

University of Iceland  
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Economical Affects of Landmines:  
Sanski Most Municipality,  
Bosnia and Herzegovina

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## **Abstract**

Landmines and Unexploded Ordinance or UXO continue to keep communities in about 70 countries, in economical, psychological, physical and social hostage. The threat of landmines has lead to devastating effects on communities as well as whole countries where for example agricultural production is only half of what it used to be.

The objective of this research is to cover the topic of landmines from different perspectives but the main focus is to compare agricultural production before the Bosnian War and after the war in the Municipality of Sanski Most which is located in the North-western part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second objective is to look specifically at the small village of Sasina which is located within the Municipality and examine how the people in the village cope with the threat of landmines even when over a decade has passed since the end of the conflict.

The methodology of the study is based on field visits to the village of Sasina and interviews with villagers; use of appropriate literature and other resources which cover the subject of landmines, history of the Balkans, theories of war to mention a few. Part of the research involved statistical analysis of agricultural production as an attempt to conclude the economical affects of landmines on the municipality. The research compares as well the landmine context in Bosnia and Herzegovina to that of Afghanistan and Mozambique.

The study comes to the overall conclusion, that the economical situation is quite different among the three countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina is economically much further ahead and which makes a difference when it comes to economical survival of the communities and the threat of landmines, Un-Exploded Ordinance (UXO). The conclusion of the statistical analysis on agricultural production in the Municipality of Sanski Most shows that the absence of the Bosnian Serb ethnic group has far more economical affects than the threat of landmines. The landmine pollution in the village of Sasina does have economic affects on the inhabitants however there are other elements counter-affecting the

impact. It was more a question of negative psychological and sociological affects rather than economical.

**Keywords:** war, landmines, agriculture, husbandry, economics, Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Mozambique.

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The Memorial fund of Margrét Björgólfssdóttir financially supported the research. There are a number of people in the field who assisted with and facilitated the research. I have to mention Mrs. Biljana Bosancic my assistant who took additional interviews, Mr. Jasmin Selman the focal point for landmines in Sanski Most Municipality, Commander Rafic Mulalic, the Commander of the Bosnian de-mining team, and last but not least, all the informants in Sasina village, as it is clear that without them this research would never have materialized.

## **Introduction**

In early 1990 I quite frequently used the underground transportation system in London. What attracted my attention were the large posters with beautiful pictures from the coastline of Yugoslavia and bold text encouraging people to visit the country, and I thought to myself: “Well, I wouldn’t mind going there!”

In November 1993 I went to the Balkans for the first time. I had been offered a mission with the International Committee of the Red Cross – Geneva (ICRC) through the Icelandic Red Cross. The location was in Zagreb, Croatia and my job title was Relief Administrator responsible for relief items for the airlift into Sarajevo. My task was basically to organize the loading of the Russian made Iluzium 76 cargo plane that the ICRC was using to transport relief items to Sarajevo, a city under siege, where approximately 20.000 people were receiving food from a number of soup-kitchens which the ICRC was running.

While being important work it was definitely not exciting. My working days were 7 days a week, stuck in a warehouse hangar close to the airport and the only time I got some time off was when there was a fog and planes couldn’t take off. Sometimes on Fridays I would watch my colleagues rushing off to Budapest, Hungary, Austria or other places for a long weekend. That would have been nice but I did manage to get few days off and went to Iceland. I only went for one brief trip to Sarajevo, where I met up with Martin, another ICRC Delegate, who was on the receiving end in Sarajevo and responsible for distribution in the city.

In May 1994, I finished my mission and having this background, I was not at all satisfied with the time I had spent in Zagreb. I remember when the plane took off and was flying over the city; I looked out of the window and said to myself “I will never come here again, never...” However I could never have imagined how wrong that turn out to be.

In October 1996, I accepted an offer to go to the Kosovo region of the former Yugoslavia as a Logistics Manager for Children’s Aid Direct; a UK based Non-Government Organization (NGO). Again in April 1997, I was offered a position in Bosnia and Herzegovina on a long term reconstruction/rehabilitation project. The organization was Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and the work

involved mainly re-construction of houses, apartments and infrastructure such as schools, health care centers, roads, bridges. In the same month, we opened up an office in Sanski Most, which is located in the north-western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina and which would become my home until the end of 1999.

Being in a busy office with a lot of field work and weekends off, I had ample opportunities to explore the surroundings of the project area. One thing that I noticed on the military maps which were used to locate more accurately damage houses, was a clearly marked road which led directly from Sanski Most to Banjaluka, the main city in Republika Srpska. Asking around, I was informed that part of the road could not be driven because it was inside a landmine belt that stretched along the demarcation line of the two entities of Bosnia. Still curious about what this road looked like, I decided one day to drive as far as possible to see where I would end up. Where I ended up was at the village of Sasina where landmines were clearly marked with red ribbons, labeled with the word “MINE” and with skulls on them. The ribbons had been placed close to the side of the road, and driving further these ribbons became more and more condensed. I realized that I had gone too far and carefully turned the car around and drove back. This was my first experience of being close to landmines and it was not at all a nice feeling. Apart from the looted and or partly destroyed houses there were two main landmarks which I noticed, one was the school, which was not in bad shape, and the other was the church which had only the bell tower standing. We could not work in this area as the mines needed to be removed, but later on we learned that the Caritas Switzerland carried out some reconstruction work in the area.

I did not leave the Balkans until 5 years later in October 2001, when offered a mission in Tanzania for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. However, Zagreb became a city that I visited quite frequently both for business and for rest and recreation, but by then the city had changed. The beautiful Croatian coast was as well frequently visited during the summer for weekend breaks or holidays and the thoughts which came to my mind in the underground in London early 1990, actually became very real.

In 2006, I was in communication with the LWF office in Sanski Most and was looking for sites where I could possibly conduct research for my MA thesis. Sasina was one of three villages mentioned. Nearly a decade had passed and still the threat of landmines existed in this small village. Only about 10% of the original inhabitants had returned after the war or approximately 300 people. The agricultural households were down to about 67 and the majority of the villagers were pensioners. Even though the school had by now been reconstructed, it was not operating as there were simply not enough children in the village. It was a sad feeling looking at the agricultural fields in disarray and one can truly say that the war had not only had devastating economical affects on the village but it was in a way like the soul of the village had left when the war broke out. Having said that, there were indeed some children there and who hopefully as years pass by, will find and build up the future of the village.

This MA thesis aims to examine the affects of landmines on countries and communities where the focus is on the economical affects and counts as 50% or 30 units in the old grading system of University of Iceland, Faculty of Social Science. The supervisor of this thesis is Dr. Jónína Einarisdóttir at University of Iceland. In Chapter 1 theories of war and military researches will be introduced. In Chapter 2 the historical background of war on the Balkans will be covered including the war in Bosnia. Landmines and the horrific consequences of the menace including the landmine situation in Afghanistan and Mozambique are the main topics in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 introduces Bosnia and Herzegovina and the landmine situation in the country. Chapter 5 introduces the methodology of the field research. In Chapter 6 the agricultural production and agricultural statistical calculations in Sanski Most municipality is one of the key focus in this research. In Chapter 7 and through interviews, covers the village and the inhabitants of Sasina and their dilemma of living in close proximity of landmines. Chapter 8 draws the conclusions to this research.

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## **Chapter 1 - Military research and theories of war**

### **1.1 Origin and nature of war**

A lot has been written about war. Since beginning of history or at least 10.000 years, man has fought organized wars but that was confirmed when artifacts were found about the Neolithic community located in the Middle-East (Dawson, 1996).

Many individuals including specialists have come up with different theories about wars and tried to answer the question: “Why does the human being engage in wars?” Both the knowledge and the background of these theories are from different academics such as philosophers, anthropologists, archeologists, biologists. While there remain huge differences in these theories, many of them link up one way or another (Dawson, 1996).

According to Thomas Hobbs, which as well has been named “the father of modern political philosophy” the human kind is by nature war orientated (Dawson, 1996:3). War by civilized nations is a direct continuation of wars of the primitive ones. Hobbes quoted among others Thucydides<sup>1</sup> in his work, that there were three main reasons for disputes. Firstly he puts competition, secondly; intolerance and thirdly glorification or fame. Hobbes justifies preventative war, that is, to attack the enemy before being attacked.

Contrary to the Hobbs theories, theories introduced during the Rousseau period, were far more positive towards the humanity and the classical traditions had another alternative of origin of war, that the primitive and natural state was peaceful and war is one consequences of accruals of wealth and inequality (Dawson, 1996). During the same period, Baron Montesquieu turned these classical traditions into a serious theory of anthropology and created a historical period rather than historical myth. Baron Montesquieu claimed that strengthening civil society was progress and agreed to “justifiable wars” and even conquest of

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<sup>1</sup> See further about Thucydides on: <http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GREECE/THUCY.HTM>

territories. This meant that war must be created by the state not the individual, communities nor people. Wars were derived from politics and not from the human nature. Rousseau did not hesitate and supported the assumption. He was rightly considered the philosopher of peace as Hobbs was considered philosopher of wars.

Herbert Spencer, who is famous for putting together the words “survival of the fittest” to describe the following: “From the beginning the victory of one person over the other, has been the victory of the social being over the anti-social being or victory of those who have adaptability over those who have less adaptability” (Dawson, 1996:8). Nine years later Darwin published his book “Origin of the species” where some thought that he had borrowed some ideas from Spencer but in fact he actually had developed his own theories but a bit similar.

Other theories deriving from biology, archeology, psychology, sociology etc., were developed. The animal instinct of the human being was as well disputed, Sigmund Freud wrote to Albert Einstein in 1932 and claimed that war has its origin in the “the death-instinct” and “lust for violence and destruction” (Dawson, 1996:14). The latest research on apes show them attacking each other has in fact reactivated ideas that our forefathers attacked each other (Otterbein, 1999).

In his “Historical essay”, Otterbein (1999) has identified four major periods in his brief history of warfare and these are based mostly from anthropological perspectives. These periods are; the Foundation Period, Classical Period, Golden Age and the Recent Period. During the Foundation Period (c. 1850-c. 1920) ethnographic data collected in the field became more available. The study of warfare was not a central concern for early anthropologists. The reason being that war was not an ongoing phenomenon while anthropologists were conducting their fieldwork; they were morally opposed to war, some pacifists; and thirdly they failed to appreciate the important role that war can play in the affairs of native peoples; they appear not to have focused their reading upon historians and political scientists. The main characteristic of the Classical Period (c. 1920-c. 1960) was the myth of the peaceful savage. The myth is a direct outgrowth of

evolutionary thought that became firmly rooted in the Foundation Period. Once the myth sprouted in the Classical Period it was nurtured by cultural relativism. Well established, the myth came to influence research in the next two major periods.

According to Otterbein (1999), the Golden Age (c. 1960-c. 1980), the main characteristics of this period are research and publications by anthropologists dealing with war, and which dramatically increased in the 1960s. These were both theoretical and ethnographic researches and publications. During this period, theories of the causes and effects of war proliferated, classic ethnographies were produced, and cross-cultural studies, some using a developmental approach similar to those used in the previous two periods, flourished. During this period, anthropologists were very much looking at tribal warfare. Anthropologists took sides, one who believed that band and tribal peoples were warlike and others who believed they were not.

The main trends which characterize the research of the Recent Period (c. 1980 - ) is the focus on origin and seriousness of war, ethnic wars and genocide, and studies of peaceful people. The recent interest of anthropologists has been ethnic wars and genocide, which can they be seen as resulting from expanding states but as well can be viewed as a result of the breakup of the state. Studies of peaceful societies have recently flourished but in general it is acknowledged that peaceful societies are rare but are believed to be worth studying for the guidance they can give as to how peace might be achieved. Peaceful societies are considered usually isolated societies, such as the Amish and or very small scale societies, hunter-gatherers. According to Otterbein (1999), the history of research suggests that theories neither accumulate nor replace each other, but rather that a process occurs that involves both attrition and combination.

Ever since the onset of systematic research on military intervention, there have been fundamental differences between the main schools of thought. Paul Wehr<sup>2</sup> in 1979 distinguished between seven fundamental statements of nature and causes of conflicts (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999). According to

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<sup>2</sup> Mr. Wehr is a sociologist focusing on peace research and peace study movement, which started in the late 60s and late 70s are response to the war in Vietnam. Most of his work has been in university, carrying out peace research, teaching conflict sociology.

Wehr, conflicts can be seen as inherited among social animals, derived from the nature of societies and their build up; as a cause of interruption in the social system and symptom of stress, as an active element in the social system and part of necessary social development; as an unavoidable part of conflict of interests between states in an international anarchy, as a cause of misjudgment and bad communications. It is a natural process common to all societies.

Joseph S. Nye (2005) states that the origin of conflict can be found in the nature (i.e. theories of paganism and anthropology). Some causes are connected with relationship between the warring parties (i.e., certain theories of behavior sciences, sociology and social-psychology), and other special connections that build up each conflict and which in some cases create the conflicting parties (i.e., neo-realist and Marxism theories). It's clear as well that some explanations are political mediations, whether initiated by the warring parties or third party.

According to the historian Kaldor (1999), ideas about war as part of an operation of a state did not become established until the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century. The only example before this was the era of the Roman Empire, still the Roman wars were not unilateral but rather against tribes who had no precedent of separation of state and the society. According to Kaldor (1999), Martin van Creveld<sup>3</sup> is of the opinion that the wars between the Greek city-states could not have been considered war between states as there was no clear differentiation between the state and its citizens. From the fall of the Roman Empire until the late Middle-Ages, wars were conducted by many parties; i.e., the church, Barons, "primitive" tribes, city-states; and each had their own special military tactics. Therefore the battles of the "primitive" tribes were built on general war supporters; the individual warrior was the key of every military unit. The Barons depended on cavaliers who had their own moral rules and were supported by peasants and or slaves. Typical city-states in North Italy had to depend on armed civilians just as the old Greek city-states had to do. According to Kaldor (1999:15), "war, in the Clausewitzian definition, is war between states for a definable political ends, i.e. state interest."

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<sup>3</sup>Mr. Creveld is a military historian and has written 15 books about military history and strategy.

## **1.2 The military philosophy of Clausewitz**

Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz was born in 1780 and became a Prussian soldier and intellectual. He wrote a book which has become the most influential work of military philosophy in the Western world. That book, “On War” has been translated into virtually every major language and remains a living influence on modern strategists in many fields. Clausewitz, who came from a middle-class background, had vast own experience of warfare. He first entered combat at the age of 13 and gained extensive combat experience against the armies of the Revolutionary France. By the age of 38 he had risen to the rank Major-General of the Prussian state, later he became a well known military educator; he married a woman of high nobility, Countess Marie von Bruhl, and moved into the intellectual circles of Berlin.

According to Clausewitz (1780-1831) war in itself is a social action. It’s about getting troops together and the management of men (nearly never women) as individuals, for the purpose of inflicting as much violence as possible; therefore wars are about organizing social communications (Kaldor 1999). Christopher Bassford (2008) has studied Clausewitz and believes that his writings about war are not only important for their content but rather for how much influence these writings have had on later Western, as well as many other military thinkers. Even Antoine-Henri Jomin<sup>4</sup>, who was wrongly considered Clausewitz’s rival, read his book “On War.” He then wrote a book; Summary of the Art of War in 1838 and did not hesitate to take some liberty with the Clausewitz book. Clausewitz’s original ideas have been rejected, misunderstood, distorted, developed and agreed to, adopted, etc. for 166 years. According to Bassford (2008) that does not mean that there are weaknesses in Clausewitz’s theories, on the contrary it shows their fundamental strengths, flexibility and adoptability, and reflect the wants and stubbornness of those who use them.

Bassford (2008) maintains that Clausewitz’s methodology of military action was first and foremost built on reality; not only in the sense that he was suspicious of political theories and “naked power” but rather in a way that

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<sup>4</sup> Further information about Antoine-Henri Jomini can be found on the following webpage:  
[http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Antoine-Henri\\_Jomini](http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Antoine-Henri_Jomini)

reflected complex and unforeseen happenings in the world. Clausewitz takes into consideration both the weakness of human nature and the complex geographical and sociological patterns of humans on this earth. The most famous Clausewitz quote is “War is merely continuation of politics.”<sup>5</sup>

### **1.3 Factors affecting wars**

Research and analysis which are built on quantitative sources have been used to support theories about probability that states will initiate conflicts and wars. The same research has been used as well to refute theories of conflicts and wars. The most common quantitative information models that are used are i.e., World Event Interaction Survey or WEIS,<sup>6</sup> Comparative Research On Event of Nations or CREON<sup>7</sup> and Correlates of War or COW<sup>8</sup>, but various other quantitative models exist and are used to research various elements of conflicts in the world (such as COPDAB, DON etc.).

In the book “Nations at War - A Scientific Study of International Conflict” Singer and Geller (1998) examine studies of war that build on quantitative methodological approaches. These studies aim at identifying factors of importance for outbreak of war. According to such studies based on quantitative data from European states from 1816 to 1965 on population density, geographical areas and war, population density as well as changes in the density had no link with embarking on a war. Size of a state has also been pointed out as a factor influencing its probability of entering a war. According to Singer and Geller (1998) by using the CREON model to analyze 36 states in 1959 and 1968 in 1973, East found quite a number of cross-effects between the size of the state and participation in foreign conflicts. Large developed countries had proportionately the highest war behavior pattern, while small developed countries had the lowest proportion.

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<sup>5</sup> Further explanation of this statement can be found on the following link:  
<http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/CWZSUMM/CWORKHOL.htm#Politik>

<sup>6</sup> WEIS – see further on the following link:  
<http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/WPP.APPENII.HTM>

<sup>7</sup> CREON see further on the following webpage: <http://ssdc.ucsd.edu/ssdc/icp05205.html>

<sup>8</sup> COW – see further on the following webpage:  
<http://www.pcr.uu.se/conferenses/Euroconference/nilspetterpapper.pdf>

In 1980 Duval and Thompson published results of a research using the WEIS model to analyze participation of 147 states from 1966 to 1969 (Singer and Geller, 1998). They concluded that the size of the population, size of the economy, geographical size, size of the military and level of economic development do not connect with participation of the states in foreign conflicts.

The level of economic development, in both directions, had as well been used to explain war. For example, it has been pointed out that developed countries as well as developing countries could engage in aggressive geographical expansion strategies and be war oriented as well (Singer and Geller, 1998). In research by Richardson from 1960, hardly any quantitative evidence could be found connecting the level of the economic development and the 300 lethal conflicts in the years from 1820 to 1945. However Collier and Hoeffler (1998) using statistical models and analysis, in their research found out that the higher the per capita<sup>9</sup> income, comparing to international standards and which is normal, the lower the risk of a civil war. They state as well that increased natural resources increase the risk of a war however high level of natural resources starts to reduce this risk. This they interpret as the governments have more revenue and are able to spend more funds on building up the military and defend themselves.

In 1982 Thompson researched war patterns of four developed countries from 1792 to 1973, and the possibility that there could be a connection between business cycles and starting a war (Singer and Geller, 1998). Thompson came to the conclusion that expansion and contraction in a capitalist economy had nothing to do with the cause of war.

Researchers, who concentrate on the effects of cultural identity on interactivity in foreign conflicts and wars, indicate that there are minimal connections between these factors. Still, researchers who seek to connect national culture and foreign conflicts and wars, have come to contradictory conclusions. Singer and Geller (1998) point out that the research by Cattell and Grousch in 1965, which focused on 40 to 69 states from 1837 to 1958, showed that there are isolated incidents where pressure from national culture is strongly linked with participation in wars. In 1969, Rummel examined the connection between war

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<sup>9</sup> Average income per person

and national culture, i.e. if militarism is part of the historical culture or the culture has history of foreign conflicts being then part of the national culture. Rummel showed yet again that there is a minor connection between psychological characteristics of a population and foreign conflicts, but he examined 77 states in a short period of time; 1955 and 1957.

Studies that focus on finding quantitative connections between internal conflicts and international disputes have found conflicting results (Singer and Geller, 1998). Some have not managed to show any connections while other has found connections; but only when taking into consideration the kind of government or regime which is ruling. These researchers show the connection between internal conflicts and specific kind of foreign conflicts, where a specific type of government or regime is ruling. According to a research carried out by Geller in 1985 which covered 36 states concluded that states which have a number of internal conflicts are more probable to participate in aggressive foreign policy than states which have less internal conflict. There are therefore signs that the theory of connection between internal conflicts and foreign conflicts is correct.

Number of bordering countries has been identified as risk factor for war. In his research in 1960, Richardson came to the conclusion that geographical position of a country increases the probability of participation in a war; and the more borders it has with other countries proportionately, the more wars (Singer and Geller, 1998). In 1964, Wright used DON, a calculus-model, on 59 states between the years 1955 and 1960. He clearly came to the conclusion that a connection exists between the number of borders a states has with another state and the tendency to participate in violent foreign conflicts, that is; the number of borders a country has with another country, the more likelihood of conflict.

Quite a number of researchers have looked at the connection between ruling governments or regimes and wars. Among others elements that have been examined are central governments, contributions of bureaucracy, election cycles and pillars of politics. Conclusions from a research carried out by Wright, covering the period 1942 to 1964, indicates that many central governments are more likely to participate in a war than the de-centralized governments and or



more democratic governments (Singer and Geller, 1998). The process of centralization or de-centralization effects the participation in a war as well. The conclusion of research carried out by Gregg and Banks in 1965 was that the stronger the executive power, the more tendencies there was to have both diplomatic and violent foreign conflicts.

Researchers looking at election cycles have concluded that there is more probability that a state will go to war soon after elections rather than later. According to Gaubatz, the reason for this was that the elected power was afraid of being punished in the next elections (Singer and Geller, 1998). Other studies about causes of wars focus on the arrangements of democracy, the position of power of a state, military built-up, power circles, borders and opportunities related to them, unions between states, and when people in power want to expand their territory because of dissatisfaction.

King (1999) with his military background, has reviewed the book “Nations at War” by Singer and Geller, and in his critique, he points out that the authors use the word “correlates” in stead of the word “cause.” At the end of the day it is very difficult to decide the actual cause of war. The authors as well do not present a single theses or conclusion to their work. King as well criticizes the preconditions of their calculations for example to define a “severe war” as being 15,000 casualties while possibly the definition could be set at 30,000. Singer and Geller use three categories of stages of war, but what if the categories would be set at four, five or six? Would that change the outcome of the calculations? King suggest that they simplified their data and as he puts it: “The authors provide an interesting approach but reader would be better served by in-depth studies of individual cases examining specific causes of a war in all of their complexity” (King, 1999: 91).

Another type of wars which have been studied is rivalry wars and repeated wars. The analysis of Goerts and Diehl on prologue of wars or disputes from 1816 to 1992 concludes that during that period 26 percent of conflicts were isolated military disputes (Vasquez, 2000). This simply means that research of independent traditional conflicts does not apply, since nearly 40 percent of military disputes happen because of permanent disputes between rivals. Most or

three quarters of the disputes occur in some kind of rivalry dispute, both ad hoc disputes and permanent. He points out that according to a research conducted by Maoz in 1984 covering repeated conflicts, conclusions show that 76 percent of disputes are a direct continuation of previous disputes between the same states. These conclusions strongly indicate that previous wars increase the probability of future conflicts between the same states. The consequences of repeated conflicts seem to be pretty clear; repeated conflicts between the same states increase the probability of disputes and then war.

#### **1.4 The greed-grievance and new-old war disputes**

In the last decade two disputes have characterized research on wars: the greed versus grievance dispute and the debate on new war versus old war. The former is concerned with the root causes of civil wars while the latter treats mainly the characteristics of wars.

In their research Collier and Hoeffler (2004) looked on how rebellion could be financed and continue to be financed during the conflict. They found three main sources of funding namely; rebellions appear to be linked to the capture of valuable resources such as diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone or timber in Cambodia. Another type of funding is from people with the same ethnic background living abroad and sending funds to support the rebellion or continued war effort. The third element was funding from a hostile government which had stake in the rebellion. Having power over economical resources kept the rebellion ongoing and was a strong incentive possibly the main incentive to initiate a rebellion. However, the only proxy for grievance they used that had adverse effects on war was dominance of one ethnic group. Thus, Collier and Hoeffler (2004:588) argue that:

Opportunity as an explanation of conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretation of rebellion as greed-motivated. However, it is also consistent with grievance motivation as long as perceived grievances are sufficiently widespread to be common across societies and time. ... the

grievances that motivate rebels may be substantially disconnected from the large social concerns of inequality, political rights, and ethnic or religious identity.

Quoting a research by Angoustures and Pascal (1996), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) mentioned the case of funding from abroad and which keeps the ongoing independence struggle of the Tamil Tigers. The conflict is more or less financed by Tamil ethnic group living in i.e. United States. Shenoy in 2008 argues that while rebellion is more likely to continue and or succeed if the rebels have access to resources but seeking these resource could hardly be the reason for their very existence (Shenoy, 2008). Korf (2005) presents case studies and states that in the political economy of conflict, greed and grievances reinforce each other, meaning war or economies created by combatants and the survival economies of civilians are intertwined. Once a civil war has broken out, the political economy of war produce a self-sustainable favoritism along the lines of perceived of who is a friend and who the enemy is (Korf, 2005). The case studies indicate that because of the civil war and the breakdown of state and civic institutions, ethnicity becomes a mechanism for civilian actors to access resources available largely through arbitrary power. Civilians thus become part of the game. In contrast, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) tend to argue for greed as crucial for out-brake and continuation of wars, rather than grievance.

