Development and its Discontents

From Postdevelopment to Post-Anarchist Critique

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60 credit thesis part of the
Magister Scientiarum degree in Geography

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Reykjavík, 13 May 2014
Abstract

The concept of development is of importance in geography and many other fields. It has been critically deconstructed by many writers associated with ‘postdevelopment’. In this thesis I take a critical look at the postdevelopment approach and articulate a post-anarchist position to the concept of development. My analysis of postdevelopment theory centers on two major arguments that I identify. The first is the critique of the Western international institutional framework of development that is seen as a renewed form of imperialism and exploitation of the so-called developing world. Theoretically, this thesis attempts to depart from the postdevelopmental stand by conceptualizing development as something more than an institutionalized power apparatus that postdevelopmentalists describe, or as *Empire* as Hardt and Negri (2000) phrase it. Development is conceptualized as both individual and institutional. The second argument that I look into is the postdevelopment embrace of social movements as an ‘outside’ to development; a form of social organization that supposedly defies development by its very nature. Critical of this argument, I argue that social organizations are in themselves part of practices of development, positive and negative at the same time. I then turn to anarchism in general, and post-anarchism in particular, in an attempt to outline a post-anarchist perspective on the concept of development that does not situate itself within a postdevelopmental frame of thought. Both postdevelopment theory and post-anarchism rely on poststructuralist theory which is also discussed in this thesis, particularly the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, and Derrida. I will also stress the work of Nietzsche, who I see to be of significance in a discussion on development from a post-anarchist perspective.

On the basis of this, I suggest that a new understanding of development has to emerge; one freed from structural restraints such as the institutional framework described by postdevelopmentalists. This notion of development is anarchist and not based on a different mode of social organization. It is rather a non-system since it undermines systematization of thought and practice. Instead of being a system, it is signified through a state of deconstruction. Development has to be deconstructed to become a less patronizing process.

**Keywords:** Development, Postdevelopmentalism, Post-anarchism
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Acknowledgements

Every work relies on the conflation of an individual with its environment. Environments are a tricky thing. They are, first, a personal relationship to people, and second, an indirect connection to peoples’ minds and ideas that are placed in books, articles, pamphlets. Here in this few lines I wish to say some thanks to the first environment. The second is a passive one that I can only thank through my presentation of it in the text.

First and foremost, I wish to give thanks to those who have hinted me towards texts that have encouraged certain interests and perspectives of mine and as a consequence partially made it into this thesis. This acknowledgement is particularly given to Irma Erlingsdóttir and Karl Benediktsson. Karl Benediktsson, along with Sigridur Þorgeirsdóttir, also deserves thanks for enduring my occasional stubbornness in regard to improving this thesis’ content and language. I believe that even if one may argue that both simply did their ‘job’, a special acknowledgement is definitely deserved for their work. After all, I know myself.

I also want to thank those who have helped me in other ways. These are in particular Kári and Arnar. Their enthusiasm for long and productive talks made me realize some important aspects. I further thank Aleksandra and Kári for some effort and time that unfortunately will not be visible in this thesis.

I also want to give a special shout-out to my mom. Not only did she talk to me about all sorts of things regarding my work on this thesis, but she also supported me in many other ways. It would burst the acknowledgement section if I listed it all up...

Thanks also belongs to those who, either asked if they could help where non was needed, or attempted to help even when they did not have time or abilities to help. In particular this goes to my brother Nils, who offered to help when I did not feel like accepting it, and my very good friend Colin, who well, I better don’t say...
Chapter One

Introduction

In this thesis I discuss two streams of political writing, firstly postdevelopment theory, and second post-anarchism. I attempt to approach the concept of ‘development’, that is at the core of the postdevelopmentalist critique, from a post-anarchist perspective. The concept of development occupies a particular position in postdevelopmentalism. I believe that this particular position can be pursued onwards in a post-anarchist perspective that tackles the problems that I identify in the postdevelopment argumentation. Both approaches build on a similar premise of critique. This critique sees institutions as oppressive social actors. Grassroots social organizations, represented by social movements, are seen as the liberating force that can overcome the domination of the oppressive institutions. Due to the fact that there is not yet a post-anarchist discussion on the concept of ‘development’, I believe that this thesis will help position a possible perspective on the matter. It enables a reading of development from a perspective that does not abide to the arguments of postdevelopment theory. I show that anarchist literature has tendencies to regard notions of development in a similar manner as postdevelopmentalism. What I propose is a way to transcend a thinking of structurally linking development to a particular setting, as postdevelopment theory suggests.

Today, development cooperation is a distinct part of the internationalization and globalization of ideals in respect to political, economic, cultural, and other issues. Development thus has become a very distinct and important aspect of almost all international relations that connect the so-called developing and developed countries. The development cooperation is led by institutions that are primarily financed and operated by Western so-called developed nations. These nations, according to the postdevelopment critique, serve only their own interests in the so-called developing countries. Further, the approaches to development are based on a process of universalization of Western ideals that are imposed on the developing world. All in all, development is one contemporary Western approach to promoting control in non-Western countries that are labeled ‘developing’. Most of these countries were colonies in the past, which shows that development represents a renewed form of imperialism. Prior to the contemporary universal and international policy articulation, it was each colonial power that determined its individual approach to colonial administration. Today, Postdevelopmentalists argue, all approaches to the so-called developing countries originate from
one source of political will, the US-controlled global hegemony. The American way has thus become the sole conception that defines approaches to progress globally.

In opposition to the development apparatus, and the theoretical justification for it, there are various views and movements resisting the grip of the capture mechanisms of development. One period of such resistance is in the 1990s, when postdevelopment theory emerged. Two of the concerns that came up in the postdevelopmental resistance will be the departure of this thesis. The first is the critique of the institutions that promote and reproduce processes of development. The second point of departure is the localization of alternatives to development social movements. Social movements have become the figurehead of postdevelopment literature in regard to resisting the US hegemony. Postdevelopmentalists see the mechanisms and approaches to social change of social movements as the anti-developmental position par excellence to a globalized and universalizing Western agenda.

This thesis specifically sets off from the critique of postdevelopment theory that has established itself as an academic critique of development in the early 1990s (Ferguson, 1990; Sachs, 1992; Escobar, 1992b, 1995; Esteva and Prakash, 1998). In opposition to many other development critiques, postdevelopmentalism has taken the position of complete dismissal rather than complementation and improvement, positioning development to be a pure counterproductive force and new form of colonialism that has lost all justification for existence, according to their arguments. Where postdevelopmentalists envision something other than development, I depart from their critique and argue that their position would not enable a new discourse free from the shackles of a development idea but would legitimize the emergence of a new form of development; one freed from institutional restraints but carried by other social constructs.

Post-anarchism, which just as postdevelopment theory has utilized French poststructuralist authors for its ends, can continue the critique of postdevelopmentalists in a more comprehensive fashion, I believe. Anarchism has historically focused on the issues of local autonomy and resistance to hierarchic power, particularly that of states and institutions. Due to this, both these theoretical approaches have a large area of overlap that enables to continue the critique of one on the basis of the other. Anarchist authors have so far refrained from focusing specifically on the issue of development in an extended fashion and thus there are only few perspectives on the relationship of so-called developed and so-called developing countries. This thesis could be understood as a continuation of, or at the least inspired by, an article written by Süreyya Evren (2006) in which he poses the question of how post-anarchism should engage this specific topic, the one of development. Evren stresses that development has to not only see a societal scope but also see the individual in the process. Evren also attempts to show the complexity of approaches that, he argues, cannot
simply be seen alone from traditionally accepted aspects. Development and so-called ‘third world countries’ should be looked at from new perspectives that so far have not been considered.

Evren’s (2006) article, as mentioned, is the closest that the recently emerging political philosophy of post-anarchism has come to the concept of development. The article shows that there is a need to relate the work of authors that so far have written on post-anarchism to the debate on development in order to not reproduce approaches to developing countries that are based on the localization of development in structurally defined contexts. Authors with a structural approach have established a framework through which they seek an outside to development which, as I argue in this thesis, does not exist. Post-anarchist literature (May, 1994, Newman, 2001a; Koch, 2011) as well as other anarchist related texts (Veracini, 2010; Lagalisse, 2011; Barker and Pickerill, 2012; Ince, 2012) show that there is a danger of overstressing hegemonic structures in an attempt to bring about social change. In this approach, institutions are seen as obstacles that, once overcome, open the path to a world in which the problems brought about by development are purged along the institutions themselves. In regard to development, some anarchists (Graber, 2004, 2011; Springer, n.d., 2012) have taken a path that resembles postdevelopmentalism. In this thesis, I approach development from a post-anarchist angle that overall reflects many points of critique raised against postdevelopment theory.

The question that underlies this thesis as a whole is whether and how post-anarchist approaches to the development discourse can continue postdevelopment theory without reproducing its metaphysical grounds. I define these metaphysical grounds as, first, the inherent description of development as solely an international institutional framework, and second, as the postdevelopment conception that development can be eradicated. The point of departure in this thesis is that development is not a structurally defined and easy conceivable phenomenon. Through the writings of poststructuralists, post-anarchists, Max Stirner, and Friedrich Nietzsche, I attempt to show that there is no simple solution to getting beyond the identified problems of development.

In order to outline my argumentation from the postdevelopment to the post-anarchist theoretical approach, I start this thesis with a brief overview over what is acknowledged as development. With an analysis on the origin and meaning of development according to authors not directly linked to postdevelopmentalism (Illich, 1970, 1974; Said, 1979; Larraine, 1989; Blussé, 1995), authors linked to the postdevelopment tradition (Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Rist, 1997; Mosse, 2005) and postdevelopment authors themselves (Ferguson, 1990; Escobar, 1992b, 1995; Esteva and Prakash, 1998), I show the structural premises of much of critical development literature.
From what many call the beginnings or invention of development, I will move into the 20th century in my analysis of postdevelopment theory in Chapter Three. There I will look at the main arguments that postdevelopment authors have presented. I will critically engage their arguments on the basis of two main perspectives that I bring into the open. These are aimed at the postdevelopment’s arch-enemy, the development institutions, and the proclaimed alternative to development, namely social movements. With an established critical perspective on much of the development literature as well as postdevelopmentalism, I continue my analysis to the works of anarchism that will be at the center of Chapter Four. Anarchism and post-anarchism in particular will be discussed in order to establish a ground for engaging a post-anarchist perspective on development. For this I refer to the works of Stirner and Nietzsche, as have other post-anarchist authors before me (May, 1994; Newman, 2001a, 2002; Koch, 2011). Both Nietzsche and Stirner are important early influences on what today has become a post-anarchist philosophical tradition, as well as for poststructuralists that in turn are the key to understanding post-anarchism. In order to define a potential post-anarchist perspective towards development, I will also take a critical look at post-anarchism itself. For this Nietzsche is particularly helpful. He opens up opportunities to view post-anarchism with a distinct dose of caution that I argue is important in an attempt to approach development. In the fifth chapter, I will bring together the findings from the earlier chapters and discuss development as a possible post-anarchist the concept.

As other authors before me, I will throughout the thesis put a stress on the word ‘development’ in order to signify its critical position inside the development discourse. I will write development in italics when signifying a notion of a development process, such as the one of the international development cooperation. This process is seen as imposing, patronizing, and condescending despite an overall aim to enhance or improve the situation of those developed. The development institutions attempt to develop so-called developing countries to the state of the so-called developed countries. As can be seen from the previous sentence I will only use italics in relation to a direct imposing measure or application. This means that development occurs where people influence other people directly in an imposing manner. Development agendas, development policies, development institutions, as well as other expressions that I will use throughout the paper, represent the foundation for development and thus stand in a direct relationship to development. The structural relation to the concept of development, not in italics, implies that these expressions are critically regarded throughout this thesis. Because of this, I will not mark separately these in italics. This logic also applies to the expression of developing and developed countries which I will not either place into italics.
Thus, the reason to place development in italics is for me to show a direct way of differentiating what I mean by development and development in the text. There, I often remark on the specific character of each approach in relation to the other in a comparative manner.
Chapter Two

On the Invention of Development

In this chapter I will present what Cowen and Shenton (1996) describe as the ‘invention’ of development. I will discuss a question that has been with development studies for long. This question is whether development emerged at a given time and in a particular place. Each section looks at development from a different angle. With a discussion of all the section in the end, I attempt to show that development cannot be looked at in regard to either a specific time, or place.

2.1 Development as 18th to 20th Century Concept

2.1.1 Metropolitan Origins of the 19th Century

Cowen and Shenton (1996) are the two authors who have traced development in its modern postdevelopmental understanding arguably furthest back in history. They argue that it emerged in the early 19th century. More concretely, Cowen and Shenton see it in the European, but also South American, engagement of philosophy and literature with emerging positivism. Saint-Simon was the first who set forth development as a policy framework but the Siant-Simonian school found a height of expression around Auguste Comte. Only with Comte did development emerge as a greater political idea that found application in society and not only on paper. With Comte, development began to rearrange society by developmental approaches.

Comte set out to place social existence under natural laws. For him, natural science was the foundation for social science, and human development could be explained by laws that fundamentally were based on mathematical equations. Sociology, as Comte called it, became a tool of understanding, predicting, and influencing societies. In short, sociology was a means to develop society to a better future. Comte, however, did not envision an international apparatus to control societies globally, but rather based his study on France alone. Auguste Comte, according to Cowen and Shenton (1996), nonetheless finished the invention of development, meaning that after Comte development was a definite approach to social and economic issues. For Comte, development was an approach that had to be directed from the top to the bottom. The role of developers was to be taken by ‘trustees’ (Cowen and Shenton, 1996, 26), who were knowingly involved and given the responsibility to act according to a grand plan. Trustees follow a clear vision, a development idea,
which they seek to manifest in society’s social, legal, economic, and cultural fabric. Through this development, change is initiated at specific points from where it then flows through society as a whole. Such positivist development found application in South American ventures that sought a second Europe in the newly independent region. The grand scheme was to influence society to the degree that it became a mirror of the West. In Europe on the other hand, positivism emerged as a driving force to re-establish ‘order’ to the chaotic rise of the enlightenment period. This had seen the emergence of an early capitalism characterized by misery, unemployment, and destructive crises.

From the early Comtean domestic focus of development in the late 19th century, the term came to be seen as what it implies today, an international largely economic approach of a state to another one. This modern conception of development however did not develop untied from its positivist origins. Cowen and Shenton state that it was in sense a paradox that the modern conception was picked up by colonial administrations, and conflated with the typical peripheral problems that struck the British colonies of Australia and Canada. Only from there did the matured policies, or doctrines of development, make their way back to the heart of the kingdom, England, where they evolved further to the development approaches of the early 20th century. In this process, the role of Joseph Chamberlain is central. Chamberlain proposed radical changes in the financial support of colonial territories. Further, he aimed at increasing the economic activity of colonial regions in order to increase overall productivity that he argued would benefit the Empire. Crosby (2011) describes in detail Joseph Chamberlain’s policy of ‘Developing the estates’. This policy was set up by Chamberlain in order to secure funding for large scale projects through which he wished to develop the British colonies. This proved difficult as financial support to colonies was only given reluctantly. The British state and government had traditionally thought of colonies not as a primary investment but as areas to exploit as cheaply as possible. Chamberlain attempted to change this. For him, a nation had to develop all of its lands, whether domestic or colonial. Development created opportunities outside competition or efficient financial accountability. In some instances, the improvements to be made were only based on an assumption that an increase in production could be achieved. Certainty was not to be of importance to development. All projects envisioned worked on the premise of consolidating the land usage or simply bridging gaps between different regions so that the Empire would evenly develop. Development had to be state-led as colonies would otherwise only thrive where economic incentives were a given. All in all, one has to see Chamberlain’s vision to create productive colonies not as goodwill to support the people that lived and worked in colonial regions. For Chamberlain, development was more about creating a world-wide Empire that was not solely defined through a metropolitan country, the domestic mainland, and peripheral colonies. For him,
development was a means to establish, develop, a metropolitan Empire with a flourishing England and a flourishing English colonial world.

2.1.2 Capitalism as Origin of Development

An even earlier dating for development comes from Jorge Larrain (1989). He looks at capitalism as a source of development but considers that the early beginnings were found even earlier than in 19th century positivism. For Larrain, it is in the writings of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo that one can see the first developmentalities. Developmentality is a combination of development and mentality, and describes a mindset that is developmental (Deb, 2009, 106). Capitalism, as thought that emerged in the late 18th century, sparked a thinking of economic development that can be traced to today’s approaches. Larrain approaches development from the most dominating connection that it has in contemporary understanding. This is an economic determination. While Comte’s approaches were not focused on merely economic aspects, Larrain sees capitalism’s early beginnings as the true origin of development. He maintains that “some form of economic development existed always everywhere” (Larrain 1989, 18) but, similarly as Cowen and Shenton, he fixes the origin to a specific time in which he sees development come together from multiple angles. It was thus not a novelty of the 18th century to think of development, but with capitalism it became policy. Larrain’s approach, however, already by itself raises questions in regard to why a definition of development has to be reliant on early capitalism if some of development existed before. For him, development is defined by a specific set of policies, mostly economic, that became essential to capitalist economics. Capitalism however as he shows developed itself from something else which to some degree included developmental tendencies or hints.

Capitalism is also the departure of those authors who see development as a 20th century concept. Hart (2009b) and Cooper (1997) argue that development was a reaction to structural colonial problems of the 1930s and 1940s, and as such not invented actively but thrust upon the colonial powers who tried to hang on to their overseas territories. The problems were directly linked to the global economic recession of the 1930s and the following WWII which left most European colonial powers in economically desperate situations. This development led to a financial retreat from any investments in colonies. Cooper’s (1997) placing of development into the early 20th century, specifically into the 1930s and 1940s, also fits to the description of Cowen and Shenton (1996) who see this period as an important in the history of development. For them, however, it is not the beginning, but a setting of a new paradigm. This new paradigm, for Cowen and Shenton, is the most important one of development as it directly connects to the current understanding of the concept.
While Cowen and Shenton, however, strive to more concretely trace the origins of the modern development to older ideas that initially sparked the coinage, Cooper’s (1997) description sees the emergence of development as a simpler structurally linked phenomenon, part of colonialism before in the 1930s, and the time following WWII. Despite the reactive fashion that Cooper applies to the concept development, though, it remains something that was invented as a means to controlling colonies. The difference between Cooper and Cowen and Shenton merely lies in the way in which it came about, and the particular time. For Hart and Cooper, it was not a case of an active will, but a reactive, imposed, decision of the early 20th century. For Cowen and Shenton (1996), it was an active conscious political reasoning that led to development.

Postdevelopment theory, similarly to Hart and Cooper, sees development’s relevance as a mere neocolonial one that originated from the rise of the US hegemony in the post WWII era. In this, postdevelopmentalists (Sachs, 1992; Escobar, 1992a, 1995, Esteva and Prakash, 1998) have given development the most recent birth date. According to its major representatives, development’s origin lies in early 20th century imperialist approaches to problems within the European powers’ colonies. But it was not until 1949 that development in its ultimate setting came about. This specific dating relates to Harry Truman who set a new course in the international combating of ‘underdevelopment’ in his Presidential inauguration speech. Truman made the American capitalist agenda the new universal approach that set the standards of development’s main goals globally. The American development predominantly focused on economic factors. According to postdevelopmentalists, development became an expression of controlling former colonies through a new set of policies in a decolonizing world. Development is thus imperialism in a new disguise. I will not deepen this excursion into postdevelopmentalism here further, as it will be the specific focus of the following chapter. What stands out from the postdevelopmentalist approach is the character of renewed imperialism that becomes insurmountably entangled with the idea of development.

2.2 Development as a pre-19th Century Conception

2.2.1 Looking at Development through Orientalism

Cowen and Shenton’s (1996) description of development, that starts as a positivist signification, becomes more entangled with colonialism as they move through the 19th century in their analysis. I have stated that they see Saint-Simonianism, in particular Auguste Comte, as the origin of developmental thought and policies. The contemporary understanding of development, however, also for Cowen and Shenton, originates from the conflation of development and colonialism.
Colonialism of the late 19th century became the ground in which development doctrines arose. Joseph Chamberlain, whom I mentioned above, was not the only one of his kind, but the most radical in the British Empire (Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Crosby, 2011).

