University of Akureyri,
Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, Department of Law
Master's Programme in Polar Law

Security Outlook of the Arctic States and Perspectives on NATO's Involvement



Irina Zhilina
September 2013

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

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Master's Degree Thesis Submitted as Part of Studies for
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Master's Degree Thesis
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

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Contents

Acknowledgements....4
Introduction....6
Chapters Overview....8
Chapter 1. Methodology and literature survey....9
Chapter 2. Defining Security in the Arctic in the XXI century....12
Traditional Security....14
Social Constructivism....21
Human Security....23
The Copenhagen School....28
Chapter 3. Security outlook of the Arctic States....33
Norway....34
Denmark....36
Iceland....37
Sweden....40
Finland....42
Russia....43
USA....48
Canada....52
Arctic as security community....55
Chapter 4. Security aspects in the Arctic: the potential Role of NATO....64
The Arctic as a Geopolitical Pivot....64
The role of NATO in historic perspective....67
NATO's strategic concepts during the Cold War....70
At the turn of a century....72
Nuclear Containment in the Arctic....81
Conclusion....88
Bibliography....91

Introduction

Since the end of the 20th century the notion of security has considerably evolved. The concept has been extended in several dimensions: from security of a state to security of a group or individual (downwards) and from security of a state to security of the whole international system (upwards). Moreover, the understanding of security has gained political, social, environmental and various other perspectives.[1] Redirected from "hard" military issues to "soft" civilian matters, security has become more human-oriented, which has made its understanding more holistic and comprehensive.[2] Indeed, the international security political agenda has become far more diverse. In the 1970s the security concept already included international economics, as it became clear that the U.S. economy was no longer the independent force that it had been before; on the contrary, it became powerfully affected by economic policies of dozens of other countries. The 1973 embargo of Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on oil export dramatically affected the hydrocarbons market prices and, after that, energy security became the issue of the day. By the 1990s climate change had shifted its status from optional discussions at conferences towards the higher agenda of international affairs.

Contemporary global developments like globalisation and the opening of borders suggest the need for another analogous broadening definition of national security that would include and give a greater priority to energy security issues and environmental threats as well as demographic issues, drugs, public health and many other problems.[3] Nowadays there are very few states in the world that are actually experiencing an imminent threat posed by another state's military forces. Therefore, the "hard" or military security agenda is not dominating over "soft" security challenges any longer. Maintaining internal order against the threat of insurgency and/or contributing to regional or global order and justice is a greater issue more the issue of the day.[4]

The security challenges relevant to the Arctic Region are naturally linked to climate change processes, in particular, global warming. In the High North most of the threats are of a non-military character. Furthermore, a great part of security challenges are on the agenda of international cooperation institutions. Except one, which is military security concerns that were emasculated from the table of negatiations at the very birth of the Arctic Council, a major international entity when it comes to Arctic affairs. The discussions on traditional security matters are very limited, only some of them take place bilaterally in less institutionalised frameworks. However, avoiding a dialogue does not necessarily produce a more stable strategic environment.[5]

Being a very sensitive topic, hard security is less discussed in academic circles compared to environmental risks, maritime transportation, fishery, hydrocarbons exploitation, legal regimes and international cooperation. It is the mass media that covers the topic, and very often it inadequately labels the political situation with such tags as "the scramble for territory and resources", "remilitarisation of the Arctic"[6] Though much of the new interest in the region stems from new economic opportunity, there is also a military dimension to the changing Arctic that is increasingly being addressed by the armed forces of the region in military-to-military cooperation.

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[1] E. Rothschild. 'What Is Security?' (1995) 124(3) The Quest for World Order 53-98.
[2] Lassi Heininen and Chris Southcott, *Globalization and the circumpolar North* (University of Alaska Press, 2010) 221-265.
[3] Jessica Tuchman Mathews. 'Redefining Security' (1989) 68(2) Foreign affairs Foreign affairs 162-177.
[4] Peter Hough, *Understanding global security* (Routledge, 2009), 57.
[5] Annika Bergman Rosamond, '*Perspectives on Security in the Arctic Area*' Danish Institute for International Studies (2011) 35.
[6] See, for example, the Guardian 13 May 2009; Rusnet 31 March 2009; Reuters UK 13 May 2009; Barents Observer 29 March 2009, etc.

The multi-level web of institutionalisation that deals with soft security matters is in place and is effectively managed so far, nevertheless, the Arctic Region is still experiencing geopolitical tensions emerging from conflicts of overlapping interests in sovereignty claims (e.g. Beaufort Sea, Lomonosov Ridge), differences in perceptions of scientific data (e.g. viability of fish stocks, the prognosis on natural resources reserves) and diametrical approaches to some legal regimes (e.g. The Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard, navigation via Northern Sea Route (NSR) and Northwest Passage (NWP).

All the Arctic States refer to international law in their national strategies and policies for the development of their respective northern territories. From the legal perspective, bilateral negotiations and provisions of Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) are meant to be the only and overarching international instruments designed to solve any possible conflict of national interests. However, in practice, the stability of the region, a commitment to the rule of law, as well as transparency and accountability are in the hands of national governments and their goodwill. That is why, this thesis deals with the understanding of security in the Arctic Region through lenses of the respective national strategies and other relevant programme papers of the Arctic States.

Its primary aim is to examine the patterns of change in approach to specific issues of potential relevance to the state's security. The structure of the thesis is organised by a set of research questions:

1. How were the threat perceptions and security policy priorities redefined after the end of the Cold War on the world arena and in IR academia?
2. How did the Arctic littoral states respond to this paradigm shift?
3. How do the Arctic littoral states perceive themselves in the changing geopolitical landscape from the security perspective?
4. What are the national perspectives on the specific NATO involvement in the Arctic Region?

In order to answer these questions the following tasks were established:

- To describe the shift in theoretical paradigm in Security Studies and analyse the political developments in the Arctic Affairs at the turn of the century.
- To provide a comparative analysis of the Arctic strategies and defence policies and other relevant documents, reports and statements.
- To look into history, dimensions and examples of NATO's involvement in the region.

Getting the full picture of what Arctic security is about is important because of the unique characteristics of the area. First of all, the Circumpolar North has been perceived as a region of strategic significance for many decades, and this feature did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. The second characteristic feature of the region is the existence of some unresolved issues of international law. Thirdly, the Arctic is a region of peripheries as it does not fully encompass the territories of the 8 Arctic States and because they are so far away from the political centre. But at the same time these areas generate big portions of the national GDP because of rich oil and gas reserves, mining and forestry industries, fisheries. etc. Fourthly, after the Cold War the Arctic also became the region of trans-border cooperation. Last but not least, the High North is characterized by harsh climate conditions. These features form a unique background for studying the security dynamics increasingly affected by the climate change.[7] This thesis is meant as a springboard that can open up a very complex discussion.

[7] Kristian Åtland. 'The European Arctic in Soviet and Russian Security Policy 1987-2007.' (Philosophiae Doctor University of Tromso 2009) 6-7.

Chapters Overview

Chapter 1 describes the methodology of the research and sets the research questions. It also intends to briefly introduce most influential academic sources that guided the research process.

Chapter 2 explores some of the major philosophies of International Relations theory, with the focus on the paradigm shift from "hard" to "soft" security matters in Security Studies. In particular it describes in details the approaches from realist, neorealist, social constructivist schools as well as human security approach and the theory of securitization from the Copenhagen School. This chapter tries to give an answer how relations between the changes in the political environment, climate change and emergence of the new security agenda evolved.

Chapter 3 continues by applying theoretical framework within the Arctic context and explaining how it is relevant in the in Arctic political discourse. In other words, it analyses the national strategies and defence policies and other relevant programme papers in order to explore: what kind of threats do the Arctic states recognise for their national security. Are there existential threats among them? Which security matters, "hard" or "soft", are prioritized. Furthermore, the research examines the self-perception of Arctic littoral states in the new security environment in relation to each other and their respective perspectives on the involvement of NATO in the Arctic Region. All in all, in this chapter the author attempts to represent real motivation of states to formulate their security policies. In addition it touches on the hypothesis of the Arctic Region as a security community.

Chapter 4 gives insights on the retrospective of NATO's presence in the region and describes recent developments and current situation. Specifically, the author pays attention to the evolution of the Alliance as a military-political organisation in terms of diversifying its range of tasks from "hard" to "soft" security matters in its recent Strategic Concept and the perspective of Russia on this matter. Also, this chapter highlights nuclear containment and deterrence policy in connection to relations with Russia.

Chapter 1. Methodology and literature survey

The structure can be roughly divided into theoretical and empirical part. The first part represents explorative research based on the classic texts of major philosophical schools in International Relations theory and Security Studies. The second part of the research draws heavily on the multi-country comparative strategy analysis that uses the Arctic littoral states Arctic strategies and defence policies as its primary object of study. The author compares and contrasts the key security aspects of these documents. As such, this cross-analysis looks at the details of the strategies and considers the underlying priorities from within. It then investigates the inter-linkages between the priority areas. Moreover, it considers the role of these strategies and policies as national tools within the larger international political framework of the Arctic Region.

To be more specific, the content of the research was formed through study of the fundamental sources. Thus, a great deal of information was examined from primary sources such as respective Arctic strategies, defence policies as well as government documents and publications from governmental offices related to the security in the Arctic Region. In order to expand the understanding and application of these policies and as a way to give broader perspectives on new political environment, the sources of information were books, articles, official websites, reports, conference proceedings and online news articles. Therefore, it could be called secondary research as it is based also on other academic sources.

The process of reading and analyzing the documents happened through multiple stages. In the beginning readings involved looking for prominent themes, reoccurring phrases and key words. Later on the readings considered the meaning of the documents within the geopolitical context of the state. Secondary research materials supported the procedure of identifying the themes and priorities within the documents.

First of all, sources used in Chapter 2 were primarily classical texts from such schools of thought as realism, neorealism, social constructivism represented by works of Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Stephen Walt, *The Rainaissance of the Security Studies* and others. Also, Chapter 2 explores the Copenhagen school though work of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wile (*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*) and Human Security from the perspectives of Keith Krause (*Towards a practical human security agenda*), Gunhild Hoogensen (*Human Security in the Arctic*) and etc. Also, a course on International Security at the University of Tromsø (Norway) and a training course

"Security in a changing world" at Thule Institute (Finland) attended by the author in 2012 gave knowledge about these influential works and comprehension of major milestones and future prospects of Security Studies theory. The analysis of sources mentioned above created a theoretical framework of the evolution in the understanding of security, that was used the other chapters conceptualizing new Arctic political situation, new security agenda and the way the sates address it.

Secondly, in Chapters 3 and 4, the empirical part of the thesis, the sources were specifically devoted to the Arctic Region. For instance, multiple works by Lassi Heininen (particularly, *Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study, Globalization and Security in the Circumpolar North*) provided details for how to conceptualize Arctic geopolitical trends within geopolitical theory. Publications by Alison Bailes (*Potential Roles of NATO and the EU in High Northern Security, NATO and the EU in the north: what is at stake in current strategy development?,* etc.) together with Helga Haftendorf's (*NATO and the Arctic: is the Atlantic alliance a cold war relic in a peaceful region now faced with non-military challenges?*) provided with a great analysis of the potential involvement of NATO and its possible tasks in the Circumpolar North. Some of these sources were introduced to the author in 2011 during course "International Cooperation, Geopolitics and Security" at the University of Akureyri (Iceland) and some through personal communication with the authors. Furthermore, of big influence and value were the publications issued in frames of an international research programme "*Geopolitics in the High North*"[8], providing an outlook on the traditional and emerging actors in the politics as well as the patterns of cooperation and conflict. The materials were useful also for examining Russian, Norwegian and American political agenda in the High North. During the thesis research special attention was drawn to the SIPRI research project "*Arctic Futures: Managing Competition and Promoting Cooperation"*[9] a source for exploring military capabilities of the Arctic littoral states and military cooperation between them. Also insights of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies "*Oslo Files on Defence and Security*" and publication by NATO Defence College "*Security Prospects in the High North*" as well as the NATO Multimedia library and its section on Arctic Security[10] were very informative and knowledgeable publications in terms of providing reading material on Northern European and Russian vision on security

[8] For more information see: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. 'Geopolitics in the High North' <http://geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php>.
[9] For more information see: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 'Arctic Futures: Managing Competition and Promoting Cooperation' <http://www.sipri.org/research/security/arctic>.
[10] For more information see: NATO Multimedia library. 'Arctic Security' http://natolibguides.info/arcticsecurity>.

developments (e.g. publications of such authors as Katarzyna Zysk and Kristian Åtland). The Russian perspective on the security developments was also represented by publications issued by think-tank Russian International Affairs Council[11], Russian Institute of Strategic Studies[12] and Institute of World Economy and International Relations.[13] Northern American positions were covered by such authors as James Kraska (*The New Arctic Geography and U.S. Strategy*), Whitney Lackenbauer (*Mirror images: Canada, Russia and the Circumpolar World*), Rob Huebert (*U.S. Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power*) and Heather A. Conley (*The New Foreign Policy Frontier: U.S. interests and actors in the Arctic*), etc. These sources were found mostly during the desk top research online and at the university libraries. Moreover, "Arctic Frontiers" Conference in 2013 became a both educating and inspiring event to progress in research.

Finally, works of many other authors were used in the process of carrying out this research, their arguments are found within. In general, the author attempted to refer to the most recent literature from different Arctic and other states to shape the research in more objective way and provide with more comprehensive and multi-national perspectives.

[11] For more information see: 'Russian International Affairs Council' <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?PROJECT_THEME_ID_4=13#top>.
[12] For more information see: 'Russian Institute of Strategic Studies' <http://www.riss.ru/>.
[13] For more information see: 'Institute of World Economy and International Relations' <www.imemo.ru/en/>.

Chapter 2. Defining Security in the Arctic in the XXI century

Nowadays, the Arctic Region attracts a lot of political and academic attention. Primarily, the focus tends to be on different aspects of economic development, environmental protection and indigenous peoples issues. However, security agenda is in a way underrepresented, which stirs up misleading speculations and echoes of the Cold War in mass media. In the Circumpolar North climate change has been shifting the political environment from tension and distrust to peace and cooperation. In this respect security studies are important in terms of interplay between security interests and other national priorities of states in the Arctic Region. Security is a pillar for international cooperation potential and understanding of interstate conflicts in a longer term, it is a tool to avoid use of violence and promote stability.

To begin with, let's define the term security and take a look at what specific forms it can take in the geographical scope of the Arctic Region. The word "security" derived from the Latin "securitas" that refers to tranquillity and freedom from care. In the Russian language, which is the mother tongue of the author, the word "security" literally means "with no danger". In everyday life when we talk about security we refer to the feeling of being secured, safe and not threatened. Security is both about identifying the threats to our values, and the instruments or measures we use in order to protect those values. Threat perception is related to the perceived magnitude of loss of that we value.[14]

However, in International Relations (IR) studies the discussions on security include more complex interpretations. Security studies, as a sub-field of a larger discipline of IR, emerged relatively recently, during World War II, setting the stage for the "Golden Age" or "first wave" of security studies.[15] Since then it has experienced a series of debates on nature of threats, objects and subjects of security.

Historically, the understanding of security was formed in a situation when states threatened each other by intervening in the territory, imposing a political will, challenging independence and sovereignty. The world and accordingly the system of IR have been gradually changing since the end of World War II. The security studies have been evolving as well. Early scholars argued that only threats of military character directed towards a state were the major component of security studies. In the mid-1970s security studies were broadened by including different actors of IR on various levels and non-military threats as possible sources of insecurity. The end of the Cold War made this trend more visible. E.

[14] Zeev Maoz, *National choices and international processes* (Cambridge University Press 1990) 609.
[15] Robert Jervis. 'Deterrence theory revisited' (1979) 31(2) World Politics 289-324.

Rothschild wrote that the concept of security has been extended into several dimensions, depending on the level of analysis, security in IR has different entities. Firstly, security was extended vertically: from the security of units of IR, which are states and nations, down to the security of individuals. The upward extension took place from security of a state up to the security of the whole international system which is the highest level encompassing the largest conglomerates on the planet. Secondly, it was horizontal extension of the security agenda, it included military, political, economic, social, environmental and other sectors of security. Finally, "the political responsibility for ensuring security (or for invigilating all these "concepts of security") itself extended: it diffused in all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organizations, to public opinion and press…"[16] Consequently, security on different levels does not assume the same thing.

Today security covers the interaction of various factors in terms of their importance to provide, maintain or disrupt safety of actors of IR and individuals or communities. In other words, "international security is mostly about how human collectivities relate to each other in terms of threats and vulnerabilities."[17]

The development of a security policy of a state and its consequent implementation depends on the actual meaning that is put in the term security. When we try to define what the concept of security is, we need to break the problem down in several parts. The first part is about identifying a referent subject of security, who or what needs to be secured? Secondly, it is important what kind of threat should be kept on the front-burner, in other words, what is the nature of insecurity: is it a threat of military conflict or environmental catastrophe? Thirdly, who is responsible to provide security? Is it a state or non-state actors, or perhaps, the international community? In this chapter major philosophical schools will be surveyed and academic literature that recognized evolution of understanding security in the new world order explored. Broadened and deepened interpretation of security encompassing a varied range of perceived threats to humankind will be looked at. In other words, the chapter will focus on the three most frequently used approaches within the security studies community: strategic studies, securitization theory and human security. Finally, an attempt will be made to analyze political developments that have taken place since World War II in the Arctic Region through the lenses of these schools.

[16] E. Rothschild. 'What Is Security?' (1995) 124(3) The Quest for World Order 5355.
[17] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: a new framework for analysis* (Lynne Rienner Pub. 1998) 239, 10.

Traditional Security

Being one of the most criticised academicals approach, realism is, nevertheless, regarded as a dominant theoretical paradigm in the study of international politics and security. The origins of the principles of realism have been connected to Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, and epitomising the work of Machiavelli's *The Prince* and Hobbes' *Leviathan*. More recently the modern proponents of realism can be found in the work of Morgenthau, Carr and Kissinger. The Classical Realism emerged in early 1940s. It used to be a dominant school of thought during thane Cold War period, when IR system was strongly bipolarised and even a minor inter-state conflict was characterized by a backstage competition between two super states.

In realist tradition, security of a referent object should not be isolated but studied in a wider context of the international situation. Classical security theory assumes that states are the most important actors in IR. Thus, the main focus was on the analysis and prediction of states' behaviour, especially in the military and political sector. Realism concentrates mostly on two levels of vertical gradation of IR. It suggests the highest level of a global stage to be useful for studying superpowers, while regional level was claimed to be the most relevant for the state level. The role of international organisations was neglected in IR, as at those times, in comparison with the current situation, they were unable to create enough political influence to affect decision- making in the global system, it needn't be mentioned that transnational corporations or individuals had no influence either. The realists believe that the whole sphere of IR is anarchical and a state ought to rely on their own capacities to support its security and to enforce its national interest. Traditional understanding of security also includes Neo- realist theory originating from the classical realism from Machiavelli and Hobbes[18] to Morgentahau[19], with such thinkers as Waltz[20] and Mearsheimer[21]. This sub-school does not deny the classical approach, it rather embraces it. Both approaches view a sate as the main actor in international affairs and the greatest powers have the greatest impact on the IR, thus, the distribution of power or capabilities shapes the IR, determines international outcomes. However, several key differences between classical realism and neo-realism. For example, classical see the origins of conflicts and wars in an imperfect human nature while neo-realists argue that causes are found in the anarchic system of IR. In classical

[18] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford University Press 1998).
[19] Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, Thompson, Kenneth Winfred, Clinton,W.David., *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace* (7th edn, McGraw-Hill Higher Education 2006).
[20] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of international politics* (Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 1979).
[21] J. Mearsheimer. 'A Realist Reply' (1995) 20 International Security 82.

realism the state is ontologically superior to the system, in contrast, neorealism allows more space for agency.[22] Furthermore, classical realists differentiate between status-quo powers and revisionist powers while neorealism regards states as unitary actors.[23] Finally, neo-realists attempt to construct a more rigorous and scientific approach to the study of international politics, heavily influenced by the behaviourist revolution of the 1960's while classical realism confine its analyses to subjective valuations of international relations.[24] Nevertheless, in terms of understanding security classical and neo-realism are going hand in hand in mainstream literature.

The idea of the national interest was central to the development of Realism after World War II and still continues to be an influential concept among both scholars and national governments. Implementation of national interests in foreign policy allows a state to act according to the interests of its own people even if this conflicts with the interests of other states and peoples.[25] Although sometimes merely a last resort, the use of military power or just the treat of using it is considered as major tool to secure the position on the world arena. Finally, according to such realists as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz the distribution of power in the global system drives international politics, the reason being that states tend to seek to maximize their power and/or their security wherever possible,[26] which is justified by "national interests". For Realists, governments should make a clear distinction between "high" and "low" politics in policy-making in which the importance of international affairs is dominating over such domestic concerns as welfare, for example.[27] Capturing the traditional understanding of security Stephen Walt wrote:

> "Security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force. It explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of the force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war."[28]

In a traditional approach, the notion of security implies that it is the state that is in "physical" danger and, thus, is a referent object of security. In this concept, the use of violence and ultimately death, the end of existence of a state, but not an individual, is the

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[22] J. Hobson, *The State and International Relations* (Cambridge University Press. 2000) 17.
[23] R. Schweller. 'Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?' (1996) 5 Security Studies 90, 155.
[24] Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sørenson, *Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches* (Oxford University Press 2008) 75.
[25] Peter Hough, *Understanding global security* (Routledge 2009), 4.
[26] S. M. Lynn-Jones, 'Realism in Security Studies' in Craig A. Snyder (ed), *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 17, 20.
[27] Peter Hough, 'Understanding global security' (Routledge 2009), 3.
[28] S. M. Walt. 'The Renaissance of Security Studies' (1991) 35(2) International Studies Quaterly 211, 212.

biggest fear. As long as the state is secure the people are secure as well.[29] At the same time, it is also the state that is responsible to secure itself, as only a state has the capacity to defend its territory and sovereignty, and most commonly it's done by military means. Therefore, the state is a container or holder of security, ensuring the safety of the population residing within its borders. In the Social Contract Theory, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes says, that individuals give up their freedom to a state to define what is vital and valuable for them, what needs to be secured. In return the state takes a moral obligation to protect its people from danger. [30] Within the realist approach the state claims a special right, a privilege to identify the nature of threat. The identification of danger and enemies as existential and immediate gives a green light to legitimise or justify the practice of (counter-) violence[31] which the state also has a monopoly to use. When we talk about a state we do not necessarily imply a unitary entity with one decision-making perspective. There are many different actors involved, for example, policymakers, military, lobbyists, political elite etc., which do not always share the same interests. It takes a long and complicated process is necessary for power holders to come to a common position. But in security studies all of them are commonly united under the same umbrella called the state apparatus.

