



Abstract: Spurious Landscape no. 11


by Stephen Hastings-King



The map is not the territory.



I imagine texts arranged as polyhedrons or pseudo-spheres that one would read by turning or moving around them.
Your movements would transform elements into sequences.
At every point, this-sidedness



The top half of a pseudo-sphere

would be a problem: the material you organize would be arrayed such that what you encountered on a particular side would not enable projections as to what would appear on the reverse.

114: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5: "The general form of a proposition is: This is how things are."----That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the things nature over and over, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.

115: A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.ⁱ

L'Ecrit, le grimoire est l'existence de l'idée.

Etymologically, grimoire is an altered version of the French grammaire, is itself altered grammar.

On the distinction between description and invocation:

Any description invokes, any invocation describes.

To invoke

[a. F. invoque-r (12th c. in Hatz.-Darm.), ad. L. invocre to call upon, esp. as a witness or for aid; to implore; to call by name, f. in- (IN-2) + vocre to call.]

A sentence invokes a world symmetrical with the nature and possibilities of grammatical particles enframed by syntax relations.

3. To call upon, or call to (a person) to come or to do something.

A sentence sheers off what it cannot contain.

What a sentence sheers off includes a coherent account of its own production.

1.

Collective deliberation as to self-organization lean on representations of the social-historical, which not only position but also delimit the deliberations themselves, distinguishing for example what is "natural" from what is arbitrary.

These representations are best understood as procedurally generated forms.

Ontological claims occupy a level of generality such that they orient locally applied procedures as they are repeated in them. The more implicit these are, the more wholesale the repetition. ⁱⁱ

A short story that distinguishes determinacy from partial determinacy

The sentence: "I move through a visual field" entails the motion of a discrete subject, identical with itself, which undertakes an intentional act, motion, and which as a result now finds itself interacting with a visual field, an aspect of an objective world entirely external to itself.

The sentence "I move through a visual field" entails moving-through as a psycho-kinetic project, organized around a viewpoint, an empty space oriented by means of a vertical with reference to the field which it organizes, the field of which it is the causal center. The visual field is partially ordered through the unfolding of bodily schemata, which orient and disappear into the orientation produced. It denotes the "I" as function, the content of which is some combination of patterns generated on the basis of the stream of incoming visual data, integrative associational networks. The I is emergent from within a stream, a densely sedimented rule-bound projection, a social institution.

In principle, a recursive statement denotes both modes.

Wittgenstein formalized a distinction between what a proposition says and what it does. The "doing" of a proposition involves a redefinition of operators and operations, the subsumption of the particular under the category. That a proposition designates those aspects of a situation that can be formalized does not mean that therefore all there is within a situation is that which can be formalized. This would be like saying that because you cannot account for the processes or interactions with language as material in terms shaped by the sentences that result from them, that therefore the processes do not exist.

While there is a tendency to subsume the shifting complexity of the instituting into particular types of relation between fixed sentence particles, it is obvious that we can to some extent hold this tendency in abeyance simply by saying that we are doing so. So the problem is not language itself, not propositional form itself, but the relations that we adopt to them, and the erasure of operations that follow from this relation. The relations we adopt are frame-effects.

To be clear, this is not to deny the efficacy of operations unfolded on the basis of determinist assumptions—these correspond to a dimension of our experience and a dimension of our thinking, which Cornelius Castoriadis called "ensembliste-identitaire." Categories are patterns of information reduction that we lean on, which enable our orientation within/toward the world.

Partial determinacy enables an integration of the instituting and instituted, which in turn enables some account of the play of singularities (individual acts of giving form, projecting meanings) and broader social-historical patterns of usage and/or transmission (institutions). Thinking through a partial-determinist frame raises questions concerning the nature and meaning of the relations we assume obtain between the elements of a sentence and the social-historical which it reconfigures as it represents.

For example, determinist ontology reduces meanings to predication at the level of category. A given object is an exemplar of a category. This circuit temporally isolates the instituted. It enframes repetition as reiteration to the exclusion of repetition as producing sequences.

2.

If ontological-level argument is to have any consequences that run beyond the accumulation of symbolic capital in the academic gift economy, the procedures that we develop must be geared both around elucidation and opening up arguments and their consequences in order to make them intuitively available.

