A Border Dilemma in a Nordic Context

Danish and Swedish discourses on the reintroduction of border control amid influx of displaced persons

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Lokaverkefni til MA-gráðu í alþjóðasamskiptum

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HÁSKÓLI ÍSLANDS

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Útdráttur

Í kjölfar Arabíska vorsins hafa milljónir manna neyðst til að flýja heimkynni sín og margir freistuðu þess að ná til Norðurlandanna, þar sem lönd líkt og Svíþjóð eru þekkt fyrir góðar móttökur fyrir flóttafólk og hælisleitendur. Gífurlegur fjöldi fólks á flótta hélt til Svíþjóðar en þar var ákveðið í kjölfarið að innleiða hertar aðgerðir í formi landamæraeftirlits, þrátt fyrir að vera innan Schengen svæðisins sem stærir sig af því að halda landamærum sínum opnum. Nokkrum tímum síðar tóku yfirvöld Danmerkur upp svipaðar aðgerðir á landamærum sínum við Þýskaland. Tilgangur þessa ritgerðar er að bera saman orðræðu frá Danmörku og Svíþjóð þegar kemur að þessum tímabundnu landamæraaðgerðum, en megin tilgangur þeirra var að verða við auknum fjölda flóttafólks og hælisleitanda. Það verður gert með því að greina orðræðu sem birtist í fréttamiðlum á síðasta ársfjórðungi 2015 og heild yfir árið 2016. Helstu skólar öryggisfræðanna verða kannaðir, ásamt því að orðræða verður greind í gegnum þrjú megin þemu: aukið álag á kerfið, innra öryggi og gildi landanna. Helstu niðurstöður sýna að stjórnvöld í Svíþjóð óttuðust mest að kerfið þeirra gæti ekki orðið við áframhaldandi fjölgun fólks á flótta og gæti á endanum brostið. Í Danmörku birtist mun róttækari orðræða og vildu stjórnvöld þar í landi, yfir höfuð, ekki sjá hælisleitendur og flóttafólk enda þar.

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, millions of people became displaced, and many had their eyes set on the Nordic region, where countries like Sweden have been known for their welcoming attitudes and generous benefits for refugees and asylum seekers. With an unprecedented flow of people wishing to enter, however, Sweden turned to drastic measures and reintroduced border control within the Schengen area, an otherwise passport-free zone. Within hours, authorities in Denmark decided to do the same with their borders to Germany. The aim of this thesis is to compare discourses from Denmark and Sweden regarding the temporary reintroduction of border control in the last quarter of 2015 and throughout 2016, which was purposed to stem the flow of refugees and asylum seekers. The discourses examined will be those presented in popular media during that timeframe. The discourse analysis will be centered on three main themes: pressure on the system, internal security and values. The main schools of security studies will additionally be evaluated in order to provide a crucial context to the situation. The primary findings of this study are, within Swedish discourse, a general fear of system collapse if there was another protracted increase in displaced persons seeking refuge there, and in Denmark, an unwillingness to accept refugees and asylum seekers at all.

Preface

This thesis was written as the final assignment in the M.A. program International Affairs within the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Iceland. It accounts for 30 ECTS credits and was written under the supervision of Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir, Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Iceland in the spring of 2017.

While watching the news one night in November 2015, a particular story caught my attention: Sweden, a country known for its openness and generous policies toward refugees and asylum seekers, was introducing stricter border control in response to the massive flow of displaced persons into the country. Denmark quickly followed suit, although this was not such a surprise, as they had not demonstrated a similarly welcoming stance on the matter. At that precise moment, I knew I wanted to explore why this turn of events had occurred, and thus, the inspiration for my thesis was born.

I would like to thank my supervisor Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir for her valued assistance, support, professional supervision and critique during this writing process. I also want to thank my parents, Herdís and Jóhann, and my siblings, Vala Margrét and Birkir Orri, for their encouragements and support, along with their patience and belief in me. I would lastly like to thank all of my dear friends and family members who gave me support and wise words during the time of my writing.

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"The idea that some lives matter less is the root of all that is wrong with the world"

– Paul Farmer, anthropologist and humanitarian

1 Introduction

The international migration of individuals is at an all time high. Many move willingly, seeking new opportunities and carrying with them hopes for a better life, while others are forced to migrate because of hostile environments. This thesis will focus on the latter category, those millions of people that have been forced to flee and seek shelter outside their home country. The displacement of persons is by no means a novel happening, but the definitions of 'refugees' and 'asylum seekers' have only come into being at the midpoint of the 20th century. These are now defined groups with certain rights and host countries, the countries to which these displaced persons go to, typically have a responsibility to provide them with protection and resources. Many states, however, fail to do so; the violation of international rules and regulations with respect to displaced persons has thus become commonplace.

With increased numbers of displaced persons reaching the European continent in 2015, mostly deriving from the Middle East and North Africa, the mass movement of people started to become known in the media as the European refugee crisis or the European migration crisis. This thesis will refer to the crisis as the European refugee crisis, with the notion that many are also asylum seekers, but it has put an immense pressure on national borders of a number of European countries.

In early 2016, Swedish authorities decided to reintroduce border control on their borders with Denmark, most notably on the Öresund Bridge that connects the two countries. Some softer measures had been applied in the last quarter of 2015 but this decision came as a shock to many, where Sweden had previously been known for its welcoming attitudes toward refugees and asylum seekers. Denmark subsequently increased controls on their borders with Germany, only a couple of hours after the measures were introduced in Sweden. These increased border measures were maintained for the entirety of 2016, despite having been introduced as 'exceptional temporary measures'. Both countries are within the Schengen Agreement, an open border treaty that prohibits the reintroductions of border control such as these, except in emergency situations.

The welfare systems of the Nordic countries are renowned and the countries had therefore become a desired destination for many displaced persons, especially Sweden. As a result, Sweden saw far greater numbers of persons seeking refuge in their country than ever before. Denmark also saw increased numbers from previous years, although these were markedly lower than Sweden.

1.1. Purpose and Research Questions

In order to understand the justification for this reintroduction of border controls, the discourse in the media concerning the particular cases in Sweden and Denmark will be analyzed. The research methods will be mixed: a discourse analysis will be used primarily, and subsequently a comparative case study, in order to compare the results of this analysis in the Swedish and Danish contexts. This research is based on the main schools of security studies, the Copenhagen School, the Paris School and the Aberystwyth School, along with the concept of 'human security'. Most of the attention will be placed on the Copenhagen School and the concept of securitization, but the other schools also provide important grounds for discussion. Border treaties such as the Schengen Agreement will be evaluated in order to provide crucial context to the reintroduction of border controls within an open border treaty. Additional focus will be placed on 'refugees' and 'asylum seekers', where the two terms will be defined and analyzed. A comprehensive background of the countries in question, Denmark and Sweden, will also be laid out, along with a brief explanation of similar procedures in the other Nordic countries: Finland, Norway and Iceland. The main research question that I seek to answer is the following:

> *What distinguishes the discourses of Denmark and Sweden concerning the reintroduction of border control amidst the influx of displaced persons in 2015 and 2016?*

In order to better grapple with the question above, I have proposed the following three questions, which serve as three hypotheses for what could be most frequently mentioned in the discourse of the two countries:

1. Can the reintroduction of border control be explained by the *pressure on the system* in Denmark and Sweden?
2. Can the reintroduction of border control be explained by the *threat to internal security* in Denmark and Sweden?

3. Can the reintroduction of border control be explained by the *threat to values* in Denmark and Sweden?

These hypotheses are reflective of my own reading and understanding of the situation, and serve strictly to assist the dissection of the primary research question, with the biases inherent to these supplementary questions acknowledged. To clarify the three questions above, the *pressure on the systems* refers to the systems in the countries regarding displaced persons, along with services that provide vital resources for these groups. *Internal security* refers to the threat of terror attacks or related crimes within the countries, in this context, derived from displaced persons. Finally, the *increased threat to values* refers to the theoretical risk that displaced persons, with various religious and cultural backgrounds, pose to the host community on a cultural level. In addition to these three questions, an intentional effort was made to source discourses opposing the measures from the non-elite, along with discourses from the displaced persons.

1.2. Overview and Structure of Thesis

The structure of the essay will be as follows: chapter 2 will provide the theoretical framework, which includes the introduction of security studies and Critical Security Studies, before exploring the main schools of security: The Copenhagen School, The Aberystwyth School, and the concept of human security, and finally the Paris School, followed by summarizing remarks concerning these differing schools. These will lay the ground for the analysis and discussion later in the thesis. Chapter 3 includes the methods used in this thesis, along with other key elements such as the research design, limitations and data collection.

Chapter 4 will serve as the main platform for defining displaced persons, firstly asylum seekers and then refugees, along with the rules, regulations and systems relating to these two terms. Chapter 5 will explain the mechanisms of the Schengen Agreements and discuss previous challenges it has experienced in order to give context to the current challenges. The chapter will then look more closely at the background of Sweden and Denmark, before giving brief examples of similar measures from the other Nordic countries: Finland, Norway and Iceland. The final subsection of the chapter will outline the case this thesis focuses on, the

reintroduction of border control in Denmark and Sweden, and will provide a timeline of the events, along with any other appropriate details, before concluding remarks are made.

Chapter 6 will outline the main findings from the media articles I made use of, and is organized into subsections, each summarizing the findings of the three supplementary questions I posed in chapter 1.1. with a fourth section that contains additional findings. Chapter 7 serves primarily for a discussion of the two cases of Sweden and Denmark and a theoretical context will be added. Finally, a conclusion of the thesis will be laid out, before ending with the bibliography and an appendix detailing the news articles used.

2 Theoretical Framework

This chapter examines different schools and theories within security studies in order to provide a general overview, along with the main defining themes, concepts, contributors and critiques of these schools. The chapter starts by exploring what the discipline of security studies entails and then examines the narrower area of Critical Security Studies. After giving background to these, the Copenhagen School and the concept of securitization will be illustrated, along with highlighting the school's main components, scholars and critique. The chapter then turns to the Aberystwyth School, also known as the Welsh School, and its importance on emancipation, or the freeing of the individual. In association with the importance of individual security, the following section then examines the human security approach. Finally, the Paris School will be outlined, along with its focus on the institutional practice of security, before ending in concluding remarks.

The discipline of international relations is deeply rooted in various theories that share the aim of explaining how the international system works. In order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the topic in question, it is important to first explore the theoretical orientation of the subject. The concept of security is a complex one, but it plays a major role in international relations, and will be crucial for this thesis. The first things that come to mind when thinking of security are often militaristic and material securities but in the reality of today's world, many new threats have appeared on the security spectrum, threatening not only the state but also the individual, society and other defined groups. The security landscape of the international system is constantly changing, and it is therefore imperative to continue to study current approaches and scholarship.

2.1. Security Studies and Critical Security Studies

Security studies are an ever-growing field within international relations, and have thus seen an evolution of definitions. Stephen Walt, in the early 1990s, offered his interpretation that security studies were: "the study of threat, use and control of military force" (Walt 1991, 212). This definition was generally respected and upheld until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s that concluded in a manner that

contemporary theories of security studies had not accounted for. It became evident that the importance of military force, was, and continues to be, an important aspect of security, along with that of state and national security. The realist theory of international relations has long been dominant in security studies, where states have to rely on their own defenses because of the anarchic structure of the international system (Dunne et al. 2013, 79). The importance of their military capabilities is also crucial in situations where cooperation is difficult, and self-help is similarly integral because of the lack of higher authority. As this chapter will illustrate, however, alternative understandings of 'security' that incorporate more aspects than just brute militaristic force, and give attention to other factors than just the state, have gained much momentum since the 1990s.

The field of security studies started to undergo notable changes after the publication of Barry Buzan's book, *People, States and Fear*, in the mid-1980s. Buzan argues significantly for the security of other factors than just the state (Williams 2008, 4). These ideas began to gain real ground in the early 1990s when other scholars started to acknowledge the relevance of moving the center of security away from the state, granting non-state actors more weight. Buzan also pointed out how the notion of security could be manipulated for use as a political tool, giving priority and attention to certain issues over others (Buzan 1991, 370); once an issue was declared a matter of security, it became more likely that it would be dealt with at all, and would likely be done so much more rapidly. Where an issue is not seen as a threat, conversely, it might not be able to garner the attention that it possibly needs.

There has been an increasing importance and urgency in defining new security threats as an important aspect of security studies and adopting new ways of combating them. It can therefore be seen that security studies have been moving further away from the narrow state-centric view to a much broader understanding of security, which will be demonstrated with an examination of Critical Security Studies.

The study of Critical Security Studies (CSS) is a discipline that explores security matters beyond the traditional and the material approaches to security. CSS gained much ground at the end of the Cold War and increasingly attempts to explain the

evolution of security in the 21st century. Security is, as has been noted, a broad concept, and CSS thus makes efforts to highlight issues that might not have previously been afforded attention. This 'deepening' and 'broadening' of security is a critical part of CSS, where the former goes beyond the militaristic sphere, while the latter looks past the state and affords attention to individuals or groups (Vaughan-Williams 2010, 5). This has given more room to areas previously ignored in the study of security, such as aid and development, migration, and transnational terrorism (Vaughan-Williams 2010, 2).

According to CSS, traditional security methods are becoming increasingly inadequate in responding to different facets of security, most prominently political, economic and environmental issues. These issues regularly suffer from a lack of understanding regarding the links between the relevant actors, and precisely what the referent object is, meaning, who or what has to be secured. Traditional security studies generally place the state as the referent object of security, or the component being threatened, but CSS, as has been noted, has moved away from a state-centric focus, and can extend the referent object to that of the individual or defined groups. This allows a subtle depiction of the role of the state itself, where it can in fact be the creator of domestic insecurity, rather than just the victim: the decision-making process of the state might not always benefit the civilians living within the state or other actors, such as displaced persons seeking protection from within (Fierke 2015, 15).

Critical Security Studies, as with security studies, can be very political in nature, where they explore the relationship between security theory and the broader political order and are therefore fundamentally intertwined. It can therefore be difficult to separate our ideas about how politics should, or could, work with matters of security (Nunes 2012, 347). Security is ultimately about the experiences of real people in real places, and models of security can therefore always be challenged and eventually transformed when new situations arise (Nunes 2012, 352). CSS, with its depiction of the state and its move away from state-centric security studies, arguably brings us closer to the reality of security practices in the world today, and it is for this reason that its body of knowledge will be more thoroughly explored.

The following subsections will introduce the main schools of Critical Security Studies, along with the concept of human security. The main orientation of the schools and contributors will be put forth, along with the varied critique they have received.

2.2. The Copenhagen School and Securitization

The Copenhagen School has become an increasingly important school of thinking within the studies of critical security. The school of thought originated in Copenhagen, Denmark, in the 1990s, from the ideas of scholars Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver who were associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). The body of knowledge pioneered a more subtle view of security studies, but the changes and developments of the school will be detailed below, alongside its particular relevance for discourse analysis and, therefore, its importance for this thesis.