Not only the causes of warfare have become a matter for debate, but also the ways of waging wars. In one of her books about the new and old war debate, *New and Old Wars: Organizing Violence in a Global Era*, Kaldor (2005) defines "Old War" as predominately European and as they were conducted in the 18th and 19th century, while there always had been rebellions, colonial wars or guerrilla wars. These kinds of wars were in Europe and in other parts of the world and described as irregular warfare or not war at all. They were sometimes called uprisings, insurgencies or recently low-intensity conflicts. On the other hand, Kaldor (2005) defines the "New Wars" as the opposite. She claims that the New Wars take place in the context of the disintegration of states; they are wars fought by networks of state and non-state actors; often without uniforms. There could be

distinctive signs, for example wearing crosses or Ray-Ban sunglasses and Kaldor (2005) mentions the Croatian militia in Bosnia Herzegovina as an example. In New Wars, battles are rare and commonly violence is directed against civilians as a consequence of counter-insurgency tactics or ethnic cleansing. Typically the taxation is falling and war finance consists of looting and pillage, illegal trading and other war-generated revenue, and at the same time creating fear and hate. These are wars where the distinctions between combatant and non-combatant, legitimate violence and criminality are all blurred. However and importantly they construct new sectarian identities (religious, ethnic or tribal) that undermine the sense of a shared political community. However Kaldor (2005) admits that these wars are not entirely "new" They have much in common with wars in the pre-modern period in Europe, and with wars outside Europe through out the period. It is even possible to identify some elements of "New Wars" in within "Old Wars" which even makes the dispute of the definition more complicated.

When it comes to the Cold War and War on Terror, Kaldor (2005:4) argues that both the "Cold War" and the "War on Terror" are ways of keeping the idea of "Old War" alive more from political point of view than anything else, preventing them to see the reality of the "New Wars." Quoting Kaldor (2005:8) "... and the impact of fighting a reconstructed "Old War" was not victory over an enemy state but state disintegration and "New War." This surely applies to the war which was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina as previously mentioned, which has been analyzed and well documented through various literatures including academic, around the world.<sup>10</sup>

Kalyvas (2001) does not agree with Kaldor's definition and distinction of New and Old Wars. He argues that information about recent or ongoing wars seems to be incomplete and biased; and historical research on earlier wars tends to be disregarded. As Kalyvas puts it: "Most versions of the distinction between old and new civil wars stress or imply that new civil wars are characteristically criminal, depoliticized, private, and predatory; old civil wars are considered ideological, political, collective, and even noble."(Kalyvas, 2001:100). What

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<sup>10</sup> If one goes to [www.google.com](http://www.google.com) and writes "Books on war in Bosnia" the outcome will be 10.7 million hits. If one writes "Books on war in Bosnia and Herzegovina" the outcome is about 964,000.

Kalyvas (2001) is as well not agreeing to is the definition of looting being not clear because it's not clear whether it refers to causes of war or if it motivates the combatants or possibly both. The question remains whether people wage war in order to loot or do they loot to be able to wage war? If the latter is the case then looting may be no different from the widely accepted practice of "revolutionary taxation". The question remains also who is carrying out the looting; the elite' maybe; militias or armed peasants? Thirdly, Kalyvas states that the linkages between looting and grievances are complex and fluid.

By quoting number of resources, Kalyvas (2001) iterates the position that new wars are not really distinctive from old wars and refers to number of past historical literature and research. An example, are the warlords in 19th century China and argues that the main purpose of existence of the warlords was to rule rather than looting. Warlords were never considered bandits but they dominated specific territory by virtue and of their capacity to wage a war. Bandits in China and elsewhere had to hit and run in order to survive. Warlords place taxes on people, administer justice, maintain some degree of order, including generally assume the burdens of government in the areas they control Looting seems to be a recurring element of civil wars, including the most ideological ones such as the Russian revolution and the Chinese one. The French Revolution is mentioned in comparison to the New War but in the 1789 the French Revolutionary armies, were described by their contemporaries as "highwaymen," "vagrants," "robbers," "vagabonds," and "vicious, bloodthirsty hooligans. Violent ethnic conflicts such as on the Balkans but in fact violence is in fact the central component of all kinds of civil war, ethnic and non-ethnic alike. The conflict in Sierra Leone and the atrocities committed there as described by a European commissioner for humanitarian affairs, as carefully planned and centralized rather than gratuitous and random.

The conclusion of Kalyvas (2001) is that the diffraction of new and old wars is not clear and there is a need to specify the key mechanisms including identify the relevant empirical indicators, and collect appropriate and accurate data. Analytical and empirical research is needed for example; patterns of looting

may or may not vary with levels of war centralization, ethnic polarization, ideological commitment, or levels of violence.

## **1.5 Conclusions**

While mathematical formulas and analysis thereof can provide possibly strong case of probability that a conflict could break out or not, the fact remains that the dynamics of causes of conflicts can only be partly explained with these mathematical probability formulas. Whether its greed, grievances or even genetically inherited aggression the complex human behavior is and will remain difficult to predict.

This short summary of the war researches and theories of war provides partly understanding of a background of causes of war, it is important to link these researches and wars with the conflict on the Balkans. In the next chapter we will explore the history of conflicts on the Balkans and among others to seek possible reasons for these conflicts.

## **Chapter 2 - Wars on the Balkans**

History has left scars on the Balkans, these scars have reached deep into the heart of the former Yugoslavia, and one can say this is the root of the problem that later, and again much later, became the background of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mr. Patric Brogan (1998) in his book “World Conflicts” researches the relationship between humanity, violence, history and politics. He claims that the greatest dangers to peace at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are caused by ethnic rivalry. Brogan spent over twenty years as a foreign correspondent for British newspapers and among others covered some of the conflict in his book. The following summary of the historical background on the wars on the Balkans is more or less from his book and serves the purpose.

### **2.1 Historical background**

The geographical deviation of the territory of former Yugoslavia can be traced to the Roman Empire and the East-Roman Empire (Brogan, 1998). The north, where Slovenia and Croatia are located, became a Catholic dominated area and uses the Latin alphabet. In the south the Orthodox Church dominated and the Cyrillic alphabet is in use. From the time the Slavs moved into the Balkans in the seventh century, the territory of Slovenia and Croatia were part of Central Europe and looked to Vienna and Rome. The Kingdom of Croats was established in the year 924 and existed for two centuries. Later Croatia as well as Slovenia became part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and the territories in the South continued to be part of the East-Roman Empire until the Turks took control in the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> centuries and kept them for 500 years (Brogan, 1998). Dalmatian, the coasts of the Adriatic Sea, was separated from the inland for a number of centuries, first the

Venice Empire and then Austria kept a grip on the territory. Dalmatian, therefore, remained Catholic and is now part of Croatia. Ragusa was one of the cities of the Venice Empire and became one of the power commercial centers in the Middle Ages. The Turks took Ragusa, but it was allowed to keep its Catholic religion and the focus on western civilization and prosperity. The city was renamed Dubrovnik when Yugoslavia was established in 1919. This historical accident meant that Serbia never became part of the Adriatic coast and in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century and early 20<sup>th</sup> Century, during the wars, the overall strategy of the Serbs had always been to gain access to the sea, and Europe did everything to block that possibility. With the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1919, this issue was not solved and was immediately readdressed when Croatia declared independence in 1991.

The Serbs won their independence from the Turks in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. In June, 1903, members of a Serbian organization, the Black Hand, killed the King, Alexander Obrenovic and his wife Draga in their palace (Brogan, 1998). In the series of wars on the Balkans up to 1913, the Serbs annexed Montenegro, Kosovo and the northern territory of Macedonia. Austria went south and took Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878 and formally annexed the territory in 1908 and ignored the protests of Serbia.

## **2.2 The First World War**

According to Brogan (1998) on 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1914, the Black Hand was again in full action, when a Serbian activist, Gavrilo Princip, murdered Franz Ferdinand, the heir of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and his wife in Sarajevo. Princip was a member of the Black Hand, and the government of Serbia rejected any claim of being involved in the assassination, but it was known that individual members of the government were part of the conspiracy. Austria demanded compensations from Serbia; and when Belgrade hesitated, Austria issued an ultimatum which meant that the total surrender of Serbia to Vienna was required.

Emperors and Generals who sent their men to war in August 1914 did not think it would last longer than weeks, certainly not months and surely not years (Stoessinger, 1998).



Serbia asked their ally, the Russians, for support, who in turn supported their cultural brothers and mobilized their army (Brogan, 1998). Germany and France mobilized their armies as well, and Germany attacked France and Belgium. In the catastrophe which followed over 20 million died.

Serbia was badly destroyed during the First World War and lost one quarter of its mature men but came out of the ordeal as a winner (Brogan, 1998). During the peace discussions in Versailles in 1919, the main thinking was that the borders of Europe would reflect the fundamentals built on a homogeneous national culture and justice. That did not work out; as in fact, it was impossible. In the case of Serbia, it was confirmed that Macedonia would belong to Serbia, the Banat area which had been part of Hungary. Slovenia was annexed as well as Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. All these territories were placed under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenia, which later changed the name to Yugoslavia.

Between the First and Second World War, Yugoslavia was a federal state with a central government that rotated between the states but remained always under the power of the Serbs (Brogan, 1998). King Alexander Karadjordjevic was murdered in Marseille, France in 1934. This time it was a Macedonian terrorist whom Croatian Ustache<sup>11</sup> members had recruited for the job. The heir was Prince Peter, who was only 11 years old. The Government asked his uncle, Prince Paul, to take over as the ruling heir; he tried his best to maintain democracy and unity in Yugoslavia while Nazism was spreading over Europe. Italy and Hungary were allies of Germany and had territorial claims against Yugoslavia.

### **2.3 Second World War**

In 1938, Hitler annexed Austria; and in 1939, Mussolini took Albania. Yugoslavia was then surrounded (Brogan, 1998). In October 1940 Hitler occupied France and Mussolini attacked Greece. Mussolini lost and in the springtime the Greeks organized the freedom of Albania. He was then forced to ask Hitler for assistance.

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<sup>11</sup> Ustasche (or the Uprising) Organization was established in Croatia in 1929 by Ante Pavelic. This facist movement wanted to build up a Catholic, Croatian Kingdom from the ruins of Yugoslavia. During the WWII, Ustasche worked very closely with the Nazis and committed atrocities beyond anyone's imagination. Jews, Serbs and Gypsies were given even worse treatment than the methods the Nazis carried out.

Hitler, on the other hand, demanded that Prince Paul allow the German army to cross through Yugoslavia on its way to Greece. Paul caved in; and on 25<sup>th</sup> of March 1941 in Vienna, he signed a pact with Germany. This event created tremendous outrage among Serbs; and the next day he was overthrown by his own army. King Peter, then only 18 years of age, took over. The new power hoped to keep Hitler pleased by honoring the Vienna pact; however, Hitler refused to accept that one of his allies had been overthrown. He ordered that Yugoslavia and Greece should be immediately conquered. The offence began 6<sup>th</sup> of April 1941; and in only a few days the country was occupied, and King Peter had to flee in order to stay alive.<sup>12</sup>

According to Brogan (1998) it is thought that the cost of Hitler's decision was the failure to occupy Russia, because Yugoslavia kept up resistance against the Germans in a barbarian and deadly guerrilla warfare. The Germans needed 200,000 soldiers in Yugoslavia in order to keep up with Tito's resistance<sup>13</sup>. Hitler had to wait with his invasion of Russia for six weeks, and these soldiers could have been fighting on the Eastern front, and most likely would have won against the Russians because six extra weeks into a very cold winter made all the difference.

When the Germans had conquered Yugoslavia, they divided the country. Slovenia was partitioned between Germany, Italy and Hungary (Brogan 1998). Italy took Kosovo and a large part of Dalmatia; Bulgaria annexed Macedonia; and Hungary took back the Banat region. Croatia on the other hand was made an independent, fascist Kingdom under the ruling of Ante Pavelic, the leader of the Ustache organization. Croatia annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and a large part of Serbia, and Pavelic began getting the Serbs to convert to Catholicism. Those whom he could not convince were killed, as were the Jews. It is estimated that the Croatian dictatorship government was responsible for killing 700,000 people.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> It must be noted that he did not return until 1991.

<sup>13</sup> Various information about Tito, Josep Broz, and his life can be located on "his" homepage <http://www.titoville.com/>

<sup>14</sup> Further information about the killings carried out by the Ustache Organization during WWII as well as the barbaric prison camp they used can be found on the following webpage: <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005449>

## **2.4 Tito and the nationalistic / political arrangement**

Josip Broz, who used the guerilla name of Tito, was in Russia in 1914 (Brogan, 1998). During the revolution he participated in the civil war there and as well in the Spanish civil war. In 1941 he became the Secretary General of the Yugoslav Communist party, but that position was given to him by Stalin, after Stalin had executed his predecessor. During the Second World War, Tito fought the Germans and he called his military Partisans, after the Spanish guerillas that had fought Napoleon (Brogan 1998). The guerilla warfare in Yugoslavia was merciless, the Germans executed people to revenge its own losses, and the fight between Croats and Serbs was merciless as well. Muslims from Bosnia were hired both by Croats and Ustache to fight against Serbs, as well as by Germans to fight against Russians. It is worth mentioning that Ratko Mladic, witnessed his parents being executed by Ustache and lived to be one of the worst of Bosnia's war criminals.<sup>15</sup>

After the war, Tito established a Stalinist state and took a hard position against the Western countries (Brogan 1998). However, Tito quickly changed his mind and became more liberalist; and Stalin had Yugoslavia thrown out of the COMINTERN<sup>16</sup> or Communists International. After that Tito gave up on Stalinism and asked the West for assistance. He developed a moderate form of communism that lead to prosperity and peace in Yugoslavia. He encouraged western tourism, and he developed the coastline of Dalmatia to become the most popular travel destination in Europe. He played a large part in the Third World – a definition that he created with Nehru,<sup>17</sup> Chou En-lai<sup>18</sup> and Sukarno.<sup>19</sup> Even

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<sup>15</sup> Information about General Ratko Mladic can be found on the following link: <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mla-ai021010e.htm> and as well on: [http://www.interpol.int/Public/Data/Wanted/Notices/Data/1995/54/1995\\_47754.asp](http://www.interpol.int/Public/Data/Wanted/Notices/Data/1995/54/1995_47754.asp)

<sup>16</sup> More information about COMINTERN can be found on the following link: <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUScomintern.htm>

<sup>17</sup> Information about Nehru , among others, can be found on the following link: <http://www.kamat.com/kalranga/freedom/nehru.htm>

<sup>18</sup> Information about Chou En -ai can be found on the following website: <http://www.bartleby.com/65/zh/ZhouEnla.html>

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.asiasource.org/society/sukarno.cfm>

though changes in the political system were made, there remained only one political party in Yugoslavia. What ever the constitution claimed, the real power remained in the hands of the party.

Later, Tito put in place a federal constitution and presidential council on which the six republics had equal representation (Brogan, 1998). The Presidency of the Republics became a rotating Presidency of the Federal Republics for one year at a time. Even though this system did not work, it did not matter while Tito was alive. The solidarity of the party remained the foundation of Yugoslavia.

## **2.5 Yugoslavia after Tito**

When Tito passed away in 1980 and while the decade was passing, it was clear that the communist party and the constitution were disintegrating as well (Brogan 1998). They were under a lot of pressure and could not survive much longer. Competition had formed between the Croats and the Slovenians as well the division between the rich part in the north (Slovenia and Croatia) and the poorer part in the south. There were similar situations in Europe; but unlike Italy and Spain, the government was mostly in the hands of the south part of Yugoslavia. During Tito's time, the leadership used force and manipulation. However, after Tito, the leadership depended on vicious force without realizing that its power had been reduced tremendously through the years.

The economy of Yugoslavia had steadily down turned in the nineties (Brogan, 1998). The federal government lacked power to deal with the underlying economic and political problems. Slovenia and Croatia did well; Bosnia moderately, while Serbia had stagnated, and Macedonia and Kosovo were still in deep poverty. In 1988 there were unavoidable signs that the Yugoslav Federation would be dissolved.

The Serbs began demanding that their previous historical role as leaders of Yugoslavia be confirmed (Brogan, 1998). Milosevic became the leader of the Serbs with such an over whelming vote that Tito would have been the only other leader to achieve such a grand victory. It was clear that after this he could not be trusted by other leaders of neighboring countries. Milosevic demanded that Kosovo and the Vojvodina province, another self-determined region in the

northeast which had lost its rights, merge with Serbia. In October 1998, Milosevic organized demonstrations of 100,000 Serbs in Vojvodina, which led to the resignation of the local administration. As a result, administrators who supported Milosevic were put in place. After continuous riots in Kosovo in 1989 where Serbs had been among those killed, Milosevic swore in a mass protest that never again would Serbs be persecuted in their own country. But what he meant was when the Turks destroyed the kingdom of Serbs in 1389.<sup>20</sup> In this mass protest in Belgrade, it was estimated 600,000 people demonstrated against activities of the Albanians against the Serbs in Kosovo. In 1989 he was well established in Belgrade and sent the army into Kosovo to administer the region and depress all town- and regional governments.

While the Cold War was in full force, Yugoslavia was between enemies in the East and the West; and then the West was very much in favor of the Yugoslav Federation (Zimmermann 1999). One could say that Yugoslavia was pampered by the United States and the West. On the other hand in 1989 the world had changed a lot. The Cold War had come to an end and even the Soviet Union was disintegrating. Mikhail Gorbachev the leader of the Soviet Union had allowed the Eastern European countries to move away from Moscow's grip. Poland and Hungary had managed to establish some kind of western political system, and the Czechoslovakia followed soon after there came East- and West Germany<sup>21</sup>, Romania<sup>22</sup> and Bulgaria<sup>23</sup>.

The public in Eastern Europe had simply had enough (Brogan, 1998). Milosevic managed to implement a decision to take over the autonomous regions and demand more power for the Serbs in a Federal republic, which was, in fact, collapsing from within. And when the communist dictatorships in the

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<sup>20</sup> More can be read about the battle of Kosovo in 1389 on the following website:

<http://www.kosovo.net/kosbitka.html>

<sup>21</sup> The Berlin Wall fell on 9th of November 1989. Germany was unified less than a year later on 3rd of October 1990. Information about the Berlin Wall can be found on the following website: <http://www.dailysoft.com/berlinwall/history/berlinwall-timeline.htm>

<sup>22</sup> Ceausescu, the communist leader of Rumania was executed along with his wife in December 1989, more information can be located on the following website:

<http://www.phoenixcommand.com/hell4.htm>

<sup>23</sup> In 1990, in Bulgaria multi-party elections were allowed, the first one since WWII, democratic forces won control, see further information on the following website:

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bu.html>

surroundings countries were dissolving, it was clear that a major time error had occurred.

## **2.6 The Bosnian war**

Bosnia-Herzegovina had for a long time been without a sense of nationalism, which Milosevic was upholding in Serbia and which Tudjman was playing on in Croatia (Brogan, 1998). Only about 17 percent of Muslims practiced their religion, and there were a lot of mixed marriages: and Bosnians called themselves Yugoslavs instead of connecting themselves with national groups. With the first multiparty elections in 1990, Alija Izetbegovic<sup>24</sup> was elected as the first president of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bjarnason, 2001). He had already warned about recognizing Croatia on an international basis as it would create war in Bosnia. At that time Muslims were about 43 percent of the population of Bosnia while Croats were about 18 percent, which made them the majority.

Milosevic's xenophobia<sup>25</sup> and attacks on Muslims in the Serbian media would guarantee that Muslims would be a minority group oppressed in a Serbian led Federation (Brogan 1998). Both Tudjman and Milosevic did nothing to hide their plan to divide Bosnia between themselves and persecute Muslims.

In the short term, both Bosnian Serbs and the Croats had prepared themselves for war (Brogan, 1998). The Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic,<sup>26</sup> and his General, Ratko Mladic, never hid their disgust for Muslims

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<sup>24</sup> Fikret Abdic received more votes than Izetbegovic but the political party which they both belonged to, the SDA, decided that Izetbegovic would be the next president. Worth noting, that during Tito's time, Izetbegovic had to do time in jail for his political beliefs. Among others, he wrote a book "Declaration of Muslims", which connected him with Muslim fundamentalism. Further information about Alija Izetbegovic can be found on the following webpages: <http://www.srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/alija.html> and <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3203323.stm> <http://www.q-news.com/351.pdf> <http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199604/60415-003-trae-sar.htm>

<sup>25</sup> Milosevic believed that the designated land within Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be purely occupied by people of Serbian ethnicity hence the word xenophobia or as the merriam-webster online dictionary would clarify (<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/xenophobia>) "fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign"

<sup>26</sup> After the war, Karadzic was a wanted war criminal. Various information about Karadzic can be located on the following webpages: <http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p119.html> and <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/karadzic.htm>

whom they called Turks. When the Yugoslav army was dissolved they handed over all their weapons including all the weapon factories. The Bosnian Serb army was made up of former soldiers of the Yugoslav army. Meanwhile Izetbegovic did nothing to defend the state. When Germany recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, other countries within the European Union were forced to do the same on the 17<sup>th</sup> of December 1991. Then Muslims and Croats in Bosnia began to press for independence from Yugoslavia and the European Union tried yet again to mediate. A conference was held in Cutileiro, Portugal in February 1992, where it was agreed to split Bosnia into three national areas, each with its own federal government.

When Izetbegovic came back to Sarajevo he discovered that the Serbs would not be satisfied unless they controlled 64 percent of the territory (Brogan, 1998). His colleagues pointed out that these three ethnic groups were so mixed, from a habitat point of view, that it was impossible to split up the country without having to go through a major internal migration of the population. He therefore decided to reject the Cutileiro agreement, and on the 29<sup>th</sup> of February, a national referendum was held on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs decided to stay home. Europe and the United States recognized the independence of Bosnia in April 1992, by then the war had already begun.

Serbian militia came over the river Drina in large numbers from Yugoslavia and surrounded a number of Muslim villages and towns on the east bank (Brogan, 1998). The Bosnian-Serb army, under command of General Mladic, attacked Muslim habitats in central and northwest Bosnia while the Croatian militia attacked in central and south Bosnia and Herzegovina. In all these areas the intention of the Bosnian Serbs was to cleanse them of Muslims and establish a pure Serbian state. Hundreds of mosques, schools and memorials were destroyed. Muslims were pushed from their homes and in a short period of time hundreds of thousands became refugees. Those who stayed behind were killed. The territory of Bosnian Muslims was, in fact, a series of islands which the Serbs and the Croats had surrounded. The siege of Sarajevo was particularly vicious and

the international media covered the horror which the residents of the city had to go through.<sup>27</sup>

Isolated Muslim villages such as Goradze<sup>28</sup>, Srebrenica<sup>29</sup>, Zepa and Bihac had to depend on the assistance of the international community (Brogan 1998). The Serbian death squads continued their ethnic cleansing and sporadically killed Muslims; large towns such as Prijedor and Banja Luka were completely cleansed of Muslims. The international media discovered Serbian prison camps in northwest Bosnia; i.e., in the municipality of Prijedor, in the small town of Omarska. The pictures that were taken were uncomfortable reminders for the international community of the Nazi prison camps during the Second World War.

Even though there was a weapons embargo on the states of the former Yugoslavia; weapons were smuggled with the help of Turks, Egyptians, Iranians and other Muslim states supporting the Muslims in Bosnia (Brogan 1998). In Herzegovina where Croats were in control, Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia, was supporting them generously. Before the war Muslims had just been in the majority in the town of Mostar. The Croats isolated the Muslim part of the town and, among other structures, blew up a bridge that was built in the sixteenth century by the Turks, one of many national treasures destroyed during the war in Bosnia.<sup>30</sup> The Croats re-gained the former territory of Krajina, a large area inside

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<sup>27</sup> Worth noting, the TV network channel Cable News Network or CNN as we know it, had live tv broadcasts from the siege of Sarajevo finally changed news broadcasts as we had known them, that is, now the audience could watch war being broadcast live. The position of CNN was so strong that now “the CNN Factor” is something that even the United States military has to consider. It’s actions maybe taped and shown on TV, minutes after the occurrence has happened and the military has to send materials regularly to TV stations as war is as well a question of public opinion. See: <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2051/cnnfactor.pdf>. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have as well benefited from the “CNN Factor” and use it. News about disasters, natural and or man made, showing victims etc. makes fundraising much easier, as well exposing the Organizations and providing PR for them.

<sup>28</sup> Further information about what happened in Goradze can be found on i.e. following webpage: <http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p94.html> additionally there are communications between General Mladic and the United Nations on pages: 133,144, 152, 156 and 157 in the book: Shawcross, W. (2000). *Deliver us from evil - Warlords & Peacekeepers in a world of endless conflict*. London, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 38 Soho Square, London W1V 5DF.

<sup>29</sup> Further information about what happened in Srebrenica can i.e. be found on the following webpage: <http://www.srpska-mreza.com/Bosnia/Srebrenica/NYT.html> as well on the previous webpage about General Mladic: <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mla-ai021010e.htm> [http://www.gendecide.org/case\\_srebrenica.html](http://www.gendecide.org/case_srebrenica.html)

<sup>30</sup> Examples of the destruction of national treasures during the war in Bosnia can be found on the following WebPages: <http://odin.let.rug.nl/CB/bosnia/destroyed-3>



the border of Croatia that had been annexed by the Bosnian Serbs and justified by the fact that the majority of the population of Krajina had been of Serbian ethnicity. It took the Croats only 4 days to regain Krajina. About 150 thousand Serbs became refugees and had to leave a territory which had been their home for the past 500 years.

Croats and Muslim joined forces and began winning battle after battle (Brogan, 1998). Even after tremendous fights, sieges and ethnic cleansing, the luck started to turn against the Serb forces; but it was not until repeated interference and pressure from the western governments, including the European Union and the United States, and placement of UNPROFOR, the United National Protection Forces, that peace was finally reached.

## **2.7 The end of the conflict – The Dayton agreement**

At 11:00, on Monday morning on the 28<sup>th</sup> of August 1995, five 120mm mortars were shot and landed near the Markale market in the centre of Sarajevo (Shawcross 2000). These mortars killed 37 people and wounded 90. These were the killings which can be said to have ended the war in Bosnia.

In a wider sense, it can be said that interference applies when external states take action about internal affairs of another state (Nye 2005). It is clear that the peace process was pushed by external parties. The United States Government decided to use the Wright Patterson military base in Dayton, Ohio to discuss the peace process but the hosts were the Americans, the European Union and the Russians. Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovich attended. However, Karasic was not invited as he had been accused of crimes against humanity. It was decided to leave the United Nations out of these peace negotiations and the organization was left out of the final agreement as well (Shawcross, 2000). The meeting commenced on 1<sup>st</sup> of November 1995 and ended on the 21<sup>st</sup> of November with the so called Dayton peace agreement.

