendations.

2. The concept of human security

'The human security paradigm not only changes the way we look at the world, it leads to a new way of acting in the world – and to a new diplomacy.' (McRea & Hubert, 2001, p. xxi).

In this chapter the concept of human security will be discussed. The chapter will give an overview of the concepts emergence and its definitions as well as the academic debate surrounding the concept and its difference from traditional state security. Starting with the historical conditions under with the concept emerged the chapter will look at the human security debate and explore the two approaches to the concept, one narrow and the other broad, otherwise called freedom from fear and freedom from want and fear, defined by their different focus on threats to human security. As the chapter will show, these different approaches share fundamental ideas and the difference is more of packaging then of substance. The main thread in both approaches is the security of the individual.

2.1 A new approach to security

Security has traditionally been defined as security of states. Following the peace treaty in Westphalia in 1648 the Hobbesian model gained ground, with its central thesis being that by providing security for the people living within it, the state derives legitimacy for its sovereignty. According to Hobbes, by the provision of security for its citizens the state earns legitimate monopoly of violence within its borders (Amouyel, 2006, p. 11). This realist security approach can said to have reached its peak during the Cold War when international stability relied on the balance of power between states and on the notion that if the security of states was ensured then the security of citizens would follow. Security was seen foremost as protection from invasion, preserving the territorial integrity of the state and using military means to ensure its protection against external aggression. When the Cold War came to an end this traditional way of looking at security began to lose credibility as it became clear that secure states are not a guarantee for secure citizens. This became plain with horrible tragedies such as the mass slaughter of the Tutsi population in Rwanda by the Hutus in 1994 and the ethnic cleansing of Bosnians by the Serbs.

When the focus of the international community shifted from the power balance between the superpowers and the fear of a nuclear war to other things happening around the world, it became clear that the Cold War had hid the fact that people were not necessarily secure within seemingly secure states. As Liotta and Owen put it:

> Ironically, the faith placed in the realist world view, and the security it provided, masked the actual issues threatening the individual. The protection of the person was all too often negated by an over attention to the state. Allowing key issues to fall through the cracks, 'traditional security' failed at its primary objective: protecting the individual. (Liotta & Owen, 2006b, p. 38)

There was a need to respond to this challenge to state-centered security; to major changes in international relations; and to the increased inter-dependency of individuals and nations. Transnational non-state actors as well as international organization were becoming more relevant actors in the international arena. The process of globalizations with all its pros and cons also had a big impact on this changed security environment. Unrestricted movement of financial capital and technology led to economic crises like the Asian and Russian crises of the 1990's and to increased trafficking of drugs, people and weapons and of international terrorism which was on the rise. Despite the decreased risk of major state-to-state wars, conflicts, and global confrontations that came with the end of the Cold War, the expected global peace never became a reality: rather, the shift from a polarized to a global environment meant an increased awareness of these different, more diverse threats and insecurities for people around the world (Chenoy & Tadjbakhsh, 2007, pp. 11-12).

The traditional security concept was not able to address these new threats or to explain this new world order, and this left a gap in the security discourse that led intellectuals to explore ways to broaden the security debate so as to encompass non-military aspects of security. Two ground-breaking articles were published in the prominent journals, *International Security* and *Foreign Affairs,* both with the title ¨*Redefining Security*¨. The first article, published in 1983 by Richard Ullman, questioned traditional security for focusing too much on military threats and for ignoring other even more harmful threats (Ullman, 1983, p. 129). The other article, by Jessica Mathews Tuckman, published in 1989, called for a redefinition of what would constituted as national security in the 1990s. Recent global development, she argued, suggested the need for a broader security concept, taking into consideration environmental, resource and demographic issues (Tuchman, 1989, p. 162).

The failure of the state-centered view of security to explain the post cold war era enabled new ways to conceptualize and examine security. The erosion of the security concept at the conceptual level lead to a simultaneous broadening of the concept both horizontally and vertically. Horizontally the security concept incorporated non-military dimensions of security such as environmental, economic and demographic, and vertically it incorporated non-state referents such as individuals, ethnic groups, religious groups and local communities. The combination of these new security dimensions and these new non-state referent objects of security led to a new environment where Human Security emerged as a concept (Prezelj, 2008, p. 3).

The term 'human security' first officially appeared on the scene of international relations in 1994, with a report by the UN Human Development Program (UNDP). It challenged the traditional concept of security by contending that the central focus of security efforts should be the individual human being, not the nation-state that had so far been the typical focus of analysis. It stated that it was time to redress the balance and to move from the security thinking of the Cold War, focused on the protection of territory, to a security vision including the protection of people (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 22).

In support of this shift in security focus, the report cites the founding document of the United Nations where freedom from want and freedom from fear were stated as recognized rights and where equal weight was given to territories and people (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 24). Human security was defined in the UNDP report as safety from constant threats, such as hunger, disease and repression, but also as protection from sudden and harmful disruption in the patters of the daily life of individuals (p. 3).

The primacy of human rights was one basic tenet distinguishing the human security approach from the traditional state-based approach. It served to highlight several issues in world politics that were moving into the centre stage of international relations after the Cold War, such as human development, the increasing number of transnational threats, political violence inside states, and the increasing influences of non-state actors. It implied, in fact, that in today´s world it would be impossible to separate security and development as the former UN-Secretary Kofi Annan pointed out in his report to the General Assembly 'Accordingly, we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights' (Annan, 2005, p. 17).

As already noted, this new emphasis on the individual in the security debate was driven partly by the changed nature of war in the early 1990s. The end of the bipolar competition changed the nature of threats and their perception dramatically. The very nature of conflict had altered and it became clear that unlike the state-to-state wars of the past, today's wars were increasingly within states. An increasing number of violent conflicts erupted in the early 1990s within states in Asia, the Balkans and Africa, leading to huge humanitarian crises. Of the 89 armed conflicts in the world between 1989 and 1992, 79 could be defined as intra-state wars: only three were state-to-state wars (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 47).

In these circumstances it became clear that the concepts of traditional and national security were not able to reflect either the actual situation or the needs stemming from it. In this new security environment it can be said that a new intellectual revolution started, with scholars trying to find a solution to this gap in the security debate. The realistic focus on states and military security did not fit this new world order (Prezelj, 2008, p. 2). The UNDP report attempted to recognize this shift in world politics, from the bipolar threat of the Cold War to the more prominent intra-state wars. It stated that there was a profound need for a transition in thinking, from nuclear security to human security.

> The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as a global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has been related to nation-states more than people. The superpowers were locked in an ideological struggle-fighting a cold war all over the world. The developing nations, having won their independence only recently, were sensitive to any real or perceived threats to their fragile national identities. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 22)

Human security is presented here as an approach to security much more in tune with the realities of the twenty-first century than the traditional state-to-state security approach, capable of addressing new threats and sources of insecurity that transcend state borders and so require international responses. It is more consistent with the post-Cold War values that emphasize the existence of universal rights held by all human beings, and that members of the international community have the obligation to ensure their protection and to respect those

rights. Approaches to human security indentify two different sets of means to this ultimate goal of protection of people from threats: preventive means that aim at minimizing the vulnerability of individuals by all possible measures, and reactive means that are understood as secondary for providing human security, as the use of force is interpreted only as a last resort. The following means for providing human security are amongst those frequently mentioned: humanitarian intervention or humanitarian help, peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding, sustainable economic development, early warning, diplomatic missions, preventive deployment of armed forces and preventive diplomacy (Prezelj, 2008, p. 10).

When the concept first became a hot topic within the academic debate, it was assumed that it contradicted the traditional security approach focusing on state security from external threats as the only way to achieve global security. However, as human security became more prominent in the discourse, it became clear that those two ways of looking at security do not exclude one another but can exist side by side and are in fact interlinked. Simply put, if every human being becomes secure, states become secure and global security and stability will be achieved.

2.2 Different definitions and debate

"The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace" (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 3). This quotation from the UNDP report, New Dimensions of Human Security, points to the deepening that the new perspective of human security entailed. It s a people-centered concept, is based on the understanding that there exists multiple insecurities and a broad range of conditions that constitute threats to the survival, livelihood and dignity of individuals. Therefore human security entails a broadened understanding of these threats. The UNDP report offered seven different areas where a threat to human security can be found:

- **economic security** where the main threat is persistent poverty.
- **food security** where the threats are hunger and famine.
- **health security** where the threats includes injury and disease and lack of access to healthcare.

- **environmental security** where the threats are among others pollution and environmental degradation.
- **personal security** where the threats are different forms of violence.
- **community security** where the threat is to the integrity of cultural diversity and other identity based discrimination,
- **political security** where the threats are, among others, political repression and human rights abuses (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 24).

These different areas of security threats are not distinct from one another but rather overlap and influence each other in certain situations, as the threats in themselves are interconnected. As Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh point out, they are connected in two ways. First, in a 'domino effect', as poverty can lead to health insecurity that can then lead to food insecurity and so forth. Second, different threats can spread over one country, then spill over to a region and finally impact global security in a negative way. Human security recognizes these interconnections and the fact that none of these threats and forms of violence can be addressed in isolation: they are connected in a global context where sovereignty and national borders have lost most of their relevance (Chenoy & Tadjbakhsh, 2007, pp. 16-18).

How, then can the world community possibly combat this vast array of security threats? Traditional security threats would be tackled with military means and weapons, power alliances and great power interventions. But the UNDP report called for a different approach, where this new security agenda is dealt with by a much wider range of instruments and actors, and the use of force is only a means to the primary end of development. Preventive diplomacy and development is important, as well as a policy focus at the national and international level on basic needs and human rights (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 236). And for this to happen, the report stresses that the concept of security must change urgently in two basic ways: 'from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people's security, and from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development' (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 24).