To understand the Copenhagen School of thinking, one needs to first understand the term 'securitization' as it is a fundamental facet of this school. The term was first coined in Wævers 1989 paper *Security the Speech Act: Analyzing the Politics of a Word* (Wæver 1989). In this paper, Wæver sets out to "re-think the concept of security" (Wæver 1989, 1), a core tenet of CSS. Securitization as a concept was then built upon in wider scholarship, for example in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda* (Buzan et al. 1993), and formed one of the main cornerstones of the book, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis* (Buzan et al. 1998). Since the 1990s, securitization has been a key thought that continues to be referred to, developed and interacted with. Securitization, according to Buzan and Wæver, is defined as:

> The discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 491).

This can be understood more simply as a process of extreme politicization in the name of security, whereby such politicization allows then for radical measures. In order to successfully 'securitize' an issue, a number of steps must be followed: the

first is the identification of a proposed threat in order for a specific actor to take action. The threat has to be something that has both priority and urgency to it, where it is necessary to be solved as soon as possible, and is considered an otherwise unacceptable situation if it is not dealt with. The second step is to implement the emergency action, which is the application of measures to combat the threat. The final step is often seen as *breaking free of rules*, such as using measures that do not correspond with international agreements or rules (Buzan et al. 1998, 26).

Once an issue has been successfully securitized, the appropriate measures to curb the threat can be taken by government actors, policy makers or other elites, where the actor is commonly someone who has authority within a certain group (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 214). It is usually the case, however, that in order to accomplish the final step, to break free of the rules, one must have relevant representatives in positions of power who are capable of operating in ways that ordinary actors are not (Wæver 1995, 55). It is therefore evident that some groups are in a superior situation to both complete these three steps of securitization and then to subsequently act on the issue too, while other groups encounter more difficulties or might simply be incapable of securitizing.

Discourse is a naturally important part of this process and becomes a crucial tool when analyzing why certain issues become a security concern, while others do not. Wæver mentions how securitization theory could be called the "collective theory of political speech acts" (Wæver 2015, 122), and argues that it has a potential relevance that reaches far beyond just security studies. Wæver also views the concept of security negatively, or as: "a failure to deal with issues of normal politics" (Buzan et al. 1998, 29) and therefore, prefers a process of desecuritization or where an issue that has been securitized returns back into the normal sector of politics and is no longer considered a threat. He does, however, mention how desecuritization is not always the answer, where concrete situations might actually call for securitization (Williams 2011, 459). He acknowledges that some issues are real threats and should therefore be securitized, while on the other hand, there are issues that have become securitized that should not be considered matters of security at all.

It is crucial to understand the context of securitization, but Buzan calls for an examination of: "who securitizes, on what issues, for whom, why, with what result and under what conditions" (Buzan et al. 1998, 32). Thus, there are a great many factors that demand investigation when one examines the securitization of an issue and many components that might be attached to this process. When one comes to define these factors, there can also be interpretative differences among different actors, where one might for example define an entity as a threat, where others do not.

The political speech act, the securitizing actors and the audience all play a central role in the securitizing act. The securitizing actor has to convince the audience that the issue in question is a real threat and uses the speech act as the means to do so. Common actors include political leaders, lobbyists, governments, pressure groups and bureaucracies. The position of the securitizing actor, both socially and with respect to power structures, can be important in successfully justifying the securitization of an issue; Buzan mentions that: "security is very much a structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power to define security" (Buzan et al 1998, 31), and it is this process of definition that is crucial to securitization.

Audience acceptance is vital for the securitization process, where the issue in question can only be securitized if the audience accepts it as a threat (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). The securitizing actor also has to have justification for why such an action is necessary. Michael Williams emphasizes this claim, where the speech act is not only a discursive exchange between the audience and the actor, but also that it: "becomes implicated in a process of justification" (Williams 2003, 522). It is natural to suggest that such justification is a more important element in democratic societies, and would not be as important in authoritarian states where the general populations has little or no say in any matter.

The referent object, that is the factor being threatened, also plays an important role. Examples of referent objects can include the state, an individual, or even concepts such as national identity. The actor who has the intention of securitizing an issue can in theory try to make more of less anything the referent object (Buzan et al. 1998, 36). However, it tends to be most effective when it is greater than the individual because

when the referent is an individual, it is often not taken seriously and is usually left out of the discourse. Didier Bigo supports this claim when he talks about using securitizing actions against certain groups, such as migrants, where he talks about how actors use "the negative securitization of migration is an attempt to reassert their control and political integrity" (Bigo 2002, 70).

Since it was first introduced, the Copenhagen School has seen some critique. Lene Hansen, in her article *The Little Mermaids Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School* brings up the issue of how the school suppresses those who are already vulnerable by focusing mostly on dominant voices (Hansen 2000, 287). In that context, she mentions occasions when insecurity cannot be articulated or spoken. She refers to it as *security as silence* or a where the subject of security has very limited or even no prospect of speaking about the security issue (Hansen 2000, 294). In this sense, an individual, or a group, can be silenced from the discourse. She argues that when the school places the state as the referent object, as it usually does, it ignores individuals and groups who are unable to take part in the security speech and contribute to the discourse.

Rita Floyd agrees with Hansen where she argues that the Copenhagen School is unable to advocate a change in the lives of the most disadvantaged groups. She talks about how securitization is a very state-centric approach, and highlights a disparity in Wæver's writing when it comes to the role of the state. He talks about how security belongs to the state in his 1995 publication, *Securitization and Desecuritization,* but only three years later in 1998 he argues for the incorporation of other referent objects of security, including the individual. Floyd states, however, that what changed was not his opinion, but rather the practice of security (Floyd 2007, 41). Floyd mentions that despite the individual being mentioned, the state is usually the securitizing actor, as it is the only actor with the capabilities to make securitization happen. Wæver has a preference for desecuritization but Floyd does not believe in that possibility and argues that it is: "one-sided and ultimately limited" (Floyd 2007, 44). She also mentions that while security experts analyze *how* actors securitize, more importance should be put on the *why*, because, "their intentions can indicate the potential outcome of a securitizing move" (Floyd 2007a, 337).

Matt McDonald argues that the conceptual framework of securitization is problematic in three senses. First, he notes that the speaker is usually a political leader, which gives little room for speech acts or other forms of representation. Second, the context of the issue is important to the moment of the intervention, where the potential for construction of security over time is often ignored. Finally, the nature of the act is defined only as a threat to security and ignores how security is understood in particular contexts (McDonald 2008, 564). McDonald also wonders when an issue becomes a security issue, arguing that it could possibly be after a successful speech act, when the audience accepts the issue as a threat through the discourse presented, or when the exceptional measures are finally put in place (McDonald 2008, 575).

Jef Huysmans criticizes the Copenhagen School for being arguably too Eurocentric, suggesting that: "the school's work seems to be fundamentally anchored in European security dynamics" (Huysmans 1998, 483), and might not necessarily be applicable beyond that. He argues that the school has to further its understanding of security from the classic European and American understanding of the term, especially if its logic is being applied outside of the region. Holger Stritzel similarly argues that the theories do not seem to be well grounded enough in the experiences of the real world, suggesting, for example, that the speech act is rarely sufficient by itself, and will at best "only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it" (Stritzel 2007, 377).

The Copenhagen School's main emphasis, then, is on the speech act of a particular actor and the subsequent audience acceptance of it, along with the process of securitization. The school has advanced since it was first introduced and will likely continue to do so as new security issues arise and the structure of the security landscape changes, in addition to likely growing from the wide criticism it has received. The following section explores the Aberystwyth School and its main emphasis on emancipation.

2.3. The Aberystwyth School and Emancipation

The Aberystwyth School, also known as the Welsh School, emerged from the ideas of Jürgen Habermas who mentioned the "the potential for emancipation" in his work *Knowledge and Human Interest* (Habermas 1986, 314). More notable contributors include Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, but they place their primary emphasis on this idea of emancipation, with the Aberystwyth School arguing that sustainable peace cannot be attained without it. The school focuses on the marginalized and voiceless, in order to give opportunities for the emancipation of the defenseless (McDonald 2008, 579).

Booth defines emancipation as: "the freeing of people from those physical and human constrains which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do" (Booth 1991, 319), while Wyn Jones talks about how emancipation is the: "absence of the threat of pain, fear, hunger, and poverty" (Wyn Jones 1999, 26). Booth suggests that security and emancipation are fundamentally intertwined, arguing that one cannot be achieved without the other (Booth 1991, 319). Both Booth and Wyn Jones put a great deal of importance on the individual, and place it at the center of security, unlike many traditional security theories and schools that place most of their emphasis on the state. Traditional theories usually see security measures as being applied when something is threatening to the state and its sovereignty, while the Aberystwyth School believes conversely that the state can in fact be the main provider of insecurity.

The school tries first and foremost to ground its conceptions of security in "real people in real places" (Wyn Jones 1996, 214), for which Wyn Jones gives two explanations: firstly, the individual is an important part of political life, where it serves as the referent object, and secondly, this views is able to then deal with actual insecurities, such as life-determining conditions (Booth 2008, 101). This is where many other theories and concepts go awry where it is suggested that they give too much focus to hypothetical situations.

A world where total emancipation is a possibility is difficult to conceptualize, and arguably runs the risk of venturing too far into hypothetical scenarios. Although the

Aberystwyth School gives some credible points, some aspects of this scholarship have received criticism, primarily concerning the individuality and, similar to the Copenhagen School, the school's western orientation and preoccupation. McDonald underlines the concern of how westernized the school appears to be, noting: "the dangers of forcing others to be free, denying the legitimacy of difference, and imposing values are ultimately western in philosophical origin" (McDonald 2009, 121). It is therefore important to look beyond the western orientation of the school and push the question of how freedom is conceptualized in different parts of the world. With this context, one can then assess how or why emancipation should be the end goal.

Claudia Aradau argues that the usage and definition of the concept of emancipation is conflicting. She says that when the concept is linked to security, it becomes "difficult to envisage social change outside the logic of security" (Aradau 2004, 398). Aradau contends that when a subject is made secure, it would inevitably entail that someone else is made dangerous. She also wonders how one would choose which group the attention should focus on or "on which grounds can one privilege such a construction of security, the security of migrants over the security of racists, the security of HIV-positive people over those at risk of being infected?" (Aradau 2004, 399). Booth tries to answers this critique by stating that emancipation cannot be gained at the expense of others (Booth 1999, 41), but Aradau's central contention is that this would be the reality of such a concept.

The Aberystwyth School, in its pursuit of emancipation, emphasizes individuals as its central argument, instead of locating the state at the center of national and global security concerns. There seems to be growing interest in exploring what role the individual can play in the international system, especially with regard to those who are in vulnerable situations. To explore this notion further, the concept of human security will be laid out in the following section.

2.3.1. Human Security

Human security offers a broader dimension to security than simply ideas of national security and the power of the state. The post-Cold War environment introduced greater emphasis on human rights, along with humanitarian intervention, and shied away from the more traditional state-centric, militaristic landscape. Working from a human security standpoint would arguably be a more multidimensional approach than the two schools mentioned above, as it attempts to include all human life, both in the North and the South hemisphere: employing the concept of human security can thus help to both broaden and deepen the concept of security.

The concept of human security was first introduced in the United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) 'Human Development Report' in 1994 (Newman 2010, 79). There is no formally agreed upon definition of the concept, but the UNDP report describes it as a two-dimensional security or a "freedom from fear and freedom from want" (UNDP 1994, 3). Other definitions focus more on safety from violent threats like poverty, disease and environmental disasters (Owen 2004, 375). In the report, seven main categories were introduced as areas that were most threatening to human security: economic-, food-, health-, environment-, personal-, community- and political security. In relation to the scope of threats, it is stated in the report that, "when human security is under threat anywhere, it can affect people everywhere" (UNDP 1994, 34). This is therefore an approach not confined to borders.

Floyd compares the concept of human security to the approach of the Copenhagen School, acknowledging that the former places greater emphasis on the persistent nature of insecurities to the individual, while the Copenhagen School focuses instead on the action of who is able to securitize an issue, which issues these are, and under what circumstances (Floyd 2007, 39). Floyd argues that a human security approach concerns itself with the identification of existential threats to individuals or groups of individuals (Floyd 2007, 42), while the Copenhagen School focuses on elites and states as the ones capable of securitizing issues. The concept of human security is thus arguably more empowering: it enables individuals to claim dangers that are most threatening to themselves *(*Floyd 2007, 45*)*.

Human security seems to lack a framework of analysis, unlike the other schools of security, and some scholars do not see human security as a theory but rather as a concept. Roland Paris argues that as a concept, it is too imprecise, claiming that the definitions of human security is simultaneously expansive and vague, including matters such as physical security and the emotional well-being of individuals. Paris claims that this does not help inform policymakers, or similar actors, as to what should be prioritized, and it is also thus of limited use to academics in informing what needs to be studied (Paris 2001, 88).

Finally, there is a significant difference of opinion regarding who should be the provider of security for human beings. The provider is usually thought of as a larger entity, such as the society, global institutions or the state, but Buzan questions how any approach or concept can dismiss the role of the state as a provider of security. He argues that states are a "necessary condition for individual security because without the state it is not clear what other agency is to act on behalf of individuals" (Buzan 2001, 589). A human security approach, however, does not disregard the state entirely; it, however, questions its position as the sole provider of security, especially when the state can be the cause of harm against its own population and others, such as refugees and asylum seekers that are rejected entrance to countries.

The Paris School, the final school of security introduced in this thesis, will be outlined below, followed by a summary of this chapter.

2.4. The Paris School and Institutionalized Security

The Paris School is mostly based on the ideas of Didier Bigo, who views security mostly as a construction and an application to various issues and areas trough a dimension of routinized practices (Bigo 2002, 65). He also pioneers a more sociological approach to security measures, mentioning, how:

> Some (in)securitization moves performed by bureaucracies, the media, or private agents are so embedded in routines that they are never discussed and presented as an exception but, on the contrary, as the continuation of routines or institutionalized security (Bigo 2008, 5).

He therefore broadens the concept of security and gives more room for alternative factions of influence when it comes to the securitizing action, especially with regard to procedures that often go unmarked, such as the heavily routinized checking of identification documents at state borders.

The Paris School can be seen as presenting the everyday and repeated institutional method of performing security, giving focus to these routinized actions, rather than the exceptional discourse made by elite groups (Fierke 2015, 125). These procedures are called 'institutional securitization'; to return to the example of a state-border, if a person does not behave in an appropriate manner or is seen as posing a threat, the individual can be denied access. An individual can also be denied access if they fail to produce the appropriate documentation. These security measures are so normalized that individuals in these situations often do not realize that they are even in place. Theses practices, given their otherwise lack of attention in scholarship, can be fruitful to evaluate.

According to Scott Watson, the state is not the sole provider of security: certain activities have been institutionalized and handed over to other administrations that specialize in dealing with these types of security crises "in accordance with norms of intervention based on consensus" (Watson 2011, 12). Practices of surveillance and border controls, for example, are a central part of securitization and are not simply those actions enabled by preceding speech acts, especially if they have always been in place (Bigo 2002, 65). Bigo describes the concept of insecuritization, which can be thought of as the process where government authorities decide to lower the threshold of the accessibility of others. Bigo further explains how: "external threat and internal life are connected through policies over terror and migration" and how the police and border officials use these fears. A wide array of speech acts are blended with a mixture of insecurities that ultimately allow for this movement of practices away from one policy framework to another (Williams 2003, 578).

