Vinsamlegast notið þetta auðkenni þegar þið vitnið til verksins eða tengið í það: http://hdl.handle.net/1946/14760
Proponents of moral hazard theory argue that the norm of humanitarian intervention encourages victim groups to initiate conflicts and provoke genocidal retaliation in the hope of triggering intervention by the international community. The aim of this thesis is to analyse the theoretical plausibility of a moral hazard of humanitarian intervention, and also examine whether humanitarian intervention generates in practice the moral hazard that some authors claim it does. It is shown that while moral hazard theory is theoretically plausible, there is no discernible trend in the quantitative data consistent with moral hazard theory since the emergence and strengthening of a norm of humanitarian intervention. After applying moral hazard theory to Kosovo, often cited as the strongest case of moral hazard, the conclusion is reached that the framework proposed by proponents of moral hazard theory only partially accounts for the sequence of events and fails to explain key aspects of rebel behaviour. While there was some level of moral hazard at play in Kosovo, the conventional theories of rebellion and conflict – greed, grievance and the security dilemma – are needed to fully explain what occurred in Kosovo.
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Sverrir Steinsson - Moral Hazard.pdf | 500.81 kB | Opinn | Heildartexti | Skoða/Opna |