In IR all states form a global web of security interdependence in this or that way. Despite technologic breakthroughs in modern armament a threat of a military conflict spreads easier and faster over short distances than over long ones. That is why generally neighbouring powers are considered to be of a greater threat than distant powers.

The Realist School produced several theories to explain puzzling security dynamics such as balance-of-power and balance-of-threat, security dilemma, offence-defence balance, hegemonic stability and power transition. The balance-of-power theory describes IR under conditions of anarchy when a state is aggressively pursuing its national interests and eliminating the interests of the others. In response other states are checking their internal capacities and possibilities to form alliances in order to balance the unipolar accumulation of power in the IR system. Establishment of such an alliance can take place before the state actor gains obvious power edge. Balance-of-threat theory adds complexity to this picture[32] by analysing how states immediately respond in their foreign policies to the emergence of a new

[29] D. Mutimer, 'Beyound Strategy: Critical Thinking on the New security Studies' in Craig A. Snyder (ed), *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 45, 49.
[30] Thomas Hobbes, 'Leviathan' (Oxford University Press 1998).
[31] Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv. 'Security by any other name: negative security, positive security, and a multi-actor security approach' (2012) 38(04) Review of International Studies 835-859.
[32] William C. Wohlforth, 'Realism in Security Studies' in Cavelty Myriam Dunn and Victor Mauer (eds), *The Routledge handbook of security studies* (Routledge 2010) 15.

threat in the world stage. If a rising power wields a combination of military and economic potential together with factors of geographical proximity and aggressive behaviour it certainly changes threat perceptions of the others that feel an imminent need to balance the emerging power. The other focal point on security developed by the Realist School is a concept of security dilemma coined by John Herz. The realists believe that state's security is achieved by maximisation of its power in the world arena. The security dilemma is expressed in the idea that if a state is building up its military capacity, it creates insecurity for the other state or even for the world community. The latter feels the need to respond with equivalent measures arming for self-defence. But then the first state will need to decrease its own military potential. This vicious circle took place during the Cold War forming the bipolar IR system. The two superstates followed each other in the arms race and at the same time they were not allowing each other to become too powerful. Balance of power was helping them to maintain *status quo*.[33]

Offence-defence theory was mainly developed by Charles Glaser (1994/95), Stephen Van Evera (1999) and others as an offshoot of security dilemma theory. This theory builds on the idea of distinguishing offensive and defensive military preparations basing on both technological and geographical factors, along with a few others. Its main prediction is that militarised conflict and war are more likely to occur if offensive military operations have a relative advantage over defensive ones. Peace and cooperation are more likely when the situation is reversed and defensive operations are more feasible. Accordingly, the easier it is to distinguish offensive and defensive preparations, the greater the probability to establish peace.[34]

Hegemonic stability theory describes how states tend to accumulate resources and their potential seeking for dominance and sort of hierarchy in the IR system. It analyses the phenomena of cooperation between actors, how and why it emerges and sustains. It argues that the international order is based on a certain distribution of power in IR.[35]

The theory of power transition adds to the previous observations the fact that smaller and medium powers tend to contest stronger ones as they accumulate capacity to do so. Thus, the old order is breaking down and turns into a new system of IR.

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[33] Peter Hough, 'Understanding global security' (Routledge 2009) 3.
[34] William C. Wohlforth, 'Realism in Security Studies' in Cavelty Myriam Dunn and Victor Mauer (eds), *The Routledge handbook of security studies* (Routledge 2010) 16.
[35] R. G. Gilpin, 'The Richness of the tratidition of the political Realism' in R. Keohane (ed), *Neorealism and its critics* (New York Columbia University Press 1986) 301-321.

All in all, traditional security "has been dominated by a uni-actor approach, whereby the term 'security' ought to be a limited, one-actor, state-centric concept as it invokes the deployment of the most extreme measures (usually the military) to address issues of immediate and existential danger,"[36] arising from beyond the borders of one's own country. Issues of traditional security, therefore, become concerned exclusively with the "phenomenon of war", and the "threat, use and control of military force."[37] Traditional security sees state legitimacy looking outward to the international system for power, recognition, and independence.[38]

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the global threat of nuclear war fell by the wayside while previously marginalized issues registered on the international political agenda and both widened and deepened the interpretation of security. Dissatisfied with the long-lasting narrowing of security studies, scholars began to highlight other issues: demographic pressures and resource depletion (Ullman 1983), environmental problems such as ozone depletion and global warming (Mathews 1989), superiority of internal over external threats, with particular focus on less developed countries (Ayoob 1997). This trend was not welcomed within the Realist School, but it did not undermine the traditional perspective on conventional security studies. The focus in IR was still on the state system and seeing relationships between states governed by power.

However, in varying degrees the Realists agreed to consider non-military factors of conflict in the international system. Some traditionalists (Chipman 1992; Gray 1992) claimed that narrowing of the security to military and nuclear obsessions was artificial. J. Chipman suggested recognising non-actors as relevant players in IR: "The structuring element of strategic analysis must be the possible use of force… Non-militry aspects of security may occupy more of the strategist's time, but the need for peoples, nations, states or alliances to procure deploy, engage or withdraw military forces must remain a primary purpose of the strategic analyst's inquiries"[39]

The rise in significance of economic interactions between states in the 1970s expanded security agenda with economic issues and gave a way to Neo-realism and International Political Economy. Walt (1991), Dorf(1994) and Gray(1994) included the

[36] Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, 'Security by any other name: negative security, positive security, and a multi-actor security approach' , vol 38 (Cambridge Journals Online 2012) 835-859.
[37] S. M. Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies' , vol 35 (1991) 211, 212.
[38] Taylor Owen. 'Human Security - Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition' (2004) 35(3) Security Dialogue 373, 377.
[39] John Chipman. 'The future of strategic studies: Beyond grand strategy' (1992) 34(1) Survival 109, 129.

economic factor affecting the security, but in a way it influenced the military component more than the economic security per se.

The Contemporary Realist School is multidimensional and complex. At some point it lacks a monolithic theory as there are many sub-schools with an on-going security debate (Classical Realism, discussed above, Structural, Defensive, Offensive, Neo-classical and Hegemonic Realism). The school of Realism does not cover military matters only. It does not advocate confrontation as an instrument to implement foreign policy. For example, such realists as Steven Krasner (1991), Josef Grieco (1993), Robert Gilpin (1987), Charles Glaser (1994) etc. also discuss world economy processes and believe that international cooperation is capable to maximize mutual security.[40]

However, the focal point of today's Realism is reaffirming that even though the definition of security takes into consideration factors of non-military character, it should still primarily include threat or actual use of power. Realism is still a central approach to security studies, as potential of conflict between states, use or threat of use of force are key conceptions still applicable to modern system of IR.

In terms of strategic studies the Arctic Region was certainly a more relevant arena in the Cold War. Security in the Arctic has traditionally been dominated by geopolitical perspectives of two military blocks that further shaped national security policies focused on territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state through political and military means. There were several factors defining the importance the Circumpolar North: possibility of a nuclear exchange over the Polar Regions; capacity of the Soviet Northern Fleet and submarine-based nuclear weapons; as well as radar stations located in the Western Arctic Ocean States united under the umbrella of NATO and a net of defence agreements on different levels. Today it has been over 20 years since the end of the Cold War, but the era of the nuclear weapons is still ongoing. In this respect the Russian Northern Fleet and submarine-based nuclear weapons are still considered highly relevant. However, the importance of military power is clearly not even nearly as dominant as it used to be before 1989. The decline in number of academic research on security policy after 1989 has become evident. And another reason is emergence of new agenda and more progressive theoretical approaches in IR theory. But what especially noteworthy are the national strategies of the Arctic States for their respective high latitude territories. Lassi Heininen wrote that Arctic national strategies "mostly cover civilian fields of international relations, such as economy and development, governance and

[40] S. M. Lynn-Jones, 'Realism in Security Studies' in Craig A. Snyder (ed), *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 17, 20.

environmental protection, and scientific cooperation" but at the same time they also address positioning of a nation-state "in relation to other powers". Therefore, sovereignty and national security are top priorities for Arctic coastal states and one of the instruments to reaffirm the security is military presence.

First of all, the Canadian policy includes strengthening of military presence in the High North as one of the priorities, for example, establishment of the Army Training Centre in Resolute Bay and expanding the capabilities of the Canadian Rangers.[41] Secondly, for the USA it is preserving "the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and aircraft".[42] Thirdly, the Russian strategy refers to the Arctic as "the sphere of military security" (including creation of groupings of armed forces, protection and control of state borders). Fourthly, the Danish Arctic Strategy includes the aspect of defence for the Arctic territories under sovereignty of Denmark and the Greenlandic Home Rule Government, for example, upgrading of the Thule Radar.[43] The Norwegian strategy for the High North is also stating the role of the armed forces in exercising sovereignty.

None of the Arctic member states, refer directly to NATO and its role in the region in their Arctic strategies, but at the same time we can observe that in some of them it is not entirely excluded the organisation from the picture as well as the whole military component. [44] For example, the Norwegian High North Strategy points out the cooperation with "allies" and the need to keep up cooperative "allied operations" in the North. In fact Norway is a leader in promoting NATO's role in the Arctic. Denmark is highlighting NATO in it's the strategy section devoted to national security and sovereignty. But at the same time there is a clear understanding that active role of the alliance can fuel a security dilemma with Russia. As for the Russian position on the involvement of NATO, it is indicated that it will not cooperate with the Alliance on Arctic matters.[45] Canada also strongly opposes any NATO involvement on it is own sovereignty grounds. As for Iceland, Finland and Sweden, security and sovereignty matters are not prioritized in their respective strategies. But Iceland highlights security through international cooperation as a priority in the Arctic strategy. It

[41] Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy. Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad 2010.
[42] National Security Presidential Directive-66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25 (NSPD-66/HSPD-25) (adopted on 9 January 2009).
[43] Denmark: Arktis i en brydningstid. Forslag til strategi for aktiviteter i det arktiske område 2008.
[44] Alyson J. K. Bailes. 'Potential Roles of NATO and the EU in High Northern Security' (2010) 2(201) The Yearbook of Polar Law, ;Lassi Heininen, *Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study* (The Northern Research Forum & The University of Lapland 2011).
[45] Ronald O'Rourke, *Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress* (Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress 7-5700, 2010), 35.

sees its membership as the cornerstone of the country's security. Iceland has asked NATO for more frequent exercises and military visits.

All in all, the Western European bid of the Arctic Region experience is a growing scepticism towards relevance and utility of the strategic studies both in the political establishment and academic circles. First of all, they criticize the strategic studies for a too narrow military focus and being toothless to address emerging non-military security threats. In addition, they find this approach irrelevant towards understanding the developments in the generally stable and peaceful Arctic Region.[46] Perhaps, Finland is the only Nordic country that hosts strategic studies regarding the Northern Regions.[47] On the American continent it is more important to address security challenges in other parts of the world. On the Russian side the nuclear deterrence theory is also subjected to critical analysis.

Social Constructivism

Dissatisfaction with the narrow focus of security on such terms as power, arms, threat and fear gave roots to an alternative paradigm of Security Studies known as **Social Constructivism.** What is the contribution of constructivism to security studies? Commonly constructivism is not seen as a theory of security studies, but rather as an approach to address security. It argued that understanding political events in the world necessitated more introspection and less grand abstract theorising. The paradigm favours a more sociological approach and advocates a greater appreciation of the cultural dimension of policy-making. It began to be argued that perhaps the actors on the world stage did not really follow any kind of rational script, be it written in the language of self- or mutual interest or dictated by economic circumstance. Perhaps, at least some of the time, foreign policy reflects parochial ideological or moral guidelines rather than objective gains. For instance, on the international side, Martha Finnemore focuses on the norms of international society and on their effect to state identities and interests.[48] In the book edited by Katzenstein, other constructivists argue that culture, norms and identity also matter in national security.[49] Katzenstein and Hopf focus on the role of domestic norms in the area of national security.[50]

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[46] Kristian Åtland. 'The European Arctic in Soviet and Russian Security Policy 1987-2007.' (Philosophiae Doctor, University of Tromso 2009) , 18.
[47] Lassi Heininen and Gunnar Lassinantti, 'Security in the European North : from 'hard' to 'soft'' in Lassi Heininen and Gunnar Lassinantti (eds), *The European North – Hard, Soft and Civic Security* (The Olof Palme International Center/ Arctic Centre, University of Lapland 1999).
[48] Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Cornell University Press 1996).
[49] Peter Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security* (Cornell University Press 1996).
[50] Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Relations: Identities and Foreign Policies* (Cornell University Press 2002); Peter Katzenstein, 'Cultural Norms and National Security' (Cornell University Press 1996).

There are several aspects of IR which Social Constructivism interprets differently than realism. The main assumption is that the international system "is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place.[51] So, the international system is not given but constructed by social reality reproduces by human agents through daily practices. Secondly, according to constructivist approach state interests emerge from an environment in which states operate and are endogenous to states' interaction with their environment.[52] Thirdly, constructivists emphasize the importance of normative or ideational structures as well as material structures in defining the meaning and identity of an individual.[53] In other worlds, the way the material resources are conceived, organised and used to provide international security is based on the intersubjective beliefs such as ideas, conceptions and assumptions[54]which also construct the identity. All in all, Constructivism challenges the material and rational assumptions of the mainstream IR theories and attempts to address ontological questions largely ignored between 1940s and 1990s. Ontological questions started to emerge. Who is actually being secured? Who is responsible for doing the securing? What else is there to be secured?[55] Keith Krause (1998) organised new research agenda for critical security studies in three parts: the construction of threats and responses, the construction of the objects of the security, and the possibilities of transforming of security dilemma. Social Constructivism suggested that there are other threats than military, other referent objects than the state and other responses to threat than the strategic policies.

The basic claims the constructivist approaches are, that "security" is not an objective condition and that threats to it are not simply a matter of correctly perceiving a constellation of material forces, and that the object of security is neither stable nor unchanging. Moreover, for constructivists are not threats are not objective but socially constructed[56] Security in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired core values. Yet, for constructivism threats are not natural and inevitable. States may change their threat

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[51] Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sørenson, 'Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches' (Oxford University Press 2008).
[52] Thomas Risse. 'Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration' (2005) 12(2) Journal of European Public Policy 291-309.
[53] Emanuel Adler. 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics' (1997) 3(3) European journal of international relations 319-363.; John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilateralism and Social Constructivist Challenge,' in Peter J. Katzsentein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner (eds), *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics* (Cambridge, MIT Press 1999) 239.
[54] Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sørenson, 'Introduction to international relations : theories and approaches' (Oxford University Press 2008).
[55] Peter Hough, 'Understanding global security' (Routledge 2009), 6.
[56] Pernille Rieker, 'EU Security Policy: Contrasting Rationalism and Social Constructivism' , *Working Paper 659* (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2004) 7.

perceptions by evolutions in their environment and modified practices.[57] Constructivism asks questions about how the object (nation, state, or other group) is to be secured, and how particular issues (economic well-being, the risk of violence, environmental degradation) are placed under the "sign of security" and become central.[58] "Security" (especially, national security) is understood as a particular set of historical discourses and practices that rest upon institutionally shared understandings. In Constructivism the research goal is to study the process by which threats are represented politically: to examine who can "do" or "speak" security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects "... [W]hat is essential is the designation of an existential threat ... and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience" (Waever 1995) The concept and usage of national (or state) security is not rejected as either outdated or in need of transcendence; instead, it is taken seriously as an important historical resolution to central problems of political life (Weldes 1996).

Social Constructivism pushed alternative security challenges, such as economic and environmental issues as well as human rights and migration, to the security agenda. (Richard Ullman (1983), Jessica Tuchman Mathews (1989), Theodore Moran (1990/91), Brad Roberts (1990), Myron Weiner (1992/93), and Beverly Crawford (1994)-) Also it was offered to look at security studies from a different perspectives by moving either down to the level of individual or human security or up to the level of international or global security, with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points.[59] (Rubenstein 1988; Buzan 1991; Grant 1992; Tickner 1992; Waever et al. 1993) All in all, Constructivism became the middle ground between the mainstream research traditions in IR, traditional security studies and critical theory.

Human Security

The end of the East-West confrontation in late 80s revealed a tendency to downgrade uni-actor state-centric security in the new world order as new threats of a global scale emerged on international agenda. In 1994 as a response to these shifts United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its famous Human Development Report. It argued for a transformation "from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on

[57] Nilüfer Karasulu and Elif Uzgören. 'Explaining Social Constrctivist Contributions to Security Studies' (2007) Perceptions 27, 38.
[58] Keith Krause and Michael Williams. 'Broadening the agenda of security studies: politics and methods' (1999) 36(3) Mershon International Studies Review 229, 243.
[59] ibid, 230.

people's security", something we call today the concept of human security.[60] Human security, first of all, includes "safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life whether in homes, in jobs or in communities."[61] The report has identified a very broad agenda and categorised all global threats into 7 categories: political security, implying enjoyment of civil and political rights, economic security, meaning freedom from poverty, food security, requiring an easy access to food and fresh water, health security, including access to health care and protection from diseases, environmental security, which is understood as protection from dangers of pollution and degradation, personal security issues, combining physical safety from war, torture, criminal attacks, domestic violence etc., finally, community security, referring to survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as their physical security in these groups.[62]

Human Security as a topic for a debate has gathered the attention of many states, the UN, NGO's/INGO's and many scholars. Nevertheless, the term is still loosely defined simply because different actors in IR wish to maintain their own agenda. All in all, the definition of the term is still in process of evolution as it has been debated as field of academic research and policy. There are two major debate rounds on human security in academic circles. They evolved into the broad and the narrow perspective on the nature of threat. The broad concept primarily touched problems of underdevelopment and UNDP agenda, such as poverty reduction[63] The supporters of a broader focus definition of human security as a "freedom from want", they correlate it with well-being and dignity.

The narrow concept deals with political violence against ordinary individuals commonly during interstate conflicts.[64] For this branch of school human security is about reducing levels of violence, death and casualties rates.[65] The proponents of the narrow conceptualization correlated human security with so called "freedom from fear."

Certainly, there is a direct link between underdevelopment and violence that may be actually a reason of each other. Therefore, narrow and broad concepts are not positions which

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[60] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security* (Oxford University Press , 1994) 22.
[61] ibid 23.
[62] ibid 24.
[63] R. Thakur, 'Human Security Regimes' in William T. Tow, Ramesh Chandra Thakur and I. T. Hyun (eds), *Asia's emerging regional order reconciling traditional and human security* (United Nations University Press 2000) 229;C. Thomas, *Global Governance, Development and Human. Security: The Challenge of Poverty and Inequality* (London Pluto Press 2000).
[64] Keith Krause, *Towards a practical human security agenda* (Geeva Centre for the Dmocratic Control of Armed forces (DCAF) 2007); Andrew Mack. 'A Signifier of Shared Values' (2004) 35(3) Secur Dialogue 366-367.
[65] Pauline Kerr, 'Human Security and diplomacy' in Victor Mauer and Myriam Dunn Cavelty (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies* (Routledge 2010) 115.

cancel each other out. It is also important to say that although human security enabled a strong critique of state-centric concept of security, in fact the state is the means to provide human security too. Both camps of human security and traditional security are relevant to holistic understanding of security.[66] But in real life human security is still largely invoked in cases of large-scale violent conflicts.[67]

> "Human security has become both a new measure of global security and a new agenda for global action. Safety is the hallmark of freedom from fear, while well-being is the target of freedom from want. Human security and human development are thus two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing and leading to a conducive environment for each other."[68]

Human security became a people-centric concept that shifted security studies from military to non-military issues and from the state level down to individual one. Allegedly, security of states does not always equate with the security of the people they are meant to represent.

Human security studies an individual and/or a community which are regarded as referent objects. The academic literature recognizes them also as security actors, capable to provide general security with their own means. The shift from state-centric level down to an individual one, "democratized" the term of security, which enables the inclusion of many other actors as researchers, NGOs, media, business and industries, but, importantly, did not exclude governmental bodies such as policy-makers and militaries. All of them have their own role depending on the context and nature of threats to security. The state apparatus lost its monopoly to identify imminent threats.

Another specific feature of human security is that practices of security used by non-governmental actors are often considerably different from what a state would do. Many of the practices of the communities to avoid threats and build capacities are non-violent in character and exclude use of force. For example, measures ranging from humanitarian and development aid, to economic, education, environmental, and other social network support.[69] Within the human security approach threats are identified on the basis of different values, priorities and context.

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[66] Pauline Kerr, 'Human Security' in A. Collins (ed), *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford University Press 2007) 91-108.
[67] Marlies Glasius. 'Human Security From Paradigm Shift to Operationalization: Job Description for a Human Security Worker' (2008) 39(1) Security Dialogue 31-54.
[68] Human Security Network. 'A Perspective on Human Security: Chairman's Summary' (1st Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network Lysøen, Norway 20 May 1999).
[69] Peter Hough, 'Understanding global security' (Routledge 2009).

Gunhild Hoogensen argued factors of multi-scale actors, democratic and context-based definition can identify security in a following way: "Security is achieved when individuals and/or multiple actors have freedom to identify risks and threats to their wellbeing and values, the opportunity to articulate these threats to other actors, and the capacity to determine ways to end, mitigate or adapt to those risks and threats either individually or in the concerts with other actors."[70]

As it has already been mentioned UNDP's report attracted a lot of attention from different governments, and in fact many of them responded by widening national security definitions. For example, back in 1994 the US Administration reflected it in its "National Security Strategy" stating that "not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications for both present and long term American policy"[71]

The Canadian and Norwegian governments went even further launching the Human Security Network in 1998. This network advocates the development of global policies focused on human interests, whether or not they happen to coincide with the primary interests of a state.

So, how is human security applicable to people and communities residing in the Arctic Region? And considering its loose definition, is it really relevant? G. Hoogensen in collaboration with other authors issued an article on this matter and in it contends that yes, it very much is. The Circumpolar North is experiencing dramatic changes in climate, economy and politics and the drivers of change are expected to only intensify in the future. The prospects of intensive economic development driven by climate change are ambiguous and have complex after-effects on the local communities. On one hand, it can contribute to general economic wealth because of new business brought to the region, along with increased investments and improved infrastructure. On the other hand though, the same activities and climate change can be destructive for the ecosystem, fauna and flora as well as local livelihoods, communities dependent on traditional subsistence economy. The consequences may result in human security increasing or decreasing depending on local community response and adaptation capacity.[72]

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[70] Hoogensen, Gunhild, Bazely, Dawn, Christensen, Julia, Tanentzap, Andrew,Bojko, Evgeny,. 'Human Security in the Arctic - Yes, It Is Relevant!' (2009) 5(2) Journal of Human Security 1-10.
[71] National Security strategy of engagement and enlargement (adopted in July 1994).
[72] Hoogensen, Gunhild, Bazely, Dawn, Christensen, Julia, Tanentzap, Andrew,Bojko, Evgeny, 'Human Security in the Arctic - Yes, It Is Relevant!' , vol 5 (2009) 1-10.