When we talk about social being as continuous self-creation, continuous instituting performance constrained by what is instituted, we are not inventing anything. We are developing a framework that enables this general dynamic to become in a sense visible, even as a condition of this metaphorical visibility is a claim for the incompleteness of the visual. The terrain presupposed by the project of autonomy

emerges directly through thinking creation across the play of the instituting and the instituted.

The map is not the territory. Conventional grammatical structures stage a particular range of relations to a particular register of the social-historical. They do not repeat the social-historical, its multi-dimensionality, nor do they enact how orderedness is created collectively. Partial-determinist claims do not negate these structures: they simply make evident that each sentence is both a saying and a doing.

Partial-determinacy opens spaces for the development of different constraints that impact upon the ways in which sentences are constructed and new ways of making them performative. It also circumscribes what sentences can render as positivities.

Consider this paragraph from Castoriadis' The Imaginary Institution of Society:

We therefore have to think of a mode of being belonging to this world—to these worlds—of signification in its specificity and its originality, without 'substantializing' them, even metaphorically, or transforming them into 'subjects' of another order (...). Likewise, when we speak of the social-historical and of the social imaginary, the difficulty is not to invent new words for what is at issue here, but instead to understand that what these words are aiming at is not categorizable by means of grammatical categories (and behind these logical and ontological categories) in accordance with which we are in the habit of thinking. The difficulty lies in understanding that when we speak of the social-historical, for instance, we are not intending a substantive, and adjective or even a substantified adjective; in understanding that the social imaginary is not a substance, not a quality, not an action or a passion; that social-imaginary significations are not representations or forms, not concepts.ⁱⁱⁱ

It follows that partial-determinacy has fundamental implications not only for modes of thinking about being-in-the-world but just as much for the modes of ordering that we deploy in made objects that refer to the social-historical, the understandings of what counts as information and the ways in which we fashion statements. Partial determinacy disrupts conventional modes of expression. How do we explore an alternate ontological regime using sentences that reinscribe what they refer to back into a determinist framework?

For example, each usage of the term "social-imaginary significations" as a type of noun entails projections that render them as visualizable objects. It is across this dynamic that one imputes to them substance. The problem is not that claims generated from within a partial-determinist framework negate the instituted aspects of how we interact with nouns, but rather than they displace one's attention onto the instituting dimension, and so onto relations which are structured or mediated by them.

Partial-determinacy poses problems of textual surface, the sentences one uses to describe that surface, what one moves through and how that movement unfolds. Sentences are component parts of paragraphs are figures within a larger figure. Manipulation of form can alter relations between and to paragraphs can provide room for multiple types of performativity in sentences. There are stakes involved with extending conventional modes of writing into discussions of autonomy. Exegetical writing makes of autonomy an object in the world and of relations to it a type of spectatorship. Exegetical writing is necessary as a device for clarification of arguments, extension of implications, consideration of possible consequences.

But if autonomy is a desired outcome, the texts we produce should be symmetrical with that goal.

Open work requires that readers actively produce what they experience. Open work is composed to assemblages. Umberto Eco outlines one approach to assemblage by describing how performances of Karlheinz Stockhausen's "Klavierstücke 11" are made. The score is modular. The performer decides the sequence of modules for each performance. There is a fantastic number of possible Klavierstücke 11s. To the extent that this is symmetrical with autonomy, that symmetry holds for the performer and is exercised practically through the procedures that shape a particular assemblage/performance.

Open work begins in modular form. Modules entail seams, their discreteness is thereby marked: more radical variants generate gaps which are filled by the projections of the auditor or reader. Segment A maybe be through composed and segment C as well: but segment B is open and there are myriad ways to describe this open space and each descriptions alters the meanings of A and C. There are myriad trajectories that can link A to C but all are constrained. Without constraint there is no trajectory.

Open work is completed by through interaction but no two completions are identical. How the person who makes the environment may see the whole and how that whole is made by others can vary considerably. But at least there is making. Spectatorship is not an alternative.

There is a distinction between gaps or space as constituent elements of an open work and descriptions of gaps or spaces as constituent elements of an open work. That distinction lay in what is fixed and repeatable.

Open work is at the level of form symmetrical with the project of autonomy. Open work supplements more conventional forms.

Hybridity is unavoidable: one can no more wish away existing forms than one can wish away grammar.