2.2.1. Human security versus traditional security

Before exploring the different definitions of Human Security it is important to clearly distinguish it from the traditional security concept, and to do this it is important to discuss some common terms of reference.

Human security places the individual at the forefront, making him the central object of security. It recognizes that states may function as the primary protection for their citizens, but only if the security trickles down to the people. Security should be provided by soft power, long-term cooperation and preventive measures as opposed to the hard power of military. As Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh point out, human security has changed the status of the individual from being secondary to the state to being an equal actor and subject in international relations. The ultimate objective of protection is the individual (Chenoy & Tadjbakhsh, 2007, p. 13). The individual and not the state must be the ultimate referent of security. This does not however mean that other actors are not in need of security. They also referents of security, but the individual is the ultimate one, since once individual security is assured, so is the security of all other referents.

Glenn, Poku and Renwick point out that human security views security as being concerned with 'individuals qua persons' rather than with 'individuals qua citizens' - that is only as citizens of their states (Glenn, Poku & Renwick, 2000, p. 17). The traditional realist vision of security sees people, on the other hand, first and foremost as citizens of states; security is about the security of the state, state and society were considered as one, and the state was the only provider of security. The focus was on these sovereign units and their self-interests. The realist approach states that 'security necessarily extends downwards from nations to individuals; conversely, the stable state extended upwards in its relationship to other states to influence the security of the international system. This broadly characterizes what is known as the anarchic order.' (Liotta & Owen, 2006b, p. 40).

That said, tension and rivalry between states are what characterize international relations and the key to a secure and stable world lies in balance of power between states. Four central questions need to be answered when distinguishing human security from traditional security: Security for whom? Security at what values? Security from what threats? And security by what means? Through these questions the major debates, critiques, challenges and concerns emerge. Table 2 summerises the difference between the two security concepts in responce to these questions (Bajpai, 2000, p. 48):

Table 2 - Human Security versus State Security

	National Security	**Human Security**
Security for whom?	Primarly states	Primarly individuals
Values at stake	Territorial integrity and national independence	Personal safety and individual freedom
Security from what	Traditional threats	Non-traditional and traditional threats
Security by what means	• Force as the primary instrument of security, to be used unilaterally for a state‘s own safety	• Force as a secondary instrument, to be used primarily for comopolitan ends and collectively; sanctions, human development and humane governance as key instruments of individual-centered security
	• Balance of power is important: power is equated with military capabilities	• Balance of power is of limited utility: soft power is increasingly important
	• Cooperations between states is tenuous beyond alliance relations	• Cooperation between states, international organizations and NGO‘s can be effective and sustained

2.3 Theoretical debate

In the beginning the notion of human security was defined as a wholly civilian concept with no military aspects attached to it. Before proposing a new concept of security, the UNDP report from 1994 criticized the widespread focus on state security and negation of ‘the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily life.’ (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 22). The concept has, however, since been highly debated as it has no single universally accepted definition: it, has been critiqued for being

vague, incoherent, arbitrary, difficult to operationalise and for underestimating the importance of states in security (Buzan, 2004, p. 370). Especially, critics have underscored theoretical weaknesses and problems in evaluating the concept, but also problems relating to the implications of blurring the distinction between human security and human rights (Davì, 2009, p. 7).

Human security has been discussed widely in the literature for the last years. It has become a prominent reference point both in the discourse of international organizations, and in the practice of actors engaged in post-conflict peacekeeping/peacebuilding or in mediation exercises (Suhrke, 1999, p. 267). The human security proponents most prominent on this subject have had very different opinions on what human security means and there remains a vigorous argument about its purpose and scope. However, while there may be disagreement about the exact definition of the concept, there is a strong consensus on its fundamental deviation from the state-based security. Human security specialists have been divided largely between two main definitions, one broad and one narrow. A broad approach to human security is based on the concept of freedom from want and fear and the narrow approach on freedom from fear (Liotta & Owen, 2006b, p. 41).

2.3.1 Freedom from want and fear

Those who advocate the broad conceptualization, drawing largely on the work of the UNDP and later the work of the UN-appointed Human Security Commission and the Japanese Goverment, suggest that human security means something more than safety from violent threats. They place less emphasis than does the narrow definition on issues of protection from direct violence through military intervention. The focus remains on the human citizen and 'on people's ability to live without dramatic hindrance to their well-being, whatever the cause.' (Liotta & Owen, 2006b, p. 24). The UNDP report argued that freedom from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, all of which demand long-term planning and development investment; require action under the security rubric thus combining security issues with development issues. The report brought what was traditionally considered 'development' or 'humanitarian' considerations into the security discourse, which had profound implications for the overall security debate (Liotta & Owen, 2006b, p. 42).

Japan has been a leading advocate on the issue of Human Security, driven partly by its ambitions to gain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. It has both incorporated

aspects of Human Security into its foreign policy and promoted the idea in the international arena by funding various initiatives such as the UN Commission on Human Security. It emphasises threats from a broad range including economic crisis, global warming, transnational crimes, landmines and child soldiers. Japan‘s definition of Human Security is based on the promotion of approaches designed to protect people from threats to their livelihoods and dignity. Self-empowerment is seen as a means to this and should be upheld (Chenoy & Tadjbakhsh, 2007, p. 29).

Human security according to the broad definition is thus understood as combining freedom from fear - meaning being free from direct violence - and freedom from want, meaning a focus on issues like employment, food and health. It is a shift from the traditional concept of security of states to an ‘all-encompassing concept of human security’ (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 24).

Prominent scholars who advocate the broad conceptualization are among others Leaning, Alkire, and Thakur. They all criticize the narrow school for not recognizing the substantive importance for human security of a wider range of issues such as poverty, disease, and environmental disasters. To them, the subsequent analytical and normative difficulties are unfortunate but unavoidable consequences of broadening the security paradigm beyond threats to the state (Owen, 2004b, p. 375). In 2003, in a report called Human Security Now, The Commission on Human Security descriped the breadth of human security in accord with the ‘freedom from want definition‘:

> Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential...Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of the future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national security. (Commission on human security, 2003, p. 4)

Advocates of the broad concept argue that human security is something more than just safety from violent threats. They admit the analytical and normative difficulties that rise from this broad conceptualization but argue that they are an unfortunate and unavoidable consequence of shifting the security focus from the state to individuals. They counter the

criticism from supporters of the narrow approach by stating the substantive importance for the security debate of a wider range of threats to people such as poverty and hunger. Another line of argument is that when the referent point of security is shifted from states to individuals, these wider range of threats are essential for human security and therefore fall under the human security umbrella (Owen, 2004b, p. 375).

2.3.2. Freedom from fear

The narrow definition primarily focuses on violent threats against the individual (Owen, 2004a, p. 375). The focus is, in the words of the Human Security Commission, on protecting the 'vital core' of the individual from critical and pervasive threats. This narrow focus on human security emphasizes the more immediate necessity for intervention capability rather than long-term strategic planning and investing for sustainable and secure development. By concentrating primarily on violent threats, this definition makes a clear distinction between human security and the much broader and established field of international development. The threats it focuses on can come from a vast array of issues, including the drug trade, landmines, ethnic discord, state failure, and trafficking in small arms, but all have in common that they are direct and violent threats (Liotta & Owen, 2006b, p. 42). The narrow school thus sees human security first and foremost as a responsibility to protect, and with this narrow focus tries to make the concept more approachable and easier to understand than the broad definition. It focuses on protection of civilians, conflict prevention and peace operations. The threats are of of military and physical nature and the focus on the individual. It is centered on violent threats to make it a better instrument of policy and to achieve more conceptual stength. As Liotta and Owen (2006b) put it, this '…narrow focus emphasizes the more immediate necessity for intervention capability rather than long-term strategic planning and investing for sustainable and secure development' (p. 91).

An expression of the narrow approach to human security is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept, first proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Responsibility (ICISS), in response to the international debate on humanitarian intervention that arose from the international community's inaction in Rwanda and Bosnia. This idea is based on the traditional concept of sovereignty and on the proposition that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens: if they cannot or will not do so, the responsibility to intervene shifts to the international community. Therefore sovereignty is seen

as a responsibility, it is no longer absolute but rather 'contingent on whether residents are protected from gross human rights abuses; the international community has a legitimate duty to intervene in the domestic affairs of states to contain dire threats to human safety.' (Fukuda-Parr & Messineo, 2012, p. 10). At the 2005 World UN summit, all UN member states formally adopted a conclusion on R2P stating that all states have a responsibility to protect their population from direct violence such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The summit conclusions also stated that the international community has an obligation to support states in fulfilling their responsibility to protect, but that if states fail to protect their citizens, the international community would take action, thus making R2P a possible reason for future intervention by the UN Security Council. This affirmation of the R2P principle has been repeated since within the UN framework with different UN Security Council resolutions (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 827).

The narrow definition has also been called the Canadian approach, mainly because of the efforts of Canada's former foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, who called for new measures and strategies to deal with problems such as children caught in violent conflict zones, the increasing proliferation of arms, and the danger of terrorism. He criticized the UNDP report for a much too wide definition of human security which made it unwieldy as a policy instrument (Chenoy & Tadjabakhsh, 2007, p. 30). In this way the Canadian government was clearly siding with pragmatism; by focusing on only a small component of human vulnerability, i.e. violence chose the narrow and operable approach over the broad and ideal (Liotta & Owen, 2006b, p. 43).