The Serbs got 49 percent of the territory of Bosnia while the Muslims and the Croats got 51 percent (Brogan 1998). This meant that the military forces of

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[http://archnet.org/library/documents/one-document.tcl?document\\_id=9281](http://archnet.org/library/documents/one-document.tcl?document_id=9281)  
[http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report\\_format.cfm?articleid=1010&reportid=160](http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?articleid=1010&reportid=160)  
[http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news\\_body.cfm?newsid=1782](http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=1782)

Muslims and Croats had to give back part of the territory they had managed to take. Bosnia became a federation of the Republic of Serbs (Republika Srpska) and Muslims and Croats where each one would take care of its own affairs; i.e., security, defense and tax collection. Two million refugees received the right to return to their previous residence (Brogan 1998). What awaited them were approximately 400,000 destroyed homes and the country receives substantial reconstruction assistance and humanitarian aid from the international community but will have to prepare for an era of declining assistance (CIA, 2008). In 2005, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA, 2005) estimated about 135,000 homes had been reconstructed, and about 1 million refugees, including the displaced, had been able to move back to their original homes.

When some of the refugees began returning to their previous homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they faced destruction and devastation beyond anyone's imagination. Both homes and agricultural land were polluted with landmines and other unexploded ordinance (UXO); i.e. booby traps (LM1, 1999). In Tito's time, the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had been one of the most prolific producers of landmines in the world. There were an estimated six million mines of all types in Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija<sup>31</sup> (JNA) stocks at the beginning of the conflict. Other estimates are three million JNA mines stockpiled prior to the war and an additional three million mines acquired or made during the conflict.

## **2.8 The Bosnian War – discussions**

There are two issues which two separate research teams; Bossert, D'Ambrosio and Ferrara (2005) and Collier and Hoeffler (2000) covered in the theories of war and which can be applied to the context of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely the ethnic grievances factor and partly the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index. The index measures the probability that two people, randomly selected, who do not speak the same language. Another similar constructed index is a religious fractionalization index and which measures the

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<sup>31</sup> The JNA is in Serbo-Croatian and stands for The Yugoslavian National Army

probability that two randomly selected people do not share the same religious affiliation.

Before applying this to the context in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is worth mentioning the development of a Generalized Index of Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalizations. Bossert, D'Ambrosio and Ferrara (2005) refer to empirical studies which have found among others, that ethnic diversity is associated with lower growth rates, more corruption, lower contributions to local public goods. According to a study carried out by the Centre for the Study of African Economies at the University of Oxford (CSAE, 2001) for the World Bank, concluded that a country with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of USD:2277 had shorter wars than those who had USD:1413, the average USD:1762. While this being the value of 1985 United States Dollars it still provides important evidence of the correlation of probability that a conflict will occur due to economical reasons, meaning the lower the GDP the more probability of a conflict to occur including a re-current conflict. The conclusion from these studies showed, among others that living peacefully was more profitable. But how can that apply to the context of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

Looking at statistical overview provided by the World Bank (DDG-WB, 2007) the GDP of Bosnia and Herzegovina can not be determined for the year 1985 as it formed part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at that time. However the same statistical overview provides summary of statistics on GDP of developing countries as well as low income countries and in 1985 the average was about USD: 500 and which is close to the figures for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia back then. It's not difficult to link the low GDP to the recurrent conflicts in these republics but what creates complexity is the fact that life was good in Former Yugoslavia. Everyone had a job, long vacation, free education, good income and even free housing if one belonged to a large company etc., and so what went wrong? Was it the economical burden and large loans it had taken (Kaldor, 2005). Or other factors such as religion which could have contributed to the end of a peaceful era created by Tito.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was considered the least developed of the Federal republics, it had the most ethnic combination; Muslims, Serbs and Croats; the

inter-ethnic marriages were the most highest of the republics as well. From language point of view it was not mixed, the Serbo-Croatian was spoken and taught in all the Federal republics. The exception being the autonomous region of Kosovo but while the majority of the local population spoke Albanian they did and do indeed speak Serbo-Croatian as well.

Looking at the greed and grievances models of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), they claim and basically to their own surprise, that the ethnic and religious fractionalization makes a society safer, as predicted by the greed model, rather than more dangerous as predicted by the grievance model. Either way, if this should be applied to the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian war, this conclusion looks rather strange. However Shenoy (2008) concludes that ethnicity alone is not the overarching cause of violence but statistical analysis have found that ethnic fractionalization is only associated with greater risk of civil war if there consist a dominant group against a relatively large minority.

According to Shenoy (2008) Psychologists who have been studying terrorism have argued that not just any grievance, but humiliation specifically, is the root cause of civil war. The devastating effect of humiliation can have on personal relationships, mass humiliation of entire ethnic, racial, religious, or class groups can destroy the bonds that keep society cohesive and peaceful.

When the war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the religious factor, which had been depressed for decades, came out very sharply. While during Tito's time, mixed ethnic and religious marriages were about one third of the registered marriages in rural centers and basically considered normal. Then the war came and people begun identify themselves with their birth religion: Croats with Catholics, Serbs with the Orthodox Church and the Muslims with Islam. Mixed marriage couples became refugees or internally displaced etc. and this was followed with ethnic cleansing which was based on religious hatred as well as territorial claims and domination. The territorial domination was followed up with enthusiastic greed which came in the form of extensive looting and in many cases organized looting. Everything from the houses was removed including roofs, windows, electric wires and even bricks. The infrastructure was as well looted i.e. second hand electric transformers were up for sale, as I witnessed when visiting a

second-hand hardware store in North-west of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The looted materials from the houses were then either used by the conflicting parties to build their own houses as well as being sold onwards.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was and is a fractionalized society both from religious and ethnic point of view and it was the religion which determined the ethnicity as the people looked very similar if not the same. While Collier and Hoeffler (2004) cover different scenarios in their research, it will be very difficult to apply their religious and ethnic fractionalized conclusions of their research to Bosnia and Herzegovina as being a safe fractionalized society.

If the results of the studies which were carried out in Sri Lanka by Korf (2005) and if we adapt to the context to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the resemblance can be found to a certain extent. During the war ethnic cleansing took place in i.e. villages within territorial claim of ethnic groups. Tales and later indictment by the Tribunal in The Hague of the notorious militia leader Arkan and his Tigers has been well documented, and which included vicious and “rapid” ethnic cleansing, looting, raping.<sup>32</sup> The result was opportunistic reaction by the population specifically those who had the dominating ethnic background in their area, while properties were destroyed, the massive looting of homes was extensive throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Anyone who would have visit and still can visit Bosnia and Herzegovina can see with their own eyes the difference between war-destroyed house and a looted one including both scenarios. If these same neighbors were friends before the war, it is difficult to see that grievances were the motivating factor to loot rather is was a pure opportunistic action and pure greed.

From the economical perspective, as from what I was informed, the tourist industry on the Croatian coast was built up through taxation of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The industry provided and continues to provide billions of EUROS in revenue, and which most of it went to the Central Government which was based in Belgrade, Serbia. It therefore can be argued that the income from tourism was a major incentive for Croatia to split from the Federal system and declare independence. Today, the tourist industry in Croatia

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<sup>32</sup> See further about Arkan and his Tiger team on the web of NY Times:  
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9407E6DD1439F932A35757C0A96F958260>

counts for about 20% of GDP, generating approximately 7 billion EURO per year and growing<sup>33</sup>. Was greed and possibly grievances the main driving force for independence or was it genuine need of a nation to gain freedom? The mathematical model of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) would explain the case of Croatia that the belief for profit would lead to conflict which could possibly explain why Croatia wanted to be independent even though the cost could mean deadly conflict with its neighbors.

In regard to financing of conflicts, which Collier and Hoeffler (2004) mentioned earlier in regard to funding of civil conflict in Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers, a good Bosnian Serb friend of mine who had moved to Austria before the war and decided to return after the war informed me about an interesting aspect of the funding of the war in Bosnia. Soon into the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he, a Bosnia Serb working abroad was contacted and basically “ordered” to contribute monthly fee to the war effort. He paid 100 German Marks per month or equivalent today value of about 50 EUROS. Tens of thousands of his countrymen contributed the same.

I was informed as well that the Bosnian Muslims had to pay to the war effort and special bank accounts i.e. in Germany were set up. The bank accounts were sometimes depleted or abused and as in the case of General Mehmed Alagic. After the war he became the mayor of Sanski Most town and interestingly I had several meetings with him and his team during my post-war works in the town. However the corruption charges were never mentioned in the news but his indictment by the Tribunal in The Hague for war crimes is far better documented and well as his sudden death in the prison there.<sup>34</sup>

If Kaldor’s (2005) definition of “New Wars”<sup>35</sup> is applied on the war on the Balkans, while being some factors in common with “Old Wars”, there does remain elements of similarities of her definition. Targeting of civilians and which

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<sup>33</sup> See further on the following link: <http://travel.iafrica.com/bulletinboard/669239.htm>

<sup>34</sup> See further about the indictment on the following link: <http://un.org/icty/pressreal/p610-e.htm> and on the following link: <http://un.org/icty/hadzihastrialc/decision-e/06161354.htm> and as well on the following link: <http://forum.b92.net/lofiversion/index.php/t8743.html>

<sup>35</sup> What Kaldor (2005) sees as “New War” is the social relations of warfare and a new type of warfare associated with globalisation including the disintegration of states as in the Balkans or Africa. This all she sees as a challenge and important to identify “New Wars” to enable to address them.

included brutal ethnic cleansing; falling taxation or possibly disappearing and financing the war partly consisted of looting and pillage, illegal trading and other war-generated revenues. What can be added is the imminent disintegration of the state; above all to construct sectarian identities such as religious, ethnic or tribal (Kaldor, 2005). All these elements have been well documented and can be applied to the context of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

However these elements in many ways are not new as such. For about 500 years Bosnia and Herzegovina was under Turkish rule and while the tax revenue may not have been going down, the harassment of local population by the Turks against the orthodox – Christian believers was common. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo religious and ethnic cleansing took place repeating the history but in a more sophisticated way. The “New Wars” deliberately violate all the conventions of ‘Old Wars’ (Kaldor, 2005) as the “Old Wars” were fought according to certain rules (at least in theory) and which was well established in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in International Conventions, which means minimizing civilian casualties, treating prisoners well etc.

The question is “How do these theories, the historical aspects and related discussions link with landmines?” In the following chapter landmines will be covered and how strongly it links with warfare and warfare tactics including and in particular the indirect impact which the menace has on communities. The landmines situation in Afghanistan and Mozambique where the communities have been living with the threat of landmines for about three decades will be covered as well.

## **Chapter 3 - Landmines**

Originally, landmines were produced for defense purposes, but today they are used more and more as an attack weapon.

The invention of gunpowder fostered the military mining of fortresses and strongholds in medieval Europe (Rosenfeld, 2000). In the American War of Secession, wooden boxes filled with gunpowder were used and detonated by mechanical and electromechanical fuses. The Germans were the first to detonate mines under their opponent's trenches in the First World War; and then in 1915, the British used the Royal Engineers to start mining the German positions. By June 1916, no less than 25,000 men from Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom were involved in this form of mine warfare. Antitank mines were developed with the arrival of tanks in 1916.

Later, as attacking troops learned to pick up these anti-tank mines in the path of their tanks, the anti-tank mines were protected in turn by the introduction of antipersonnel mines (Keeley, 2003). These would slow down the progress of engineers sent into the minefields to breach paths through the minefield, and their detonation would also alert the defenders to the fact that an attack was in progress. Mine warfare reached its peak in the North African campaign in World War II when the desert provided few other obstacles to maneuvering armies, and huge minefields were built, extending many miles.

### **3.1 Facts and figures**

The effects of landmines on communities are horrendous. It is estimated landmines wound and kill about 10,000 citizens a year, mostly children (CLF, 2008). Those victims who survive have to go through physical, physiological and economic difficulties the rest of their lives. In general, landmines hinder the ability of societies to recover long after the conflict has ceased. Landmines do not



differentiate between the footstep of a soldier and the footstep of a child. Apart from the risk of living in the proximity of landmines, they create heavy economic burdens on these societies.

From a military perspective, military forces use landmines or landmine-like devices because they are capable of autonomously delaying or killing the enemy at a safe distance from friendly forces (CATR, 2001). Landmines fall into two broad categories. Antipersonnel landmines, or APL for short, are intended to kill or disable soldiers on foot (or dismounted soldiers). Antitank landmines, or AT mines, are used against vehicles (mounted), such as tanks and armored personnel carriers. Mixed systems that combine both AT mines and APL in the same device are typically used against a mounted enemy force accompanied by significant numbers of dismounted soldiers. APL in mixed systems are intended to prevent or discourage foot soldiers from penetrating or breaching an AT minefield.

Landmines are essentially tactical and operational weapons, although on occasion they also have strategic implications (CATR, 2001). When used tactically, landmines are usually employed during battlefield engagements of relatively limited duration to disrupt an enemy's progress. There are also long-term strategic landmine missions, such as border protection, as is the case in Korea. Minefields are used to place an enemy in a vulnerable position that can be exploited by friendly forces; it causes the enemy forces to divide; interferes with enemy command and control; inflicts damage on enemy personnel and equipment; exploits the capabilities of other weapon systems by delaying enemy forces in an engagement area, and protects friendly forces from enemy infiltration. Occasionally they kill friendly personnel, typically in hastily marked minefields. In addition, if the tide of battle changes rapidly and defensive missions change into rapid offensive battles, the minefields can become a major obstacle for maneuvering the army.

Landmines are designed as well with civilian targets in mind, to disrupt lives of ordinary citizens and to destroy whole communities and their agricultural land (CATR, 2001). In many countries landmines have been spread in agricultural lands, walking paths, buildings, bridges, forests / woodlands and even deserts.

54 countries have produced 340 types of landmines (NMRS, 2004) including other kinds of explosive devices specially made to wound or kill a human being, and it cost only about 3 USD to produce one piece (UN-C, 2008). However it costs about 300 USD to 1000 USD to remove one piece and is usually quite complicated and time consuming work.

It costs between 100 USD to 3000 USD to provide an artificial limb for the victim who survives (NIM, 1998). An adult needs a new artificial limb approximately every three to five years while a child, because of growth, may need one every six months (CLF, 2008). But there are other problems such as medical, psychological and economic complications. For example, landmines usually wound or kill people who are the core of the workforce in the communities; and hinder refugees in their attempts to return to their homes.

In 1998 it was estimated that there were 110 million landmines in stock and the same number in the earth (NIM, 1998). Sources from 2007 state however that there are estimated 45 to 50 million landmines in the earth in 70 countries (CLF, 2008).

Landmines hinder peace and peace reconciliation, as well as, delivery of international aid (CLF 2008). Jerry White, one of the founding members of Landmines Survivors Network, said that when dealing with the global landmine problem, it is necessary to not only look at those who have stepped on landmines and have had to have their limbs removed; but the focus needs to be on the families and the societies who are held hostage by landmines.

Landmines are most often produced to wound rather than kill (Dincerler, 1996). Most victims are women collecting firewood, or children taking care of the herds. Because landmines can be in the earth for many years and, in most cases, for a long time after the conflict is over, they continue to hold societies hostage and; in fact there is no peace for nations which have to live in the proximity of landmines (CLF, 2008).

Landmines hinder productivity, countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam and Afghanistan could double their agricultural outputs if landmines were cleared from agricultural land (NIM, 1998) (NMRS, 2004).

Although there are clear guidelines for the use of mines in warfare which delimit their use to defined zones, these “rules” have been totally ignored in many recent military conflicts (Rosenfeld, 2000). The Landmine Ban Treaty, which is an international agreement, was signed in Ottawa, Canada in 1997 hence the name the Ottawa Convention (CLF, 2008). The official title is: “The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.” The treaty is the most comprehensive international instrument in the world for getting rid of landmines and deals with everything from use of landmines, production and trade, victim assistance, mine clearance, to the destruction of stockpiles.

In February 2007, 153 member states had signed the agreement (ICBL, 2007). Only two signatory countries are still needed to ratify the agreement and make it legally binding internationally; but 40 countries have not signed the treaty, including the United States, Russia, China and Finland.

Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 (LM1, 1999). At the signing ceremony the government declared its intention to destroy its antipersonnel mine stockpiles and dismantle production facilities within four years. The instrument of ratification was signed in Sarajevo on 29 August 1998 and deposited at the United Nations on 8 September 1998.

### **3.2 Economical affects of landmines**

As this research focuses on the economic effects of landmines, it would be appropriate to look generally at the effect that landmines have on communities in general. It is possible to look at the effect of landmines from different perspectives; i.e., environmental effects, effects on peace and reconciliation, effects on children, medical effects, and psychological effects as well as economic effects. Each one of those effects is material for either Masters’ or PhD research. It is clear that each one of those effects is definitely worth researching, but the following is a brief introduction to the economic effects of landmines. It would take too much time and space to cover all these effects in this thesis and the main purpose is to focus on the economic effects.

One can say that those societies where the quality and quantity of agricultural products are dominant and constitute the economic foundation will remain most fragile in regard to landmine pollution (CLF, 2008). In general population in developing countries relies heavily on the land for survival (CLF, 2008) (NMRS, 2002). They are vulnerable, as well, to the pollution of landmines, as the landmines make fertile land unusable. Landmines that have been placed in fertile agricultural land result in communities becoming reliant on external food distribution and other aid, which would not be the case under normal circumstances

Landmines and related UXO destroy and or prevent usage of infrastructure in the communities; i.e. train systems, roads, electricity and water supplies (TAC, 2008). Placement of landmines interferes with production and distribution of products and commodities. Whether direct or indirect, the impact of the threat of landmines, linked with that of war, causes economies to suffer. As a direct consequence of the war, Croatia lost for instance 40 percent of its hotel rooms, as hotels were damaged, destroyed or taken over to house displaced citizens

Projects related to landmine cleaning take away funding for other important development and reconstruction projects. According to the Landmine Monitor Report covering the year 2002 (LM5, 2002), as well as other reports which are available online; i.e., (LM4, 2006) (LM2, 2007) (LM3, 2001) (LM1, 1999), the total amount which has been spent on landmine cleaning in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Republika Srpska, from 1995 to 2006, comes to 216.5 million USD. If we estimate that the average exchange rate of USD versus EURO was about 1.2 in favor of the EURO,<sup>36</sup> the average comes to approximately 180 million EURO.

CARITAS Switzerland provided reconstruction materials to the inhabitants of Sasina, as self help, at an average cost of 11,000 KM per house, or about 5,500 EURO (Amhof, 2008). This estimate is on the lower end but not unreasonable; therefore, we can estimate that over 32,000 families could have

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<sup>36</sup> The EURO was not introduced until 1999 and banknotes and coins not until 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2002 and yes, the USD was for a while stronger than the EURO.

received 5,500 EURO each or the equivalent in materials to reconstruct their houses.

Direct and indirect medical costs related to landmine accidents have taken their economic toll as well (CLF, 2008). Medical services are expensive and often not available. Families often could not afford the necessary treatment. Costs for surgery, artificial limbs and psychological treatments have taken away funds from the economy of a country that was already in bad shape. In most cases landmine victims can not start to work immediately after the accident and sometimes not at all. These victims become a financial burden on their families and the communities.

One of the long term effects on countries which have landmines in their territories are that these countries become dependent on international humanitarian and development aid (CLF, 2008). At the same time, unfortunately, international funding of projects is not equally distributed amongst the needy countries. Where funding or aid is available, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs') have problems bringing that aid to its destination because the infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, has deteriorated and is polluted with landmines. Not being able to access enough food, housing, medical supplies or state services means that millions of people around the world have to live in a never ending cycle of despair (CLF, 2008).

### **3.3 Landmines in Afghanistan and Mozambique**

Part of the goal of the research is to look at the landmine situations in other countries and briefly compare them to the landmine situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Afghanistan and Mozambique were chosen randomly, without checking beforehand whether it would suit my research. Background references come from variety of resources, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the Landmine Monitor, United Nations and other available resources. These countries are located in two different continents and have different cultures; different historical backgrounds but they do have at least three things in common, being war torn countries, Afghanistan

still is a conflict zone, ongoing poverty and both are polluted with landmines including unexploded remnants of war.

### **Afghanistan**

Ahmad Shah Durrani unified the Pashtun tribes and founded Afghanistan in 1747 (CE-A, 2008). The country served as a buffer between the British and Russian empires until it won independence from national British control in 1919. A brief experiment in democracy ended in a 1973 coup and a 1978 Communist counter-coup. In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support the tottering Afghan Communist regime, touching off a long and destructive war. The USSR withdrew in 1989 under relentless pressure by internationally supported anti-Communist Mujahedin rebels. Subsequently, a series of civil wars saw Kabul finally fall in 1996 to the Taliban, a hard-line Pakistani-sponsored movement that emerged in 1994 to end the country's civil war and anarchy. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City<sup>37</sup>, a US, Allied, and anti-Taliban Northern Alliance military action toppled the Taliban for sheltering Osama Bin Laden.<sup>38</sup>

About 12% of Afghanistan is arable land, covering approximately 77,000 km<sup>2</sup> (12% of 647,500 km<sup>2</sup>); permanent crops are only 0.21%; other products make up 87.66%. Main agricultural products are opium, wheat, fruits, nuts; wool, mutton, sheepskins, lambskins(CE-A, 2008). In the past 25 years, the area of agricultural land has drastically decreased. Although there are no statistics for agricultural productivity, if we compare the net loss of agricultural products to the loss of agricultural land, we can estimate an average annual loss of 3.5% of net agricultural products since 1978 (Saba, 2001). However increase of opium cultivation may have reversed this development (Emery, 2008). Afghanistan is a traditional agrarian society, with rural Afghans constituting well over 80% of the

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<sup>37</sup> Further information about the attack on the Twin towers on September the 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 can be found on the following web site:

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in\\_depth/americas/2001/day\\_of\\_terror/](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/americas/2001/day_of_terror/)

List of victims of these attacks can be found on the following web site:

[http://www.september11victims.com/september11victims/victims\\_list.htm](http://www.september11victims.com/september11victims/victims_list.htm)

<sup>38</sup> Further information about Osama bin Laden can be found on i.e. the following link:

[http://i-cias.com/e.o/osama\\_b\\_laden.htm](http://i-cias.com/e.o/osama_b_laden.htm)

population before the Soviet invasion in 1979 (Saba, 2001). Since 1979, agricultural products have decreased by 50%.

In 2007/2008 United Nations Human development Index (HDR, 2007), of 177 countries listed in the index, Afghanistan did not make it to the list.

There are not many statistics which could be used for comparative calculations in order to find out the economic effects of landmines, that is, calculating possible loss of production of agricultural products because of landmine pollution on agricultural land in Afghanistan. FAO<sup>39</sup> (FAO, 2006) has published some production figures which could give some indication of the effects of landmines but not necessarily the only factor effecting agricultural production. Other factors could be as previously mentioned; such as the Russian occupation, and the resistance from the Mudjahedin that resulted that millions of Afghans became internally displaced (IDPs) or refugees fleeing to the neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan (HALO-1, 2007).

According to FAO (FAO, 2006) the production of wheat in from 1979 to 1981 was 2.561 million tons, while from 1989 to 1991 it had gone down to 1.725 million tons or a reduction of 32%. Wheat needs extensive land and possibly landmines could be one factors affecting the production while at the same time the refugee factor can not be ignored. No reports can be located which outright lists what type of land let alone agricultural land is polluted with landmines. Further calculations of the affects of landmines can therefore not be calculated.

According to Emery (2008), opium cultivation generates approximately 5,385 USD per hectare; while irrigated wheat generates 575 USD per hectare and rain-fed wheat approximately 282 USD per hectare. Given the economic situation, specifically in the rural areas, it is no wonder that a poor Afghan farmer chooses to grow opium.

Officially the unemployment rate is about 40%; the size of the grey economy is not known, but growing opium has become a major contributor to the rural economy (Chouvy, 2006). In 2006 the production of opium was estimated to be around 6100 tons which occupied about 165,000 hectares or 1,650 km<sup>2</sup> or about 2.15% of total arable land and expanding. In 2006 the value of these crops

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<sup>39</sup> FAO stands for Food and Agricultural Organization, see further their website: [www.fao.org](http://www.fao.org)

can be estimated at about 888 million USD. James Emery sites the United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) for the above value of the opium cultivation, and this seems to be an accurate figure based on thorough research. At the same time the production of opium has been a major obstacle for both the economic and political development of Afghanistan (Chouvy, 2006).

In Afghanistan opium poppies are much more likely to be grown in areas where security has broken down and power is wielded by the Taliban, who encourage farmers to grow the crop (Emery 2008). Growing opium can make a farmer rich by Afghan standards where over half of the population is living under the poverty line and the Gross National Product per capita is under 1,000 USD. In 2007 the average annual cash income of farmers growing opium poppy was 3,933 USD, 42 percent higher than the 2,279 USD average for non-opium poppy growing farmers.

According to Emery (2008), who quotes UNDOC,<sup>40</sup> about 3.3 million Afghans work in the poppy fields, 14.3 percent of Afghanistan's or 23.8 million of the country population. There are also Pakistanis working in the Afghan opium fields, in addition to Afghans working in other facets of the drug trade. Poppy laborers in Helmand and other volatile provinces can earn \$15 a day, about twice what they make in stable areas. The combination of high wages and increased cultivation has attracted migrant Afghan farmers from neighboring regions. Opium cultivation also offers the opportunity for thousands of Afghans with little or no land holdings to earn a living by sharecropping fields.

### **The landmine situation**

The devastating effects of landmine accidents in Afghanistan are vividly portrayed in a statement from a victim (STC, 2003): "What will happen to my family...to my mother and father? Why couldn't I have died? It would have been better if the mine had just killed me. Now I am useless and a burden on everyone, including myself." -Ahmed, 13 years old. Both of his legs were blown off in a landmine explosion. His father is also an amputee from a previous landmine incident.

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<sup>40</sup> UNDOC stands for United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



The Government of Afghanistan has laid down its strategy for the future. In a Government / International Agency report “Securing Afghanistan’s future” (SAF, 2004) various social-economic-political issues which Afghanistan is facing are covered. Among these issues, the strategy of the mine action program for Afghanistan has been set. The goal of the mine action program is to free Afghanistan from the threat of landmines and UXO, thereby providing a safe environment conducive to development. By 2007, the impact of landmines and UXO will be removed from all high impacted areas in all regions of Afghanistan, and by 2015 from the whole country. It’s estimated that land in Afghanistan polluted by landmines, UXO and other unexploded devices is approximately 778 km<sup>2</sup> (LM2A, 2007). Afghanistan is probably the most mined country in the world, estimated at up to 640,000 mines laid since 1979 (HALO-1, 2007).