Bigo further points out how displaced persons have been increasingly interpreted as a security issue. Once they have been securitized, security actors often claim that they are responding to new threats that require extraordinary measures beyond the scope of

everyday politics. He adds that these assumptions are often: “anchored in the fears of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries” (Bigo 2002, 65); the securitization of displaced persons are thus used as a political tool to manipulate supposed unease and in doing so affirm the actor’s role as a provider of protection (Bigo 2002, 65). Bigo supports his claim by noting how sometimes “security creates unwanted side effects towards other groups of people” (Williams 2000, 173).

The Paris School seems to be given less credit than other approaches to security because of its mundane, day-to-day nature and it has naturally then attracted less criticism. This perspective on security, however, is becoming increasingly important, and more awareness to it is required. Its most relevant point is the importance of being critical toward the security measures that are seen as routinized, because they might need reconsideration.

2.5. Summary

The discipline of security studies, within the field of international relations, is rather broad. Critical Security Studies has thus been the starting point to go into greater depth in the field, and to give more concrete explanations of methods that challenge the ideas of traditional security, as well as providing ideas for new approaches. The schools each endeavor to achieve a viable situation of security, whether it is through speech acts that lead to securitization, emancipation, human security or institutional security. Security is at heart a complex and evolving concept, that has already undergone fundamental changes, especially after the end of the Cold War. The chapter has looked a the theoretical notion as it relates to this thesis, and has examined three different schools of thought and an approach founded in the concept of human security, in order to provide a sociological grounding to the discussion that will be held in this thesis. The following chapter will look at the methodological orientation of this thesis.

3 Methodology

In this chapter, the methodology of my thesis will be laid out, along with the research design, structure, data collection and other key elements. The purpose of this study is to compare discourse in Denmark and Sweden regarding the reintroduction of border control on their inner Schengen area, amidst the influx of displaced persons into the countries. This topic was chosen because of an interest in the alleged irony of Sweden's treatment of displaced persons, where they otherwise have fostered welcoming policies. I considered comparing the discourse from all of the Nordic countries but decided a comparison between the cases of Denmark and Sweden, where the two have introduced similar controls on their borders, would be of greatest interest. Norway had also introduced similar border controls, but I, however, decided to focus on the two chosen countries because of their connection through the Öresund Bridge, that will be detailed later. The national attitudes present in these two countries toward the welcoming of displaced persons are also fundamentally different, which gave thus good grounds for comparison. The research and writing process was conducted from January to May 2017.

This thesis will follow a qualitative research design and use discourse analysis as the main method of evaluation, along with a comparative case study as a supplementary method. Discourse analysis is largely based on the works of the French philosopher Michael Foucault but he was interested in the rules and practices that construct relevant statements, and it can therefore be said that he defined discourse as being the "production of knowledge through language" (Hall 2001, 72). Foucault also explained how discourse did not consist only of one statement or text, but could appear across many texts, at any given time. He claimed that discourse was not purely about the 'linguistic' concept, but concerned both language and practice (Hall 2001, 72). Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson poses three questions in his chapter *Searching for contradictions* (e. Leitað að mótsögnum) that the researcher ought to bear in mind when conducting discourse analysis: what did the researcher find that they did not expect? Is something being silenced that the researcher believed to matter? What does that kind of silencing mean? (Jóhannesson 2006, 186). These questions have been of great use in this thesis, particularly with reference to the speech act of the Copenhagen School, that have been made reference to throughout.

Case studies are also widely used in the field of international relations, and they will be valuable here as a comparative tool after a discourse analysis is performed. Robert Yin mentions how the utility of case studies are a great tool when the main research questions are based on "how" or "why" inquiries; the primary question of this thesis can be understood as: *how are the discourses coming out of these countries different?* Yin adds that it is also useful when the researcher has little or no control over the events and the focus of the study is on contemporary events (Yin 2013, 2). Case studies are further used to try to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result (Yin 2013, 14). All of these facets apply to this thesis, and a comparative case study method is therefore an excellent complement to the discourse analysis that will form the foundation of this research. Case studies are not without fault: one of the main criticisms regards an alleged lack of generalizability, and that it is therefore difficult to draw any general conclusion on the results (Flyvbjerg 2006, 221).

When it comes to data collection, this thesis is founded on existing data and sources. These have been primarily sourced from peer-reviewed articles, journals and books, with a special emphasis on the news articles used for the discourse analysis. Sources from organizations and treaties have also been made use of, such as the Schengen Agreement and other official documents from the European Union and relevant organization in Denmark and Sweden. The majority of the sources used were in English and some in Icelandic, where my language skills are most proficient. When available, more emphasis was placed on primary sources, but otherwise secondary sources have been used as a supplement.

This thesis focuses on a specific timeframe: the last quarter of 2015 and the entire year of 2016. The increased border control was first implemented in Sweden in November of 2015 in the form of randomized checks, and complete border checks were then introduced in January 2016 and are ongoing. An update will be given concerning the current situation in the conclusion of this thesis.

The material used for the discourse analysis was 200 news articles, concerning the case in question, that were read and reviewed. It was not problematic to locate

material, but beyond a certain quantity, limitations in the quality of the articles became apparent, and the content of the articles had started to drift. 200 articles were therefore decided as sufficient for this study, especially in light of how recent the events had occurred. When choosing statements and quotes for the discourse analysis, I focused on using statements that appeared over multiple periodicals, but in other incidents I chose accounts that were descriptive of the overall dialogue. It can be of fault that some discourses are left out, but it is my hope that the chosen discourse reflect fairly on the overall findings. Most of the news articles were in English, with a small number in Icelandic, and therefore it can be assumed that they were aimed primarily at non-Swedish or Danish audiences.

This study has comprised of news articles, in an attempt to find a source that was both available to the general public and easily accessible. Ethical issues, such as handling private sources did, therefore, not prevail. No focus has been made on specific newspapers, and this study therefore encompasses a wide variety. A complete list of the news articles used can be found under *Appendix I.* MAXQDA, a qualitative data analysis software, was used to code the articles and the three questions put forth in the introduction were used as codes, along with two others: discourses from the non-elite and discourse from the displaced persons themselves. The first three were used as main codes and the last two were supplementary.

There are various procedures that, as a researcher, I had to be aware of. Bennett and Elman point out that official documents often hold a bias against certain issues, and this has been taken into account when they have been used (Bennett and Elman 2007, 181). My own background can also influence the research, coming from a western country and having preconceived ideas about the world and the issue in question. Having also worked with groups of refugees through the Red Cross in Iceland, it was integral to put my own opinions aside in order not to influence the research. Therefore, I also had to be careful when drawing conclusions, especially because of my preexistent beliefs and natural bias. Some of the limitations to this thesis had to do with language, where a few of the sources were in Danish and Swedish, but the majority of sources I used were in English. It would have been a considerable addition to the thesis if I had been able to interview policymakers and other relevant

actors, along with locals who have been affected by the border controls or the refugees themselves, but this was unfortunately out of my reach at this point in time.

There are multiple studies and reports regarding refugees and asylum seekers, especially concerning the European refugee crisis. However, at the time of writing there did not seem to be any other studies precisely like this one. It is however relevant to mention a brief report called: "Sweden's U-turn on asylum" by Bernd Parusel, an expert at the Swedish Migration Agency, which concerns the change in Sweden's asylum policy (Parusel 2016, 89-90). As for Denmark, a similar short report from Jon Kvist, from the European Social Policy Network, called: "Recent Danish migration and integration policies" provided a brief account on the matter (Kvist 2016). Since this case was very recent at the time of my writing, more detailed research was not available and therefore it is my hope that this research will add some value or significance to this field of scholarship.

The following chapter will define the two core groups of this thesis: asylum seekers and refugees. It will also introduce some of the main agreements and regulations concerning the two groups, and offer other relevant definitions.

4 Defining Displaced Persons

The flow of people from one place to another has reached new heights with advances in transport and technology, and as both a result and product, the world is becoming more globalized than ever before. Many search for a better life by choice, while others have had to leave their homeland involuntarily. In recent history, the mass flow of people who were displaced after the Second World War comes to mind as an obvious example of the latter. Displacement of peoples from their home countries had been a reality for centuries, but it was only around the midpoint of the 20th century that a definition of the concept 'refugee' started to take form, as distinct from simply 'migrating': these were people forced to leave who required protection in a host country. This thesis focuses primarily on refugees and asylum seekers fleeing untenable situations that they cannot return to, and are therefore seeking protection in another state. The term 'refugee' seems to be the dominant concept in relation to the current crisis, but 'asylum seeker' has also begun to gain traction and is more widely mentioned than before, especially in the particular case of this thesis. It is crucial to define these two terms precisely and illustrate the distinction between the two, as different international regulations apply to each, but firstly a description of the broad category of 'migration' will be offered as context.

A migrant can be defined as a person who's incentive to move is largely based on a desire to improve their quality of life or through ambition, such as seeking work or education in another country. The Oxford dictionary defines a migrant as: "a person who moves from one place to another, especially in order to find work or better living conditions" (Oxford dictionary, 2017). Economic reasons are usually the biggest pull factor for migrants, where they relocate to places richer in resources, or where they have better opportunities. A key facet of the term is that the move is voluntary, and not because of threats or fear of death. The migrant is able to return safely back to their country of origin, unlike an asylum seeker or a refugee. If a migrant decides to return, they are normally still under the protection of their home government (UNHCR 2005). The following subsections will go into further details about the main terms used in this thesis concerning displaced persons: asylum seekers and refugees.

4.1. Asylum Seekers

The term ‘asylum seeker’ is commonly confused with refugees and it is thus crucial to make a distinction between the two. The Cambridge Dictionary defines an asylum seeker as:

> Someone who leaves their own country, often for political reasons or because of war, and who travels to another country hoping that the government will protect them and allow them to live there (Cambridge Dictionary 2017).

This group of displaced persons is therefore at the very starting process of receiving protection, and can be more vulnerable than refugees where less international protection is applied until they reach the desired status. The definition provided by the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) more closely elucidates the difference, where an asylum seeker is: “someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been definitively evaluated” (UNHCR 2017a). The status of ‘refugee’ is therefore normally the desired status for asylum seekers.

Determining whether a given person should be granted refugee status, or not, is often under the purview of certain government agencies within the host country, but the decision can also be made by the UNHCR or other international organizations. Country of origin is usually the determining factor for assessing asylum claims with asylum seekers often being denied refugee status on the basis that their country of origin has been deemed ‘safe’. This designation, safe or not, is a political decision that does not necessarily reflect the reality of a given country: some of the most dangerous places in the world have been put on a safe list, which naturally endangers asylum seekers, especially if they are sent back.

Asylum seekers are a vulnerable group and usually have limited rights in the country they are seeking asylum in (UNHCR, 2017a). They are typically not authorized to work and sometimes they are not even allowed to move freely within the host country, not to mention abroad. Waiting times concerning one’s status are often lengthy, which can lead to feelings of helplessness and powerlessness among asylum seekers. There are however occasions where asylum seekers are given refugee status on a group basis; they are then called *prima facie refugees* (UNHCR, 2017a). This is

when the situation for seeking a refugee status is well known and individual assessment is not necessary. Asylum applications to the European Union saw a new record of 1.2 million in 2015 (Eurostat 2016), mostly originating from the Middle East and North Africa. Of these, almost 1 in 3 were seeking asylum for the first time (Eurostat, March 4th 2016).

4.2. Refugees

The Office of the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1950 as a response to the millions of displaced persons following the end of World War II, in Europe and beyond. Also known as the UN Refugee Agency, its original plan was to operate for three years, but it soon became known that people holding refugee status were more prevalent than previously believed, and the continued existence of this institution was therefore vital for their protection and safety (UNHCR 2005). In the year following the establishment of UNHCR, a legal treaty called the 1951 Refugee Convention was published, the key legal document that defined the term 'refugee' and laid out protections of their rights. The 1951 Convention was limited to Europe in the post-World War II landscape, but the 1967 Protocol then gave it universal coverage, along with, significantly, the inclusion of events that happened after 1951 (UNHCR 2011, 2). According to Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, a refugee is defined as:

> Someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (UNHCR 2011, 3).

When exploring the functions of the 1951 Convention, it states that refugees are not to be punished if they enter, or stay, in a country illegally. The Convention therefore shows an acute understanding of the fact that when seeking refuge, persons are often forced to violate rules and regulations in order to receive protection. The prosecution of refugees, therefore, must be differentiated from those committing crimes that are defined under common law (UNHCR 2011, 3). It is evident that these procedures can be immensely complex, and will not be explained further in this thesis, but it is important to have a general awareness of the mechanisms of the Convention. Other requirements put forward by the Convention include that: "no one shall expel or

return a refugee against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom" (UNCHR 2011, 3). This measure is, however, frequently broken where refugees have been sent back to warzones or situations where their safety is uncertain or at great risk.

The provision of protection is to be applied without discrimination when it comes to race, religion, or country of origin, and the denial of this protection can have deadly consequences. Asylum seekers and refugees, however, are often sent away on the grounds of other laws, such as the Dublin regulation, a European Union law that allows countries to send displaced persons back to the European state where they first applied for protection. This law has been widely criticized, especially in the cases where the receiving country is not guaranteed to offer them protection or might send them further to an unsafe location. In 2015, there were around 21.3 million refugees in the world, and over half of them came from three countries: Afghanistan, Somalia and the largest group from Syria (UNHCR 2016). This number has certainly grown again in 2016, where we are now witnessing a time when more people than ever before hold a refugee status.

It can be extremely important for a displaced person to be placed in the correct category when seeking protection, as a refugee or an asylum seeker, as international law and national regulations vary between the two. It is also vital for the press or public information outlets to use the correct terms and give the persons involved dignity and respect, where being called a migrant does not give the correct image of the difficult situation these people are in. The term *illegal immigrant* has also been used, which gives the indication that the persons fleeing these situations are in some way criminals. It is for this reasons that, when speaking of both refugees and asylum seekers in this thesis, and while acknowledging the difference between the two, the term *displaced persons* will be used, as it is a neutral and factually descriptive term that clearly refers to reality: persons displaced outside of their home country who are seeking protection.

In relation to definitions concerning asylum seekers and refugees, it is worth mentioning the concept of 'othering', but displaced persons are unfortunately

commonly victims of this classification. ‘Othering’ describes the diminishing action of classifying a person as someone of a subordinate category, or seen as ‘the Other’ (Bullock 1999, 620). Individuals or groups that fall victims to this kind of labeling are usually seen as not a part ‘of us’, which usually stands for the dominant group in society, and they are even sometimes seen as the ‘dangerous other’. This will be a common theme in the discourse concerning displaced persons, outlined in chapter 6.

The next chapter will lay out the main background and the historic context of the cases in this thesis. First, the Schengen Agreements and other relevant treaties will be introduced, followed by a discussion of the main challenges to this passport-free zone. Each Nordic country and their stance on border control and attitudes toward displaced persons will then be laid out with special emphasis naturally afforded to Denmark and Sweden as the main players of this thesis. A timeline will then be given for the events covered by this thesis, along with the European Union´s plans of returning the area back to normal. The final chapter will offer a summery to these discussions.