3. Situation

The past is a circumscribed negativity that requires reference to the outside.^{iv}

Frame. Insofar as oppositional politics is concerned, the present is (as the past 20 years have been) dominated by the implosion of the Marxist Imaginary. There is still no coherent narrative of this implosion. There is still no staging of a generative relation to the tradition which imploded, no argument for closure in the deconstructive sense: a foreclosing of the tradition and initiation of a processes of taking up basic philosophical problems and re-interrogation of inherited categories. This would form the underpinning for a new radical politics.

The work of Castoriadis constitutes a detailed point of departure, but it's reception has been limited. And there are problems which arise from the simply fact that Castoriadis' trajectory through the Marxist Imaginary is not our own, that we operate in a different context, facing different problems, and that particularly in matters pertaining to artistic production, he does not speak to or for us.

There is a general notion of the social imaginary as continuous autopoiesis, but little understanding of how regions (particular vector-spaces or densities) come into being and even less of how they collapse. The notion of the social-imaginary has still not been made operational. In part, this follows from an undervaluation of the problem of institution itself, which is the problem of constraints, what enables vectors or systems to unfold in one direction and not others.

Consider fashioning a history of the implosion of the Marxist Imaginary as a topological experiment. The surface (the imaginary) is an effect of accumulated trajectories. In the France of the 1950s-mid 1960s in particular, the PCF-CGT was what Bourdieu called the "idée force" that structured the sense of the Marxist Imaginary which obtained there. A split had been driven between the PCF and the Socialists such that the former occupied a space within and the Socialist outside. Oppositional groups arrayed themselves within the space that the PCF structured, working fundamentally as heretical groups against the church of the Party. A very good narrative sequence that outlines the process of implosion from within a vision of history shaped by that of the PCF is Chris Marker's films "Le fond de l'air est rouge" and "Sans Soliel." For the social group we will for brevity's sake call the generation of Mai 68, Socialisme ou Barbarie—operating as a narrative by way of the journal, a subterranean influence felt from myriad sources beyond that, was both a reflection

and driver of the crisis of the Imaginary. All of this would function as sociologizing indices that one could use to organize a collection of narratives or trajectories.

The Marxist Imaginary is in a sense all the ways in which it was organized, all the ways in which it was understood, and so would be a cumulative result of trajectories in that each would posit a particular vision of and relation to it as they recounted something of a generating of fracture through disinvestment.

But even at this abstract level, it is not so simple: a characteristic of Left politics was flows through the space shaped by acquisition and loss of belief. This is also a type of collective disinvestment. These flows were continuous. At what point does collective disinvestment extend beyond the accumulated trajectories and effect the surface held together by them? How discrete is this surface which is held together which is an effect of accumulated trajectories, if its discourse is a variant of ordinary language, if the practices that direct or shape interactions with that discourse lean on patterns of ideological performance that underpin equally any number of other regions of the social-historical?

The trajectories which enable thinking collective disinvestment involve diffuse, silent zones covered over by repression, narrated across experiences of vertigo and the re-intergration of vertigo into an altered sense of narrative coherence. So it is likely that trajectories will not provide access to events—nor is it obvious that this history involves events in a meaningful sense. The history may be an accumulation of triggers and markers. For example, a recurrent motif in militant accounts of their experience through the 1980s-1990s is the sense that a profound shift had taken place but it made no sound, as if the collapse of the context that had enabled them to articulate themselves as militants had undergone a failure in the way floppy disc failure may have erased the boundaries that separated one directory from another, as if the frame which had oriented their militant identities and activities was made of tissue and that one day, without warning, that tissue dissolved. There was no experience of dissolution, only of having-dissolved. Something happened, but I do not know what or when. But something happened. But it is at this moment that I noticed. Maybe this is that moment, when you ask me when I noticed.

Effect. The world is now an accumulation of things: the meaning of the present tense of verbs collapsed onto the materially present, as if the Marxist Imaginary had intertwined present and subjunctive, making the present tense a special case of the subjunctive, holding the world a slight distance above itself.

In the absence of such a history and the possibilities for staging arguments as to closure that hinge upon it, various projects recode the old vocabulary as if the only problem created by the historical specificity of the Marxian project and the history of that project is one of transposition. So the bourgeoisie becomes empire and the proletariat multitude. The center of this is avoidance.