It is estimated there have been more than 100,000 landmine victims in Afghanistan over the last 25 years (ICRC-1, 2006), however, today there are estimated 52,000 and 60,000 (LM2A, 2007) survivors of landmines, UXO and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Although Afghanistan has the oldest, largest and most richly resourced mine action program in the world, mines and ERW continue to pose a formidable challenge to social and economic reconstruction, which is critical to the country’s political stabilization and to the return of refugees (LM2A, 2007).

The Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey, completed in 2005, found 2,368 communities and more than four million people affected by mines (LM2A, 2007). It identified some 715 square kilometers of hazardous areas, concentrated in 12 of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces. Despite the release of more than 100 square kilometers of land since then, the estimate of contamination has increased, as a result of new surveys and information generated by the return of refugees to previously unoccupied land. In its statement to the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007, Afghanistan reported 723 km<sup>2</sup> of suspected hazardous areas, affecting 2,387 communities or 17 percent of the population. Updated estimates at the end of May 2007 put total contamination even higher—778 square kilometers.

The following is an advertisement in the Afghanistan Research Newsletter (AREU, 2007):

Afghanistan Amputee Bicyclists for Rehabilitation and Recreation (AABRAR) – Disabled Cycle Messenger Services – Restaurant take out, packages, letters within Kabul – Competitive rates – Contracts with discounts for regular clients – 0700 285 470 / 0700 285 480 / 0799 373 860 – [aabrar\\_dcms@yahoo.com](mailto:aabrar_dcms@yahoo.com) – Using AABRAR's messenger services, you will both reduce your operational costs and support the families of disabled people.

This organization is one of many who are working with victims of landmines / UXO as well as other related issues in Afghanistan such as rural development and socio-economic rehabilitation.<sup>41</sup>

Surviving the explosion and losing a limb or two is just the beginning for the survivor as it then takes a long period of rehabilitation. The survivor has to face stigma in Afghan society and the means of economic survival becomes one of the priorities. Mine/ERW survivors constitute a significant proportion of all people with disabilities in Afghanistan; moreover, they are usually among the poorest in society and suffer from limited service provision. In 2006 more than 50 percent of services for people with disabilities were provided by NGOs and international organizations (LM2A, 2007). Suffering can not be measured economically but it does not help that survivors of landmines receive 300 Afghanis or about USD: 6. per month and people with less than 50% disability receive 150 Afghanis or about USD: 3 per month in social benefits (LM2A, 2007).

According to the Landmine Monitor (LM2A, 2007) healthcare in Afghanistan has been severely effected by decades of conflict and ranks among the worst in the world. Health infrastructure is damaged and poorly maintained; the health care system lacks trained staff, resources and supplies, and is unable to

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<sup>41</sup> See further list of NGOs working in Afghanistan on the following link:  
<http://www.afghana.com/Reconstruction/AfghanistanRehabilitation.htm>

meet the basic health needs of most of the population. Services are provided through the Afghan hospital network and international NGOs and agencies, but there is limited coordination. First-aid is available at the district level but emergency transport is lacking; trauma care and continuing care are limited to a few hospitals in major cities and can be of poor quality and expensive. Cultural barriers mean that women may be denied care or refused treatment by male practitioners, in a country with few female practitioners.

There is a lack of psychosocial and economic support activities, relevant information, and coordination; unemployment among people with disabilities is very high. According to Landmine Monitoring Report (LM2A, 2007), which sites a disability study of Handicap International, 70 percent of people with disabilities do not have access to schools. In the case of Afghanistan it is difficult to measure the direct impact of landmines on the economy after nearly 30 years of warfare. During this period it is estimated that there have been over 100,000 victims of landmines, and today there are between 52,000 and 60,000 who are survivors of landmines and other explosive remnants of the war. Social stigma prohibits most people with disabilities from fully exercising their rights and minimizes their inclusion in almost all economic and social opportunities. Afghanistan has no law protecting the rights of people with disabilities, but the 2004 constitution provides some basic protection. In 2006 the National Law for the Rights and Privileges of People with Disabilities was submitted to the Ministry of Justice for approval.

### **Mozambique**

In 1752, the Portuguese announced that Mozambique was their colony and the slave trade begun. On June 25<sup>th</sup> 1975, Mozambique became independent. Samora Machel was the first president in a FRELIMO single-party system (Farlex, 2008). Within a short period of time, Portuguese white settlers as well the Portuguese state pulled out of the country leaving Mozambique in chaos. In 1977 the socialist wing of FRELIMO gained more power. The party was now Marxist-Leninist and made new plans based on the Soviet model. Many of the new doctrines were in conflict with traditional African beliefs; i.e., FRELIMO advocated for women's liberation; against the system of bridal price and did not approve of polygamy.

The South African resistance movement, the African National Congress (ANC), was permitted to work in southern Mozambique bordering South Africa (Lubkemann, 2005). "RENAMO" or the National Resistance movement of Mozambique was established by Rhodesia and a civil war commenced. Both FRELIMO and RENAMO used brutal methods of controlling the population; accusations of murders, rapes; etc., are well documented.

During the civil war there was massive destruction of housing, communications networks, and education and public health facilities (IMF-M1, 2001). Livestock herds were decimated and fields were abandoned. Almost half of the population was affected, with over one million dead, 1.5 million refugees and 1.2 million internally displaced.

The total surface area of Mozambique is 801,590 km<sup>2</sup>. Water covers about 17,500 km<sup>2</sup>. Arable land is 5.43% of the area and permanent crops are 0.29%, the remaining 94.28% is dedicated to other uses (CIA-MZ, 2008). Other sources site that approximately 4% of Mozambique is under cultivation (EN, 2007).

The population of Mozambique is about 20.9 million; however, the population figure remains an estimate due to the HIV/AIDS infection among the population, which also contributes to the lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality and death rates. The HIV/AIDS infection contributes to lower population and growth rates and changes in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected. In 1997 the Mozambican census reported a population of 16,099,246 (CIA-MZ, 2008). The ethnic groups which live in Mozambique are 99.66% African such as the Makuhuwa tribe, Tsonga, Lomwe, Sena and others. Europeans are 0.06%, Euro-Asian 0.2% and Indians are 0.08% (CIA-MZ 2008).

Today, Mozambique ranks 172 out of 177 countries listed on the United National Human Development Index (HDR, 2007) and is in the company of countries such as Chad, Central African Republic, Mali and Niger.

At independence in 1975, Mozambique was one of the world's poorest countries (CIA-MZ, 2008). Socialist mismanagement and a brutal civil war from 1977-1992 exacerbated the situation. Still today Mozambique remains dependent

upon foreign assistance for much of its annual budget, and the majority of the population remains below the poverty line.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, Mozambique's agricultural sector was barely functional due to a combination of manmade and natural causes (EN, 2007). The prolonged drought in the early 1980s, followed by floods and cyclones, has made its mark on agriculture. By 1986, a famine emerged from renewed drought, civil war and refugees.

After the General Peace Agreement in 1992 and the democratic elections in 1994, many of the refugees and migrants returned to the countryside, sharply increasing the area under cultivation (IMF-M1, 2001).

As information about the total land being cultivated in Mozambique is conflicting, we can still make an approximate estimation that on average 5% of Mozambique is under cultivation at any one time (EN, 2007). This would mean that about 39,200 km<sup>2</sup> is being cultivated. The fact remains that agriculture supports almost 80% of the population and in 2001 provided about 24% of the GDP.

There are large regional differences in agricultural production because of differences in ecology, climate, and soil fertility and population density (IMF-M1, 2001). The most fertile area is in the Northern provinces, where food and cash crops are grown. In the drier provinces towards the south, food crops are less easily grown and cash crops such as sugar depend on irrigation. These areas are more sparsely populated. According to the IMF Country Report (IMF-M1, 2001) 98.9 percent of the rural poor in Mozambique own land, with an average of 2.5 hectares per household. Many small holder farmers can only produce enough for subsistence (survival) purposes, while others are able to produce a surplus to sell on the market. Another important aspect of agriculture is that almost half of urban poor are engaged in agriculture.

### **The landmine situation**

Estimated landmine / explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors are estimated to be about 30,000 (LM2M, 2008). Mozambique is affected by landmines and ERW that are a legacy of nearly 30 years of conflict that ended in 1992. The exact

extent of contamination is disputed, and in March 2006 the National De-mining Institute acknowledged that the extent of the mine problem posed a major challenge needing the efforts of all stakeholders. To provide a more accurate picture of the mine/ERW threat in Mozambique, the Institute engaged the HALO Trust<sup>42</sup> as well as Handicap International<sup>43</sup> to conduct an internationally funded “baseline assessment” in the central and southern regions (HALO, 2008). The baseline assessment / technical survey showed that in the central and southern half of Mozambique the mine problem still exists. The findings show that there are 450 confirmed minefields remaining, as well as large minefields in some of the areas, in particular, in those bordering on Zimbabwe (former Rhodesia). This situation exists despite mine clearance expenditures considerably in excess of that in the north. The existing minefields are a danger to the lives of ordinary people and inhibit their ability to use the land and develop their livelihood. It is estimated that remaining contamination might be as low as 11.5 km<sup>2</sup>. Previous figures put the estimate at 60 km<sup>2</sup>.

The HALO Trust has achieved very good results in Mozambique, in particular in the northern part of the country (HALO, 2008). The results were clear: all known minefields have been cleared - a total of 525 minefields containing 100,843 mines. The HALO Trust has in fact concluded 14 years of mine clearance in the northern part of Mozambique as the sole operator for the majority of that time, with a survey of every community in order to confirm that there are no known minefields remaining.

As another measurement of success when in 2007 the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA, 2007) which had been working on landmine issues since 1994, decided to phase out their operation. The organization felt that the landmine problem in Mozambique had reached the level that it could be handled and organized by the national authorities. In 2009 it will completely phase out its operation.

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<sup>42</sup> Information about HALO Trust work in Mozambique can be found on the following link: <http://www.halotrust.org/mozambique.html> and general information about the HALO Trust can be found on the following link: <http://www.halotrust.org/index.html>

<sup>43</sup> See further information about Handicap International and the work the organization is carrying out in various parts of the world including Mozambique, on the following link: <http://www.handicap-international.org/>

An external review in 2005 concluded that mine/ERW contamination in Mozambique no longer represented a humanitarian emergency, but was rather a constraint on reconstruction efforts and development (LM2M, 2008). However, in presenting appeals for mine action funding in 2007 the UN states that, “The impact of mines in Mozambique has become acute in some cases because of the increased economic and social activity accompanying the country’s transition from conflict to stability and economic growth.”

Mozambique’s healthcare infrastructure was severely damaged during almost 30 years of armed conflict (LM2M, 2008). Today many local health centers can only provide first-aid and refer casualties to rural and district hospitals for emergency and surgical care; specialized medical services are only available at provincial and central hospitals. Health services are also provided by private clinics, international NGOs and religious organizations.

Trained surgeons, medical equipment and drugs are in short supply. Rehabilitation services are available in 10 centers in provincial capitals mostly far away from mine-affected areas; all but one is operated by the government. Physiotherapy is available at hospitals with surgical capacities. Service provision suffers from a lack of coordination between ministries, trained technicians, raw materials and modern equipment, as well as long waiting lists. With state funding, all the centers provide services free of charge to war-disabled people, including mine/ERW survivors. However, access is limited because many people with disabilities are not aware of the services available, referral is lacking and most cannot afford transport or accommodation costs (LM2M, 2008). People with disabilities are often stigmatized and are usually marginalized and poor. However Mozambique does have legislation to protect the rights of people with disabilities and a national disability policy.

Mozambique has signed several international agreements related to mines and mine victims / survivors as well as created its own national plans. In 2006 a National Plan of Action on Disability for 2006-2010 was approved by the Council of Ministers. Specific actions in favor of people with disabilities were also included in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Program 2006-2009, PARPA II, which was approved in 2006. The PARPA expenditure of total Gross Domestic

Product for agriculture and rural development was 2.1% but in 2006 it was 3.3% (IMF-M 2008). This is not exactly good news for the approximately 98% percent of the rural poor in Mozambique. Relying on agriculture as their sole source of livelihood and which desperate needs an overhaul and support if ever the United Nations Millennium Development Goals<sup>44</sup> are going to be achieved. In the same IMF report, there is no mention of expenditure to clean landmines.

In this chapter, landmines in general have been introduced as well the context in Afghanistan and Mozambique. With combination of landmine pollution, rural and urban poverty including post war (Afghanistan being still at war) in these countries has created a poverty trap for large part of the population. The scenario of these two contexts will not be solved in foreseeable future.

In the next chapter we will link the general landmines situation with the context of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the landmine problem still remains dire. The focus will be in particular on the socio - economical aspects of landmines.

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<sup>44</sup> Further information about the United Nations Millennium Development Goals can be located on the following website: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>



## **Chapter 4 - Bosnia and Herzegovina**

### **4.1 Post-war recovery and poverty**

In 2007, Bosnia-Herzegovina ranked 66<sup>th</sup> in the United Nations Human Development Index (HDR, 2007). Bosnia is 51,129 square kilometers (km<sup>2</sup>) (CIA, 2008). 54% of the land is covered with forests (Earthtrend 2003). The population is about 4.6 million, and the Gross Domestic Product per capita was about \$6,600 as estimated at the end of the year (CIA 2008). The interethnic warfare in Bosnia had caused production to plummet by 80% from 1992 to 1995 and unemployment to soar. With an uneasy peace in place, output recovered in 1996 to 1999 at high percentage rates from a low base; but output growth slowed in 2000-02. Part of the lag in output was made up in 2003-07 when GDP growth exceeded 5% per year. National-level statistics are however limited and do not capture the large share of black market activity which is estimated to make up 30% of the economy. The unemployment rate is 45.5% (official rate). It is that estimated the grey economy may reduce actual unemployment to 25 to 30% at the end of 2004. This remains one of the most serious macroeconomic problems.

The KM or BAM<sup>45</sup>; the national currency introduced in 1998, was first pegged to the German Mark and then to the EURO when it was introduced, and since confidence in the currency and the banking sector has increased (CIA, 2008). Implementing privatization, however, has been slow, particularly in the Federation, although more successful in the Republika Srpska. Banking reform accelerated in 2001 as all the Communist-era payments bureaus were shut down; foreign banks, primarily from Western Europe, now control most of the banking sector. The private sector is growing and foreign investment is slowly increasing,

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<sup>45</sup> KM stands for Konvertable Marka or Convertible Marks and was exchangeable on an equal basis of the German Marks. The international currency code is however BAM (Bosnia Herzegovina Convertible Mark). When the EURO was introduced then one EURO was fixed at 1.9443 KM.

but government spending, at nearly 40% of adjusted GDP, remains unreasonably high. Poverty is widespread.

Until recently the term “poverty” meant an insufficiency of revenues for procurement of the minimum basket of goods and services (IMF, 2004). Nowadays, it is considered that “poverty is the state when basic preconditions for a dignified life are lacking.” The Living Standards Measurement Survey or LSMS has estimated the level of the total expenditure (including non-food goods) of the households that spend the absolute minimum on food, measured by its caloric and nutritive values. The total expenditure arrived at in this way amounts to 2,198 KM per person per annum or about 183 KM per month and this is the general poverty line for Bosnia and Herzegovina while expenditure on minimum nutritional needs, i.e. the extreme poverty line, amounts to 760 KM per person per annum or about 63 KM per month (IMF, 2004).

According to the report: Bosnia and Herzegovina; Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper — Mid-Term Development Strategy the percentage of those in Bosnia and Herzegovina living under the general poverty line is about **19.5%** of the population on average, 25% in Republika Srpska and 16% on the Bosnia Federation side (IMF, 2004). The percentage of citizens who are below the general poverty line differs for different community types, being lowest in urban communities (14%), higher in rural communities (around 20%), and highest in mixed local communities (near 24%).

The analysis of data in the IMF report indicates that children, especially those under 5 years of age, displaced persons and returnees, the unemployed, and persons with low education levels, are particularly exposed to the risk of poverty (IMF, 2004). Interestingly and contrary to general perception the report states that the elderly are less threatened by the risk of poverty than the average person, and the same can be said for the disabled and war veterans. Those least at risk are the employed, both those in the non-economic sector and those in the “grey economy.”

## 4.2 Agriculture

Agriculture is one of the key activities of the rural area and the main activity of the rural population, as well as a very important factor for preservation of the balance and protection of the environment (IMF, 2004). Agro-environmental conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina are relatively favorable for agricultural production. However, the agriculture in Bosnia and Herzegovina is faced at the same time with the necessity of repairing war damages and the process of transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2004) has analyzed the basic characteristics of agriculture in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the following are a part of these basic characteristics:

- It has been estimated that the share of cattle breeding is around 50 percent of the total agricultural production. This participation level is noticeably lower compared to the pre-war conditions, and especially in comparison with the situation in developed countries
- Agricultural products account for a significant percentage of the total foreign trade deficit. The agricultural product deficit per capita is USD 200 (USD 73 in Croatia, or USD 71 in EU)
- The degree of utilization of natural resources, primarily the land exploitation, is the second key indicator of the situation in the sector. The percentage of untilled plough land in the Federal side of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 50 percent in 2001 and 33 percent in Republika Srpska
- The indicators of agricultural productivity rank Bosnia and Herzegovina last on the European scale
- With the exception of potatoes, Bosnia and Herzegovina have not achieved self-sufficiency in any of the major agricultural products
- The average age of the population working in agriculture has increased
- Few farmers have reached the level of commodity producers
- Foreign markets have been lost due to the war

Not only were foreign markets for agricultural produce lost, but also many of the industries such as mining and cloth lost their contacts as well. To gain again the

confidence is and has remained economical priority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### **4.3 Landmines**

As mentioned earlier, one of the consequences of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that future generations have inherited about one million landmines used by the conflicting parties during the war. These landmines are still taking lives or maiming innocent people (Woodmansey and Maresca, 1997). Currently the estimates are that about 670,000 mines and 650,000 UXO are active within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Mine 2008).

Available data on the number of landmines and minefields is neither complete nor reliable (Mine, 2008). In the database of the BHMAL (the Mine Action Centre of Bosnia-Herzegovina), the Bosnia-Herzegovina Mine Action Centre, are 18,600 registered minefield records. Based on experience the Centre estimates that 25 percent are not correct therefore further reducing the knowledge of the whereabouts of the landmines. Minefields in Bosnia-Herzegovina are generally widespread and random in pattern and contain relatively small number of mines.

The main problem remains that the minefield records are of poor quality, meaning that the troops who planted them were not professional enough to map clearly where the mines had been planted (Mine, 2008). Adding to the problem was the fact that many records were not delivered after the war; instead they were destroyed or hidden by individuals. There are few other possibilities which could be that those who planted the mines were killed during the conflict; or on the other hand, the same individuals could have left the country or kept the valuable information to themselves.

A reassessment of minefield records was initiated by BHMAL in 2006 and was complete by June 2006 (LM4, 2006). Preliminary results show that only one million landmines were held by the various warring factions during the war (instead of the three to six million sometimes previously claimed). During the past nine years, 461,000 stockpiled mines have been destroyed and 39,200 mines were

cleared from minefields. Thus, according to BHMAC analysis, there remain some 500,000 mines in the ground

Many minefields are in and along the Zone of Separation or Inter Entity Boundary Line – IEBL, which runs through Bosnia-Herzegovina and which separates the Federation of Muslims and Croats and the Republic of Srpska (Mine, 2008). The Zone of Separation (ZoS) or some call it Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) is a belt which is about 1100 kilometers long and is about 4 kilometers in width, and total square kilometers is estimated to be about 2000m<sup>2</sup><sup>46</sup> or 4 percent of the total territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During the time of Yugoslavia, all men had to serve for one year in the Federal military or JNA (Woodmansey and Maresca, 1997). One of JNA's main military tactics was to depend heavily on landmines as a strategic defense against possible invasion. While engineering teams were responsible for planting the mines, all soldiers were trained in technology regarding explosives including landmines. Detailed manuals existed on how to plant or put in place various explosives meant to wound or kill enemy soldiers, destroy tanks and other military devices. Interestingly enough it contained information on how to plan a landmine belt. These manuals taught as well how to mark and register landmines once planted. Different from other conflicts, for example in Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia, the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was marked by a steady battle zone and the armies who were fighting had experience in landmine and or explosives military tactics.

Experienced armies registered mostly where they planted the landmines; however, the behavior of militia and individuals were in total contradiction and they did little to register their work (Woodmansey and Maresca, 1997). Landmines were in general used to protect the frontlines and protect escape routes of armies however, landmines in Bosnia and Herzegovina were also used to protect transportation equipment and its infrastructure or to hinder its usage; to protect important strategic buildings such as power stations, electric- and telephone poles to protect POW camps; to destroy memorials and national heritage sites (for example, churches and mosques were destroyed and then booby

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<sup>46</sup> See further on the following website:  
[http://www.icbl.org/problem/country/bosnia\\_and\\_herzegovina](http://www.icbl.org/problem/country/bosnia_and_herzegovina)

traps set in place); to protect personal properties such as houses and gardens; to help with ethnic cleansing by blocking returnees as they tried to return to their homes. Houses were destroyed and booby traps were placed to block or delay reconstruction of their homes.

Of registered landmines areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, approximately 74 percent are in the Federal area of Muslims and Croats and approximately 26 percent in the Republika Srpska (Network, 2003). Adding to the existing BHMAL<sup>47</sup> efforts, ever since the conflict ended at the end of 1995 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as well as organizations sponsored by other nations, have offered to “adopt” landmine areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Organizations such as Adopt a Minefield<sup>48</sup> have been quite active in this field. Another organization which is quite active in cleaning landmines in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the Norwegian organization Norwegian People’s Aid.<sup>49</sup>

From an international perspective, a lot of projects are being implemented to assist victims of landmines; and various institutions and NGOs contribute to lessening the suffering of the victims. Among these organizations is the International Committee of Red Cross – Geneva (ICRC).<sup>50</sup> For years it has worked with victims of landmines, in particular, in post-war areas. ICRC has, as well, been working quite effectively on the ban of production, transport and stockpiling of landmines and anti-personnel explosives. ICRC estimates that in 1994, as the peak of usage of landmines was reached worldwide, about 2,000 people became victims per month. In the years that followed, 15,000 to 20,000 became yearly victims of landmines as well as of anti-personnel mines. It is

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<sup>47</sup> Further information about BHMAL can be found on their website: [www.bhmal.org](http://www.bhmal.org)

<sup>48</sup> See further about the organization on their website: [www.landmines.org.uk](http://www.landmines.org.uk). On their website, it is possible to find a list of landmine areas which can be adopted in Bosnia and Herzegovina: [http://www.landmines.org.uk/Countries/Minefield\\_Clearance/Bosnia+and+Herzegovina](http://www.landmines.org.uk/Countries/Minefield_Clearance/Bosnia+and+Herzegovina)

<sup>49</sup> The following is the homepage of Norwegian People’s Aid:

<http://apu.idium.no/folkehjelp.no/?template=english:lang=eng>

<sup>50</sup> International Committee of Red Cross - Geneva. The first Red Cross in the world, established in Geneva, Switzerland in 1863. Further information about ICRC can be found on their homepage: [www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org). Information about ICRC work in regard to landmines can be found on the following link:

<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList2/Focus:Landmines?OpenDocument>.

On the following link can be found a 12 minute film in Icelandic about the origin and the reason the Red Cross was established

<http://www.redcross.is/um%5Frauda%5Fkrossinn/althjodleg%5Fhreyfing/>

thought that after the Ottawa Convention and the following Ottawa Treaty these numbers have decreased.<sup>51</sup>

#### **4.4 Victims**

According to UNDP (Mine 2008) there were 4866 recorded mine and UXO (Unexploded Ordinance) victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina up to 1<sup>st</sup> of December 2004. From 1996 to 1<sup>st</sup> of December 2004, there was 1520 mine victims recorded, of which 427 were killed.

On the positive side, statistics show an ever decreasing number of mine victims; and looking at statistics on a monthly basis, there are seasonal “peaks” which are clearly recorded (Mine, 2008). March seems to have the most fatalities. July and October seem to claim more victims as well. According to an ICRS survey conducted in 2003, 40% of all mine victims are adult men between 19 and 39 years of age, who enter the mine areas on purpose. They are the most endangered group. Children under the age of 18 are 20% of all mine victims.

However, in 2003, the number of mine victims rapidly increased among returnees (Mine, 2008). It’s thought that these returnees were not well informed on the dangers of the presence of landmines. In the last few years, mine victims have been mostly adult men, age 20 to 60. Although they are aware of the mine danger, they are compelled to enter the mine risk areas for economic reasons, such as woodcutting, agricultural activities etc.

According to BHMAC, there were 15 mine accidents in 2007 with 18 civilians injured and 5 killed (BHMAC, 2008). They reported as well that there were 5 de-mining accidents in 2007; 4 de-miners were injured and 3 were killed. It is estimated that contaminated areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina cover land of 1,820 km<sup>2</sup> (LM2, 2007).

There are four different schemes to support people with disabilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (LM2, 2007). The state has put war veterans and their families as priorities for continued treatment. On the Federal side, the Bosnia and Herzegovina military mine survivors have the right to compensation, free

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<sup>51</sup> See further about the Ottawa Treaty on the following link:  
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/580>

healthcare and replacement prostheses through the Ministry of War Veterans. On average, veterans receive benefits that are about five times that of civilian victims of war. In 2006 Republika Srpska civilian war survivors' benefits were increased by 30 percent bringing them to about 75 percent of military benefits.