Krause, Mack, and Macfarlane are prominent scholars who focus human security in terms of violent threats. Krause critiques the broad conception and points to the perils of including the lowest common denominator of individual vulnerability and well-being under the rubric of security. He describes a broad definition of human security as 'a potential laundry list of 'bad things that can happen.' (Owen, 2004b, p. 19).

Mack, in a similar tone, stresses, that 'any definition that conflates dependent and independent variables renders causal analysis virtually impossible' (Mack, 2004, p. 367). MacFarlane believes that in general, the widening of the concept makes the establishment of priorities in human security policy difficult. Diluting the concept diminishes its political salience. 'The more comprehensive the sweep of human security, the less likely are the objectives of its proponents to be achieved.'(MacFarlane, 2004, p. 369).

The logic of such a narrow approach to the human security agenda is that a safe security environment must be assured first for development to take place. The primary action

needed is to secure individuals from prominent violent threats to their lives. For the proponents of this approach, human security must, to be a useful policy instrument, be limited to violent threats. Owen (2004a) states that this position is strengthened by the fact that a norrow approach to Human Security has been behind many successful initiatives. Amongst them are the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Landmine Ban Convention (p. 19). He even states that 'in fact, most of the significant policy advances achieved in the name of Human Security have used this narrow definition.' (p. 19). This narrow focus on human security emphasizes threats of military and physical nature and the immediate necessity for intervention capability over the need of long term strategic planning and inversing for secure and sustainable development.

2.3.3. A narrow or a broad definition of human security?

Although the debate may at first appear polarized (narrow vs. broad), there is in fact significant convergence among proponents. The differences are not of substance but of packaging. Proponents are not debating the merits of various threats, but rather the choice of and priorities among appropriate policy responses. How human security should be applied as a policy guide in the real world is the true theme emerging from the debate (Owen, 2004b, p. 376). Both schools draw upon the initial report by the UNDP and both have as their primary concern the security of the individual. Both approaches rely on non-coercive methods and on the ability to intervene effectively and swiftly. These methods include 'security sector reform, sustainable economic development, preventive diplomacy, post-conflict statebuilding and mediation, and negotiation efforts by parties external to conflicts.' (Liotta & Owen, 2006b, p. 43).

The two schools'approaches regarding values, referents and security threats do not differ in great measure, but, the narrow school of human security, argues that the wide range of potential concerns makes the –broad approach unwieldy as a policy instrument (Department of foreign affairs and international trade, 2000, p. 2). That said, comparison of the two approaches to human security suggest that the similarities on many aspects probably outweigh the differences.

The ultimate goal of both approaches is to help threatened people. Bajpai's (2000, p. 48) definition of human security is a good attempt to bring these two approaches together:

> Human security relates to the protection of the individual's personal safety and freedom from direct and indirect threats of violence. The promotion of human

> development and good governance, and, when necessary, the collective use of sanctions and force are central to managing human security. States, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other groups in civil society in combination are vital to the prospects of human security.

Though the concept of human security is wide, it is not necessarily vague, as its all-round approach to security is its greatest asset. Contrary to the traditional security approach where security is established around the state and military actions, human security is flexible regarding the perception ef security threats and the actors addressing them. Instead of focusing on the differences, academics should focus on the similarities between the two approaches to give the concept of human security a strong theoretical basis. Consensus, if reachable, between academics on the concept of human security, will however only emerge through long-term theoretical debate and policy experimentation.

3. Human security and the European Union

The European Union (EU) has become a global player on the world stage and the main tool and guide to achieve this goal has been its Common Foreign and Security Policy, including as a major element the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, previously /ESDP). The following chapter will provide an overview and critical analysis of CFSP within the framework of Human Security. Three documents concerning human security in EU policy will be analyzed in order to determine to what extent the concept of human security has a basis in the strategic documents defining the objectives and conduct of CFSP. These documents are: the European Security Strategy, from 2003, the Barcelona report from 2004, and finally the Madrid Report from 2007. It is also important to review the Lisbon Treaty coming into force in 2010 and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) which it entailed, to see if these brought any changes, to the promotion of human security within EU external security policies. First, however, comes an introduction to the CSDP, its structure and goals.

3.1. EU involvement in the field of foreign and defence policy

Over the years the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been at the forefront in the field of foreign and defence policy in Europe, and that role was uncontested during the Cold War. The European Union (EU), on the other hand, does not have a long history in this field, in part precisely because of the strong position of NATO. Some efforts were made early on by the countries of Europe to establish a common European foreign and security policy, for example with the European Defence Community (EDC) agreement following the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. This agreement collapsed, however, when the French National Assembly voted against ratification of the treaty. Other efforts were made to deal with security in a non-military context, for example the European Political Co-operation (EPC) process, but none were so successful as to challenge NATO´s uncontested role as the sole provider of conventional security in Europe during the cold war (Cottey, 2007, p. 81).

While the Western European Union (WEU), a defense and security organization mostly composed of EU and NATO members, provided a European forum for discussing security questions during the Cold war, its military significance and political role were marginal (Haine, n.d., p. 1). After the crumbling of the Soviet Union the WEU defined the

Petersberg Tasks in June 1992. These were tasks, other than self-defense, using both military and non-military means that were considered suitable to be pursued under European leadership; they comprised humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (The French delegation to the EU political and security committee, 2008, p. 11). The EU's Maastricht Treaty, which was adopted in February 1992 and came into force in 1993, was a crucial step for Europe in the field of security. It formally established the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which would henceforth constitute the second pillar of the European Union. As Biscop (2006) notes, the creation of the CFSP was for the most part motivated by the concern that the US and NATO could no longer be relied upon in security issues that confronted Europe, and also by the shortcomings of existing European capabilities that had been evident in the Yugoslav conflict at the beginning of the 1990s (p. 3).

As part of the CFSP and the work towards the ESDP, the EU assumed responsibility for the Petersberg tasks from the WEU and incorporated them into the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. They remain a central element of CSDP today (Burwell, Gompert, Lebl, Lodal & Slocombe, 2006, p. 6). These tasks were broadened with the Lisbon Treaty and now include the following 'joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.' (Möstl, 2011, p. 147).

In December 1998 the French and British governments signed an agreement at St. Malo, which paved the political way for EU governments to launch the European Security and Defence Policy. The St. Malo Declaration stated that the European Union 'needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage´ and that the EU 'must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises' (EU institute for security studies, 2000, p. 2).

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was born in June 1999 when the European Council decided to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. Although the Council's main objective with the ESDP was for it to become a autonomous military arm of the EU, it was decided to include missions using non-military capacities. The ESDP was thus focused on both military and non-military instruments and was able to combine 'soft' civilian and 'hard' military means with a range of intervention capabilities. It distinguished itself

through the focus on international crisis and conflict management and its narrow focus on political mandate, but also by a comprehensive understanding of security policy. With its broad vision of instruments, the ESDP had a far wider potential reach to tackle security threats than other international entities as NATO and OSCE, and from the start allowed action anywhere in the world, but at the same time it had a rather limited political mandate (Flechtner, 2006, p. 158). The ESDP was intended to cover all questions relating to security, including the possibility of non-military interventions:

> In the context of the CFSP, the Union is developing a common security and defence policy, covering all questions relating to its security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy. The European security and defence policy allows the European Union to develop civilian and military capacities for international crisis management, thus helping to maintain peace and international security. (European Union, 2009, p. 1)

In practice, the ESDP focused on crisis management operations specifically and on giving the EU the necessary capabilities to conduct such operations. At the June 2000 European Council in Feira, Portugal, EU leaders launched the civilian dimension of ESDP. They established four priority fields of civilian action: police; strengthening the rule of law; strengthening civilian administration; and civil protection (European Union, 2009, p. 2). The year after, at the Laeken European Council, the ESDP was declared operational and in 2002 an agreement with NATO, referred to as 'Berlin plus', was concluded that allowed the EU to have recourse to NATO collective assets and capabilities (The French delegation to the EU political and security committee, 2008, p. 11). Unlike other major international actors, the EU did not start off with a doctrine that could provide a framework for its action abroad. The European Security Strategy that was adopted in 2003, however, set out a policy framework for the ESDP and broadened the spectrum of the ESDP missions to include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. This was reinforced when the Headline Goal 2008 was adopted by the European Council in June 2004. With the addition of these further tasks, the set of missions that provide the framework for both military and civilian missions within the ESDP are now collectively referred to as the Petersberg Plus tasks (Burwell et al., 2006, p. 18).

3.2. The European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World

With the European Security Strategy, the EU for the first time established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests. The document, developed in 2003 was aimed at moving beyond the disputes over the Iraq war that had dominated the agenda within the EU at that time. The European Security Strategy, here after referred to as the ESS, suggested the possible ways the EU could contribute to regional and global security. It starts with the notion that 'Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free' but then notes that there still remains security challenges and threats that Europe has to face in current times, and mentions the conflict in the Balkans as a reminder.

The first section of the ESS addresses these security challenges and the changed security environment after the end of the Cold War where the EU faces new, more diverse threats that are less visible and predictable (European Union, 2003, p. 3). It identifies five key challenging threats which are seen as interdependent and mutually reinforcing. These threats are terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime (p. 1).

Section two addresses these threats and points out that unlike before, the EU now has to defend itself outside its borders. 'In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe.' (European Union, 2003, p. 6). This section outlines two strategic objectives; to create security in EU's neighborhood and to create an effective multilateral system where international law and the UN charter are at the forefront.