Another important aspect and food for thought regarding the economic development discussed by G. Hoogensen is energy security (which refers to undisrupted supply at reasonable price). It has become a central part in national Arctic strategies. Energy security concerns and more desirable environment conditions give access to untapped resources, particularly hydrocarbons, that drives national economies and wealth by satisfying global energy demands. Consequently, it accelerates climate change that directly impacts not only states but humans and human security.[73]

All these concerns that are attributed to human security started the process regionalisation in the Arctic and, in a way, established the Arctic Council. It has been forged not around defence or trade, but around the protection of human security: environmental and cultural threats to the survival of societies, groups and individuals.

A bright practical example of state-sanctioned threat to human security in the Arctic was European Commission's ban on seal-product trade in 2009. This trade boycott led by environmental concerns seriously affected Inuit communities in Greenland and Canada. What is more important is that these trade-disrupting measures went beyond economic security matters but also social and cultural security of indigenous population was places at risk. There is a strong link between commercial practices and subsistence activities. For Arctic indigenous peoples the relationship with the environment is considered to be of a crucial importance for self-actualization and identity. The economic dependence on subsistence practices creates relationship between hunting and food security, hunting and socio-economic relations, social vitality, and cultural identity.[74]

Although people residing in the Circumpolar North are not particularly vulnerable to state-led physical violence as there are no ongoing inter- or intra-state conflicts.[75] But instead Arctic residents face serious threats to their political, economic, environmental and cultural and traditional food and health "securities". And the question is how the state will address them, either taking paternalistic approach to determine what the threats are or work in concert with communities and individuals.[76]

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[73] ibid.

[74] Milton M. R. Freeman, ' Contested Knowledge Systems and the Search for Sustianability and Institutional Security in the Arctic. Michelle Daveluy, Frncis Lévesque, Jenanne Ferguson.' in Michelle Daveluy, Francis Lévesque and Jenanne Ferguson (eds), *Humanizing Security in the Arctic* (CCI Press edn, 2011) 5-25.

[75] Heather Exner-Pirot, *Human Security in the Arctic: The Foundation of Regional Cooperation. Working Papers on Arctic Security No.1* (Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program 2012).

[76] Hoogensen, Gunhild, Bazely, Dawn, Christensen, Julia, Tanentzap, Andrew,Bojko, Evgeny, 'Human Security in the Arctic - Yes, It Is Relevant!' , vol 5 (2009) 1-10.

The Copenhagen School

"**The Copenhagen School**" became another alternative paradigm in security studies founded through the collaboration of Barry Buzan (1990) and Ole Wæver (1993). They suggested a wider focus on security dividing it into contextual sectors with different referent objects. In military sector the referent object is a state or any kind of political entity. Military security concerns the balance of offensive and defensive potential and intensions. In the political sector it is the state's sovereignty that can be existentially threatened. Political security means organisational stability of government, ideology and legitimacy. Economic sector commonly includes firms as referent objects and economic security concerns availability and access to resources, finances and markets in order to sustain welfare and state power. In societal sector it is large-scale collective identities, for example, nations or religions. Societal security refers to the balance of sustainability and evolution of language, traditions, culture and customs. The referent object in environmental security framework can be different and depend on the scale of the threat. It can be concerning the survival of certain species as well as maintenance of the planetary scale ecosystem and biosphere which is an essential support system on which humans depend.[77] Over time the importance in national security of each sector may vary.

"Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind."[78]

The scholars concluded that "the traditional military and ideological security preoccupations of Europe would become much less important in the future." Hence, the security was taken out of the traditionally established context. Instead, the Copenhagen School offered something called "securitization" of problems in different aspects of life of both state and public as well as the whole globe. However not every issue is an actual existential threat. The security realm was not meant to include all political, economic and social agenda, otherwise it would expand endlessly. Wæver consequently asks this question: "What really makes something a security problem?"[79] This is what securitization is about. Generally it describes the transformation of a certain issue and the threat of its after effects up to the level of a security matter. In order to understand the whole process first, we need to

[77] Barry Buzan, *People, states, and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era* (European Consortium for Political Research 1991).
[78] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, 'Security: a new framework for analysis' (Lynne Rienner Pub. 1998) 239.
[79] Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization' in R. Lipschultz (ed), *On Security* (Columbia University Press 1995).

explain the trilogy that actually composes the process of securitisation. They are: a speech act, a securitising actor and an audience. First of all, a speech of act is basically the naming or articulation of a certain issue as undermining the security both in a particular sector and at a certain level. The threat should be existential or presented as such by a securitising actor. Second of all, an actor performing a securitising move is commonly regarded as an institution or an individual that has a legitimate authority to claim a threat of a problem beyond "normal" political consideration but a (national or international) security challenge. The Copenhagen School reserved this special right to a state or a state representative, as the realist school tradition dictates.

Finally, while the actor only proposes a certain recognition and representation of an issue, it is the audience which approves the securitising move of the actor. It is crucial that the significant audience will consider the act of speech as relevant and real and recognise the exceptional measures to deal with the issue as adequate. However, the audience can also refuse to do so. In this case only the securitising move takes place but it turns out to be unsuccessful. So, there is a negotiating between the actor and the audience. However, in practice it is difficult to clearly define which audience is active at any point, why it is the most relevant in evaluating a certain problem[80] and what implications it has if there are several audiences and when exactly an audience is "persuaded"

The Copenhagen School suggested to replace the state as a referent of security with people, with either individuals or global international collectivity. What poses a threat to a state may not necessarily pose a direct threat to the residents of that same state. In the everyday life of the resident of a state, economic welfare, environmental problems, cultural identity and political rights are of a larger concern than a warfare preparations. The understanding of security was reconceptualised into something called societal security which "concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible and actual threats." When the referent object changed, so did the nature and goals of security. At the same time, not every single problem that the society faces undermines the security of a society.

The Copenhagen School also introduced a term of "facilitating conditions" to fulfil the analytical framework of securitisation. It includes:

1. the internal demand to the speech act to follow the grammar of security,

[80] Holger Stritzel. 'Towards a theory of securitization : Copenhagen and beyond' (2007) 13(3) European Journal of International Relations 357.

2. the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitising actor — that is, the relationship between a speaker and an audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitising attempt, and
3. features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitisation.[81]

The Copenhagen School defines securitisation as a successful speech act "through which an inter subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent "object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat"[82] In other words, securitisation defines what is a matter of security and what is not in a given sector and level; either case by case or more or less on permanent basis. But it is important to mention that the Copenhagen School is more than security agenda setting. It is about formulation of a more consistent theory of what security is and is not, basing on both traditional and widened perceptions.[83]

The Copenhagen School in a way balanced two camps of traditionalists and wideners offering a middle position. Turning to the question of securitisation theory's relevance to the Arctic Region, many examples of securitisation and the reverse process of de-securitisation can be observed. An example is the emergence of new soft security issues, that put cooperation of Arctic states under the umbrella of the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Region. The concerns of political stability, political demands of indigenous peoples, environmental pollution, nuclear safety and organized crime has been gradually shifted up to the regional level. At the same time hard security issues were deliberately excluded from institutionalised cooperation and kept at the state security level or within external policies of the NATO and EU.

Some hard or military security issues were de-securitised, that is, removed from the security agenda of a state or society. The biggest example of this phenomenon is de-securitisation of the Soviet security policy after M. Gorbachev's speech and his Murmansk Initiatives. They were both of military and civil character: denuclearisation in Northern Europe, naval Arms control and confidence building measures, cooperation in the energy sector, scientific and environmental cooperation and finally, indigenous peoples matters. At that time political statements and dialogue were unconventional measures to deal with the

[81] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, 'Security: a new framework for analysis' (Lynne Rienner Pub. 1998) 239
[82] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and powers the structure of international security* (Cambridge University Press 2003) 491.
[83] Ole Wæver. 'Securitization: Taking tock of a research programme in security Studies' (2003) <http://www.iiss.ee/files/7/CopSchool2003.doc> accessed March 2013.

military build up. Military issues were not entirely de-securitised or taken out from the "existential threat mode". But it certainly lowered tension and stimulated arms reduction talks at European and Soviet-United States levels that later on were estimated as successful. At the same time de-securitization of soft issues was positive, moreover, it had a cross sectorial spill over effect and cooperation on civil issues stimulated the change in interstate relations in the military sector too.[84]

But there are other good examples, like the Russian-Norwegian delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea, deconstruction of the DEW line in Greenland and withdrawing of US forces from Iceland. K. Åtland wrote it has been recognized across the Arctic States that "closed borders, closed maritime zones, closed cities and limited civil-military interaction that shaped a security regime before are incompatible with the process of normalization, "marketization", regionalization and globalization."[85]

However, some previously de-securitised issues were, on the contrary, re-securitised again primarily in the military sector. The relationship between Russia and NATO went through both good and bad times. And the actions that the Alliance is undertaking outside of the Arctic Region, like eastward enlargement, the Kosovo campaign and military conflict in Georgia, directly influence the Russian perception of the Alliance, which leads to revival of defensive thinking in the High North. For instance, the Russian concept of "Northern Strategic Bastion" approved in 1998, made the Barents Sea the primary stationing area for strategic nuclear submarines for traditional nuclear deterrence purposes, to defend Russian mainland.[86]

Lassi Heininen wrote that "Climate change has had a special influence on redefining northern securities."[87] It is proven by the rapid emergence of national Arctic Strategies in the last 4 years, which became a reflection of the developments in the political, socio-economic and environmental spheres. All of the programme papers aimed at building a safe and secure region and society to sustain the climate change in many aspects. Arctic Strategies prioritise security, however generally, the security agenda is diverse even for littoral states that underline military component. The reality of the modern world forces o remain up-to-date on the trend of expanded security studies. For example, Canada's priority area, sovereignty, includes a human dimension, i.e. people and living conditions. Denmark links the importance

[84] Kristian Åtland, 'The European Arctic in Soviet and Russian Security Policy 1987-2007. ' (Philosophiae Doctor edn University of Tromso 2009) 60.
[85] ibid 30.
[86] ibid 27.
[87] Lassi Heininen and Chris Southcott, *Globalization and the circumpolar North* (University of Alaska Press 2010), 239.

of security with protecting the economic base of Greenlandic economy. Such Northern Europe nations like Norway and Sweden have adopted a doctrine of 'societal security' (see e.g. Burgess and Mouhleb, 2007) allowing all hazards, other than traditional war, to be assessed and prepared for through new governmental coordinating structures.[88] Russian perspective focuses on international cooperation in general and the US focus is on freedom of seas. On the other hand, it also important to say that civil issue areas are still marginalised, and are considered as secondary, particularly, in the example of Arctic Strategies of Russia and the US whit have taken a traditional realist approach in defining their agenda.

[88] Alyson J. K. Bailes, 'Options For Closer Cooperation in the High North: What is Needed?' in Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor (eds), *Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?* (NDS Forum Papers, NATO Defense College 2009) 28.

Chapter 3. Security outlook of the Arctic States

The Arctic, as a region of strategic importance, has gained close political attention not only because of climate change but also because of shift in security dynamics. They are characterized by cross-sectoral and multi-level spillovers. In other words, security dynamics in one sector have high effect in another. On one hand, the melting ice cap opens economic opportunities and therefore contributes to economic security but the impact on environmental security is controversial. When we analyze the Arctic region we should not forget to look at it from a global perspective. Security dynamics on the regional level also affect the global situation.

Rapid emergence of the national Arctic strategies in the last 4 years is a reflection of the developments in political, socio-economic and environmental spheres. All of the programme papers aimed at building safe and secured region and society to sustain the climate change in many perspectives. All Arctic Strategies prioritize security, however generally, the security agenda is diverse. In this section the security agenda of the 8 Arctic States will be explored from the perspective of positioning themselves in relation to other powers and perceiving threats. More importantly, the author will explore if the countries see the strategic situation in fundamentally different ways?

All the states more or less agree on the factor driving the new pre-occupation with the High North which is the climate change. All states support cooperation and dialogue between each other regarding issues linked to the Arctic affairs. All emphasize their sovereignty which is reflected in their respective strategies and program documents. The claim for sovereignty in the Arctic region is understood as "an ability of national authorities to freely operate in the areas"[89] The most effective way to support sovereignty is to establish long term presence in the area. It may be in different forms, from actual presence like economic activity, scientific research or military facilities to presence in the form of long-term political involvement. It is important to mention that northern security challengers are multi dimensional and thus, do "not always require a display of kinetic strength"[90] and that is why all the states try to contribute to overall security. Nevertheless the traditional security matters are alive but the level of military interest in the region is different from country to country.

[89] David Rudd. 'Northern Europe's Arctic Defence Agenda' (2010) 12(3) Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 45, 46.
[90] ibid.

Norway

Norway has defined its security agenda in the High North in two principal documents. The first one is the *Norwegian Government's High North Strategy*, prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and second one is *Capable Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces*, prepared by the Ministry of Defence. The foundation of the country's security policy lies in the protection of national territory, protection of sovereignty, prevention of wars and the promotion of international security through the rule of law. However, the Norwegian Arctic strategy reflects a departure from the traditional security concept and, thus, argues that security issues concern threats to sovereignty and sustainability of marine resources and impacts of the climate change. The *Capable Force* document lists the following factors affecting national and international security. They are: mutual dependence and vulnerability, competition for resources and environmental matters which are challenges of globalization. This supports the idea of security dynamics on the regional level affecting the global situation. For Norway, security in the nearest periphery including the High North is a first priority.[91] In this respect, Norway emphasizes security of both peoples and countries with energy security highlighted in *High North Strategy* document. In a similar way, the *Capable Force* document views the existence of traditional and non-military threats together. These threats are considered to be cross-sectoral and thus government response comprises participation of both civilian and military authorities.[92] The main instrument for dispute settlement is bilateral dialogue or the Arctic Council forum on multilateral level. However the Norwegian government doesn't expect large scale military threats in at its northern frontier and it states in the *Capable Force* document that

> "[t]he most likely future challenges to our sovereignty will be in the form of episodes and limited assaults or crises. There may also be attempts to restrict our political freedom of action. These challenges could materialise very quickly, and they require an immediate response by Norwegian authorities. Here, the [armed forces] will play a central role. For these reasons, the High North will remain the Government's primary strategic focus area also in the future. It underlines the general need for Norway to demonstrate that it is able to protect vital national interests in the High North."[93]

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[91] Capable Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces (adopted November 2009) 4.
[92] The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy (adopted December 2006) 19.
[93] Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Capable Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces (adopted November 2009)40.

The *Capable Force* highlights the security of offshore oil and gas installations and freedom of navigation which is linked to the energy security of the country. NATO is seen as vital to Norway's national security and defence. The soft security issue of energy is also among NATO's priorities in its Strategic Concept agenda.[94] Espen Barth Eide sees Norway as an integral part of NATO which has already presence in the Arctic Region through its members. But stresses at the same time that the Alliance should "improve situation awareness in the Arctic High North." Norway would like "the Alliance to refocus more on its core mission at home" and "regain a kind of territorial understanding of security." The Norwegians suggest that taking care of business on its own turf should be of a bigger priority than away-missions, hold far beyond the NATO's territory. The Norwegian approach towards strengthening NATO's role in the High North is to increase large scale military exercises in the vast northern Norway. They believe their territory is a superb zone for combined air, sea and land exercises.[95] As it was mentioned before NATO membership is not an argument in settling disputes for example with Russia which is supported by the example of the Russian Norwegian Maritime Delimitation Treaty in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Perhaps Norway cannot rely on support from NATO regarding disputes over fishing in the Svalbard fisheries protection zone, at least because of the fact that most of NATO's members do not recognise this unilaterally proclaimed FPZ.[96] Also, Norway stands for strengthening cooperation with its Nordic neighbours in frames of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and NATO Partnership for Peace members but it does not necessarily include mutual defence guarantees and therefore cannot serve as a substitute to NATO membership.[97] The main instruments to secure the Norwegian national security are the Home Guard and the Coast Guard which are both paramilitary bodies. Home Guards are primarily employed in homeland defence including border protection while the Coast Guard patrols the country's exclusive economic zone. They are responsible predominantly for search and rescue, environmental- and fisheries control.[98]

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[94] Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (adopted in 2010) 12, 17.
[95] Gerard O'Dwyer. 'Interview: Espen Barth Eide, Norway's Foreign Affairs Minister' <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130711/DEFREG01/307110010/Interview-Espen-Barth-Eide-Norway-s-Foreign-Affairs-Minister> accessed 8 June 2013.
[96] Lev Voronkov. 'The Arctic for Eight: Evolution of NATO's Role in the Arctic' <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Arctic-for-Eight-16058> accessed 8 July 2013.
[97] Peter Felstead. 'Guardians of the North' (2009) Jane's Defence Weekly 24.
[98] ibid 29-30.

Denmark

The Danish security agenda is primarily identified in its program documents such as the *Kingdom of Denmark's Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020* and the *Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014*. The general trend of these papers is that they priorities threats of non-military character and put traditional security approach in the back front. The Defence Agreement first of all recognises the high global demand for hydrocarbons and thus underlines the importance of energy security. It also highlights the importance of the increasing maritime cargo-traffic and tourism in the Arctic. These activities are entailing more tasks for the defence units. The Danish Arctic Strategy sets such goals as enforcing sovereignty, enhancing maritime safety and undertaking surveillance tasks at sea and in the air as well as fisheries patrol. For Denmark, enforcement of sovereignty is exercised by armed forces through an actual presence in the area. At the same time the tasks that are armed forces are aimed to perform are of the mixed character, military and civil. Apart from that, Denmark links the importance of its national security with the protecting of the economic base of Greenlandic economy. To fulfil these tasks on the national level, Denmark is establishing a continuous physical presence of the coast guard and naval units and by upgrading military facilities in Greenland. The Danish Defence Agreement includes the establishment of the new Arctic Command by merging Greenlandic and Faroese command units. Their task will be "improving information sharing and overall coordination in mission areas – such as monitoring fish quotas and combating illegal fishing – in which both units play a key role"[99] The Arctic Command is based in Nuuk and therefore demonstrates Danish proactive position in Greenland's defence and foreign affairs. The Defence Agreement does not link the Danish economic interests in the Arctic with NATO assistance while the Arctic Strategy Document says "the Danish Kingdom's area in the Arctic is covered by the NATO treaty article 5 regarding collective defence."[100]

Greenland as a home-ruled autonomy is under the military security umbrella of Denmark, NATO and the United States according to the 1951 Defence of Greenland Agreement updated in 2004.[101] Self-government of Greenland also doesn't see the Arctic security matters purely in military terms. Together with the Danish government they take the expended security approach including such soft security matters as sustainable economic development, pollution prevention, mitigation of climate change effects, indigenous peoples

[99] Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014 (adopted June 2009) 12.
[100] Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark's Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 (adopted August 2010) 20.
[101] Embassy of the U.S. Copenhagen, Denmark. 'Greenland' <http://denmark.usembassy.gov/gl.html> accessed July 2013.

policy and emergency response operations. Although the full scale military conflict in the High North is not foreseen by the Danish authorities, the Defence Intelligence Agency sees "a risk of minor clashes and diplomatic crisis between the coastal states of the Arctic because significant strategic and particularly energy policy interests collide."[102]

The possible international disputes that involve Denmark first of all concern the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf which overlap with the Canadian and Russian claims. However in the respect Denmark fully relies on the UNCLOS framework and the decision of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the Ilulissat which provide the most important guidelines for resolving potential disagreements between the Arctic States. Another dispute concerns delimitation of Hans island but it is regarded not as a security problem but a diplomatic problem.[103] In the 2005 agreement, Canada and Denmark agreed to disagree on the legal status of Hans island. In the joint statement that followed the signing of the agreement foreign ministers committed themselves to reach a long term solution on the sovereignty of the island and they stated that it is going to be based on the principles of the United Nations.[104] (FIX) There is other remarkable Danish-Canadian document, a Memorandum of Understanding on Arctic Defence Security and Operational Cooperation signed in 2010, which provides framework for cooperation in information exchange, military operations and search and rescue missions.[105] Denmark also doesn't recognise Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard, it presented a policy that contends the application of the Svalbard Treaty to Svalbard's maritime zones. But challenging the Norwegian legal perspective to this area has very little grounds for the dispute at least because of the fact that the Faroe Islands has agreed to restrain its fishing activities in Svalbard waters.[106]

Iceland

Iceland has released several documents where soft security agenda is emphasised and any "direct military threat from other states or alliances in the short or medium term" is denied.[107] In addition to that in 2011 the Icelandic Parliament stated that all the security interests must

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[102] 'Arctic Argument Escalates' *Copenhagen Post online* (4 September 2009).
[103] Adam Worm, 'Arctic Security: A Greenlandic Perspective' in James Kraska (ed), *Arctic security in an age of climate change* (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 166, 173.
[104] Canada-Denmark Joint Statement on Hans Island 2005.
[105] National Defense and the Canadian Forces. 'Canada And Denmark Sign Arctic Cooperation Arrangement' <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=3376> accessed July 2013.
[106] Torbjørn Pedersen. 'Denmark's Policies Toward the Svalbard Area' (2009) 40(4) Ocean Dev Int Law 319, 328-329.
[107] Valur Ingimundarson, Margrét Björnsdóttir, Einar Benediktsson and et al., 'A Risk Assessment for Iceland: Global, Societal, and Military Factors Summary of the Findings of an Interdisciplinary Commission Appointed by the Icelandic Foreign Minister' (2009) 4.

be insured by non-military means and through resistance to militarisation of the Arctic.[108] Icelandic current security agenda is highly influenced by the financial collapse in 2008. The crisis that followed raised the aim of economic and financial stability and societal security to the top of the priority list. In terms of the Arctic Region a possibility of an environmental disaster is Iceland's greatest national concern due to expected increase in maritime traffic, off-shore activities and exploitation and its impact on the fishing sector which is one of the largest pillar of Iceland's economy.[109] The burden to address these issues falls on the coastguard which mission includes domestic and high seas fisheries patrol, search and rescue operations and explosive ordnance disposal.[110]

Regarding security in the Arctic Region, Iceland has adopted the "think globally, act locally" motto. It takes proactive position in organisation and discussion forums with its member states[111] Despite the absence of the armed forces Iceland compensates it by participating in NATO, UN and EU operations. It serves to goals, both strengthening Iceland's ties with these organisations, and compensating for the lack of a territorial defence.[112] Nevertheless, there is a strong attachment to a traditional understanding of territory[113] and the first response in case of emergency situation comes from the national Coast Guard, a para-military unit.[114]

At a larger level Iceland's security is supported by the 1951 U.S.–Icelandic Defence Agreement which is still in force but in practice it was signed to institutionalise American contingent in the country. The US troops withdrawal in 2006 was partly due to the Icelandic government pressure and partly because of the shift in paradigm towards away-missions of the NATO. Since that time the backbone of the Icelandic national security policy has been based on the NATO membership due to the obvious absence of any military force in Iceland. That is why it supported the Norwegian government's push for a NATO surveillance role in the High North limited to regional soft security issues such as search and rescue at sea and marine pollution management in the Arctic.[115] As compensation for the US departure NATO

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[108] A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy (adopted on 28 March 2011) Alþingi (139).
[109] Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen, 'New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration' The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (2012), 136.
[110] David Rudd, 'Northern Europe's Arctic Defence Agenda' in Volume 12 (2010) 45, 56.
[111] ibid 57.
[112] Valur Ingimundarson and others, 'A Risk Assessment for Iceland: Global, Societal, and Military Factors Summary of the Findings of an Interdisciplinary Commission Appointed by the Icelandic Foreign Minister' in (2009), 4.
[113] Valur Ingimundarson. 'Iceland's Post-American Security Policy, Russian Geopolics and the Arctic Question' (2009) 154(4) The RUSI Journal 74, 75.
[114] David Rudd, 'Northern Europe's Arctic Defence Agenda' in Volume 12 (2010) 45, 57.
[115] Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, *Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?*(NDS Forum Papers, NATO Defense College, 2009);Valur Ingimundarson, 'Iceland's Post-American Security Policy, Russian Geopolics and the Arctic Question' in Volume 154 (Routledge, 2009) 74, 77.

offered Iceland a limited air surveillance arrangement starting from 2008. This air patrol played a symbolic role to demonstrate that Iceland is a member of the Alliance. Simultaneously, Iceland signed a bilateral agreement with Norway and Denmark on security cooperation that includes a temporary military presence and occasional exercises, search and rescue operations, police training and exchange of information. This cooperation is for most parts about soft security and full of political symbolism of the Nordic unity.[116] Although in practice, these agreements with Denmark and Norway do not entail any security guarantee. For Iceland it is a very comfortable arrangement for several reasons. First of all, the US has little interest in Icelandic security matters since the Cold War. Second, the security ties with the UK have weakened after the financial crisis and third, the Nordic cooperation – Iceland, Norway and Denmark – which is de facto trilateral, is run by NATO member states and is not in conflict with the policy of the Alliance.