Before the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a relatively advanced medical establishment compared to other landmine-affected countries. There were over 7,000 doctors and 18,257 nurses (Woodmansey and Maresca, 1997). Since the war ended, the number of active medical personnel has been reduced by half, and in some places the war has damaged between 35-50% of the medical infrastructure. Health services are free of charge for people with life threatening conditions or with medical insurance, but approximately 50 percent of people with disabilities do not have health insurance (LM2, 2007). Emergency care and transport are available to all health centers; in 2006 with funding from Japan, intervention time for emergency care was reduced and the number of ambulances increased. Community-based rehabilitation centers provide free services to war veterans including mine survivors. All clinics have basic orthopedic and mobility devices. Orthopedic workshops reportedly provide sufficient coverage but the standards of services vary; not all are equally accessible; and most beneficiaries are not treated by a complete rehabilitation team. People with disabilities are legally entitled to prosthetic and orthopedic services, of which the government covers 85 percent of the cost; but this legislation has not always been implemented.

Psychological support is available through state-run mental health facilities working in conjunction with community-based rehabilitation centers (LM2, 2007). It is also provided in psychiatric clinics and through peer support groups; but there is a lack of specialized educational opportunities. The vast majority of people with disabilities are unemployed. Employers are legally obliged to keep people with disabilities in the job they performed before being disabled or provide an alternative.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a legislation prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities, but implementation is weak (LM2, 2007). As of 31 July 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina had not signed the UN Convention on the



Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The international community and the Bosnia and Herzegovina government continue to work toward alleviating the medical and socio-economic hurdles faced by landmine survivors; however, no overall coordination exists.

#### **4.5 NGOs at work**

When researching for NGOs working with landmine victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was clear that a large number of organizations, both local and international have been working in the country on a short-term basis. However, the picture looks different if those are isolated from the organizations which are committed to work on a long-term basis in the country. The short-term NGOs receive temporary funding, possibly, from a number of donors or from a large international donor such as CIDA<sup>52</sup>, SIDA or UN agencies etc. The variety of the projects is as great as the number of organizations.

The Genesis Project is a local, non-governmental, non-profit, humanitarian organization established in June 1996 in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Pejic, 2003). The main project objective is to conduct interactive education of children through live puppet show performances representing diverse MRE (Mine Risk Education) educational topics: children's rights, prevention of addictions and healthy lifestyles. Part of the objectives is to strengthen the communities by informing the public on freedom of speech, democracy and fundamental human rights, including assistance to war-traumatized children and their families. Development and support comes through various coexistence initiatives throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Genesis has provided school-based MRE programs since 1996, and 6,497 children have benefited from the MRE puppet shows so far. Genesis, with the support of UNICEF, has produced and broadcast 15 educational TV shows for children and adolescents since 2001 (FitzGerald, 2007). Since its establishment, the Project has mainly worked with the population in the rural areas of Republika Srpska by setting up libraries or organizing puppet show performances for children (Pejic, 2003). Although the vast majority of Genesis Project activities have been focused

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<sup>52</sup> The Canadian International Development Agency, see further the organization website:

on the whole entity of Republika Srpska, Geneses started in 2003 to be active as well in some parts of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Red Cross Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina with support from the International Committee of the Red Cross – Geneva (ICRC) has been supporting various activities for landmine victims in the country (ICRC, 2007). While ICRC is concentrating on projects on missing persons, visiting prisoners etc., the de-mining is not as high on the priority list as it was in the past. However in 2006, ICRC supported the Red Cross by sending 30 Red Cross volunteers for a training course which was certified by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre for workers in mine affected communities. 19 staff was trained in effective presentation techniques in mine-risk education.

One of the most active NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an international organization called the Landmine Survivors Network,<sup>53</sup> (LSN) the co-recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 (LSN, 2007). LSN works in the 47 most landmine affected countries in the world. The organization has projects, for example, in a number of war-torn and or post war countries such as Columbia, Ethiopia, Vietnam and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2007 LSN managed to serve a total of 682 survivors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after an extension of programs into nine additional municipalities. The activities of LSN cover, for example, small grants to start up businesses, fighting stigma, training LSN Outreach Workers who visit landmine survivors, providing peer support, including access to mobility devices, jobs and human rights training etc. To enable them to reach as many survivors as possible on the community level, LSN works with local NGOs being their implementing partners.

In the next three chapters we will look closer at the landmine situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As mentioned earlier the Municipality of Sanski Most was chosen as the stage for the theses, and yes there are personal reasons behind my selection, and one can argue that it was maybe not the most perfect one. However and for those who read this theses there are elements of surprise so after all it may have been not a bad selection after all. After the introduction of the methodology, statistical analysis of the economy of the Municipality will take

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<sup>53</sup> See further about the organization on their website: [www.landminesurvivors.org](http://www.landminesurvivors.org)

place with the focus on the war and landmine affects. The last of these three chapters, covers analysis of the interviews with inhabitants of the Village of Sasina, which is located within the Municipality.

## **Chapter 5 - Methodology**

### **5.1 Entering the field**

Sanski Most, the main setting of study for this thesis, is a town and a municipality in north-western Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is located by the river of Sana in Bosanska Krajina, between Prijedor municipality in the north and Kljuc in the south. Both Prijedor and Kljuc have towns with the same name. Administratively, Sanski Most is part of the Una-Sana Canton, which is one of 10 Cantons in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Answer-SM, 2008).

In spring 2006, I was in contact with my old LWF office in Sanski Most, which was still up and running SIDA<sup>54</sup> funded reconstruction projects in the area, as well as in the region, to get permits from the authorities to enter the research area. I was in contact with Mrs. Arijuna Foric, another previous colleague of LWF; and she was then in contact with Mr. Jasmin Selman who was and is the Head of Civil Protection Sanski Most Municipality. The permit to enter the area was granted by Mr. Selman; but in due time, I was asked to pay a visit to his office.

As planned, I came to Bosnia in July, 2006; and shortly after that, I paid the requested visit to Mr. Selman's office in Sanski Most. Mr. Selman proved to be a very valuable source of information and advice. Apart from having the authority to grant access to the de-mining teams and recommend cleaning of mines in certain areas, Mr. Selman was quite keen in providing documents, including maps of landmine areas in Sanski Most Municipality, empirical history of the region, as well as the political aspect of cleaning of landmines in the region. Importantly, he knew the de-mining project that was being carried out; and the people who were living in Sasina.

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<sup>54</sup> The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.

Mr. Selman's office was located in the fire brigade house in Sanski Most, and like a number of local government offices in Bosnia-Herzegovina deprived of funding, was not in good condition. An old 4 wheel-drive vehicle, a Russian made Lada Niva, which according to Mr. Selman worked just fine, was provided for his work.

As there was no Mine Action Centre<sup>55</sup> office in Sanski Most, the civil protection office has the responsibility of being the centre point for de-mining and dissemination activities of the area. One can say that Mr. Selman, basically, was the office; and later it was clear that everyone in the area knew him.

The core of this thesis is based on interviews with informants and the collection of qualitative as well as quantitative information from various sources, such as the internet and available physical documentation which has been compiled for different purposes. Total interviews used in the research were with 9 informants, residents of the village of Sasina, representing 5 family households and one single household (one person household). The interviews represent a total of 15 residents of Sasina. Given a total population of about 100, this was 15 percent of the total population of the village. The age group of the informants ranged from early twenties to late seventies. Interviews were taken with two young couples which had two young children each and three elderly couples and one single pensioner. In addition interviews were taken with Mr. Jasmin Selman and the Commander of the de-mining team, Commander Rafic Mulalic, of the Federation army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Due to lack of time, I asked a former colleague of mine from Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Mrs. Biljana Bosancic to conduct additional interviews. She agreed; and based on 37 interview "points," which I gave her, she conducted interviews that met my research requirements with three families. When she agreed to take additional interviews for me in 2006 she was still fully employed with the organization. By her profession she is an English teacher from Projedor, a town which is about 50 km north of Sanski Most. As the economical situation after war was and is still considered dire. For

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<sup>55</sup> Information about the activities of the Mine Action Centre in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be found on their homepage on the internet: <http://www.bhmac.org/en/stream.daenet?kat=19> but in essence the MAC office in Sarajevo is the centre of coordination of all de-mining activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a number of regional offices in the country.

those who could get employed by an international organization UN etc., was like hitting a small jackpot. I must say that my experience has shown that employees from the Balkans have proved to be excellent staff.

## 5.2 Assessing statistics

Locating the actual economic/agricultural statistics online which cover the economic output on a municipal level is very difficult, if not impossible, as my online research proved. According to the Agency for Statistics (AS-BiH, 2008) or “Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine”,<sup>56</sup> there are three main statistical institutions within Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the law on statistics, the competent authorities for organizing, producing and disseminating statistics are the following:

1. The above mentioned agency at the level of the state (BHAS)
2. The Federal Office of Statistics for the Entity of Federation of Bosnia or “Federalni Zavod za Statistiku” (FZS)<sup>57</sup>
3. The Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics for the Entity of Republika Srpska or “Republika Srpska Republicki zavod za statistiku” (RZSRS)<sup>58</sup>

In addition to the three statistical institutions, the Central Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina compiles monetary, balance of payments and financial statistics for Bosnia-Herzegovina (CBBIH).

Collecting the necessary and specific statistics in the English language for my research from web sites of these institutions proved to be nearly impossible. Several statistics exist on a Cantonal level; however my requirement was to locate statistical economic/agricultural production numbers on a municipal level. I did manage to get the demographic figures, which were very important, as the figures presented on some web site articles were incorrect. Surveys, researches and reports etc., are mostly in Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian. There are a number of reports, surveys, etc., available in dual languages and includes English as well.

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<sup>56</sup> The link to the Agency for Statistics for Bosnia-Herzegovina, homepage in English is the following: <http://www.bhas.ba/eng/Default.asp?>

<sup>57</sup> The link to the Federal Office for Statistics, homepage in English is the following: <http://www.fzs.ba/Eng/index.htm>

<sup>58</sup> The link to the Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics, homepage in English is the following: <http://www.rzs.rs.ba/English.htm>

But some parts of these web sites are in the process of being built and translated and understandably that will take time. But just to be clear, I found the published materials to be of very high quality and compliant with international standards.

Some of the statistics used in this research came from published work retrieved online from the home pages of aforementioned institutions. The core of the statistics used and upon which the comparative calculations, assumptions and part of the conclusions are based on, comes from my temporary assistant, Mrs. Biljana Bosancic, who gathered information from the record office located in the municipality building of Sanski Most (Bosancic, 2006). The report itself is simple, but catches the main economic statistics including agricultural productions figures and the gross and net value of this production. The two years used for comparison are 1991 and 2005. As previously mentioned, part of the references of this research, came as well from various online resources.

While some of the statistics could be verified or double-checked, other sources could not be located. So I had to use my own judgment as to whether I should use the figures, which ones to eliminate if they were contradictory or confusing in comparison to other statistics in the report. Every now and then I do try to present this dilemma to the reader during the statistical analysis.

For the reader of this thesis, this may look like that I am “filtering” the statistical information presented in Mrs. Bosancic’s report as well as Mr. Zeric’s report for the Mine Action Centre; but on the contrary, I selected statistics which could reinforce my case and left out other information which basically had no particular purpose for the research, hence I have included a section with the title “Justification of the statistical analysis” in next chapter, that aims to assess the changes in agricultural production since 1991 in Sanski Most municipality.

## Chapter 6 - Agricultural production in Sanski Most municipality

The purpose of this chapter is to value the loss of agricultural production due to landmines in the Sanski Most municipality. However, it became more complex than anticipated partly due to lack of statistics but by using the limited figures available; applying close estimation including assumptions etc., conclusions were reached and which in a way were unexpected as such.

### 6.1 Population and demographic statistics

For information purposes, the population figure of Sanski Most municipality as of **30<sup>th</sup> of June, 2007** was a total of **44,859**, with the following age group distribution (FZF-population, 2007):

Age:	0 - 14	15 - 64	65+
Per age group	6,458	32,380	6,021

According to MAC (Zeric, 2001), in 2001 the population figure is set at **58,300**. There is no reason to conclude that the population has gone down drastically from late 2001 to mid 2007, on the contrary and if Zeric was correct it should have gone further up. No recorded specific events happened during that period which should have drastically reduced the number of the population. In this instance I am accepting the official figure from the Federal Office of Statistics for the Entity of Federation of Bosnia.

For pre-war, 1991, at least two sources (Zeric, 2001) and (Answer-SM, 2008)<sup>59</sup> agree that the total population was **60,307**, with the following breakdown:

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<sup>59</sup> Taking statistics from this web site may not academically be acceptable or in a “grey area” but there were definitely not many options to choose from but then again, the statistics there were reinforced by other sources hence the reason for using the statistics from this web site.



Bosniaks <sup>60</sup>	28,136	or	46.65%
Serbs	25,363	or	42.05%
Croats	4,322	or	7.16%
Yugoslavs <sup>61</sup>	1,247	or	2.06%
Others - unknown <sup>62</sup>	1,239	or	2.08%

According to Zeric (2001) the total population in Sanski Most municipality was **58,300** and demographic breakdown as per his report dated 20<sup>th</sup> of August 2001, was as follows:

Bosniaks	52,292	or	89.69%
Serbs	5,000	or	8.58%
Croats	960	or	1.64%
Others	48	or	0.08%

There are two problems with these statistics; one is the total population which contradicts at least two other sources and the “rounded up” figure of the Serb population. Both of them should be refuted but interestingly enough while the figure of **58,300** has not been found anywhere else, the percentage of **89%** of the population being Bosniaks has come up. On answer.com (Answer-SM, 2008), it is claimed that in 2005, **89%** of the population of the municipality were ethnic Bosniaks, a claim which, very likely, is correct; but no further ethnic breakdown is presented.

Regarding the assumingly “rounded up” figure of 5000 being the population of Serbs in 2001, it does look odd and contradicts another source, where it is claimed that a total of 555 Serbs had returned to Sanski Most in 2000

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<sup>60</sup> The Bosniaks or Bosniacs are a South Slavic people, living mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sandzak region of Serbia and Montenegro, with a smaller autonomous population also present in Croatia, Kosovo and Republic of Macedonia. Bosniaks are typically characterized by their tie to the Bosnian historical region, traditional adherence to Islam and common culture and language. See further info about Bosniaks on the following link: <http://www.answers.com/topic/bosniaks>.

<sup>61</sup> See further the definition of Yugoslavs on the following link: <http://www.answers.com/topic/yugoslavs>

<sup>62</sup> Zeric compiles into one figure the number of Yugoslavs and Others but the totals add up.

(Novine, 2000). Several e-mail communications to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee, UNHCR, in Sarajevo, requesting information of total returnees to Sanski Most Municipality from 1996 to 2007 as per ethnic breakdown, was never answered.

The reason for the importance of having a relatively correct figure could in fact not only change the preconditions for the calculations; but also alter the conclusions of the statistical analysis, including the threat of landmines, as the reader will discover in the following pages.

The size of Sanski Most municipality is 984 km<sup>2</sup> or 98,400 hectares (Zeric, 2001). However, according to information from the Federal Office of Statistics for the Entity of Federation of Bosnia, the territory of Sanski Most municipality is presented as being 781 km<sup>2</sup> or 78,400 hectares in 2006 (FZF, 2008). The difference in square kilometer figures has no real effect on the following statistical analysis of production outputs of agricultural land. The total hectares being compared as used for agricultural production does not change. That is, the pre-war figures from 1991 and the 2005 figures remain the same. As to the land exchange which took place between the municipalities or the private sale of land, there is no information available whether this involved major agricultural land, and in the analysis it's not factored in.

The following are the three categories of landmine locations:

1. Infrastructure which has been mined
2. Agricultural lands that are polluted with mines
3. Forests and wood-land areas

The temptation would be to analyze the economic effects of having landmines around infrastructure as well as the forest industry. But the purpose of this research is to concentrate only to a limited extent on the actual statistical analysis of agricultural production. Before the war there were operating industrial factories which became in-operative during the war. The limitations and, in some cases, the reliability of information

prevents me from presenting statistical analysis which is clearly with an unacceptable margin of error (RZSRS, 2008):

1. In this research I have chosen, for the sake of simplicity, to use the words “agricultural” and “production” as a collective descriptor for the purpose of presenting coherent statistics, but at the same time reaching factual conclusions in the analysis. The definition of “agriculture” would include cultivable land and arable land as per definition from the Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics but still within the following limitations.
2. Agricultural areas are land areas utilized for agricultural production. Agricultural area includes cultivable areas, pastures, fishponds, reed tracts and pools.
3. Cultivable area covers land areas where farm crops, vegetable crops, permanent plantings and grasses are grown, as well as cultivation, mowing and other agricultural works are performed and the yields are gathered every year. Cultivable area consists of arable land and gardens, orchards, vineyards and meadows.
4. Arable lands (fields) are lands areas solely dedicated for field crop production. These areas are sown with the following crops, in rotation: cereals, industrial crops, vegetable crops and fodder crops. Arable area includes recovering areas, also, arable land that remains uncultivated: green fallow, black fallow, or neglected land. In addition, arable lands are also areas under vine and fruit tree nurseries and areas under clover and lucerne.

“Production” is defined here in the research as the value of the output from the agricultural land.

## 6.2 Agricultural production

The following is a statistical comparison of economic and agricultural data from 1991 and 2005 for Sanski Most Municipality. The basic statistical information on which the analysis is based comes from a document translated by Mrs. Bosansic which I received from Mr. Selman. I understand that the original information comes from a small statistical office in the Municipality building of Sanski Most, but who put it together is unknown.

As previously mentioned, many official records were destroyed during the war, including pre-war records. Shortly after the war in December 1995, the local government in Sanski Most put in place again an office to oversee statistics and record keeping.

According to the records received the following are the main statistical analysis of employment for these two years.

The total number of agricultural households in 1991	9,705
The total number of agricultural households in 2005	7,123

The records distinguish clearly between those solely occupied as general employees in factories (non agriculture), business and the service sector and those employed in agriculture, as follows:

The total number of general workers in 1991	8,263
The total number of general workers in 2005	4,276
The total number employed in agriculture in 1991	29,115
The total number employed in agriculture in 2005	10,684

Between 1991 and 2005 employees in the agricultural sector decreased by about 63% and general employed workers decreased by about 48%.

Total economic and agricultural production statistics for 1991 were not available for Sanski Most. The total agricultural surface in hectares<sup>63</sup> or Ha and m<sup>2</sup> for 1991 and agricultural productions statistics for 2005, including the value of the production, were available.

Agricultural surface in 1991	47,232 Ha
Agricultural surface in 2005	37,750 Ha

The total agricultural surface in 2005 was about 20% less than in 1991. However total agricultural surface does not necessarily represent what the actual usage of this land was for growing vegetable and cereals. The following are the figures showing how much of the land was actually sowed:

Total surface sowed in 1991	26,236 Ha
Total surface sowed in 2005	7,940 Ha

The difference is nearly 70% fewer surfaces sowed in 2005 than in 1991. It is worth noting that there was no clarification of the proportion of the total agricultural land used for pure grass or pastures for haymaking.

The following are the main harvest figures for 2005, as well as the total value of the harvests. The information provided does not clarify whether the value of the harvest is real market price figures as sold on the market, median market prices, or prices paid for the produce to the farmers. The following are the statistics as they were presented on documents provided by Biljana (2006):

The harvest of cereals; i.e., wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize etc.	4,275 Ha
Total value of cereals harvested	6,941,740 KM

The vegetable harvest; i.e., potatoes, carrot, garlic, onion, beans, cabbage, tomato, peppers, cucumber, melon etc.	3,665 Ha
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<sup>63</sup> One hectare is equal to 10.000m<sup>2</sup> so 1000 hectares equals 10.000.000m<sup>2</sup> or 10km<sup>2</sup>.

Total value of vegetables harvested	20,358,500 KM
Cattle breeding; total surface used	1,477 Ha
Total value of the cattle food production	11,348,000 KM
Milk production	9,032,880 liters
Total value of the milk production	4,732,080 KM
The total value of agricultural production in Sanski Most in 2005 was worth	56,717,436 KM
Total costs	34,395,038 KM
Gross added value (total value less costs)	22,322,398 KM
Total depreciation	156,567 KM
Total net value	<b>20,759,830 KM</b>

The post war total net value of agricultural production in 2005 comes to just over 20 million KM or about 10 million EURO but in order to see how that stands in comparison with pre-war production figures, the following are calculations based on the last available data or from 1991.

The harvest figures for 1991 are not available, but the total amount of hectares sowed is available, 26,236 Ha. As previously mentioned, records did get destroyed during the war. However, given the information above in regard to utilization of agricultural land and sowed land, close estimation can be carried out based on the **unchanged value** of the production in 2005 for simplification purposes. The percentage of land surface and agricultural land use estimated for 1991 can be compared to the published figures of 2005.

Total sowed agricultural surface in 2005 was 70% less then in 1991 or 7,940 Ha, meaning the multiply hectare figure of 1991 versus 2005 is: 26,236 Ha / 7,940 Ha meaning the **multiply factor** would be approximately **at 3.3 as baseline** for calculations.

If we accept that, proportionally, the output per hectare and the total value of the agricultural produce was the same for both of these comparable years; and again for the sake of simplicity, we do not factor in inflation or other cost factors, and if we assume that prices remained unchanged, and the percentage mixture of cereals and vegetable remained the same, the total worth of the produce can be estimated at a total gross value of **187 million KM** or estimated total net value at **62 million KM** in 1991 versus the net value in 2005 of just over **20 million KM** per year. This is a net value production loss of approximately **41.5 million KM**.

Using the same preconditions as above to calculate the total loss of production from 1992 to 2005 inclusive (a total of **14 years**) and if we give ourselves the fact that there was no commercial production of agricultural products during the war years (a total of about **4 years**) or at least the market for such products was very small to non-existent, and if we accept that the agricultural production from 1996 onwards was already at the 2005 capacity, which is highly unlikely, but again for the sake of simplicity, the following conservative and approximate conclusions can however be reached.

The loss of gross production value can be calculated as follows: 4 years of war at 1991 value capacity, meaning total loss of agricultural production capacity:  $4 \times 187,167,530 \text{ KM}$  or just over **748 million KM**. 10 years of loss of production capacity, meaning the difference between the value of 1991 production and 10 years of production loss capacity, using the year 2005, as baseline. If not clear enough, from 1996 to 2005 inclusive, the production capacity has not managed to reach the level of the 1991 capacity. 1991 gross value of 187,167,530 KM less 2005 value of 56,717,436 KM = 130,450,094 KM per year for  $\times 10$  years or rounded figure would be **1.3 billion KM**. Therefore we can conclude that the estimated total gross production loss of value to be over **2 billion KM** over these years.

The net loss value can be calculated as follows: 4 years of war  $4 \times 62,279,490 \text{ KM}$  or about **250 million KM**. If that is then calculated over a 10 years period (1991 less 2005) or  $10 \times 41,500,000 \text{ KM}$ , the sum would give approximately **415 million KM**. Hence the total net value production loss is approximately **664 million KM**.

However, if we assume that the first 4 years after the war, 1996 to 1999 inclusive, the agricultural capacity was only on average 50% of 2005, and again using the 1991 and 2005 figures for as baseline for further analysis and the same pre-conditions as above, the following would be the gross loss of production value as well the net value loss: 4 years of war (1991 capacity)  $4 \times 187,167,530$  KM or about **748 million KM**. 4 years of 50% reduced 2005 production capacity or  $0.5 \times 56,717,436$  KM would add additionally **28 million KM**. By deducting this figure from 1991 capacity it will give  $158,808,812 \times 4$  years = or approximately **635 million KM**. A 6 years of 1991 production capacity less 2005 production capacity or  $6 \times 130,450,094$  KM or approximately **782 million KM**. The estimated total gross loss of production value would be **2,166 billion KM**. This is about **150 million KM** higher loss of gross production capacity than if previous calculations are used.

Using the same method as above to calculate possible additional net value loss of production: 4 years of war  $\times 62,279,490$  KM or approximately **249 million KM**. 4 years of 50% reduced production capacity of 2005 or  $20,759,830$  KM divided by 2 =  $10,379,615$ . That figure is then deducted from the 1991 figure, which gives  $51,899,875$  KM  $\times 4$  years or about **207 million KM**. 6 years of 2005 capacity  $\times 41,500,000$  KM or about **240 million KM**. The total net value production loss can be estimated to be **696 million KM**. The total net value production loss would then be just over **30 million KM** more over these 4 years of 50% reduced production capacity of 2005.

### 6.3 The ethnic factor

As previously mentioned and in a way debated, in 1991 the total population in Sanski Most was **60,307** residents the demographic breakdown of the main ethnic groups as per that year (Answer-SM, 2008) (Zeric, 2001):

Bosniaks <sup>64</sup>	28,136	or	46.65%
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<sup>64</sup> The Bosniaks or Bosniacs are a South Slavic people, living mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sandzak region of Serbia and Montenegro, with a smaller autonomous population also present in Croatia, Kosovo and Republic of Macedonia. Bosniaks are typically characterized by their tie to



Serbs	25,363	or	42.05%
Croats	4,322	or	7.16%
Yugoslavs <sup>65</sup>	1,247	or	2.06%
Others - unknown <sup>66</sup>	1,239	or	2.08%

As previously cited in another source (Novine, 2000) the total population is claimed to have been 73,239 before the war with a total population of 27,670 Serbs, making that ethnic group 37.78% of the total population. I am not sure why the ethnic group figures vary so much but thought came to my mind is that the Bosniaks wanted to show they were majority ethnic group before the war and the purpose is possibly to justify occupation of land and houses, but this is only a guess. The demographic figures which are mentioned in the Mine Action Centre report (Zeric 2001) as well as in (Answer-SM, 2008) confirm the previous figure and breakdown of ethnic groups.

No information can be found on how the remaining 11% is ethnically distributed by end of 2005. As noted earlier, UNHCR HQ in Sarajevo did not respond to communications about the issue.

There is a reason for this large ethnic imbalance in the population figure. During the Bosnian war, Sanski Most was taken over by the Bosnian-Serb forces was under their control from the spring of 1992 to October 1995. During this time, large parts of the non-Serb population either fled or were forcibly expelled. In October 1995, the town was taken over by the Bosnian Federation forces. This triggered a mass exodus of the Serb population (Answer-SM, 2008).

We will therefore use the population figure of **60,307** residents for 1991 and the demographic breakdown as per above as baseline for looking at the ethnic factor affecting the agricultural production. As previously mentioned (according to source (Answer-SM 2008) in 2005, the picture had changed dramatically, and **89%** of the population of the municipality was ethnic Bosniaks.