5 A Nordic Goodbye to Open Borders?

In the aftermath of two world wars, the European continent underwent immense changes when it came to the control of borders. The ability to control one's borders and to, therefore, define one´s territory is an important mechanism for every state. The border control of sovereign states used to be in the hands of the state itself, but many states in Europe have increasingly moved this authority into the hands of international agreements and organizations. Managing the movement of people is no easy task and becomes even more demanding in an environment where borders are open and rules and regulations have to be maintained. In order to get a more complete understanding of what options are available and the limitations in play when it comes to controlling borders today, it is important to look into the agreements and treaties that correlate with the managing of borders. It is important to understand what rules apply to citizens of a particular area, and the rules that apply for displaced persons who want to seek protection there.

The Schengen Agreement, introduced in the mid-1980s, is currently the key agreement concerning borders in Europe. It was, however, not the first arrangement in the area; the Nordic countries, connected through history, culture and language, along with a long standing tradition of trade and various similar relations, signed the Nordic Passport Union in the summer of 1952 in Copenhagen. This allowed citizens of the Nordic countries, then Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, to travel freely without passport in the four countries (Norden 2017). In 1954, the agreement was extended and allowed citizens to work and live as well in all four countries. Iceland joined this union in 1965 and the Faroe Islands a year later. Greenland, despite being under Danish realm, has never been a part of the union (Norden 2017). Thus, a large common area was created, and with this free movement of people, the countries became even more integrated than before.

5.1. The Schengen Agreement – and Open Borders for all?

Five European countries; France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, took the first steps together toward a border-free zone in mainland Europe, in an area that had been a warzone only a couple of decades before.

The goal was to create a common area where goods and people could travel freely within the designated space, much like the Nordic Passport Union had already established *(Z*aiotti 2011, 2). The Schengen Agreement, named after the town where it was signed in Luxembourg in 1985, was the outcome of this vision, and it would later become supplemented by the Schengen Convention in 1990, which removed internal border controls and created a common visa policy. Once a nation had joined, the government had to renounce the control of the movement of people from the national border to this area that could be described as Europe's internal frontier *(Z*aiotti 2011, 3).

Ten years following the signature of the agreement, in 1995, the Schengen area was officially created. At this time the area consisted of the five original signatories, along with Austria, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece. The Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1999 where it incorporated the Schengen Agreement into the European Union law, and the then area grew substantially (European Union Law 2009). The list of countries developed steadily, with a record nine joining in 2007, and as of 2016, twenty-six European countries were a part of the area, spanning 500 million people and an area of over four million square kilometers (Eurostat, March 4th 2016). All of these people could now live, work, study and travel freely within this large area. Despite the merge with the European Union, not all members of Schengen are European Union members; Iceland, Norway, Lichtenstein and Switzerland are all part of the Schengen area, but not members of the European Union. Likewise, not all European Union members are a part of Schengen but those are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom (European Commission 2017a).

Having operated an area of open borders since the 1950s through the Nordic Passport Union, all five Nordic countries officially became a part of the Schengen area in early 2001 (Norden 2017). Despite having joined the large network of Schengen countries, Nordic citizens still enjoy more rights than the other members when they move between the Nordic countries. Some examples include less paperwork, exemptions of residence permits and other benefits, such as less restrictions if they want to obtain a citizenship (Norden 2017).

Substantial focus has been placed on the external borders of the Schengen zone, where participants have to follow strict rules applied to persons entering the area. These checks are coordinated by the European Union's Frontex agency, and are subject to common rules concerning the surveillance and procedures for the external borders (Frontex 2017). The Schengen area also has a common information system, the Schengen Information System (SIS), used to fight organized crime such as smuggling and similar misconducts (European Commission 2017b). This system allows police stations and consulates to access a shared database of wanted or undesirable people, along with various stolen objects. These measures are applied in order to track and determine who is allowed into the Schengen area, and who is not, because tracking a person is much more difficult once that person has reached the inner borders of the area. Considerable pressure on the external borders of the area has prompted issues between states, which will be demonstrated later in this thesis.

It might sound utopist to some that an area such as Schengen could be successful. Not all individual state control is lost, however, because in certain circumstances border controls can be reinstated. The Schengen Borders Code (SBC) was implemented in 2006, allowing member states to reintroduce border controls temporarily in exceptional circumstances, such as during a serious threat to security (European Commission 2017b). Articles 25 through 29 of the Schengen Agreement state carefully how the reintroduction of internal border control should be carried out (European Parliament 2016, 8). This temporary reintroduction of border control has a time limit and is restricted to the bare minimum controls to combat the threat, along with requirements such as notifying other members and relevant authorities (European Commission 2017b). The European Union's body of Migration and Home Affairs stresses that, "reintroducing border control at the internal border should only ever be used as a measure of last resort" (European Commission 2017b).

Relevant articles in the SBC for reinstating internal border controls will be outlined in this paragraph. Article 25 states that if there is a serious threat to internal security, a 30-day limited period of border control can be reintroduced (European Union Law 2006). These procedures can also be carried out in advance of foreseeable events, but certain steps have to then be followed, requiring a statement of the reason, scope,

duration and similar information for the proposed reintroduction to be granted. Article 28 outlines the procedures to be followed if there is an urgent action that must be taken without prior notification of other European Union member states. This action is allowed for 10 days and available to be renewed for a period of 20 days up to a maximum of 2 months (European Union Law 2006). Article 29 then gives details about the actions needed if the prolonging of border control at the internal borders is necessary. This can be done for up to six months and is available for repeated renewal up to a maximum of two years.

Along with the important step of informing the European Commission and the European Parliament of the proposed border controls, Article 34 also states the importance of informing the public of the measures taken. The Commission and the state in question are obligated to inform the public in a transparent manner, along with indicating the start and end date of such a measure, unless a particular security situation does not allow for such a notification. It is naturally important for the members of the Schengen area to follow the same set of rules in order for the cooperation to be effective, but as will be demonstrates in the following section, states can interpret these rules differently, and even try to bend the rules, which can pose difficulties.

5.1.1. Challenges to the Schengen Agreement

For the first few decades, the Schengen area operated as promised, and many people took advantage of the many benefits provided as members of the area, seeking work and education abroad, along with enjoying the freedom to travel. It was not until 2011 that the Schengen area started experiencing more challenges, with increasing numbers of people arriving in Europe in need of humanitarian protection. One of the largest factors for this increase can be linked to The Arab Spring, a revolutionary wave that broke out in late 2010 in Tunisia and spread out across the Arab world (Simpson 2014). This led to various crises, which displaced millions and left thousands dead, most notably the Syrian civil war. Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria, met uprisings against him with fierce violence, and a war has raged in the country ever since, with no perceivable end in sight (Simpson 2014). This thesis will not go into

further detail regarding this war, but it is relevant to note that it has left millions of people displaced, both within Syria and in other states.

In the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, around 50,000 North African refugees from Tunisia, Libya and Egypt arrived in Italy in 2011 (European Parliament 2016, 23). Italy issued a large number of residence permits, mostly to the Tunisians who arrived in the first three months of the year. These permits gave them the right to move freely within the Schengen area and most then headed toward France, where many had families and knew the language (European Parliament 2016, 23). France responded by introducing border checks, especially aimed at the large group of Tunisians trying to enter the country. The European Commission sided with the French government on this decision and argued that the permits issued by Italy should not have given automatic rights to travel freely within the Schengen area. Italy responded with the claim that it had been left alone to deal with this group of asylum seekers. The European Parliament came to the conclusion that both states were in compliance with the European Union law and only "the spirit of the Schengen rules" had been violated (European Parliament 2016, 24). This line of events highlighted a potential issue of external borders of the Schengen area, where one member of Schengen allowed a large group to enter and continue then their journey toward a desired destination. This was the first such example, but in the years following, the Schengen area would start to see many similar problems arise.

In the spring of 2011, Danish authorities put in place border checks in response to the flow of displaced persons into the country. Random checks were introduced on their borders with Germany and Sweden in an action they claimed to be aimed at combating transnational crime and mafias from Eastern Europe, which is debatable in light of what was occurring at the time, hence the number of displaced persons into the country (Traynor 2011). These procedures were put in place without any notifications to other members of the European Union or Schengen, which are necessary when operating such measures. The European Commission, along with the German government, quickly stated that this move was not legal (Pop 2011). José Manuel Barroso, then President of the European Commission, informed the Danish government that he had "important doubts" about whether these actions were in line

with European and international law, and threatened to take this case to the European Court of Justice (Traynor 2011). The measures were subsequently dropped in early fall 2011, but this act was a glimpse at what was to come only a few years later.

The high rise of terror attacks across the European continent also attracted more criticism to the open border system of Schengen, and prompted calls for more restrictions and regulations. These attacks became more frequent in 2015 and 2016. After the terror attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, where 130 people were killed, France declared a state of emergency, which included measures to control borders with other Schengen states (BBC News, December 9th 2015). There were concerns about how the terrorists had been able to roam freely within the Schengen area, where some had arrived in Europe through Greece and then made their way from Belgium to France without any hindrance (BBC News, April 24th 2016). Other attacks occurred in the following months, in Brussels in March 2016 and then in Nice during that same summer. These attacks made many in the region, and around the world, skeptical about the Schengen Arrangement, as they seemed to illustrate how easily terrorists could travel without any interference. Many started linking displaced persons to these attacks, and began to see them as a threat to national security.

The control of the external borders of the Schengen area has thus come up for a debate. Throughout the European refugee crisis, many displaced persons have crossed into Greece via sea or land from Turkey, mostly because of the close proximity of Syria to Greece. Therefore, a widespread criticism has been aimed at Greece for allowing so many refugees and asylum seekers into the Schengen zone, and has even been threatened with expulsion from the area (Traynor 2016). Turkey, a non-member of the European Union or Schengen, has also received some criticism for not taking enough measures to stem the flow of refugees into the Schengen area. The so-called 'EU-Turkey' deal, which came into effect in March of 2016, stated that for every Syrian asylum seeker sent back to Turkey, one Syrian already in Turkey would be resettled in the European Union (BBC News, March 20th 2016). This deal was partly introduced in the hope that it would discourage persons from making the dangerous journey from Turkey to Greece via boats, a journey that has killed thousands of people. The deal was widely critiqued, however, namely by Amnesty International,

which pointed out that one of the flaws of the agreement was that Turkey was not a safe destination for persons being sent there (Gogou, Amnesty International, 2017).

5.2 Border Control and Displaced Persons in the Nordic Countries

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, thousands of displaced people, forced to leave their homes, set their sight on reaching Northern Europe, especially the Nordic countries, as some were known for their well-established welfare systems and fair treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. With record numbers of people seeking refuge in 2015, the strain on the systems in the Nordic countries became visible and a matter of concern, alongside an increased threat of attacks like the ones that had been occurring across the European continent, most notable the recent attacks in Paris.

This chapter will now turn to how the Nordic countries have reacted to the increased numbers of people seeking asylum in their countries. It will start by introducing the two countries this thesis concentrates on, Sweden and Denmark, before assessing the other three Nordic countries: Finland, Norway and Iceland. Border controls and recent methods aimed at displaced persons will be described, along with a historical and cultural context. These sections will also show recent measures introduced both before and following the introduction of the border checks.

5.2.1. Sweden

Sweden has the largest population of the Nordic countries, with around 9.5 million people, along with the biggest geographical area. The country is known for its liberal values and has prided itself of granting protection to those in need; it has one of the highest protection rates and has, in the past, granted permanent residents to incoming groups of displaced persons (Swedish Migration Agency 2017). It has been one of the main destinations for displaced persons entering Europe since World War II, where those fleeing wars have been embraced with open arms. Their accommodations and offers of social assistance, along with legal help, have always been relatively fair, and the country was therefore seen as one of the best destinations for humane assistance (Parusel 2016, 89). Sweden received more refugees per capita than anywhere else in Europe in 2015, with 163,000 people applying for asylum that year (Parusel 2016,

89). This number is more than double that of the previous year, which saw around 80,000 applications (Swedish Migration Agency 2017). Receiving this massive number of asylum seekers, the country was not able to ensure that all of the new arrivals could get the accommodation and the help they wished for, as Sweden had been able to provide for before.

Sweden shares a land border with Norway to the west and Finland to the northeast, along with a maritime border with Denmark, Germany, Poland, Russia and the Baltic countries. The connection across the Öresund Bridge, which opened in 2000, created a large commuting region on each side of the bridge, and is an important economic space connecting the countries through Malmö and Copenhagen. More than 3.5 million people live in the region around the bridge and thousands travel across it every day for work (Bookbinder 2013, 183). It was therefore clear that when border checks started to come into action, the lives of a large groups of people were going to be affected, particularly as this bridge is one of the central ways for displaced persons to reach Sweden from Denmark.

Sweden, alongside most notably Germany, was one of the few countries that maintained open policies when welcoming refugees and asylum seekers throughout the European refugee crisis, but the countries were reaching their limits: there was around 720,000 refugees registered in Germany alone (Eurostat 2016). Politicians and analysts have argued that if more countries, especially others inside the European Union, had stepped up and welcomed more displaced persons, the crisis would have not have been as severe (Parusel 2016, 90).

A study by the British think-tank Demos, published in February 2017, showed that the general openness and attitudes of citizens toward the welcoming of refugees had started to change in Sweden as the crisis continued. The study particularly noted a rise in the use of the term ‘Swedish values’, which had been previously been primarily used by the anti-immigration party Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), but saw an increase in popularity with all major political parties in 2016. It is worth noting that the term was seldom used back in 2012 (Demos 2017). The Swedish newspaper *Aftonbladet* demonstrated also that views of Swedish citizens concerning

the refugee crisis had dramatically changed, where respondents who would "definitely" help asylum seekers had reduced from 54% in 2015 to 30% in 2016 (Quartz, 2016). Similarly, when asked if the government should take in more refugees in 2015, 31% had said yes, while only 13% felt the same way a year later (Garza, 2016). It is therefore evident that both political and public opinion had started to change, and were now not as open-minded as before.

Swedish interior minister Anders Ygeman announced in January 2016 that the plans of the government included deporting asylum seekers whose applications had been rejected. He added that at first, they talked about deporting 60,000 people but the number could be increased to 80,000 (The Guardian, January 29th 2016). These proposed deportations would account for about half of all asylum requests Sweden received in 2015. The shift in attitude in Sweden probably came as a surprise to the international community, but when one takes into account the strain the large numbers of arrivals had on the system, the shift becomes more understandable. Sweden had not executed as extreme measures as many other countries had, but eventually tended in that direction with the tightening of border controls and the suggestion of deportation.

5.2.2. Denmark

Denmark, a country with around 5.6 million citizens, is geographically the smallest among the Nordic countries. Denmark's only land border is with Germany to the south, but it is now also linked to Sweden via the Öresund Bridge. Denmark received around 21,000 refugees in 2015, an increase from 14,700 in the previous year (Delman 2016). The country has a compelling history with respect to its borders and relationship toward refugees and asylum seekers. Denmark was under German occupation during World War II from 1940 to 1943, and at the end of the war, Danish citizens helped Jews and others threatened by Nazi persecution in the country, many risking their own lives to this end (Otzen 2013). In addition to this, Denmark was the first state to sign the Refugee Convention in 1951 (Refugees Welcome Denmark 2017). There is an irony, then, to Denmark's recent responses to this refugee crisis, with many of its actions not actually in line with this Convention.