Not to put all its eggs in one basket, Iceland has taken measures to increase Nordic wide cooperation which does not only include Norway and Denmark as well as themselves but also Finland and Sweden, non-NATO members. This proposal was put forward by former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg in a 2009 report on Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy commissioned by the Nordic Council, where he particularly made a set of recommendation on joint defence efforts for the Nordic countries.[117]

In October 2012 during the meetings of the ministers of the Nordic states an agreement for Finland and Sweden to participate in Iceland's air surveillance was signed with mixed response from Icelanders. This agreement reflects the trend of deeper integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO's sphere of interests and it is one of the security concerns of Moscow, as Russia is very sensitive about actions that regard strengthening Finnish and Swedish ties with NATO members on security matters. This is well understood by the Finnish and Swedish authorities and that is why the agreement has not been finalised yet. The national parliaments of the three countries have still not ratified it.[118]

Regarding 200-mile FPZ around Svalbard Iceland rejected Norway position arguing that the non-discriminatory rights to practice peaceful economic activities of the parties to the

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[116] Valur Ingimundarson, 'Iceland ’s security policy and geopolitics in the North' in Kjetil Skogrand (ed), *Emerging from the Frost. Security in the 21st century Arctic* (Oslo Files on Defence and Security, Institutt For Forsvarsstudier 2008) 80.
[117] RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:122;Niklas Granholm, 'Delar av ett nytt Arktis: Utvecklingar av dansk, kanadensisk och isländsk arktispolitik' Totalforsvarets Forskningsinstitut () FOI-R-2861-SE ;Valur Ingimundarson, 'Iceland's Post-American Security Policy, Russian Geopolics and the Arctic Question' in Volume 154 (Routledge 2009) 7478.
[118] International Relations and Security Network (ISN). 'Finland, Sweden: A Step Toward Greater Nordic Security Cooperation' <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?fecvnodeid=127885&dom=1&groupot593=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&fecvid=21&v21=127885&ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=154657> accessed July 2013.

Spitsbergen Treaty apply. And the Icelandic government has not formally abandoned its preparations to proceed against Norway before the International Court because of its unilateral interference with herring fisheries in the waters surrounding Spitsbergen.[119]

Sweden

Sweden was the last of the Arctic States that issued its national strategy for the Arctic Region, more precisely in May 2011. In terms of security it is devoted only to soft issues such as climate and environment, economic dimension and human dimension.[120] Sweden's Arctic strategy confirmed that the High North region is an area of low political tension and Sweden will work to assure that it stays the same.[121] One of the most concrete goals stated in Sweden's strategy is contributing to the improvement of security and surveillance in the area from the perspective of increasing maritime traffic in the Arctic Ocean.[122] In its Foreign Policy Statement from 2010 Sweden drew a more distinctive line between climate change and security and it was highlighted that in this perspective Sweden sees its security through partnership with other Nordic states and its membership in the Arctic Council. Geographically Sweden is a landlocked country towards the Arctic Ocean and the absence of frontage to the Norwegian and Barents seas focuses the political attention to the Baltic region where Sweden boasts a long coastline. Another important geographical aspect to understand the Swedish security situation is its Finnish-Baltic states buffer zone in the east. If those four states are safe the same can be said about Sweden.[123] That is why the perspective on the Swedish national security is viewed differently than in other Arctic States. Their interest is stronger in engaging its Nordic partners in soft security and perhaps even hard security cooperation in the Baltic Sea region rather than in the North Atlantic.[124] Regional and global security challenges are of higher concern of the Swedes than security within their own borders.[125] It is explained by the fact that the danger of great power conflict had largely vanished with the end of the Cold War and today regional conflicts and the new transnational threats could have a bigger impact on Sweden's security. That is why, in addition to

[119] Valur Ingimundarson, 'Iceland 's security policy and geopolitics in the North ' in Kjetil Skogrand (ed), *Emerging from the Frost. Security in the 21st century Arctic* (Oslo Files on Defence and Security, Institutt For Forsvarsstudier, 2008) 80
[120] Sweden's strategy for the Arctic region (adopted in May 2011).
[121] ibid 4.
[122] ibid 36.
[123] Wilhelm Agrell, *Fred och fruktan: Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska historia 1918-2000.* (Historiska Media. Lund, 2000) 271-275; Berner Örjan, *Sweden and Russia. In Finnish and Swedish Security: Comparing National Policies.*(Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, 2001) 131-133.
[124] Håkon Lunde Saxi. 'Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War' (2011) Oslo Files on Defence and Security 1, 38.
[125] ibid 37.

territorial defence, Swedish defence policy had to encompass participation in Peace Support Operations overseas in under the umbrella of UN, NATO/PfP and EU.[126]

Although traditionally Sweden is considered to be a neutral state in wartime, Swedish defence has both a pro-active and increasingly collaborative character.[127] In Sweden's *Functional Defence* paper it states "Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack."[128] In 1995 it limited neutrality policy to military non- alliance by joining the EU and accepting its common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Also the Riksdag has ratified solidarity clause – Article 222 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), it was also interpreted to include defence.[129] Today Sweden looks at the EU as a key organisation for maintaining security order in Europe.

Entry into NATO in short term is not considered to be likely and even though the current government is in favour of membership the public does not seem to have the same opinion, especially now when Sweden recently celebrated its 200th anniversary of non-participation in wars due to the policy of military non-alignment during peacetime.[130] On the other hand, statistics show that as per January 2013, 29 per cent of Swedes were in favour of, and 32 per cent against, joining NATO. More than a third were undecided. Only two years earlier, a full 50 per cent opposed NATO membership.[131] Anyways, time the defence cooperation with NATO is undertaken openly through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework which Sweden joined also in 1995. Nowadays Stockholm confirms its interest in promoting Arctic security in collaboration with the Alliance by hosting military exercises. The Loyal Arrow war games was a major air exercise of NATO forces in the High North in 2009. Also Swedish troops participate in such exercises as Cold Response, Cold Challenge and Joint Winter held in Northern Norway.[132]

Nevertheless, Sweden does not see any conventional threat to its immediate territory, a military attack in short and medium term is "virtually inconceivable"[133] and sees international cooperation as appropriate security assurances.

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[126] Marco Wyss. 'Military Transformation in Europe's Neutral and Non-Allied States' (2011) 156(2) The RUSI Journal 44, 47.
[127] David Rudd, 'Northern Europe's Arctic Defence Agenda' in Volume 12 (2010) 45, 57.
[128] Functional Defence 2010.
[129] The Swedish Defence Commission, 'Security in Cooperation: The Swedish Defence Commission´s analysis of challenges and threats.' Swedish Ministry of Defence (2007) 46.
[130] Email from Lev Voronkov to author (17 July 2013).
[131] Charly Salonius-Pasternak, 'Swedish defence illusions are crumbling' in *FIIA Comment* Volume 6 (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs 2013).
[132] Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen, 'New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration' in (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2012) 140.
[133] Swedish Ministry of Defence, 'Functional Defence' in (2010)

Finland

As well as Sweden, Finland has been forming its policy in a similar security environment. Throughout the Cold War it was military non-aligned, this characteristic is continuing to be viewed as a security guarantee. In 1995 it softened its policy of neutrality and autonomous defence and also joined the EU.

Helsinki is determined to realise a co-operative security policy within the same framework of EU's CFSP and NATO's PfP which Finland joined at the same time as neighbouring Sweden. Moreover, Finland shares preoccupation with the Baltic Sea region, which is strong in domestic politics. As well as Sweden, Finland geographically has no frontage to the Arctic Ocean, however, it should be noted, that one third of the country lies above the Arctic Circle. Stability in the High North is regarded by the Finnish government as vital for commercial and economic activities.[134]

In 2013 the new *Finnish Security and Defence Policy* acknowledged that "the threat of large-scale armed aggression is low" but "it cannot categorically be ruled out"[135] because unlike Sweden Finland is sharing 1300 km with Russia. A conflict between Russia and Georgia back in 2008 made Finland together with Sweden and Norway to reconsider the emphasis on territorial defence According to some researchers, although the significance of the territorial (self)- defence concept significantly declined after the Cold War, it is still alive in Finnish defence policy circles[136] Cronberg suggests that while Denmark, Norway, and Iceland rely on NATO's Article 5, and Sweden trusts its friends in the EU and Nordic countries, to Finland such assurances are insufficiently reliable.[137] But the recent 2012 Security and Defence Policy says that "a completely independent national defence is no longer a viable concept. Collaborative capability development as well as pooling and sharing have become important political and military goals"[138]

Finland is strengthening its security through partnership with other Nordic states (NORDEFCO) and through involvement in international organisations. Cooperation with NATO plays a key role in Finland's defence policy. Finland is a member in the Partnership for Peace framework and adopting the Comprehensive Approach is another course of action

[134] Finnish Security and Defence Policy (adopted in 2009) 74.
[135] Finnish Security and Defence Policy (adopted in 2012) 14.
[136] Jyri Raitasalo, 'Reconstructing Finnish Defence in the Post-Cold War Era' in P. Sivonen (ed), *Finnish Defence Studies* (National Defence University 2010) 96-103.
[137] Tarja Cronberg, 'The will to defend: a Nordic divide over security and defence policy.' in A. J. K. Bailes, G. Herolf and G. Sundelius (eds), *The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy* (Oxford University Press 2006) 320-322.
[138] Ministry of Defence of Finland, Finnish Security and Defence Policy (adopted in 2012)43.

that has awaken interest of the Finnish-NATO cooperation supporters according to the 2009 Finnish Security and Defence Policy.[139] Moreover, deeper integration and even the possibility of joining the North Atlantic Alliance is not excluded.[140] However, recent polls suggest that the Finnish population is not in favour of NATO membership.[141]

Despite the increasing multilateral co-operation, still Helsinki is committed to remain militarily neutral. It succeeded in absenting itself from the mutual assistance clause of the EU Lisbon Treaty, fearing being dragged into a European conflict with Russia.[142]

In the Arctic policy dimension Finland is perceiving itself as a major power in the European North with strong ambitions. Finnish national *Strategy for the Arctic Region* also focuses on the soft security matters which are the environment, economic activities, infrastructure and human dimension.[143] Environmental security issues are interconnected with the economic development and activities as well as multiple impacts of climate change. It is prominent due to expected increase of maritime traffic, exploitation of natural recourses, biodiversity fluctuations, pollution and nuclear safety. Human security also gained a prominence in the with regards to the status and rights of indigenous peoples. International cooperation with all actors in the region to solve environmental issues raised by climate change is said to be essential. Interesting, that sovereignty or national security matters are not mentioned in the Strategy in detail. But it is clear that Helsinki's approach to the overall security in the Arctic Region and the political developments taking place in the area is in tune with often-cited "High North – low tension" motto.[144] The forthcoming update of the Arctic Strategy is expected discuss national goals, more concretely, including security and stability.[145]

Russia

Russia differs significantly from the other Arctic States. The first obvious reason is its geographical position. The Russian coast line to the Arctic Ocean is the longest among the Arctic States by far, it spans almost half of the latitudinal circle. The second reason is that

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[139] Ministry of Defence of Finland, Finnish Security and Defence Policy (adopted in 2009) 65-66.
[140] Ministry of Defence of Finland, Finnish Security and Defence Policy (adopted in 2012) 78.
[141] Yle Uutiset. 'Finnish FM rejects speculation on Swedish NATO membership plans' <http://yle.fi/uutiset/finnish_fm_rejects_speculation_on_swedish_nato_membership_plans/6691164> accessed July 2013
[142] Hannu Aikio. 'Finnish Defence Forces in Transformation' (2009) (2) Military Power Revue der Schweizer Armee 47-54; Jyri Häkämies. 'Global Security Challenges: Finnish Perspective' <http://www.defmin.fi/?663_m=4325&l=en&s=270> accessed July 2013.
[143] Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region (adopted in June 2010) 2010.
[144] Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen, 'New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration' in (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2012) 143.
[145] Government Communications Department. 'Finland's new Arctic strategy at the government evening session' <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=278479&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> accessed July 2013

Russia maintains a central role of the Arctic in terms of strategic defence policy while for example the Nordic states shifted the focus of their security outlook towards non-military issues. Finally, Russia holds an enormous potential to develop its natural resources which are primarily located in the Arctic regions of the country.

Back in 2005 Sergei Ivanov, at that time First Deputy Prime Minister, formulated the "triad of Russian national values" which are sovereign democracy, economic might and military power.[146] This situation is accompanied by the intensified military presence in form of modernisation and military exercises along with rising funds of the Russian Ministry of Defence.[147] However, this trend does not really describe the regional security environment but relates more to the global level. Russian military strategy is often overlapped with the air and maritime domains in the Arctic but it is not necessarily aimed at that specific region. Fuelled by high world energy prices the military played a big role in returning the country to the world stage, after the downfall of the Soviet Union and economic turbulence during the 90s, as a global power with a global reach and influence on world affairs.[148] Despite the recently established special Arctic military formation the country is weak in conventional forces. The key elements in Russian defence policy are nuclear weapons and deterrence policy. The air force is perceived as a central tool in demonstration of power.[149] In addition, the North-West of Russia is an important basing and operational area for the sea based nuclear forces deployed by the Northern Fleet.[150] After the collapse of the Soviet Union the access to the Baltic and Black seas limited considerably and this geopolitical change significantly increased military relevance of the High North. That is why maintaining and modernising nuclear arms is the highest priority in Russian defence policy.[151]

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[146] Sergei Ivanov. 'A Triad of National Values' *Izvestia* (13 July 2006).
[147] Atle Staalesen. 'Russia to Boost Defense Budget with 60 percent Barents Observer,' (30 July 2010) Barents Observer ;Katarzyna Zysk, 'Military Aspects of Russia's Arctic Policy. Hard Power and Natural Resources' in James Kraska (ed), *Arctic security in an age of climate change* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York 2013) 85, 104.
[148] Katarzyna Zysk, 'Russia and the High North: Security and Defence Perspectives' in Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor (eds), *Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?*(NDS Forum Papers, NATO Defense College, 2009) 102, 108.
[149] Lassi Heininen, Alexander Sergunin and Gleb Yarovoy. 'Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic' <http://valdaiclub.com/> accessed September 2013.
[150] Katarzyna Zysk, 'The Evolving Arctic Security Environment: An Assessment' in Stephen J. Blank (ed), *Russia in the Arctic* (Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College 2011) 91, 113.
[151] 'M. Abramov, address at conference organized by the Maritime Board, Moscow, 13 June 2007,http://www.morskayakollegiya.ru; V. Vysotskii, "My obespechivaem bezopasnost' Rossii"; A. Smolovskii, "Voenno-strategicheskaya obstanovka v Arktike"; L.Karitskaya, "Vzashchitu national'nykh interesov"; Voprosy obespecheniya natsional'noi bezopasnosti; Morskaya doktrina RF, "Concept for Use of the Russian Navy in Peacetime"; "Voprosy obespecheniya natsionalnoi bezopasnosti v raionakh Severa. Rabochaya Gruppa Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii po voprosam politiki v otnoshenii severnykh territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2004," Arktika Segodnya, http://arctictoday.ru/ russ/facts/200000439' ;Katarzyna Zysk, 'Russia and the High North: Security and Defence Perspectives' in Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor (eds), *Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?* (NDS Forum Papers, NATO Defense College, 2009) 102, 108.

The major document that defines the dimensions of overall national security is the 2009 *Russian National Security Strategy for the period until 2020.*[152] It encompasses both hard and soft security issues the prioritisation of the issues is as follows: National defence, State security and civil protection, Improvement of living standards, Economic growth, Research, technologies and education, Healthcare, Culture, Ecology, and Strategic stability and partnership on equal terms. The attention given to hard security issues is considerably less than the soft security ones. The threats regarding hard security that are mentioned are: efforts to undermine the strategic balance of nuclear and conventional armament[153], terrorist acts, transnational criminal organisations etc.[154] It is not mentioned in the security strategy but it is very obvious in political and military as well as academic circles that the US and NATO are still regarded as potential adversaries. The deployment of missile defence system in Central Europe and NATO enlargement lay ground for this way of thinking and perception of insecurity.[155] The second priority is devoted to the human dimension. In order to provide adequate human security the strategy suggests to take measures against organised crime, measures against poverty, improve access to medical facilities, sufficient food supply of good quality, modernise human rights protection.[156] The economic security sector takes a prominent place in the document. The major threats in this sphere are the dependence of raw materials and uneven economic development of different regions.[157] The Security Strategy also links Russia's position on the world stage with the control of energy reserves. The document highlights energy security and over the long term does not exclude competitive struggle for natural resources at a global scale which may be solved with the use of military force.[158] Interestingly, in this respect some Russian experts argue that military presence will make the Arctic Region even more stable and attractive for economic development and cooperation.[159] However, it might be difficult to reconcile the presence and operation of the international business and military secrecy.

A year earlier, in 2008, Russia issued its first Arctic Strategy document, then in February 2013 a follow-up was approved. This first document point out the necessity to lay

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[152] Russian National Security Strategy for the period until 2020(adopted in May 2009).
[153] ibid para 30.
[154] ibid para 37.
[155] Katarzyna Zysk, 'Military Aspects of Russia's Arctic Policy. Hard Power and Natural Resources' in James Kraska (ed), *Arctic security in an age of climate change* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York 2013) 85, 90.
[156] Russian National Security Strategy for the period until 2020 (adopted in May 2009) para 48-52.
[157] ibid para 55.
[158] ibid para 12.
[159] S. Koz'menko and V. Selin. 'Kontseptsiia Soglasovaniia E'konomicheskoi' Oboronnoi' Deiatel'nosti v Arktike [Ap-proaches to the Coordination of Economic and Defense-Related Activities in the Arctic]' (2009) (4) Morskoi' Sbornik 55-60.

the groundwork for upcoming economic activities in the Arctic. It recognises some non-traditional security challenges and threats that might arise in the process such as terrorism at sea, smuggling and illegal migration along with higher risk of damage of aquatic biological resources that need protection. Hence, it is the Coast Guard force deployed by the FSB, a law enforcement unit, to play a central role in protecting national security interests in the area within 200 nmi EEZ.

The document vaguely states any traditional security threats, but it says that Russia needs to maintain a "necessary combat potential" in the North due to political elite's perception of the USA and NATO as potential adversaries and threat to national interests and state's unity. The military exercises under ran by NATO in the European High North and the Baltic States is often seen as an increasing influence of the Alliance overseas close to the Russian borderline, which is commonly interpreted as a threat. On the other hand, Russia sees Norway as a stable and predictable partner and neighbour, despite its membership and open lobbing of the NATO's activities in the Arctic Region. The same trend describes relations with Denmark and Iceland. As for Sweden and Finland, Russia is determined to demonstrate these neutral states that there is no need in accession to military alliance and that Russia is reliable partner, not the threat from the East. For example, recent visits of Russian President and Defence Minister and inter alia re-establishing of the military-industrial trade are supporting examples. The relation with Canada and the US, on the contrary, have been less cooperative. Russia carefully watches the expansion of naval capabilities of Canada. The perception of the US is not so much determined by the security environment in the Arctic, but rather by the US approach to global security.