Section three of the ESS proposes different policy implications to face these challenges:

- First, the EU has to become more active in pursuing strategic objectives. For conflict prevention and crisis management is important to combine various instruments such as political, military, civilian, diplomatic and trade activities. Preventive engagement and support with the United Nation is important as well as developing operations that involve both civilian and military capabilities.
- Second, the EU has to become more capable of action. Militaries have to become more flexible and mobile, and a more efficient use of resources is important. Reducing duplication, increasing civilian capacity, stronger diplomatic capability and

improved sharing of intelligence among member states are all necessary for this to happen.

- Third, the EU has to become more coherent. This can be met by bringing together the different instruments and capabilities of the EU, including environmental, development, trade policies and diplomatic efforts.
- Fourth, working with partners. International cooperation is necessary, as well as strategic partnerships with those who share same goals and values as the EU (European Union, 2003, pp. 11-13).

Together these elements form a basis for a holistic and comprehensive approach to crisis management, but they do not offer any concrete recommendations on where and under what conditions to act, nor mention the word human security. In other words the ESS tells us how to do things, but not really what to do.

In 2008 the EU marked the fifth anniversary of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and a decade of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) by publishing an implementation report on the ESS. The report elaborated a 'distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy', citing as evidence EU interventions ranging from post-tsunami peacebuilding in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad and aimed at reinforcing the previous security strategy. For the first time, the Council of the EU, which authored the document, also explicitly referred to human security as central to the EU's particular strategic goals (Martin & Owen, 2010, p. 216). It statet that:

> Drawing on a unique range of instuments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good givernance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root couses of conflict and insecurity.' (European Union, 2008, p. 2)

The original ESS document came in for some criticism and was been accused of being weak on guiding policies in practice. This critique continued after the implementation report of 2008, which stated that despite everything achieved, implementation of the ESS remained a work in progress. 'For our full potential to be realized we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active.' (European Union, 2008, p. 2). Flechner for example criticizes the report for not providing answers to core strategic questions such as when the EU

shall intervene and under what circumstances military force should be deployed (Flechtner, 2006, p. 161). Sven Biscop (2005), in his book of 2005 on The European Security Strategy stated that the ESS certainly had the potential to serve as an integrating conceptual framework and an effective strategy for the EU's external actions (p. 26); but that 'because the EU and the Member States have not translated it into clear priorities, it has not generated sufficient action. Nor has it had a real impact on the development of means and capabilities, on which the ESS remains vague as well.' (Biscop, 2006, p. 1).

Although the original ESS did not explicitly refer to the concept of human security, it reflected its importance and has clear references to human security thinking. With the combination of military and civilian capabilities and a focus on different instruments, preventive measures and cooperation as a way to crisis management, the ESS clearly understood security as much more that state-to-state security. With the implementation report in 2008 which directly mentioned human security and highlighted issues such as poverty, disease and multilateralism, stating that security is a 'precondition for development' (European Union, 2003, p. 2) the ESS now clearly reflects important aspects of human security.

3.3 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona report

The human security concept's first real impact on EU policy creation was through a report made by an independent academic group, called the study group on Europe´s security capabilities (now the Human Security Group), for the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. In the report, 'A Human Security Doctrine for Europe' published in 2004 and, often referred to as the Barcelona report, the commision discussed how the ESS could be developed with a human security basis. A human security consept was proposed as the most appropriate appoach to EU's foreign and security policy (Kotsopoulos, 2006, p. 7).

The report argued that the EU must reflect the changes in the international environment through its involvements and actions and should become more involved in supporting global security. The most appropriate way to do this was through the promotion of human security. The report defined human security as ´freedom for individuals from basic insecurites caused by gross human rights violations' (Albrecht et al., 2004, p. 5). and emphasized the 'primacy of human rights in what distinguishes the human security approach from traditional state-based approaches' (Albrecht et al., 2004, p. 14). The report identifies

seven principles that should forms a guideline for all conserned actors such as politicians, diplomats, soldiers, civil aides and the public, and proposes two key capabilities required for applying those principles in practice. That capapilities are, first, a Human Security Response force to carry out human security operations, and second, a New Legal Framework governing both decisions to intervene and operations on the grounds.

Table 3 - Principles and guidelines

Seven guiding principles for operations	**Human security Responce Force including**	**New Legal Framework based on**
• The primacy of human rights • Clear political authority • Multilateralism • A bottom-up approach • Regional focus • The use of legal instruments • The appropriate use of force	• 15 000 men and women • Thereof 5000 on perminent standby • Both military and civilians • Multinational • Voluntary element	• domestic law of host states • domestic law of member states • international criminal law • international human rights law • International humanitarian law

The Barcelona report is about how to make the EU more capable in its foreign and security policy, so that it can respond to the new global context where there is a gap between current security capabilities, consisting largely of military forces, and real security needs. The way to do this is through a human security focus where the protection of individuals is the security focus and not only defence of territorial borders. The report distinguishes three reasons why the EU should adopt a human security approach (Albrecht et al., 2004, p. 5).

- The first reason has its basis in morality. We as humans have an obligation to help others when their security is threatened, we all have a right to live our lives secure and with dignity and all human life is equally valuable.
- The second reason is a legal one. States and international institutions have a legal obligation to concern themselves with the protection of human rights and therefore human security. This is stated in different human rights treaties as well as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights which all members of the EU have signed.

- The third and final reason is enlightened self-interest. That is, people in Europe cannot be secure if there are people in other parts of the world living in severe insecurity. Conflict tends to spill over to other states and the criminal economy is exported from conflict zones as well as by terrorist networks.

The focus should be on capabilities needed for 'dealing with situations of severe physical insecurity, 'freedom from fear', rather than the whole range of possibilities and instruments of European foreign and security policy' (Albrecht et al., 2004, p. 8). This statement from the report points to a narrow approach to human security rather than a broad one. Liotta and Owen (2006a) point out, however, that the report does incorporate some aspects of the broad conceptualization by stressing the need to prevent gross human rights violations and stating that in extreme circumstances a human security intervention could be needed against non-violent threats. According to them, the EU should focus on a simultaneous combination of these two approaches (p. 94).

A central theme in the report and the basic reason given for the necessity of a human security approach is the changed world order, where conflicts no longer are between states but within them. These so-called 'new wars' main characteristic is their direct effect on people, as most violence is inflicted on civilians and population displacement is a typical feature. These wars easily spill over borders and thus blur the distinction between internal and external, involving both global and local actors. In these types of conflicts the traditional military approach can be counter-productive as these are not typical state to state wars (Albrecht et al., 2004, p. 4).

A different approach is needed where the focus is on protecting individuals instead of defending borders and where other actors than strictly military are brought to the table. By clearly distinguishing the different responses of military, civilian and humanitarian actors to crisis, the Barcelona report takes a significant step away from the traditional security response and -as Matláry points out - constitutes the first attempt to develop a policy for intervention based on integration of civilian and military means and on the rights of individuals to security. Matláry is, however, quite critical of the report and questions whether the recommendations are realistic. She points in this context to the report's proposal to shift the focus of international law towards human security from state security, whereas states can be expected to jealously guard their status, and its proposals about military capacity with a battle group of only 1.500 persons. She also points out that the aspects of EU policy defined in the report

were already in place within the foreign policy framework, so that calling them human security hardly makes any difference (Matláry, 2008, pp. 139-140).

3.4. A European Way of Security: The Madrid report

In 2007 the Human Security Study Group published the Madrid report as a follow-up to the Barcelona report. The aim was to further develop the Human Security approach for the EU that was proposed in the Barcelona report and offer ways to institutionalize the concept within the context of the ESDP. The result is a much more fully elaborated document where the criticisms of the Barcelona report are answered, and the challenges facing the CSFP/ESDP are addressed. The Madrid report also clearly moves away from the narrow approach to human security of the Barcelona report to the broader approach, by stating that

> Human Security is about the basic needs of individuals and communities in times of peril. It is about feeling safe on the street as well as about material survival and the exercise of free will. It recognises that 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' are both essential to people's sense of wellbeing and their willingness to live in peace. (Albrecht et al., 2007, p. 3)

Human security is therefore about the EU meeting human needs at different crisis, not only when people suffer from the consequences of violence in conflict, but also from natural and human-made disasters such as tsunamis and famines. To ensure Human Security means a concern both with physical and material wellbeing. It is about 'helping people to feel safe in their homes and on the streets as well as ensuring they have what they need to live on.' (Albrecht et al., 2007, p. 8).

The Human Security Study Group calls in the report for the EU to define a distinctive European Way of Security based on clear principles of human security that would provide the means for the EU to intervene more effectively in crisis situations and address the needs of vulnerable communities (Albrecht et al., 2007, p. 7). Based on this, the report proposes six main principles of human security that the CFSP should uphold as guidelines for all its work. These principles are a revised and adjusted version of the Barcelona report's seven principles.

They now read as follows:

- **The primacy of human rights:** To ensure that physical and material protection of civilians is prioritized over military victory and secure the safety, dignity and welfare of individuals and their communities.
- **Legitimate political authority:** Any outside intervention must strive to create a legitimate political authority and be viewed as legitimate both locally and within the international community.
- **Effective multilateralism:** A commitment to work with other international and regional agencies, states and non state-actors, in the framework of international law for the means of legitimacy.
- **A bottom-up approach:** Intensive consultation with locals such as civil society, women and the young is required for vulnerable societies to create conditions for peace and stability themselves.
- **An integrated regional approach:** Regional dialogues should be systematically integrated into crisis policies as insecurities spill over borders.
- **A clear and transparent strategic direction:** EU's external intervention must be done with clear authorizations, transparent mandates and a coherent overall strategy. A close linkage must be between ground workers and policy makers and all missions must be lead by a civilian (Albrecht et al., 2007, pp. 4-5).