Effect. The world is now an accumulation of things the meaning of which inhere in themselves: exemplars of categories, abstract and interchangeable. Politics is the fact of their arrangement. In the United States, this is that mediated by television, which organizes experience-distant phenomena in an illusory real-time, relying on an "objectivity" which presupposes and reinforces a generalized erasure of this-sidedness, of the hyle, which is ideological at both the levels of form and content.

To paraphrase Cineas: it is not worth one's while to explore history if one does so in order to rediscover there perception such as we are already able to have it.^v

4.

This text is a peculiar sculpture I place in a tiny garden.
It is less than that: it is a particle.

A particle in other words must be shaped in such a way as to lend itself to movement and conduction. For particles have no separate existence, merely serving in support of larger functions. A particle subserves some higher-order process that is capable of further development. A particle subserves some higher order which it transmits in several directions over into three dimensions.^{vi}

5.

Making partial-determinacy intuitively available enables procedural reprocessing of social-historical phenomena. To be operative, this requires the generation of context: context constrains.

Metaproblem. Advancing a project and a context together is a move characteristic of modernist avant-garde. From the surrealists to OuLiPo, most have articulated their particular range of actions alongside a counter-history, a re-processing of the past. The versioning of the past stabilizes the procedures and their outputs in "real time", provides a density to experience and is the primary modality whereby political claims made through or about those procedures are made operative.

Objections to the category of the avant-garde and the teleological view of history generally are also objections to centralizing ideology of art production and the evaluative hierarchies it enables. Outside of this ideology there is continuous making everywhere. In practice, what one does can be done with care and attention and the question of whether that doing produces "art" or not need not be of any importance. Art is simply a device that enables one to frame particular projects. It is a condensed set of instructions.

In "Tradition and the Individual Talent," T.S. Eliot argued that education in the arts should be centered around tradition so readers would be fashioned from modernist texts. Each new work rearranges previous selections and hierarchies that had obtained amongst all previous works. Works are strong contexts if tradition is not closed is not a thing or like a thing. Chronology is then one context amongst others that can be made operative differentially. When we such insert such claims into a linear history comprised of a series of such claims, the equalization of weighting amongst contexts is negated. The ordering grid that informs this negation functions as if it were transcendent. Everything in its proper place implies the whole system behind the proper.

If partial-determinacy as an ontological framework is to be more than an intellectual parlor game, its implications must be integrated into analytic and historical work. Partial-determinacy complicates textual surfaces. If these surfaces are not reconsidered, analysis actively translates partial-determinist claims back into the inherited ontology they work against. The map is itself the territory.

Context constrains. Constraints enable motion in one direction while foreclosing it in others, are what differentiate one region from another. Networks of referrals articulate regions within ordinary language (without for that becoming more than a region of ordinary language)

108: We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is really a family of structures more or less related to one another.

If language can be disaggregated as "a family of structures" or collection of patternings that group particular visual and auditory characteristics, regularities at the level of particles and built objects comprised of particles, it is easier to see how, through the process of its acquisition, that modalities of visual perception are intertwined with types of organization specific to these structures. A similar remodeling occurs in the register of audition. Thinking the relation of the instituted to the instituting through a disaggregated conception of language---which is here obvious simply indicated---enables a re-dimensioning of the social-historical and of possibilities for referrals that point toward the social-historical.

The composer James Tenney proposed that sonic phenomena be re-imagined as unfolding across at least 6 dimensions.

Imagined in this general way, institutions and their local correlates in genre or discipline can be reconfigured as subsets of intermedia formations. The social imaginary is needlessly restricted when it is simply a descriptive category that

complicates already existing phenomena and processes. Integrating it into the structure of analysis itself enables generative rethinking of divisions between types of material, which opens onto problems of how to organize material. Information is material. These possibilities are supplements to rather than simple negations of already operative modes of ordering phenomena in the world and of enframing one's activities with reference to that world. The supplement corrodes what it supplements.

In his book *L'illusion identitaire*, J-F-Bayart's identifies the notion of culture as a fundamental ideological signification which organizes the ways in which operations within and upon the social-historical are configured around assumptions of discreteness and separation between types of activity. Bayart argues that the operative notion of culture is a nineteenth century construct which was refined in the colonial context to designate a type of temporalized object, a repetition machine which deploys its characteristics around a core of rituals or features which are repeated in the same way each time across time, which repetitions constitute essence plus time, with the effect that a culture is fundamentally self-referential and *métissage* (adaptation) an affair of edges.