The traditional functions of the Northern Fleet's to maintain "necessary combat potential" have been diversified by the new tasks to such as supporting of maritime shipping on the Northern Sea Route (NSR), providing search-and-rescue (SAR) support; preventing and responding to terrorist attacks on gas pipelines and other important transportation infrastructure, including platforms, roadsteads, terminals, filling stations, harbours, and railways. The armed forces also protect facilities involved in the processing and production of nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel.[160] A small note regarding SAR should be made, in fact all

[160] 'M. Abramov, address at conference organized by the Maritime Board, Moscow, 13 June 2007, http://www.morskayakollegiya.ru; V. Vysotskii, "My obespechivaem bezopasnost' Rossii"; A. Smolovskii, "Voenno-strategicheskaya obstanovka v Arktike"; L.Karitskaya, "Vzashchitu national'nykh interesov"; Voprosy obespecheniya natsional'noi bezopasnosti; Morskaya doktrina RF, "Concept for Use of the Russian Navy in Peacetime"; "Voprosy obespecheniya natsionalnoi bezopasnosti v raionakh Severa. Rabochaya Gruppa Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii po voprosam politiki v otnoshenii severnykh territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2004," Arktika Segodnya, http://arctictoday.ru/ russ/facts/200000439' ;Katarzyna Zysk, 'Military Aspects of Russia's Arctic Policy. Hard Power and

power structures (army, navy, border guards and the Ministry of Emergency Situations) are going to participate in the implementation of the Arctic Council Agreement on SAR 2011.[161]

In earlier discussions of the Arctic region, Russian authorities have been quite astringent regarding military activities in the area. Now it has been toned down in the Arctic document where even mentions of contentious issues are absent along with the hostile language.[162] Self-assertive and occasionally aggressive rhetoric was replaced by emphasise on international cooperation. This trend is parallel to falling prices in the global energy sector, however, in all strategic documents, Moscow emphasises that it will regulate all international issues, including the ones that relate to the Arctic Region, through negotiations and with respect to international law.

In the second document, called *The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security up to 2020*, the understanding of national security was expanded to include a human dimension and sustainable economic development of the local communities, inter alia indigenous population. Under sustainable development the strategy suggests strengthening of energy security, food security, improvements of the social environment, preservation of human resources by means of educational and medical policies.[163] In contrast to the 2008 Strategy the new document pays great attention to the environmental problems and is much more open to international cooperation to solve them and insure overall sustainable development of the region. It introduces an indicator system to monitor socio-economic and security developments in the area.[164] However, the analysis has proven that there is a big gap between what has been told and what has been made. An introduction of an expanded security agenda with less emphasize on military matters is a slow process, and it is even slower when it comes to implementation of the soft-security policies.[165] All in all, as Zysk observes, "old patterns in Russian approaches to security in the

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Natural Resources' in James Kraska (ed), *Arctic security in an age of climate change* (Cambridge University Press 2013) 8595.

[161] Lassi Heininen, Alexander Sergunin and Gleb Yarovoy, 'Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic' in <http://valdaiclub.com/> accessed September 2013.

[162] Katarzyna Zysk. 'Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints ' (2010) (57) JFQ 103, 108.

[163] A. N. Pilyasov. 'The development strategy of the Arctic zone of Russia for the period up to 2020' <http://www.2010.forumstrategov.ru/upload/documents/pilyasov.pdf> accessed July 2013.

[164] The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security up to 2020. [Strategiya Razvitiya Arkticheskoy zony RF i Obespecheniye Natsional'noy Bezopasnosti na Period do 2020 goda.] (approved on 20 February 2013) ;Lassi Heininen, Alexander Sergunin and Gleb Yarovoy. 'New Russian Arctic Doctrine: From Idealism to Realism?' <http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/60220.html> accessed July 2013.

[165] Ole Andreas Lindeman. 'Norwegian foreign policy in the High North International cooperation and the relations to Russia' (2009) 1 Oslo Files on Defence and Security 81; Nikita Lomagin, 'Forming a New Security Identity in Modern Russia' in Jakob et al Hedenskog (ed), *Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin* (Routledge 2005) 257-277.

High North are visible in the way other actors in the region are viewed through lenses of a classical *Realpolitik*."

USA

Regardless of the vast Alaskan coastline to the Arctic Ocean, Washington has only occasionally turned its attention from the Middle East to the Arctic. Also the economic crises of 2008 and a political deadlock between Obama and the Congress made the security issues in the Arctic left out of the political agenda.[166] Even the fact that the National Strategy for the Arctic Region has been issued by the White House long overdue in May 2013 say it all. The Arctic Region is not a top priority of foreign policy or national security of the US. The Arctic Region does not receive a diplomatic representation comparable to the other states. After the end of the Cold War the strategic engagement in the Arctic has decreased. Even security infrastructure that is located in the region was built back in the 1950s and 1960s, but in fact the Arctic region has never been used for US identity, especially when compared to other Arctic States. But today the Arctic Region is steadily emerging as a new important area in US foreign policy. Strategic guidance on the Arctic is articulated in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25, currently released Arctic Strategy, as well as in *the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS)* and the *2010 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR).* "The overarching strategic national security objective is a stable and secure region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded and the U.S. homeland is protected."

The first US Arctic Policy Objectives were published in 1994, it concerned protection of the Arctic environment, sustainable use of natural resources, strengthening of intergovernmental cooperation, involving northern indigenous peoples in decision making, enhancing scientific research, and meeting post-Cold War national security and defence needs.[167]

Later in 2000s when the trend on issuing Arctic Strategies was in a full swing, the president's administration updated its policy with the *National Security Presidential Directive-66* and *Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25* in 2009. It has become first document that called the US "an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region". One year later *National Security Strategy* also acknowledged "broad and

[166] Rob Huebert, 'U.S. Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power' in Barry Scott Zellen (ed), *The Fast-Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for a Warmer World* (University of Calgary Press 2013) 189, 190.
[167] Lassi Heininen, *Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study* (The Northern Research Forum & The University of Lapland, 2011) 54.

fundamental interests ... and national security needs" in the Arctic region.[168] Importantly, it focuses on Alaska as at the core of U.S. Arctic interests in the region, and these interests are of national scale.[169] *NSPD- 66* addressed both soft and hard security interests. *NSPD-66* entailed such soft security issues as governance, continental shelf and maritime border delimitation, sea traffic, economic issues, including energy security, and environmental protection. Regarding the hard security matters, which are of a higher importance, the US policy defined several priorities: "missile defence and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring the freedom of navigation and oversight" though military presence and the projection of sea power throughout the region.[170] *NSDP-66* has a strong focus on national and homeland. And that has become a major development from the 1994 policy document. The basic objectives of the 1994 document remained the same, but the order has been changed, the need to meet national security was moved from last to first. Rob Huebert writes that also the fact that, homeland security was shifted to national security level is a reflection of the changes after 9/11.[171] In general the US strategic thinking does not exclude a possibility of conflict in the region. In 2005 *The Cooperative Strategy for the 21st century Sea Power* acknowledged that the developments taking place in the region increased the significance of the national energy security and that national resources are "potential sources of competition and conflict"[172] The National Intelligence Council confirms that major war in the Arctic is unlikely, but small-scale conflict as a result of spillover from disputes in other region is possible.[173] In this perspective it's very interesting to look at what instruments the US will rely on. On one hand several presidential administration have reaffirmed that NATO is one of the foundational pillars of security in the Arctic.[174] "Central to the security of the United States is a strong transatlantic partnership, which is underpinned by the bilateral relationships between the United States and the governments of Europe."[175] Some analysts say that the collective security mechanism will not be a primary tool for insuring the Arctic

[168] National Security Strategy (adopted in May 2010) 50.
[169] Rob Huebert, 'U.S. Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power' in Barry Scott Zellen (ed), *The Fast-Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for a Warmer World* (University of Calgary Press, 2013) 189, 191.
[170] National Security Presidential Directive-66/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25 (NSPD-66/HSPD-25) (adopted on 9 January 2009).
[171] Rob Huebert, 'U.S. Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power' in Barry Scott Zellen (ed), *The Fast-Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for a Warmer World* (University of Calgary Press, 2013) 189, 192.
[172] A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (adopted in October 2007) 3.
[173] National Intelligence Council, 'Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World' (2008) 53.
[174] J. B. Steinberg. 'Arctic region will be next international strategic challenge' <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20387/us_deputy_secretary_of_state.html>
[175] Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 57.

security from the US perspective.[176] "The U.S. military potential is used as a tool of the national security policy and global strategy rather than an integral part of NATO's collective forces expected to deter a specific hostile country in the Arctic."[177] In general, all the Arctic NATO member states rely on their national military potential above a collective one. *Cooperative Strategy for the 21st century Sea Power* does not mention NATO as an instrument to address this potential, so, the US are not considering an specific engagement of the Alliance into the Arctic security matters. Instead the bi- and multilateral cooperation is in the US perspective. On the other hand with two costly wars and a struggling economy, cost-sharing through collective defence efforts such as NATO should be an attractive option.

NSPD-66 promotes international governance and cooperation institutionalisation. For example the priorities of the Defence Department in terms of the Arctic are: seeking opportunities to work with Russia and Canada[178] The two instruments ensuring national security will be the US Coast Guard and the US Navy. Following the objectives of *NSPD-66* the Navy produced its "Arctic Roadmap" in October 2009 and its "Strategic Objectives for the U.S. Navy in the Arctic Region" in May 2010. But these steps did not become of whole-of-government level. The U.S. Coast Guard issued its Arctic strategy in May 2013. Apart from law enforcement tasks and emergency management services these two institutions will ensure "freedom of seas" and "project sea power" throughout the region. Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region is considered as a top national priority.[179] The interest to preserve freedom of seas is linked not only to commercial tasks but mostly to the global mobility of the military vessels and strategic deployment. Kraska writes that naval forces depend on global strategic mobility and tactical maritime and aerospace manoeuvrability to conduct the spectrum of sea, air, and land operations. Freedom of navigation is also a component of nuclear deterrence capacity, as it assures the mobility of strategic ballistic-missile submarines.[180] The implication of "freedom of seas" security priority in the Arctic context concerns the fact that the United States do recognise neither Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage nor Russian sovereignty over Northern Sea Route, which means that in the U.S. view laws governing maritime passage through the

[176] Helga Haftendorn. 'NATO and the Arctic: is the Atlantic alliance a cold war relic in a peaceful region now faced with non-military challenges?' (2011) 20(3) European Security 337, 351.
[177] Lev Voronkov, 'The Arctic for Eight: Evolution of NATO's Role in the Arctic' in (http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Arctic-for-Eight-16058 edn 2013).
[178] U.S. Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review' in (2010)59, 62.
[179] The White House, 'National Security Presidential Directive-66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25 (NSPD-66/HSPD-25) (adopted on 9 January 2009)'
[180] James Kraska, 'The New Arctic Geography and U.S. Strategy' in James Kraska (ed), *Arctic security in an age of climate change* (Cambridge University Press 2013) 244, 254.

NWP and NSR cannot not be developed unilaterally by Canada and Russia. It is not because Washington actually uses the waterways but because to do so would set a precedent which might damage American interests elsewhere.[181] That is why the ratification of the UNCLOS has been pushed by last three presidential administrations by both democrats and republicans along with the Navy and the Coast Guard. However, the process of ratification of the convention is still stuck in the Senate.

The second major security concern in NSPD-66 is energy security and exploitation of the Alaskan shelf. From the strategic perspective Oil and gas exploitation would allow to decrease the dependence on foreign suppliers. Domestically there are environmental concerns of sustainability and coexisting with fishing and subsistence economic that conflicts with the extraction operations. But there is also a concern at the international level, more specifically, regarding Canadian-American energy relations. Canada opposes the development of oil and gas in Alaska, while US resist over the construction of pipelines to carry the oil sands product from Canada. Further complicating issue is boundary dispute in the Beaufort Sea and the shares the economic returns of any development.[182]

For a long time NSPD-66 was highly criticised domestically for inadequate attention given to the region and many calls were made for its updating until[183] in May 2013 the White House released *National Strategy for the Arctic Region*. The document appears to supplement NSPD-66. In terms of security the US will "seek to maintain and preserve the Arctic region as an area free of conflict, acting in concert with allies, partners, and other interested parties. Support and preserve international legal principles of freedom of navigation and over flight and other uses of the sea and airspace related to these freedoms, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes for all nations."[184] In the American perspective the major threats to national security comes from the non-state actors, terrorist acts, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. It is also important to say that the Arctic is of a strategic military interest for the United States. The deterrence capability is on the national security agenda, but just as in Russia's case, it is not only a part of the Arctic strategy but a matter of the state's global policy. Just like Russia, US started to modernise its to tackle threats that originate beyond the region. Because the Ballistic Missile Defence

[181] Adam Lajeunesse, 'Negotiating Sovereignty: The Past and Present Failure of 'Security' as a Bargaining Chip' in *Working Papers on Arctic Security* (Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, 2013) 3.
[182] Rob Huebert, 'U.S. Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power' in Barry Scott Zellen (ed), *The Fast-Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for a Warmer World* (University of Calgary Press 2013) 189, 200.
[183] Heather A. Conley et. all., 'The New Foreign Policy Frontier: U.S. Interests and Actors in the Arctic' Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 1.
[184] National Strategy for the Arctic Region (adopted in May 2013) 2.

System (BMSD) and Upgraded Early Warning System (UEWS) stretching from the Northern-American Arctic via Greenland to UK is not limited to functions of policing and patrolling. BMSD provide space surveillance, tactical warning and assessment and midcourse coverage to detect sea-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles out to a distance of 3,000 miles.[185] Freedom of seas is also not a regional issue but rather has worldwide implication politically, operationally and legally.[186] One interesting observation built upon the reading materials is that if in Russian perspective NATO and the US are not commonly seen as potential adversaries, academic literature on US perspective does not view Russia in similar way. But at the same time US Arctic Strategy and the previously published document are analysed with a close look at the Russian Arctic developments

Canada

The last Arctic State examined in this chapter is Canada. The concept of Arctic security appeared in Canada's strategic thinking during the Cold War. It is no surprise that is was mostly associated with the threat lying in Canada's close periphery, the Soviet Union. At that time security on sea was provided by the United States. According to all officially documented papers, the need to provide military security disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union.[187] In the 1990s it became clear that the focus was shifting towards soft security matters. Canada initiated the establishment of the Arctic Council and has been promoting environmental issues, sustainable development and human security as a focus of circumpolar cooperation. However, in the start of the new century, things started to shift back towards a traditional approach and Canada became the first state that publicly addressed the rebuilding of the security capability in the Arctic. Although the Canadian Arctic Strategy heavily emphasises sovereignty and security and has the issue as a priority in their foreign policy priority it “does not anticipate any military challenges” in the region.[188] There are several ongoing boundary disputes with the USA in the Beaufort Sea and Denmark over the Hans Island along with a dispute regarding the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Canada regards these disputes as political and diplomatic but neither poses a real threat to Canadian sovereignty. Therefore is does not create any defence challenges or has a negative impact on

[185] James Kraska, 'The New Arctic Geography and U.S. Strategy' in James Kraska (ed), *Arctic security in an age of climate change* (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 244, 254.
[186] ibid, 259.
[187] The Arctic: Canadian and international perspectives.2008 1-7, 29-34.
[188] Canada's Northern Strategy: our North, our Heritage, our Future (adopted in March 2009) 4, 25.

cooperation with the other Arctic States.[189] "Canada will continue to manage these discrete disputes and may seek to resolve them in the future, in accordance with international law"[190]

The Canadian Arctic Strategy is based on two documents, *Northern Strategy* passed in 2009 and *Statement on Canada's Arctic Policy* issued in 2010. Both of them focus on the Arctic as a first priority in foreign policy and the main focus is on exercising the sovereignty in the region through strengthening Canada's presence in the Arctic. It calls for "improving land, sea and air capability and capacity" and "defining maximum seabed limits." In 2009 the area of the application of the Arctic Waters Pollution Act was increased to 200 nmi, also the vessel traffic reporting to the Coast Guard has become obligatory as recommended in the *Northern Strategy*.[191] The other main priorities of the strategy are promoting social and economic development, protecting its environmental heritage and improving and devolving northern governance[192] It is also important to address the conclusions of the Canadian Standing Committee on National Defense report: "There is no immediate military threat to Canadian territories either in or "through" the Arctic... The challenges facing the Arctic are not of the traditional military type... These do not require combat capability."[193]

An interesting observation was made by Heininen that although the Canadian north is said to be "first and foremost about people – the Inuit, other Aboriginal people and Northerners" the priorities of the strategy do not lie in that area, "neither (indigenous) peoples nor the human dimension" are of main interest. But such goals of empowering the peoples of the north was included in the 2010 *Statement*.[194] Particularly it says that indigenous communities should have influence in shaping Canada's foreign policy through direct contacts with the government and through international forum of the Arctic Council.[195] In general, Canada recognises the expended approach to understanding of security which involve economic, societal and cultural issues. Huebert says that sovereignty and security in the Arctic are interconnected and should not be distinguished from each other. He says that sovereignty is about control within a specific geographic area by specific entity and the

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[189] K. Bergh, 'The Arctic policies of Canada and the United States: domestic motives and international context' in *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2012/1* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012)4; Lassi Heininen, 'Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study' in (The Northern Research Forum & The University of Lapland, 2011) 14.

[190] Government of Canada, 'Canada's Northern Strategy: our North, our Heritage, our Future (adopted in March 2009)' 13.

[191] An Act to amend the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (adopted on June 2009) ; Vessel Traffic Reporting Arctic Canada Traffic Zone (NORDREG).

[192] Government of Canada, 'Canada's Northern Strategy: our North, our Heritage, our Future (adopted in March 2009)' in ().

[193] Standing Committee on National Defence, 'Canada's Arctic Souvereignty' Speaker of the House of Commons () 3

[194] Lassi Heininen, 'Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study' in (The Northern Research Forum & The University of Lapland, 2011) 16.

[195] Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy 2010 23.

reason for this control is protecting the security, safety and well-being of any nation.[196] He also argues that the fact that each Arctic State started rebuilding its northern military capabilities is a signal of the remerging traditional security threats. In this perspective he points to Russia as Canada's first potential rival in the Arctic.[197] Lackenbauer voices a similar opinion regarding Russia as an emerging security threat but takes a slightly different position by adding the U.S. in to the mix as a threat to the Canadian sovereign rights, particularly in the maritime dimension.[198]

Canada is always very sensitive to actions that Russians undertake in the region. Canadian politicians and academics commonly accuse Russia of remilitarisation while at the same time Canada's military activities have been enhanced over that last ten year. In 2002 the Canadian Navy resumed operations in the Arctic waters and since 2007 three major military exercises have taken place per year. One of them, operation Nanook includes Navy and Coast Guard of the U.S. and the Royal Danish Navy. Canada is also collaborating with the U.S. on providing aerospace warning and common defence for North America in frames of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) It's task is to provide air and maritime surveillance and shared understanding of potential threats, not only from military objects, but also from non-state actors. Canada identifies threats such as organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. The commitments of the Harper's government demonstrate the focus on hard security matters rather than human security. The understanding of sovereignty from the military perspective has been highly criticised, the main argument being that the challenges are not of military nature but regarding people and environment while the real ambition of the power holders is to gain political support rather than fix what needs fixing.[199] However, the economic crisis of 2008 created a gap between the goals that Canada set to provide security in the Arctic Region and resources available to support them.

Basing on the security outlook of the Arctic States the author argues that there are no *fundamental* differences in the respective Arctic Strategies. The similarities are many, they mostly include threat and risk analysis and are aimed at the coordination of the responses to them. Also, all national strategies aimed at both domestic and international audience. At the national level, by adopting a strategy, the state demonstrates its awareness of the threats and

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[196] Rob Huebert, 'Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World' in *Foreign Policy for Canada's Tomorrow No. 4* (Canadian International Council, 2009) 5-6.
[197] Rob Huebert. 'Welcome to a new era of Arctic security' *Globe and Mail* (24 August 2010).
[198] Whitney P. Lackenbauer, 'Mirror images: Canada, Russia and the Circumpolar World' in Barry Scott Zellen (ed), *The Fast-Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for a Warmer World* (University of Calgary Press 2013) 257, 258.
[199] K. Bergh, 'The Arctic policies of Canada and the United States: domestic motives and international context' in *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2012/1* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), 16.

risks and its commitment to deal with them and offers guidelines and instruments to address them. At the international level the state estimates its position in relation to other powers, attracts the support and sympathy of the partners and indicates the acceptance of relevant international legal norms.[200]

Generally it is possible to say that an expanded and multifunctional approach towards understanding of security takes place in the Arctic Strategies. They are in their nature foreign policy documents, which means that they have been initiated at the executive level and the top leadership sets the overall framework for discussion, issues and language.[201] The fact that economic development, social issues and environmental protection were included in such high level documents demonstrates that a securitising move was performed by a state actor (although many state departments were participating). Thus, the soft issues were securitised which means that these problems gained more than merely the normal political consideration and were moved up to the national and even in some cases the international level.

Despite many similarities, several distinctions can be made. **To begin with**, only Russia and the United States have a clear focus on hard security and advocate maintenance of deterrence capabilities. **Secondly**, only the Arctic Coastal states put sovereignty as a main agenda and they relate sovereignty to the prospect of new resource discoveries.They believe that the extended continental shelf and maritime boundary disputes may affect their access to the resources. Commonly, these concerns are regarded as elements of conflict in the region. The widespread question is if the Arctic is a region of cooperation and an unlikely area of armed conflict why are the Arctic States so eager to demonstrate their military potential? All these military trainings and exercises are viewed as a re-emergence of traditional threats but the answer lies in the blurred lines between what military actions or preparation is aimed at the Arctic specifically or is merely a part of the respective states global strategic interest. **Lastly,** Finland, Sweden and Iceland emphasise that there is no immediate threat to their sovereignty or national security. Instead, they believe soft security matters, that is human and environmental security, are matters of greater importance.

Arctic as security community

[200] Alyson J. K. Bailes and Lassi Heininen, *Strategy Papers on the Arctic or High North: comparative study and analysis* (Centre for Small State Studies Institute of International Affairs, 2012) 21, 25.
[201] Harry Borlase, 'Consistencies and Inconsistencies in the National Strategies of the Arctic Littoral States   ' in (Master's Degree edn University of Akureyri, 2010) 46.

The academic perspective on the arctic region is in transition only in frames of shift in security studies but also in terms of shifting climate patterns. It is important to understand how the climate changes and how it impacts the security on different levels, directly or indirectly. On one hand climate change threatens the very existence of the current ecosystem and those communities located in the nearest periphery. On the other hand climate change can serve as a driver of intra- or interstate conflicts. In a way climate change may bring up issues that may not have seemed relevant before and the level of the issues has been raised from a *problem* to an actual *threat*. Thus, it can cause regional instability and in worst case scenario even violent conflict. The latter perspective on indirect influence of the climate change regarding regional security is more favoured in academic circles than the direct influence perspective.[202]

In Arctic studies there are mainly two approaches on the question "is there going to be a conflict involving use of force?" Neo-realists such as Blonden, Borgerson and Howard tend to simulate the developments taking place in the arctic with a gold rush. They put great emphasis on the competitive behaviour of wealth seeking governments "towards maximising their revenue from Arctic" natural resources and that is the reason why they find serious interstate conflicts possible. On the contrary, scientists from the neoliberal tradition, such as Bailes, Koivurova, VanderZwaag and Young, believe in cooperation supported by multinational and bilateral institutionalization although they do not deny the fact that it is economic interest of stakeholders that pushes arctic affairs.[203] Neo-realists think that arctic cooperation institutions are not capable and were not designed to address hard security matters which are the main sources of conflict in the region. Neo-liberalists say that these matters have been replaced by soft-security, or in other words, has been "desecuritised" and in this perspective institutionalised cooperative governance is relevant, effective and successful.