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the Bosnian historical region, traditional adherence to Islam and common culture and language. See further info about Bosniaks on the following link: <http://www.answers.com/topic/bosniaks>.

<sup>65</sup> See further the definition of Yugoslavs on the following link:

<http://www.answers.com/topic/yugoslavs>

<sup>66</sup> Zeric compiles into one figure the number of Yugoslavs and Others but the totals add up.

According to Katavic (2000), before the war **72 percent** of the privately owned land in Sanski Most belonged to the ethnic group of Serbs.<sup>67</sup> If we look at the total hectares being sowed in 1991, and if we estimate, as before, that this is mostly agricultural land, and as before was 26,236 hectares in 1991, 72% of that figure would give approximately **18,890 hectares** of agricultural land belonging to the Bosnian Serbs or 68 percent. This means that only 7,940 hectares were sowed in 2005.

If the **72 percent** figure is correct, and if we allow for a margin of error such as, the Serb land is not all agricultural land, we can conclude that land owned by other ethnic groups is being fully utilized (Katavic, 2000). On the other hand and it wouldn't be unreasonable to expect, and to conclude that part of the land or **594 hectares** approximately **3%** of the land owned by Serbs, is being used by other ethnic groups, such as the Bosniaks. An important fact remains that many Serbs have sold their properties in Sanski Most, including their land, to Bosniaks or exchanged them for properties in Republika Srpska.

It is worth noting, while I was living in Sanski Most between April 1997 and the end of 1999, I was informed there were land exchanges happening on municipal levels. A Serbian village belonging to Ostra Luka, Republika Srpska, located north of Sanski Most, which during Dayton agreement came to be a part of the territory of Sanski Most, was exchanged for land in Kluc municipality, a neighboring Bosnian Federation municipality of Sanski Most. I have not been able to locate the size of the land that was exchanged.

If we ignore whether this 3% of the land is being used or not, and if we apply this information to the cumulative calculations above by using the 72% Serb ownership of land in the municipality less the 3% sold, exchanged, etc., the gross loss of agricultural production value as well as the net value figure still would leave the cumulative loss of over 14 years being over 2.1 billion KM and 675 million KM respectively.

One could reinforce the case by considering the size of rural household farms. In 1991 the average household size in Bosnia Herzegovina was 3.4

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<sup>67</sup> I have not been able to locate this percentage figure anywhere else other than in this newspaper article.

persons.<sup>68</sup> If that figure was divided into the Serb population in Sanski Most in 1991 (25,363 / 3.4) the sum would be an estimated 7,459 households. According to Mrs. Bosancic (2000), agricultural households in 1991 in Sanski Most totaled **9,705**. This would make the estimated **7,459** Serbian households **76.85%** of the total agricultural households; however, all Serbian households could not have been agricultural households.

As Sanski Most is a rural town with no university and limited industry its function was primarily as a service-centre for farmers. From my own observations, most homes had some kind of plot to grow vegetables or other produce to subsidize their own consumption; therefore, one can make the assumption that the Serbian households were largely agricultural in nature. The previous pre-war figure of 72% land ownership by Serbs and the 76.85% of Sanski Most agricultural households listed as Serbian households are two very close figures, and possibly the difference, or **4.85%**, could be the non-agricultural households.

The average size of a rural household farm in the Republika Srpska today is **3.5** hectares or 35,000m<sup>2</sup> divided amongst 8 plots (Nikic and Predic, 2006).

This is in a less mountainous part of Bosnia-Herzegovina where most land is arable. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where many farms are in mountainous regions, the average farm size is **2.5** hectares or 25,000m<sup>2</sup>. The small size of farms in Bosnia and Herzegovina has traditionally been like that for hundreds of years and which will most likely continue to be the most traditional and common size of farming. From the perspective of economics of scale, this is not the most economical way of farming as the utilization of equipment and manpower is expensive in proportion to the limited production output.

When the Serbs left Sanski Most in October 1995, they left behind part of their livelihood and thousands of plots of private agricultural land, which is illegal to utilize without the consent of the owner. It is as well difficult to economically use the land as the soil is mixed and mountainous land prevents or limits the use of machinery. From this we can conclude that the Serb population, which left in October 1995 and became internally displaced and/or international refugees, had

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<sup>68</sup> According to Britannica, see further link: <http://www.britannica.com/eb/question-700826/11/household-size-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina>

contributed greatly to the agricultural production in the municipality during the pre-war years. The statistical analysis of the gross production value loss and the net value loss reinforces this as well. Their land is being used to a limited extent, approximately and possibly about 3%. Even considering the property and land exchange currently happening, the importance of the Serb ethnic group as a major pre-war contributor to the economy in Sanski Most municipality cannot be ignored.

#### **6.4 Affects of the landmines**

According to Mr. Selman, the estimated land polluted by landmines in Sanski Most municipality is estimated at 31 km<sup>2</sup> or **3,100 hectares**. The size of Sanski Most municipality is 781 km<sup>2</sup> or **78,100 hectares**. Which means that landmine polluted land can be estimated at nearly 4% of the total agricultural land. However in 2001, the Federal Mine Action Centre estimated that the risk areas were about 3.325% of total surface of the municipality (Zeric 2001).

As previously mentioned, the category of the landmine areas are as follows:

1. Infrastructure which has been mined
2. Agricultural land which are polluted with mines
3. Forests and wood-land areas

There is no percentage break down of the proportion of each category, so if we make a conservative assumption that that categories 1 and 3 - represent **25%** each, and category 2 - Agricultural land would represent approximately **50%**. This could mean that **1.550 hectares or 5.9 percent** of agricultural land are polluted by landmines ( $1.550 / 26.236 = 5.9$  percent). This may not be accurate, but again for the sake of simplicity, we will use the figure as baseline. According to Zeric (2001), then Head of the Regional Office of the Mine Action Centre in Bihac, the IEBL<sup>69</sup> where most of the landmines are located, a minimum of landmines went through agricultural land in Sanski Most.

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<sup>69</sup> This is a 4 kilometer Inter-Entity Boundary Line which splits up the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

If we use the 5.9 percent as a **baseline** for calculating the effects of landmines on agricultural production and apply them to the above figures we would get the percentage of gross production value loss by using the previous maximized estimated calculations of about **2,166 billion KM** x 0.059 = **127.8 million KM** accumulated loss over the period of 1992 to 2005 inclusive, as a direct result of the affect of landmines polluting agricultural land.

By applying the same calculation to the total accumulated net value loss over the same period of time the conclusion would be the following: **696.7million KM** x 0.059 = about **41.1million KM** in accumulated loss over this period of time.

There is still the ethnic factor presented earlier. How does that fit into economic effects of these landmines in Sanski Most? If we look closely at the total land that is owned by the Bosnian Serbs (72 percent Serb ownership before the war, less 3 percent of Serb land currently being farmed equals 69 percent), the picture will look considerably different even though there is no available statistical breakdown of whether the landmines are spread equally over land owned by all ethnic groups. As before, we would assume that there was no commercial market for agricultural products, as people were basically growing and sowing mainly for their own consumption. Land owned by Serbs represents 69 percent of all land in the municipality versus 31 percent of land owned by other ethnic groups or **1.069,5 hectares** versus **480,5 hectares** of landmine polluted land..

Estimated landmine polluted agricultural land owned by other ethnic groups:

Gross value loss:	127.8 million KM	x <b>0.31</b>	=	39.6 million KM
Net loss:	41.1 million KM	x <b>0.31</b>	=	12.7 million KM

Estimated landmine polluted agricultural land owned by Serbs:

Gross value loss:	127.8 million KM	x <b>0.69</b>	=	88.2 million KM
Net loss:	41.1 million KM	x <b>0.69</b>	=	28.3 million KM

Comparing these two different scenarios (other ethnic groups versus Serbs) the economic effects of landmines would logically impact the Serb population if they were there but they are not. Unless the Serbs begin to return in flocks, no one is attending to their landmine polluted agricultural land; hence, it would be fair to conclude that the threat of landmines could be close to 69% less. Meaning, until the land has been cleaned of landmines, there is far less probability that landmine accidents will occur during their absence.

Could that be? According to Mr. Selman, in the summer of 2006, only one landmine victim had been registered in Sanski Most municipality since the end of the war, nearly 11 years. Further online research revealed that at the beginning of 2008, no additional victims had been reported. It is highly likely that another factor has contributed to the low victim prevalence in Sanski Most. Mr. Selman states:

When it comes to children, special focus has been to educate them by disseminating information by producing special pamphlets. Sometimes there is competition among school children, where they compete in identifying landmines, UXO's etc. (all deactivated).

This effort, alongside strategically disseminating information leaflets, posters, billboards etc., and using warning signs and red tape to seal off all mine affected areas, has enhanced the knowledge of the danger of landmines among the public. During my field research, I picked up various dissemination materials adapted for different target groups as well as for the general public. This material had clear, simple and effective messages meant to warn the public about the danger of landmines.

## **6.5 Conclusion**

One can argue whether my calculations are realistic given the fact that the landmine effected agricultural land may be much lower than the calculations indicate, but the fact remains that somehow the effects need to be placed in a quantitative measurement, and this being at least one way of measuring it. From

the presentation of the statistics above it can be argued that the landmine pollution had a limited effect on the economy in Sanski Most. From statistical point of view, the cumulative economical affects of over 10 years has meant total gross loss of production value of over 2,1 million KM and total net value loss of nearly 700 million KM.

The psychological fear factor can as well contribute to the fact that good arable land is not being utilized simply because it's thought and or possible known to be polluted by landmines, UXO, as there is never any guarantee that land is free from landmines. The psychological aspect affecting people who are living in close proximity of landmines are covered to some extend in the interviews with the informants in Sasina in next chapter.

## **Chapter 7 - Landmines and livelihood in Sasina**

This chapter is based first and foremost on interviews with habitants of the Village of Sasina which is located within the Sanski Most Municipality. The interviews are divided up according to different factors related to their different economical ways of survival in this landmine polluted village. The interviews explore as well some social and psychological aspect of this reality and coping mechanism. Other references related to the topic are integrated in the text.

### **7.1 Short introduction to the informants in Sasina**

For the sake of keeping the confidentiality of the informants in Sasina in the research and possibly for their personal security, their names have been changed and their surnames are not disclosed.

Anthony and Adrijana – pensioners

The first informants, whom I visited at Mr. Selman's recommendation, were an elderly couple and pensioners, Anthony and Adrijana. Anthony was born in 1932 and they were living alone. Their house looked neat as well as their surrounding garden.

Branka and Branimir – pensioners with no pension

These are old couple, very talkative and full of life. Their house is located 500 m from the center of the village, with a big, tidy yard in front. Next to the house there is a shed, a small pigsty and a hen house. The house was newly built, has a very small kitchen which is also used as a living room, and another room that is connected to the kitchen and used as a bed room because of heating.



Catherine and Cedomir - pensioners

Catherine was happy to have someone visit them, especially because they have a lot of problems regarding landmines. Her husband Cedomir didn't want to speak to me; Catherine says that he is usually quiet and would refuse to give an interview anyhow. Their house is close to the road, a couple of hundred meters from the center of the village. The house is on a small hill; the area around is very tidy; and in the house it is obvious that Catherine is a hard working and very tidy woman. It is a nice and warm home. Catherine's mother-in-law was living near them, but separately.

Snjezana - pensioner

Snjezana lives alone, and when I met her she had been a widow for 3 years. She is Danijela's neighbor. Snjezana has a good pension from Germany, where she worked when she was young.

Danijela and Davor— young

This was basically an ad hoc interview; because so few people reside in the village, the opportunity was taken to interview Danijela. Her partner was not in the house, but we ran into him when he was returning from Sanski Most after looking for work. They had two very young children and Danijela is in her early twenties. It was clear that they were very poor by any standard.

Emanuel and Esther - young

Emanuel and Esther have two girls, Elanor (5) and Eldina (3). The house of this young couple is in the first part of the village of Sasina (closer to Sanski Most), located on the top of a hill. Even though the day was nice and the weather dry, it was still difficult to climb up the hill to their house because the road was in very bad shape. Ante repairs it a couple of times a year, but when the winter snow comes, they are cut off from the rest of the world. The house was newly built, simple and nice, no façade.

The level of education of the informants was not covered in the interviews but based on how they lived and described their life one can only assume that the education they received was at most a secondary, possibly some post-secondary education. The village of Sasina was mainly engaged in agriculture, and opportunities for the children of the inhabitants were quite limited. If not already residing abroad when the war broke out, most of the villagers left for Croatia or another European country; such as Germany.

## **7.2 The village of Sasina**

The village of Sasina is on the outskirts of Sanski Most town and stretches along the “old” main road to the city of Banja Luka. For those who have not traveled in the republics of Former Yugoslavia, it can be quite hard to identify a village when houses are not condensed; i.e., no cafes, shops or fuel station.

One of the typical landscapes of Bosnia-Herzegovina is forest which dominates the hills and mountains, and the area of Sasina has a similar landscape. Commonly, there are rivers in these valleys; but in the case of Sasina, they are only small streams. The inhabitants must depend on water from their private wells. Sasina can be defined as one of those “stretched” villages in a long and relatively narrow valley the houses are dispersed along side the road for few kilometers with small plots of grassland as well as plots of cultivated land where maize is by far the most popular agricultural product. These small plots of land are mostly at the bottom of the valley, close to the houses of the owners; while some of the plots stretch up to the hills but are mainly grassland. Some landowners are growing vegetables on a small scale, as it’s next to impossible to have any automated harvesting in the hills.

According to local history, the name of the village, Sasina, came from people named Sasi or Sassi who were there working in iron mines. These families were also involved in primitive processing of the iron. Anthony could trace his family back to the year of 1850 and claimed it was a historical place. Another informant, Snjezana, claimed that: “Our grandparents were telling us that Sassi used to live in this area and therefore the village got the name Sasina.” In my

research I could not locate further information about Sasi or Sassi people except they could have been of Italian origin.

In October 1995, the Bosnian Federation Army took Sanski Most and a result was the exodus of the Serbian population. Previously the Serbs had expelled and killed the Muslim population, however, the Croats in the village of Sasina and Poljak had been allowed to stay during the years from early 1992 to October 1995. Many of the inhabitants of Sasina had left before, and for those who stayed until the Federation Army took Sanski Most, life was hard. From October 1995 to early 1996 most of them were arrested and used in an exchange for Muslims held by the Serbians or Croatians. When those who wanted to return came back, they were faced with the fact that their houses had been looted, burned or blown up. The Catholic Church that was located in the middle of the village had been completely destroyed except what remained of the tower.

### **7.3 Returnees**

According to Bosancic (2006), the present number of households which had returned to Sasina were 63 in the summer of 2006. That however does not give an accurate figure on individual returnees. Households can be of four persons, two or even one. According to one of my informants the total population of the village in the summer of 2006 was about 100.

However the village has basically been cut more or less in half. That is, the other half belongs to Republika Srpska and part is in the Inter Entity Border Line zone as well. Information about returnees to the other side was not available. As with the Una Sana Canton, total collective returnee figures are available and only 2007 figures had a breakdown of returnees by ethnic background.

For example, according to UNHCR 81 registered Croats returned to Sanski Most in the first 6 months of 2007 (UNHCR, 2007). The question is: To which villages of Sanski Most did they return. The information was not available from UNHCR even after several attempts to contact the offices of the organization in Sarajevo.

Returnees coming home after the war faced several difficulties; their land was polluted with landmines, including some of the infrastructure; their houses

were damaged, some completely; there were no electricity neither telephone lines and part of their livelihood was not accessible due to landmines. Catherine reported the following about her home: “Someone was staying here, I don’t know who; but it was impossible to live in the house, because the house was damaged by grenades.”

One of the key issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina for returnees was the need for assistance to reconstruct the war damaged homes. Being a catholic village, Sasina was one of a number of villages in Bosnia-Herzegovina that benefited from assistance from the Catholic agency for international aid and development, Caritas.<sup>70</sup> Most of the assistance to the inhabitants was in the form of self-help, meaning that material was provided but the actual reconstruction was in the hands of the beneficiary. The organization provided different aid to the village as Branka commented when asked if they, she and Branimir, received any aid: “Yes, from Swiss Caritas, bricks, roof, windows and doors. We had bricklayers but most of the work we did alone.”

According to Mr. Peter Amhof (2008), the head delegate of Caritas Switzerland based in Sarajevo, the organization was working in Sasina between 1997 and 1999. It was funded to a large extent by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation or SDC.<sup>71</sup> The project was comprised of a cluster of three villages Sasina and Poljak (Bosnian Croats) and Trnova (Bosnjaks). For the Bosnian Croats in Sasina and Poljak, two neighboring villages, Caritas provided reconstruction materials in two phases; for the phase 1, 103 houses, and for phase 2, 31 houses. Mr. Amhof could not define exactly how the aid was divided between the beneficiaries in the two villages, but he could make a close estimate that the organization provided reconstruction materials for at least 50 houses for the village of Sasina.

The average cost per house for the building material amounted to approximately 11,000 KM. As previously mentioned, the project was carried out on a self-help basis, which meant that the beneficiaries received construction

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<sup>70</sup> See further info about CARITAS on the following link:

<http://www.caritas.org.au/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FAQs>

<sup>71</sup> See further info about the Swiss Development Agency on the following link:

<http://www.sdc.admin.ch/>

materials and built their houses on their own. Depending on the category of destruction, size of the family; etc., the construction materials provided would be considered basic and not necessarily reflective of the pre-war status of the house, let alone the size of the house. The value of the reconstruction materials provided to the beneficiaries in Sasina could be estimated at 550,000 KM.

Caritas Switzerland identified the need to invest in the infrastructure of the village and the project invested approximately 150,000 KM for a high-voltage line and two transformer stations, including a low-voltage network in Sasina. Apart from SDC, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, as a back-donor to fund its project, other sister organizations, such as Caritas Luxemburg, Slovenian International Trust Fund, Handicap International, UMCOR, ICRC and LWF, pulled in resources.

Caritas did not only invest in houses and infrastructure but made valuable inputs in securing the livelihood and sustainability of the inhabitants of Sasina. The organization persuaded other organizations, both NGOs' and international organizations, to fund different projects in Sasina (and Poljak); therefore, complementing /supplementing the work of Caritas Switzerland.

As part of the sustainability of the project, Caritas delivered in Sasina/Poljak the necessary material for the repair of 45 stables. The cost for repairing the stables was approximately 2500 KM per stable. A total of 17 pregnant cattle were given to the villages at 2800 KM each. As previously mentioned, Caritas was implementing Sasina/Poljak as one cluster, so the aid which was provided was considered one and the precise split-up between the two villages is not available.

Before the power lines were put in place, the Mine Action Centre in Bihac and Handicap International<sup>72</sup> did the necessary de-mining along the route. Later on, The Slovenian International Trust Fund worked on de-mining agricultural land and access roads, but how many m<sup>2</sup> was cleaned remains unclear. A bigger investment in the water supply was provided by the International Committee of

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<sup>72</sup> See further information about Handicap International on their homepage: <http://www.handicap-international.org/>

the Red Cross - ICRC<sup>73</sup> and the Lutheran World Federation. United Methodist Committee on Relief – UMCOR<sup>74</sup> was working in the area as well and provided 13 pregnant cows, but whether they went to the Sasina/Poljak area or the village of Trnova is not known. The Phare - Obnova Program<sup>75</sup> worked on stables in the municipality as well and UMCOR on the distribution of calves.

In December 2000, Caritas provided materials for reconstruction in Sasina/Poljak for 14 houses, and again the split-up between the villages is not known. In May 2001, more infrastructure work was carried out on a low voltage network and then 11 more stables added worth about 36,500 KM. The extent of the programme as well as the number of beneficiaries who were from Sasina/Poljak is not known.

Total funds invested by Caritas and other donors in these villages, Sasina, Poljak and Trnova can be estimated to be about 5.4 million KM. The investment in Sasina can be estimated of being over one million KM and that would include the cost of de-mining.

#### **7.4 De-mining**

According to Mr. Selman, Sasina had been identified as one of the villages and area to be cleaned of landmines in 2006 and 2007.

The Access to the de-mining team in the field is forbidden to the general public. As previously mentioned, with the help of my former colleagues, a connection has been established with Mr. Selman and who granted permission to visit the de-mining team which was operating in the heart of Sasina. There we met Commander Mulalic, the Commander of the de-mining team that is a part of the Federation army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Commander Mulalic is originally from Ostra Luka which is a village only about 10 kilometers north of Sanski Most, but he lives in Bihac, is 31 years old, and married, with two children.

The De-mining Brigade of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) constitutes the biggest de-mining agency in the country (LM2, 2007).

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<sup>73</sup> Information about ICRC can be found on their homepage, see the following link: <http://www.icrc.org/eng> - please note that other languages are available.

<sup>74</sup> See further information about UMCOR on their homepage: <http://new.gbgm-umc.org/umcor>

<sup>75</sup> See further information about Phare – Obnova programmes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the following link: <http://www.seerecon.org/Bosnia/ec/phare/index.html>

The agency operates with 560 personnel and 34 de-mining teams, including two in reserve, and supported by both mechanical assets and mine detection dogs. In 2007 the De-mining Brigade planned to expand to 611 full-time and 36 active reserve members.

Commander Mulalic and his unit are based in Bihac, which is the largest town in Una-Sana canton. There are nine persons in his unit. When I asked Commander Mulalic what his orders were, his answer was:

My orders are to clean a landmine area of 82000 m<sup>2</sup> in the Village of Sasina. The total project is 250,000m<sup>2</sup>....The timeframe is from March to November this year (2006). Of the present 5000m<sup>2</sup> areas that we are now concentrating on, we have cleaned 1200m<sup>2</sup>. So far we have removed 7 landmines. We should be able to finish the 82000m<sup>2</sup> by November, but it also depends on the weather, as it could snow.

According to Commander Mulalic, the land which will be cleaned is **80% agricultural land** and **20% forest**. As already pointed out they are working in three de-mining categories, infrastructure, agricultural land and forests, and woodland areas. The team is concentrating on the first category, the infrastructure. Quoting Commander Mulalic: "There are, for example, natural springs which people want to have access to"

I asked Commander Mulalic about the landmines situation in Sasina and about the location of the landmines. Commander Mulalic answered:

I would say it's a normal spread, we received maps from those who originally planted the landmines but these maps are not at all correct and we cannot and should not depend on them. Those who originally placed the landmines and mapped them were most likely in a hurry and possibly not accurate enough. For example someone marks on a map a

landmine 20 meters from a road, but you actually never know.

When Branimir was asked about landmines on his small piece of land of 2000m<sup>2</sup> around his house his response was:

Something was cleaned, but it is still not safe. Some strangers came first, and they were cleaning the area by machine, and they told us that it is 60 % cleaned. At that time we started to build a house, and before they came I had already cut the grass here. I was told: "Buy 10 sheep and let them walk around, if there are mines, they will find them." And I decided to start with 2, it is better for them to be killed by mines, than me.

Though I never witnessed the use of sheep as method for mine cleaning while I was working in Sanski Most, I was informed about this quite brutal de-mining method by a local resident:

People would get a flock of sheep and encourage them with noise, shouting etc., to run round the land which you want to clean of landmines and at the end of the day there would either be a large barbeque, a small one or possibly none.

Using sheep is considered one of the effective landmine cleaning methods. However, it is not considered a 100% safe method but it's fast. If this de-mining method was working there was a lot of meat to be grilled or so I was informed.

## **7.5 Change in agricultural production**

The following is a statistical comparison of agricultural production and land usage in the village of Sasina, from the side of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The comparison years are the same as for Sanski Most municipality, 1991 and 2005.



According to my informants, the total population of Sasina before the war was estimated to be somewhere between 2500 and 3000. One stated both figures while another one was persistent that the population was close to 3000. This is not an accurate enough figure as it has too high a margin of error<sup>76</sup> of over 16%, but on the other hand official, accurate figures of the pre-war population could not be located. To carry out part of the statistical analysis, I decided to use the median<sup>77</sup> figure of 2750 as the population before the war. By doing that, the margin of error went down to approximately 8%, which is high but more acceptable.

The average size of a household in Bosnia-Herzegovina was **3.4** persons, if we assumed that there were **350** households belonging to the village that would give **1190** inhabitants. If the figure of **300** households were used, then the figure would be lower or an estimated **1020** inhabitants.

The demographics are simple; all informants are of Croat ethnic background, the village is clearly defined as a Croat village. As far as I was informed there were no not mixed marriages among the inhabitants, i.e. Croats and Bosniaks or Croats and Serbs as was far more common in the urban areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Before the war or 1991, the territory of the village of Sasina covered **1300** hectares, however in 2005 or basically after the Dayton agreement in December 1995, it was down to **624** hectares (Bosancic, 2006). About **52%** became the territory of the Republika of Srpska and part of it forms the Inter Entity Border Line which is between the Bosnian Federation and the Republika Srpska.

In 1991 the village of Sasina had **231** agricultural households; however in 2005 the number was down to **63** agricultural households. This is a drastic reduction to only **27%** of the 1991 number. At the same time, this still discounts the part of the village that is located in the IEBL and Republika Srpska. According to my informants and according to information provided, the agricultural production was and remains solely on a small level.

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<sup>76</sup> Margin of error is defined as an estimate of a [confidence interval](http://mathworld.wolfram.com/MarginofError.html) for a given measurement, result, etc. and is frequently cited in statistics, see further on the following link:

<http://mathworld.wolfram.com/MarginofError.html>

<sup>77</sup> See further definition of median as a mathematical definition:

<http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Median.html>

The total hectares which were considered agricultural land and which my informants occupied or had access to was **15.3** hectares. Of the total **624** hectares belonging to the village on the Federation side **40%** was considered agricultural land or approximately **250** hectares. 15.3 hectares of 250 meant that the informants had access to about **6.1%** of total agricultural land. However when asked how much the actual use was, the total hectares became far less or approximately **1.35** hectares or only **0.52%** of the 250 available hectares in the village.

The biggest problem is that there are no pre-war agricultural production statistics available for the village of Sasina to be used as baseline for comparable statistical analysis of the two previously mentioned years. So the following calculations are only close estimates based on interviews with my informants and what they disclosed as to what they grew on the limited available agricultural land.