The human security approach is seen in the report as offering the EU tools to refine and coordinate its existing action under one hat, and to 'increase the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of European security policy.' (Albrecht et al., 2007, p. 11). The report concludes with three different key proposals aimed at advancing the Human Security agenda within the EU. First, it suggests that a Public Declaration of Human Security Principles should be signed by all countries of the EU. This declaration should serve as a guideline for the EU institutions about when and in which crises the EU should intervene. Also, it should include the core values and beliefs of the EU in connection with international operations as a way to improve transparency and add to the domestic accountability of the European foreign policy. Second, the report suggests a new strategic framework for ESDP missions, designed to make sure that every operation has the goal of restoring normal politics and that lengthy occupation or international administrations are ruled out. Also, every operation should be headed by a civilian commander who has the skills to provide the link between Brussels and people on the

ground. Third and last, different concrete steps are identified to implement a human security approach, providing practical measures to translate the commitment to human security into actual ESDP missions. These would be the adoption of Human Security ESDP mandates; Human Security cards for all mission personnel including the six principles as well as the goals and methods of the operation; a systematic use of assistance on the ground; using the human security principles as a means for EU institution's evaluation of missions; improving the accountability of EU forces; and incorporating the principles of human security into personnel training to make sure that EU forces integrate them into mission planning and execution (Albrecht et al., 2007, pp. 24-25). The Madrid report's concept and its operational implications received some criticism from member states after publication, but others, such as Finland which held the EU Presidency at the time, made use of it when pushing for a more normative focus within ESDP.

3.5 The Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the member states of EU on the 13th of December 2007 and entered into force on the 1st of December 2010 when it was ratified by all 27 states. It amends and restates the provisions of previous treaties: the Treaty of European Union (TEU), also called the Maastricht Treaty; the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), also called the Treaty of Rome, which was with amendment renamed as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); and the Nice Treaty.

The main articles on The European, Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) wich was renamed in the treaty as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are in articles 42-46 and in article 222, which contains a solidarity clause. This is important to note as before the Lisbon Treaty, no treaties made specific mention of the operational dimension of the EU. With the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the posts of the High Representative of CFSP and the Commissioner of External Relations have been merged into one. With this and the establishment of the EU's diplomatic arm, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Lisbon Treaty led to a considerable development in EU external actions. The European External Action Servise (EEAS) has the aim to enhance coordination between civilian and military actors in crisis management, especially where the role of the various instruments are defined at the strategic plannig stage (Wendling, 2010, p. 30). It brings together European Commission (EC) officials, member state diplomats, and the Council Secretariat into one agency responsible for

representing the EU abroad in all areas relating to EU external action. Furthermore (and as already noted) the Petersberg tasks were broadened, thus extending the types of possible operation under CSDP. In the Treaty they comprise 'joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation' (The Lisbon Treaty, article 43).

The principles of EU's international policies are stated in the General Provisions of the Union's External Action:

> The Union's actions on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. (The Lisbon Treaty, article 21)

Following up on the strategy development in the ESS process, the Lisbon treaty enhances with this statement the vague formulation of the EU goals from the Maastricht Treaty. The key difference is that it includes the ultimide goal of promoting the principles of organizing inter-state potlitical order not only in Europe but on a global scale. This is, according to Gerda Falkner, a statement of normative and perhaps system-transformative foreign policy (Falkner, 2008, p. 16). Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty in article 10 elaborates on these general provisions and states that the EU shall define and pursue common policies and action in all fields of international relations in order to, among others:

- Consolidate and support democracy, rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law
- Preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with among others the UN Charter
- Foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim to eradicating poverty.
- Assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters
- Promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperations and good global governence (The Lisbon Treaty, article 10A).

All these points made by the Lisbon Treaty can be said to belong to the broader approach to Human Security, which makes a clear departure from the traditional security of states and pays greater attention to people‘s security. With a focus on sustainable development, multilateralism and human rights and the interlinkages between them, the report clearly moves away from a traditional approach to security towards a softer type of security where the individual is in focus, namely human security. Thus although the Treaty does not mention the term Human Security directly, the importance of that concept is clearly implied in the text concerning CFSP‘s stratetic goals, and in the relevant general provisions.

4. The EU and human security in crisis management

During the last 20 years, the security and defence policy of the European Union has been put in place, and military and civilian capabilities for crisis management and conflict prevention have been made operational by the member states. These actions are consistent with the goals of effective multilateralism and robust intervention that the European Security Strategy, in 2003, declared as the main aims of the European Union in the global governance of security (European Union, 2003). To date 34 operations have been deployed since the first was launched in 2003, the vast majority of a civilian or mixed military-civilian nature, differing widely in size and mandate, but all aiming to stabilize conflict or post-conflict situations. Today there are sixteen ongoing missions in the framework of ESDP/CSDP. These missions and those that have been finished can be seen in the following chart (ISIS Europe, 2014).

Table 4 - Overview of CSDP missions



* Note the EUMM in former Yugoslavia began in 1991 as EUCM W. Balkans and then transitioned to EUMM in 2003.

* EUFOR Libya was not launched as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs did not allow it.

This chart is created by ISIS Europe www.isis-europe.eu

www.csdpmap.eu

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These missions have, in the language of the CSDP, contributed to or are contributing to 'the resolution of crises, particularly when it comes to disarmament assistance, strengthening the rule of law and administrative capacities, support for security sector reform and also assistance to police and justice reform' (The French delegation to the EU political and security committee, 2008, p. 4). All of them have been set up in full concordance with and often indeed at the very request of the UN. The EU's crisis procedures cover every phase of a crisis and separate the planning process into different steps through which civil-military coordination is ensured.

Since the launch of the first police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, the EU's crisis missions have been deployed with increasing geographical scope and frequency, EUTM Mali and EUBAM Libya being the latest. Conflict prevention and crisis management have meanwhile become key components of the EU foreign policy, and are increasingly mainstreamed within other EU policy areas, thus giving the EU a wide range of political, economic and military instruments to undertake conflict prevention and crisis management policies beyond its borders. In the last years the EU has, in pursuit of effective multilateralism, increased its cooperation with other international institutions and increasingly focused on aspects of security sector reform and rule of law in its missions (Gross & Juncos, 2010, p. 1). This development of the EU's operational activities, from originally being seen as a project for using military means to a broader and softer approach to security transformation, has arisen from the need for EU members to find consensus in the EU's approach to security. It also reflects a better understanding of what specific capacities and added value the EU can best contribute to the task.

4.1 The strengths and weaknesses of the EU's role in the field of security

The European Union's role in non-military security is different from that of other institutions such as NATO and OSCE. The EU's operational involvement in crisis management takes place in the framework of the Union's external action, where unanimity is in effect needed for all significant steps, and funding is relatively small. This can be considered a weakness since the Union has to take into account the interests and priorities of its member states as well as its own political objectives, interests and priorities (Haine, n.d., p. 10). Another weakness has been the overlapping nature of the EU's non-military missions. Before the Lisbon Treaty, both first and second pillars could claim jurisdiction over some missions, especially police

missions, and the Council and the Commission had contrasting views on how planning and mission support in the area of non military security should be strengthened (Tappert, 2003, p. 9). This has been met with the idea of integrating the military and civilian elements of CSDP operations, as set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS):

> As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities. (European Union, 2003, p. 11)

The EU took small steps in this direction with its mission in Guinea-Bissau. There civilian and military personnel worked under one mandate and one mission structure. There are thus trends towards a further integration in this field of security that will enhance the EU´s capacity and maximize scarce resources (Blair, 2009, p. 4). This points, however, to another weakness of EU, namely how to finance the missions. In the beginning the financing was slow and resources did not correspond to the ambitious targets that had been developed. Lack of flexibility and coordination was evident (Mullally, 2001, p. 3). This issue has since been addressed to some extent with more and better financing but the budget has been fluctuating. The CSDP budget was, for example, cut from 285 million euro in 2008 to 243 million in 2009, which was a concern for the ongoing missions (Gya, 2009, p. 2). Since 2009 the budget has risen again and is now 303 million Euros (European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013, p. 275). Another weakness that has been identified is that of finding suitable, qualified personnel for the missions, as the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt put it:

> Although the military missions are often seen as the most demanding, it is often the deployment of the more political and civilian ones that are the most challenging. While we have standing military units ready to go notably the two EU Battle Groups ready to deploy within 10 days - we don't have policemen, judges, lawyers or different instructors ready in the same way. (Bildt, 2008)

This is an ongoing problem: for example the first Civilian Headline Goal (CHG2008) noted a shortfall in the wide variety of personnel needed for civilian missions, and proposed that a Civilian Response Team should be created (CRT), to be drawn from a pre-selected, pre-trained pool of experts (Gya, 2009, p. 3). It is clear that the EU has many problems in

fulfilling its self-defined role in non-military security. However, the EU did identify many of its problems in the Headline Goals 2008 and 2010 and seems to be working for improvement. In the CHG 2008, issues such as deploying several missions at the same time, deploying at short notice and responding faster to requests from the UN were addressed, and the CHG 2010 added the needs for developed concepts, planning and conduct capabilities, and equipment. It also concentrated on improving training; mission support; procurement; field security; and mainstreaming gender perspectives and human rights (Gya, 2009, p. 3). What is often in the first sense conceived as a general weakness of the EU and its missions - the vast range and variety of the latter - could in fact be regarded as the European Union's biggest strength in this field, as the EU is probably the only international player that is able to bring all kinds of resources, for instance diplomatic, development, humanitarian and military, together.