In this context, this chapter refers to the concept of the security community coined by Karl Deutsch and developed by Amitav Acharya.[204] The Arctic Region will be viewed as a pluralistic security community which is “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states

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[202] Kristian Åtland, 'The Security Implications of Climate Change in the Arctic Ocean' in Paul Arthur Berkman and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin (eds), *NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean* (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security 2013) 205-216; Marc A. Levy. 'Is the Environment a National Security Issue?' (1995) 20(2) International Security 35-62.

[203] Sebastian Knecht and Kathrin Keil. 'Arctic geopolitics revisited: spatialising governance in the circumpolar North' (2013) 3(1) The Polar Journal 178, 179.

[204] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia ASEAN and the problem of regional order* (Routledge 2009) 322; Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, *Security communities* (Cambridge University Press 1998) 462; Karl W. Deutsch, *Political community and the North Atlantic area; international organization in the light of historical experience* (Princeton University Press 1957) 228.

whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change over a long period of time."[205]

Several features of a security community: There are several features that define a security community. **The first** worth mentioning is the **absence of war between its members**. It does not mean that there is an absence of any disputes or conflicts between the members, but what is in place is an ability and willingness to manage them by diplomatic means. Members of such a community "renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intraregional conflicts."

Generally it is the UN Charter that outlaws use of force, article 33[206] provides for pacific settlement of any disputes. In short, it means that states are obliged to find a solution that normally involves negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration. This is a general obligation to cooperate recognised under international customary law. In the Arctic Region most of disputes concern delimitation of maritime borders and/or continental shelf, which are governed by UNCLOS legal framework. When it come to the compulsory dispute settlement under UCLOS, there are several choices a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI, b) the International Court of Justice; c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII; and d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII. Where the parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure, it must be utilized unless they agree otherwise.[207] If no choice is designated by written declaration, that State is deemed to have accepted arbitration.[208] If two States have both designated methods of dispute settlement under Article 287, but have not accepted the same method, then their dispute may only be submitted to arbitration.[209] Thus, arbitration is considered the "default" dispute settlement procedure.[210] Such Arctic littoral states as Canada and Russia have opted not to accept compulsory third-party adjudication over disputes relating to maritime delimitation, while Denmark and Norway have opted not to accept tribunals constituted in accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS as a means of settling disputes relating to maritime delimitation. Both have specified a preference to use the International Court of Justice to settle UNCLOS-related disputes. USA haven´t ratified the Convention.

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[205] ibid 18-21.
[206] 'UN Charter (adopted on26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI' 16.
[207] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3(UNCLOS) art 287(4).
[208] ibid art 287(4).
[209] ibid art 287(5).
[210] Howard S. Schiffman. 'The dispute settlement mechanism of UNCLOS: A Potentially Important Framework for Marine Wildlife Management' (1998) 1(2) Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 293, 300.

Second feature is the **absence of significant warfare preparations** which would prevent an immediate outbreak of war. This point is debatable. No one denies that there is build-up of conventional military capacity. There are several publications on this matter, and the most notable is SIPRI´s Background paper in frames of the "Arctic Futures Project" analyzing air, land and sea capabilities of the coastal states. In conclusion it is said that the observed build-up in the overall picture is a "limited modernisation and increases or changes in equipment, force levels, and force structure."[211] Besides, the modernisation is neither competitive nor offensive in nature; the sole purpose is to maintain the level of defence. The absence of an arms-race behaviour that was in place during the Cold War proves that Arctic States are overcoming or have even already overcome the security dilemma. Moreover, if we look at the graph of overall military expenditures of the Arctic littoral states (except Iceland that does not have any army), on the basis of percentage of gross domestic product, we can observe a tremendous decline from late 80s and the End of Cold War. The only deviation is statistics on the US indicator, which almost reaches the levels of Cold War due to ongoing operations overseas.



Military expenditures of the Arctic littoral states (except Iceland) in percentage to GDP[212].

As Wezeman wrote that the "review of current and projected military forces in the Arctic region points to a process of modernization and the creation of new capacity to address challenges associated with the environmental, economic and political changes anticipated in the region, rather than as a response to major threat perceptions. Conventional military forces specially adapted to the harsh Arctic environment are projected to remain small scale,

[211] Siemon T. Wezeman, 'Military Capabilities in the Arctic' in *SIPRI Background Paper* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012) 13.
[212] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 'SIPRI Military Expenditure Database' <http://milexdata.sipri.org/> accessed September 2013.

especially given the size of the Arctic region, and will remain in some cases considerably below Cold War levels.“[213]

These two features previously mentioned are the most important ones. **Other features** are less determining but still provide a more accurate and detailed description of a security community concept. **To begin with** there are **long-term prospects for war avoidance among the actors because of the shared aspiration to illegitimate the use of force**. Acharya argues that "each member of a security community comes to know with a reasonable certainty that all others in the group share the same belief of undesirability of war."[214] Indeed there are numerous official public statements from the Arctic States describing that “the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation is of the utmost importance”[215] The mantra is “high north – low tension”[216]

The long term expectation is that there is not going to be any conflict in the future, also, Acharya writes about a sense of a **collective identity,**[217] another feature of a security community, which is just starting to form in the Arctic. There are several things that form this "Arctic Nation" identity, common history involving trade, communication and in some cases even common language groups and surviving in harsh environmental conditions. Nowadays politicians are using these criteria to boost international cooperation process. In a way they romanticise them to build up the feeling of this collective identity. But there are other, more objective, elements of this collective identity such as economy, where the structure of the economy is more or less the same across the borders. There is heavy state dependence of the extraction of natural resources that at the same time contradicts with the subsistence economy of the indigenous population. Political movement of the indigenous peoples at the national level along with their breakthrough up to the international level. The last element but certainly not the least is facing and adapting to climate change.

The next feature that will be mentioned here is **institutions and processes (formal or informal)** for the pacific settlement of disputes, which would assure peaceful change among members of a security community with a reasonable certainty "over a long period of

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[213] Siemon T. Wezeman, 'Military Capabilities in the Arctic' in *SIPRI Background Paper* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), 14.
[214] Amitav Acharya, 'Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia ASEAN and the problem of regional order' in (Routledge, London 2009) 322, 17.
[215] Vladimir V. Putin. 'International Forum "The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue"' (Archangelsk September 23, 2010) <http://arctic.ru/news/2010/09/prime-minister-vladimir-putin-speaks-international-forum-arctic-territory-dialogue> accessed 01 June 2013.
[216] Jonas Gahr Støre. 'Interview with Jonas Gahr Støre, Foreign Minister of Norway' <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_60694.htm> accessed 01 June 2013.
[217] Amitav Acharya, 'Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia ASEAN and the problem of regional order' in (Routledge 2009) 322, 18.

time".[218] As Zysk wrote "speculation about the potential for conflict has been based mainly on the assumption that a struggle for gas and oil in the disputed areas may lead to the use of military force."[219] However it is a well know fact that most of the hydrocarbon fields are located within exclusive economic zones of the coastal states and for all the disputed areas UNCLOS provides extensive legal framework, so there is very little possibility of any armed conflict. Other factors that support this argument, disputed areas have a low probability of oil findings.[220] Second of all the development of unconventional energy resources including shale gas significantly decrease the demand for the Arctic oil and gas. Apart from that, the EU aims at getting 20% of its energy from renewable resources.[221] Apart from that there are other legal issues that are not finalized like US-Canada border delimitation in the Beaufort sea. Hans Island case between Canada and Denmark. Un-ratified US-Russia border delimitation treaty in the Bering sea. Fisheries protection zone around Svalbard and the status of the Northern Sea Route and North West Passage.

Mostly, UNCLOS framework covers settlement of disputes in the Arctic Ocean. And in terms of maritime delimitation, regulated by the articles 74 and 83, it is compulsory for parties to a dispute to "make every effort to cooperate", however, with maximum flexibility of choice for procedure. A good supporting example of Ilulissat declaration 2008 in which Arctic coastal states expressed their commitment to UNCLOS "legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims."[222] It is particularly remarkable since the USA haven't ratified the UNCLOS. Also, the experience demonstrates that all maritime border delimitation disputes arose in the Arctic Region have been peacefully resolved.[223] There are also good examples of disputes regarding fisheries being solved in a peaceful way. The loophole dispute in the Barents sea and management of the Grey Zone, also in the Barents sea. It is safe to say that practices of pacific settlement as well as

[218] ibid 16.
[219] Katarzyna Zysk, 'The Evolving Arctic Security Environment: An Assessment' in Stephen J. Blank (ed), *Russia in the Arctic* (Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College (SSI), Carlisle, United States 2011) 91, 105.
[220] Charter on Trust and Non-self-governing territories and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2002.
[221] Directive 2009/28/EC Of The European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009;on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently   repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC .
[222] 'The Ilulissat Declaration' (Arctic Ocean Conference Ilulissat, Greenland 27-29 May 2008).
[223] Canada-Denmark (Greenland): continental shelf boundary agreed 17 December 1973; Denmark (Greenland)-Iceland: continental shelf and fisheries boundary agree 11 November 1997; Denmark (Greenland)-Norway (Jan Mayen): continental shelf and fisheries boundary agree 18 December 1995 following adjudication by the International Court of Justice; Denmark (Greenland)-Iceland-Norway (Jan Mayen) tripoint agreed 11 November 1997; Denmark (Greenland)-Norway (Svalbard): continental shelf and fisheries boundary agreed 20 February 2006; Iceland-Norway (Jan Mayen): fisheries boundary following the 200 nm limit of Iceland's EEZ agreed 28 May 1980; continental shelf boundary and joint zone agree 22 October 1981; Norway-Russia: maritime boundary in Varangerfjord partially delimited 15 February 1957 and extended 11 July 2007. Agreement on the maritime boundary in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean signed on 15 September 2010 and entered into force on 7 July 2011; Russia-USA: single maritime boundary agreed 1 June 1990.

institutions have formed in the Arctic Region through global, regional and national agreements both binding and non-binding. The feature of a security community regarding institutions and processes of peaceful settlement of disputes is in place, but only when we talk about soft security matters. For example existing governance arrangements concern fisheries, extractive industries, pollution, shipping etc. When it comes to hard security matters the situation is different and will be discussed later in this chapter.

The **last feature** Acharya writes about is significant functional cooperation.[224] There are many dimensions and many levels of cooperation in the Arctic Region. The most significant units operate under the umbrella of the Arctic Council. But there are also other important political organisations as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Nordic Council. In fisheries there is for example the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission and North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission that perform different tasks in negotiating on TACs. There are other relatively little publicised cooperation practices. For example the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and Northern Chiefs of Defence Conference that address such issues as infrastructure, environment, joint exercises and training and marine domain awareness.[225]

This thesis supports the opinion that the Arctic Region is a forming security community. After the end of the Cold War it has been in transition and since the Rovaniemi process and the establishment of the Arctic Council several shared transnational values and common understanding have emerged. First of all, mutual trust between the Arctic States. Second, peaceful co-existence of industrial development and environment. The understanding of anthropogenic causes of climate change and common perspective on the impact of the climate change, globally as well as locally. Deutsch defined security community as a group that "has 'become integrated', where integration is defined as attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions and practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with 'reasonable' certainty over a 'long period of time'"[226] but still there is a long way to go to complete the formation of a security community. Instead, it is more visible it divided by Russian, North-

[224] Amitav Acharya, 'Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia ASEAN and the problem of regional order' in (Routledge 2009) 322, 21.
[225] Ronald O'Rourke, 'Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress' Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS Report for Congress 2013) 57.
[226] Karl W. Deutsch, 'Political community and the North Atlantic area; international organization in the light of historical experience' in (Princeton University Press 1957) 228.

American and Nordic sub-community. And, of course, the security community represented by NATO member-states.[227]

The main goal of the ongoing international cooperation is to formulate institutional responses for the forecasted activities in time. Today the Arctic security architecture is fragmented, it's a complex and open-ended research field. It can be visually represented on the following graph that has been developed by SIPRI "Arctic Futures" project[228]:



The graph represents international military cooperation in the Arctic. It includes examples of bilateral, multilateral cooperation as well as such an institutionalised cooperation as NATO. At the same it excludes joint military exercises in which parties of different sub-communities. Such as for example, annual operation Nanook in the Canadian Arctic, in this exercises participate representatives of US, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Norway and the UK. The Norwegians are also doing a yearly joint naval exercise with Russia, the Pomor. Not to mention annual Barents Rescue exercise. At the same time the graph includes Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff Conference initiated by Canada, the graph also depicts Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), organized by the US European Command and the Norwegian government, as Circumpolar cooperation example of discussion on civil-military relations, environmental stewardship and search and rescue in the Arctic. But in fact these are not institutionalised practices yet.

In these terms the Arctic Region significantly differs from other geographical locations although the states as political actors are in some cases the same. For example the political positions regarding the situation in the Middle East. On this matter, Deutsch writes: "even if some of the prospective partner countries [in a security community] find themselves on the opposite sides in some larger international conflict, they conduct themselves so as to

[227] Email from Kristofer Bergh to author (19 September 2013).
[228] Ibid, the work is in progress.

keep actual mutual hostilities and damage to a minimum–or else refuse to fight each other altogether"[229]

In the end of this section, the author would like to refer to the article of Exner-Pirot, *Defence diplomacy in the Arctic*, where she analyses the 2011 Search and Rescue Agreement as a confidence building measure. Historically security matters were excluded from the Arctic Council agenda and they have been led through bilateral negotiations and NATO-led discussions. The need for Arctic Cooperation on hard security has been broadly discussed in academic circles but clearly there is some resistance at the political level to address this matter. In this case Search and Rescue Agreement is "conducted or coordinated by branches of armed forces, it's protective, not defensive, nature clearly"[230] symbolises the willingness of the Arctic States to establish a security cooperation and the meeting of defence chiefs and senior commanders of the eight Arctic Countries in 2012 confirms that. Exner-Pirot refers to a term of defence diplomacy which is defined as "the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure as a tool of security and foreign policy."[231] The Search and Rescue Agreement is an instrument to put defence diplomacy in practice. It will, according to Exner-Pirot (1) symbolize a willingness to cooperate and work to overcome differences; (2) introduce transparency into defence relations; (3) reinforce perceptions of sharing common interests; and (4) change mindsets about who or what is a threat.[232]

[229] Karl W. Deutsch, 'Political community and the North Atlantic area; international organization in the light of historical experience' in (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1957) 228.
[230] Heather Exner-Pirot. 'Defence diplomacy in the Arctic: the search and rescue agreement as a confidence builder' (2012) 18(2) Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 195, 197.
[231] ibid.
[232] ibid.

Chapter 4. Security aspects in the Arctic: the potential Role of NATO

In this chapter the author will discuss historical perspectives on the presence of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the current role and status of the Alliance in the Arctic Region. The author will also analyse the new Strategic Concept of NATO from the perspective of the expanded security approach. The author will continue discussion from the previous chapter regarding the perspectives of the Arctic States on the Alliance involvement in the Circumpolar North.

The Arctic as a Geopolitical Pivot

The term "geopolitics" reflects the connection between political powers, national interests, strategic decision-making and geographical space in international relations. Geopolitics is closely related to the political school of "realism", which focuses on the concept that states must pursue their objective interests. The existential threats to their sovereignty are considered of the highest importance.

In the beginning of the 20th century, long before the arms race between East and West started, two American geostrategists, Halford J. Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman, laid the groundwork for the most enduring perspective on the conflict of the century: land power versus sea power. The natural conflict of the landlocked Euroasian Heartland and Western maritime nations became a core geopolitical doctrine in Western strategy regarding the containment of the Soviet Union, which later became a *raison d'être* for NATO.[233]

Traditionally, Northern America is defined as a sea power due to its open and free access to the high seas: to the Pacific Ocean in the West and the Atlantic Ocean in the East, not to mention navy forces. Although the Soviet Union had, and Russia now has, four fleets, it's still a land-based and continental state, since all of its navies would have to overcome considerable geographical barriers to participate fully on the warfare stage. The Black Sea Fleet needs to pass the straits of Bosporus, Dardanelles and later Gibraltar, while the Baltic Sea Fleet needs to pass the Gulf of Finland and the Danish Straits to enter the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. As for the Far East Fleet, it has direct access to the Pacific Ocean, but its remoteness from Moscow's strategic centre should be perceived as a geographical obstacle. The only exception is the Northern Fleet, which is more mobile and faster in any response.

[233] Caitlyn L. Antrim. 'The Next Geographical Pivot. The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-first Century' (2010) 63(3) Naval War College Review 15; Barry Scott Zellen, *Arctic doom, Arctic boom the geopolitics of climate change in the Arctic* (Praeger 2009) 232.

The Heartland theory by Mackinder says that the world is divided into "Inner", "Outer Crescents" and the "World-Island", with "Heartland" in its centre. Even though geographically this area has been shifting a little bit on the map, traditionally this theoretical concept includes Russian Siberia, which is rich in hydrocarbons and minerals. Mackinder postulates: "[He] who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; [he] who rules the World-Island controls the world."[234]

As for Spykman's "Rimland", it describes the maritime fringe of the World-Island as a key to control the whole Eurasian continent. Rimland as a geographical line has also been continuously moving and changing frontier. Today it is the Arctic that is often called the last frontier. To some extent, Mackinder's dictum was reformulated into the following:[235] "He who controls Heartland, controls Rimland; he who controls Rimland controls the world."

Even though none of geostrategists addressed the Arctic region directly, it was mostly due to its geographical remoteness and harsh climate conditions, the ice-covered Arctic Ocean being perceived as a natural containment wall. Nevertheless, Spykman addressed the crucial role of the port of Murmansk as the eastern terminus for supplies from the western allies in World War II, as well as the establishment of the Soviet Northern Fleet in 1933 and the growing importance of sea routes linking ports along the Eurasian Arctic coast to the Soviet Union. Nowadays the Heartland and Rimland doctrines are being adapted to the diversification of state and non-state actors in international relations, the widening of securitisation issues, as well as climate change.

Looking at the map of sea ice extent initiated by the US National Snow and Ice Data Centre, we can see how fast the Arctic Region with the thawing icecap is turning into a coastal Rimland, through with the relative strategic insignificance of an Outer Crescent. On the other hand, looking at the same map, it is possible to approach the Arctic more like an Inner Crescent region enclosed in the Heartland, though still far away because of its enduring ice and cold climate. Thus, the Arctic is "outer" in spirit but "inner" in geographical continuity.[236]

The following table represents levels of awareness regarding main Arctic issues and the thawing icecap in the Arctic:

	Conflict	Dilemma of common aversion	Dilemma of common interest	Cooperation
Territorial jurisdiction	X			

[234] Halford John Mackinder, *The geographical pivot of history* (Royal Geographical Society 1969) 298-321.
[235] Caitlyn L. Antrim, 'The Next Geographical Pivot. The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-first Century , vol 63 (2010) 15.
[236] ibid.

Military activity		X		
Energy resources		X		
Shipping			X	
Fishing			X	
Environmental issues				X

Table 2.The problem structure in various Arctic issue areas[237]

The area North of the Arctic Circle has an estimated 90 billion barrels of undiscovered, technically recoverable oil, 1,670 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of technically recoverable natural gas liquids in 25 geologically defined areas thought to have potential for petroleum. These resources account for about 22 percent of the undiscovered, technically recoverable resources in the world. The Arctic accounts for about 13 percent of the undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the undiscovered natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural gas liquids in the world. About 84 percent of the estimated resources are expected to occur offshore. More than 70 percent of the undiscovered natural gas is estimated to occur in three provinces: the West Siberian Basin, the East Barents Basins, and Arctic Alaska.[238] Technically recoverable resources are those resources that can be extracted using currently available technology and industry practices. In addition to that, there should count in significant deposits of gold, lead, copper, silver, zinc, tin, iron and diamonds that are experiencing strong market demand and can be important for the future developments in the High North.[239] Apart from hydrocarbons and mineral recourses, there is also an opportunity to utilise alternative wind and river flow energy sources. Not to mention Arctic sea waters rich in market-valuable fish stocks and sea fruits. Moreover, trans-Arctic navigation can contribute a lot to the economy of a state, which is able to change the world trade routes. To sum up, Heartland together with the attached icy sea of the Arctic are perceived as "an immense reservoir of resources" of all kinds. Today the world's leading economies are looking at the High North, its opportunities and challenges.

As Oran R. Young described there are two major ways to discuss policy making in the Arctic Region. One characterised by geopolitics and political realism,[240] and the other by ecosystem-based management and spatial planning, which describes the Arctic as a complex and dynamic socio-ecological system. He discusses that in the first one the competition for

[237] Dag Harald Claes, Øyvind Østerud and Øistein Harsem. 'The New Geopolitics of the High North' (51st ISA Convention New Orleans 18 February 2010).
[238] U.S. Geological Survey, *Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle* (U.S. Department of the Interior 2008).
[239] Lassi Heininen and Chris Southcott, *Globalization and the circumpolar North* (University of Alaska Press 2010) 221-265.
[240] Oran R. Young. 'Arctic Governance - Pathways to the Future' (2010) 1(2) Arctic Review on Law and Politics 164.

natural resources is what drives the remilitarisation of the region and creates political tensions in the Arctic. In the other there's a different case, the focus is on soft security arising from interdependence between humans and the environment. It has been proved that global warming is stimulated by anthropogenic impact and at the same time it opens up new economic opportunities. Young described the first way as a "re-emergence of a new Brzezinski's "*Grand Chessboard*" and war for resources, but it is important to note that high demand in energy resources is rooted in economies not necessarily situated in the Arctic, which makes the whole situation more complex. If the first approach is characterised by selfishness of the states the second approach is its complete opposite, as it calls for a more comprehensive understanding of the region as a whole, not separated by national borders or interests. It calls for deeper international cooperation as the only way to mitigate the challenges of the climate change and upcoming economic development. So it is very important to understand which of these two ways is a starting point in policy making. In reality, neither of these two ways will be on top, and in the end the decision making process will be based on the debate between these two discourses.