Using the available statistics, available information, and using probability in calculating agricultural production, it is possible to estimate the loss in income or in quantities. Out of the estimated agricultural production of 2005, the 1991 production will be estimated. However, placing a value on the agricultural produce will be difficult as it was nearly all for personal use.

When Anthony was asked about how much he got from his field and what he did with it, he answered: "At the moment we have 1000 m<sup>2</sup> of maize, still the land is not de-mined; there is no mechanization, no labor. Maize is for cattle, and we have some vegetables in the garden for our own use." This was about 0.1 hectares and would generate 800 to 1000 kg of maize according to Anthony.

There are different kinds of maize, and the market value of maize that is used to make maize flour or maize meal is very low. When Danijela was asked if they could sell any of their agricultural products she said: "Sometimes, if it's a good year, we can sell some maize, but very cheap. Last year he (Davor) took maize to the mill, and when he came back he had earned only 20 KM." I don't know the quantity that Davor took to the mill but taking maize to the mill meant that it would be milled into maize meal, either for animal feed or human consumption.

The low price is surprising but in a way it can be explained. Home-grown crops meet only 20 percent of the demand in Bosnia, which imports 400,000 metric tons of wheat and 200,000 metric tons of maize every year, mainly from Serbia, Croatia and Hungary (Flexnews, 2007). These countries have surplus production and other countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina can meet their domestic needs with cheap imports.

The prices for wheat and maize had been going up in 2007 and 2008 due to droughts in these countries as well as in other corners of the world, forcing governments to put export bans or special export taxes on these agricultural products (Flexnews, 2007). Davor would have to get much more in his pocket if he were going to spend the whole day harvesting maize and transporting it to the mill and only to get 20 KM for it.

## **7.6 The forest**

Forests in Bosnia-Herzegovina amount to 54% of all land (Earthtrend, 2003) and the forest has always been considered a vital part of survival for the Bosnians.

Thanks to the favorable climate in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there has been a long tradition of collecting different types of wild medical and aromatic plants and spices, forest fruits, rose hips and mushrooms. Before the war and on the basis of available data, it has been calculated that the purchase of medicinal plants, forest fruits and mushrooms in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 5000 to 7000 metric tons, and the estimated export value was about 15 million USD (Dunjic, 2000).

As with many villages and areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the forest in the village of Sasina was no exception. It had at least two advantages; it provided wood for winter and non-wood forest product such as mushrooms which the inhabitants enjoyed during the pre-war years and provided some extra income for them. The mushrooms season was in spring and in autumn and according to my informants, most inhabitants of Sasina took the opportunity to collect mushrooms for their own use and to sell.

As one of my informant, Catherine commented:

I could earn up to 2000 to 3000 KM per year.” Branimir commented when asked about collection of mushrooms in the village: “Mushrooms were collected when 2 to 3 shops in the village were buying and Italians were coming to buy. They were buying blackberries as well.

Emanuel, his wife Esther and two children live in the first part of the village meaning quite close to the outskirts of Sanski Most. Emanuel commented when asked if it was possible to earn a lot from mushrooms before the war:

It is possible even now to earn a lot, whoever has time to go and collect them, but this year was dry, so there were not many mushrooms.’ And Ante continued: ‘People used to collect wild fruits before the war, a lot. But now it is not like that, there are not much wild fruits as it was, and it is not safe to go and collect it. We go where it’s safe and demined

Living closer to Sanski Most meant living further from the previous war zone or the IEBL and therefore less likelihood that the threat of landmines would interfere with daily life of the inhabitants.

As part of fighting rural poverty, micro credits, for example from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) have been made available to fund establishment of mushrooms processing / production (IFAD, 2007). There are recorded successful cases where individual entrepreneurs have hired, on a seasonal basis, up to 2000 workers who have been able to pick 400 tons of mushrooms.

Information about how much mushrooms and wild fruits were picked in Sasina before the war cannot be located. But as my informants commented, the mushrooms and even the wild fruits were sold abroad as well as being picked for private use; and in that way contributed to their survival but, more importantly, added to their quality of life.

There is more to the forest than mushrooms and herbs, and one of the largest cost savings aspects for the inhabitants of Sasina and other rural and urban households in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was having access to a forest for cutting wood. Electric stoves are common in the urban areas and towns where central heating works in the winter time, but all houses are designed to have a wood burning stove, meaning that there is a connection to a chimney, and that includes apartment block buildings. However in the urban areas, if people can manage to build a central heating system in their houses which uses electricity, the system is expensive to run. Electrical outages are quite common, increasing the risk of having a dysfunctional system in place. With electrical outages comes the possibility of not being able to cook.

The most common stove in the rural areas is a special stove, found in many varieties, which is fed with wood. This wood burning stove has basically two purposes; to be used for cooking and to keep the home warm during winter. It is quite common that the kitchen is part of the living room and not located in a separate room, and if the winter becomes harsh, people will sleep in the living room. That is when a good wood burning stove becomes very handy.

During the siege of Sarajevo, the wood burning stove played an important part in keeping the residents warm, providing they had wood to burn. Not many trees were standing at the end of the siege, and people were even chopping up furniture and burning books to feed their stoves for survival (Burns, 1993). Anyone who wanted and could buy wood in Sarajevo had to pay 500 USD for one cubic meter (UNESCO, 1996). The element of the life threatening risk involved in chopping wood had been calculated into the price.

Most inhabitants of Sasina try to get fire wood in the “safe” areas of the forest or as far from the IEBL as possible, where the risk of stepping on a landmine is minimal. When Danijela was asked how much wood they needed over a period of a year, she replied: “25 to 30 cubic meters (m<sup>3</sup>), because we heat the kitchen plus the children’s room, and one cubic meter is 50 KM.” If this family with two children, had to buy fire wood, it would cost approximately 1250 to 1500 KM per year. That is a lot of money which can be saved if they can go into the forest and cut their own wood.

Pensioners need less or as Anthony put it: “One cubic meter is 50 KM and we need approximately 12 meters (cubic m<sup>3</sup>) that costs 600 KM (per year). But we make savings because we cook on wood.” Anthony’s and Adrijana’s home is very close to the IEBL and when they were visited, their house was very close to the forest but for Anthony, going there and cutting wood was a risk he was willing to take in order to save money.

The informants were not paying much on electricity, the amount mentioned ranged from approximately 15 to 30 KM a month or as Anthony explained: “There are two tariffs, winter and summer. Now it’s summer tariff which is cheaper but if we will take average, it would be 25 to 30 KM. I use wood as well.” The wood burning stove was saving them money, but it was not clear how much the savings were. On the other hand, the wood was warming their home as well.

## **7.7 The psychological factor**

After all these years the inhabitants of Sasina live in fear of the landmines and they will continue to do so until someone can convince them that everything is safe.

Originally, I never thought of looking at possible psychological and or depression factors of the informants. After analyzing the answers from the informants about the threat of landmines in their daily lives, the idea arose that there could be other factors common to their struggle for survival and that these other factors could lead to possible depression. While landmines could be one factor there are other factors, such as, poverty, limited job opportunities, isolation; etc., that combined could contribute to depression.

There are mixed feelings and fear in the heart of inhabitants who enter into the forest but poverty and economic factors drive people to make decisions which could not only threaten mutilation but their lives as well. When discussing the mushroom picking in the forest with Emanuel and Esther, Emanuel did add another comment: “There are not so many mines around us here, I am only afraid when I go to collect mushrooms.” So even though where they live is close to the

outskirts of Sanski Most, in their mind, entering the forest remains an ongoing physical and psychological risk for them.

When the interview took place with Anthony and Adrijana, a neighbor dropped by and listened to the discussions in silence but when it came to the landmines, he interrupted and said: "People are still afraid because of mine fields, after 11 years." Branimir had his own part of the forest and when he was asked if he collected wood, he responded:

I have my wood but I can not go there because of mines....

I don't go there, even hunters are very careful and do not dare to go there. It is because there were trenches in the woods during the war, and people were finding some landmines.

Branka added her comments: "When we see the map of this area, it shows that everything is full of mines."

Whether picking mushrooms or cutting wood, the level of risk and fear is the same or as Catherine responded when asked if her husband cut wood: "Yes, but we are always afraid, since our woods are on the borderlines with mine fields. I often go with him in case anything bad happens, so I can help him." When asked if all landmines were cleared, what would change in their lives, she responded: "People would not be afraid, where ever you go, you are aware of danger." When it came to the end of the interview with Catherine, she did have an additional comment. When asked if she had anything to add, she said:

I am glad that someone is interested in our problems and those mine fields, I am always thinking, how come some areas where no one is living are cleaned; and we are here, and still have no freedom to go where we want

Without freedom caused by the proximity of landmines, living a normal rural life close to nature will always remain difficult. Enjoying again what the

fields and forests can add to the quality life will have to wait, possibly for future generations.

The psychological stress factor affects not only the inhabitants of Sasina; the de-mining team has had its problems as well. When Commander Mulalic was asked how many were in his team, he replied:

We are presently nine, unfortunately one person of the team is in a mental hospital and I don't think it's due to work strain....He had been on the team for 8 years. If I see my men being stressed or not ready to continue I feel obligated to let them rest. I don't look at myself as a commander of the team but rather a friend.

Given the circumstances, psychological stress would be part of the work. In 2007, five de-mining accidents happened, four de-miners were injured and one was killed (BHMAC, 2008). If the web site of the Landmine Monitor is visited (LM2, 2007) and any year chosen, it is documented that every year there are de-mining fatalities which involves de-mining personnel.

## **7.8 Memories of war**

It is quite common, when having a general discussions with a person from Former Yugoslavia, that the question of "Where were you during the war?" The villagers of Sasina were no exception.

When Emanuel was asked about what was different before the war and now he answered: "People were happier, now every one talks just about problems." Indeed, number of my informants went through difficult times during the war. Catherine tells: "We left in 1995 at the end of war. We were here during the whole war, and life was very hard at that time." and when asked if they had problems during the war, her reply was:

Yes, it happened many times that we spent the night in the corn field. We were very afraid. At the end, they collected



us during night, all Croats, and there were two Muslims. They told us that we would be exchanged, but we expected that we would be killed. First, the exchange for Croatians was not arranged properly, so we were brought back

This was after the Muslims – Bosniaks – took Sanski Most and the exodus of Serbs had happened in October 1995. They were brought back after the exchange did not work out. The prisoner or POW<sup>78</sup> exchanges were between the Muslims and Serbs armies but civilians were used as well as in the case of the Bosnia Croats living in Sanski Most Municipality. At the end of the war when the Dayton agreement was signed there still remained POWs to be exchanged.

In 1998, I moved to Prijedor which is a town about 50 km north of Sanski Most town, in Republika Srpska. In my street, Boska Buhe, was a neighbor who had lost his son because he did not manage to find a Muslim to exchange for his son, who was a Serb soldier. Two times he heard prison exchanges were going to happen in Ostra Luka, a small town between Sanski Most and Prijedor. The second time, he had desperately tried, in vain, to locate a Muslim; and arriving with no prisoner to exchange, he witnessed his only child being executed 100 meters away. He was his only child and 18 years old. The brutality of the war had no mercy even after the Dayton agreement had been signed. In 2006 when I was in Prijedor, I briefly met with him and his wife they were still wearing black displaying the sorrow they still kept inside.

Catherine explained: "For 10 days we were in Oštra Luka, they kept us for two days without food. Then we went to be exchanged for Croatians. So we spent 6 months close to Zagreb, staying with my husband's sister." Emanuel's described his experience of the war and when he was asked when they had left, his reply was:

In October 1995, we were all here during the war, and we left when there was the liberation of Sanski Most. We spent 40 days in a camp in Prijedor, and then I was in the village

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<sup>78</sup> POW stands for Prisoner of War, soldiers which have surrendered, captured etc., by enemy forces.

Tomašica (in Prijedor) for a couple of days. After that I spent 3 months in the monastery in Banja Luka, and after that I went to Glamoč (Croatia)

Being in a refugee camp in Prijedor was not a pleasant experience but then they managed to get transferred to a Catholic monastery in Banja Luka, a city which is about 50 kilometers east of Prijedor. Branka and Branimir's experience was the following:

(We left) in 1995, at the end of the war. First we spent 8 days in one camp in Oštra Luka, and then we went to Glamoc (we were exchanged). We didn't like being in Glamoč (Croatia), so we went to Kutina (north Croatia). We were accommodated in some small houses, like a collection center, but we were given only bread there

Danijela was a child when the war begun (1992): "During the war I was in Zenica (north Bosnia). Then I went to Grahovo (Croatia), with my family. I was born in Zenica. Davor, my husband is from here." During the interview with Danijela something else came up which I saw repeated in other interviews with the informants in Sasina and that is the element of having had to live in a village with no shops, no regular transport and few people in their daily life, Danijela: "Loneliness is difficult, during these day people are coming here because of All Saints Day but when they leave no one visits this area until spring time."

## **7.9 Refugee collective centers**

Linking a bit to the different experience the informants went through during the war, by the time the war ended in December 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, there were an estimated 1.3 million Bosnian Internally Displaced Persons and 500,000 refugees displaced in the sub-region plus some 700,000 refugees in Western Europe. In August 1995, the Croatian armed forces launched a military offensive called "Operation Storm" which managed to retake

all the Serbian controlled areas in the Krajina region that is located in the southern part of Croatia. As a result, over 200,000 ethnic Serbs fled their homes to the rest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or FRY and later Serbia and Montenegro. By 1996, FRY was hosting about 560,000 refugees of Serbian ethnic background mainly from Croatia and from Bosnia Herzegovina, the highest number of refugees in Europe. The most vulnerable of these refugees and IDPs ended up in public buildings, otherwise known as collective centers, such as disused schools and factory dormitories, not meant for permanent accommodation. Ten years later, the situation has significantly improved at least in terms of numbers. According to updated UNHCR and government statistics, by mid-2006 the number of Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina had fallen to 182,000 and the number of refugees in Serbia Montenegro to approximately 114,000, about 296,000 in total (Ambroso, 2006). This is due to extensive re/construction projects both in the host countries as well as in towns across Former Yugoslavia enabling the return of these refugees.

During my time in Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo, I visited some of these centers, both for monitoring purposes as well as food and non-food distributions. The living conditions for these refugees were, with no exceptions, horrific. Living with hardly any privacy in a common hall or sharing rooms with several people, lack of running water, destroyed latrines, no showers; etc. the people had personal hygiene problems and skin diseases; and from a psychological point of view they were depressed and felt that they had no future. The worst cases I witnessed were in Kosovo in 1996 and 1997 and as I was informed, Milosevich with his policy to increase the population of Serbs in Kosovo had ordered that refugees should be pushed down there. These were the most vulnerable of them all, a lot of elderly or people who had no money or relatives in other parts of Serbia or Montenegro whom they could turn to. Meeting the elderly, I found many of them had just given up on living and were waiting to die.

When I drove for the first time to the Croatian coast in spring 1997, I went to a hotel which was quite close to a town called Sibernik. There were four hotels there and three of them had been reconstructed and were very nice, the fourth one

had refugees in it. It looked like an apartment block building with laundry hanging on the balcony and trash lying around.

The plan to vacate the last hotels occupied by refugees in Croatia was supposed to happen in October 2003 (MPVRC, 2003).

#### **7.10 Social interactions and support mechanism**

Through the interview with the informants, the social interaction and support mechanism came up. I felt that this support mechanism was more linked with a very few years after the war, rather than the whole 11 years which had passed since it ended. That could be understandable as slowly the reality had sunk in that the village life would never be the same as before. The school was not operating because of lack of children. When the interview took place the telephone lines had not been put in place and as far as I understood there were no plans to do so. There was no shop in the village, but there used to be five of them. After a few years, life became a question of survival and helping the neighbor was not exactly a priority, with few exceptions.

The informants had their return to the area in common and in case of need they could rely on each other, at least to a certain extent. When Branimir returned, he could rely on his neighbor:

When we returned, we lived for 1 year at Emanuel's place, since we didn't have a place to stay. Before the war our house was in the hills, but up there everything was burned down, so as we had part of our land here, we decided to have a house here

Emanuel and Esther were not relatives but neighbors of Branka and Branimir and in the spirit of solidarity, Emanuel had offered them a place to stay while they constructed their house with assistance from Caritas. Emanuel was the only one of the informants who had a car; all others had to depend on a bicycle or passersby to get to Poljak and Sanski Most. But Emanuel did more, as per Branka's answer when asked how they would go to town: "Since Emanuel works

in town, he drives us to town but we come back on foot.” There was a solution for bringing the monthly supplies, they bought it and Emanuel brought it to their house. For Anthony to go to Sanski Most or Poljak, which is located between Sasina and Sanski Most town meant either as Anthony puts it: ”I use bicycle or someone picks me up on the way” Anthony continues:

Before the war there were 3 school bus lines to Banja Luka, over Bronzani Majdan (between Sasina and Banja Luka). Now there are no school children, but this way is shorter, just that 20 km of asphalt road is missing. There was some talk between Sanski most and Banja Luka, to make some agreement, but allocated funds are needed. For example, there were allocated funds from Germany, Hamburg for a school, so the school was repaired, but it’s still not in use. Army (de-mining) teams are sleeping in the school. There is no shop in the village.

It was six kilometers to the next shop which was located in Poljak, so getting a ride was a sign of solidarity, especially in winter time when snow and cold was the normal climate.

The road to Banja Luka has been closed from the beginning of the war; it goes through the IEBL and is still polluted with landmines. The distance from Sasina to Banja Luka, via Bronzani Majdan, a village in between, is approximately 55 km, and the bus went every day, twice a day. The ticket was around 12 KM total for a round trip. The bus was usually almost full with 40 to 50 passengers. Now there is no bus commuting between Sanski Most and Banja Luka. If anyone wants to go to Banja Luka, he/she has to come to Sanski Most, and then busses go via Prijedor. The ticket is around 10 - 12 KM for a round trip but the price depends on the bus Company and the distance is about 100 km.

When Danijela was asked whether neighbors helped them out, she replied:” What neighbors? There are no neighbors, even if there are, they are all old.”

Being young and healthy meant that they had to take care of themselves. But Snjezana, was their neighbor and when she was asked about whether she was completely self-sustaining from her land: "I am quite satisfied, just that I'm alone, and whatever is needed to be done I have to pay someone to do it." If compared to other informants in Sasina who were pensioners or in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Snjezana was quite well off receiving 500 EURO per month or approximately 1000 KM in pension from Germany (where she used to work), or as Snjezana puts it: "My children are telling me not to work this much, since I can live very nicely off my pension but I like to work and I am used to that." By receiving this amount in pension, Snjezana, whether she liked it or not, was expected to pay for the help she needed.

Anthony, in comparison was receiving 180 KM per month and his wife, Adrijana, was not receiving any pension. When asked if they could survive with only a pension and no field produce, Adrijana replied: "We could somehow live off it. We are even trying to make some savings. When you live in a village, you just pay for electricity."

When Catherine was asked what made her life easier or more difficult on a daily basis, her reply was: "Loneliness is difficult, during these days people are coming here because of All Saints Day<sup>79</sup> but when they leave, no one will visit this area until spring time." But as will be covered in the employment section, Catherine had her way to meeting her social contact needs by working for an NGO.

The social interaction differed between the inhabitants of Sasina, in the sense that some have managed to bond much closer than others. For those living alone the coping mechanisms were as different as the people. For Snjezana

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<sup>79</sup> All Saints Day is celebrated yearly on 1st of November. An explanation for informative purposes can be located on the following website: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-AllStsDa.html>:

All Saints' Day feast of the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches, and day on which churches glorify God for all God's saints, known and unknown. It is celebrated on Nov. 1 in the West, since Pope Gregory IV ordered its church-wide observance in 837. Its origin lies earlier in the common commemorations of martyrs who died in groups or whose names were unknown, which were held on various days in different parts of the Church; over time these celebrations came to include not only the martyrs but all saints. During the Reformation the Protestant churches understood "saints" in its New Testament usage as including all believers and reinterpreted the feast of All Saints as a celebration of the unity of the entire Church. In medieval England the festival was known as All Hallows, hence the name Halloween for the preceding evening. **The author is not known.**

watching TV was one of her ways to pass time. Catherine was working for an NGO and visiting elderly people at the same time earning some income, Anthony who was born in 1932, did some gardening but as his vision was not good he did not read much and he was not interested in TV.

### **7.11 Paid employment and other means of survival**

There was a big difference in the economic means of survival of the informants in Sasina. The average salary in Bosnia Herzegovina Muslim Croat Federation in December 2007, was 1,007 KM (which is about 500 EURO) and the net salary was 681 KM (BosniaNews, 2008). However the average gross salary in Republika Srpska was about 6% lower or 940 KM (SeeNews, 2008) (RZSRS 2008). The definition of gross salary includes social contributions of the employer such as pension funds etc. while the net salary is what the employee gets paid “in the pocket” (St David’s 2002). In comparison, the average salary in the year 2002 was 195 USD or then, approximately 300 KM.

According to Danijela, Davor was a daily worker and when asked how much he would earn, her reply was: “It depends where he works but the usual pay per is 30 KM.” Working 20 to 24 days a month would give him 600 to 720 KM per month but the problem is that there was no guarantee that a daily worker actually had work on any given day. This payment had no social security attached to it, no income tax was paid and this was purely on a “cash in hand” basis. During my stay in Sanski Most from early 1997 to end of 1999, we sometimes needed daily workers to unload trucks which came from Icelandic Church Aid with second hand clothes. The daily workers hung around the main square in the centre of Sanski Most and waited for anyone who would offer them paid work. When we needed these workers I used to drive to the square, and depending on the work, I used to take 5 to 10 workers on the back of the pick-up truck. For the daily worker, the summer time was the best season, as reconstruction projects were in abundance and sometimes there was a lack of workers. In winter time the picture was in total reverse, times were hard for these daily workers and survival was not at all easy. Often I found myself paying them double the daily rate and some beer on a hot summer day.

Emanuel had managed to build a house in Sasina, but he had another house in Trnova, a neighboring village, which Caritas had reconstructed. Esther had gotten materials from Caritas to build a house in Sasina but it only reflected one family member. Emanuel had two horses and carried out plough work in the fields and then he sold the horses and used part of the proceeds to build a much larger house in Sasina. Esther's uncle was a stone-cutter and when needed Emanuel had access to paid, but not stable work. After analyzing their expenditures, which were an average of over 500 KM per month including running costs and the yearly registration / insurance of the vehicle, he said that he could cover it.

Catherine, even though she was a pensioner was working for a local NGO: "I am taking care of four elderly people in my village. I visit them once a week and I bring them medicines, supplies because they are unable to do that." She was receiving 100 KM per month and according to her it covered the monthly phone bill (mobile) and electricity. Of the informants, these were the people who had a salary: Davor and Emanuel had irregular access to work, and Catherine, a pensioner, had 100 KM income per month but her and Cedimir's other income was the pension including the pension of her mother-in-law.

## **7.12 Pension**

The total number of pensioners in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of the end of July 2007 was 320,219. The average pension was 284.31 KM. The lowest pension was 223.52 KM and the guaranteed pension was 298.03 KM. The highest pension in July 2007 was 1263.94 KM (BosniaNews-I, 2007). This was higher than what Anthony received one year earlier when I interviewed him in the summer of 2006; then it was 180 KM per month and his wife, Adrijana, had no pension at all. As previously mentioned, Snjezana was receiving 500 EURO per month or approximately 1000 KM in pension from Germany. She and Cedimir are the only ones of the informants who were receiving a pension from abroad. When Cedimir was asked how much his pension was, he refused to comment. Branka and Branimir are pensioners with no pension and their survival was far more difficult than others (see further below).



The general situation or number of pensioners in Sasina is not known, but given the fact that the primary school was not operating due to lack of children, one can only reach the conclusion that the majority of the inhabitants were elderly, had no young children, or were pensioners. No statistical figures could be located in this regard.

For pensioners, having to buy medicines could mean that part of the limited income would be needed to cover those expenses, Branimir: "I was paying tax on land and therefore I had health insurance. Now I don't pay it and there is no health insurance."

When Branimir was asked what would happen if they become ill, he replied: "We can just kill ourselves because even one medicine is often too expensive." This was a bit of an exaggeration by Branimir, but understandable if they did not have any pension to cover these expenses. He and Branka were spending about 30 KM per month on medicines. For Snjezana, while having a knee problem, life was not complicated when it came to purchasing medicines, when asked how much she was spending on medicines: "I don't know. I just buy what I need." Catherine had high blood pressure and needed regular medicine: "Sometimes I get it from my children, or my sister sends it, since she takes the same type of medicine, and if she has some more, she sends it. If I have to buy it, I usually give 15 KM per month." So Catherine's support mechanism, being her sister abroad, was on hand in case of a need.

### **7.13 Income from agriculture and husbandry**

Catherine: "We used to keep 5 to 6 cows. I used to sell cheese and cream regularly, and I had quite a decent salary for that, so I was very satisfied." Their land was totals 10 hectares which includes both agricultural land and forest, however only a small part of it has been cleaned of landmines. While they are the only informants to have a tractor, most of their land is polluted with landmines. Today, the only livestock Catherine and Cedomir have are 50 chickens producing eggs, and when asked whether they sold the eggs to someone, the reply was: "No, because we don't have transport to town. I give them to the people in the village." Maybe Cedomir's pension was enough for both of them to have a decent life; or

with his mother receiving a pension their livelihood was safe. But they did have another income and that was making “rakija<sup>80</sup>.” When Catherine was asked how much: “A lot and we make it from plums, apples and pears. We make 200 to 300 liters.” That is a large quantity and they did not sell everything as they gave it as gifts; but they were selling 1 liter for 10 KM, and that was not at all bad. Before the war they produced moderately but as they had more time on their hands they were producing much more and earning good money as well.

This is perfectly legal in the Balkans; and watching my neighbor once making rakija, I understood that this is really a cultural phenomenon. For 100 liters he needed about 1000 kilograms of plums that he left in a big barrel for few days until it fermented. I am not sure how many plum trees had to be picked but I can estimate that it must have been somewhere between 15 and 20. Then for 24 hours he and his neighbors fed the “Happy machine” which is usually made of copper, and basically is the boiler for the fermented fruit, with cooling mechanism etc. The end result is the sought after rakija or slivovitz if made from plum. To pick up to 3000 kilograms of plums and transport with a wheelbarrow, ferment it and then boil it in the “Happy machine” Catherine and Cedomir needed time. Being pensioners, time was not an issue. This was not a bad income if they managed to sell two thirds (2/3) of what they produced, earning them a yearly income of approximately 2000 KM.

Snjezana, living alone with a good pension from Germany, did not have high requirements: “I grow maize, barley, wheat, tomatoes and peppers.” It was only for own consumption and no income was generated from these small agricultural activities. Whatever else she needed, she bought at the shop and had it

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<sup>80</sup> The following explanation what Rakija is all about, is from Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rakia> however whoever wrote it does not site any reference or resources hence the reason for placing it as an unofficial explanation but it there is definitely element of truth in it. I did this because I did not manage to find a good explanation from known resource without paying for it. Rakija is similar to brandy, made by distillation of fermented fruits, popular throughout the Balkans, Italy and France. Its alcohol content is normally 40%, but home-produced rakija can be stronger, typically 50 to 60%. *Prepečenica* is double-distilled rakia, with alcohol content sometimes exceeding 60%. Rakija is considered to be the national drink among some of the South Slavic peoples in Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Its most common form, slivovitz which is produced from plums. The most common other fruits are peaches, apricots, apples, figs and quinces. Plum and grape rakia is sometimes mixed with other ingredients, such as herbs, honey, sour cherries and walnuts, after distillation.

delivered. Due to her pension there were no economic reasons for growing vegetables. She would be able to live without any of the agricultural produce she was growing and simply buy what she needed from her neighbors or the shop. The prices for the items she was growing are very low in the shops so for Snjezana it was not really complicated: "...my children are telling me not to work this much, since I can live very nicely off my pension but I like to work and I am used to that." Quality of life was more important for Snjezana and being busy was important for her. And there was one other thing that helped her fight isolation: "Since I am alone, for me television is all."

Anthony and Adrijana had very little agricultural land or only 0.2 hectares. They mostly grow maize meant for the pigs. Part of their land is used for growing vegetables; they keep a few goats that provide them with milk products, and they have some chickens as well. While not receiving any direct income from these products, they enhance their pensions and therefore create savings and a better quality of life for themselves.

The most vulnerable of the informants were the young couple Danijela and Davor with their small children, and Branka and Branimir, pensioners but with no pension. Davor has his irregular income as a daily worker and the couple had only limited space to grow vegetable and store them for winter. Danijela replied when asked if they had any animals: "Yes, some chicken, 2 pigs, some lambs and 2 rabbits." When asked what they planted: "Everything, maize, potatoes, beans, peppers." Danijela stated that that was enough for them but some things had to be bought such as salt, sugar and wheat flour. As previously mentioned the value of the maize was very low and while the quantity of the harvest was not known and mostly meant for private use, according to Danijela they managed. During the interview with Snjezana she mentioned that sometimes she and Danijela made some rakija for private use only, so somehow with the children, with some vegetables, with some work and with some rakija, the couple found a way to have some quality of life.

Even poor, living in a re-constructed house with no bathroom, Branka and Branimir managed to survive as well. While most of their agricultural land was polluted with landmines they had a plot of around 0.2 hectares on which they

could grow some vegetables and maize for their own use. They had 8 hectares in total and would have liked to grow more. Before the war they had 3 to 4 cows, 2 horses and pigs. Now they had neither machinery nor horses to cultivate the land nor the money they might have earned to plough the land for others. However Branka and Branimir had 30+ sheep and they were selling the males and keeping the females but as Branka said: "But all that goes very slow." The market value can be estimated at about 90 KM for each lamb which has been fed for 3 months. Not knowing how many male lambs they managed to get from 30 sheep per year, one could estimate that there were at least a few of them, bringing in a small but important income for them. If they could manage to put up a small place and sell grilled lamb, they could get 25 KM per kilo; but given the minimal traffic and the buying power of the inhabitants of Sasina, that could turn into a small disaster for them. Branka and Branimir had some chickens and one pig as well, which gave them some eggs and every now and then, poultry for their diet. Piglets could be sold for 3 KM per kilo but females could generate future income by reproducing. Again, if they could grill and sell the pork, they could get 11 KM per kilo. The total value of the 30 sheep can be estimated at being around 5000 KM. From a holistic point of view and with no pension to fall back on, they do manage to live off what they have; the limited agricultural produce and animal husbandry was just sufficient for survival.

Emanuel and Esther with their two young children had various means of survival. Growing some agricultural produce and small animals was only part of their means of survival. They have gotten about 3 hectares of land in Sasina from Esther's brother. They had a reconstructed house in Trnova, the neighboring village; and it is worth noting they did not volunteer information as to whether the house generated rental income or not. They usually cultivated around 0.5 hectares; but in 2006, when the interview took place, they had planted 0.3 hectares. They grew only vegetables for their own use. They had to pay 120 KM to someone to cultivate the land which took one day's work. I am not sure if a tractor was used or a horse pulling a plough. They had some animals; two adult goats; two small goats, one pig and 15 chickens and: "...and couple of days ago I got four sheep from the priest." It was a donation from Holland in order to help

the renewal of cattle breeding and sheep growing. He couldn't remember which organization had given the animals, but it could have been Dorcas Aid International – Holland,<sup>81</sup> which was and had been working on various extensive rehabilitation projects in post war Bosnia and Herzegovina. Emanuel did not stop there; he was going to buy two more piglets and pay for them in installments until the next summer (2007). Again as with other informants, buying these items provided them with more savings. There was no income as such from the agricultural produce and animals that provided goat milk for their children and cheese. With his occasional work cutting stone and driving people, they were managing to make ends meet. As Emanuel admitted earlier, he managed to cover the monthly 400 to 500 KM that was needed for their monthly survival.

There was indeed another important way of receiving support as the following chapter will cover.

#### **7.14 Assistance from abroad – remittance**

When I was working in the post-war Sanski Most, the town seemed to be empty during winter time; but in the summer it was full of people, many of them coming from abroad. The evidence was the dominating number of cars with German, Austrian and occasional other foreign number plates. One can say that the town was flourishing. The main street became a pedestrian street in the early evening, the restaurants and bars placed chairs outside and people looked relaxed and happy.

Apart from the re-construction of houses and apartments that I was managing with LWF, hundreds of construction projects were taking place which had nothing to do with aid. These were private construction projects and investments came from local residents, but mostly from those working abroad. The construction projects were of business spaces, apartment block buildings and the very common one was to turn the ground floor of a private house into business space and the upper floors into apartments. Before the war, and even today, people from the former Yugoslavia were and are sought after as laborers. The

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<sup>81</sup> See further about the organization and it's activities on their homepage: <http://www.dorcas.net/>

number of Serbs in Germany in 2005 was estimated to be about 600,000, and the formal remittance sent to Serbia alone was about 250 million EURO (Kausch, 2007).

However the reality is that the amount of remittance is estimated to be much higher as people use other ways to send or bring funds into Serbia and Montenegro i.e. cash. The total amount is thought to be another 250 million EURO, making the total about 500 million EURO; and that was only in 2005 (Kausch, 2007). The remittance figure for Croatian guest workers in Germany is 100 million EURO, and that figure could be doubled. The formal remittance the Bosnians are sending home was just about 60 million EURO in 2005 and could be estimated at a total of 120 million EURO. The use of the remittance is mainly in consumption and investment in housing. Personally, I have witnessed funds been invested in companies including constructions and when I have asked about the origin of the funds, I was in most cases informed that these were funds coming from abroad.

Figures about how much remittance and total funds were being sent from Germany to Sanski Most municipality could not be located, but while I was there I was informed that up to 60% of Sanski Most's economy was coming from abroad and that was also so before the Bosnian war. During the Bosnian war, Germany received about 350,000 refugees. In 1998 about 230,000 were asked to leave, but only 100,000 returned to Bosnia because many of them managed to stay and work, sending funds to Bosnia (Behrent, 1998). While Germany remained the favorite country, Austria, as well had large communities from the former Yugoslavia including Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Overall, I would say that the remittance being sent and or brought to Sanski Most from Gastarbeiters / refugees who living in Germany and Austria contributed significantly to the local economy. While it does not replace the value of agricultural production in the municipality it continues to strengthen the economical base and provide a valuable "safety-valve" for the community, who relies on these remittances from abroad.

In a research conducted among Bosnian refugees in upstate New York in the year 2000, 100 refugees of about 3500 who arrived from 1993 to 1999 were

asked different questions about their lives in New York (Coughlan, 2000). Part of the overall conclusion was that they were sending significant amounts of their modest salaries overseas, an average of 216 USD per month. Most of them held jobs that were paying from about 6 to 10 USD per hour depending upon their level of English language and their gender. These refugees had considerable personal costs to cover every month before sending money to their families overseas.

For the villagers of Sasina, having grown children and or other relatives working abroad was a valuable safety net which could be relied upon, and in case the need should arise. All the informants had children, siblings and or relatives living and working abroad. One of the unique characteristics of the inhabitants of Sasina was that they all had Croatian citizenship and therefore passports. With that they could travel not only to Croatia but further into most European countries without any travel visas.

After the Bosniaks / Muslims took over Sanski Most in October 1995, all the inhabitants had either left or were used for exchange purposes; i.e., for Muslims held by the Serbs or Croatian army. Before the war there were already sons and daughters residing in Croatia or other foreign countries such as Germany. Catherine and Cedomir had two daughters who went to Croatia at the beginning of the war. They started to work there and are married and are permanently living there. The house in which Catherine and Cedomir were living belonged to Cedomir's aunt and they helped her to rebuild it, but the bathroom and the façade were never finished. The aunt had a flat in Sisak, Croatia and she came occasionally and as Catherine put it: "...but she spends time here, especially during summer time and when the weather is nice. She likes to work in the garden." Catherine had two brothers, one living in Switzerland and another one in Germany. It was surprising that they had not pulled in support from them to help finish the re-construction. But then, the relationship between Catherine and her brothers was not discussed / analyzed further in this interview.

Catherine but not Cedomir stays with their two daughters occasionally, her explanation was: "I just visit my children for about 10 days (per year) but it becomes very boring for me there because I have nothing to do, except washing

dishes. I am used to work and move all the time.” When asked what the level of assistance was from their daughters, Catherine replied: “They don’t need to, we don’t ask for it. But if there is need, they would help us, they are building their homes there.” When asked if they brought something: “Yes, they bring gifts when they come to visit us...”

Adrijana and Anthony had six children, all in Croatia. The son had come and helped them fix various things on the house but on the other hand his and his brothers and sisters’ lives were not in Sasina anymore. As with many Bosnians and other people from the Balkans, their children who are working abroad came to visit in the summer time or over the holiday season, and hardly or not at all in the winter time. I visited Adrijana and Anthony two times and interviewed them, on both occasions I asked how their children helped them and I never really got a straight answer: “I don’t calculate that, children help sometimes, when we need it but they have their own families.” But earlier when the pension section was covered, Adrijana indicated that they actually made some savings. It was clear that they did receive assistance from their children and a careful estimation of the amount could be anywhere between 150 to 200 KM per month, if not more.

Danijela’s and Davor’s house was still in Davor’s father name even though Danijela was the one who got the material aid from Caritas. Maybe that is understandable as the material provided was to repair the house so it could house the family but not to construct a new house. As Davor’s father was living in the village and not abroad it at least showed support, and for Davor’s father it was possibly an investment. Who would reject aid to reconstruct his own house? We never got into the discussion of whether they had relatives or siblings abroad.

Snjezana had seven children; one son and two daughters in Germany and one son and two daughters in Croatia. She did not mention where her seventh child was located. As previously covered, Snjezana was in good shape financially but being a widow and with limited companionship she was lonely. We never went into discussions about why she didn’t want to live with her children but in a way she liked living her remaining days in the countryside, in touch with nature and with occasional human contact.



Emanuel had relatives in Croatia and Esther had two sisters living in Germany who visited every now and then, and brought some gifts with them. Otherwise the extent of assistance from the siblings or relatives was never discussed. Branka and Branimir had four children living abroad, two daughters and one son in Croatia, and one daughter living in Slovenia. One son and one daughter were still living in a collective centre in Kutina in Croatia, the son had no work but the daughter was working in a café bar. The one in Slovenia was married and the other daughter in Croatia had a child and was in a relationship with a partner who was married.

In regard to my own experience there is one factor which I want to cover, the refugee collective centers which still exist in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina and how they relate to the fact that their only son and one daughter were still living in one of those refugee collective centers. These centers are a direct consequence of the war, and 11 years after the war they still existed. I have to admit that I was a bit surprised that Branka's and Branimir's two children chose to live in one of those centers instead of moving to Sasina, but surely they had their reasons. Possibly the son fought with the Serbs against the Muslims and hence the reason for staying in Croatia, but the interview never went in that direction.

### **7.15 The poverty line**

Looking holistically at the informants' economic survival as well as their economic vulnerability, the temptation is to compare and possibly rank them according to the information on hand. The criteria for this ranking is first and foremost regular income being either pension or work; possibilities to grow some vegetables in some quantities and or use of land including ownership of animals; strength of the support system; i.e., relatives living abroad so the stronger the system the lower the vulnerability. Having a house does not necessarily mean survival and having enough to eat. This is then compared to the general and the extreme poverty line of Bosnia and Herzegovina (IMF, 2004) while the survey which the poverty line is built on is from 2004, comparing the Sasina context and

the official poverty line should still give an indication of where the informants stand.

**Branka and Branimir**, who are pensioners, are the most economically vulnerable of the informants in Sasina. This is based on a few facts such as, neither of them receives a pension; the support system is weak; i.e., two out of their four children are living in collective centers in Croatia, the other two have limited resources to help out or as Branka puts it: "They don't send anything, they just bring something when they come and it happens every 3 to 6 months. They are also trying to survive and they expect us to help them."

Landmines are having an effect on their lives as a large part of their agricultural land as well as the forest is polluted with landmines. Their house had no bathroom and there was no electric boiler for hot water. Of all the informants, they were the most effected economically by landmines. As part of their livelihood, Branimir used to work with horses in the fields for others, now it's not possible as others' agricultural land is polluted as well and there is a simple lack of people in the village for whom he might work. Apart from the horses they did have more animals, such as cows, pigs and chickens, than they have today. However, they did have 30 sheep and were growing vegetables, and storing them for winter. Their main income was from the sheep and they managed somehow to survive and to pay the small electricity bill as well. Given the above facts, I can only place them around the extreme poverty line of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

My conclusion is to place **Danijela and Davor** and their two young children in second place as the most economically vulnerable of the informants. The main reason for placing them in second place is the unpredictable income, Davor being a daily worker, which in winter time is not at all stable or even possible at times. Even if it is difficult to predict Davor's income, as it was not disclosed in the interview, it would not be unreasonable to assume that he has at least a minimum of 3 months full time work at 30 KM per day or 90 days of work per year meaning an income of 2,700 KM total per year. Supporting two young children will take them back financially, as Danijela was working at home. By growing various kinds of vegetables and keeping some animals they managed to save money on food. Their support system was that Davor's father was living in

the village and Danijela had relatives in Zenica in north-eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The poverty line in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 was income of total 2,198 KM per year per person and the extreme poverty line was 760 KM per year per person (IMF, 2004). If these amounts are adjusted to inflation of approximately 14% mid year 2007 (Indexmundi, 2007), representing 2.5 to 3 years of inflation since these 2004 figures were derived, the amounts would become approximately 2,500 KM and 866 KM respectively.

While Davor's income is still estimation it would not be unreasonable to adjust his income as well for inflation of approximately 7% per year. As he was working in 2006 for 30 KM per day, his income for 2007 could possibly have risen to about 32 KM per day or approximately 2,900 KM per annum. As this is the only monetary income of the family, the figure will have to be divided into two in order to reflect the definition of the poverty line being per person, Danijela and Davor and in this case we will exclude the children, the amount becomes 1,450 KM per person. This places them under the basic poverty line but still the amount is 67% higher than the extreme poverty line. In this scenario there are elements which are not clear, such as possible support from Davor's father or other relatives which was not disclosed during the interview or possible income from "rakija" making. Another factor that contributed to the savings, making up for the lack of income to cover necessities, was the value of the vegetables that they were growing. Even though the quantity was not specified, judging by Danijela's reply when asked how much of vegetables, including maize, they got out of their garden: "It depends on the year, how the weather is. Mainly we can get enough of course we have to buy other things." To conclude that by adding this element into the calculations, that it brings the family further from the extreme poverty line and they end up somewhere around the basic poverty line.

In the case of Danijela and Davor, the landmine factor does not affect them much, or possibly not at all, as their only land is around their house and they had permission to grow some maize from another landowner. Worth noting, Davor cuts his own wood and by doing that he brings additional savings for the family.

In the case of **Anthony and Adrijana**, Anthony was receiving a pension from the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the amount of 180 KM when I interviewed him, but in 2007 the minimum pension had gone up to 220 KM per month (BosniaNews-I, 2007) so we can assume that he was receiving at minimum 2,640 KM for that year. However Adrijana was not receiving any pension, so per person it would make 1,320 KM for each. Being their only official income and compared to the inflationary adjusted basic and extreme poverty line, 2500 and 866 KM, they are 52% above the extreme poverty line and about 47% under the basic poverty line.

The support factor is strong, all their children are in Croatia and visit them regularly, and if they needed help they asked them. It was never disclosed how much this assistance constituted per year. Anthony and Adrijana were living quite economically growing vegetables and keeping a few animals; however, they were buying wood. The landmine factor affected them by restricting how much maize they could grow or wood which they could possibly cut themselves. However, by storing and pickling part of the vegetable harvest for winter they should move closer to the basic poverty line.

**Emanuel and Esther** and their small children are just above the basic poverty line of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of the informants they would be placed in the fourth place as economically vulnerable. This is based on facts, such as, Emanuel has access to work every now and then; they have another house in a neighboring village which can possibly be sold in case of real financial problems; they have a support system abroad: Emanuel has two sisters in Croatia and Esther has relatives in Croatia and two sisters in Germany; he has a car which sometimes generates income. There were expenses as well, such as, the yearly car registration was 400 KM; Ante had a mobile phone; they grew vegetables but had limited amount of animals.

What puts them above the basic poverty line is that in discussions about various family expenses that came up during the interview, Emanuel claimed that he could earn the 500 KM per month needed to cover these expenses. This would bring their income to at least 6000 KM per year and divided by two would make 3000 per person, not counting the kids.

**Catherine and Cedomir** would be placed as the second least economically vulnerable. Cedomir was receiving a pension from Slovenia and even though he did not disclose how much he was receiving, we can assume that he was receiving at least the minimum, being equal to 33.3% of the minimum pension bases of 104,495.45 Slovenian Tolars or SIT (OP, 2006) or approximately 285 KM per month or 3,420 KM per year. In addition Cedomir's mother was receiving a pension that should have been at least 220 KM at minimum in 2007 or a total of 2,640 KM per year. This is estimated to be a total of 6,060 KM per year at minimum.

Catherine was working part time for 100 KM per month or 1,200 KM per year, bringing the total to 7,260 KM per year. Divided by three this would equal 2,420 KM per person compared to the basic poverty line of 2,500 KM with inflationary adjustment. However, Cedomir's sister is over eighty years old and when she dies, the supporting income she provides will discontinue, but on the positive side she is healthy. This gives them a guaranteed income just under the basic poverty line, however, what brings them up and above the poverty line are few factors. Cedomir's sister, who is living in Croatia, helps them with buying food; and their two daughters who are living in Croatia helps them with medicines. Catherine has two brothers living in Switzerland, but the extent of the assistance from the two brothers was not discussed during the interview.

Producing 200 to 300 liters of "rakija" a year and selling most of it at 10 KM per liter could possibly add another 1,500 to 2,000 KM per year to their income. The cost of producing "rakija" is basically nothing as the raw materials, plums and pears are taken from the trees of neighbors who are not using them. The quantity wood which is needed to boil the plums is minimal. However they could go further above the basic poverty line if landmines were cleaned from their agricultural land. They could cut grass for cows and sheep and grow corn as well. They have the equipment including a tractor to work the land but that is not possible at the moment.

Of the informants Snjezana was definitely the best off; actually she was not at all economically vulnerable. Receiving a pension of EURO 500 per month or approximately 12,000 KM a year placed her way above the basic poverty line

of 2,500 KM per year and well above other informants. On top of that all her seven children are living abroad, in Croatia and Germany. In her case, landmines had no economic effects on her livelihood: she was growing her own vegetables, had some animals and bought whatever she needed.

#### **7.16 The future – the dream**

After analyzing the interviews, it was clear that all informants mentioned that the clearing of landmines would greatly increase their quality of life. Branimir, responded when asked if something would change if more landmine areas were cleaned: “Of course, and we would let our sheep in those fields, it would be easier to cut the woods.” Saving money by cutting firewood for own use was a step forward. When Anthony was asked how much they would need to be able to live off the pension: “At least same amount (180 KM in 2006). If I could have 400 KM but that’s as well is also little. However with 500 KM minimum including the land and no help from the children.” From the perspective of a pensioner, Anthony’s vision of a good life reflected a bit more than just covering basic needs, but in order to survive without assistance from their children, the rest of his agricultural land needed to be cleaned of landmines.

When I asked Danijela if she was positive about the future, her reply was:” Yes, of course! We will manage with what we have.” It will be up to Danijela’s and Davor’s generation to bring a positive spirit and slowly build up the future of Sasina. Maybe one day the elementary school will be full of children but that remains to be seen. Danijela wanted to see the school start in Sasina but there weren’t enough children. But Emanuel was quite optimistic about the future and his family: “Better for all of us. I hope for normal life like before.” Catherine’s view of her future was bleak even though her husband and mother in-law were there and she had her work; this was her reply: “I am just feeling that things are difficult because of loneliness but I will live and work as much as I can, just to have good health.”

Branka’s and Branimir’s dream was quite simple: “We would like to have health insurance and a bathroom but we need 4,000 to 5,000 KM for bathroom because we need to bring water from the water tank which is down in the valley.”

Since the war employment possibilities remain slim, when the children grow up and have opportunities to obtain education, they leave for Croatia, Germany and or Austria where more opportunities remain. Thus, the future of the village remains bleak. When Branimir was asked what would change if more land would be cleaned of landmines, his reply was:” More people would come, maybe someone would build up a weekend house!”

### **7.17 Conclusion**

The villagers use various ways of enhancing their lifestyle by utilizing the land; while the results were limited, it did pull them away from extreme poverty and closer to the basic poverty line. Growing vegetables, having some agricultural crops and keeping husbandry did contribute to their economic survival; In the case of Sasina, it was not solely a case of economic survival.

Sasina may not have been the best choice to carry out a research on the economical affects of landmines; but it did bring up another issue related to the war and that was the psychological impact of living in close proximity to landmines. Being afraid of the possibility of becoming a victim of a landmines accident has, in a way, kept in a way the village in a hostage situation. The inhabitants were all aware of the dangers that surrounded them. One can only conclude that well prepared dissemination programmes involving landmine awareness had much to do with the fact that no victims of landmines had been recorded in the village or in the municipality.

From the economical perspective, to conclude that landmines have had a large economic impact on the village would be an overstatement. Some of the informants may be more vulnerable than others, resulting in a mixture of negative economic effects; in most cases, the conclusion is that it’s however a relatively small one and mainly affects their quality of life and limited economical standard of living but not extreme poverty.

## **Chapter 8 - Conclusions**

One of the main focuses of this MA thesis has been to compare agricultural production before and after the Bosnian war in the Municipality of Sanski Most and possible economical affects of landmines on the area. I have then looked specifically at the small village of Sasina which is located within the Municipality and examined how the people in the village cope with the threat of landmines after a decade had passed since the end of the conflict.

Theories of war may well be applied to the Bosnian war however it can be argued that theories and conclusions which are based on mathematical calculations on whether probability exists that a war may or may not break out can only tell part the story. At the end of the day there are unpredictable human beings which these theories are built on and which can turn around conclusions. How do we quantify hate or bad feelings towards someone? In many if not most cases, mathematical calculations ignore historical aspects of conflicts just like there is no history.

By the presentation of the statistical analysis of agricultural production in Sanski Most Municipality it can be argued that the landmine pollution had a limited effect on the economy in Sanski Most; at least it is minor in comparison to the ethnic factor. The total gross loss of agricultural production value from 1991 to 2005 inclusive both years can be estimated at being over 2 billion KM. The statistical analysis has indicated that the absence of the Bosnian Serbs may have had far more affect than the presence of landmines. If, however, the Bosnian Serbs decide to return in significant numbers in order to claim their properties and agricultural land, the landmine affect could seriously start to affect the livelihood of the ethnic group.

The livelihood of the inhabitants in Sasina village was described with their own words. As a conclusion to the field research in Sasina, first and foremost, it's



difficult to value the economical affects of landmines on the inhabitants in the village as they are not solely dependent on income or cost saving measures from agriculture including the forest. There are various factors which contribute to their economical survival, pending on their age i.e. younger informants need to be far cleverer in surviving rather than most of the pensioners who receive regular payments from the social security system. Occasional work is available and support mechanism from relatives, siblings etc. living abroad contributes to the economical survival. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, landmines do affect the inhabitants economically but it is not on a scale that it's a matter of life and death but rather a question of economical standard of living. In the case of Sasina, where the inhabitants were living in close proximity of the threat of landmines, it was more a question of negative psychological and sociological affects rather than economical.

By comparing the three counties, Afghanistan, Mozambique and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it can be concluded that being a person in Bosnia and Herzegovina and living in proximity of landmines is not the same as living in an African country such as Mozambique or Central Asian country such as Afghanistan. The probability of becoming a victim of a landmine in Bosnia and Herzegovina is there but not as high as in Afghanistan or in the southern part of Mozambique. However, what is common in these three countries is that survivors of landmine explosions will face very similar social stigma during their lifetime.

The economical impact of landmines in each of these countries is not the same. The social security and the health care network in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly distinct it's self from the context in Afghanistan and Mozambique. While not much, receiving a pension does provide means of survival and the health care system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is functioning fairly well. In Afghanistan and Mozambique the social security payments are very limited to non-existent and the health care system is in many cases less than basic. What possibly says it all is the fact that in the United Nations Human Development Index for 2007/8, Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks at number 66 of 177 countries, Mozambique ranks at 172 however Afghanistan is excluded on this list.

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