There have been some very controversial policies introduced and implemented in Denmark. One of the most notable of these was an authorization for the Danish police to confiscate valuables from asylum seekers, with the justifications that it was being used to 'fund their stay' (Etzold 2017, 2). The primary function of this policy seemed to instead have been the creation of hostile environment for the incoming groups, and to deter further displaced persons from seeking refuge in Denmark (Martin 2016). Other measures on a more local level include the town council of Randers, a Danish town of around 90,000 people, which demanded that all public schools serve pork to discourage the entry of Muslim refugees (Martin 2016).

The Danish government had also cut benefits in half for refugees and placed advertisements of these cuts in Lebanese newspapers (Atkin 2015). Other methods have included complicating the process for family reunification, with a typical wait time of one to three years. Danish authorities have also punished their own citizens, such as a high-profile case where a 70-year-old woman was convicted as a human smuggler after she drove refugees with a young child to Sweden (Martin 2016). The combination of these policies and stories clearly illustrates the message Danish authorities wanted to send to those wanting to seek protection there.

Denmark has also seen an increase in political parties that oppose the welcoming of refugees and asylum seekers. The Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti), a right-wing party, saw an increase in support to become the second-largest party in Denmark after the general election in the summer of 2015 (Erlanger 2015). The elected Prime Minster, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, represented the Left (Venstre) party, which follows a conservative liberal ideology, and has as a result of this election come under immense pressure from the more right-wing parties. This change in the political landscape can explain why some of the more controversial policies have been implemented. Sweden also saw some rise in political parties with a similarly right wing ideology, but not to the same extent.

Denmark has thus been very hostile to the mass flow of displaced persons, and has responded with controversial policies aimed at stemming the flow of people, even toward those who were mainly trying to reach Sweden, and authorities have

demonstrated clearly that refugees and asylum seekers were not welcome in Denmark.

5.2.3. Finland, Norway and Iceland

Before continuing on to the specific reintroduction of border control in Sweden and Denmark, it is worth giving context to the other three Nordic countries: Finland, Norway and Iceland. Some of them have implemented drastic measures and have experienced a shift in attitudes toward the welcoming of refugees and asylum seekers, especially in relation to border control. While their situations differ somewhat, such as their affiliations with international organizations and their geographical locations, the pressure on the Nordic countries generally seems to have created quite the domino effect, where it seemed as countries have almost competed to be the most unattractive place for displaced persons to seek protection.

Finland, a nation of 5.4 million people, is the only country of the three that is a member of the European Union where Norway and Iceland stand outside the union. Finland saw a huge increase in asylum seekers in 2015: the Finnish Immigration Service reported that 32,000 asylum applications were received in 2015, which was almost a ten-fold increase from the 3,600 applications in 2014 (Finnish Immigration Services 2017). Some of the measures in place against the incoming groups included the classification of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia as safe countries of origin, although most of the refugees accepted in Finland did in fact originate from these three states (Etzold 2017, 2). The government also revealed plans to deport two thirds of the 32,000 of asylum seekers that had arrived in 2015 (The Guardian January 29th 2016). These measures were a clear indication that the goal was to stem the flow of incoming refugees and asylum seekers, along with some border measures aimed at the group, which seemed to be very successful as the number of asylum seekers had decreased to around 5,600 in 2016 (Finnish Immigration Services 2017).

Norway, a country of just over 5 million people, saw the arrival of 35,000 asylum seekers in 2015, an increase from the 11,480 applications from the previous year (Deutsche Welle, December 29th 2015). Norway introduced a reintroduction of border

control, similar to the one in Denmark and Sweden, in November of 2015. In December 2015, tough asylum rules were introduced that would, for example, only allow family reunification after the applicant had worked or studied in Norway for four years (Deutsche Welle, December 29th 2015). An interesting case specific to Norway involved displaced persons who had found a loophole in the border crossing procedure and started using bicycles to cross over from Russia (Luhn 2016). That was short lived, however, and action was then taken to order the refugees and asylum seekers to return back to Russia. In a notification on the 14th of April 2016, the Norwegian authorities stated that in spire of a lower number of asylum seekers arriving in Norway, and the number continuing to be low, that they did not want to lift the controls, "as the migratory pressure at the external border continues to be significant" (Council of the European Union 2016). Norway received 3,460 asylum applications in 2016, the lowest number the country had seen in over twenty years (The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 2017).

Iceland, the smallest of the Nordic countries, by far, with a population of only 330,000 people, was in a very different situation. Iceland is an island far out in the Atlantic and has no land borders with other countries, so refugees and asylum seekers mostly arrive by plane and on a few occasions by ship. The screening process is thus different, and arguably easier, than in the other Nordic countries. Iceland was the only Nordic country that saw an increase between years, where the country received 176 applications in 2014, 354 in 2015, but 1,132 in 2016 (The Icelandic Directorate of Immigration 2017). Despite the increase, these numbers are still small compared to the other Nordic countries, but the small population of Iceland must be taken into consideration. Iceland has operated quite a few controversial deportation, including a case where two Iranian asylum seekers were dragged out of a church and arrested, before being deported under the law of the Dublin regulation (Iceland Monitor, June 28th 2016).

The Nordic countries have seen, to a various degrees, particular pressure on their borders with a huge influx of displaced persons in 2015, a great increase from previous years. It is undeniable that most of the pressure had been in Sweden, which saw more asylum seekers than all of the other countries combined, and it is thus of

little surprise that there is evidence of a shift in public opinion. Denmark employed a very hostile attitude toward displaced persons from the outset, and introduced some highly controversial measures. Finland, Norway and Iceland all operated on some controversial measures and while the former two introduced border checks of some sort, Iceland is the only country of the five that has not applied any direct border controls throughout the crisis, but its geographical location plays a large role in that matter.

5.3. The Beginning of the End? Reintroduction of Border Control in Denmark and Sweden

All of the Nordic countries have used controversial measures to deter the flow of refugees and asylum seekers into their countries. The differences in stances and practices toward these persons and the introduction of temporary border controls have called into question the guiding principles of Nordic cooperation, that has always operated on an open scale (Etzold 2017, 3). This section will outline the timeline and the details of the reintroduction of border controls and identification checks in Denmark and Sweden, which started in the last quarter of 2015 and continued throughout 2016. The reaction of the European Union regarding this interference to the border-free area of Schengen will also be discussed. A discourse analysis regarding these events will then be laid out in chapter 6.

On the 15th of November 2015, temporary border checks were introduced in Sweden; it became required for international airlines and ferries to check the identifying documents of their passengers before entering the country (Billing 2016). The following month, a temporary law was passed that further compounded this action, requiring then all transport companies to check the identification of their passengers. (Swedish Parliament 2015). These border controls were the first of their kind in over 60 years or since the Second World War: it is thus of little surprise that many people were shocked by this decision. These checks were, however, a softer version of measures that were about to be introduced the following year. The turning point came on the 4th of January 2016 when Sweden called for identity checks by transportation companies on the Danish side of the Denmark-Sweden border (BBC News, January

4th 2016). Stricter border control had then officially been put in place. After Sweden imposed these border controls, Denmark responded with similar controls in only a matter of hours on their borders with Germany, in order to avoid the anticipated increase in asylum seekers on their way to Sweden as the main reason (Jørgensen and Haslund, January 4th 2016).

Following the events in Sweden and Denmark, in March 2016, the European Commission introduced its *Back to Schengen* plan (European Parliament 2016, 9). It was a roadmap for repairing the Schengen area back to a fully functioning system, but similar border controls had by this point also been introduced by Austria, Germany and Norway. The plan stated that the Schengen system had been severely tested by the European refugee crisis and the Commission was willing to give full support to the member states experiencing these difficult circumstances. The plan was outlined in a press release from the Commission stating that the border controls were temporary and should be an exception, along with the hope to return back to normal as soon as possible (European Commission, March 4th 2016). It was evident that the European Union wanted to reinstate a functional border agreement as soon as possible, and for countries like Sweden and Denmark to return to their previous state.

Then Vice President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans described the Schengen Agreement as one of the greatest accomplishments of European integration, and stated that it would be an unbearable cost to lose it (European Commission, March 4th 2016). He added that the goal was to lift all internal border controls by December 2016 by the latest. This, however, did not happen. The Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship in the European Commission, Dimitris Avramopolous added that it was time for the states of the European Union to secure the Schengen Agreement, "the union´s crowning achievements" (European Commission, March 4th 2016). From the perspective of the European Union, ending the border check and returning to normal operations was clearly a high priority.

The Back to Schengen plan also laid out some of the additional costs that had been created through the temporary border controls, and the Commission estimated further that a full reestablishment of border controls in the Schengen area could cost between

5 and 18 billion euros annually (European Commission, March 4th 2016). The plan placed great emphasis on the securing of external borders, and the shared responsibility among the members states to commit to this (European Commission, March 4th 2016). It was additionally outlined that immediate support for Greece would be necessary, especially in the light of external border control.

The Back to Schengen plan revealed that the approach that had been used by many states, the so-called 'wave-through', or when a state allows a person to pass through without registering them, was not legally or politically adequate. This had been the case in Denmark and Sweden, where the former had been sending persons through to latter without checking them, thus creating extra pressure for Sweden. The plan stated that member states were required to grant entry to all asylum applications that arrived at their borders. Furthermore, the decision about which state would be responsible for the particular application would be handled according to European Union law, and in addition that, it was not up to the asylum seekers to choose a state where they wished to be granted protection (European Commission, March 4th 2016).

On the 12th of May 2016, the European Council allowed Denmark and Sweden, along with Austria, Germany and Norway, to maintain their border checks on the basis of "serious deficiencies" of the external border control system in Greece, which: "put at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control" (European Parliament 2016, 8). The European Union members states who had introduced border controls had mainly cited two reasons or threats justifying their institution of border controls: mass migration and the risk of terrorism (European Parliament 2016, 9). The proposed controls were extended with the European Commission's consent in June 2016 and then again in November 2016 for three more months (Etzold 2017, 2).

By fall 2016, the number of asylum seekers in Denmark and Sweden lay between 69 and 84 percent below the figures for the previous year (Etzold 2017, 2): numbers for 2016 regarding asylum applications were 6,235 for Denmark (Refugees.dk, 2017) and just below 30,000 for Sweden (Eurostat, March 13th 2017). It is hard to deny that the proposed border controls had worked in the goal of reducing the number of asylum applications. The evaluation of when the situation was under control or when the

border controls could be lifted was not clear. By this time, less attention had also been given to the reintroduction of border control in the countries and while they were still intact, attention seemed to have shifted away from the measures. At the end of 2016, Schengen closures continued to be renewed, and the border controls remain intact until the 11th of May 2017, despite both the extensive plans of the European Union to return the Schengen area by this point and the decrease in the number of asylum applications.

5.4. Summary

The establishment of the Nordic Passport Union created a passport-free area within the Nordic countries, and with the Schengen Agreement, the border-free area grew substantially and has continued to grow, especially after its integration into European Union law. Because of the nature of the Schengen Agreement, refugees and asylum seekers have often been able to enter one country and make it to a destination of their choosing by the virtue of the agreement's open borders, despite laws stating that they should register in the first country they arrive in. As a result, many made their way to the Nordic region, but all of the countries saw a sharp increase in asylum applications in 2015. The numbers then decreased in all countries, apart from Iceland, in 2016.

The Nordic countries have demonstrated different attitudes and policies toward refugees and asylum seekers entering their countries and they have been reflected in this chapter. Most countries have used extreme measures to stem the flow, while others have done so using softer measures. Although the border checks are 'technically' acceptable under European Union law and the Schengen border code, they remain controversial and contested. Despite efforts by the European Union to return the Schengen area back to normal, the border checks remained throughout 2016. The next chapter will explore the discourse in the media about the particular case of increased border control in Denmark and Sweden.

6 Discourse Analysis

When Sweden, the Nordic nation most known for its liberal and progressive values, announced stricter border measures aimed at stemming the flow of refugees and asylum seekers into the country, it made headlines all over Europe and around the world. What had driven them to such drastic measures? Denmark, their Nordic cousin, took up similar measures only a couple of hours later, though this decision was markedly less shocking, given their measures they had introduced in 2011 and their controversial policies. The media, both local and international, closely followed as the events in Sweden and Denmark unfolded, and as the two Nordic nations stepped over 60 years back in time with the introduction of these controls.

When I started my research, I considered focusing specifically on the Öresund Bridge, which seemed to be the center of these events, not only affecting displaced persons trying to get to Sweden but also the large community of local commuters surrounding the bridge. On examination of news articles, however, a stark difference in the speech patterns between these two Nordic nations began to become clear. It was therefore decided to collect discourse from both Sweden and Denmark in order to evaluate and better elucidate the differences between the two.

I sought after the justifications that prevailed in both the nations, the claims and arguments from persons in power, the displaced persons and others, such as residents of Sweden and Denmark. The discourse highlighted in the media was predominantly from persons in power, while, unsurprisingly, the most vulnerable groups were left almost entirely out of the discourse: the refugees and asylum seekers. Representatives from the European Union were occasionally quoted, but not to a large degree, and there were few accounts from citizens of the two countries themselves. It is generally easier for persons in power to get their views across, such as presidents, prime ministers and others with political or economic authority. They are frequently quoted in the news articles and are highly visible across the coverage of the events, with many of the same statements appearing in multiple news articles.

The use of terms in the media was also interesting, where some outlets repeatedly called the situation a *migration crisis*, implying that these people were willingly relocating, and not out of need. Most, however, talked about *refugees*, while others mentioned *asylum seekers*: the terms, as have been covered in chapter 4, are both more accurate and crucial to use. Labeling the displaced persons as *illegal immigrants* or *terrorists* was only presented in a few accounts, but did however occur. It tended to be tabloids and other more populist newspapers that made use of these more controversial terms, with a presumed goal of shocking people in order to attract more readership.

News outlets and the media in general must be approached with care. Certain newspapers are known for propagating particular political agendas, while others can endeavor to be more neutral, but will still contain their own biases. Some outlets might therefore view displaced persons more negatively because of such political stances, while others might try to give them a more objective treatment. It is also presumed that the different media understand their audience and what they want to read, and will adjust their style, discourse, or even position in order to satisfy them. There is also the cultural factor, that while coverage might be seen as more appropriate for one audience, it might offend another. Language barriers can also complicate matters, or connotations, which can also create problems. There are therefore many difficulties to the evaluation of discourse from news sources, but I have endeavored to be aware of these limitations.

6.1. Closing the Gates? Displaced Persons as a Pressure on the System

Before the border checks started in Sweden, there had been some tension with its neighbor in the west. On the 10th of September 2015, Stefan Löfven, the Prime Minister of Sweden, criticized Denmark's decision to send trains their way without trying to register anyone on board. He mentioned the Dublin Regulation in this context, where asylum seekers are supposed to be registered in the country where they first arrive, and said that: "this is how we act in Sweden, and we intend to follow the rules" (Telegraph, September 10th 2015). This statement, that Sweden had intentions of sending people away, probably came as a shock to many, given the country´s previous status as a welcoming haven. As mentioned before, Sweden received one of

the largest numbers of asylum applications in Europe in 2015, while Denmark saw a number only small by comparison. Only a few days prior to this statement, on September the 6th 2015, Löfven had a different idea saying that his Europe was a place that took in those fleeing from wars, instead of building walls (The Guardian, January 4th 2016). This stark change in opinion demonstrates how quickly the situation changed.