The role of NATO in historic perspective

If we look at the Arctic map, we will see 8 Arctic Council member-states and 5 of which founding members of the Alliance: USA, Canada, Denmark (Greenland and the Faroes), Iceland and Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty, which brought NATO, the political, but mostly military, alliance, into existence in 1949. The bedrock of the organisation and the establishing treaty is Article 5, confirming mutual solidarity and protection:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."[241]

[241] North Atlantic Treaty (adopted 4 April 1949,entered into force 24 August 1949).

NATO as such has been present in the Arctic since its establishment and now it is the only intergovernmental organisation and security community in the High North.[242] NATO remains to be a forum where Europe and North America organise their collective defence, and it remains one of the key actors through which they do crisis management and cooperative security. It means that hard military security will still retain its importance in the Circumpolar North in the foreseeable future. The question is how will the Alliance define and respond to new security challenges?

Historically, being a border region, the Arctic has experienced a heavy military presence as a measure to endorse and control the state's sovereignty and national borders. Being one of the warfare stage in World War II, the Arctic demonstrated its strategic importance having lease convoys transported from the USA along Icelandic and Norwegian coastlines to Murmansk and Archangelsk in Russia. After World War II, political system competition gave *carte blanche* to a bipolar model of world politics. NATO and the then-Soviet Union became immediate neighbours sharing a territorial border with Norway in the West and a marine border with Alaska in the East. The shortest air route between the USA and the USSR was, and still is, across the Arctic Ocean. Thick polar pack ice was and is a perfect screen for submerged submarines. The ambient noise of the pack and marginal ice was and is severely limiting for any acoustic tracking. Naval vessels as a major counter-measure to submarines efforts were and are unable to operate and patrol the icy Arctic waters. These environmental conditions shaped and still shape the strategic importance of the region from a military security perspective. These geographical opportunities were vigorously exploited by the military. During the Cold War the Arctic had been characterised by heavy militarisation and development in offensive/defensive systems. The geopolitical competition was based on possibility of nuclear exchange over the Arctic Ocean, as in practice it involved an arms race of intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers[243] deployed over the Arctic airspace, while nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) plied up in North Atlantic and Arctic waters.[244]

The Early Warning System installed on the territory of NATO parties in the 1950s could serve as another example. It included 26 radar stations comprising the Aleutians (Adak), Point Lay in Alaska, Cape Dyer on Baffin Island in Canada, plus a chain formed by

[242] Lassi Heininen and Chris Southcott, 'Globalization and the circumpolar North' (University of Alaska Press 2010) 221-265.
[243] ibid 221-265.
[244] Jørgen Taagholt and Jens Claus Hansen, *Greenland: security perspectives* (Arctic Research Consortium of the United States 2001) 36.

the Faroe Islands, Greenland (Thule, Søndre Strømfjord, Kulusuk, Qaqqatoqaq, Andissoq and two more on the Ice cap), Iceland, as well as Rockville in England, Fylingdales and Vardø in Norway. In 1958 the North American Aerospace Defence Agreement (NORAD) was signed by the USA and Canada in order to monitor the airspace and aerospace above North America, including the Arctic, to provide warning and possible response to threatening nuclear activities. Later in the 1980s the DEW line was upgraded to the North Warning System. The DEW line in Greenland was decommissioned, whilst Søndre Strømfjord station was evacuated, and then replaced in the late 1980s, as well as Rockville in the early 1990s.[245]

Thus, traditional defence and territorial security were on the highest priority during the Cold War period. A game of cat-and-mouse between NATO and the Soviet Union unfolded. The Arctic States that were also NATO members participated in a web of numerous national, bilateral and multilateral defence agreements, and not always strictly within the NATO milieu only. For example, the Thule airbase project was based on a secret agreement between the USA and Denmark in 1953.

But there was also another model of behaviour among Arctic NATO member-states: I would like to bring the focus to the Norwegian perspective on relations with the Soviet Union. Norway was the only country that had an actual territorial border with the Soviets and due to its geographical proximity, the northern territories of Norway became a concentration area of electronic surveillance and intelligence directed towards the Soviets strait soon after Norway joined NATO. Nevertheless, the tensions between the two states, such as maritime disputes in the Barents Sea and the status of waters around the Svalbard/Spitsbergen archipelago, were kept at a low level. The key-reason was the remoteness of the Arctic from the major political frontline of the Eastern opposition to the West. The USA/NATO strongly believed in the idea that the concrete military threat was located in central Europe, presumably in the form of a conventional attack from the East. Norway was considered as vulnerable and a "forgotten flank of NATO" dispensable to Soviet exposure.[246]

The way the Norwegians perceived the threat from the Soviets in the North was with no doubt more sensitive and more serious than the attitude of the Alliance in general, especially during the outbreak of Korean and Afghani wars in the early 1950s and late 1970s respectively. The invasion in Afghanistan particularly sharpened the Norwegian perception of threat, because Afghanistan and Norway were both neighbour countries of the Soviet Union. By joining and contributing to NATO, Norway had sought security in the common lap of the

[245] ibid 36.
[246] Olav Riste, *Norway's foreign relations: a history* (Universitetsforlaget 2001) 230.

allies, and crucially, under the American nuclear umbrella. Yet it is interesting that at the same time Norway introduced the following restrictions to its membership in the Alliance:

1. Refusal to station allied forces on the Norwegian territory, or the so-called "base policy";
2. Refusal to store nuclear warheads or building missile bases on its soil;
3. Ban on foreign vessels calling at Norwegian ports with nuclear armaments onboard;
4. Establishing a "no-go" area of 250 km from the Soviet border for NATO forces, for example, aircrafts or warships.

The explanation of such a line was a clear understanding among Norwegian authorities that the co-operation and membership in NATO could be interpreted as provocative by then existing Soviet Union. Moreover, all NATO installations, airports and other intelligence and surveillance infrastructures located on the Norwegian territory could become a potential target for the Soviet nuclear and conventional arms. That is why Norway limited its integration to the Alliance by self-imposed restraints applied during peacetime "as long as Norway is not attacked or threatened with the aggression."[247]

NATO's strategic concepts during the Cold War

The emergence of nuclear-armed long-distance strategic missiles as the main Cold War weapon made offensive military installations located geographically close to the adversary largely redundant. Although NATO has been in the Arctic since its establishment, it took decades for the Alliance to enter the region from this strategic point of view.

First of all, the geographical perception of where the North was, got relocated to higher latitudes only around the end of the 1960s. The "northern flank" was associated with the southern part of the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Baltic Sea and its straits. The area was considered to be a potential attack corridor in a Central European Front, i.e. the main potential theatre of the Cold War for the central organisation of NATO. At the same time, Scandinavia was a buffer between transatlantic Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and the Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula. Moreover, it served as a barrier for the Soviets to access temperate waters, whilst the bases located there could be used most effectively for counter-offensive operations due to favourable geographical conditions for detection and early

[247] Fredrik Fagertun. 'Threats and Threat Scenarios in the North during the Cold War' (2003) 20(1) Acta Borealia 75-90.

warning installations. That is why the headquarters of the northern flank had already been placed in Oslo in 1951.

Second of all, the shift in perception of strategic posture of the region took place also in the late 1960s. Being just a tactical flank of the Central Front the High North turned into a possible independent theatre of war. This evolution in approach followed several specific political events in international relations that boosted or, on the contrary, hampered the strategic reorientation.

From the beginning, one of NATO's pillars was to have large conventional forces easily available along its central borders. However, European member-states, economically exhausted after World War II, could not afford their maintenance. Besides, nuclear weapons of mass destruction had been actively developing at that time, both in numbers and scale. Thus, it became a cheaper and more effective alternative to balance the rising military numerical and material capacity of the Soviet Union, which leaped forward also in rocket technology. Therefore, NATO officially adopted its strategy of Massive Retaliation by the end of 1956, as of the Military Committee document MC 14/2.[248]

However, soon after the Cuban missile crisis, controversies detonated over the very rationality of the nuclear policy as a security strategy. Being on the verge of the nuclear exchange, US president John F. Kennedy introduced a new doctrine of Flexible Response, which was a new strategy for both the United States and NATO. It primarily made a stake on limited conventional war; it also suggested a nuclear exchange on condition that conventional forces should fail. However, Kennedy's assassination in 1963 hampered discussions on implementing Flexible Response in the Alliance's strategy until late 1967.

There was another attempt to shift a solid NATO's strategy of Massive Retaliation by the Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) which became increasingly aware of the Soviet naval build-up in the Barents Sea after World War II, while the general circles of NATO had hardly had these developments on the agenda in the early 1960s. In 1965, SACLANT issued two maritime studies called "Contingency Study for Northern Norway" and the "NATO Maritime Strategy". It highlighted how the Soviets were focusing on the use of the open seas as a theatre of war as the submarine fleet became capable of a strategic strike while remaining undetected. To be able to counter-balance this power, the studies suggested two new concepts, that is, standing naval forces and maritime contingency forces, which would be more of a flexible counter-power relying on nuclear attack as a very last measure. The three

[248] Gjert Lage Dyndal. 'How the High North became central in NATO strategy: revelations from the NATO Archives' (2011) 34(4) The Journal of strategic studies 557-585.

stages of response were then developed. The "Direct Defence" was about seeking out the enemy to defeat him at a conventional level. Had it failed, "Deliberate Escalation" would start. At this level, tactical nuclear weapons were to be used to force the attacker to cease the conflict and withdraw from NATO territory. Finally, the last resort was to go to a "General Nuclear Response."[249]

These suggestions were shelved, though, until the Brosio Study was published in 1969. The document was named after NATO's Secretary-General, who was strongly supporting SACLANT's views and initiatives. The main focuses of the research were: firstly, the relative strength of the maritime forces of the NATO members and the Warsaw Pact; secondly, an analysis of their respective maritime strategic doctrines; thirdly and most importantly, it included only one main scenario of military clash, which was of naval powers in and around the Norwegian Sea. At the same time, the relations between the two blocks turned towards the policy of *détente*, relaxation, as the US withdrew a considerable part of their contingents in Europe in order to reach positive agreements with Soviet Union with regards to Vietnam. Thus, an alternative area of power accumulation seemed needed.

As a result, the high Arctic waters became of strategic importance and at the heart of the Alliance's attention. The region was no longer viewed as just a subordinate tactical flank of the European Central Front, but an independent theatre of war. By the late 1960s, NATO had dramatically altered its perceptions on the strategic importance of the High North and the Brosio Study remained remarkably topical in the NATO's strategy till the end of the Cold War.

At the turn of a century

The collapse of the Soviet Union and, accordingly, the end of the Cold War changed significantly the political atmosphere in the Arctic Region. The Circumpolar North experienced a demilitarisation process due to both political and economic reasons, but nowadays NATO's presence is visible once more, for example, the Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS), including fighters on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) and regular AWAC airborne early-warning fights and military exercises.[250] It could be argued that, being the only intergovernmental organisation and security community up in the North, NATO has some qualifications to undertake the dialogue on military security matter. The question is whether the Alliance is capable to implement them without endangering stability and

[249] ibid 585.
[250] Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, *Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?* (NDS Forum Papers, NATO Defense College 2009) 1-12.

prosperity in the Arctic Region with regard to relations with Russia, which is very sensitive to any NATO activity.

In the beginning of 90s it was interesting to observe that the NATO continued to exist as a security organisation, although the major external threat withered away. According to Risse-Kappen the institution's survival was founded upon a set of democratic and liberal values. On the other hand, Williams and Neumann's analysis of NATO enlargement (2000) suggested that enlargement was driven by an exercise of symbolic power rather than democratic values.

Nevertheless, relations with NATO countries experienced a crucial transformation over recent decades. In 1991 formal cooperation between Russia and NATO started within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994 Russia joined the Partnership for Peace programme. In 1997 NATO-Russia relations were institutionalised in a Permanent Joint Council forum, which evolved in the Russia–NATO council created in 2002 for handling security issues and joint projects.[251] A number of issues identified after 2002 by the NATO–Russia Council as suitable to be addressed jointly are particularly relevant to the Arctic. These include the struggle against terrorism, counter-narcotics, airspace management, military-to-military cooperation, submarine-crew search and rescue, crisis management, logistics and civil emergencies.

At the same time, there were also political shifts in other dimensions of the High North: Finland initiated its Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Norway introduced the idea of the Barents Region Cooperation in 1993, and with the Canadian initiative the Arctic Council was established in order "to promote cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States."

But the most important thing was that most military installations and units were either reduced or dismantled in the region. Nevertheless, shaping the Arctic coastline as an arena to play "nuclear muscles" during the Cold War has brought long-lasting effects. NATO–Russian relations are still characterised as strained due to many factors originated outside of the Arctic context: possible enlargement of the Alliance, the Georgian crises, the Syrian question, etc. Nowadays Arctic coastal states are continuing maintenance of military facilities, conventional and nuclear, albeit reduced in numbers, such as: navies, submarines, air forces, radar system, new weapon testing, military applications, training and exercises and

[251] 'NATO-Russia Council' <http://www.nato-russia-council.info/en/about> accessed 10 October 2012.

intelligence strategies making the world move as though by inertia.[252] It seems likely that NATO will remain engaged in the Arctic for a very long time.[253]

However, the major geo-strategic significance context changed too. There is no more the risk of a larger interstate conflict between two military blocks that was in place during the Cold War. Nowadays, the Arctic is politically stable, surrounded by states with robust governmental systems and there are relatively harmonious relations between these states.[254]

In the 21st century, the strategic importance of the region is defined by its untapped economic potential: offshore and onshore hydrocarbons exploitation and to be more specific, by energy security.

So far the major political framework on NATO's role in the Arctic Region is very modest and limited to conferences and meetings. For example, the Chairman's conclusions at the NATO Conference on "Security Prospects in the High North", held at Reykjavik, Iceland, in January 2009 and the seminar of NATO's Parliamentary Assembly entitled "Changes in the High North: Implications for NATO and Beyond", held in Tromsø, Norway, in June 2011. But NATO's concern about regional security in the Arctic is growing.

The following issues were addressed during both roundtables: the increased attention paid to Arctic development strategies; emerging opportunities and challenges of northern economies; navigation, energy and mineral explorations; as well as claims on continental shelf and existing institutional and legal framework. The question of energy security is particularly an important one for the Alliance, a point agreed in 2008 during the NATO summit at Bucharest. With increasing Arctic oil and gas production north of Norway and Russia, and continued exploration above Canada and the United States, the Arctic is an obvious location to exercise that mandate.[255]

NATO's Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer acknowledged in his 2009 speech in Iceland that increasing accessibility will lead to more human activity in the region, with positive and negative consequences, and highlighted "what is very clear is that the High North is going to require even more of the Alliance's attention in the coming years."[256] Alliance spokesman James Appathurai labelled the Arctic "a region of enduring strategic

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[252] Lassi Heininen and Chris Southcott, 'Globalization and the circumpolar North' (University of Alaska Press 2010) 221-265.
[253] Rob Huebert and others, *Climate change & international security: The Arctic as a Bellwether* (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2012) 21.
[254] Kjetil Skogrand, 'The Arctic in a geo-strategic perspective' in Kjetil Skogrand (ed), *Emerging from the Frost. Security in the 21st century Arctic* (Oslo Files on Defence and Security, Institutt For Forsvarsstudier 2008) 9-17.
[255] Rob Huebert and others, 'Climate change & international security: The Arctic as a Bellwether' (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2012) 21.
[256] J. D. H. Scheffer. 'NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on Security Prospects in the High North' (2011) <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinion_50077.htm> accessed 28 November 2011.

interest to NATO and allied security."[257] By 2010 the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation had issued a report calling for "proactive engagement" and cited increasing desire from within the alliance's Arctic members (particularly Norway, Denmark and Iceland) for increased attention to the region**.**

The international role of the Circumpolar North is shifting, as well as security matters in the region. Security in the Arctic is not about state-centric traditional security only. Driven by climate change, it is beyond a fear-based, military-as-solution conception.[258] It involves many actors and "soft" issues. Unsurprisingly, the Alliance's perspective on security is also gradually changing. Since 2001, NATO has reframed its entire concept of security. The Alliance's operational agenda has shifted towards dealing with non-traditional, transnational threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation and weak states.[259] At the Lisbon Summit held in November 2010, the 6th Strategic Concept in NATO's sixty-year-long history was adopted**.** The official document outlines NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, therefore acknowledging the comprehensive and extensive approach towards contemporary understanding of security: "Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches",[260] such as, *inter alia*, "the key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations."[261]

The Strategic Concept also specifies the core tasks of the Alliance:

1. **The collective defence** principle establishes obligation of assistance among member states in case of attack according to the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
2. **The crisis management** principle refers to the conflict situations that have the potential to affect the Alliance's security. It includes political, civil and military instruments to manage and prevent crises from escalation; to stop ongoing conflicts

[257] James Appathurai. 'NATO weekly press briefing' (2009) <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090114a.html> accessed 29 October 2011.
[258] Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv. 'Security by any other name: negative security, positive security, and a multi-actor security approach' (2012) 38(04) Review of International Studies 835-859.
[259] Alyson J. K. Bailes. 'NATO and the EU in the north: what is at stake in current strategy development?' (2010) 2010(23) Lithuanian foreign policy review 8-28.
[260] Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (adopted in 2010) para 5.
[261] ibid para 15.

where they affect Alliance security; and to restore and maintain stability after a conflict.

3. **The collective security** principle means engagement in international security affairs, through partnership with countries and international organisations; contribution to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament issues; and promoting membership in the organisation.[262]

Another innovation outlined in the Strategic Concept is the fact that the Alliance is characterised not only by military nature, but also special identity "based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law"[263] In other words, NATO perceives itself as a military organisation providing democracy and the western model of governance by military means. It aims at establishing rule-based international order through value-based partnership. Does it mean that the Alliance can "be friends" only with the countries that have a certain set of democratic norms?

Generally, Russia and NATO have different perspectives on security, nature of threats and risks in the Euro Atlantic Region. In Russia-NATO dialogue, Russia is more willing to discuss hard security matters with the use of military force and the monopoly of a state to provide the security because in this perspective Russia perceives itself as an equal partner to NATO's member-states. According to A. Sergunin expanded understanding of security and value-based partnership undermines Russian position. Moreover, A. Sergunin writes that during the *travaux préparatoires* the experts working on Strategic Concept included such non-military tasks as democratic consolidation, stabilisation of weak and fragile states, strengthening good governance, preventing genocide and other humanitarian catastrophes, protection of maritime transportation and energy transit, etc. [264] In sum, its Strategic Concept equips the Alliance for security challenges and guides its future political and military development. A new Strategic Concept is reflecting an evolving security environment and an evolving Alliance. But is NATO capable indeed to adequately respond to emerging security issues? Climate change, energy scarcity, global economic and financial governance, the role of the emerging powers, are these threats, entailing the use of military force or rather political action? Such matters as energy security, cyber-security, or even terrorism, are not best tackled by a holistic foreign and security policy, including police and justice dimensions,

[262] ibid para 15.
[263] ibid para 38.
[264] Alexander A. Sergunin and Andrei Makarychev. 'Rasmussen: NATO i Rossia: bolshe ne predstavlyaut ugrozy drug dlya druga. [Rasmussen: NATO and Russia are not a threat to each other anymore] (2011) (1) Sovremennaya Evropa 5.

within which the military instrument is a very last resort? Once one starts to add other types of contingencies than an armed attack, such as energy or cyber-security, a grey zone quickly emerges, making it more difficult to decide what constitutes sufficient ground to invoke Article 5.[265] The diversification of the comprehensive approach towards security by NATO is also reflected in 2011 Maritime Strategy, to which all 28 member states also agreed. It says: "Climatic changes pose new opportunities and challenges, which may, inter alia, allow new and economically attractive sea routes, as well as improved access to resources. The maintenance of freedom of navigation, sea-based trade routes, critical infrastructure, energy flows, protection of marine resources and environmental safety are all in Allies' security interests."[266]

It is no secret that NATO is expanding its territorial borders to the Middle East and South-East Asia, referring to the fact that in today's globalised world the borders and sovereignty do not matter that much for states with the political system in crisis. Moreover, the Strategic Concept says "Crises and conflicts beyond NATO's borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises..."[267] that means that the organisation does not associate itself with geography only, but also with population, which is mobile. That can lead to uncontrolled territorial expansion.

It is true, that the word *Arctic* was used neither in the 2010 Strategic Concept nor the 2012 Chicago NATO summit declaration. So far, the official position of the Alliance regarding its strategic role in the High North was pronounced by Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on 29 May 2013: "At this present time, NATO has no intention of raising its presence and activities in the High North... Tensions in the region, and the potential for disputes over sovereign rights to the region's estimated vast oil and natural gas resources, could be best handled through dialogue...The Arctic is a harsh environment. It rewards cooperation, not confrontation. I trust we'll continue to see cooperation."[268]

Partly, it was made due to the fact, that there is no consensus within the Alliance if NATO has any role to play in the Arctic. While Norway is fully supportive of the Alliance's commitment, Canada strongly opposes any NATO involvement on sovereignty grounds. At

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[265] Sven Biscop. 'From Lisbon to Lisbon: squaring the circle of EU and NATO future roles.' (2011) 16 Egmont Security Policy Brief 3.
[266] Alliance Maritime Strategy (adopted in March 2011) para 5.
[267] NATO, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (adopted in 2010) para 20.
[268] Gerard O'Dwyer. 'NATO Rejects Direct Arctic Presence' (2013) <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130529/DEFREG/305290022/NATO-Rejects-Direct-Arctic-Presence> accessed 29 May 2013.

the same time, although Arctic nations follow some kind of an individualistic approach when building their national strategies, still they recognise the Alliance as a backbone of its security and defence. Sovereignty and national security are among the strategic priorities, or priority areas of the United States, Canada, and Denmark,[269] NATO is appreciated as an instrument to sustain the regional stability that serves the countries' political and even economic interests in the Arctic. More detailed discourse on this matter is represented in the previous chapter. Another motive of this statement is the awareness of the likely negative reactions from the Russian side. Most certainly, the complicated history with NATO does not help Russian suspicion over the organization's possible participation in the Region. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov affirmed: "The situation in the Arctic is not complicated from the point of view of military units, which are not there (though some of our partners are trying to invite NATO)…We object to that. We believe that such a move would be a very bad signal to the militarization of the Arctic, even if NATO wants to just go there and get comfortable. Militarisation of the Arctic should be avoided by all possible means."[270] During the Barents Summit 3-4 June 2013 in Kirkenes (Norway) Russia's Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned: "Any expansion of NATO to include Sweden and Finland would upset the balance of power and force Russia to respond."[271]

The idea of closer cooperation between Sweden, Finland and NATO is met with disapproval in Russia, NORDECO and other steps of the Nordic states towards security cooperation causes the same reaction. For example, in 2011 five Nordic States accepted a declaration of solidarity, based on Stoltenberg's recommendations and that, much like article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty:

"Should a Nordic country be affected, the others will, upon request from that country, assist with relevant means. The intensified Nordic cooperation will be undertaken fully in line with each country's security and defence policy and complement existing European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation."[272] Even though, the declaration did not include the militarily binding guarantees that Stoltenberg asked for.