4.2. Aspects of human security in CSDP

To explore the aspects of human security in CSDP it is important to go back to the six main principles of human security that the Madrid report suggested CFSP should use as guidelines. These were: the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism, an integrated regional approach and a clear and transparent strategic direction (see page 37 for details). In the following section of the thesis where the work of the CSDP and the role of the EU in specific crisis are reviewed with reference to their consistency with human security, these six principles will be used as guidelines.

EU external security policy aims first and foremost to address the root causes of conflict and is understood as a long-term process where structural change is important. This can be seen for example in the Lisbon Treaty, where conflict prevention, and therefore an aspect of human security, is mentioned as one of EU’s external objectives (The Lisbon Treaty, Article 21). Conflict management thus not only includes peace-making and peace-keeping but also activities that take place after stabilization of a conflict such as police, monitoring and border assistance missions (Gross & Juncos, 2010, p. 5). Aspects of human security can also be seen in the common legislative framework and strategy papers of the EU. Examples are the European’s Council adoption of an agreement with the International Criminal Court (ICC) on exchanging information and documents of concern of both parties,

and the steps taken by the European Parliament and the European Council adopting regulations on actions against anti-personal landmines (Möstl, 2011, p. 143). Another human security adherence can be seen in EU's engagement with the R2P concept. The EU first affirmed its support to the idea in a statement in 2005 by the EU Presidency where the responsibility of the international community to protect citizens not protected by their own states was affirmed and furthermore it stated the authority of the UNSC to act on the citizens behalf. The EU has since made numeral references to R2P with the UN being the primary venue for EU expressing its support (Kirn, 2011, p. 8).

The EU's adherence to multilateralism in the CSDP can also be seen as an element of human security. Cooperation with the UN, and the inclusion of third countries in EU missions, are clear pointers in that direction, as the mission's mandates normally include resolutions from the UN Security Council or a request from the country in need. Here it is also important to note the inclusion of non-governmental actors (NGOs) in the CSDP process. The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), where different NGOs having an interest in promoting sustainable peacebuilding policies by the EU come together is a good witness to this (Möstl, 2011, p. 154). Other elements of human security can be seen in the emphasis put on crisis management as a long-term process and in EU's emphasis on mainstreaming human rights into missions. The fact that a combination of civil and military capabilities has gained importance within the CSDP is also a testament of a human security approach as structures and procedures for missions are being increasingly developed with this in mind. This can be seen for example in the fact the training programme for CSDP personnel now includes joint courses for military and civilian personnel (Möstl, 2011, p. 152). Another aspect of human security within the CSDP can be seen in its efforts to make sure that human rights are a part of operational missions. The European Parliament's paper on Mainstreaming of Human Rights into ESDP stated that:

> The protection of human rights should be systematically addressed in all phases of ESDP operations, both during the planning and implementation phase, including by measures ensuring that the necessary human rights expertise is available to operations at headquarter level and in theatre; training of staff; and by including human rights reporting in the operational duties of ESDP missions. (Council of the European Union, 2006, p. 2)

Human security has also frequently been mentioned in speeches, mostly by the former Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner. In a speech in 2005 she

stated the importance of placing people, their human rights and the threats that they face at the center of EU external policies (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005, p. 3). In 2006 she was more explicit in regard to human security's role in EU foreign policies, stating that:

> Development, security and human rights are inextricably interlinked and achieving progress on one means achieving progress on all. And vice versa. That recognition is encapsulated for me by the notion of human security, an idea of security which places people at the heart of our policies…despite the different routes which brought us here, and the difference of emphasis from one approach to another, opinion has converged around what for me is the clearest and most useful definition of human security: the comprehensive security of people, not the security of states, encompassing both freedom from fear and freedom from want. (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006)

With all this in mind, it is clear that human security ideas have influenced the development of EU's security policies and many aspects of human security can be found integrated into the EU's work, even though the concept has never been referred to explicitly in official documents. It seems that the EU is to a large extent pursuing a human security agenda in all but name. In this regard it is important to note the challenges the EU faces in implementing policies based on human security ideas: policy thinking is one thing, but making it count in the field is another.

This provides a bridge to the next section of the thesis, where case studies are analysed. In order to get a solid picture of human security within the foreign security framework of the EU, it is crucial to take a look at actual missions to see what happens on the ground. Given the limited length of the thesis it will not be possible to view all the relevant missions in depth. Therefore two of the newer cases of CSDP missions have been selected, both of them deployed in Libya: the proposed EUFOR Libya (which never became a reality), and EUBAM Libya, a currently undergoing mission.

5. The case of Libya

The crisis in Libya arose in the context of the political unrest that had been prominent throughout the Middle East and North Africa, starting in December 2010 in Tunisia. Protests aimed at governments had been spreading in this region, long controlled by authoritarian regimes, in a process that since been called the Arab Spring. Before the Libyan crisis these uprisings had been relatively peaceful, but that was not to be the case with Libya.

The starting point was in February 2011 when peaceful protests against the Qadhafi regime suddenly resulted in violence. The arrest of human rights activist Fethi Tarbel on 15 February triggered riots that then escalated into an civilian uprising against Qadhafi's authoritarian regime, which was met with massive violence and repression (Koenig, 2011, p. 12). The protesters established a Transitional National Council (TNC), headed by former Justice Minister Mustafa Mohamed Abud Al Jeleil, to spearhead the struggle against the Qadhafi government and took control of several areas, including the second largest town in Libya, Benghazi. By the end of February, however, the government forces had managed to take back several towns that had been overrun by the protesters, and were threatening a bloodbath in Benghazi. In response to the threat by Qadhafi to crush the rebellion, the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1970 on the 26th of February which expressed grave concern at the situation in the Libyan Arab Republic and condemned the violence and use of force against civilians. It referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and imposed an arms embargo as well as strong sanctions (United Nations Security Council, 2011a, p 2). When the violence continue to escalate, the Council authorized the use of force to protect civilians with the passing on 17th March of resolution 1973, which marked the beginning of western countries' intervention in the Libya crisis. It marked the first time the UNSC went against a state and authorized a use of force for the purpose of human protection, thus using an aspect of narrow human security, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (for further discussion see page 37) as a reason for intervention.

It deplored the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 and expressed determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance. The resolution also established a no-fly zone over Libya (United Nations Security Council, 2011b, p 3). On the 19th of March a coalition of nations, including 10 EU member states and, with France, the United Kingdom and the United States at the forefront, began air strikes against the Libyan authorities on the

basis of UNSCR 1973. By the end of the same month the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had taken over all air operations. The NATO mission, named Operation Unified Protector, consisted of three different tasks: policing the arm embargo, patrolling the no-fly zone and protecting civilians. After two months the Transitional National Council (TNC) had taken over all of Libya and Qadhafi had been captured and killed. On October 31st the Operation Unified Protector came to an end (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012, p. 3). The UN Security Council has been praised for its quick response to the Libyan crisis and NATO for the ultimate success of the intervention (see Daalder & Stavridis, 2012 and Dunne & Gifkins, 2011).

5.1. The EU in Libya, a test case for human security?

The six principles[3] adopted in the Madrid report will in this chapter be used as a kind of human security checklist against which various documents connected with the discussion of EU's role in Libya will be scrutinized. This will help to decide whether human security is in fact present in the documents and discussions leading up to and accompanying the still ongoing EU involvement in the crisis, and if so, to what extent.

The EU's task in Libya was to become the first mission of the newly renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after the Lisbon Treaty. The EU's first response to the crisis came on the 20th of February 2011 when Catherine Ashton, the High Representative for CFSP (HR), issued a statement urging the Libyan government to refrain from the use of violence and emphasised the EU's grave concerns about the unfolding of events in Libya. She went on to emphasise that freedom of expression and the right to assemble were human rights and fundamental freedoms of every human being, which must be respected and protected: thereby acknowledging that the Qadhafi regime presented a threat to the security of the Libyan people (European Union, 2011a, p. 1). In her statement at the UN Human Rights Council a week later, adherence to a human security approach to the crisis was clearly visible as she emphasised the cooperation of the international community and the importance of human rights. '...human rights is what I call the silver thread that runs through everything that we do in the External Action Service and it's at the core of our response to the developing situations on Libya and beyond' (Ashton, 2011).

[3] See page 37 of this thesis for further discussion of the six principles.

This human security approach was also emphasized by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, in a statement on the developments in the EU's Southern neighbourhood where he stated that 'The European Union should not be patronising, but should also not shy away from using its political and moral responsibility. The EU is interested in sustainable stability, based on respect of democratic values, human rights and fundamental freedoms.' (Van Rompuy, 2011). On the 8th of March a joint document by the European Commission and the HR was released called Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. It was designed to offer a new approach in response to the radically changing political landscape in the region, and shows a clear adherence to human security. It proposed that the EU should state its readiness to support all its Southern neighbors who are able and willing to embark on political and economic reforms through a 'Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity', based upon: democratic transformation and institution-building; a stronger partnership with the people, with specific emphasis on support to civil society and on enhanced opportunities for exchanges and people-to-people contacts; and sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development. The document includes a list of detailed means for applying this new approach and sums up the approach to Arab partners as 'the EU wants to support them in building real democracies and peaceful and prosperous societies.' (European Commission, 2011a, p. 13), thereby clearly pointing to the bottom-up principle of the Madrid report.