Colonialism served as a justification for developmental policies. According to the prevailing understanding of the time, Western civilization had become the leading power in the world, reflecting the work and developments that the people living in the nations making up the West had achieved. All other people, according to this world view, had to come under colonial administration in order to be lifted from their inferiority; be lifted into history which could not be managed without outside guidance. According to the Earl of Cromer, the colonial administrator of Egypt between 1883 and 1907, Egyptians not only welcomed the colonization, but indeed demanded it as they saw how they could not govern themselves (Said, 1979). Their culture simply was not developed to the point of self-governance and Egyptian civilization depended on foreign occupation. Cromer, who prior to his post in Egypt served the British Crown in India, noted that “subject races don’t have it in them to know what is good for them” (Said, 1979, 37). Managing them, despite some small variations considered, was basically the same everywhere. The Orient as such in the mind of the administrations had to be contained in a geographical as well as culturally defined and confined frame that was set by Westerners. This typical racist foundation of colonialism, according to Said (1979), did not arise within the colonialist perspective, but signified a previously acquired knowledge base, the work of ‘Orientalists’. In the descriptions of Said (1979, 1993), humanism had come to serve as the backbone for expansion politics of the 19th century. Orientals, and generally non-Westerners, were regarded as inferior beings. Orientalism was a means of expressing the superiority beliefs of Westerners. The description of colonialism that Cowen and Shenton (1996) engage in also shows that there was a distinct belief in Western superiority. Colonies were dismal places that only could be improved through development. Crosby (2011) shows that it was the view of people like Chamberlain that comes close to the contemporary development cooperation. Chamberlain established a ground for developing colonies that was based on Western-led financial investments. Only through the foreign investments could underdeveloped places be lifted to the level of the Western metropolitan region.

Edward Said’s work on 19th century-led colonialism starts with the French expedition into Egypt in 1798. In this, Said’s approach differs little from Cowen and Shenton’s that see development emerge in the early 19th century. I argue that Said’s description of Orientalism, written in 1979, engages the same theoretical framework that is the foundation of Cowen and Shenton (1996), only from a different point of departure. While Said does not describe Orientalism with the word development, the similarities are striking. Both approaches formulate a Western thinking that justifies
interventionism in foreign regions. Both seek out a justification for this interventionism in Western superiority beliefs that are carried abroad. Escobar (1992a), a prominent postdevelopment author, also notes that Orientalism and development share some of the same structural features. Debal Deb (2009) also draws a connection between the two concepts. One may thus with caution approach Orientalism from a developmental perspective. In both Said’s (1979) and Cowen and Shenton’s (1996) descriptions, the issue, either of development or Orientalism, carries the notion of an enlightenment thinking that considers everything as having a determinable final state, social as well as natural. In relation to societies, this meant that all people had to become Western through the guidance, the development, of Western nations. Either case emerged from a period of reconstruction within Western societies. Both conceptions, development and Orientalism, are described as a philosophical engagement with the idea of improving society according to a plan that is in the hands of those who have the opportunity to direct society. Cowen and Shenton (1996) show that Comtean positivism for example specifically sought to utilize those who had the power to change the political and economic field of states. One focus was placed on bankers, who were to redirect financial investments into areas seen as positive for societal development. In Said’s (1979) analysis of Napoleon’s expedition into Egypt, trustees were people sought out in the Egyptian society. Local elites were needed as trustees in order to establish a local supporting and administrating class that would secure France’s position as colonial power. The French position was at stake as troops were not strong enough and numerically too few to repress the country effectively over longer periods.

Said (1979) stresses that Napoleon’s expedition was not the beginning of Orientalism, but a moment in history where the Western eyes were moved towards the Orient in a military fashion. Previously this had happened only in the colonial theatres of the Americas, Africa, and Asia, where a similar Western patronizing attitude had established itself over indigenous peoples. With Napoleon, the logic that had before only found direct application in the colonies was extended by military means to include the Orient. In Culture and Imperialism (1993), Said takes the argument from Orientalism and looks at the imperialistic culture of the USA, Great Britain, and France. His discussion shows that the superiority belief inherent in Orientalism is by no means limited to the Western relationship with its Muslim ‘other’. It also included applied to all other regions, colonial or not. In fact, Said argues that even non-Westerners created developmental notions. The Ottoman Empire for example produced just as well imperialistic approaches as Western powers did. This, however, is not the direct focus of his book and thus only briefly analyzed.

Orientalism of the 19th century thus shows an older beginning point of imperialist thinking according to Said than the practices of the French, the US-American and British. All of these started their cultural imperialism after the emergence of Orientalism. The Americans set out an imperialistic policy
in the 19th century, the British and French already in the 16th century (Said, 1993). The origins to Orientalism on the other hand, Said (1979) shows, can be traced to the Council of Vienne that met between 1311 and 1312. This ecumenical council of the Catholic Church, convened in the town of Vienne, supported studies into Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, and the Syriac alphabet at universities of Avignon, Paris, Oxford, Bologna, and Salamanca. The support was given with the belief of creating a knowledge base for the Orient, the religious and cultural other of the Occident and its Christian tradition. As universities were clerical institutions at the time, the council’s decision enabled the first scholar research into these languages at a university level in Europe. It not only reflected the drive for knowledge, but is an early representation of the connection between knowledge and power that Michel Foucault has made central to discourses in the second half of the 20th century. For Said (1979), Vienne stands as the defining moment of exporting Catholicism into what later would become colonial territories. For the first time, knowledge of languages was seen as a key to understanding, in other words controlling and annexing, heathen religions such as Islam or other religious beliefs encountered in territories that would become colonies. A cleric tradition in the matter of encountering foreign cultures remained the norm until the opening of the Institut d'Égypte in 1798. Napoleon decided to reserve a more enlightenment defined coinage of the institute by inviting not religious researchers but scientists from a more humanist side that would also influence Auguste Comte and sociology as a whole. This did, however, not change the patronizing character of the approach to the Orient, but carried the former religious determined Western superiority belief into the humanist tradition. The enlightenment had created new forms of expression that were not any longer reliant on the religious argumentation, but as Illich (1971a) argues, could not disconnect themselves fully from subjacent religious connotations.

With the dating of developmental thought to religious origins Said builds a bridge to a perspective on development that will be taken up in the next section.

2.2.2 Development as a Religious Signification

Mersland et al. (2013) argue that religion is only given a minor importance in the development debate despite its continuing impact in an increasingly secular development context. This fits into the

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1 The main reason for calling the council was the persecution of Templars in France by the French King, Philip IV, who heavily indebted thought out a way of preventing his financial ruin. The money was needed for his strive to continue fighting the English in the hundred years’ war (Said, 1979). The solution to his problem was the instigation of the Templars, seeking a reason to lay claim to their holding and wealth within the French Kingdom, removing first some of his credit from the then imprisoned creditors as well as using their wealth to pay off the other creditors lurking on the kings door step. The council of Vienne effectively withdrew papal support from the Templars, sealing their fate in France (Barber, 2006).
arguments of Ivan Illich, who sees the Catholic Church as a long standing agency of development. Illich’s view is apparent in many of his works (for example in Celebration of Awareness from 1971) but becomes clearest in the collection of essays and letters titled The Church, Change and Development from 1979. In this collection, the focus is put on a papal missionary decree to modernize, in a sense develop, the Latin American Catholic Church. This modernization was to be achieved through the help of a volunteer force made up of 10% of all Catholic Order’s members, a total of roughly 20,000 missionaries. In concrete, the mission was to “help modernize the Latin American Church along the lines of the North American model. The continent on which half of all Catholics live had to be saved from ‘Castro-Communism’” (Illich, 1979, 47). This papal agenda called the ‘Papal Volunteers in Latin America’, short PAVLA, was issued in 1960 by Pope John XIII. Illich argues that it essentially reflects the age old approach of the Church’s attempts to push internally and externally for a universal understanding of the gospel. The result of this edict, however, was an imposition of North American values on the Latin American Catholic communities in a useless, even harmful, way. More than the imposition of values on the local convents, the cultural influence translated directly into the local communities as religious institutions adapted to changing conditions in regard to upkeep costs and support from official sides. The overall result of the papal edict often was a cultural change in regard to the inside of the church in Latin America. Many convents and churches took on the characteristics of development projects in order to secure finances from government sources and donations.

All in all, Illich (1971a, 1979) describes the Catholic Church with almost two million employees as the biggest non-governmental organization involved in development. This fact may have changed due to the churches reduced focus on development, however the continuous debate on contraception can serve as reminder of the influence of the church on a variety of typical development issues such as health, population growth, equality, and so on (DeCosse, 2012).

Leonard Blussé’s (1995) approach to an origin of development leads him to conflate religion with the more commonly associated development notion that have been discussed in the first part of this chapter. These notions are firstly economic interests and second colonialism. Blussé argues that development approaches can already be found in the early colonialist endeavors of the Dutch Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), the Dutch East India Company, on Formosa. There, he argues, between 1627 and 1644 the formerly common approach of military domination was for the first time augmented with an approach of local development. This was achieved through the successful convergence of local and Dutch interests. This convergence was initiated by missionaries that first overcame the formerly more antagonistic life styles of the two cultures. Thus, in the end of the colonial setting, schools were erected and local tribes brought under control of the VOC. The VOC
in turn implanted a European market system into the local communities that aimed at increasing the trade with the Dutch. What made the case of Formosa special in comparison to other VOC trading forts around the globe was the fact that for the first time social change through development became a realized positive approach for colonial control. Formosa thus departed from the common dealing with natives by guns and threats. At first the VOC only controlled the immediate vicinity of their Fort Zeelandia close to a locally long-established village of native island inhabitant, the Sinkan. Before the example of Formosa, Dutch colonialists saw in locals mainly adversaries that were to be treated with the intention of subduing them to will of the VOC. Cooperation was only considered if the Dutch profited from the exchange, but even then mistrust was the foundation of all interactions. There was no one within the corporate detachments with the role of developer forging ties to local communities with the aim of turning them into VOC, Dutch, Christian or even simply allies. With the arrival of the missionary Georgius Candidus on Formosa in 1627, things changed however to the dislike of the traditional thinking VOC administration. Originally sent to Formosa to serve the colonist religious needs, Candidus settled in the nearby village as he disliked the Dutch administration and its distinct practices of domination. Accepted by the villagers on the ground that he would inhibit rather common sanctions and punitive enforcements from the VOC garrison, e.g. in form of confiscations, he managed to enter the native community and learn about their culture. He also quickly established himself within the hierarchies, managing to influence marginalized villagers with his religious belief. With his behavior and religious teachings, Candidus attracted the attention of the oppressed in Sinkan society. In 1629 a second missionary, Junius, arrived who Blussé (1995) describes as a modern missionary. Junius not only taught the gospel but thought of his duties in a wider range of practices, mainly bringing about social change. Together, Candidus and Junius extended their influence over the Sinkan, bringing the VOC administration to rethink its approach, now giving the missionaries official approval of their actions, seeing the positive effect that their living among locals had on the relationship between the two cultures. Over the course of some years, the interaction between the two missionaries and the Sinkan remodeled the entire Sinkan culture. Blussé notes that

The wide range of activities of the two clergymen and staff is singularly stunning. Apart from spreading the true gospel, they acted as agricultural developers, and tax officials (an initial tax on deerhunting was imposed by Candidus and Junius). They wrote ABC primers in the straya language, prepared expeditions with the aim of conquest, and thought out a formula for colonial administration (Blussé, 1995, 172).

In 1644, when Junius left Formosa, Candidus had already returned back to the Netherlands some time before, the Sinkan society had been influenced by Christianity, and large parts of the tribe converted to the Dutch Reformed Faith. Its independence had also been so much linked to colonial
Dutch rule that it in effect it had lost its sovereignty. VOC representatives now lived in the village and had a part in all social decisions. Much of this however, as already stated, did not only happen at the disadvantage of all Sinkan people. Restructured hierarchies allowed for different groups formerly marginalized to emerge from the shadow of Sinkan society. At the same time, the new religion brought about new significations; a new society had developed, with new negative and positive structures. The VOC however had ultimately gained control over large areas of southern Formosa with the help of native people, subduing communities which then traded to the VOC with local resources. Deer hides are an example but also other valuables that could be made to profits in Europe, China, or Japan. The VOC thus utilized local economic opportunities that added value to the colony which in the first place was established as a trade port and fort to access the Japanese and Chinese markets.\(^2\) (Blussé, 1995).

So, as the example of Formosa shows, a previous approach of forceful domination through the means of violence and threats was slowly replaced by an approach of local development practices. This saw the change of former adversaries into colonial subjects, a project that could only be started by the Dutch on Formosa as they were thrown off the island in 1662, 40 years after their arrival. The Dutch however successfully built up a colonial system that was to dominate the later colonial era of the 19th century. Formal state-lead colonialism with practices of development replaced the corporate aspirations that were formerly dominating the VOC activities. In many regards, it acted only on the interests of capital, expanding its territorial range only where it saw threats to its establishment, and profits in enforcing a monetary system that encouraged the trade of local resources that alone could not have been extracted. At the height of VOC control over large parts of the southern Formosan coastline and large strip adjacent in the hinterland, the idea emerged to establish the colonial outpost around the fortress of Zeelandia as a full-fledged Dutch colony. This perception throve on the basis of a successful conversion of the natives and development progresses that were largely initiated by the Jesuit Priests Candidus and Junius. From the practices of the two, an understanding that development could result in colonial control became obvious to the Dutch colonial administrations.

Blussé (1995) in many ways supports Weber’s (2003) position that saw capitalism emerge through Protestant, and particular through Calvinist, ethics. Since the strong connection that is drawn between economics and development, one can see how Blussé’s discussion feeds into the argumentation of those that see development as mainly economic. At the same time, Blussé

\(^2\) Similarly as the Dutch, the Spanish settled in the northern part of Formosa however were ejected by the Dutch with its local allies in 1642. In 1662 the Dutch themselves were ejected from Zeelandia by Koxinga, who retreated to Formosa from the mainland China as it was conquered by the Manchu. Koxinga himself died on Formosa later in 1662 (Blussé, 1995).
produces an important bridge to connect the two shores of religious and economic factors that are so separated in the greater development discourse. With my reading of Said (1979), the seemingly clear picture erected gets blurred. I have shown how Said sees Orientalism as a Catholic signification, one that emerged in the 14th century. Since I have molded Orientalism together with a notion of development and development, as Blussé does with capitalism, one can see how my arguments collide with the Weberian ones. But then this is one of the goals of this chapter; the questioning of the overall conception that development was invented at one time or another.

Let me return to the Sinkan society for a few more lines. The development and adaption of Sinkan society to the Dutch did not make them equal partners in Formosa. While many Sinkan were converted, they continued to be treated as inferiors. This did not change dramatically as the joined raids on other communities conflated the interests of the two parties, the Dutch and the Sinkan. All efforts to bring Sinkan and Dutch closer to each other still retained a condescending attitude of the colonists. This underlying component remained a constant throughout the VOC intermezzo on Formosa. It also remained a constant in later colonial approaches.

Formosa shows the example of a still religiously-dominated and signified approach of development. The cultural ‘other’, local natives could in their engagement with the Europeans only achieve a more equal position within the ambiguous relationship if they decided to convert to the Christian faith. Even if equality never was achieved, the embracement of the Western religion served as the ultimate development goal of Westerners that was to enlighten the savage natives in the early 17th century. Racism towards colonized people that Cooper (1997), and generally postdevelopmentalists such as Escobar describe for the period of late 19th and early 20th century, is thus not a religiously detached phenomenon. Cowen and Shenton (1996) also acknowledge religious connections to development conceptions. They state that theological ideas of development bear a striking resemblance to the path that this idea has followed in the realm of development studies. During the 1960s we find development becoming a ‘buzzword’ of theology and ‘widely seen as Newman’s gift’ to the Catholic Church, making Rome, as a result of the Vatican Council II in 1965, ‘accept the demands of historical development’ (Cowen and Shenton, 1996, 114).

The late 19th century figures of John Henry Newman and Neville Figgis stand out as religious advocates who attacked the growing secular description of development. In their view, the concept remained an individual experience, one that was not societal as formulated through the national
development agendas that aimed at manifesting central power to the state and its bureaucratic systemization. Figgis went as far as inferring that only if nation states renounced their sovereignty they could legitimately take the position as developers (Cowen and Shenton, 1996, 111). Important in Newman’s usage of the word development however lies not only in the attack on the state but on the Anglican religious tradition, which Newman sought out to weaken for a revival of the Catholic tradition in England. This revival, for Newman, would also place the Church back into the driver’s seat of the nation. With a retreating state, religious institutions would be able to step back into the prominent position as social developers. In the later part of the 19th century, Thomas Hill Green also attacked the macro-scale ideology of the emerging modern conception of development. In opposition to the religious critique, he argued that development couldn’t be understood as a societal experience, but as an individual one that should entail an increasing ability for consciousness. Consciousness, according to Green, implied mainly the “capacity of the subject for reason” (Cowen and Shenton, 1996, 263) and reflects the approach of a Hegelian thinking. Reason of course was related to the enlightenment ideals and subject to the scientific scrutiny of the time.

In the core of the approaches of Figgis, Newman, and Green are ideas such as equality, liberty, and freedom. All these ideas are also part of the general debate on development. Said (1979, 1993) shows that such ideas even were part of the justification for Western-led colonialism. According to the colonial justification, colonized societies could not be lifted into history without the occupation of their own culture, meaning that they had to be developed into a civilization from their barbaric state of being. Within the same framework of colonies, however, development also implied the build-up of local colonial infrastructures which were to enable colonists to exploit the natural resources of the territory. In this situation, contact between settlers and native locals remained usually limited to the necessary. Yet, Blussé’s (1995) description of Formosa shows that hybrids between central administrative and local settler approaches were also part of a colonialist repertoire. Still, even on Formosa, the role of the state as developer cannot be neglected as the Netherlands more and more looked at Formosa as a way of establishing a long-term colony rather than a trading fort. The state was the creator of the environment in which colonies, and the people living in them, could flourish. The state liberated and freed those who were developed from their uncivil state of being. The central role of the state also became part of the emerging socialist streams that followed the writings of Karl Marx. Marx also focused on the question of freedom which he derived largely from Hegel. Hegel, who can be read in the lines of Green’s definition of development, similarly argued that it was essentially a question of freedom and the individual development of the mind. Said (1979) argues that Marx served as an exception to the general relationship envisioned. Marx did not see colonial cultures, meaning the cultures of colonized peoples, as deprived through lack of development but as
a direct link of colonialist exploitation. This theory, in turn, resulted in the creation of the Fabian Society in late 19th century England, a political group that attacked and subverted the legitimization for British colonialism. They argued for a central state role in the dominating laissez-faire capitalism that, according to their agenda, was largely responsible for the miserable condition of the colonial territories.

Before I drift into a separate discussion, let me return to the question of religion, or faith. Stirrat (2008) looks at development actors, who he classifies into three main categories; the mercenary, missionary, and lastly the misfit. The focus in his text should be placed on the first two, as misfits are defined as those who go into the development industry running from their own background in the search of a line of flight. While mercenaries are considered professionals who mainly enter the scene for financial gains, missionaries carry a strong will to improve or help those they see in need of helping, the so-called developing or ‘underdeveloped’. This missionary will “take[s] on the status or the Creed of the Catholic Church or the Thirty Nine Articles in the Anglican Church” (Stirrat, 2008, 415). Taken into the secular realm, it is commonly expressed in the stereotypical thinking of how help should be supplied, namely through participatory, democratic, bottom-up approaches that consider social issues such as gender. Today’s missionaries, mainly workers of NGOs are, similarly as their missionary forefathers carrying the cross, very much aware of their actions and the influence on social relations they have. Further, at all times did missionaries carry the strong sense, or will, to do the right thing. Missionaries conceive of themselves as vanguards of either the right faith, or as today, the right way of life. A distinct visionary aspect is key to this sort of social intervention and change administered from an outsider to the locality.

Stirrat’s portrayal of missionary visions opens the door to an understanding of development that is not bound to a time but behavioral aspects. Change taught by people of a missionary type, as described by Stirrat, is not bound to any specific religious tradition or religion as a whole. Missionaries stand as enunciators of change that they carry with a strong will, actively converting their environment. This brings me to the last section of this chapter that focuses on an understanding of development that is not bound to any specific time but humanity as such.

### 2.3 Detaching Development from Particular Times

I have touched on the word ‘consciousness’ in relation to Thomas Green when analyzing the relationship of development and religion before. While a consciousness-related approach to developmental questions has largely vanished from the official ‘dev(elopment)-talk arena, in a
similar fashion as the religious one as Mersland et al. (2013) argue, it can still be traced down to some authors, including Allan Kaplan, who in his *Development Practitioner’s Handbook* (1996) refers to *development* in a distinctly different manner. For him practitioners should “facilitate development towards a more human purposeful and conscious future” (Kaplan, 1996; 85). Kaplan argues, as did Green, that it is impossible build up a system of social change on the premise of imposing a societal belief onto individual people. Such *development* will work on a condescending level and reflects a perversion of the real *development* mission. The real mission is to help people find, claim, and utilize their own capacities in dealing with the world. Kaplan’s definition does very much reflect the belief of many development practitioners. Mosse (2005) for example describes the conflicting interests of development agents and a project’s goal that often stands in contrast to individuals’ understandings of the word development. In contrast to the religious approach of Green, Kaplan attempts to see consciousness as an individually defined experience that is determined by the individual itself. The development practitioner’s job, according to Kaplan, is merely to help an individual to achieve a higher state of consciousness on the basis of its own premise. Kaplan thus places *development* into a thought of development (not in italics) where intervention occurs only where an individual wishes. An individual decides to become *developed*. The imposing character is thus mitigated. Kaplan (1996) as well as Green in Cowen and Shenton’s (1996) description, and also Mosse (2005), approach *development* from an more individual perspective than is common to development literature. They direct the attention from the societal to the individual, from the direct paternalistic understanding of a nation or empire dealing with economic and social developments, to a way of dealing with equals that enable individuals to find their own way. Adulthood, according to Kaplan (1996), is the engagement of independent humans with each other. Adulthood stands in opposition to the state of childhood and adolescence, where an individual slowly frees him/herself from the grip of their parents. Adulthood corresponds to the time period where one has developed a sense of individuality and only from this premise should and can *development* proceed. It requires the acceptance of an adult other that one engages as an equal. Only from that point on may someone try to facilitate the path of others that they themselves have chosen. Kaplan’s essential definition of *development* comes down to Glynn Robert’s argument that “development is the more equal distribution of power among people” (Kaplan, 1996: 52). Only with an equal distribution of power can people be in an equal relationship to each other. Only in such an environment is *development* on a societal level not occurring. *Development* is a sign of an unequal relationship, a relationship defined by powerful and powerless.

Here again Kaplan approaches Green’s denunciation systems that not only hinder but suppress the ability for people develop individually. Only a society in which each individual has right to economic
participation and independence, and the political obligation to participate in the life of the political community (Cowen and Shenton, 1996, 266), can allow for increasing development, or consciousness as Kaplan puts it. Kaplan’s text builds on a very different premise than literature that seeks to trace development historically in order to show where it came from, and what it is built on. Kaplan places not development but development in the center of his attention. In correspondence to that he does not portray a historic picture, but approaches human development as a constant that occurred at all times and places. The relationship in which Kaplan sees development and development opens a way to see development as a human constant, just as development. Where development is restricted due to powerful imposing on the powerless, a society built on development emerges. This is just as much true to the contemporary world as it ever was.

Gilbert Rist (1997) traces development furthest back. Unfortunately Rist’s approach remains a short excursion rather than a detailed analysis. For him, development acquired its meaning through the philosophical engagement of Aristotle with the phenomenon of change. Development in the modern sense did not exist as a word, Rist shows, but in Aristotle one can read a conception of development in the word Φύσις. Φύσις means nature. From Aristotle’s teleology development inherited the idea of a final state, a state that defines the maximal development, the maximal potential. “‘Nature’, to be sure assigns to each a ‘final state’, which corresponds to its perfect form” (Rist, 1997, 31). Final, in Aristotelian teleological sense, refers to an end state or that which is determined by the final cause. Only through this idealism associated with change did the will to change others to one’s desire get connected with the word development. Here, one can once again see the meaning’s connection to the writings of Comte who sought to create a final state for man through natural laws. Man’s principle and final state in Aristotle’s picture is society, development in accordance to the natural state of being in relation to other beings. More specifically the ‘state’ is seen as the final norm of humanity as it is the beginning, and will only be overcome in the end of history. In a nutshell, the Aristotelian understanding of development is from the perspective of Comte a naturalist concept. Development is an essence of being. This being can take the shape of anything, from the individual to the family to the state. Here development very much is in the sense of a development, as the polis, the ancient Greek equivalent of what today might be a state, is not only a political institution of societal scale, but also serves as the purpose-giving entity in the individual’s life. The individual stands as a means of the greater end, the survival of the polis and the Greek state of being. Or as it says in Aristotle’s first book of Politics: “He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god; he is no part of the State” (Aristotle, Politics, Book I, 2010, 98). This development is very much in the line of a development as an individual is imposed upon to be part of society. It unmasks a thinking that ultimately produces a
universalized ideology. Without adhering to the ideology one is not of this world, either a god or a beast.

2.4 Education as Development

Another important agent that bears close resemblance to development is the general idea of a school system, according to Illich (1971a, 1971b). Schools do not only serve as mechanisms for universalization of knowledge; they also produce a systematic acceptance to higher authorities that have been given the power to judge, grade, and decide what deserves to be known. In regard to the ‘third world’, a term that as ‘developing’ or ‘developed’ countries should be seen critically in regard to what it infers, Illich argues that a compulsory system comparable to the Western model has luckily not yet been achieved. The issue itself remains nonetheless one of the most consistently driven forward ‘problems’ associated with poverty. One sees an ever increasing tendency to universalize Western concepts of education, knowledge, and authority in so-called developing countries (Illich 1971a, 1971b, 1974). Illich’s critique on education comes close to the writings of Colin Ward. Ward (2008), who was a self-proclaimed anarchist, attacked education on similar grounds as Illich, however without making use of the same developmental notion that is inherently part of Illich’s arguments\(^3\). Ward focuses mainly on the education apparatuses in Great Britain and shows how it is mainly the state that sets regulations that develop British pupils. The difference between Illich and Ward is thus not the topic itself, nor the understanding of educational practices, but the context in which it stands. Ward only looks at the internal system that one country produces. Illich draws the connection to the typical associations of development between different countries. Illich sees Western countries developing children in ‘third world’ countries according to Western educational practices and ideals. Western developers do wish to improve the overall situation of education in these countries, but do not consider that education could, and should according to Illich, occur on the premise of what the third world countries themselves consider as important knowledge for children. Thus, education is part of the bigger developmental picture that defines the relation between the so-called developed and developing world.

The main reason why I place the discussion on education as a separate section, and not into the first that relates development to periods after the 19\(^\text{th}\) century, is the distinct character that Illich ascribes to education (1971b). For him, education is not structurally defined to time or place, but to a

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\(^3\) Ward was a British anarchist who died in 2010. Being one of the most prominent and influential anarchist authors of the 20th century, his texts focused largely on the conflation of direct action and anarchist philosophy. I will not refer to Ward in the next chapter, as I have not found his arguments against development as useful as Ivan Illich’s.
particular form of teaching. This is universalized education. Universal education attempts to develop a large group with a generalized vision of what is considered education. Education, however, does not have to be developmental. Education should be built on a foundation of individual creativity and needs. One keyword is conviviality (1973) which describes an individually creative approach to not only learning but working and thinking. Pupils should build frameworks in which they can learn, find their own teacher that fit their requirements and enable them to educate themselves according to the needs and wishes that they have. Illich sees education as something that enables people to access their talents and wishes instead of something that imposes a general knowledge for the masses. Education, for Illich, is thus something that has to happen self-consciously of one's own being. One needs to find out the wishes and needs that one has, so that one can require the education according to the findings. This applies to all forms of education, including primary school, universities, and schools that teach arts, and crafts.

2.5 Concluding the First Chapter

So then, what is development after all? Is there a tendency within its multiple significations and its relationship to specific times? I have shown different approaches to development, here I draw my conclusions.

Development according to all the different approaches that I have discussed reflects an imposition of some over others. For all, the concept implies a direction of those who develop to those developed. There is however a distinction between development and other forms of imposition. Cowen and Shenton (1996) show that there is a belief of improving, enhancing, and advancing others in the process of development them. Colonial administrators such as Joseph Chamberlain believed in improving colonies through doctrines of development. But also in Comte’s positivism could such an approach be found in relation not to oversea territories, but domestic France. Capitalist approaches (Larrain, 1989; Cooper, 1997) also draw on the importance of improving conditions either in colonies or the metropolitan domestic countries of colonial powers. A difference exists between the argument that states that capitalist development was an active will to improve (Larrain, 1989), or a decision that was forced onto colonial powers (Cooper, 1997). Postdevelopment theory (Sachs, 1992, Escobar, 1995; Esteva and Prakash, 1998) goes further and argues that development is not an expression of a will to improvement, but a form of imperialism that controls through developmental imposition. In such imperialism, development is a process that is consciously applied despite the knowledge of its negative effects on societies all over the world. There is thus no will to improvement.
Kaplan (1996) also shows a connection to improvement similar to Cowen and Shenton’s description of Comte when talking about development. For him, development is a practice that should not improve on the level of societies, as Comte attempted. Rather development should improve the lives of individuals by enabling them to increase their consciousness.

A possible religious connection of development that Cowen and Shenton (1996) trace to Thomas Hill Green also builds on the premise of individual development. For Illich (1971a, 1979), Catholicism of the 20th century presents a clear developmental picture. That, however, does not mean for him that previous centuries were free of such notions. Religion for Illich is an approach to social and individual questions that has historically been of a developmental kind. It does not have to be this way though, as religion has the potential to liberate, not restrict. Similar to Kaplan, Illich attempts to open a discussion of consciousness and individual freedom that for him can also be found in religious thought. Illich does also look at education as practice of development. Education becomes developmental once it aims at disenabling individual needs and wishes of those being taught. This is the practice of a universalized institutional education system that proclaims that all students have to learn the same things. Only in creativity and individuality, conviviality, lie non-developmental approaches.

Getting back to religion, Blussé (1995) draws a picture of religion that is inherently developmental. For Blussé there is nonetheless a less imposing connotation of development than for other authors. In Formosa, religion served as a means to undermine the imposing policies of the colonial administration. It was the religious attempt that realized a different approach to the traditional one that was far more brutal and imposing. Still, development once again was conceived as an overall improving of the Sinkan society and occurred on a patronizing foundation.

All in all, one can see that there is no consensus among proponents of different approaches to development. For some it is supposed to be a religious and spiritual idea (Illich, Blussé, Said, Mersland et al.), for others an economic process (Cooper, Larrain). Some see it as a question pertaining to individuals (Kaplan), others as a national or international question (Cowen and Shenton, Escobar). There are also different views in regard to the patronizing aspect of development. All authors see development in its core as paternalistic, or at least part of superiority thinking but the degree of this expression varies between authors. For postdevelopmentalists such as Sachs, Escobar, and Esteva, development is pure paternalism, even imperialism. For Larrain, development simply shows a belief of improvement that has transformed into a form of paternalism on the way.

I have drawn on Edward Said (1979, 1993) to show that development can also be approached from a different perspective. Said does not specifically talk about development but nonetheless comes
remarkably close to the notion of development in his analysis of Orientalism. Said not only talks about similar approaches of colonial administrative agents and agencies, but draws on John Henry Newman and Auguste Comte in the same fashion as Cowen and Shenton do in their historical analysis on the beginnings of development. In both cases, development and Orientalism, influence and control directed from the West to the rest of the world is at the heart of the analysis. Further, the justification of this taking influence and control originates from the same foundational premise. Orientalism as development has served as justification for interventionism and paternalism all over the world.

In regard to the opening questions of this conclusion, I argue that development can be seen as a process that is not confined to either a particular place, or a specific time. Already within literature that looks at development one can find multiple approaches that open space to apply the concept to various times, places, and encounters. If one widens the discussion, one can even see how different approaches to the problematic relationship of those who control and those who are controlled, are possible. I have discussed Edward Said, but certainly there are also other approaches that can be utilized for this. Said’s analysis of the Western relationship to the Orient shows that one can trace development to the late middle ages.

I will return to the argument of delinking development from the preconceptions that the authors discussed here have given it, in the chapter that discusses anarchism. Before getting to that point, I will focus on the latest major critique on development that I have also mentioned in this chapter: Postdevelopment theory.
Chapter Three

Development as Imperialism – The Postdevelopment Position

3.1 Introducing Postdevelopment Theory

Postdevelopment theorists, including James Ferguson, Arturo Escobar, and Gustavo Esteva, look at development in a rather narrow perspective. For postdevelopmentalists, development is first and foremost the manifestations of a global system of capture that seeks to establish a universalized development agenda. This agenda is established by the USA and reinforced by the means of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), mainly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. Postdevelopment theory establishes a frame in which development emerges only after the end of WWII. Earlier approaches to development that have been discussed in Chapter Two are considered to be the introduction, the run-up to development (Escobar, 1992a, 1995; Esteva and Prakash, 1998). Development is a mechanism that is deployed by those in power. There is clearly a pyramid scheme at work according to postdevelopmentalists, who consider third-world-country agents only the middleman between the Western superstructure and the exploited in the third world. Developing countries are linked to the hegemonic West in such a way that development decisions happen only in accordance, or as a direct consequence of Western exercising of influence.

I have argued that developmental practices are not new and occur at all levels between political, economic, and social bodies. Postdevelopment theory in opposition stresses the specific moment that saw development spring onto the global scale. This moment has been pinpointed to the inauguration speech of Harry Truman in 1949, where he highlighted the importance of ‘developing’ the ‘underdeveloped’, the incapable ones, who cannot help themselves but are reliant on the industrial countries to come and help them⁴. Let me cite a few lines of the speech that carry this message.

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. [...] For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of

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⁴ One can see a correlation of the overall rhetoric at the core of development approaches in Truman and for example the Earl of Cromer, whom I mentioned in the second chapter. Both applaud Western abilities to bring about positive changes to other parts of the world. Both also argue that there is a particular duty to do so. The difference in the matter, I would argue, lies in the fact that one set of ideas – Cromer’s – is not accepted any longer today, while the American is still only regarded critically by some in some specific regards.
these people. [...] we should foster capital investment in areas needing development. Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens (Truman, 1949).

It is this rhetoric that in the eyes of postdevelopmentalists created 'underdevelopment': the statistical comparison of the poor with the rich, the ‘developing’ with the ‘developed’. From this point, foreign politics would often be written in the spirit of development approaches. This had the aim of developing those under its grip according to the needs and wishes of the developers, the Western countries. Thus, development always has been synonymous with development, according to postdevelopmentalists.

Postdevelopmental ideas were largely articulated in the 1990s after development policies had recently wreaked havoc in many countries with its neoliberal agenda. The neoliberal agenda stressed the so-called structural adjustment policies that the international financial institutions and donor countries pushed for globally. Structural adjustment was a set of policies that became standard procedure for the development organizations. The agreement of the three major institutions involved, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the US Treasury Department, has been coined the Washington Consensus. The power of these three actors ensured that structural adjustment became the norm of development approaches throughout the 1980s. Structural adjustment policies involved the direct linking of development funds to legislative changes in the target country. These changes were centered on the overall reduction of state control and taxation over domestic markets.

Postdevelopmentalists position themselves not only critical to the practices of structural adjustment and development altogether, but argue for the total annihilation of the concept of development. Postdevelopmentalists’ arguments are posed from the stance of a grassroots approach that according to authors (Escobar and Esteva are the major proponents of this approach in my thesis) would eradicate Western imperialism. My critique on the postdevelopment position states that the new environment anticipated, freed of Western direct influences, would by no means be anti-development. Postdevelopmentalists see a dualistic geography of spaces. One place, grassroots resistance is idealized, while the other space, the hegemonic elite, is seen one-sidedly evil. Removing outside forces does not eradicate internal processes to societies that are also developmental. That is not to say that society is an agent of development similarly to the IFIs. What I argue is that there are processes in every society that develop society from the inside. Grassroots movements are potentially also one way of signifying such a process. Thus, a society disconnected
from the international level of development would in its own way continue to develop. In fact it already does. Development simply occurs at multiple levels and spaces. There is no pure space without development.

In order to clarify my argument I will structure the following part of this chapter into two main parts. The first will consist of an analysis of the postdevelopment critique of the imperialist institutions that run the ‘development cooperation’. The second part will then look at the alternatives that postdevelopmentalists present, the multitude of grassroots social movements.

3.2 The Postdevelopment View of a Renewed Imperialism

3.2.1 Postdevelopmental Notions of Westernism

Escobar (1995) describes the period of Imperialism, namely the time before WWII, as a setting where brutal, harsh, and enforced development was perceived as a necessity in dealing with the ‘primitives’, the colonial subjects, that were helpless and unable to change, develop, out of their cultural and racial inabilities. Only through the deployment of foreign introduced knowledge and social change could the primitive, barbarian, or whatever else colonized cultures were called, enlighten themselves and step into history where a civilized life awaited them. I have also drawn on Cowen and Shenton (1996) and Said (1979) in Chapter Two to describe these processes. The perception of Western superiority manifested itself in and through the production of knowledge about colonies. Prior to the end of the Imperialist reign of Western countries over colonial territory, each colonial power would create its specific set of information networks that fed into a more or less centralized colonial institution. Each colonial power cultivated a typically Imperialist bureaucratic structure that processed information into policy approaches (Cooper, 1997). The collection of knowledge about lands and cultures was a very important part of colonial administration and considered essential in keeping order in the colonies. The major idea behind the information usually was not of a developmental kind, but reflected the importance of control and power over the local populations. Gaining knowledge over cultural practices, different ethnic populations, land, water, climate, etc. enabled the colonial administration to play its cards according to how it profited best (Said, 1979). Collection of data and information however also went into the absurd, fostered by the racist attitudes that dominated all cultural encounters. As Said (1993) shows, not all information went into the strategic policy approaches of colonial administrations, much was simply collected for scientific interest or the desire to know about exotic places, for example with the intention to write stories.
Escobar (1992a, 1995), and Esteva and Prakash (1998) argue that information as the tool for control was and still is part of the global agenda to universalize the entire globe into one Western entity. Information is not only considered essential in respect to colonies, or in the ongoing framework of so-called developing countries, but reflects the overall agenda of nation states, I argue. Even before the development of the modern nation state in Weberian sense, Kingdoms and other forms of social organization all included information in one form or another as a tool for social control and development. In his work, Discipline and Punish – The Birth of the Prison, Foucault (1991) for example gives a detailed description not only of how punishment was perceived and understood in the feudal system of medieval times, but in the same lines shows how punishment, torture, and discipline were inscriptions of information onto the body for all others to see. In a period where literacy was not very widespread, the visible aspect of the punitive system thus was far more than an individual punishment on the body, especially if conducted in public on the local square or somewhere else where a crowd could follow. So, in simplified terms, one can argue that while in feudal times, direct punitive measures ensured social obedience and ‘docility’ as Foucault describes it, postdevelopmentalists argue that a system of professionalized and institutionalized organizations today ensures that neo-colonial bodies remain docile and adapt to the Western model (Sachs, 1992; Escobar, 1995; Esteva and Prakash, 1998). With the statement that development is a modern phenomenon emerging only after WWII, a possibility to trace down a connection between medieval conceptions of docility and large scale social control and modern conceptions of the same becomes impossible for postdevelopmentalists – irrelevant even, one might argue. This also applies to all the approaches to development that have been discussed in the previous chapter.

While imperialist colonialism laid the foundations for development according to postdevelopmentalists, the US hegemony arising after WWII produced a new strategy of development. Former approaches of exploitation and control that had become criticized for harsh side effects became remodeled into new policies. The overall goal, however, never changed. In this new system, information remained a factor as important as before and became the cornerstone of a new professionalized analytical approach to development. This approach was conducted in the newly founded ‘Bretton Woods’ institutions, the World Bank and IMF. The overall strongest and most important form of information collection that made its way through these institutions into the modern day development regime, according to postdevelopmentalists, was determined by political and economic factors. Thus, when new institutions were formed after WWII with the specific task to foster development, they largely focused on the liberal economic agenda proclaimed by the leading partner in the cooperation, the United States. Richard Peet calls the IMF, World Bank, and the WTO the ‘unholy trinity’ of development (Peet, 2003). It is in these institutions that postdevelopmentalists
see the imperialist agenda of Western countries channeled into the policies that predominantly arrange the developing countries to the liking and profit of the Western world. Development has thus to be understood in the terms and emergence of globalization that maximized the potential and scope of development proposals to the global level. Even those who try to resist, often times forcefully, have become so entangled with the concept of development that they tend to submit to some idea of development from the outside. China could arguably be seen as one player that has gone through stages of refusal and antagonism, then opening, and today acceptance of the development idea as its recent engagement in the global development field shows (Cheng and Shi, 2009; Jiang, 2009). China can at the same time also be seen as a new and powerful introduction into the development arena with the potential to bring about some changes to the current universal trajectory that development follows (Gillian Hart, 2009a, 2009b). I will however not talk about China in more detail in this thesis as postdevelopmentalism was largely phrased before China emerged as global actor in the development field. One could make the argument though that postdevelopmentalists would see China similarly as an imperialistic developer that simply chooses a slightly different approach than its Western counterpart. But, to prove this hypothesis, one would have to research it separately.

For Esteva and Prakash (1998) for example, the globalized development agenda is nothing but a renewed faith; a monotheistic secular faith that has put God out of the picture and replaced it with a set of development goals that shape the contemporary organization of entire societies. Esteva and Prakash make the case that development influences all societies, as it is a global agenda. This ‘Western project’, as they call it, thus has manifested itself, and continues to do so, in a constant reproductive manner in the underlying structures that hold the strings of the entire modern nation state system, as well as the superstructure organizations, be they part of the United Nations, the European Union or other similar regional political and/or economic unions, or even military pacts such as NATO. I hope to be excused of my Eurocentric exemplifying here. Of course I could have named comparable formations from other regions, for example from so-called developing regions, such as Africa. Especially since the end of the cold war, development through the means of the ‘Western project’, has become the sole leading agenda, since the Soviet model was ‘beaten’ by the Western supremacy. It is this image that further strengthens the Western capitalist-democratic model that continues to see itself at times in opposition to a more socialist view. However, even in times of the cold war struggle over who got to dominate the global political and economic sphere, one could argue that there was not pluralism as Esteva and Prakash (1998) describe it, but rather a dualism of two universal ideas, that one might also call development ideals. But even this argument once again tries to frame the world into a Western perspective, arguing for an “either/or” instead of
a “neither/nor” (Purcell, 2012). Purcell argues that political writings often are defined by a simple approach that relates everything into dualistic relationships. For him, however, there is not only a duality, or a simple relationship of some against some others, that defines the world. There have historically always existed alternatives to the big power blocks shaping the global politics. This is also my argument. Instead of seeing everyone inevitably under direct control or influence of the developmental pawns of a larger powers, one can also see enclaves, even open spaces that remain somehow little affected, or possibly even entirely unaffected, by the institutional superstructures that seemingly control every individual within their theoretical scope. Such scopes often are nothing but a spatial frame, for example a colony, a country, a municipality, a city. For example, while colonial powers took control over large strips of lands for their king and fatherland, or themselves, actual power they exercised was often very limited to a small area of that land. What this means is that there are structural differences between the time of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism is seen as the period following decolonization in Africa. Postdevelopmentalists, however, generally do not make a distinction between colonialism and neo-colonialism; or in other words, between colonialism and development. Both forms are seen as direct Western control over land and people. Ray Kiely (1999) shows this by arguing that postdevelopmentalists imply a direct correlation between imperialism of the 19th and earlier 20th century and development. Uma Kothari takes it even further and bluntly states that when colonialism (or imperialism) left, development took over.

The description of development as a universalizing Western-dominated agenda that seeks to control the world in many ways resembles what Horkheimer and Adorno (1969) call Kulturindustrie. Kultur, German for culture, has in their eyes become a commodity that is centrally defined within a small business-oriented community of elites that profit from it. Similarly, an Entwicklungsindustrie (a development industry) has become organized within a limited number of institutions that represent commercial interests. This is the argument that postdevelopmentalists such as Escobar (1992b, 1995) and Esteva and Prakash (1998) make without reference to Horkheimer and Adorno. In the case of Kulturindustrie as well as the Entwicklungsindustrie, one sees capitalism as the root of all evil. While such a critique does tackle an important issue of the modern development machine, it is solely based on the assumptions of a capitalist framework and as such cannot ever achieve its goal to encompass a broader perspective on the development dilemma. The strength that it derives from an anti-capitalist view at the same time limits itself to the frame that has been placed around the concept. This is the fact that capitalism emerged sometime in the 18th century. Limiting itself to such an approach nevertheless keeps the postdevelopment critique within a structural context, the same that on other levels it tries to evade.
3.2.2 The Postdevelopment Position of Ferguson

The way that postdevelopmentalists have situated development in many ways resembles an antagonism. While the development institutions, along with the national governments of the Western countries that predominantly exercise influence within these, are one side of the dualism, social movements represent the other side of the coin: the commoners, the people, the marginalized, the exploited ones of the same system. Breaking loose from within the system can only be achieved fully by overturning or overthrowing the system. Including all postdevelopment writings into such a categorical dualist frame however would be wrong. One of the earliest postdevelopmentalists, James Ferguson, for example engages development as critically as Escobar or Esteva, but does not try to postulate an alternative, a possible exit from the Imperialist structure. Already in the preface to his major work on development, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Ferguson (1990) notes that the text is not to be considered as a general study of the falseness of development. It is a study that shows the fact that this system has important effects, and that such ideas play a major role in structural change. It follows that, according to Ferguson, whether development is wrong is not the question that the book tries to answer. While Ferguson’s critique aligns with the typical postdevelopment statements, he does not simply envision a post-development era as Sachs (1992), Escobar (1995), or Esteva and Prakash (1998).

There is also a fundamental difference between Ferguson and most other postdevelopmentalists in the way that they continue from the critique that they present. As mentioned before, Sachs (1992), Escobar (1992a, 1995), Esteva and Prakash (1998), and others, see a general intention in development practices that aims at subjugating, controlling, and continuously exploiting ‘third world’ countries. Their image of development institutions is thus a clear imperialist one that employs premeditated practices and policies along with the knowledge of the sometimes devastating effects that these can have on the local spaces where they are deployed. The most commonly used example for these approaches are the structural adjustment policies (SAP) of the 1980s. For Ferguson however, the consequence of the critique on development approaches looks slightly different. He argues that the ‘development machine’, as he calls it, is not only related to the institutions that make up the openly visible part of development. Important to the machine are also various other social agencies, practices, traditions – overall, “a great mix of things” (Ferguson, 1990, 276). The problem of development is thus not manifested alone in the body of a limited field. It has to be analyzed and considered from a much larger angle than merely the big political drivers that are embedded in the few development institutions. The development institutions, similarly as states, have to be considered not as the creators or the motors of change, but more like relays, or points of
coordination a multiplication, where power relations come together, merge and exit once again⁵. The development institutions along with the Western nation states thus are not the sole instigators in the development scheme. There are numerous other social bodies, entire fields that contribute to the reproduction of development ideals. Development is also not a process that works according to the wishes and goals that developers have in mind. When writing about SAPs, Escobar (1995) argues that the initiators were mostly aware of the exact consequences for the countries that the policies were forced upon. For Escobar (1995), creating a developed country was and is not actually part of the development agenda. In reality, development is all about power, especially about economic power over other countries’ resources and markets that are desperately needed to fuel the capitalist expansion of Western corporations. The final consequence thus is that development serves as a political excuse for an imperialist agenda in an apparently international community of equal nation states. One might argue, with one’s conspiracy goggles strapped on, that development is the perfect crime, where everyone not initiated is convincingly fooled. Thus, development can continue almost unchallenged.

For Ferguson, the main objective of development lies in the intensification of state control. Here development is "a machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power, which incidentally takes “poverty” as its entry point” (Ferguson, 1990, 255). Similarly as the US hegemony created underdevelopment, or poverty in essence, for the purpose of interference in foreign sovereign countries, governments of these developing countries have utilized the poverty agenda for interfering in the regions that had formerly been disconnected, or at least marginally located, in regard to geographical access and control by the central government and state apparatus. Ferguson thus enlarges the scope of development in comparison to Escobar and others, who mainly see the international institutions as an obstacle in overcoming the development agenda. Ferguson takes the international critique of an Imperialist system controlling individual states to the national level, where a bureaucratic system is controlling individual cultures, or groups.

I just mentioned how Escobar (1995), and Esteva and Prakash (1998) argue that the disruptive, sometimes even destructive practices of development are planned into the approaches. For them, negative effects are thus taken for granted in the overall plan. Ferguson, however, sees these outcomes more as ‘side-effects’. Not anticipated, side-effects are nonetheless considered as useful for the purpose of the greater goal, the increase of state control, and thus are often times welcomed. Often, they are even further strengthened after initial recognition. The main failures of development, 

⁵ Here, Ferguson is engaged with the concept of power as developed by Foucault. While he generally agrees with Foucault’s interpretations on biopower, Ferguson argues that state policies usually do not attain their anticipated effect but only succeed in creating a diversified version of the same. This version is defined by side-effects.
that postdevelopmentalists generally focus on are thus not always in the eyes of all postdevelopment writers part of the agenda. The end results nonetheless are still based on the same assumptions of an Imperialist system running the show from a hierarchized, centralized, elitist Western capitalist agenda that, whether premeditated or not, considers negative effects as acceptable in the path that it takes.

What I want to take from Ferguson in particular is the argument that development occurs at different levels, not necessarily only related directly to the international development agenda. Development in the eyes of most postdevelopmentalists is very closely linked to the direct involvement of development partners, the financial donor parties, and/or international organizations that are in charge of the projects on the ground. Outside this institutional framework however, development occurs in various other institutional settings, outside the direct influence of outsiders such as Western states and their big lobbies, for example the previously mentioned IFIs, or even the UN. I do not want to suggest entirely disconnecting this specific form of lobby from the development discussion, as I agree with postdevelopmentalists that the lobby plays a major role in the contribution to a prevailing Westernization of the so-called developing countries. However, I think of governments and non-governmental bodies in the ‘third world’ not as a solely receiving agent in the creation of developmental reforms, but also as active creators. Escobar (1995) in particular sees development only as directed from the Western hemisphere to the so-called developing world.

3.2.3 Anchors of Development

Ferguson (1990), in comparison to Escobar (1992a, 1995) and Esteva and Prakash (1998), shows that there is a different level of development to be seen as equally important as the international. Below the official levels of organization, from the top downwards, development always needs an anchor; a hook that reaches out to a target group. Without such a minor group within a community, the overall agenda would often come to a standstill before even been deployed. David Mosse (2005) supports this, noting that no development project can be successful without a local partner that utilizes the project for the local integration. For Mosse, it is this support network alongside and around the official framework of a policy oriented project that becomes the most dominating factor driving on success in the project. It is important to see that the small group which is approached, be it businesses or local elites, usually share a certain amount of power within the community. This power is commonly a non-institutional power that is then utilized by development agents as an entry point. From this entry, projects usually manage to widen their scope within the local entity. Ferguson’s (1990) example from the late 1980s still remains legitimate as I will now show.
In the case of the Thaba-Tseka project, a massive agricultural development project from the late 1980s in Lesotho, the organization only managed to gain access to local communities after consulting, speaking to, flattering, and bribing the local chiefs. What followed from this was that the entire project served the creation of a national increasingly export-oriented market system, just as the international donors of the project wanted, on the basis of a smaller local elite that profited personally from the emerging new business opportunities. Chiefs for example secured the monopoly on selling the new seeds that were to change the husbandry-oriented farming system into a crop-dominated agriculture. Similar developments occurred in all other new emerging businesses, for example shops for farming tools. It also applied to a service industry that supplied needs for the project itself, such as car services, food services, housing, or direct employment in the project offices all around the district. The overall picture that emerges from this is not a dualistic system of developers and developed but a more stratified system of multiple layers. For sake of simplification, one might argue that the following levels can be identified: first the international development agenda, then the national level of the developing country, then the first non-institutionalized layer of local elites, and further down the lines there are again different strata that are more or less influenced by the overall development goal. Beginning from the top of this development hierarchy, each agent directs its own anticipations downwards on the next one, which then works with the given frame before handing it down to the next level. Mosse (2005) supports this with his description of multiple development projects all over Africa. Theoretically, I believe, that there is no final layer where development ends, thus it is not a pyramid with a closed bottom. Development works in endless layers that may or may not be institutionalized, but are always hierarchized. Only through some form of hierarchy can one agent take the position of a physical or psychological superiority that then directs its development ideals downwards to its inferiors.

In regard to the ‘development machine’, this means that not only do institutions look at a given frame, often a country, a region, a specific economic activity, political decisions, policies, ideals such as democracy or capitalism, with a narrowed and judgmental vision. Social groups, or even different classes – to speak in Marxist terms – do the same and by this create development ideals that are to be expanded. Ferguson (1990) shows that chiefs’ personal gains from the development project in Lesotho did not necessarily align with the needs and wishes of the entire community. In fact, development served the chiefs’ own economic position as well as their power within the community. Thus an older existing social frame was changed into a newer one where those who were powerful before remained so in the new setting. The distinct alterations are thus not represented in the eradication of an unjust system, but the creation of an equally, sometimes even more, exploitative system. Sometimes such a new system can bring change in regard to who gains access to the tools of
power, but the overall structure remains. One group, defined through either its economic, social, political, cultural or any other sort of power, be it by gender, age, property, education, etc., remains in control.

3.3 Shortcomings of a Philosophy of Eradication

Considering now a possible eradication of development in the postdevelopmental sense, one would be confronted with a pluralist system of movements, or groups, that have to come to agreements over how to deal with emerging issues. With the eradication of development, however, one would not change the approaches of how these issues are engaged. Changing the social mode of organization from an institutional machine to a localized grassroots machine does not automatically come along with a change in the way that people conceive of a problem, and ultimately its solution. Here postdevelopmentalists follow similar misconceptions as classical anarchists who have antagonized the state, Newman (2001a) argues. Looking at the state and the main development institutions as the main antagonists, postdevelopmentalism has created a concept of a devilish opponent that has to be abandoned and overcome, rather than resolved in a dialectic tradition. This antagonistic conception, however, would create a vacuum once the very specific goal is achieved. Since all effort has been directed solely at the antagonistic relationship, there is a lack of the internal understanding of how in the anarchist example ‘power’, and in the postdevelopment sense ‘development’, really works. Anthony Bebbington (2000) argues that Escobar, and along with him most other postdevelopmentalists, draw on a similarly basic conception of resistance as the one that I described for classical anarchism. For Bebbington, postdevelopmentalism thus deploys an essentialist notion of resistance that derives its strength from an understanding of a pre-development society. Just as classical anarchist writers envisioned a post-power society without realizing that oppressive power was not only bound in the state apparatus, postdevelopmentalists proclaim the eradication of the development apparatus without the necessary understanding of where, how, and in what ways development exists. Bebbington continues to argue that the original motive for resistance to development can especially be traced to Escobar. Escobar derives his energy from the conception of peasant resistance, as described in detail in Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (1985) by James Scott. What it comes down to, according to Bebbington (2000), is a vision of a pre-development society that Escobar wants to rebuild, free from the

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6 Newman argues that antagonisms can only be removed by a revolutionary condition. This, however, replaces the old system with a new one, one that has not overcome and resolved the issues of the older one by pushing it aside. Thus, old problems remain part of the new social condition, simply reshaped, emerging as a ‘spook’ in a new disguise in a Stirner-ish sense.
imperialist domination of Western countries. This however is very problematic. Whatever Escobar considered as a pre-development condition in fact is just a previous from of developed society. South America for example has been under foreign influence since the 16th century. The motives that have thus been placed in the center of postdevelopment writings are based on a flawed point of departure, just as Newman (2001a) argues that classical anarchists thought to establish a stateless society that they saw having existed in the past. While I agree with Bebbington and Newman in their critique that both writings discussed are based on a flawed understanding of the past, I would go further and fundamentally argue against the notion that any such time ever existed. Even if one could tap back into the times of pre-Western influence in South America, or any 'third world country', or a pre-centrally organized society in Europe as classical anarchists tried, the problematic of a having a very limited and flawed understanding of the given time would remain at any point. Even within South America some did influence others. Some dominated others in oppressive ways as Europeans did when they arrived. While on a more local scale, some cultures did create frameworks for those that became part of their reach, forcefully or not. The Azteks, Incas, or Mayas were not culturally homogenous groups, but developing Empires with all that goes along with it. What emerges from references to the past is that one replaces one cultural domination over a preceding one.

3.4 Postdevelopmentalists’ Alternatives to an Imperialist World

3.4.1 On Social Movements

Social movements, according to major postdevelopment writings, are a locally occurring, anti-essentialist, anti-imperialist form of social resistance to the international development agenda. While each author brings along some detailed analysis of particular movements, one can generally summarize their commonalities in the following way: Social movements resist to higher authorities that decide over the heads, demeaning them to subjects of a greater system. Such a greater system utilizes developmental approaches for its end. The resistance to this should be aimed at the international development institutions, as well as nation states that are usually included somewhere along the line of postdevelopmental argumentation. All in all, there is a countless number of movements struggling for more autonomy and authority over certain issues concerning their lives and environments. All social movements should on some level cooperate so that the global development cooperation can be eradicated by popular demand.
The question that I am raise in the discussion about social movements as forms of contestation is whether these movements themselves are not deploying forms of development that would continue to work after, in the words of Ferguson (1990), the ‘development-machine’ was destroyed. Wolfgang Sachs also shows a harsh view of development that resembles Ferguson’s. Sachs writes: “The last 40 years can be called the age of development. This epoch is coming to an end. The time is ripe to write its obituary” (Sachs, 1992, 1). Escobar argues that the development institutions are the biggest obstacle to the coming of a postdevelopment era (Escobar, 1995). There is thus an important relation to be considered in regard to states and local social actors, despite the strong focus on the IFIs as primary target.

Drawing on Ferguson (1990), one can see how social movements in themselves are driven by interests that usually do not include all those that the movement stands for. Ferguson describes how local cattle owners in Lesotho deliberately use their livestock to trample down erected fences that were set up in an attempt to protect grasslands that had come under severe grazing pressure. The outrage of the farmers was in that case aimed at the development bureau that had decided to fence off some traditional pastures without the general consent of the cattle owners. It is arguable whether this specific case can be used as a legitimate case for activities of social movements. Ferguson himself does not make any note of it, but it could be noted that the book was written before the term ‘social movement’ became a buzzword in the 90s. The example nonetheless makes a good case, since it shows the typical motivation for social resistance in a local entity that develops to some sort of organized shape. The analysis of Ferguson is overall similar to Esteva’s (2010) analysis of Oaxaca, Mexico, where in 2006 the entire city was governed by a variety of social actors until the central and thrown-out city government decided to take control over the situation and break it down by force. Oaxaca stands as a typical social movement activity in the postdevelopmental sense. People involved, Esteva argues, made references to the Paris Commune of 1871 that similarly took control over large parts of Paris for a few months, before being brutally crushed by the national authorities. For Esteva, this sort of social movement activity has become the central cornerstone in what he calls ‘grassroots post-development’. It indicates that social organization occurs through various social movements that come together to formulate a general perspective, goals, regulations, even laws for the whole of the community. All in all, the cluster of different social actors, Esteva calls it the ‘movement’, which emerges as the local agent resembles some form of authority. It is a movement made up of a large variety of social actors. The result thus is a movement of movements.

While I have stated that from this central organ, the ‘movement’, goals and regulations emerged, Esteva stresses that
there is no proposition or goal that defines APPO; it encompasses a diversity of intentions and trajectories. There is growing convergence around certain agendas—like producing a new Constitution or resisting capitalism—but even on these points there is no agreement on what they mean (Esteva, 2010, 981).

APPO was the central organization that stood for the struggle of Oaxaca. The convergence of agendas that Esteva mentions does, however, in no way include all individuals that lived or were in some other way involved in the region. Rather, it represented the actors that had taken it upon themselves to organize the community. This fact shows that any form of consensus, if it were ever achieved, did not represent all, even in an indirect manner, as there was no concrete direct democracy at work. It follows that when decisions on issues were made in Oaxaca, even if beneficial for everyone, they merely reflected the voices of some in a very large community. This is what I refer to as a developmental framework.

3.4.2 Idealizing Social Movements

I argue that Oaxaca is perceived as legitimate forms of struggle against an oppressor, while in reality there is only a vaguely understood democratic process at work that is shown to represent a better way of social organization. This should not imply that I see such forms of resistance only negatively. In fact, I see them as enabling and disenabling at the same time. Esteva himself shows that there was only a vague understanding of the structures that that made up the organization of Oaxaca. He notes that the “APPO remains a mystery, even for those who are part of it” (Esteva, 2010, 980). It is made up of the numerous social actors who struggled against the regional government, and included state representatives, unions, social movements, organizations and cooperatives, as well as non-affiliate individuals.

Through the structure that made up the organization of Oaxaca, Esteva (2010) shows that there was no direct vision that drove the whole process, except the core agenda that different actors had come around to organize. According to Esteva, visionless organization generally helps keeping movements anti-essentialist in theory, as no concrete vision is used as vanguard for social change. While I agree with this position in general, the core problematic is not removed from the equation in regard to Oaxaca. An inability to define clear goals is an advantage in a situation where each individual has the full representation of his/herself. In Oaxaca, however, social change became organized in a core group that projected clear visions. Thus, while the outside saw the movement visionless, the central apparatus that emerged as driving agent of change continued to follow a developmental vision that
simply excluded those not part of the decision making process. The result was that not everyone retained their representation. The entire social process was essentially defined through some who took the lead on the issues, partially for personal gains, I argue. Esteva’s description supports my argument:

Both insiders and outsiders still view APPO as a political organization. They assume that, like almost all of them, it is focused on the state and replicates structurally the apparatus that supposedly aspires to run. Like the state, it would be vertical and hierarchical. Its leaders, like state officials, would routinely succumb to partisanship and corruption. Assuming that the people cannot act on its own, someone would be pulling the strings behind APPO. Surely, a group or a leader would be manipulating the masses (Esteva, 2010, 981).

Esteva (2010) describes what he notes as typical contemporary social resistance in form a social actors and movements coming together to formulate a strategic, focused and somewhat organized struggle. Thus, generally even grassroots movements tend to become monopolized to a small group of decision makers, a core or an assembly that cannot fully represent what each individual participant desires. I would make the argument that they cannot even if they tried. Here the participatory form of organized social resistance reaches a limit. It has come to a point where individual resistance should emerge. But this will be delved into in the next chapter.

Social resistance with a centralized structure, be it from the start or emerging over the course of the action, also fits the case example of James Ferguson (1990). His example shows clearly how a social movement encompasses the interests of few in a typical manner. Traditional pastoral practices are waged against newly introduced agricultural goals set forth by the development program, clashing on the grounds of which system should persist. The forthcoming movement here, represented by the cattle owners, emerges at the head of the anti-development struggle as it openly disrupts and destroys the program’s assets and achievements. To outsiders, this movement seems coherent and with the support of the local population. But this is misleading. Ferguson shows that cattle does profit the entire village in a general sense, although the specific benefits are restricted to the domain of the men and property owners. Thus, women and very poor villagers have a less direct stake in the matter of cattle grazing. While women in most cases support their husbands over the debate whether access to public grazing lands should be open, they also struggle with their men over the ability to control some of the family’s monetary assets that the cattle represents. Ferguson argues that some support is given to the movements in return for some concessions in regard to social practices and traditions surrounding the understanding of roles of women and men. There is thus a multitude of reasons for an open support for a movement. Often, the cause itself is not the first and
foremost reason. While I only scratch the surface of this here, consensus for social movement activity is a generally oversimplified process in many writings that applaud its ability to shape a new way of social organization.

Escobar (1995, 2003, 2009) similarly positions social movements as a postdevelopmental phenomenon that derives its resistance from an anti-imperialist and postmodern motivation. As an example, Escobar presents social movements as inherently anti-global in his article from 2003, entitled ‘Displacement, Development, and Modernity in the Colombian Pacific’. He relates displacement as part of modernity and establishes a framework that sets up social movements in opposition to this. Displacement, in respect to the article, remains a mostly spatial component that according to Escobar is part of modernity seeking to displace traditional images of place with the establishment of a modern one. In regard to development for example, large projects displace thousands for the sake of new constructions or agricultural changes. More than on the mere spatial level, however, displacement is also pursued on an ontological level. Foucault and Habermas have written on this, Escobar notes. While Escobar remains on safe ground in his observation of displacement and its consequences, he enters unstable ground as he sets out to show how social movements are essentially place-bound, local in a sense, and in this context work against displacement and modernity. Escobar produces a dichotomy of global versus the local, where the international development cooperation becomes the global actor that the local one, social movements resist. The result is that for Escobar social movements could serve as tool for transcending development into an era of ‘post-development’. This argument is supported by his other works that state the same issue similarly. In 2007 for example, Escobar argued that

not only have the activists and communities themselves claimed their right as knowledge producers (along with the conventional experts, whether in opposition to them, or hybridizing expert and local knowledge), in doing so they have developed an alternative conceptualization of the Pacific as ‘region-territory’ of ethnic groups that does not correspond to the conventional construction of a place for regional development. They have gone further in crafting what could be called an alternative political ecology, based on notions of sustainability, autonomy, diversity and alternative economies that do not conform to the mainstream discourse of development (Escobar, 2007, 21).

The ‘they’ in this sentence, as well as in the ontological foundation of postdevelopment, however, is as I argue just a different ‘they’ than those of international professionalized institutions. ‘They’, in regard to social movements, can thus not claim to stand for a post-era as it is founded on the same premise of social organization. In essence, this is a generalization of people into the category of a
local rather than a global, since social movements are understood as local phenomena. Generally, this underlying fact is one of the cornerstones of postdevelopment and can be traced all the way to Escobar’s early works, in specific *Encountering Development* from 1995.

At times one can see the heavy influence from poststructuralist conceptions of discourse that shed a slightly different light than the otherwise standing paradigm of postdevelopmentalism, grassroots determination or organization. This applies especially to Escobar. Still, the arguments on social movements carry a strong dualistic tendency. Escobar does acknowledge poststructuralist notions at the same time as he disregards them in other instances. Let me demonstrate this with the help of Jan Pieterse and Ray Kiely. Pieterse (1998) argues that postdevelopmentalism is endangered by its own writing. It is full of contradictions. While Escobar (2007) has given answers to some questions and points of critique, the overall picture remains the same. According to Pieterse, the postdevelopment perspective involves a mélange of vocabularies: discourse analysis, poststructuralism, social movement theory, development. This mix is both rich and uneven, with exaggerated claims sustained by weak examples (Pieterse, 1998, 363).

Pieterse continues to argue that postdevelopmentalism idealizes the resistance to the development apparatus. He writes:

> To post-development there are romantic and nostalgic strands: reverence for community, *Gemeinschaft*, the traditional. [...] There is a strand of equating poverty with purity and the indigenous and local with the original and authentic (Pieterse, 1998, 361).

Pieterse’s argument well sums up all the points that I have made so far in this section, I believe. He shows that social movements are overall an idealized form of resistance that should be considered more profoundly for its problematic aspects. Kiely (1999) criticizes postdevelopmentalism on the same grounds as Pieterse but in comparison uses a concrete example. He describes the postdevelopmental image of social movements as presenting the image of a noble south (savage) struggling against the evil north that tries to dominate it. The noble savage, as a phrase in the *development* context, is presented as a colonized being that has retained its cultural identity from the dominating Western hegemony which merely attempts to exploit ‘man’ in disregard for his local traditional way of life.

The debate on social movements, or the underlying theory of individual participation, has since the emergence of the topic slowly managed to find its way into the mainstream *development* debate. This partially due to the success of the postdevelopment critique, as I would argue, and partially simply as a result of a newly emerging understanding for more individual participation on societal
issues that also fed into the interest on postdevelopment writers. Grassroots activity thinking, not in itself the social movement type proclaimed by postdevelopmentalists, thus slowly crept into the development agenda in the 1990s, known under the umbrella of ‘participatory development’. The core of this focuses on local knowledge and so-called grassroots capabilities that are supposed to define the new development agenda that is represented by the international agencies and organizations such as IMF and World Bank. What Cooke and Kothari (2001) however show is that in a prevailing understanding of top-down approaches, grassroots approaches serve as a justification for the continuation of the dominating paradigm. In the case of development, this refers to the ideas of modernization, capitalism, growth, or Westernization. David Mosse (2001) states that “local knowledge [always] reflects local power” (Cook and Kothari, 2001, 19), specifically local relations of authority and gender, and thus participatory approaches remains largely a way of speaking rather than doing things. This is also a clear message in Mosse’s book Cultivating Development (2005) that analyses the development projects. Francis Cleaver (2001) also notes that participatory approaches in themselves retain a paradox as they link the new model to an institutional framework that only looks participatory while in reality being yet another institutional top-down paradigm.

One can see parallels between the participatory paradigm, that in fact retain a strong institutional control, and the social organization model of a grassroots approach that Esteva (2010) describes in Oaxaca. In Oaxaca a somewhat institutional framework developed around APPO. A divide between the actual grassroots, the people, and APPO can be seen that led to critical voices against APPO. People started to see APPO as part of an oppressive state system. While APPO did succeed to press for widely desired changes, it did not manage to comprehensively represent the people it stood for. It thus worked counterproductive to the social agenda that created it in the first place. Thus, in the end the approach resembled some renewed form of top-down approach essentially led to the exclusion of those who did not approve the results of the movement.

Social movements, I argue, often remain in a framework of organizing for the masses and thus essentially plan or end up planning in a top-down methodology. Cooke and Kothari show that social movements represent a community of sorts that “can be used as a definition for exclusion as well as inclusion” (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, 53). Social movements are a community that creates new powerful local agendas which they press against some formerly dominating frame. This clash occurs on the ground of the inclusion of new issues. These issues, however, continue to exclude some, as social agency always is made up of a consensus among people. Sometimes, the new inclusion even excludes that which it managed to overcome. Consensus remains a common ground among a community and thus excludes those that are unable to join, for whatever reason that may be. There
is thus an overvaluation of democratic decision making processes in ‘peasant communities’ and a downplaying of hierarchies and exploitation, according to Kiely (1999; 44).

3.4.3 Renewed Development in Smaller Scale

The dangers of social movements that I have discussed in the previous section are clearly recognizable in the vision that postdevelopmentalism presents. Instead of being internationally controlled by the power of the Western, or more specifically the US hegemony, spaces would be organized from within by utilizing local knowledge(s) and traditions that do not necessarily reflect the Western idealism of development. These spaces, however, would not be essentially development-free. While the focus of postdevelopmentalism does stress the importance of local capabilities, the way these are arranged is seen essentially as a positive that is democratic, consensual, and progressive. Thus, in regard to social movements, one can see how the concept, as mentioned before a newly acclaimed academic phenomenon of the 1990s, became an ideological tool for an argumentation that fit postdevelopment authors. It is true that at the time so-called social movements were mainly a form of resistance to a neo-liberal and globalized world view, and in that they could be used according to the wishes of critical writers. However, social movements are not restricted to a leftist agenda where liberal progressive ideals are sponsored. There are also right wing movements. For Mouffe (n.d.), right wing popularity largely arises from political streams that oppose a dominating paradigm. Thus they can equally be applied to the entire spectrum of resistance, not merely the right wing agenda that she specifically looks at. Looking into more depth for the origin of the different streams that exist within a country, from leftist to right wing politics, Mouffe (2000) argues that social issues need to be confronted on an agonistic level, that allows finding compromises and a consensus between the different parties involved, rather than on an antagonistic level which denies any form of approach to each other. Social movements, however, often approach their goals on an antagonistic plane where their ideas are placed in opposition to the ones they struggle against.

All the above shows some important aspects in regard to how social movements are perceived within postdevelopment writings. While social movements, social actors in general, may represent a large body of individuals, their political view will never be able to enclose all. Social movements coexist next to each other with different motives and goals, from the left spectrum to the right. Most of these movements, however, attempt to attract support in order for their goals to capture the state

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7 Capabilities has become a buzzword in development jargon as it summarizes beautifully whatever development stands for: to do, and know, more and better.
apparatus or even the international apparatus of supranational organization, such as the UN. An exception to this might be the Zapatistas that I will mention in more depth a few pages on. Thus, I do not see a political field of social movements arise that would in itself remain non-dominating. Many movements attempt to capture a particular apparatus. Development remains too much an idea of political scope that is attached to specific apparatuses.

If the international body, consisting of the IFIs and their entourage, were dismantled by social actors, *development* would thus continue on different levels, the levels and scopes of social movements. But social movements have also to be seen as a political agent, made up of political ideas that from some other perspective will be resisted. Thus, social movements inherently create oppositions that cannot be neglected in a discourse analysis such as Escobar’s (1995). What this means is that social movement activity, if successful or not, will always produce resistance that in itself may take the form of social movements. I argue that postdevelopmentalists do not see beyond the creation of social movements as agent of resistance. Their overly positive view on social movements cannot but see these idealistically as resistance that produces a state in which everyone is satisfied. For Homi Bhabha (1995), social movements, just as other social organizations, clearly represent social values that are coded for certain purposes. These purposes inevitably have to clash with others. It also situates them antagonistically in opposition to the IFIs, which have to be smashed by the power of thousands of movements. Thousand movements is what Esteva (2010) would call a movement of movements. Escobar (2001), as an example, refers to the G8 demonstrations of Genoa in 2001 when noting how social movements can cooperate to overcome the IFIs. The concept of social movements as resistance rests on a similar conception as that of antagonizing institutions. It cannot anticipate or understand a form of, in their view immoral, opposition to the social movement concept that would arise if the development apparatus was dismantled. I argue that it is thus not as simple as Escobar notes. He argues that one social movement alone cannot take on the regime, while thousand together create a strong enough will and power to do so. On the other hand, I have argued that even if movements would be able to take on and overthrow the *development* regime, it would not mean that movements necessarily remain non-*developmental*. In fact, many are already agents of *development* in one way or another.

The picture that emerges from these examples of postdevelopment resistances is again essentialist in its core. Instead of an international so-called consensus between nation states, that from time to time come together to articulate a new agreement and agenda on how *development* should proceed, social movements draw together individuals on a smaller scale around an idea that is developed around a core principle. Here postdevelopment writers proclaim a system wherein the imperial power is challenged by another power that simply overtakes the supremacy within the given
territory; territory is not understood in a spatial sense but as places of contestation; physical, social, economic or even cyberspace (Escobar, 1994, 1999, 2009). Social movements, for their purpose of resistance, remain a generalized and vague experience that resists the global hegemony.

While I would argue that most postdevelopmentalist authors are somehow aware of some of the dangers that are part of a purely grassroots organized social context (I did mention Escobar in specific). The poststructuralist influence on postdevelopmentalism cannot be underestimated. Still, the problem of theorizing from a highly generalized point remains on the ontological level. I argue that despite all the poststructuralist influence that tackles antagonisms, a notion of ‘us vs. them’ remains an essential part of the postdevelopmental school. The idea of proclaiming an opposition, most probably even an antagonism, towards the concept of development is at the core of writing for something else than development, for alternatives that by their deployment through grassroots social movements are seemingly free of the homogenized and universalized agenda of Western agencies and institutions. To which degree social movements themselves are homogenized for the purpose of this resistance is difficult to estimate from the texts. Suffice to say that Escobar, Esteva (along with Prakash in numerous works), Sachs, and other prominent postdevelopmentalists all utilize social movements as their way out of the problem of imperialist development. The institutions that represent this Imperialism are structured in strong hierarchies, largely restricted to an elite body of decision making processes, and closed to outside democratic participatory and representations. This picture has been criticized by development writers from the beginning, many of who stress that development does not only deliver misery, as postdevelopmentalists sometimes would state, but has a large variety of positive and negative effects that have to be seen in a more concrete and specific case than a global understanding of development (Mosse, 2005; Kiely, 1995, 1999).

3.5 Concluding the Postdevelopment Excursion

In this chapter I have taken a look at two major concepts that overshadow much of postdevelopment writings. I identify these as, first, an institutional critique of the professionalized agency managing the so-called developing countries, and second, an alternative to this development thinking based on a grassroots-organized, decentralized, locally occurring discourse that manages developmental issues outside a global agenda or hegemonic imperialism.

In the first part where I focused on the institutional critique, I have shown that development institutions, despite their negative results, are not generally the evil agent they are presented to be by most postdevelopmentalists. Even if one would want to paint a more antagonistic picture to social
movements, degrading the other party for the glorification of other, an analysis of development institutions needs to follow a less generalized perspective on social movements that are seen as an alternative to the institutional framework. Each author has taken on some specific cases of social movements that he (unfortunately there are only few women among primary postdevelopment writers) writes about. Arturo Escobar, for example, writes about Colombian social movements as well as on the Zapatistas in Mexico. Gustavo Esteva focuses on the Zapatistas as well as on other Mexican social movements. All descriptions of social movements are not only shown as a specific change in the local case, but as a motivation and encouragement for other resistance movements all over the world. This is not restricted to so-called developing countries. Here, however, a logical error emerges in my opinion that is carried on into the conclusions of postdevelopment writings. This error is the idea of grassroots approaches, as proclaimed through social movements, replacing any form of (imperialist) top-down approach. If one were to achieve this ‘final’ goal, the antagonism of top vs. bottom would seemingly fall. I argue that such a revolution would quickly rebuild new forms of development in a new shape. If one structure is torn down, social ideas would inevitably be reborn into new forms of influence, meaning that the antagonism itself is not resolved but overthrown. One part of the problem that rests in postdevelopment writings is thus a missing observation of the fact that the alternative(s) to development in themselves might be a product of yet another way of conceptualizing development of social entities, not in a globalized fashion as the critique rightfully shows, but in a smaller scale, locally produced one might argue.

I have shown that, despite the acknowledgement of postdevelopmentalists that their discourses somehow generalize and overstate some aspects, there is no visible attempt to effectively discuss these paradoxes. In reaction to this I have departed from the mainstream critique on the basis that postdevelopmentalism has gone too far, but in my opinion, not far enough in the embrace of poststructuralist theoretical approaches. Poststructuralism remains a very selective notion in postdevelopmentalism that uses some ideas where it deems them supportive, but neglects the same where the proclamation of an idealized resistance to the global capitalism is placed up front. The work of power in social movements for example is one aspect that needs to be approached better in postdevelopmentalism, as I have argued. This critique does also apply to the second point of critique that I have made central to my arguments; the institutions that are blamed for failing development policies.

As an example, I do agree with a discourse that does not attempt to deliver a formulated framework; an aspect often cited by critical authors. This has been done in the past and is one of the many factors that makes development a failure in regard to its promises, or maybe more correctly, its stated agenda. Escobar (2007) has himself reacted to the critique that has been raised by many
authors in regard to this. I depart from the perspective on the ground that postdevelopment remains within a discourse of societal organization or some sort of it, be it local or regional, that entails not a generalization of needs, wishes, demands, hopes, dreams, or even ideas of development on an individual level, but argues for some undefined size of social bodies. I argue that such as societal perspective will continue to entail some form of development, patronizing others into developing according to someone’s own set of ideas. Here social movements easily can become agents for exactly such a change, from international and national to local and regional development. The scope of the developmental processes depends on the reach of each particular social movement in society. In regard to other issues raised against postdevelopmentalism here, postdevelopment authors have themselves in various instances made concessions to some degree, realizing the complexity of the developmental field. However, as I have shown, this does not stop them from continuing to present a rather antagonistic and hegemonic picture which serves their overall agenda on fighting, or resisting, development.

After approaching poststructuralism from a different perspective in the next chapter, I will come back to discuss postdevelopmentalism in a comparative manner. However, there is one last thing that I want to give on the way from here. This third chapter, along with the remainder of this thesis, is to serve not a dismissal of postdevelopmentalism, but a constructive continuation of the postdevelopment critique; just not in its antagonistic position to development towards a post-development era.
Intermission

Now, in between what I would term the two sides of my discussion, postdevelopmentalism and anarchism, let the curtains fall for a minute and the intermission melody take us into a mindset of lax thinking. What better way to achieve this by opening up on a nagging question that has been heard and will continue to be heard, just not in the manner that I will phrase it.

If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?

There are obviously multiple ways of approaching this one. I wonder how in a developmental, or developmental, sense this would go. Remember that I distinguish between development, a willed influence over someone’s individuality, and development, as a natural process without willed and active interference. This second one is not italicized.

The question that I wish to pose maybe goes like this:

If an object or being is inherently only existing in solitude, detached from all that is, does it develop?

One might already engage the premise of this question with a critical stance arguing that the something, the subject or being, however detached and solitary it may be, must have an origin and thus cannot inherently be without outside influence that might invoke a development of sort. For sake of argument however let’s consider that this might be possible. Let’s consider that a thing, why not call it by the name of Pelevod, could possibly come to being and exist entirely without any connection and relation to anything else, that in sense it is in a state of nothingness.

Some, why not take ecologists and biologists as exemplary actors, might go and look at the needs of Pelevod determining how it survives and how its environment influences the living condition. But why not assume that Pelevod is without needs, without environmental effects that could influence its state of being. Physicists, only one of many who might begin looking at the atomic structure would similarly come to realize that Pelevod in fact is not made up of an atomic based structure, that there is no energetic reaction in any way determining its being. No bodily activity whatsoever can be detected. In fact, why even speak of a body? Since Pelevod is a being of nothingness, existing in a nothing, it also has no gender, no senses, no nothing, it only is, just like this mind game that only exists in my mind, and cannot come to being except through my expressing it. One thing however is of importance in order to not reduce Pelevod to a mere object in a natural physical sense. This is Pelevod’s ability to think detached from any sort of function or action that would influence or
determine what Pelevod thinks. As an example, my thinking here is influenced through a variety of factors. One example of this is my sense of time. Even if I excluded all my senses, time would continue to stalk me continuously; I cannot escape it. So, assuming Pelevod’s thinking happens in a nutshell, can one argue for a developmental process inherent in it?

An easy answer to this question is not necessarily something that should occupy me here in my continuous process as I argue that in a way it may as much as it may not. I start realizing an answer as I define what is left of a world that resembles something that I am aware can tickle or trigger development. At least in an individual sense this might simply be existence. As much as one reduces outside factors the individual as such remains always in the picture. Even reducing everything to nothing, one cannot reduce the fact that something exists in the vast state of nothingness. This is Pelevod’s existence that shines through the nothingness. It is this environment that after all may be the only that is entirely disconnected from what so far I have described as development, an outside force that somehow, more or less, enforces on myself, enforces an outside on my inside, develops me while I develop. This is not a place where as Nietzsche argues “a thought comes when ‘it’ wishes, not when ‘I’ wish” (Nietzsche, 1989, 24), rather it is a place where thoughts come as they wish just as much as they come as others wish them upon me. Nietzsche’s main argument however remains in my present projection of it.

In the “in-itself” there is no “causal connection”, of “necessity”, or of “psychological non-freedom”; there the effect does not follow the cause, sequence, for each other, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we project and mix this symbol world into things as if it existed “in itself”, we act once more as we have always acted- mythologically. The “unfree” will is mythology… (Nietzsche, 1989, 29).

So maybe Pelevod would be the only being capable of development, while everyone aware of an environment is doomed to a mere development, a doomsday vision in its continuity of present, mythology in its daily existence.

So does something that has no connection, no awareness but existence, in what many would describe as no sense in living, develop? From what I have written here, my answer to this is a distinct and very determined yes. In as much as development and development are entangled with the real that surrounds the being, it is also independent of the same if total seclusion was possible. Mental logic is not dependent on outside realities alone. Where there is nothing to influence I develop my own laws, my own Matrix, my own logic. Pelevod is not real and thus relies on my logic. So if Pelevod develops or not is not necessarily a question of universal truth, but a question that I, in as much as I posed it, answer to my willingness, my logic and my pleasure. All that remains is to say that all that is
will be, all that exists develops, being or non-being, me or other, mine or not. In Nietzsche’s words, “given that something always develops, and has developed, for whose sake it is worth living” (1989, 101).
Chapter Four

Anarchism’s New Clothes

In the last chapter, I looked at postdevelopmentalism and concluded that it generally resembled much of older classical anarchist writings. What classical anarchism refers to from a contemporary perspective is anarchist literature from the earlier period of its existence. This roughly describes the mid-19th century. Cornerstones of this period are considered to be among others Mikhail Bakunin and Piotr Kropotkin who postulated anarchism as a political philosophy that sets to reestablish the link of ‘man’ to his natural state of being, an anarchist society. For both, anarchism presents a way of achieving this. Obstacles to this, an anarchist state, were the state and religion, or as in Bakunin authority altogether, and the exploitative economic system of capitalism that enslaved ‘man’ to capitalists and their companies.

I will only mention these two major anarchist authors, Bakunin and Kropotkin, in my analysis. Anarchism at the time, however, was not limited to the expression of few minds emerged from the struggles of workers against an oppressive state and/or economic system. In this it tapped into the same pool of resistance as the ultimately much more influential philosophy of Karl Marx. In fact, both torrents of a socialism remained somewhat aligned until the Second International in which the famously split between anarchists and Marxists occurred. George Woodcock (1962), who has written much on 19th century anarchists and anarchism, argues that the Second International became the battle ground of German-led Marxism and anarchism. The end result was a vote on the exclusion of anarchists from the council. Despite irregular behavior in the process the vote ended with the withdrawal of the French Marxist delegation that had prior voted against the exclusion. The removal of these French votes meant that the result flipped and the German delegation that was in charge of the mandate accepted this unusual behavior on the grounds that it served their interests. They had managed to rally support for the decision among those that disliked the anarchist faction and clearly wanted the expulsion from the International as anarchists has been a thorn in the side of many Marxist thinkers. Thus a political divide was created between what Woodcock calls authoritarian socialism (Marxism) and anti-authoritarian socialism (Anarchism). To some degree this divide can be traced into the present where politics remains a highly personalized and emotional contestation between the two factions, in some instances less so, in others very much.
4.1 The Developmental Tendencies of Kropotkin

For my work, I will take a brief look at the writings of Kropotkin that displays a definite tendency towards articulating development. I am aware of the risk that a brief look into so-called classical anarchism produces but I chose to do so since my argument of this paper does not try to connect the classical to the new or vice versa, rather it tries to give a short introduction to a classical author’s approach to the topic of development. For this I chose Kropotkin over Bakunin as I am most familiar with his works and I also feel like Kropotkin’s strong connection to the natural sciences and biology adds an interesting perspective to a humanly defined debate on development that I endorse.

Kropotkin started his anarchist literacy career, if one may say so, writing in a fashion that made anarchism the natural state of ‘man’ or humanity. Natural for him is not understood in the sense of returning to some original state, for we cannot know what state that would be. For him natural means a state that allows humans more freedom; nature is freedom. This understanding reflects the general anarchist notion of freedom. Freedom is defined as a state of being that is not defined by hierarchic relations. Anarchism is an anti-hierarchic political philosophy. In *The Conquest of Bread* (1972a), a title that evoked the spirit of revolution, Kropotkin attempts to remodel the world with the help of technology on the one hand, and cooperative forces, the community, on the other. Technology for him is not only the tool of the capitalist who remains in control of the economy through the means of monopolizing the work place, but also an opportunity to free ‘man’ from the necessity of hard and long labor. It is thus technology that becomes the locus of one of Kropotkin’s cornerstones of societal organization; the ability to sustain a living for all those that can work and those that can’t work with a mere investment of four hour toiling per day. The duration of four hours follows the socially required time that would keep a modern society running according to Kropotkin, and not just in a mode of subsistence but in an inventive, productive, and creative manner. All the labor that people have to invest in their real life Kropotkin argues is the sign of capitalist exploitation and artificial creation of scarcity that serves the capitalists’ interests while the world in fact is plentiful. The idea of the social, in Kropotkin, carries a strong sense, one might argue an essence, of the local, the small scale, that he describes as ‘community’. In *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (1972a) this idea finds a way of transcending the temporality of much of *The Conquest of Bread*

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8 Here I refer to Saul Newman’s book *From Bakunin to Lacan* (2001a) where he discusses briefly classical anarchists. In light of this, Newman produces his arguments against the classical anarchist notion in favor of post-anarchism. For this he particularly engages Kropotkin.

9 Kropotkin always stressed the importance of peaceful revolution. For him, brutal force can only lead to resentment among those who are disempowered by a revolution. A revolution that produced such resentment would inevitably have to defend itself against the formerly disempowered in one way or another. Anarchism for Kropotkin, however, is a peaceful philosophy that should not have to rely on the suppression of some.
The style of *Mutual Aid* detaches itself from connections to the political, economic, and social environment of the time and focuses almost entirely on the question of mutual cooperation within communities, human and animalistic alike. The book stands still today as a highly influential piece against the notion of social Darwinism. In opposition to the idea of a struggle in society over simply spoken power, Kropotkin upholds the advantages of cooperation for man and animal alike. For this, he draws on his personal experience from Siberia where he stayed for a number of years, being able to observe how animals worked in groups not only within their own respected species but also helping directly or indirectly others. In regard to human societies Kropotkin draws on medieval cities to show how mutual interaction occurred in a social context. Mutualism in many ways stands against a notion of development. Kropotkin sees mutualism as an equal relationship between people in which no imposition occurs. Without imposition there is no development in postdevelopmental sense. While his arguments carry an important aspect, which is that life is not only competition, Kropotkin carries his notion to the point where all the aspects that control this behavior become not an option but an essence of the human being (Newman, 2001a). The argument thrives on the understanding that ‘man’ essentially is a social being which engages most naturally, and as a consequence, best in social respect with other beings in reciprocity. Society as a concept is something that is not a socially created but a natural entity that follows a natural authority. The social is not external to human beings and because natural authorities exist much longer than socially created ‘man’, the social must return to the natural state. For Kropotkin, this is logical since the natural state is the right condition of man’s existence. One implication of the strong affiliation to natural environments, in other words animal communities that Kropotkin utilizes for his arguments is not only reflected throughout this work but in all of Kropotkin’s other texts. Community becomes an underlying essence of human existence for Kropotkin. In many ways Kropotkin’s understanding of community reflects that which I have described for ancient Greek city states in Chapter Two. Community becomes not a possibility but an essence of the human existence (Rist, 1997).

Kropotkin does not see large cities dominate an anarchist society but entities in which people know each other and are capable of creating community through interaction and proximity. For Kropotkin, community represents an outside to power where people can potentially coexist without imposition. Community is thus a representation of mutualism. This also implies that community is the place

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10 *The Conquest of Bread* was published in 1892, ten years prior to *Mutual Aid* that became available in 1902. Arguably the books were written with a different purpose in mind. The first, originally published in French and introduced by Élisée Reclus, was primarily devised to serve the needs of a radical left in France. The book was also written in the years following Kropotkin’s imprisonment in France. *Mutual Aid* was written later as a response to social Darwinism, specifically the works of Thomas Huxley who was one of the best known proponents of social Darwinism.
where only development exists, and not development. As communities are built up by people who share common goals, ideas, and practices, the entire concept rests on a seclusive premise that assumes that people will always find their right community. It is not inclusive as it restricts community to those who fit the general norm of each community. Community conceptualized through Kropotkin always remains an essentialist concept. Seclusion, just as exclusion, rests on a foundation of ‘we’ and an ‘other’. I argue further that communities as Kropotkin envisions will not be able to rearrange entire societies, but will inevitably remain a small scale alternative for some. No community can remain without contestations for long. Contestations inevitably produce tendencies to development. This in fact is one reason why many communities break up (Barker and Pickerill, 2012).

I largely agree with the arguments put forward by post- anarchist writers in regard to classical anarchism’s problematic in regard to a human essence as well as essence as a concept in general philosophical terms (Newman, 2001a; Koch, 2011). At the same time however I agree with Ryan Knight’s (2013) position. He argues that the common conception of post-anarchists that classical anarchism had rather little to offer for a post-anarchist philosophy since it is filled with structural and essentialist beliefs is an overstatement. For Knight, classical authors were not unaware of their essentialist notions but self-consciously returned to these while stressing the dangers of them. Bakunin is the clearest case for Knight. His caution in regard to authority did not make him resent certain authoritarian practices as means to achieving a revolutionary anarchist society. Current authors are thus correct in hinting at issues such as the question of essence, but they present classical anarchism in light of a black and white notion. Newman (2001a) and Koch (2011) underrate the cautious character of Bakunin’s approach but only reflect on the authoritarian side of his claims. Kropotkin, as I have shown, also has to be seen with caution in a post-anarchist approach to development. Kropotkin pursues an essentialist notion of a human natural state of being. Still, once again, one should not see an author in black and white. Kropotkin’s concept of mutualism also hints at the relational aspect of social beings and thus relates to development in an important manner. Beings are relational. Through mutual relations does human development emerge as a non-developmental aspect. In mutualism is anarchism; anarchism is equality and freedom.

4.2 Development in State-bound and Stateless Societies

Kropotkin’s answer to statism lies in communism, as I have shown. For Kropotkin (1972a), people should come together in smaller communities where mutual relationships can still be visualized.
Reading Pierre Clastres (1989), one can however see that also societal forms of organizations are potentially developmental, but in a different manner. But before I get to this point, let me begin this argument by introducing the debate on state-bound and stateless societies that will fold into my argument about development.

Graeber (2011) shows that statism is not the only societal form where development occurs. The point that Graeber puts forward is that stateless societies have always existed at the same time and even in some relationship to state-bound societies. This is to show that the existence of the one does not exclude the other. This argument is particularly aimed at a general assumption that states, of course here not in the sense of the modern nation state, but an entity of some geographical range with a centralized administrative apparatus, are superior to stateless societies and as such would have inevitably conquered them if they ever became proximate to each other. State and stateless are according to Graeber not necessarily two antagonist poles which in the first place are ranked in some sort of a hierarchy, and second rival each other for ideological supremacy. Rather, each system, as diverse and unique it may be, reflects the local traditions of approaching power, and specifically decision making processes. Writing against the often produced and reproduced binary of the natural human state, the stateless, and the state, Graeber follows more the tradition of poststructuralists. Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987) have argued that state-bound and stateless are only different forms of a similar social significations. This is social control.

The State is desire that passes from the head of the despot to the hearts of his subjects ...(desire) always stamping the mark of the primordial Urstaat on the new state of things, rendering it immanent to the new system insofar as possible, making it interior to this system (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 42).

Where this desire is not voiced, a stateless society can prevail. Stateless, however, does not mean that societies are not engaged in the same issues as state-bound societies. Rather, there are different ways of dealing with it.

The Urstaat principle that Deleuze and Guattari mention refers not to a specific state-form but to the idea of the state itself. The state is an abstract machine that can take the shape of multiple approaches. Graeber (2011) leaves the idea of states similarly open as Deleuze and Guattari and argues that states as a construction have existed through the various forms of administrative centralized apparatuses of history. This means that modern states represent the Urstaat principle as for example kingdoms did in earlier periods. More recently the principle has developed into administrative modules such as the IMF. Graeber sees the IMF as one of the most influential tools of
producing and controlling debt, territorializing a value system, and developing the world towards a Western defined statist system. The IMF is thus a recent application of the Urstaat principle.

Pierre Clastres describes societies in which no Urstaat principle has developed to form a centralized form of social organization. Clastres (1989), a highly cited ethnographer within anarchist literature for his book *Society against the State – Essays in Political Anthropology*, uses his research among various so-called primitive societies to show that power can work in very different modes than that of a state or an institutional representative apparatus. The archaic societies Clastres refers to showed an active resistance to the creation of a state system, each in their own very specific way and with a very individual outcome. The consolidation of power was a complex issue for any society, but Clastres argues that it was a matter not of institutionalizing it to form a state but rather to prevent the establishment of states. Distribution of power occurred in multiple ways, sharing it among different councils or even individuals, sometimes also externalizing it by turning it into a spiritual authority. What distinguishes Clastres from the authors he is discussing is the interpretation of the results that in themselves are not entirely new. He argues that other anthropologists have generally described African societies as backward, archaic, primitive, and barbaric, underdeveloped would be a newer word. Clastres however sees these archaic societies as representing a degree of socialized development. All the tribes studied for Clastres are well aware of the advantages and disadvantages that a dehierachized society has. The outcome of their social developments should thus not be seen as a sign of primitivism, rather a sign of political will. After all, even their political systems have been and are still subject to changes as the communities in themselves develop. It is not as the Western image often shows that there has been no development and/or development in so-called primitive societies for very long. Clastres shows that resistance to statism often was a process that was actively perused with a distinct feeling of improving the society. Thus, as the governmental and institutional approaches to development that are described in the first chapter, even non-centralized and dehierarchized social forms of organization can fall under developmental practices that are imposing on those affected.

It is not Clastres’ intention to dismiss the Western state system as such. He rather aims to show that it is not superior to the so-called archaic approaches. The archaic form of ‘underdevelopment’ is judged to be inferior from the perspective of Western political conceptions. These conceptions however are also based on a distinct level of disempowerment of the common people in Western countries.
Failing to find [the political], the authors\(^\text{11}\) have located it at every level of archaic societies, with the result that everything falls within the bound of the political. All the sub-groups and units (kinship groups, age groups, production units, and so forth) that make up a society are haphazardly endowed with a political significance which eventually covers the whole social sphere and consequently loses its specific character. For if political reality is found everywhere it is found nowhere. Which makes one wonder, for that matter, whether they are trying to say precisely that, i.e. archaic societies are not authentic societies because they are not political societies. In short, the ethnographer would be justified in proclaiming that political power is inconceivable in these societies, since he annihilates it in the very act of grasping it (Clastres, 1989, 19).

The Western-centric thinking judges everything in accord with principles of rational ordering, resulting in an understanding of archaic society as irrational. It is impossible to think a society without power as power does not merely exist in hierarchic structure or violent societies. Power exists independent of these typically associated phenomena. Power and the political are not to be equated. Further, what is political and what is not political does not have to fall under a Western definition of the concept. Merely because societies do form structures of organization that actively avoid the production of a state does not mean that they are either without power or without a political. This obviously folds into the arguments that Graeber makes, or more precisely Graeber’s analysis adds to Clastres’, as he wrote his book 40 years before, in 1974.

The active will to decentralize power shows that archaic societies have approached development from a different perspective, leaving its imposing aspects decentralized as well. This means that where development as a societal practice remains a rather centralized structure in Western countries, archaic societies have broadened the structure which justifies the developmental aspects of their society. This has consequences for development in these societies that I will not further deepen here. The point that is important for my argument is that development, and development, occurs also in societies that are stateless and non-institutional.

While Clastres writes in a general sense about anti-state approaches of tribes in Africa, Mbah and Igoriwey (1997) present African perspectives on what might be called a Eurocentric anarchism. The authors focus on the historical ups and downs of regional based socialism. In their text it becomes obvious that the word anarchism, just as all socialism, is heavily influenced by Western thought and as such even defined through it. One may find examples of anarchist practices, just as Clastres did, without them ever be called anarchist in the local understanding. Local traditions have other ways of

\(^{11}\) Clastres generalizes about anthropologists, not only here but throughout large parts of his book.
giving anarchism a political meaning without ever having to search for a term that is inherently Western. Anarchism in its European tradition of meaning has become a Western way of defining approaches in African countries, so Mbah and Igoriwey. The description of Mbah and Igoriwey also show that in the aftermath of decolonization socialism became a strongly charged political idea. The two superpowers, USA and USSR, influenced African countries to align them to either bloc. This political influence, along with the negative impacts of development that Escobar (1995) and other postdevelopmentalists portrait, produced civil was in many countries. This almost harmless sounding chapter of African history, in reality a disaster, continues to have impact today. Still, despite all that, African countries and people should be left to their own potential to produce own forms of anti-authoritarian socialism that are not defined through Western philosophical texts alone. It is however just as likely that people would refer to it very differently than Western anarchists wish, maybe even in an active manner avoiding getting once more under the scrutiny of Western eyes. One should thus not describe all stateless societies as anarchist just because their social form of organization reflects that which Western anarchists define as anarchism. Stateless isn’t synonymous with anarchism. Such an approach would once again be developmental. It imposes a particular thought on those who are described while including them in one’s own framework.

In conclusion to this, I argue, that development cannot be localized to a particular form of social organization. This relates strongly to the arguments made in the first chapter, where I showed that developmental practices can be found in different periods of time as well as in different settings, be they economic, religious, or colonial. Whereas the first chapter showed perspectives that are all based on the assumption that development is directed from the West to the rest of the world, the analysis of Clastres shows that developmental practices are also active in what is referred to as archaic societies in Africa. This argument underlines my thesis in that it shows that development also occurs in non-Western, and non-institutional frameworks that control social aspects of societies.

With this, I will turn to the next section, in which I look at development from a different notion. Rather than the communal focus of Kropotkin, Stirner conceptualized an anarchist society around individualism.

4.3 Max Stirner’s Anarchism

In this section, I will take a close look at Max Stirner, and in particular at Stirner’s view on egoism, who attacks the concept of essence. Stirner stands as a radical individualist who has a strong stance against any developmental notions. In regard to anarchism and development, Stirner thus represents
an interesting position that I will analyze below. This importance is increased for my argument by the fact that Newman (2001a, 2002) considers Stirner to be an early poststructuralist author. For Newman, Stirner thus creates a connection from classical to post-anarchism.

4.3.1 Stirner’s Egoism

Saul Newman (2001a, 2002) draws on Max Stirner’s concept of the ‘spook’ to discuss the concept of essence in regard to a human state of being. For Stirner (1976), the spook is an essence that continues to haunt society in different disguises. Stirner situates man as such a spook, one that found its way from god into ‘man’. It follows that humanism did not actually overcome the divine, it merely resituated it. The spook is thus a fixed idea, one that despite the assumptions of having been overcome remains an essential part of society to the degree of it becoming sacred, a sanctuary of the mind. Such ideas, that enslave humanity, are not only humanism as a continuation of religion, but also the state and morality (Stirner, 1976, 41-44). Newman’s (2002, 11) argument is that fixed ideas in Stirner are synonymous with essences and as such formulate a proto-poststructuralism that is also immanent within Nietzsche’s philosophy. Essences for Stirner are “the bottom of things” (Clarke, 19776, 40), an emptiness that finds meaning only in piety, and the false idea of morality, civic morality in particular. The egoist however is an unmoral man, one that does not accept the pious idea of an alienated, untouchable morality, be it civic or godly. As a consequence an unmoral man does not let himself be consumed into societal domination which is hierarchy. This domination reveals itself in the representation of for example the state, the church, god, morality, or order, all essences into which individuals are pressed from early age onwards. The egoistic man is one that does not let himself be developed by outside forces. Only a man that can free himself from the grasp of outside domination is truly free. Fixed ideas are thus not only the part of the religious domination but find application in the humanist tradition as well. Humanism, the spook of religion, has the strongest attitude of education and discipline (development) which establishes a frame of progress through the deployment of essences. The changes are thus only a change of concepts, the divine replaced by the human, the ecclesiastical by the political, and doctrines by science. Attacking the mentality and justification for social control, Stirner directs his critique not only at the nation state and state institutions, which he sees as the highest level of social domination, but at all forms of participatory organization in the sense of it requiring membership rather than participation as an

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12 Stirner, whose real name was Johann Kaspar Schmidt, wrote around the same time as Proudhon, the first self-proclaimed anarchist. Both authors had some ties to Marxist authors such as Friedrich Engels and in their own way became critical of the emerging Marxism without referring to each other in their texts (Newman, 2002).
agent. All passive representation is suspect to Stirner who defines liberty only through personal or individual signification. While there is a radical individualism, arguably even a hyper-individualism, at the core of Stirner’s theory that isn’t tied to social justice that defined anarchist authors of the time, his arguments should not be discarded lightly as they are an important area of anarchist philosophy. Nevertheless, one also has to see the limitations to a more traditionally anarchist thinking. Stirner himself never saw his work as anarchist and did not share a view that defined the anarcho-communist Kropotkin or earlier authors. Stirner’s radical individualism may also in some way be inhuman and bad, inconsiderate to notions of a society. This is only logic to his philosophy as imposition is the norm of social interaction. Development lies in the social itself. There are dangers of essentialism in this theory for there is a tendency to essentialize the selfishness of the ego, man as an egoist in a mental respect. For Stirner, selfishness does not originate in action as such but in the subconscious. Altruistic acts driven by empathy are hence for Stirner still a self-pleasing act. All human action is seen as consciously or unconsciously selfish, serving the reproduction of the ego rather than a possible other. That applies to all human behavior, be it romantic, hateful, or aggressive. Also characteristics such as curiosity, creativity, according to Stirner, stand for a selfish desire to get to know other things. John Clarke (1976) argues that Stirner goes so far as to equate the ego with the body. Here the danger of essentializing in a biological manner becomes very obvious as Stirner sets out to eradicate the essence ‘man’ and thereby gets dangerously close to replacing man with ego in the same stroke. Instead of man, “Stirner attempts to put the ego in the position of the absolute” (Clarke, 1976; 28-29).

Koch, arguably author of the earliest post-anarchist text, is less critical of this replacing of essence by Stirner. Stirner for him did not consciously equate the ego with essence, yet he lacked the “linguistic tools for reformation” (Koch, 2011 [1993], 334). Stirner simply could not express himself in the manner that he wanted. Such an argument, however, I feel would underrate the capabilities of Stirner as an author who was a trained philologist. Koch attempts to deconstruct Stirner’s egoism, which he argues cannot constantly be connected to inner decisions. His argument is that one has to see the societal connections that Stirner draws. Both, ego and society are interlinked and intertwined in a web of social interactions. While this is accurate, Stirner’s description of this interaction remains largely vague and shallow. Clarke (1976) shows that while Stirner’s argument may well be less egoistically determined than it seems at times, he simply cannot convincingly meld this with his radical individualist agenda. Illustrations of the ego and the social often boil down to a tension of the two. The following example stresses this. “No other person can dispose of mine, or that whatever I may or may not do does not depend on the personal decree of another” (Stirner, 1976, 98). This shows the will to a society made up of self-determined individuals. Society can only be understood
through individuality, according to Stirner. Society is always dominated by group discipline, the encasing of the individual in a ‘we’ that always has to be seen in a state of contestation with an outside ‘them’. True freedom as a concept cannot be found in a ‘we’ but is compounded in the abstraction of each individual. Thus “only in abstraction is freedom” (Stirner, 2009, 10). In this context “knowledge perfects itself when it stops being knowledge and becomes a simple human drive once again, the will” (9). There is a strong sense of self-determination as the will is situated in the individual. For Stirner, society has no will but is the extension of individuals’ wills on an extended scale. A fact that Stirner himself stresses in the conclusion where he states that “in a word, it is not knowledge that should be taught, rather the individual should come to self-development” (13). Stirner attempts to circumvent development by placing the individual outside of developmental situation.

Feiten (2013) emphasizes that the strong notion of the individual Stirner proposes does not exclude that individuals have altruistic feelings. Altruism can be separated into two categories, one of which is a personal interest such as love, the other is a strong sense of duty recognized as obligation for something. The first version is emotion based and the second one is more cognitive based. Stirner rejects to regard the second version as a way for perceiving the individual in a greater social framework. He considers altruistic acts to be built on an individual motivation alone. The second category, in Stirner’s reasoning, underlines the developmental aspect of social interaction. Since development is taking influence over other for the purpose of some other agenda, Stirner sees even altruism of the second type, meaning a sense of duty towards something, as developmental. Nothing is outside of egoism. Anything and everything being applied at an individual is essentially developmental. Everything has to exist for the purpose of serving the interests of those who applied it.

It can be argued that Stirner’s notion of society is similar to Freud’s concept of culture as an essentially limiting, frustrating framework for the individual. There are however also differences. For Freud, culture becomes something forcing the individual but not necessarily something to be dismissed altogether. In Civilization and its Discontents (1930) Freud describes how the individual subject is forced to make compromises with the purpose of reinforcing his or her individuality within a society that despite its repressive aspects is not essentially evil. In fact, society has to impose to some degree. Stirner on the other hand envisions a society in which everyone can do according to his or her pleasure. This would reflect a society without social boundaries. In an earlier work Freud (1959 [1921]) examines more closely mass behavior. Freud looks at the mass, a smaller defined social entity, in which individuals generally are not forced or born into. Rather, mass reflects a group that people either join for various reasons, or are entangled in through daily interaction of their lives.
Psychoanalysis in a wider sense, not limited to Freud, would certainly give my entire thesis an additional perspective. I will however not deepen this approach here as psychoanalysis could be related to the way that I constitute development in an extended way, one that I shall leave open for a possible later project. It suffices to say here that psychoanalysis opens doors to understanding the inner conflicts and daily struggles of an individual with a sense of individuality and his or her involvement with the social environment. To give an example, Freud shows in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1959) that society may also serve as a means of individual emancipation and empowerment. He mentions the ability to experience high degrees of unselfishness in collectives, and a higher moral standard that may be applied in groups. Both experiences stand in opposition to engaging oneself which inevitably remains a selfish experience of self-defined morality. Groups also enable people to exalt and intensify emotions to levels that alone couldn’t be achieved. Freud further more addresses Stirner’s idea about the egoistic understanding of group experiences. Freud writes: “Social justice means that we deny ourselves many things so that others may have to do without them as well, or, what is the same thing, may not be able to ask for them” (Freud, 1959, 10). I argue that Stirner’s notion of an individual, that may do anything that he or she feels to do without limiting other individuals’ ability to free expression, comes very close to this, despite Stirner’s strong dismissal of any notion of the individual limiting him or herself in the same instance.

What stands out from Freud is that social interaction acknowledges the self at the same time as it limits the self. Stirner sees society merely as a limiting factor. This is an important aspect that I will return to when discussing Nietzsche at a later point.

4.3.2 Stirner and Education

Self-development is a key to Stirner’s paper or pamphlet ‘The false principle of our education – or Humanism and Realism’ that is concerned with education. In this text, Stirner (2009) shows an aspect of individuality that is less visible in his grand opus *The Ego and its Own*. Rather than situating the individual, or the ego as these become synonymous for him, outside the problematic of power, Stirner discusses how the self is shaped in the system of education, be it at home in the domestic upbringing, or in schools outside the parental influence. Here, a person is not stipulated to be a possible independent entity in a greater social world, but is seen as entangled in it, dependent on the social, born into it from the start of his or her life. Education, or to some degree a system of development, is a part of life that cannot be excluded, and as a consequence of that, the individual stands in constant struggle with and against it while he or she is also dependent on it. For Stirner, one result of this struggle is that
the radii of all education run together into one center which is called personality. Knowledge, as scholarly and profound or as wide and comprehensive as it may be, remains indeed only a possession and belonging so long as it has not vanished in the invisible point of the ego (Stirner, 2009, 13).

Education, with all its negative possibilities, may in the end well serve the individual in its realization of the ego in the process of becoming. More than this the ego may turn its side on knowledge, gain the knowledge of not doing what one was taught. What may emerge from this is a disregard for the teachings and an embrace of ‘the will’ to being. “Knowledge must die and rise again as will and create itself anew each day as a free person” (Stirner, 2009, 15). This underlines the importance of resisting teachings as given, resisting the mere application of what one is taught in an environment where one may have little influence over the teachings itself. Stirner’s analysis is particularly aimed at the universal education system in Germany but also applies generally, as one can take from his text. I argue that this pamphlet may serve very well in understanding Stirner’s egoism. The criticism of a neglected social context of the ego that is often raised against Stirner’s philosophy of egoism certainly is not rejected with this text but deepens the analysis of The Ego and Its Own. Egoism becomes a less individual and more relational and contextual notion that has to be seen in a world where people always are in relation to others.

Elmo Feiten (2013) supports my interpretation with his claim that Stirner conceded that “any association with others would impose certain limits on individuals’ freedom” (Feiten, 2013, 124). The case of higher education serves as an example where individual freedom is partially given up in return for something that the individual should desire. A person places itself into the hands of a teaching over which one has little power. The question remains how much freedom one should have to give up, or whether one has in fact a choice in this process altogether. As Stirner’s attack on universal education, and especially on higher education shows, the individual is given little choice in the matter. This discussion continues to have importance in the contemporary higher education systems even if it is in no way as imposing as it was in Stirner’s times.

In conclusion, Stirner’s picture of the education system is one of imposition. To remain in my rhetoric, education is development. Education imposes on an individual with a distinct belief that the imposing approaches benefit the student in the long run. For Stirner, any development is a no-go that has to be removed. The difference between what he advocates, a union, and the system that is in place is striking. Stirner notes that the union is by you and for you. You use it up according to your purposes and wishes. The system in place in society on the other hand exists as a sacred entity where you have little power. Whereas you can decide on your own how and to what degree you take part in
a union, society uses you up and you have little but to be disillusioned about the situation you find
yourself in. In relation to the case of higher education you are given the choice of leaving it or
enduring it. Since you may desire, even require whatever the result may be, my Masters degree for
me, you often chose to endure. That does not mean that one is entirely unhappy about the
situation. Rather, one’s ability to control the process is limited and one begins to feel imposed upon.
One feels *developed*. In an education system that reflects a union, the relationship of teacher and
student would not be hierarchic and students would take more control over their own progress. This
means that students would have more leverage over their work and would be able to negotiate their
education. Of course this also means that students take more responsibility over their studies. This is,
so Stirner shows, a sign for a free being. Egoistic beings are responsible for what they do in their
lives.

What emerges from Stirner’s view of development is the proclamation of an anti-development
through the emancipation of individuals. The one who is sole master to his/her own being cannot be
*developed*. This applies to any situation, to education just as well as to any relationship between
people. As I have shown, this represents the solipsistic picture of the human being. So I will now, as a
next step, continue with a poststructuralist analysis in order to describe development without taking
it into as radical individualist notions as Stirner did.

### 4.4 Post-Anarchism and the Importance of Poststructuralist Literature

So far I have talked generally about the origins of anarchism as a political literature and the general
ideas of anarchism about the human self. Departing from this particular framework of thought I place
my own thought onto a differentiating stage, one that does not deny or neglect the past but sets out
for new shores. New Anarchism, post-anarchism, only two out of a myriad of streams within
anarchism, streams of individual works that are placed within torrents of thought, or frames, that
seek to ease access while in effect blurring the reality of the text. So as the first act of this chapter I
will renounce the totality of frames that I have applied to the postdevelopment chapter as well as to
anarchism in the sense of how it has been mentioned so far. I engaged in the process of labeling for
sake of reproducing what has been done before with postdevelopmentalism, even if I already made a
note on its diversity before. Labeling, framing, and placing into categories of thought serves an
academic purpose as a means of carrying the message that I wish to convey. I wish to unearth these
same categories that others have built so efficiently in the past and attempt to make sure that the
ones I attack are not reassembled in a different shape, or to return to Stirner, are not resurging as
spooks.
This thought relates to Derrida’s concept of deconstruction that I will talk about after a short while. Before engaging in a discussion of Derrida, however, I will discuss other poststructuralist authors that have become important in post-anarchist literature. In particular, this means that I first turn to Deleuze and Guattari.

4.4.1 Deteritorialization in Deleuze and Guattari

Spooks or fixed ideas, essence or categories, universalization; all these fall under mechanism of capture that Deleuze and Guattari (1987) oppose with their philosophy of nomadism. Nomadism thus describes practices that unhinge society from frameworks that seek to control it. Due to this inherent characteristic, nomadism serves a discussion on development. Development is administered by structures that are territorializing thought and practices. Nomadism on the other hand attempts to make visible the relationship of territorialization and deterritorialization. It seeks to open this relationship to discussion so that space can be organized freely without particular forces solely determining its content.

Todd May (1994), Saul Newman (2001b), as well as other so-called post-anarchists have already written about nomadism, so let me recapture their analysis before adding to it. Todd May (1994) looks at the example that Deleuze and Guattari themselves use for setting up nomadism, or as they also call it, a war-machine. The war-machine works against the state form that attempts to fix categories for the sake of capturing and controlling society as a whole. The state on the other hand insures the homogenization of segments (May, 1994, 107). In order to capture, the state uses a certain overcoding that renders the captured object’s principle so that it fits into the anticipated homogeneity. Overcoding is not only a tactic of the state but can be traced to any “social operation that tries to subsume large regions of practice under single principles or categories that are to act at once modes of comprehension and standards of judgment to those practices” (May, 1994, 106). The state apparatus is thus only one of many, not institutions, but machines, abstract machines that work throughout society. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call this machine abstract since it is not feasible to define it precisely, even locate it within the larger social strata of society. “The war-machine, on the other hand, is sheer nomadic movement, smooth, non-striated, and uncoded; a place characterized by its very inability to become a place” (Newman, 2001, 108). Since the war-machine defies localization, it works against notions of essence and universalization. Since development is a process of territorialization, it produces certain essences that are connected to practice and thought. That can be seen in the overall generalized and universalizing development agenda set forth by the IMF, World Bank, and other institutions, that finance development cooperation. The underlying
assumption of such agendas is that all societies essentially should deal with problems in the same manner. All problems can be solved by Western solutions. Practice and thought are territorialized to Western significations. Everything becomes dependent on Westernism.

Another concept from Deleuze and Guattari’s hands that resists territorialization, and relates to the Western development agenda, is the rhizome. The rhizome is perceived as a plateau where no values are set to produce a hierarchy of entities. It should not be understood as an exterior in which different existences are entered, but as a non-place to which there is no exteriority. Entities, or more undefined simply things, are not found and added to a list of the rhizome but everything is to be seen already as part of it. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe this as n-1, which is to show that all that is newly perceived and invented is simply to be enacted as already part of the rhizome. Thought as such does not need to be arranged to categorize for the sake of hierarchies, but enacts and works as agent of a non-essence. The rhizome also connects to nomadism in an important way. For nomads, distinct points on their path are merely representations of the passing, not a dwelling (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986; 380-382). That still affirms the importance of these points, but limits their meaning to one of leaving behind; the path is the journey. Just as nomads move through areas with their distinct stopping points, thought generally speaking should not rely on these minor stops that only serve a specific purpose that is left behind for the passage that is the path between two points. Thus, in the rhizome, if one is to label certain ideas, practices, or anything really that one sees as a possible point, a node in a web, the importance is not be placed on the points but on the paths between them. Further the points that are on the passage are not to be thought of like a structuralized web that has very strongly defined connection and in which some points never connect to each other due to the structural inability to connect them. In the rhizome all points rather serve as nodes that connect to every single other one, maybe not in practice, but in theory. Nothing, no thing, is thus decoupled from any other thing. Full connectivity defines the rhizome, which is a war-machine. Full connectivity defies categorization or fixation. Only a structure that seeks to fix elements in a specific way categorizes. A rhizome in itself leaves all possibilities open, nothing in it can be captured and fixed.

4.4.2 Derrida’s Deconstruction

Derrida’s concept of deconstruction also helps in a post-anarchist discussion on development. Deconstruction derives partially from Derrida’s book Of Grammatologie (1976) and builds on a philosophy that attempts to move beyond a belief of a pure presence. According to Derrida, things cannot be stated purely, meaning that arguments cannot be made with full certainty to their outcome. There is no absolute truth. Derrida tries to show with his arguments that Western
philosophy is still to a large degree based on a metaphysics that operates with conceptual binaries like speech and writing. Speech and writing is the example with which Derrida conceptualizes deconstruction in *Of Grammatologie*. It is however in no way restricted to this, rather deconstruction applies to everything that is thought and practiced. Thus, thought in general is based on a metaphysics that Derrida wishes to discuss. A deconstructive discussion would enable to advance beyond the problem of metaphysics without falling into yet another metaphysical structure. Rather than choosing one strategy over another, Derrida believes that we must follow all paths simultaneously. In regard to *Of Grammatologie* this means that one should not looks at speech and writing in a hierarchic form that postulates supremacy of one over the other, but in an equalized form that allows probing both for possible significations disconnected from the other.

Deconstruction is a concept that is difficult to define as it remains inherently relative. Derrida notes that it is difficult to define the concept as it has to be able to adapt to different fields of application and notions of users. Caputo (1997) shows that one cannot even attempt to describe deconstruction in a nutshell since already a thinking of nutshells is a problem that deconstruction attempts to engage. After all, a nutshell defines a sort of essence, the key to a concept. Deconstruction however is not easily defined as a concept or practice. Deconstruction defies fixation:

> The very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that things—texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and sort you need—do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are always more than any mission would impose, that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy. What is really going on in things, what is really happening, is always to come (Caputo, 1997, 29).

What deconstruction opens for a discussion on development is simple. Where authors have fixed origins of development, or significations of the concept, I see deconstruction as an opportunity to break up these constructs in order to re-open new possibilities of discussion. In particular, I believe that there is a need to break open the concept and understanding of *development* to see its multiple connections to other fields of social study. This relates directly to the points that Evren (2006) raised in his article that I have briefly described in the introduction. For Evren, a post-anarchist approach to development has to be open to see the issue from multiple angles that at this time are not necessarily visible. This in short means that a post-anarchism, not only in regard to development, but in general has to be open to a constant deconstruction. This is also the premise of my arguments. *Development* is not only a simple concept that can be structurally connected to a particular area, that

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13 Here, Nietzsche can be read in Derrida’s lines. Derrida himself notes how he is indebted to Nietzsche in his philosophy. This reference in specific aims at the work ‘Beyond good and evil’ by Nietzsche that will be discusses in more detail below in the separate part on Nietzsche.
of improving so-called developing countries. For post-anarchism to approach a debate on
development, post-anarchists have to be open to a deconstructing influence that allows shedding
light into the dark corners of anarchist thought that anarchists themselves avoid. That of course
equally applies to this work. This means that anarchists need to be aware of potential developmental
tendencies in their own thought. With this I turn to some issues that I identify in an anarchist
understanding of development and development.

4.5 Problems of (Post-)Anarchist Thought

4.5.1 New Variations of Antagonism and Essence

Newman (2001a) has been shown above as one post-anarchist author who proclaims rhizomatic
structures as anarchist. Newman’s argument also applies to May (1994) and Koch (2011) who
approach anarchism from a similar poststructuralist stance. Duane Rouselle (2012) argues that all
these early approaches to post-anarchism have fallen into a similar argumentation that resists an
anti-essentialist view. No author was able to conceive of an anti-essentialist system. Rouselle who
reviews a book by Levy Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (2011), argues that Bryant manages to take
the earlier post-anarchist critique to a new level, one that would enable to write a new chapter on
post-anarchism. This chapter is freed from notions of essences in regard to the human subject as well
as thought and practice in general. Bryant goes further than Koch, May, and Newman, criticizing
poststructuralism for not having rejected essentialism of thought and practice sufficiently but having
only managed to disavow it, replacing the human subject with the equally human order of
language, or discourse. Consequently anarchists influenced by them have gone down the same lane.
Not to say that this has been negative for the culture of anarchist theory that flourishes in a creative
and (de)constructive self-critique. Bryant’s argument, however, takes an anti-essentialist notion too
far. For Bryant, anti-essentialism as a philosophical approach rests on the eradication of essence
altogether. For him, there can be no essential thinking. Nothing has an essence, nor will anything
ever have. Essences stands as generalizations that are a sign of hierarchic thinking as essences always
rate aspects against each other. For Rouselle (2012), one has to rid itself of essence and embrace a
truly anti-essentialist vision, one that does not generalize. This description does reflect the
postdevelopmentalist view on development that also argues to eradicate the concept of
development altogether. Here essence as a concept is antagonized by Rouselle just as Sachs (1992),
Escobar (1992a, 1995), and Esteva and Prakash (1998) antagonize development. As I have shown in
the previous chapter in regard to postdevelopment theory, and in this chapter in regard to classical
anarchism, there is a danger of looking at antagonisms as a methodology of classical anarchism alone. Classical anarchists as a reminder antagonized ‘power’ and could not see how even individual relationships between people are defined by notions of power. For classical anarchists, power was something to transcend, to get beyond, by overthrowing the state. Post-anarchism as political philosophy, however, also has to be cautious not to fall into a renewed antagonism that denies in depth analyses of concepts such as essence, or as in the case of this thesis, development.