In late November 2015, Löfven's statements were becoming more desperate. He talked about how his country needed respite from the influx of refugees, and is quoted as saying: "it pains me that Sweden is no longer capable of receiving asylum seekers at the high level we do today" (The Guardian, November 24th 2015). He announced that Sweden intended to revert to the European Union minimum when it came to accepting asylum seekers, despite having had higher limits before. He implied that Sweden was going to adapt stricter measures in order to discourage more displaced persons from arriving, in the hope that this would lead them to other countries instead. Sweden would, therefore, become unable to provide the same assistance as before.

When 2016 rolled around, the discourse continued to show that the pressure on the system in Sweden meant that they would not be able to handle the same numbers as the previous year. Morgan Johansson, Sweden's Minister for Justice and Migration, said on the first day of 2016 how his country was willing to go above and beyond, but had now reached its limits. He talked about how: "our whole asylum system would break down" (The Independent, January 1st 2016), if they saw similar numbers in 2016 as they did in 2015. Johansson seemed to be supportive of the border checks that were introduced, particularly from a security standpoint, and that they would then be able to better control the numbers of people entering the country.

Sweden's Interior Minister, Anders Ygemen, mentioned in early January how the procedures at the border had started as an emergency measure, but were now going to be a continued strategy because there was an enduring risk to order and security (International Business Times, January 7th 2016). In the summer of 2016, he also put emphasis on the outer border of the Schengen area and that these measures would remain until the external borders had been secured. Only at that moment, he said,

could they begin to "normalize the situation, step by step" (The Copenhagen Post, July 4th 2016). There is an ambiguity to the concept of 'normalizing' and what is 'normal', and it is similarly ambiguous when the security of Schengen might be seen as being 'under control', which therefore makes the measures seem open-ended. His statement thus makes it possible for the continued maintenance of these measures.

In November of 2016, it was announced that the border checks would extend into February of 2017. Löfven defended the measure, saying: "we have to take order and safety in our country into account" (New Europe, November 3rd 2016). His statement exhibits less empathy than before, and although the numbers of asylum seekers had dropped, the border controls were apparently remaining. A year prior to that statement, when the first border measures had just been announced, a UN official in Stockholm had said that: "the last bastion of humanitarianism has fallen" (The Guardian, November 24th 2015).

It is evident from the discourse presented above that 'pressure on the system' in Sweden was seen as one of the main push factors for the border checks in Sweden by the political elite. Sweden saw numbers like never before and despite wishing to offer accommodation and assistance to all, it was repeatedly emphasized that these could not be achieved after the record-breaking influx of 2015. The announcements made are still rather soft by this point, and more in the spirit of disseminating information and justifying actions, rather than the taking or discussion of extreme measures. It seems like they are intentionally vague and could be interpreted in many ways. The accounts above highlight the opinion and belief that despite the country wanting to help, they had reached a point where something drastic had to be done to stem the overflow of persons into the country.

When talking about the system collapsing, or breaking down, the message seems to be a that if the country saw similar numbers again, it might start to affect the current residents of Sweden. The country prided itself on providing services to people seeking protection, and when authorities saw that this was not possible any more, they did not want to welcome more who they knew they would not be able to help. There was a repeated presentation that authorities in Sweden were saddened by these

measures, but that the need to protect their internal structure and current residents was of greater importance. The adoption of these measures was also presented as an urge for other countries to take responsibility; they were framed in such a way as to present Sweden as having already done its part, alongside Germany, to try and make the measures seem more understandable.

When it came to discourse concerning pressure to the system in Denmark, I did not find as many accounts. It was clear, however, that authorities in Denmark did not favor the idea that they would be the ones who had to take in the displaced persons Sweden was turning away. There were many accounts where Danish authorities expressed their opinions that they did not want the numbers in Denmark to increase. After placing advertisements about cutting benefits and other restrictions to refugees and asylum seekers in Denmark, Inger Støjberg, the Danish Minister for Immigration, Integration and Housing, talked about how important it was that: "the advertisements must contain sobering information about the halving of benefits and other constraints we are going to adopt" (The Washington Post, September 7th 2015), which gives us an idea of how serious Danish authorities were about dissuading the arrival of new displaced persons. It is relevant to note that Støjberg is known for her anti-immigrant views.

6.2. A Dangerous Crowd? Displaced Persons as a Threat to Internal Security

The rhetoric coming out of Denmark concerning whether displaced persons were seen as a threat to internal security was quite different to that of Sweden. Danish authorities took a more direct effort to look unattractive to persons seeking protection in the country, especially where many speeches implied that refugees and asylum seekers were not welcome in the country. Inger Støjberg was frequently quoted in the media where she had many controversial statements that, at the same time, underlined what appeared to be Denmark's position in the matter. Shortly after Denmark decided to take up similar measures on the borders with Germany, Støjberg said in a statement that: "in Denmark we don't wish to be the final destination for thousands and thousands of asylum seekers" (Deutsche Welle, January 6th 2016). Søren Espersen,

the chair of the Danish People's Party, justified the necessity of border checks with Germany, claiming that they would otherwise be "overrun by Angela Merkel´s refugees" (Speisa, September 6th 2015).

Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the Prime Minister of Denmark, had some pointed comments regarding the situation. He was concerned that after Sweden announced its border measures, those denied access to Sweden would stay in Denmark where they could "increase the risk of a large number of illegal immigrants to accumulate in and around Copenhagen" (Al Jazeera, January 4th 2016a). His choice of wording is interesting, where he seems to be talking explicitly about displaced persons as *illegal immigrants*. In relation to this, Rasmussen, like Støjberg, has also voiced that: "the government doesn't want Denmark to become a new big destination for refugees" (U.S. News, January 4th 2016), but in spite of this, and shortly after introducing the border checks with Germany, he said in a statement that he was: "a true believer of the freedom of movement. This is not a happy moment at all" (Telegraph, January 4th 2016). His statements seem to contradict each other, but what is meant here is clearly a desire for free movement for the citizens of Denmark and Germany, but not for displaced persons. He affirmed this by saying the measures "weren't expected to affect "ordinary" Danes and Germans crossing the border" (Time, January 4th 2016).

Rasmussen justified the border checks in Denmark as simply an answer to a decision that had already been made in Sweden; Marcus Knuth, the immigration speaker for the Venstre Party in Denmark, similarly declared that the careless foreign policy of Sweden had "suddenly become a huge headache for Denmark" (The Local Sweden, January 6th 2016). It would have been interesting to see Denmark's actions if Sweden had not decided to introduce border checks, especially in the light of their controversial checks in 2011, where Sweden did not follow their measures.

The discourse regarding internal security in Sweden was not as common. However, Johansson provided a straight-forward statement, where he stated that: "after the attacks in Paris, we're not only faced with the refugee issue but also the issue of terrorism" (Al Jazeera, January 4th 2016a). Even though he speaks of the two separately, he seems to create a connection by linking them together; these kinds of

statements can fuel prejudice against refugees and mark all of them as some kind of danger to the host country. It comes as little surprise that there was some fear throughout Europe that terrorists could be hiding among refugee groups, but it is unfair to people who are looking for a brighter future and safety.

The influx of displaced persons as a threat to internal security was mentioned regularly in the news articles, more in the case of Denmark than Sweden. It was however surprising how infrequently such arguments were made, particularly given the more frequent terrorist attacks throughout Europe in 2015 and 2016, where there had been disputes between countries within the Schengen area about guarding their external borders and allowing large numbers of people entering and roaming the area freely. I expected more of the discourse to be about how potential terrorists could hide among the group, especially after the terror attacks in Paris on the 13th of November 2015.

6.3. The Preservation of Nordic identity? Displaced Persons as a Threat to Values

When large groups of people with various religious and cultural backgrounds enter a nation with very different values, it is not uncommon that clashes can occur between the groups. Common discourse regarding immigration and displaced persons has a prominent focus on integration, as the easing of cultural differences and the reconciliation of these differing values. When speaking of values, however, one might reasonably ask: which values? We live in an increasingly globalized society, and the world has become something of a melting pot of values. However, this thesis will refer to the values native to the host-nations.

There is a common discourse of bitterness toward refugees and asylum seekers when they receive any manner of state-funded assistance, where individuals believe that such assistance should be reserved for the states preexisting citizens. Kent Ekeroth, a member of the Swedish Democrats, claimed that Sweden was now: “discriminating against Swedes for the benefit of immigrants who have no respect for our country” (NPR, March 7th 2016). His choice of wording is interesting, where he talks about

immigrants, where he is most likely talking about refugees or asylum seekers. The lack of respect for Sweden, which he phrases with the possessive 'our' in order to create a dichotomy between 'real' Swedes and displaced persons, in order to other them, can be translated simply into a belief that their values will clash.

Similar worries surfaced in Denmark; Johnny Christensen, a 65-year-old retired bank employee, was alleged to have always seen himself as sympathetic and welcoming toward displaced persons. In response to the influx of asylum seekers, however, he was quoted as saying: "I've become a racist". He believes that displaced persons are not assimilating like they should, that they: "want to keep their own culture, but we have our own rules here and everyone must follow them"; this is a very similar othering, with the same use of possessive, as Ekeroth performed above. He added, to conclude his sentiments, "Just kick them out" (NY Times, September 5th 2016).

This notion of integration, as was discussed earlier, is a frequent matter of discussion. It was used occasionally as a justification for not helping these groups, as they were not able to assimilate into a community. Before the checks started, Martin Henriksen, the immigration spokesperson for the Danish People´s Party, said that he wanted to see refugees "to remain in government controlled centers" rather than seeing any efforts in integrating them. He also mentioned that every country had to do what they needed to protect themselves (Bloomberg, November 11th 2015). Karin Andersen, a retired teacher, helped set up the Facebook group Venligboerne, or Kind Citizens, in Denmark but she questioned that while people in Denmark were worried about losing their culture, she asked the question of: "how many help the ones who want to be part of it?" (NY Times, September 5th 2016).

6.4. The Forgotten Ones? Discourse from the Non-Elite and Displaced Persons

The discourse from the non-elite, was mostly from people who were affiliated with organizations that assist refugees and asylum seekers, such as Anna Carlstedt, the President of the Swedish Red Cross. She said that she found the government's statements of the system being on the verge of collapsing ridiculous. She mentioned

how Sweden is one of the richest countries in the world and could very well provide accommodations for displaced persons, adding, "we have thousands of places where we can put people" (The Guardian, January 4th 2016). Carlstedt also said: "traditionally, Sweden has been connected to humanitarian values, and we are very worried that the signals Sweden is sending out are that we are not that kind of country any more" (The Guardian, January 4th 2016). Her comments are starkly different from the beliefs of the authorities in her country, claiming that the Sweden was reaching its limits.

There was similarly opposition in Denmark, but it received little attention from the media. Michala Bendixen, the chairwoman of the organization 'Refugees Welcome Denmark' said that despite the rights of displaced persons already having been declining, along with hostile conditions and a decline in rights for the people who were already in Denmark, it would not stop people from coming. She added: "They have to be somewhere, they cannot stay in their home countries" (Euronews, January 25th 2016).

There were very few accounts of discourse from refugees or asylum seekers themselves. In the 200 articles, there were less than 20 narratives. Some described the horrible situations where they had come from. 16-year-old Nabil, for example, described the cruel reality in Raqqa, Syria. He recalls how he saw dead people on the street, emphasizing this by saying: "many dead people. Beheaded" (The Nation, September 27th 2016). Sayd, an 18-year-old boy from Afghanistan, travelled by himself to Sweden after a separation from his family in Turkey. He talked about how he wasn't able to attend school at home but he is now able to in Sweden. He said that: "there's really nothing I don't like about Sweden. I even love the weather" (NPR, January 25th 2016). Ahmed, a 17-year-old Syrian boy in Sweden talked about how he did not want to feed off the welfare system. He wanted to study in Sweden, but most importantly, he wanted safety (The Nation, September 27th 2016). Loghman Rezai, an Iranian Kurd in Denmark, said that despite Europe making it harder for persons to reach these countries, people would still come. He added: "The Danish government can also pressure people who are already here to return. But where are we supposed to go?" (NPR, January 25th 2016).

Some news articles mentioned willingness to speak with asylum seekers or refugees, but most refused because of fear about their own safety and their families back home. Therefore, the lack of refugee and asylum seeker discourse cannot be blamed solely on the news outlets not representing them. There is usually also a language barrier which makes it difficult to communicate, along with the already mentioned, but important, fact that many displaced persons do not want to be interviewed out of fear of being ostracized, either from the host nation or if they are sent back to where they came from.

The findings in the news articles proved to be somewhat different than I expected. I believed that I would come across more discourse regarding the proposed threat to Nordic values than I actually did. Most of the comments regarding pressure to the system came out of Sweden, which was not a surprise given the great quantity of displaced persons that they received. The discourse from Denmark stemmed mostly from authorities being afraid that they would end up with all of the asylum seekers that Sweden denied, along with a potential threat to their internal security. I expected to find more discourse from the general public of the two countries and the displaced persons, but these groups unfortunately were notably under-represented.

The next chapter will serve as the main platform for discussion, where I evaluate and answer the questions put forth at the beginning of the thesis, along with placing them in the theoretical context that was explored in chapter 2 to see what explanatory power they might hold. Additional discourse will be introduced in order to answer the questions and this chapter will then include concluding remarks for this thesis as a whole, with an update on the cases in Denmark and Sweden.

7 Discussion and Conclusion

The world is more connected now than it ever has been before, and news coverage can be delivered from the front lines of a specific event to the consumer in a matter of seconds. In line with these changes, the average citizen is now in a better position than ever to report on situations themselves from almost anywhere in the world. The landscape of media coverage has therefore changed drastically in the last couple of decades. Despite this progress, the media and news outlets still play a large role in delivering news and reporting on various affairs from around the world, and still hold a crucial power in the choice of what to publish and what to leave out. It is still therefore common that persons who are in more powerful positions are in a better situation than others to broadcast their views, and are, as an extension, able to decide what issues become security concerns and which ones do not, though the extensive focus of certain issues over others. This process was detailed as the process of 'securitization' in chapter 2.2.

Discourse is an ambiguous matter, and can be interpreted in multiple ways. In cases like this, power structures plays an important role in how influential a discourse becomes and what measures might be made in response. The discourse in Denmark was much more controversial, but also, straightforward; it seemed that those in power were not afraid of damaging their reputation in order to get their views across. Sweden, on the other hand, demonstrated a much softer discourse, where actions were still laid out but there were markedly less of radical statements. Sweden clearly wanted to continue to preserve its status as the democratic, liberal nation in the North, helping those in need.

The more traditional security studies seem to miss some key factors when it comes to explaining the case of refugees and asylum seekers. As explored in chapter 2, Stephen Walt's definition of security involved explicitly the threat, use and control of military force. When dealing with human subjects, in this case displaced persons, the sole use of military force as a security mechanism is both insufficient and not utilized. It is perhaps then arguable that a refugee crisis is a state-centric issue, especially because of the prominent role that border control plays. I would argue, however, that a refugee crisis is a matter of human, and not the state, security; the human subjects of this

thesis are in fact in a more vulnerable situation than the states in question. The states must additionally be crucially examined as potential creators of insecurity toward these groups, when they hold the power to return them to warzones, to prohibit movement both locally and abroad, and to prohibit access to their families. Critical Security Studies is therefore the most relevant theoretical background to assessing the refugee crisis, demonstrating more levels than just traditional militarism and state-centrisism. It examines wider facets of security, such as the security speech introduced by the Copenhagen School. As the world evolves, an increasing variety of security issues need to be resolved, and in this instance, Critical Security Studies are invaluable for the additional depth that they provide.

The teachings of the Copenhagen School and the theory of securitization can explain some of the common discourse presented in the articles examined. As the school suggests, most of the discourse is derived from persons of power, or the elite, who were the most frequent focus of the news articles. It is hard to deny that displaced persons had been securitized through this discourse, but I would argue that this was done primarily in the case of Denmark. In the Swedish discourse, conversely, authorities seemed to shy away, on most occasions, from making direct statements that said that displaced persons were dangerous. Swedish authorities were, however, the first of the two to introduce the border controls, so it could be said that 'actions speak louder than words', where they were not clearly voicing that they saw displaced persons as a threat, but their actions showed otherwise. As for the last step of securitization, or *breaking free of rules,* by introducing border controls despite being in a border-free zone, can be seen as a clear measure of securitizing an issue. Even though the Schengen Border Code allows for some temporary reintroduction of border control, the measures can still be seen as controversial, where this reintroduction is only to be implemented as a 'last resort'.

Barry Buzan described how security can be seen as a political tool, or a competition for governmental attention. This can be seen here, where the issue was first branded a significant security concern, justifying the reintroduction of border control. If the government did not recognize the issue, it is doubtful that the same level of control would have been possible; where the protection and maintenance of borders is

particularly in the hands of the government. It is unclear how precisely the domestic audiences of the two countries responded to the measures, where it proved difficult to find discourse from residents of the countries. Therefore, the border checks were accepted and instituted, and prevailed all year long.

As the Copenhagen School theorizes, the vulnerable group in question is mostly left out of the conversation. Hansen's 'security as silence' is prominent in this context, where the subject of security has a limited possibility of speaking about its own security problems. This proved to be the case where very few accounts were recorded from the displaced persons themselves. It can also be said that by securitizing the groups of displaced persons, they are being seen as more of a threats than they really are. It might be difficult to convince the securitizing actors and the audience that the displaced persons are not a security threat any more, known as the process of desecuritization, especially where plans of abolishing the border controls was not in near sight at the time of implementation. There were some fears concerning what would happen if the countries opened up their borders again and, therefore, the displaced persons have remained as subjects of a security threat.

The Aberystwyth School and its focus on emancipation are very prominent in this view. The school puts most of its attention on the individual and places them at the center of security. The school also focuses on the marginalized and voiceless, such as refugees and asylum seekers, where they would invariably want to seek emancipation because of the unfavorable situation they are in. Emancipating the individual would in this situation, however, be very unlikely where state control is still very prominent. Refugees and asylum seekers are almost always discussed on a group basis, but Aradau points out that once one group has been made secure, another will be made dangerous. This is applicable to this thesis, for example if displaced persons from the states that comprise the largest numbers in the current crisis: Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia and Iraq, were to be desecuritized, groups from other states would most likely take their place. Human security is also important in this context, where humans at the borders are involved, but the term includes all human life, not just the displaced persons versus the citizens of Sweden and Denmark. The term also claims that human security cannot be confined to borders, which is an important observation

in this case, especially where humans are precisely securitized at the border and the refugee crisis is simultaneously a crisis of borders. The human security approach allows us to look past this and gives depth to the human experience on both sides of these borders. More emphasis on the human security of displaced persons would be ideal in this case, but has, however, not been applied to a large degree.

Border checks are a form of institutionalized security measures, as defined in the works of the Paris School: if refugees and asylum seekers are not in possession of the correct documentation, they will not be able to cross the borders into Denmark or Sweden. In reality, many of them do not own identification papers and some of their documents are also in languages that local guards cannot understand. Institutionalized procedures have often become invisibilized through routine, and these practice could become so one day, if they continue for years to come. However, since they are rather new, and also an exception in the area that had operated previously as a passport-free zone, they are instead marked procedures that have thus become the focus of this entire case. Application of the Paris School has thus little to offer to the research of this thesis but might be more applicable in a future research if the controls were to become permanent.

The question of who should be the provider of security is a complex one. International agreements state that persons seeking protection should be able to obtain it, but this thesis has demonstrated that this process has become much more difficult where countries compete to appear as unattractive destinations through restricted access with stricter border controls. In the case of Denmark, realist claims can be found: it is easy to see that authorities in Denmark operated on a self-help basis, where they shied away from cooperation. It could also be argued that Sweden operated on a more realist basis than before, where they moved further away from previous participations. While the European Union and the Schengen Agreements are based on the virtue of cooperation, this was notably absent in this particular issue, and became a repeated call from those states that felt they were talking on more than their fair share of refugees.

7.1. Is Sweden Cracking under Pressure? "Our Whole Asylum System would Break Down"

We can now move to the first of the three questions posed at the beginning of this thesis: was *pressure to the system* a push factor for the introduction of border control? Among the articles surveyed, the overwhelming response seemed to be yes, especially in the case of Sweden. There were multiple examples of security speeches, where political elites presented justifications for the measures introduced, and it was through the speech acts that displaced persons became securitized. Sweden was initially keen to set an example for the rest of Europe when it came to the welcoming of displaced persons, but after having received such a large number in 2015, there were repeated claims that they were on the brink of exhaustion. Many justifications followed in explanation of the increase of border control, particularly as such a move was at odds with the perceived cultural spirit of Sweden. There was no precedent for such pressure on the system, which could arguably lead to the breaking down of the system, so handling this issue became a delicate matter.

Morgan Johansson, Sweden's Minister for Justice and Migration, outlined the situation as follows:

> We can handle the 160,000 people who came this year. But we can't handle it if there are another 160,000 people next year. Our whole asylum system would break down (The Independent, January 1st 2016).

This was one of the core and repeated justifications from the Swedish government to its audience. The message is clear: if they did not employ some extraneous measures, the system could break down, with implied devastating consequences. The discourse of the political elite presented sadness at the perceived need for these measures and the stress that they did so, only as an emergency procedure. The discourse concerning Denmark did not carry the same sense of sadness. While the country received significantly lower numbers than their neighbor, controversial comments were still prevalent. Prime Minister Rasmussen stated:

> When other Nordic countries try to plug up their borders, it can lead to more refugees and migrants halting their journey north and therefore ending up with us, in Denmark (The Guardian, January 4th 2016).

This statement shows clear resentment toward the thought of refugees ending up in Denmark. There were many more aggressive statements made by the Danish

authorities concerning how they did not want more displaced persons than they already had. Their hostile measures, such as the ads in Lebanon and the jewelry law, underlined this. The discourse made clear that both Sweden and Denmark were concerned about the large numbers of displaced persons they were receiving and wanted to have a better control of the situation.

7.2. Denmark's Message: "We don´t want Refugees here"

As for the second question: can reintroduction of border control be explained by the *threat to internal security* in Denmark and Sweden? After frequent terrorist attacks throughout Europe in 2015 and 2016, more people started growing wary of how many displaced persons their countries were accepting. When it comes to internal security, a more traditional vein of security studies could be utilized, especially because the state is a principal actor. It is clear that authorities in both Sweden and Denmark wanted to take matters into their own hands, and show their citizens that they had the issue under control. Sweden's Interior Minister, Anders Ygemen said in a statement:

> Border checks and identity checks are still necessary in the interest of public order and internal security in Sweden. Sweden belongs to Schengen, and Schengen's main point is freedom of movement. (The Copenhagen Post, July 4th 2016).

He emphasizes that the checks are important response to a potential security threat, but at the same time that he believes in the open borders of Schengen. The correct response to this security threat, he states, is the continued border checks. Authorities in Denmark seemed to be much more concerned about internal security than their neighbor, where Støjberg said in a statement:

> We need to look out for Denmark. We have to protect ourselves against the Islamic State groups, who are trying to take advantage of the situation where there are holes in borders. But also as protection against the influx of refugees coming through Europe (Euronews, May 2nd 2016).

Støjberg makes it clear that the measures were against potential terror attacks by Islamic groups, but she also talks about how the country has to protected itself against *the influx of refugees*. This position implies a comparable concern over refugees and terrorist groups, where they are talked about evenly as threats that Denmark has to protect itself against.

The actions Denmark had taken was clear: asylum seekers and refugees had become fully securitized, and increasingly seen and equivocated as a threat. This securitization then served as an excellent justification for the continued preservation of these border checks. Pressure on the external borders and the fact that not all countries were guarding them well enough also had its influence.

7.3. The New Nordic welcome? "It is not working, we cannot have them here."

The third question explores if the border control can be explained by the *increased threat to values*? It was an initial hypothesis that much more would surface regarding popular fears about how the majority of displaced persons were Muslim, and the threat this could pose to 'Nordic values'. There were some groups that expressed their concerns in such language, but the political elite stayed mostly away from this discourse. A group of self-proclaimed pirates from Sweden went, in their words, "refugee hunting" on the Öresund strait. The founder of the group, Dennis Ljung said:

> Swedish people and the Norwegians can't live together with Islamic people, it's not going to work. We have looked at many cases now in Sweden where Muslims behave violently. It is not working, we cannot have them here. We should help them but not in Sweden (RT news, April 17th 2016).

Ljung's terminology is interesting to note. He talks about *Islamic people*, instead of the common use of refugees and asylum seekers, or instead of even using immigrants or migrants. It is also worth pointing out that Ljung mentions that they should be helped, just not in Sweden: there is mistrust in their authorities to successfully deal with this matter. The Danish spokesperson for immigration matters in the Venstre party, Marcus Knuth, said in an interview:

> We want Denmark to be as open as possible for people who come here legally, and shut as much as possible for people who come here illegally and don't want to work and be a part of society. My hope is we can keep the amount of illegal immigration and asylum seeking to a minimum (The Nation, September 27th 2016).

Knuth talks about making it difficult for people to come to the country illegally, but it would be interesting to know what his definition of illegal is, particularly as the 1951 Refugee Convention, discussed earlier in this thesis, explicitly states that refugees are

not to be punished when entering and living in a country 'illegally'. He as well wants to keep 'asylum seeking' down, as if it is the same as entering illegally, along with implying that people who are not willing to assimilate are not welcome. There have been argument that displaced persons should fully *become* Swedish or Danish, which is both of dubious possibility, and arguably far too much to ask of an individual. I can see 'othering' in both of the statements above, where locals label the displaced persons as the other. As long as persons hold this believe, it is difficult to imagine that they will accept the group into their society.

7.4. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to seek justifications from discourse coming out of Denmark and Sweden regarding their reintroduction of border control. The main research question put forth at the beginning of the thesis was the following:

> *What distinguishes the discourses of Denmark and Sweden concerning the reintroduction of border control amidst the influx of displaced persons in 2015 and 2016?*

The result of my discourse analysis demonstrate that for Sweden, the discourse was primarily constructed around fears of damaging their system trough the intense pressure sourced from the large number of displaced persons entering the country. For Denmark, the discourse was mostly occupied with preventing large groups of displaced persons that they often saw as illegal immigrants, accumulating in the country, with the prevalent and repeated theme of internal security. I additionally explored three main questions that served as a hypothesis for the proposed border controls as: *pressure on the system, threat to internal security* and *threat to values*, but discussion regarding those were in the previous subsections of this chapter. In order to seek further explanations, I put forth two supporting questions, or codes: *discourse from the non-elite* and *from displaced persons.* I believe that I have answered the main research question, along with the other three and the supplementary two, sufficiently and if the research was to be carried out again, the outcome should demonstrate results in a similar manner.

Security studies have taken on immense changes since the end of the Cold War and with the introduction of Critical Security Studies, new ways have been introduced to

combat threats as they are presented. Out of the theories introduced, the Copenhagen School and the concept of securitization are at the forefront to explain how and why some of the actions taken by Danish and Swedish authorities were made possible. The other main schools of security studies, the Aberytwyth and the Paris schools offered some fair explanations, but not sufficient enough to explain the matters. Human security proved to be an important concept in this thesis, but it has, however, not received the attention and urgency it deserves regarding this issue. This is especially relevant in relation to the displaced persons, who should be able to live with "freedom from fear and freedom from want" according to the concept.

I hope this research has developed new knowledge in this field of scholarship, especially in the particular case for Denmark and Sweden. As for limitations, these results cannot be generalized to fit other countries, in particular the Nordic countries, where an additional research would be required. As for this thesis, more attention seems to have been awarded to Sweden then Denmark, but since the border measures were first introduced there, and arguably came as more of shock, the country was somewhat in the foreground of the issue in question. It would have been a great addition to this thesis, if I had been able to interview some of the actors involved, persons in power, the non-elite or the displaced persons. It is clear that further research could to be conducted on this matter and therefore, I believe that it would offer an important insight to research the viewpoint of the displaced persons, especially because they were largely under-represented in this thesis.

As of May 1st 2017, the border controls were still intact and had been announced to continue until at least until May 11th. However, news surfaced on May 2nd where Swedish authorities announced that they would stop identification checks in two locations, one notably on the Öresund Bridge and the other on the maritime border between the Danish city of Helsingør and Helsingborg in Sweden. The Swedish government did, however, not say that they were withdrawing completely from the border controls, but a refocus of efforts had been made to monitor crossings of people (Euronews, May 2nd 2017). At that time, news about the actions of Danish authorities regarding their border measures had not emerged. The European Union also provided a statement on May 2nd, noting that the Schengen countries that had reintroduced

border control should abolish them by November 2017, at the latest (European Commission 2017). It is therefore apparent that some changes should be under way in the near future concerning the case in question, and it will be interesting to follow the events as they uncover.

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Appendix 1 – News Articles

1. Al Jazeera, *Denmark and Sweden tighten border controls* (January 4, 2016a).
2. Al Jazeera, *Refugees look to the sea as Sweden tightens land border* (January 15, 2016).
3. Al Jazeera, *Sweden begins border ID controls to halt refugee influx* (January 4, 2016b).
4. Al Jazeera, *Sweden imposes new refugees border controls* (November 12, 2015).
5. The Atlantic, *How Not to Welcome Refugees* (January 27, 2016).
6. The Atlantic, *Why Sweden tweaked its migrant policy* (November 12, 2015).
7. BBC News, *Denmark approves controversial migrant assets bill* (January 26, 2016).
8. BBC News, *Denmark responds to Sweden border checks with own controls* (January 4, 2016).
9. BBC News, *EU migrant crisis: Sweden may reject 80,000 asylum claims* (January 28, 2016).
10. BBC News, *Migrant crisis: EU plans penalties for refusing asylum seekers* (May 4, 2016).
11. BBC News, *Migrant crisis: Sweden border checks come into force* (January 4, 2016).
12. BBC News, *Migrant crisis: Swedish border checks introduced* (November 12, 2015).
13. BBC News, *Sweden far-right party makes gains from migrant crisis* (November 11, 2015).
14. BBC News, *Swedish government struggling over migrant crisis* (May 3, 2016).
15. Business Insider UK, *The Danish PM is seeking an emergency law to reject asylum seekers at borders* (August 30, 2016).
16. Business Insider UK, *Denmark and Sweden are cracking down on passport-free travel* (January 4, 2016).
17. Bloomberg, *Sweden imposes temporary border controls amid refugee crisis* (November 12, 2015)
18. Bloomberg, *Denmark Imposes Controls at German Border as Schengen Frays* (January 4, 2016).
19. Bloomberg, *Denmark Told to Snub EU Border Laws as Anti-Immigrants Dominate* (January 5, 2016).
20. Bloomberg, *Here´s how the refugee crisis threatens Swedish Social model* (March 31, 2016).
21. Bloomberg, *Refugees: Welcome to Sweden, You´ll get a job in a decade* (September 30, 2015)
22. Breitbart, *Danish PM attacks Sweden for imposing border control* (December 15, 2015).
23. The Christian Science Monitor, *Sweden, Denmark impose border controls. New stress on EU openness?* (January 4, 2016).
24. Copenhagen Post, *Asylum-seekers walk across Öresund Bridge to Sweden* (May 27, 2016).
25. Copenhagen Post, *Commuters demand millions in compensation for Swedish border control* (October 20, 2016).
26. Copenhagen Post, *Danish government to send 400 military employees to guard border with Germany* (January 5, 2016).
27. Copenhagen Post, *Danish temporary border controls using up enormous police resources*, (October 4, 2016).
28. Copenhagen Post, *Denmark continues to keep pace with Sweden´s border controls* (March 4, 2016).
29. Copenhagen Post, *EU Commission stipulates Denmark must remain in Schengen to get new Europol deal* (December 8, 2016).
30. Copenhagen Post, *Sweden extends border control again* (April 8, 2016).
31. Copenhagen Post, *Sweden to refugees: 'We´ll close Öresund Bridge if necessary'* (December 3, 2015).
32. Copenhagen Post, *"Impossible to say" when border controls between Denmark and Sweden will become easier to navigate* (July 4, 2016).
33. CNN, *Sweden introduces border controls to halt flow of refugees* (January 4, 2016).

34. *CNN, Refugee crisis: Why Scandinavian countries are trying to look bad* (February 8, 2016).
35. Daily Mail, *Sweden launches its own 'Berlin Wall' with Denmark as it orders travellers to show Id for the first time in 50 years...while Copenhagen closes borders with Germany* (January 4, 2016).
36. The Denmark times, *Sweden and Denmark want new border control extension (*December 16, 2016).
37. DV, *Svíar auka landamæraeftirlit vegna flóttamannastraumsins* (November 12, 2015).
38. Deutsche Welle, *New Swedish border controls: A blow to Schengen?* (March 1, 2016).
39. Deutsche Welle, *No quick return to Schengen* (October 13, 2016).
40. Deutsche Welle, *Refugees unwelcoe in Denmark* (January 20, 2016).
41. Deutsche Welle, *Sweden, Denmark vow to limit border checks as refugee pressure on Schengen mounts* (January 6, 2016).
42. The Economist, *Sweden drops a barrier across the huge bridge that links it to Denmark* (January 5, 2016).
43. European Commission, *Back to Schengen: Commission takes next steps towards lifting of temporary internal border controls* (May 4, 2016).
44. European Commission, *Delivering on migration and border management* (September 28, 2016).
45. European Parliament News, *MEPs back plans to pool policing of EU external borders* (June 7, 2016).
46. Euractiv, *Denmark and Sweden extend border checks until November* (June 1, 2016).
47. Euractiv, *Denmark to introduce border controls* (December 15, 2015).
48. Euractiv, *EU offers Denmark police data access amid terror warnings* (December 9, 2016).
49. Euractiv, *Sweden extends border controls until November* (April 29, 2016).
50. Euronews, *Denmark extends controls on German border, EU set to allow more Schengen* (May 2, 2016).
51. Euronews, *Refuee crisis: Denmark "punishes people already here" to deter future asylum seekers*. (January 25, 2016).
52. Euronews, *Saving Schengen: Denmark, Sweden and Germany in emergency border talks* (January 6, 2016).
53. Euobserver, *Danish-Swedish border checks cause stress, delays* (June 21, 2016).
54. Euobserver, *EU extends internal border checks* (October 25, 2016).
55. Euobserver, *EU extends internal border controls* (November 11, 2016).
56. Euobserver, *EU reluctant to extend Schengen border checks* (October 14, 2016).
57. Euobserver, *EU offers Denmark backdoor to Europol* (December 8, 2016).
58. Euobserver, *Nordic politicians look to EU for border solutions* (April 20, 2016).
59. Eyjan, *Danir framlengja landamæraeftirlit: 230.000 manns hafa verið stöðvaðir á landamærunum* (February 23, 2016).
60. Eyjan, *Danir hefja landamæraeftirlit við þýsku landamærin* (January 4, 2016).
61. Eyjan, *Sænska ríkisstjórnin segir að flóttamenn ógni sænsku samfélagi* (November 13, 2015).
62. Eyjan, *Sænsk yfirvöld vita ekki um afdrif 14 þúsund flóttamanna* (November 28, 2015).
63. Express, *Denmark closes borders with Germany as migrants storm roads to reach asylum promised land* (September 10, 2015).
64. Express, *Denmark´s had it with Brussels: Borders will remain until EU 'gets control over crisis'* (October 17, 2016).
65. Express, *End of Schengen? Governments impose more border restrictions amid growing migration crisis* (January 4, 2016).
66. Express, *End of Schengen? Sweden´s internal borders remain as EU 'approves' ID checks* (November 2, 2016).
67. Express, *EU calls on Denmark to open borders 'as soon as possible' to help migrant-hit Germany* (February 23, 2016).

68. Express, *How 'totally unprecedented' migrant crisis is pushing Sweden to breaking point* (February 17, 2016).
69. Express, *'Living here doesn´t make you one of us' Danish Queen tells Muslims to adopt West´s values*. (October 26, 2016).
70. France24, *Sweden, Denmark impose stricter border controls to stem migrant influx (*January 4, 2016).
71. Foreign policy, *In defense of Denmark* (May 20, 2016).
72. Fox News, *The Latest: Sweden defends border control clampdown, calls for new rules on EU borders* (November 12, 2015).
73. Greater Copenhagen Post, *Denmark and Sweden want to merge border controls* (April 18, 2016).
74. Greater Copenhagen Post, *Danish ID border control with Sweden extended again* (November 2, 2016).
75. The Guardian, *Denmark to reimpose border controls 'within the Schengen rules'* (June 30, 2015).
76. The Guardian, *Denmark´s selfish stance does nothing to help the global refugee crisis* (January 27, 2016).
77. The Guardian, *EU border controls: Schengen scheme on the brain after Amsterdam talks* (January 26, 2016).
78. The Guardian, *Is the Schengen dream of Europe without borders becoming a thing of the past?* (January 5, 2016).
79. The Guardian, *Norway tells refugees who used cycling loophole to enter to return to Russia* (January 14, 2016).
80. The Guardian, *Sweden and Denmark are not all warm welcomes and cuddly politics* (January 28, 2016).
81. The Guardian, *Sweden and Denmark crack down on refugees at borders* (January 4, 2016).
82. The Guardian, *Sweden introduces border checks as refugee crisis grows* (November 12, 2015).
83. The Guardian, *Sweden slams shut its open-door policy toward refugees* (November 24, 2015).
84. The Guardian, *Swedish border controls hit Öresund bridge commuters as well as refugees* (January 4, 2016).
85. The Guardian, *These Denmark-Sweden border controls turn back the clock to a pre-Europe age* (January 5, 2016).
86. The Huffington Post, *The Ugly Duckling: Denmark´s Anti-Refuge Policies and Europe´s Race to the Bottom* (April 5, 2016).
87. Independent, *Denmark´s neighbors are even worse when it comes to refugees* (February 17, 2016).
88. Independent, *Denmark punishes citizens for helping refugees cross the border* (April 12, 2016).
89. Independent, *Eurovision 2016 will give focus to the refugee crisis despite Sweden´s stance on order control* (April 3, 2016).
90. Independent, *Laws restricting refugees' rights in Sweden spark backlash as thousands take to the streets* (October 23, 2016).
91. Independent, *Norway to build border fence with Russia to keep out refugees* (August 25, 2016).
92. Independent, *Sweden has done so much for refugees. Now it´s turned its back on them* (January 1, 2016).
93. Independent, *Refugee crisis: Denmark wants to seize jewellery and cash from asylum seekers* (December 17, 2015).
94. Independent, *Refugee crisis: Number of asylum seekers in Norway drops by 95%* (July 1, 2016).
95. Independent, *Refugee crisis: Sweden considering new law allowing 'emergency closure of Öresund Bridge to Denmark* (December 3, 2015).
96. Independent, *Refugee crisis: Sweden imposes border controls on bridge connecting Malmo and Copenhagen in Denmark to restrict migrants* (January 4, 2016).
97. Independent, *Refugee crisis: Danish watchwoman smuggles refugee on her boat from Copenhagen to Malmo* (September 8, 2015).
98. Independent, *Sweden sees record numbers of asylum seekers withdraw applications and leave* (August 25, 2016).
99. International Business Times, *Denmark: How the refugee crisis caused Europe´s liberal darling to lose its way* (June 8, 2016).
100. International Business Times, *Denmark Refugee Crisis Update: Copenhagen Extends Border Controls within Schengen Zone* (February 23, 2016).

101. International Business Times, *EU Refugee Crisis: Sweden-Denmark Border Checks Extended Amid Surge of Asylum Seekers* (January 7, 2016).
102. International Business Times, *Sweden introduces border checks amid migrant crisis* (January 4, 2016).
103. International Business Times, *Sweden petitions to close Danish bridge due to Europe refugee crisis* (December 4, 2015).
104. International Business Times, *Sweden to impose photo identity checks on Öresund Bridge to tackle refugee crisis* (January 4, 2016).
105. The Irish News, *Denmark and Sweden tighten border controls to stem flow of refugees* (January 4, 2016).
106. ITV, *Schengen zone in danger as Denmark and Sweden bring in new border controls* (January 4, 2016).
107. Kjarninn, *Íslendingar þurfa að sýna skilríki á landamærum Norðurlandana í fyrsta sinn í tæp 60 ár* (January 4, 2016).
108. Kjarninn, *Vilja framlengja landamæraeftirlitið* (October 16, 2016).
109. The Local Denmark, *Danish border control extended until November* (June 1, 2016).
110. The Local Denmark, *Denmark´s asylum numbers hit new low* (August 20, 2016).
111. The Local Denmark, *Denmark extends border controls into 2017* (November 14, 2016).
112. The Local Denmark, *Denmark extends ID checks at German border* (April 1, 2016).
113. The Local Denmark, *Denmark is forgetting itself in the wake of the refugee crisis'*. (May 2, 2016).
114. The Local Denmark, *Sweden checks send refugees to Denmark* (November 13, 2015).
115. The Local Germany, *Denmark begins German border passport checks* (January 4, 2016).
116. The Local Norway, *Nordic asylum claims drop after border moves* (January 22, 2016).
117. The Local Sweden, *Christmas gifts for commuters: Denmark to Sweden ID checks to get easier* (December 23, 2016).
118. The Local Sweden, *Could Sweden´s border controls soon be lifted?* (September 29, 2016).
119. The Local Sweden, *First migrants make it from Denmark to Sweden on foot* (May 27, 2016).
120. The Local Sweden, *Sweden and Denmark want new border control extension* (December 11, 2016).
121. The Local Sweden, *Sweden cuts 2016 refugee forecast by thousands* (October 25, 2016).
122. The Local Sweden, *Sweden extends border controls until November* (June 1, 2016).
123. The Local Sweden, *Sweden fights for EU border controls to stay* (May 2, 2016).
124. The Local Sweden, *Sweden implements temporary border checks* (November 11, 2015).
125. The Local Sweden, *Swedes´ social trust withstood refugee crisis* (November 26, 2016).
126. The Local Sweden, *Why do refugees prefer Sweden to Denmark?* (January 4, 2016).
127. Morgunblaðið, *Efna til fundar um hert eftirlit* (January 5, 2016).
128. Morgunblaðið, *Svíþjóð tekur upp landamæraeftirlit* (November 11, 2015).
129. Mail online, *The latest: Sweden: Border control to prevent illegal stays* (November 11, 2015).
130. Migration Policy Institute, *Overwhelmed by Refugee Flows, Scandinavia Tempers its Warm Welcome* (February 10, 2016).
131. Norden, *Fewer refugees but problems with ID and border controls* (January 11, 2016).
132. The Nation, *If Sweden and Denmark are so progressive, why did they close their doors to refugees?* (September 27, 2016).
133. New Europe, *ID border control remains between Denmark, Sweden* (November 3, 2016).
134. Newsweek, *Sweden introduces ID checks to curb refugee arrivals* (January 4, 2016).
135. Newsweek, *Why the Sweden-Denmark border controls will worsen the refugee crisis* (January 6, 2016).

136. The New York Times, *Europe´s Border Checks because economic choke points* (March 1, 2016).
137. The New York Times, *Sweden and Denmark Add Border Checks to Stem Flow of Migrants*, (January 4, 2016).
138. The New York Times, *'I´ve become a racist': Migrant wave* (September 5, 2016).
139. NPR*, As migrants flow in, Sweden begins to rethink its open door policy* (March 7, 2016).
140. *NPR, Danish government dealing with refugee crisis at home and abroad* (May 13, 2016).
141. NPR, *Denmark wants to become 'a little bit less attractive' to refugees* (January 25, 2016).
142. NPR*, Sweden implements tighter border controls amid migrant crisis,* (January 5, 2016).
143. PBS News hour, *Feeling burden of migrant crisis, Sweden imposes border controls* (November 12, 2015).
144. Politico, *Ending Schengen would cost up to 20 billion euros* (October 13, 2016).
145. Quartz*, Denmark and Sweden are abandoning open borders in the face of the migrant crisis* (January 4, 2016).
146. Reuters, *Danish PM seeks emergency law to reject asylum seekers at borders,* (August 30, 2016).
147. Reuters*, Danes, Swedes impose new border checks in fresh blow to open-frontier Europe* (January 4, 2016).
148. Reuters, *Danish volunteer soldiers replace police at German border amid immigrant crisis* (April 26, 2016).
149. Reuters*, Denmark extends border control on borders with Germany,* (February 2, 2016).
150. Reuters, *Denmark needs to extend temporary border controls, PM says* (September 28, 2016).
151. Reuters*, Denmark imposes temporary border control to Germany* (January 4, 2016).
152. Reuters, *EU, Denmark find deal on Europol after Danes voted to quit* (December 15, 2016).
153. Reuters, *EU gives green light to German, Swedish temporary border checks* (November 13, 2015).
154. Reuters, *EU stands by emergency border checks even as migration eases* (September 28, 2016).
155. Reuters*, Migrants put Sweden´s cozy Nordic Model under pressure* (July 7, 2016).
156. Reuters, *Sweden checks trains for migrants in first border control in 20 years* (November 12, 2015).
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