The first concrete response of the EU to the Libyan crisis was a European Council Declaration on the 11th of March urging Qadhafi to step down. There a clear reference to human security can be detected. This can be seen from the text where, first, the EU declares its support to all steps towards democratic transformations, defining the objective for Libya as to rapidly embark on an orderly transition to democracy through a broad-based dialogue, to build a constitutional state and to develop the rule of law. Second, the European Union will enhance its coordination in order to provide coherent and effective use of assets and capabilities, in line with humanitarian principles, and will make a new effort with concrete measures and projects to strengthen democratic institutions, ensure freedom of expression including unhindered access to internet, reinforce civil societies, support the economy, reduce poverty and address social injustice. Third, a comprehensive approach to migration should be promoted as well as people-to-people contacts, using such instruments as mobility partnerships. Fourth and finally, the text emphasizes that the use of force, especially with military means, against civilians is unacceptable and must stop immediately, and that the safety of the people must be ensured by all necessary means (European Union, 2011b). In its

Conclusions the European Council then expressed its satisfaction with UNSCR 1973 and its principle of the responsibility to protect. The European Council underlined its regional and multilateral approach by emphasizing the key role of the Arab countries and the Arab League in the implementation of UNSCR 1973, and further underlined its determination to contribute to the implementation of the resolution. It confirmed that the Union's main aim was the protection of the civilian population and support for the Libyan people to realize their aspirations for a democratic society (European Council, 2011).

5.2. EUFOR Libya

On the 1st of April the European Council adopted a decision to put in place a military mission within the framework of CSDP, called EUFOR Libya, in support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya. This decision provided the mission's formal mandate and set out the legal framework for future operations. An operational headquarters was activated in Rome, Italy and Rear Admiral, Claudio Gaudiosi was appointed as operation commander. The mission's main aim was to contribute to the safe evacuation and movement of displaced persons and to support the delivery of humanitarian aid, but it would do so only at the request of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), a restriction never before imposed on a CSDP mission. The mission was thus designed to back up UN aims in providing humanitarian aid (Council Decision of 1 April 2011, 2011). The EU-OCHA conditionality meant that the decision on launching an EU mission was left with OCHA. EUFOR Libya was never actualized as OCHA did not request its activation, and its mandate was formally terminated on the 10 of November 2011. The reasons for the UN not requesting an intervention from the CSDP were - according to Engberg - twofold. One the one hand OCHA was very concerned about keeping its status as an impartial and a neutral actor and therefore hesitated to add a military aspect to its humanitarian operation in Libya by putting EUFOR Libya into action. This was reinforced when UN humanitarian chief Valerie Amos described EUFOR Libya as a last resort and expressed her doubts about blurring the lines between military and humanitarian action (Koenig, 2011, p. 22). On the other hand, the UN did not want to risk meeting Russian and Chinese opposition in the Security Council as might be foreseen in the event of a widening of the UN mandate by Britain, the US and France with removal of Qadhafi as a aim (Engberg,

2014, p. 170). That being so, and as Koenig points out, EUFOR Libya can be seen more as a 'symbolic gesture than a real response to UN needs.' (Koenig, 2011, p. 22).

The decision on EUFOR Libya did not refer to human security explicitly and in fact had a rather meager human security aspect. The only reflection of the six principles of human security from the Madrid report, can be seen in its adherence to multilateralism and a regional approach. It underlined the EU's determination to act collectively with all international partners, in particular regional stakeholders such as the League of Arab States. Third states, especially member states of the League of Arab States, could be invited to participate in operations, and the release of classified Union information and documents generated for the purposes of EUFOR Libya to third countries was authorized. There was only one reference to the protection of the civilian population, where the EU's main aim was stated as being to support the Libyan people to realize their aspiration for a democratic society (Council Decision of 1 April 2011, 2011). No reference was made to a bottom-up approach, and with the appointment of a non-civilian operation commander, the declaration clearly went against the sixth principle that states that missions must be led by a civilian.

5.3. Politics meet practice in the Libya case

The EU has received extensive criticism for inaction and indecision over the Libyan crisis and for having designed a military operation which never became a reality. This has impacted on the EU's image as an international security actor, and some at the time even declared the death of CSDP (Hatzigeorgopoulos & Fara-Andrianarijaona, 2013, p. 2). The Libyan crisis was the first test for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) after the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty and the expectations were high. But there was a divide between the EU members on the approach to the crisis and they openly disagreed on how to handle the situation. No coherence was to be found and the conflicting stands of the EU member on the Libya crisis stood in the way of an effective and rapid response from the EU, as seen in the fact that it took nearly one month from the beginning of the crisis for a top-level European Council meeting to address the situation. This meeting on the Libyan crisis was held on the 11th of March following a request from the UK and France, who put forward a series of proposals to meet the crisis such as a no-fly zone and working with allies and regional partners. These proposals were not met with support from other EU members, but the summit

concluded by urging Qadhafi to step down and stating that he had lost all legitimacy (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 42).

Another example of the divide between members was when a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) was developed for EUFOR Libya. This was done in an EU Military Committee meeting on 11 April 2011, but the day after when the Foreign Affairs Council met, the CONOPS or an Operational Plan was not approved due to Sweden's opposition. In a report by the European Security Review (a think-tank publication) on April 15th the reason for this was said to be that Sweden, as one of the nations of the battle groups on standby, might be obliged to send troops to Libya in case a mission request would come from the UN OCHA and therefore did not want to make a mission more likely by approving the CONOPS. The same report speculated that opposition from other states at the meeting was caused by their objections to the EU taking on a reconstruction role through the CDSP (Bloching, 2011, p. 1). These quarrels between the EU nations over the course of action the EU should take in the Libya crisis even undermined High Representative Ashton's role, as Brattberg points out. By letting domestic politics prejudge their stands on the matter, some members weakened the base for Ashton's leadership over the EU's foreign policy. The divide between the EU members was also seen when France and Britain went head-to-head with Germany in the UN Security Council on Libya as Germany abstained from voting on a no-fly zone (Brattberg, 2011, p. 1).

As Nicole Koenig (2011) points out, one of the main objectives with the Lisbon Treaty was to enhance coherence in EU's external actions (p. 16). One of the six principles of human security from the Madrid report, the principle of a clear and transparent strategic action, also stresses the importance of coherence and states that EU's interventions must be made in accord with a coherent overall strategy. This was not the case with EUFOR Libya, as interference from national politics and the EU members' inability to act as one hindered a firm mandate and a fast response to the crisis. As Koenig (2011) states:

> The Libyan crisis has once again revealed that interests, national specificities and domestic electoral horizons often guide the unilateral actions of the member states in the short term. These unilateral actions either prevent a common European response or deprive the EU-level response of credibility. (p. 24)

Despite these criticisms and although EUFOR Libya did not become a reality, the EU did not merely stand by in the Libya crisis. All negotiations with the Libyan government

were suspended and an asset freeze was put in motion as well as sanctions against Libyan ports (Brattberg, 2011, p. 1). On the 23th of February the European Commission (EC) activated its Civil Protection Mechanism and humanitarian assistance office (ECHO) on request from the HR to support the evacuation of EU citizens and those from neighboring countries from Libya. In a statement made after the activation, Kristalina Georgieva, the Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, emphasized the EU's role in addressing human security under the narrow definition in Libya:

> The unleashing of violence in Libya has triggered a major humanitarian crisis at Europe's doorstep. Europe's values and interests command us to act decisively and this is what we are doing. Europe has mobilised itself not only to evacuate EU citizens in a coordinated and speedy manner, but also to address the dire needs of people suffering - whether refugees fleeing Libya or those trapped by conflict inside the country. (European Commission, 2011b)

The first concrete steps towards EU action on the ground were then taken on May 22th, when Catherine Ashton, EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs (HR) opened a liaison office that would be managed by the European External Action Service (EEAS) in the town of Benghazi, in order to foster EU assistance in coordination with other international organizations, and to give immediate support to the National Transitional Council (NTC) and to the civil society (European Union, 2011c). In August of same year the High Representative opened an office in Tripoli which then became a fully fledged delegation office of the EU in Libya three months later. The EU has funded humanitarian assistance which has been carried out by humanitarian organizations on the ground such as the Red Cross, UN agencies and NGOs, and has been focused on meeting basic needs and preventing human rights abuses. Also, the EU has had an ECHO humanitarian team and field experts both in Libya and on Libya's borders with Chad, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt to assess and monitor the humanitarian situation. The protection of the civilian population, in particular minority groups, Internally Displaced People and Sub-Saharan Africans, is a main concern for this team (European Commission, 2012, p. 1). As of the 11th of January 2012 the EU had provided a total of 156 million Euros in funding – double the initial budget of 80 million Euros - for humanitarian and civil protection, making the EU the biggest humanitarian donor in the Libyan crisis. (European Commission, 2012, p. 2).

5.3. EUBAM Libya

On the 22th of May 2013, two years after the crisis erupted in Libya, a decision to send a CSDP civilian mission to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing border security was adopted by the European Council and issued on the 24th of May. This followed repeated EU assurances to the Libyan authorities, starting from the 23rd of July 2012, of the EU's willingness to contribute to Libya's security and border management through CSDP. In January 2013 Libya's Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation replied to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs (HR) welcoming the CSDP proposal to 'support the Libyan authorities in developing the capacity to enhance the security of Libya's borders in the short term, and to assist in developing a broader strategic Integrated Border Management (IBM) concept in the longer term.' (Council Decision of 24. May 2013, 2013). Head of the mission was appointed, Antti Juhani Hartikainen, an expert on international border security, and a headquarters was set up in Tripoli. The mission was stated to be a part of EU's comprehensive answer to Libyan needs, supporting the post-conflict reconstruction (European Union, 2014, p. 1). The mission encompasses both the short-term objective of securing Libya's land, sea and air borders and the long-term objective of a broader Integrated Border Management strategy (IBM). These are to be accomplished mostly by a transfer of know-how as no executive function is defined for the mission (Council Decision of 24. May 2013, 2013).