A picture held us captive.

I imagine a political project—that is a conceptual action oriented by the project of autonomy that and that approaches the assemblage of context in a fashion shaped by the notion of the social imaginary and the partial-determinist ontology that is it's conceptual basis—as a collective action involving a wide range of types of experiments with transforming the surface of textual production and by extension the ways in which information is organized---as a an expanding assemblage of works/objects and procedures for generating other outputs visual and sonic, some generated with explicit reference to partial-determinacy and its correlate in the project of autonomy, others reprocessed to as to generate alternate meanings commensurate with them: a kind of nebula linked by vast networks of traces or pathways, something on the order of how Anthony Braxton describes his Ghost Trance series:

It's an idea of structure that's akin to an erector set, where things can be put together in different ways, an idea of architecture that is only directional, an idea of architecture that can be used to apply to different situations...^{vii}

Path 1

The individual elements that comprise composer/multi-instrumentalist/philosopher of sound Anthony Braxton's compositional system combine traditional and graphic notations, pulse tracks and open or improvisational sequences.^{viii} So for example one

might be working with a piece constructed around a hypothetical voyage that would consist in notated sequence A, an open sequence B and a notated sequence C in which any number of trajectories might connect A to C. Each trajectory reconfigures the meanings of all constituent elements.

The compositions are designed so as to be playable in any sequence: singly or in series, juxtaposed (2x) or superimposed (3x, 4x....). The environments they generate undercut the traditional opposition between composition and improvisation, displacing it onto a more general interaction between players and constraints.

Through their combinations of through-composed and open sections, Braxton's pieces push the players outside their particular modes of working and re-figure them in the context of higher-order dynamics that are specifiable, even as each performance is and is not the same as any other.

Each performance is repetition understood as producing elements in a (virtual) series rather than as re-iteration or repetition of the same. Repetition is refigured through its position as constraints as elements within emergent patterns. Each element within the series retains a degree of self-referentiality: each performance complicates the markers of self-referentiality. Each composition is multi-stable, in that the relation of self-referential to open areas is reversible. This reversibility is not captured on recordings. From the position of auditor, the nature of the medium erases open segments and renders them functionally equivalent to through-composed segments: by fixing the duration and its contents, each segment is the same, each can be learned down to its tiniest detail through repetition. The distinction between constraint and emergence is erased with the fixing of the interactions between them.

Path 2

"... every figure, whatever its quasi-matter, is immediately (hama) the positing of ordered gaps."^{ix}

Integrated into 2-space across a series of declarative statements, the idea of figure as ordered gaps is flattened.

Anthony Braxton compositions, for example, are self-consciously figured in this manner: but when the pieces are experienced across the medium of a recording, this characteristic is erased. Constraints and emergence are flattened into each other: everything as a function of their capture within an abstracted duration, their being-as-locked in fixed repeatable form. An audience at a particular Braxton performance may not differentiate constraint and emergence, composed from improvised and may experience the performance as a whole which is neither in particular. Nor would the characteristics of the pieces become more obvious were that audience to attend a series of Braxton performances. The symmetry that obtains between this

compositional strategy and the project of autonomy is available primarily for the performers. There is no autonomy show. Autonomy is a doing.

We walk through the mirror.

Philosophical activity and conceptual art are variants one of the other.

What distinguishes them can be seen as a relation to the open.

Conceptual art exploits possibilities of incompleteness. Exegesis fills in what is incomplete.

Conceptual art sacrifices the conventions that enframe analytic rigor for the pleasure of the experience of completing what is incomplete. Exegesis is suspicious of the pleasures of incompleteness.

Each informs the other.

Interpretation and reprocessing are reverse images.

Consider this statement from a viewpoint of temporal orientation.

Interpretation is an extension of capitalist property relations into the terrain of meaning-generation: constituent elements of a collage remain tied to their initial environments. Collage-space is derivative.

Reprocessing treats collage produced from heterogeneous elements as a strong context. Juxtaposition is a form of argument. Elements taken from one environment and inserted into another considered context are refashioned. Meanings are made and remade. Situations are defined and redefined. Arrangement is argument. You, reader, are generating surfaces that link arranged elements. These surfaces are constrained. This is a form of analytic collage. It is not the only possible form: different projects require different forms define different gaps and order them. Through this analytic collage there are any number of pathways. The form itself is one amongst any number of possibilities. This piece can be cut up and rearranged.

Try it.

Incompleteness is structural.

It cannot be avoided.

Path 3 (recursion):

Having on recent occasions come to grips with the nature of structure, let us take the next step to higher proportion. This does not mean that we have abandoned the realm of structure, for we shall never skip this stage of the initial organization of matter. Structure is not a bridge that is no longer needed once one has gained the farther shore. It is an act of material forming that proves its effectiveness as such beside the larger articulations and adapting its character anew in various parts, accented more or less, interrupted when the context demands it, only to be resumed once again.^x

The photograph is Max ERNST and Dorothea TANNING playing Chess ©2007 Dorothea TANNING (USA) & Max Ernst Museum City of Brühl (GER)

The epigraph comes from Robert Anton Wilson as he appears in Lance Baucher's 2003 documentary film "Maybe Logic." It resonates with much of the work of Edward Tufte, which constitutes one of the starting points for this series.

¹ Numbered paragraphs in this section are taken from Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations G.E. Anscombe, trans. (bibliography)

¹ In my recent work, I have been developing arguments for a partial-determinist ontology and its possibilities for rethinking how the social-historical is represented. This work leans heavily on Castoriadis, but as part of an expanded and expanding field of other possible nodes, and so is as much about generating that field as it is about developing particular readings of Castoriadis. This orientation enacts the distinction between reprocessing and critique that I will elaborate in the essay. This project is an element in a series. Working in series means that one uses the previous essays to enframe and enable the next. If you read the series chronologically, you can see how it develops. But it should not be necessary to read chronologically. It is with this in mind that each element of this series includes excerpts from one or more previous elements, generally situated so as to anchor and generate new possibilities or meanings at once. This procedure should (I hope anyway) enable a reader to enter the series from any number of points and while enabling a cumulative series to continue without getting bogged down in restating premises/previous arguments. There are no doubt other ways to do this, but I made this particular choice.

¹ Cornelius Castoriadis: The Imaginary Institution of Society, Kathrine Blamey, trans. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988) p. 369.

¹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Notes de cours sur L'origine de la géométrie de Husserl R. Barnaras, ed. (Paris: PUF, 1998)

¹ Cornelius Castoriadis: "Merleau-Ponty and the Weight of the Ontological Tradition" David Ames Curtis, trans., in Thesis Eleven no. 36 (1993) p. 33.

¹ Paul Klee: Notebooks v. 2 (Woodstock NY: Overlook Hardcover Press, 1992) p. 53

¹ Anthony Braxton, "Chasing the Ghost Trance" interview in Musicworks no. 99 (winter 2007) p. 41.

¹ For an idea of how the titles look, see:

<http://www.restructures.net/compositions/compo60-068.htm#Comp.%2066>

For a complete Braxton discography with links to copies of various liner notes (which are the primary vehicle by means of which the compositional system has reached a wider public) see:

<http://www.columbia.edu/%7Ejcf17/247.html>

The conceptual system behind much of Braxton's earlier work is elaborated in his Triaxium Writings (Frog Peak Publishers, on demand: see <http://www.frogpeak.org/fpartists/fpbraxton.html>)

A very good introduction to Braxton and his music is Graham Lock: Forces in Motion: The Music and Thought of Anthony Braxton (New York, DaCapo, 1989). A shorter primer on Braxton can be found in Lock: Blutopia: Visions of the Future and Revisions of the Past in the Work of Sun Ra, Duke Ellington and Anthony Braxton (New York: DaCapo, 1999). This section is just scratches the surface of

Braxton's work. You really should be listening to some of it as you read this. Go ahead and put some on. We'll wait here.

¹ Castoriadis, "Merleau-Ponty and the Weight of the Ontological Tradition" op cit..

Note page 20: By "conceptual art" in this context, I am referencing the experiments with the work of Wittgenstein done by Sol LeWitt, Mel Bochner and Lawrence Weiner. This project initiates a series of experiments with reprocessing these approaches, inserting them back into a more analytic context.

¹ Paul Klee: Notebooks vol. 2 p. 69.