Another Stoltenberg's recommendation suggested Finland and Sweden to enter into an agreement on data exchange with NATO's air defence system and in longer term to

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[269] Lassi Heininen, *Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study* (The Northern Research Forum & The University of Lapland 2011) 72.
[270] 'NATO is not going to expand its military presence in the Arctic' (2013) <http://news.mail.ru/politics/13022929/> accessed 8 May 2013.
[271] Igor Alexeev. 'Russia's Arctic, NATO and Norway: a post- Kirkenes political landscape' (2013) <http://barentsobserver.com/en/opinion/2013/06/russias-arctic-nato-and-norway-post-kirkenes-political-landscape-18-06> accessed 18 June 2013.
[272] The Nordic declaration on solidarity (adopted 5 April 2011).

integrate into NATO's infrastructure for air surveillance (radars, command and control infrastructure).[273]

Regardless of the recent statement of the Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on NATO's current involvement in the Arctic Region, Russian academic literature generally agrees that absence of "intention of raising ... [NATO's] presence and activities" does not mean that this intention will not appear in the future. Some of the experts see the Alliance as a military-political organisation, competing with such security-guarantors as UNO, EU, OSCE, Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Council in a security providing role in the Region. Particularly, Arctic Council is already addressing such biggest soft security challenges in its binding agreements on SAR and Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. Others say that it is challenging for NATO to exercise an effective policy specifically designed for the Arctic. First of all, due to financial constraints and lack of infrastructure, secondly, because of internal disagreement on, and finally, because NATO is commonly used as an instrument to implement foreign policy of certain member-states rather than the whole Euro-Atlantic community and for them the Arctic region pales into insignificance comparing to Middle East, for example.[274]

Another important component of the Russian perspective on Alliance presence in the region is NATO's deployment of anti-ballistic missile system, encompassing sea areas in the Northern Europe. The project called "European Phased Adaptive Approach" was initiated in 2009 by the US administration and adopted in 2010 on the Lisbon Summit. Its purpose is "to protect NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles."[275]

Its time frame consists of 4 phases that included deployment of a land-based radar and existing Aegis BMD-capable ships in to the Mediterranean by 2011; deployment of the ballistic missile defence interceptor site in Romania by 2015; deployment of interceptor in Poland by 2018; and deploy the interceptor to counter medium- and intermediate-range missiles and potential future ICBM threats to the United States from the Middle East.[276] Given the fact that the system is already paired with the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons by the U.S. and NATO conventional forward-based arms, generally it is perceived

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[273] Thorvald Stoltenberg, *Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy* (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009) 11.

[274] Alexander A. Sergunin and V. N. Konishev, *The Arctic in International Politics: cooperation or competition? [Арктика в международной политике: сотрудничество или соперничество?]* (Russian Institute of Strategic Studies 2011)133-134.

[275] Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. 'United States European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and NATO Missile Defense' (2011) <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/162447.html> accessed October 2013.

[276] ibid.

as a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation,[277] especially because of Washington´s refuse to provide legal guarantees that the system will not be directed against it. The European Phased Adaptive Approach is viewed as a threat to strategic nuclear potential as it reduces the deterrent capability. It is not a surprise that all the military exercises taken place in the Euro-Arctic region cause irritation in Moscow. Kozin V. explains it by the fact that all NATO exercises have been held too close to the Russian borders on one hand, and that the number of the military personnel is dramatically increasing as it is shown in the graph below, on the other.

[277] V. P. Koval and D. N. Lyzhin. 'Geopoliticheskie interesy gosudarstv v Arctike. [Geostrategic interests of the states in the Arctic]' (2013) <http://www.riss.ru/index.php/analitika/2064-geopoliticheskie-interesy-gosudarstv-v-arktike#.Uk2kLyRd_WZ> accessed October 2013.



Table 3. Increased number of personnel in military exercises in the Euro Arctic Region[278]

Another important thing that Kozin V. writes about concerns the fact that search and rescue trainings are commonly camouflaging exercises aimed at controlling of the airspace and mining of the sea areas.[279]

Nuclear Containment in the Arctic

When the Cold War was over, the Iron Curtain fell down together with the Berlin Wall. Both were borders dividing politically and ideologically the world into a capitalist West and a communist East. That division vanished and "the end of History" was claimed to have come about. The Arctic ice cap that used to be a geographical factor of containment used to separate two nuclear superpowers. Now this natural border is rapidly melting away, opening an area that is rich in resources and opportunities. None of the states wears a status of a superpower anymore; nevertheless, nuclear potential remains the same and is still there. The new Strategic Concept of NATO says: "as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance."[280] So, probably as Nye suggests, perhaps the end of the Cold War has heralded not so much the "end of history" as the "return to history".[281]

The process of restraining from nuclear armaments started with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 1968/1970 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty of

[278] V. Kozin. 'Kluchevye problemy ukreplenia bezopasnosti v evroarkticheskom regione [Key problems in the security building in the Euro-Arctic Region]' (2013) <http://www.riss.ru/index.php/analitika/1762-klyuchevye-problemy-ukrepleniya-bezopasnosti-v-evroarkticheskom-regione#.Uk2mIiRd_Wb> accessed October 2013.
[279] V. Kozin. 'Territoria dialoga ili protovostoyaniya?. [Territory od dialogue or conflict?]' (2013) <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/2011-07-25-15-55-34/item/9039-territoriya-dialoga-ili-protivostoyaniya> accessed October 2013.
[280] NATO,Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (adopted in 2010) para 5.
[281] Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding international conflicts: an introduction to theory and history* (Pearson Longman 2007) 247.

1996/2007. But the world entered the 21st century still nuclear-armed, although the numerical amount of these weapons in general has decreased. However, it should be said that nowadays the military industrial sector is aimed not at the quantity but at the quality of production.



US and Soviet Union/Russia nuclear forces *between 1960-2010. All estimates are approximate.*[282]

The nuclear weapon arsenals of Russia and the USA are by far the largest, one result has been that the total number of nuclear weapons in the world has been declining. Since the end of the Cold War, more and more warheads in the US and Russian stockpiles have been moved from operational status to various reserve, inactive, or contingency categories. The major milestones were bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) signed in 1991, 1993 and 2010. However traditionally, arms control agreements have not only failed to require the destruction of warheads, but have also ignored both nonstrategic and non-deployed warheads. The new START continues this trend Both countries continue to modernize or upgrade their nuclear arsenals, and nuclear weapons remain integral to their conception of national security.[283]

Today the Russian Northern Fleet possesses 22 nuclear-powered submarines, 7 of which carry ballistic missile nuclear warheads, and 1 aircraft carrier. The marine aviation has around 100 aircrafts, including 30 missile carrying bombers. The USA have 25 multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines and 6 strategic submarines that make together around 580 nuclear warheads, plus 4 aircraft carriers with 360 aircrafts. The allied forces of the UK and

[282] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris. 'Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2013' (2013) 69(5) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75.
[283] ibid 77.

France can add 4 SSBMs each (350-450 warheads) to the marine strategic forces and 15 nuclear-powered submarines and 6 aircraft-carriers with 200 aircrafts.[284]

The main factor that prevents the states to use their nuclear weapons is a concept of mutual nuclear containment and strategic stability inherited from the Cold War era. The concept of strategic stability means a balance of military forces. A first nuclear attack from any side would be tactically impossible, because it could not prevent the adequate response from the other side. The paradox of mutual nuclear containment is that this security concept does not respond to any contemporary problems such as international terrorism or trans-border organised crime. It is absolutely ineffective in halting the production and trade of other weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear containment does not promote the military cooperation either, for example in ballistic missile defence.

Still, the Senate of the US, in its Resolution Of Advice And Consent To Ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 2010, mentioned the following: "policies based on mutual assured destruction or intentional vulnerability can be contrary to the safety and security of both countries, and the United States and the Russian Federation share a common interest in moving cooperatively as soon as possible away from a strategic relationship based on mutual assured destruction."[285]

Irrespective to what is mentioned above, the concept of mutual nuclear containment is still shaping defensive capacity and weapon-based security. And new military installations or facilities hosted by any region in the Northern Hemisphere can be a threat to nuclear containment. This issue has a vital importance for the High North due to the geographical proximity of the states. Critical situations in the Arctic might directly influence the military relations between Russia and NATO on a global scale. For example, one of the latest events in international politics was the Russian counter-measures announced in November 2011 by the Russian president concerning the European missile defence shield being shaped in Europe by NATO. For the Russians, establishing ABM facilities close to its borders constitutes a threat to the current military strategic balance.

The Arctic community is aware of new nuclear arm race. Environmental degradation on Novaya Zemlya because of nuclear testing, or the crash of a nuclear bomb carrier in Thule are not the only examples. At the same time it is important to say that although all military technological developments took place during the Cold War, it does not mean that they do

[284] A. G. Arbatov, 'Arctika I Strategicheskaya Stabilnost [The Arctic and the Strategic Stability]' in A. V. Zagorskii (ed), *Arktika Zona Mira I Sotrudnichestva [The Arctic as Zone of Peace and Cooperation]* (Institute of World Economy and International Relations Russian Academy of Science 2011) 59-75.
[285] Senate, *Text Of Resolution of Advise and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty* (2010).

not impact the region today. The decreased military tensions and reduced military facilities on global level brought some results in arms control but at the same time there has been no real nuclear disarmament, either within or dealing with the Circumpolar North.[286]

Nowadays, discussions on security matters take place bilaterally in less institutionalised milieus. But institutionalisation of such dialogues and the opening up of discussions regarding possible routes to collective security and non-proliferation[287] could have far more positive effects on regional security. There is a clear correlation between such a high degree of institutionalisation and a low or declining level of violence both within and between states.[288] Simply avoiding talking about difficult developments in power politics might not be the best approach to the Arctic peace project. Talking about military security does not in itself produce negative outcomes. While all NATO member-states have been actively developing their national strategies for the Arctic development, for the moment the Alliance itself performed in relatively modest way. However, as security organisation it follows the major trend of evolution of the security *per se* by expanding its programme agenda with non-military threats.

Nevertheless, the idea to involve NATO in the Arctic agenda as a forum for discussion has been introduced already in the aforementioned Reykjavik seminar. It could include itself several additional dimensions of dialogue: with Sweden and Finland, for instance, with Russia, and probably with China.[289] Secondly, it could become a platform to address civil emergencies and large-scale search and rescue operations,[290] ecological relief and maritime security issues conjointly with Russia in the NRC framework. Perhaps, the fact the Alliance has reflected in the Strategic Concept the comprehensive/expended approach to understanding security, and thus, implying the possibility of introduction on new tasks is a major finding of this thesis. However, it is important to say a few words about NATO's post-Cold War survival. There is an opinion that despite the disappearance of the main threat and, thus, the resoin d'etre, a set of democratic, liberal values provided the institution's survival.[291] On the contrary, Williams and Neumann's analysis of NATO enlargement (2000)

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[286] Lassi Heininen and Chris Southcott, 'Globalization and the circumpolar North' (University of Alaska Press 2010) 233.
[287] Annika Bergman Rosamond, *Perspectives on Security in the Arctic Area* (Danish Institute for International Studies 2011) 35.
[288] Alyson J. K. Bailes. 'Potential Roles of NATO and the EU in High Northern Security' (2010) 2(201) The Yearbook of Polar Law, 201-224.
[289] Alyson J. K. Bailes, 'Options For Closer Cooperation in the High North: What is Needed?' in Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor (eds), *Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?*(NDS Forum Papers, NATO Defense College 2009) 28-58.
[290] ibid-58.
[291] Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO.' in Peter Katzenstein (ed), *Culture of National Security* (Columbia University Press 1996) 357.

suggested that enlargement was an exercise of symbolic power rather than a liberal, security community project driven by universal democratic values.

Thirdly, NATO could exercise a *détente* policy, or relaxation of tensions with an adversary in the Arctic, such as the renewal of arms control or disarmament.[292]

Finally, in an age of sequestration and shrinking defence budgets, NATO members have little choice but to work together to tackle contemporary security challenges and to promote domain awareness along the coastlines of the member-states.

The Arctic Region has a history of great military strain between two political alliances, i.e. NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but it should be said that today the Arctic is transforming into a territory of dialogue. While scientists and especially environmentalists are investigating primarily negative consequences of climate change, politicians issue countries' strategies to adjust to the new reality and benefit from global-warming impacts. The speech by Danish Minister of Defence Søren Gade at the 2009 NATO seminar on "Security Prospects in the High North" included the following motto: "From yesterday's problems to tomorrow's opportunities."[293]

On the other hand, it is becoming clear that in terms of military security both global warming and the thawing icecap make the rear of all Arctic states insecure. Not only because the geographical ice-wall is diminishing, but also because new resources and economic facilities are opening up and attracting global stakeholders. The key to the military strategic balance of mutual nuclear containment is turning out to be out of date. It cannot respond adequately and effectively to the security challenges of the 21st century. It cannot prevent such problems as international terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass distraction. On the contrary, very often it appears to be a stimulating factor of these challenges. What is more, mutual nuclear containment does not promote a cooperative spirit among the Arctic countries as much as the environment, civilian or topics related to economic development would sometimes do.

The NATO parties and Russia can hardly become full military partners in the nearest future, perhaps unless they redirect their potential against extremist violence, including terrorist activities. Furthermore, nuclear weapons play no useful role in the challenges of the

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[292] Alyson J. K. Bailes, 'Options For Closer Cooperation in the High North: What is Needed?' in Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor (eds), *Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?* (NDS Forum Papers, NATO Defense College 2009) 28-58.

[293] S. Gade. 'Minister of Defence of Denmark. Speech at the Seminar on Security Prospects in the High North, Reykjavik, Iceland' (2010) <http://www.fmn.dk/gamlesites/Ministeren/Taler%20og%20artikler/Documents/2009/TaleIsland29januar.pd> accessed October 2011.

rapidly evolving Arctic itself. But even if it's unlikely that military confrontation would occur between states in the Arctic, there is always the possibility of trouble erupting elsewhere, and the after-effect of a spillover. Conflict in one region may lead to escalating tensions and confrontation elsewhere, including the Arctic, either deliberately or through miscalculation. The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia served as a reminder of latent tensions and put a strain on relations between Russia and NATO. This conflict also made the neighbouring Nordic counties review their defence positioning, although, perhaps in an indirect way.[294] For example, Norwegian defence policy notes the speed at which conflicts can arise and the "renewed tendencies by great powers to establish spheres of influence." Accordingly, it recommends taking, "a balanced approach with regard to the attention which should be directed at international terrorism and intra-state conflicts in relation to interstate conflicts."[295] Finnish Defence and Security Policy mentions that "the possibility of change in the security situation of our neighbouring areas cannot be excluded, nor can the possibility of armed aggression or the threat thereof.[296]

As the Arctic security community would include several states with global reach interests one cannot disregard the impact of developments outside of the Arctic as well. In the Arctic, states are demonstrating their best commitment to cooperation and dialogue, but this characteristic does not always fully represent the overall relationships which might be complicated. Even if the Arctic states have not been in conflict with each other since the Cold War they disagree on a number of important international security issues such as how to deal with the development in Syria and potential Iranian nuclear weapons.[297]

The current geopolitical threat level is nebulous and low. The conclusion of the "Geopolitics in the High North" research programme was that there is no race in the Arctic. But remilitarisation of the High North must be prevented. Every now and then we read in newspapers about the increase of military forces or establishing another military. Incidents between claimants due to the fact that several states claim maritime zones in the Arctic that are expected to contain extensive natural resources does give some reasons for concern, including for unexpected incidents between claimants. In this respect conclusions of the SIPRI Background paper on military capabilities in the Arctic sound in due time: "in order to help mitigate negative perceptions about security policies in the region as well as the possibility of misunderstandings, the Arctic littoral states need to be clear about their military

[294] David Rudd. 'Northern Europe's Arctic Defence Agenda' (2010) 12(3) Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 45, 48.
[295] Capable Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces (adopted November 2009).
[296] Finnish Security and Defence Policy (adopted in 2009).
[297] Email from Kristofer Bergh to author (19 September 2013).

policies, doctrines and operational rules and should include military confidence-building measures in their bilateral or multilateral relations associated with the Arctic."[298]

For example, "High North – low tension" is the dictum that the Norwegian Arctic policy promotes.[299] There is enough room for cooperation on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and more comprehensive and holistic approaches to security. Rather than preparing for battle, the Arctic states should commit themselves towards increasing diplomatic resources, harmonising regulations, multilateral efforts to deal with nuclear waste, scientific cooperation, economic integration and search and rescue.

[298] Siemon T. Wezeman, 'Military Capabilities in the Arctic' , *SIPRI Background Paper* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2012), 14.
[299] J. G. Støre. 'Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway. Keynote address at NATO Parliamentary Assembly The 77th Rose-Roth Seminar: Changes in the High North: Implications for NATO and Beyond, Tromsø, Norway' (2011) <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/utenriksministeren/2011/nato_tromso.html?id=648681> accessed December 2011.

Conclusion

Using a policy-analysis methodology, this thesis has studied the theoretical shift of security paradigm as well as its empirical implication in the Arctic Strategies and defence policies as well as the NATO Strategic Concept. The study attempted to provide a multi-dimensional and multi-perspective discussion, comparing and contrasting the main themes and interests in the Arctic Region. It assumes that these documents represent a significant insight into the intentions of states, and thus roadmaps which states are expected to follow. Of course, some of the factors are subject to change such as political and economic capacity to act as well as the implementation of priorities. But the state interests as a whole will remain and endure.

Seen in a larger context, nowadays the security in the Circumpolar North has become multidimensional: from the traditional notion of security to human, environmental and energy and other dimensions of security. And generally this trend is well reflected in the national strategies and defence policies of the Arctic states. Thus, soft issues have been securitized, which means that these problems gained an above average political consideration and were moved up to the national and even in some cases the international level. Interests and priorities have been redefined, civil-military relations have been taken to a new level. But what is more important, cross-border relations are now oriented towards cooperation, not ideological antagonism.[300] But, it should be taken into consideration that, despite there are no *fundamental* differences in the respective Arctic Strategies in the way they approach security, there are still differences in understanding it and its new challenges.

Security in the Arctic is also characterized by two contradicting features: on one hand, there is less political tension, less military presence and fewer military activities in comparison with Cold War times. It is a comparatively stable and peaceful region. But at the same time, the region is still of strategic military importance to some actors within the area, as this is an area where nuclear weapons are deployed.[301] Also, Russia and the United States have a clear focus on hard security and it can be seen as a reason to advocate their maintenance of nuclear deterrence capabilities. These two states directly relate their respective strategies to defense. This kind of threat perception has a lot in common with the Cold War times. Other Arctic Coastal States link their strategies to the promotion of sovereignty and presence and correlate such issues as natural resources and shipping lanes to

[300] Kristian Åtland. 'The European Arctic in Soviet and Russian Security Policy 1987-2007.' (Philosophiae Doctor University of Tromso 2009) 187.
[301] Lassi Heininen, *Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study* (The Northern Research Forum & The University of Lapland 2011), 240.

new objects of security. An introduction of an expanded security agenda with less emphasize on military matters is a slow process, and it is even slower when it comes to implementation of the soft-security policies.[302] The Arctic Coastal states choose sovereignty as a main agenda and they relate sovereignty to the prospect of new resource discoveries. In the cases of Finland, Sweden and Iceland we can observe the strong emphasis on absence of any immediate threat to their sovereignty or national security. Instead, they believe soft security matters, that is human and environmental security, are matters of greater importance.

Another conclusion is that the institutionalisation of Arctic Security is fragmented. Furthermore, within the current geopolitical discourse there may be a polarity between how states participate in institutionalized cooperation, and that of their underlying, fundamental interests.

In this discourse the involvement of NATO in the Arctic Region in short-term is a closed question. Geographically, the Alliance is in the area via its Arctic-member states. But politically the pace of involvement has stopped, due to the preoccupation with other regions such as Middle East and North Africa. At the same time, the study revealed that the NATO Strategic Concept is undergoing similar transformation as the national policies of the Arctic States. It reflects comprehensive/expended approach to understanding security, and thus, implying the possibility of introduction of new tasks. In addition, it should be remembered that in some cases the Arctic Region is not always the most prioritised area for policy-makers in the bilateral relations with the other states. That is why the fact that NATO has expressed its Arctic ambitions in a very modest way can be seen as proof to its preoccupation with the Middle East and North African regions in the first place. In longer term the role of organisation remains to be seen. However, for now it is only possible to say that Norway with the support of the other Nordic states (although, voices of the latter are more mute) is pushing for the formalised role of the Alliance in the High North. In case of the USA, several administrations have reaffirmed that NATO is and should remain a foundational pillar of the Arctic's security architecture.[303] Canada appears to have one of the most individualistic visions of its role in the Region, rejecting any possible involvement of the Alliance on sovereignty grounds. In Russia the idea of NATO's involvement, even on soft security matters, is met with strong resistance, that also refers to closer cooperation between Sweden,

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[302] Ole Andreas Lindeman. 'Norwegian foreign policy in the High North International cooperation and the relations to Russia' (2009) 1 Oslo Files on Defence and Security 81; Nikita Lomagin, 'Forming a New Security Identity in Modern Russia' in Jakob et al Hedenskog (ed), *Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin* (Routledge 2005) 257-277.

[303] J. B. Steinberg. 'Arctic region will be next international strategic challenge' <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20387/us_deputy_secretary _of_state.html>.

Finland and NATO and between all Nordic states in frames of NORDECO. Thus, the paradigm shift from hard to soft security, outlined in the 1st chapter of the thesis is far from being complete. Moreover, there's still a long way to go to complete the formation of a security community. Instead, there is a more visible division between the Russian, North-American and Nordic sub-communities.

Understanding the dynamics of security-related policy-making for the Arctic States and for NATO is an important part of understanding the future of the Arctic region. This comparative analysis has focused on trying to identify and outline the main factors contributing to the process of future changes within the region's political structure.

The Arctic is an area in which military security, economic security, and environmental security overlap. In fact, it is an example of a postmodern arena of world politics, where short-term national interests clash with long-term global objectives. The question is whether the national interests can be reined in so that they will not jeopardise the overriding global objective, i.e. the maintenance of security and stability in the Arctic.[304]

[304] Pauli Järvenpää and Tomas Ries, 'The Rise of the Arctic on the Global Stage' in James Kraska (ed), *Arctic security in an age of climate change* (Cambridge University Press 2013) 129-144.

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