There was no direct reference to human security in the EUBAM mandate, but some aspects of the six human security principles from the Madrid report can be detected. The mission was set up at the Libyan authorities' request and in close partnership with them, thus demonstrating a strong legitimate authority. Much emphasis was put on clear and transparent strategic direction, consistent with principle six of the Madrid report. This can be seen in the decision to appoint the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) director, Hansjörg Haber, as a Civilian Operation Commander, exercising command and control of EUBAM Libya at the strategic level, which also ensured that the mission had civilian leadership. It was also emphasized that the mission should have a unified chain of command as a crisis management operation and that 'the Civilian Operation Commander, the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Southern Mediterranean region, the Head of Union Delegation in Libya and the Head of Mission of EUBAM Libya shall consult each other as required.' (Council Decision of 24. May 2013, 2013). Further concern for coherence can be seen in the decision's statement that 'the HR shall ensure the consistency of the

implementation of this Decision with the Union's external action as a whole; including the Union's development programmes' and that the mission should 'receive local political guidance from the EUSR for the Southern Mediterranean region'. Also, an adherence to multilateralism can be noted as third states may become part of EUBAM Libya, and the Head of Mission is instructed to coordinate actions with relevant third parties in Libya (Council Decision of 24. May 2013, 2013).

In the latest conclusions on Libya (as of the time of writing) from the EU Council of Ministers at its Foreign Affairs meeting in Brussels on the 18th of November 2013, some strong reflections of human security thinking can be detected. The importance of all actors recognizing essential values, such as the freedom of assembly and of expression, is highlighted as well as the EU's commitment to support Libya in its transition towards democracy. The EU urges the Libyan authorities to uphold human rights and underlines the importance of the government working with the International Criminal Court (ICC), thus putting emphasis on effective multilateralism and the importance of post-conflict justice. It also echoes the logic of the R2P concept in stating that 'the security situation in Libya remains a serious challenge for the Libyan people and state institutions, which should be able to provide security for all its citizens throughout the country' (Council of the European Union, 2013, p. 2). The conclusion emphasises a bottom-up approach and a regional approach, underlining that the EU recognizes:

> the importance of Libyan civil society, including human rights defenders, youth, women, local authorities and media, for the future of Libya and will continue supporting it. The EU further proclaims its support of regional initiatives such as the Union for the Mediterranean, the 5+5 Western Mediterranean Forum and the Arab Maghreb Union. (Council of the European Union, 2013, p. 2)

Finally, the conclusions emphasise the importance of safe and secure borders to safeguard the movements of migrants and protect their fundamental rights, and state that the EU is committed to react to the challenges arising from border management such as illicit smuggling of weapons and guns, terrorism and human trafficking (Council of the European Union, 2013, p. 2). Success in these aims would clearly enhance the human security of the people of Libya.

It would seem that EUBAM Libya does reflect a commitment to human security, and this was seen also in its celebration of Human Rights Day on December 10th last year. A

seminar on ‘human rights and migrations in Libya’ was organized where representatives from different organizations, both international and national, such as the Libya Coast Guard, UNHCR, the EU’s delegation in Libya and EUBAM gave presentations on human rights issues relating to migration and possible ways for these actors to work together on such matters. The acting head of the EUBAM mission, Peter Rundell, quoted the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, stating that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’, and said that this celebration was a testament to the direction Libya was taking. Maria Nystedt, the seminar organiser from EUBAM, also acknowledged the mission’s human security aspect by stating that ‘border management agencies have the duty to protect the rights of migrants’ (European Union, 2013, p. 2).

The EUBAM Libya mission has a difficult time ahead as Libya’s vast borders are not easy to control. A surge of asylum seekers and refugees from neighboring countries - Sudan, Egypt, Chad and Niger, Algeria and Tunisia – many of them facing huge problems themselves, as well as migration flows from Libya, presents a challenge. The proliferation of weapons smuggling from Libya, fueling conflicts in fragile states such as Syria; terrorist activities; and transnational and drug-related crimes are also difficult challenges facing the mission. The failure to launch EUFOR Libya and the critique faced in the aftermath are now in the past, and to the extent that EUBAM Libya succeeds in its tasks, the EU has the potential to change the opinion of the international community toward CSDP’s operational ability.

6. Conclusions

The main aim of this thesis was to analyse the concept of human security within the framework of EU's external policy to find out to what extent the concept has become a policy standard, a guideline, for European diplomacy and the CSDP. Research into the concept itself, an overview of its emergence and development and its difference from the traditional security concept, has provided a basis for answering the first research question regarding the theoretical aspects of the concept. The main conclusion from the second chapter is that, even though the concept of human security is interpreted in different ways, its main content is its focus on the individual as a prime object of security, and here lies its essential difference from the traditional view of state-to-state security. The lesson of human security is that international security cannot be achieved without assuring individual security.

The answer to the second set of research questions, about human security within the EU, is that there is clear evidence indicating that human security does play a role within EU external policy, as demonstrated in chapters three and four. Aspects of human security can be found in the CSDP's general approach towards conflict management where mission objectives range from humanitarian aid and the protection of individuals, to the rebuilding of democratic institutions and national security. It can also been seen in EU's efforts to address the prevention of human rights violations and corruption while using both military and non-military instruments to achieve these means. By cooperating with other international institutions and with an approach based on security sector reform, rule of law and building up civil capacities, the EU clearly follows a human security agenda. This soft approach, more in line with human security than traditional security, can be seen both in the ESS report from 2003 and in the Lisbon Treaty, which both mentions that operational capacity, should be based on civil as well as military means.

Having in mind the human security criteria of the Madrid report, that report's six principles were used to analyse in more detail the EU's external policies and its approach to crisis management. The conclusion is that the EU has realized that security is not only based on the traditional military and realist definition. The threats distinguished in the ESS, where general objectives for advancing the EU's security interests were first established, definitively go beyond traditional military threats, recognizing state failure, regional conflicts, terrorism and WMD proliferation as possible threats in a changed security environment. These challenges, according to the ESS, cannot only be met with traditional military means. In order to meet them a new approach to security is important, namely a multi-functional and multi-

instrument strategy where different aspects of security threats are integrated. The security of individuals, or human security, is thus recognized as a precondition for the security of states, regions and the world. But realizing this in principle is not the same as making a full commitment to the concept of human security, and it can be said without a doubt that the EU has not been willing to make such a complete commitment - as seen, not least, in the fact that the concept has never been explicitly voiced and drafted into the EU's own documents. However, aspects of human security are present in various EU decisions, statements and discourse as has been seen throughout the thesis.

In answer to the last set of research questions, about the EU's role in the crisis in Libya and the presence of human security in its approach, it can be said that - as with EU foreign policy as a whole - aspects of human security are to be found, but a full commitment to the concept is not visible. The case of Libya has proven to be a difficult one for the EU. The failure to launch EUFOR Libya, the clear disagreement between EU's member states on the matter, the way that some member states contradicted official EU views, and a slow response to the crisis all demonstrated yet again that crisis management is not an easy task for the EU. Expectations were high that the Libya mission, as the first one after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, would prove to be a successful example of EU's foreign policy. This did not prove to be the case, as the thesis has demonstrated. However, the EU's role in Libya is not over and its presence is now evident not only in the humanitarian assistance field but with EUBAM Libya in motion. Even if the EU's initial response, to use military means by deploying EUFOR Libya, proved to be a failure, the EU's response in terms of civilian crisis management has until now been quite successful. Using the Madrid report's principles as guidelines, the analysis above leads to the overall conclusion that in the EU's handling of Libya, aspects can be found both in discourse and in the decisions adopted that correspond to the concept of human security. From the first moment of the crisis, statements made by EU officials have emphasised various perspectives of human security, right through to the press release cited above about EUBAM celebrating the International Human Rights Day with Libyan counterparts. EU discourse has thus been reflecting the changed security environment, emphasising human security over state security.

It is clear that human security has had an effect on the EU's external policy and its development, but as mentioned earlier, it has up to now never been directly and explicitly referred to. Therefore the EU can be said to be pursuing a human security agenda in all but name. If the EU would go further by committing fully to the concept of human security and making the six principles of human security into guidelines for its whole foreign policy, as

recommended in the Madrid report, this could serve as an important factor providing the EU with a direct and clear strategy in crisis management. Protecting and securing people should be the main focus of EU's crisis management, and making the six principles a part of every mission's mandate would convey a strong commitment to that. Every mission's intention must first and foremost be to address direct threats to human security. Acknowledging and implementing the six principles - the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism, an integrated regional approach and a clear and transparent strategic direction - would serve to enhance EU's legitimacy as a global security actor.

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List of abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHG	Civilian Headline Goal
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CRT	Civilian Response Team
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC	European Commission
ECHO	Civil Protection Mechanism and humanitarian assistance
EDC	European Defense Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEAS	European External Action Servise
EPC	European Political Co-operation
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy (now CSDP)
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
HR	High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Responsibility
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
TEC	Treaty establishing the European Community
TEU	Treaty of European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TNC	Transitional National Council
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Human Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction