Vinsamlegast notið þetta auðkenni þegar þið vitnið til verksins eða tengið í það: http://hdl.handle.net/1946/22831
The underlying question of this thesis is whether human rights rest on a metaphysical foundation. I will approach this question by studying Alan Gewirth’s theory on the foundations of human rights. In particular, I will study whether his theory has serious flaws and whether any such theory is bound to have flaws. Gewirth argues, through his theory of morality, that human rights are based on a necessary truth, and in that sense on a concrete foundation. In this thesis I explore Gewirth’s theory and method by itself but also from the point of view of Richard Rorty’s stance on truth and foundationalism and his outlook on human rights. Rorty represents a different view than that of Gewirth’s, one that contradicts what might justifiably be stated as foundationalism in human rights theory. At the end of the dialogue, I present my conclusion in which I discuss my own attempt to solve the problem of the philosophical foundations of human rights.
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The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights.pdf | 377.79 kB | Lokaður til...01.01.2030 | Heildartexti | ||
Kápa.pdf | 160.9 kB | Lokaður til...01.01.2030 | Kápa |