May (1994), Newman (2001a), and Koch (2011) may have represented antagonism better than Rouselle (2012). They nonetheless describe a different aspect overly positive just as postdevelopmentalists. For Newman (2001a) in particular, resistance to the hierarchic structures of society can be found in social movements. For Newman, social movements represent a purely positive form of social organization. While Newman does describe his understanding of social movements better than Escobar or Esteva, who always remain rather vague on what a social movement implies, Newman draws a rather general view of social movement action that he sees as resisting large hierarchic structures. I argue, however, that resisting the grip of states and institutional actors does not mean that the resistance has automatically rid itself from notions such as hierarchy. Also Graeber (2013) shows a tendency to see social movements in a rather positive view. In such as view, the effect to the outside is given the strongest focus, while internal problems are placed in a less important light. Especially in regard to anarchist movements that attempt to circumvent internal struggles of power, gender, hierarchy, this seems important to me. This overall shows that also anarchists, and post-anarchists as a consequence, have to be cautious not to repeat the same rhetoric that postdevelopmentalists have already been criticized for in the 1990s, and rightly so. At the same time, this does not mean that social movements are not a valid form of resistance. Graeber (2013) shows that social movements often actively engage internally in discussion focused on issues such as gender and power. The Occupy movement, the focus of Graeber’s book, also shows a different positive aspect of social movement activity. Rather than antagonizing the ones that are seen critical, Occupy remained somewhat unclear of its target while remaining focused on the overall changes that were followed. Thus, Occupy managed to situate itself as a critical movement with a goal that did not push for a concrete change against an antagonistic enemy. It did not attempt to develop those that participated or those that were criticized. It rather stood as an undogmatic push for change that was not reliant on a particular goal such as the postdevelopment eradication of the development apparatus.
4.5.2 The Question of Development in Contemporary Anarchism

*Development* has been described as a problematic approach in this thesis. While anthropologists, geographers, and other development agents have sought to bring about change in developing countries, anarchists have also taken part in social change in foreign societies. In this process, anarchists have produced critical approaches that to some degree resemble the *developmental* approaches of institutional and non-institutional actors. This is the argument of Barker and Pickerill (2012). They show that while anarchists come to help marginalized, disempowered, colonized indigenous people in all of Northern America, their approach often resembles the one of their institutional predecessors from state-bound development institutions. Their ideas however are not only rejected by the indigenous people, but also by the anarchists that come to help indigenous communities. Often anarchist involvement even occurs in support for the indigenous resistance to institutionalized and/or state-led *development*.

For anarchists winning indigenous people’s hearts works in different ways than for the development institutions. Rather than intervention in society by outside enforced policies, anarchists rely solely on local anchors. In the previous chapter I have described anchors as a social connection in a social entity. Only with an anchor do development projects often gain the needed support of local communities. For anarchists, anchors are not only important but a requirement as they see themselves not as an imposing force coming from the outside. Rather, anarchists wish to change social practice from the inside without any sort imposition. In fact, Barker and Pickerill stress the fact that most of the anarchist groups analyzed reject the general term ‘anarchism’ to describe their activity. For them, anarchism reflects a general political agenda that they pursue, but they do not see anarchism as a defining ideology. They instead view themselves as diverse groups of people that are influenced by some sort of radical left philosophy. Typically consensus among anarchist movements according to my personal experience, as well as the description of Barker and Pickerill, works through the creation of “methods [that] often involve the formation of collectives that assert a differential autonomous capacity against centers of power involving the state and capital. However, this method is symmetrical with the historical settler colonization of the northern bloc” (Barker and Pickerill, 2012, 6). Veracini (2010) and Barker and Pickerill (2012) argue that this exact practice is characterized by a pattern of self-constituting local jurisdictions contesting the established claims of seaboard centers of power. Veracini (2010) locates conceptual separation “at the origin of the settler project, the moment when a collective body ‘moves out’ in order to bring into effect an autonomous political will” (Veracini, 2010, 63). For anarchists the separation is a political rather than a physical act, the problem of colonial dynamics, or as I would call it *development*, remains nonetheless intact. Imperialism becomes transformed into a political colonialism that lies at the center of the
postdevelopment critique as I have shown before. As anarchists largely come from settler cultures, and anarchism as a political philosophy has its origin in Western thought, anarchists cannot escape the corresponding privileges that go along with it (Veracini, 2010, Barker and Pickerill, 2012). What I mean with anarchists is not the practice of anarchist practices. As I have shown before in relation to Clastres (1989), anarchist practices can also be found in non-Western societies. What anarchism means here is the political philosophy of anarchism that is carried as a political message with the name ‘anarchism’ attached to it. There are many practices that anarchists call anarchist, but even others may practice them without being familiar with the political philosophy of anarchism.

Anarchists’ action is thus always defined by them having a specific set of privileges, as I have noted. This happens despite the fact that they seek to dismantle the very political structures that they are part of. They wish to dismantle the structure of privileges that defines their own being. The dominating multiculturalism among anarchist movements as one example relates to the problematic of privileges that Barker and Pickerill describe. Multiculturalism as a methodology of integrations is often characterized by a failure to recognize the prevailing social issues that existed before the introduction of a multicultural agenda. Social issues often cannot be argued away by a multiculturalist agenda. Anarchists do often not adequately understand how their own localization as ‘white’ grants them privileges. Privileges are of course not only to be seen in regard to color, but also apply other issues such as gender, education, or wealth. One cannot simply overwrite former social relationships and assume them to be resolved. Lagalisse (2011) illustrates other such phenomena of privilege in anarchism that have to do with gender and secularism, and the separation of religion of cultural significations. When working with indigenous people who have other views on gender and religion than anarchists, problems are bound to arise. Secular anarchists have problems understanding indigenous ideas about places and gender roles. Place as such is very differently molded into social reality connecting to the overall indigenous culture of each group uniquely. Reality has of course also in Western areas been shaped to form a cultural sense that even anarchists, as much as they attempt to resist at times, cannot elude. Freire’s (1996) argument from *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed* supports Lagalisse’s point that people cannot escape their own background, even if they wish. The only way of achieving this would be a conversion that essentially changes the individual fully. But “conversion requires a profound rebirth, a new form of existence” (Freire, 1996, 43). This is almost impossible to achieve by one’s own abilities. Freire also remarks on the relationship of those who wish to help liberate others, as did the anarchists in Barker and Pickerill’s (2012) analysis.

No pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain distant from the oppressed by treating them as unfortunates and by presenting for their regulation models from among the
oppressors. The oppressed must be their own example in the struggle their redemption (Freire, 1996, 36).

Freire thus argues that foreign ideologies cannot authentically liberate a people. Liberation always has to come from the inside. This also applies to social change that is induced from foreign sources into an oppressed locality without a process of internalization into the local forms of expression.

What Barker and Pickerill’s (2012) discussion shows is that the result of anarchist involvement in indigenous communities was often increasing struggle as different collectives start to seek support. Cooperation often failed because indigenous views clashed with the views of the ‘helpful’ anarchists. Even within communes, consensus often became a problematic aspect as people joined for all sorts of reasons not necessarily connected to the primary goals. Stories about developmental settings, where development agents came to help the underdeveloped have often produced similar strives within communities, as postdevelopmentalists have shown (Ferguson, 1990; Escobar, 1995). To recap, Ferguson (1990) shows that support to the resistance in Lesotho was connected to other issues as well, for example family ties and gender issues. But even Esteva’s (2010) description of Oaxaca shows that the big social initiative that controlled the city became a much more complicated political entity that involved internal political issues.

There is another similarity between anarchists and development actors that Lagalisse (2010) mentions. This is the one-size-fit-all approach that indigenous people were confronted with when anarchist movements entered the scene. Anarchists, as development actors, attempted to handle situations with a single approach that was inconsiderate to the local setting. It only reflected the experiences of people from their own backgrounds and thus could not function. Despite these critical remarks on anarchistic involvement in developmental cooperation, the picture emerging should not invoke a general attitude of resenting ‘Anarchoindigenism’, because much cooperation, even if to large degree developmental, was positive and successful (Lagalisse, 2011)\(^\text{14}\). Anarchist movements tend to be very diverse in their opposition to institutional development, and there are no concrete rules that apply to activism. There is a wide range of approaches that is employed when working with indigenous peoples, none of which become fixed. While many movements may tend to make mistakes, some have managed to position themselves as positive agents. This shows that it is not the social movement activity in itself that is solely negative, but often the procedures that define each social movement individually. Nonetheless a danger of fixation cannot be argued away. Anthony Ince (2012) sees a risk in anarchist literature unconsciously territorializing areas where it is not aware of

\(^{14}\) This relates well to the arguments made by Mosse (2005) who showed that while development has negative consequences, it also brings about some positive change. Mosse, as a reminder, criticizes postdevelopment theory for being overly antagonistic towards the development cooperation.
such action. It does so, where it links certain ideas essentially to anarchist practice or vice versa, linking anarchism to ideas, thought, and practice. In Ince’s view, there is a strong and widespread fetishization of “place and local territories as containing unproblematic sources of alternatives to globalized capitalism” (Ince, 2012, 5). Here alternative approaches are territorialized to the local in a similar fashion as in postdevelopment literature. The local becomes the locus of change without a regard for the dangers that may emerge along. An example for this can be found in Graeber’s texts.

In the introduction to Debt: the first 5000 Years, Graeber (2011) draws a very bleak picture of the IMF. The book opens with a personal anecdote about him being at a party where he felt a little out of place but got into a conversation with a woman who he told about his job and especially his involvement with the ‘global justice movement’. Let me copy a few lines of the conversation as he writes it in order to give a direct inside in Graeber’s view.

“Actually,” I said, “I think it’s kind of amazing how much we did manage to accomplish in those first couple of years.”

“For example?”

“Well, for example, we managed to almost completely destroy the IMF.”

As it happened, she didn’t actually know what the IMF was, so I offered that the International Monetary Fund basically acted as the world’s debt enforcers—“You might say, the high-finance equivalent of the guys who come to break your legs.”

Graeber goes on to tell the woman, who was an attorney for a foundation that provides legal support for anti-poverty groups in London, the history of IMF and how it grew into the exploitative apparatus that defends Western interests at the cost of third world countries. But more from the text itself for a few more lines....

I spoke of poverty, of the looting of public resources, the collapse of societies, endemic violence, malnutrition, hopelessness, and broken lives.

“But what was your position?” the lawyer asked.

“About the IMF? We wanted to abolish it.”

“No, I mean, about the Third World debt.”

“Oh, we wanted to abolish that too”.

Graeber, 2011, 2.
Coupled with the lines that Graber presents in his book *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology* (2004) the picture that emerges resembles the postdevelopmental view on the IMF. The IMF, as the extension of Western capitalist interests, acts as an exploitative agent that ensures that the so-called third world develops along the lines deemed acceptable and reasonable, an agency that in a way neo-colonized what was colonial before, reaching out in a global approach. While Graeber arguably looks at *development* in a different way than for example Escobar, there is a joint target of their critique, the development institutions. For Escobar and the school of postdevelopmentalism, as I have shown in the previous chapter, *development* becomes a very economically driven idea, in which North-South inequalities are defined through a structural body that if destroyed gives room for something else, something ‘else than development’ in a postdevelopmental sense. Graeber would put it differently and argue that the newly opened space gives room for something potentially anarchist in nature. The picture of Graeber and postdevelopmentalists reflects very well another position on development that I want to discuss very briefly. Hardt and Negri (2000) have written *Empire*, a book that takes the concept of hegemony and relates it to poststructuralist theories. What emerges is a position that comes close to Escobar’s (1995). Hardt and Negri reinforce the hegemonic idea of the US Empire while showing that the mechanisms that produce empire are more complex than a mere hierarchic structure controlled from the US alone. Still, Hardt and Negri see a structural form of domination that is only found in structures of empire and not in structures that resist Empire. The resisting structures, as in postdevelopmentalism, are social movements that are seen as essentially anti-hegemonic. Despite the poststructuralist influence that defines *Empire*, there is a continuous proclamation that attacks the superstructure, the top institutions that are seen as in control of societies, without critically regarding the resisting forces to that same structure. This is overall very similar to the postdevelopment perspective. But let me return to Graeber who also focuses his attention towards the large structures of society without critically engaging the resistance.

In *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*, Graeber dedicates two pages to the question of *development*. His view on the question of *development* is anthropological rather than geographical, and hence he addresses the inequalities between the North and the South in a more anthropological fashion. In his eyes the question inevitably boils down to a three-point program which he articulated briefly in a radio interview. The points are as follows:
• An immediate amnesty on [third world countries’] international debt. (An amnesty on personal debt might not be a bad idea either but it’s a different issue.)
• An immediate cancellation of all patents and other intellectual property rights related to technology more than one year old.
• The elimination of all restrictions on global freedom of travel or residence.


Graeber’s agenda show the danger of describing frameworks of thought that are producing a particular understanding of solving issues. In fact, I argue, this is typical developmental talk. It reflects a channeling and universalization of anti-authoritarian socialist ideas into a Western-based anarchism. This means that some anarchist texts have become part of a developmental process that produces a structure that could be referred to as ‘imagined’. Anderson only really looks at the formation of nation states in his book Imagined Communities – Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism but the resemblance to an anarchist community or collective as described above by Lagalisse (2011), and Barker and Pickerill (2012) is close. Anderson calls the communities ‘imagined’ since there is no real life aspect that connects people. Real life aspects describe for example face-to-face relationships. In an imagined community the perceived relationship is imaginative, defined by ideas such as language or nationality. Imagined communities work despite the fact that there are aspects that hinder or even inhibit the ability to be part of a face to face society. For him this is mainly because of the size of nations, in particular their large size and population. Nations are socially produced entities that have been built with a purpose. As a means to achieve this, links are produced where in reality none exist. Nationality, citizenship, language are all examples of such productions. A typical instrument for a production that relies on language is according to Andersen the print media. As an example, print media conveys messages that may target a specific group for the sake of nation building through a language and symbolic that is not understood in other places. There are obviously many ways of criticizing this in times of multicultural societies. I myself am an example of this, writing in a country where I moved to some years ago, in a language that is neither native to the place I now reside in, nor to me.

What I want to take from Anderson’s text is the general idea of imagining relationships and communities. The ‘anarchist imagination’ in this sense is not based on a particular language but on a signification of ideas that is mediated through language. Wherever people write or express themselves in a way that to a self-proclaimed anarchist sounds like what he deems anarchist, these people are incorporated into the anarchist imagination. I don’t want to suggest that the example of
anarchism in general can simply be translated into what I see as an anarchist imagined community, but in a wider sense it does. A culture of anarchism is already existing where specific ideas almost define whether something may be called anarchist or not. Language serves as a means of transporting that culture. Language may in this sense be better understood through the expression of ideas. That means that an anarchist imagination does not define itself through the localization of a language, rather it is localized in practices and forms of expression that are carried into different languages. Just as nation states are framed, encircled by borders, there may well be, there may have always been, a specific way of framing anarchism despite its inner openness to difference and otherness. In recent formulations, Rouselle and Adams (2013) describe this as the anarchist canon that lures above the post-anarchist school of thought. Even post-anarchism that in its foundations wishes to remain uncanonical has to be cautious not to produce approaches that all build on a similar premise. Most works of a post-anarchist tradition, however, are in danger of doing this. This also applies partially to this thesis itself.

4.6 Social Change Mechanisms and the Danger of Development

Richard Day looks at social movements not only as a potential developmental agent but argues that the mechanism of such social change is in itself based on a developmental agenda. Day (2005) refers to the Gramscian concept of hegemony and contrasts it to what he terms ‘affinity social change’. The concept of affinity, for Day, represents a way to avoid statism. He argues that statism is ubiquitous as a form of centralizing thinking that is based on a personal connection to the social fabric that a person places oneself in. While Day does arguably overstate the views of Kropotkin and Landauer to argue for a politics of affinity, he does bring forward an argument that shakes the concept of any development. Bakunin emerges in Day’s analysis as the hegemonic anarchist par excellence who would have merely replaced a Leninist political approach with a similarly ‘anarchist’ one that relies on the mass for justification. This form of an anarchist approach remains essentially hegemonic. Contemporary radical movements sustain such approaches that rely on mass justification, building up an ever increasing body backing their ideas. Once a sort of critical mass has emerged, the movement sees its justification strong enough to push for change, be it on national or international level. Anti-developmental movements in developing countries fall under this banner just as the movements in the so-called developed countries.

Connecting Day’s argument to the example of Barker and Pickerill (2012) and Lagalisse (2011) it even intensifies the potential critique in the matter. For them there may very well be only a weak sense of affinity internally within a movement. Participants may agree with one another on a variety of
questions, this however also may not be the case and consensus only emerges for very few and
defined targets. Day (2005) concludes that social movements collect power through numbers, but
are effectively not more but a support group for very few arguments. This has consequences not only
to the outside of social movements but also to the inside. Targets often are not negotiated with the
entire support base but emerge from a discussion in a selective group. Thus, support from the base
may effectively only be partial to the wider agenda of a social movement. It is this support though
that is enlarged to the surrounding social body if the social movement succeeds to push its claims.
The end result shows social change that is essentially imposing on those who did not agree, internally
and externally. The change is even imposed on those who actively worked against the movement.
This is overall very similar to the descriptions of Barker and Pickerill (2012). What is of importance to
Day (2005) is the critical realization that anarchist movements may in fact fall trap to what in many
instances is a cornerstone of their work, individual freedom. Social movements still represent a
representative system to some degree. People may have possibilities to influence the processes of
change more directly in opposition to the political system of statism, it however still shows a
tendency to representation of the many by a few. Social movements have thus only managed to
increase the individual ability to influence social change, but have not managed to radically free
society from representative social change mechanisms. This is, however, what many anarchists see in
social movements. From direct action, let me now turn to literature....

4.7 Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘Minor Literature’

Above I have presented a philosophy of the rhizome and nomadism (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987).
Both concepts remain largely general in their regard to thought and practice in the original texts by
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Their goal is, as I described before, to enable space to develop
freely from outside forces of capture. In this section I will discuss this thinking in regard to literature.
Specifically, I talk about the concept of ‘Minor Literature’ that Deleuze and Guattari have formulated.
Minor literature is a concrete approach of the concepts rhizome and nomadism, and presents itself
as a potential application of an anti-developmental literature that does not attempt to produce a
framework of expression that is enlarged to a major size that effectively imposes on those who
engage in writing. Minor literature is thus, I argue, a concrete application of an anti-developmental
philosophy.

When writing about nomadism above, the characteristic of nomadism were fluidity, open or non-
fixated, generally the ability of space to develop freely from outside forces of capture. This space is
devoid of binaries, a rhizomatic space. Deleuze and Guattari call it ‘detterritorialization without
reterritorialization’. Religion, as statism, is according to them a mode of territorialization (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 381-382) because territorialization can take many shapes, from existing realpolitical entities such as states or the church to purely imaginative that only exist in the mind of people. Literature as a means of signification obviously has to be included. An anarchist literature that I see before me has to not only be aware of this but also put this into (direct) action. In their book Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature (1986) Deleuze and Guattari put their theories into literate practice when writing about rhizomatic literature, one that deterritorializes and open lines of flight. Lines of flight refer to opportunities to escape from signifying dominations, as mentioned earlier in the discussion of nomadism. Further however, deterritorialization serves as a mode of creative production, one that does not guide the reader to a conclusion but leaves this open to the personal interpretation. Minor literature in this sense does not “designate specific literature but the revolutionary condition for every literature within the heart of what is called great literature” (18). A problem of self-proclaimed anarchist literature in today’s political field is its strategic approach. Much anarchist effort is aimed at justifying its existence, at a strategic yelling to be listened to. Simon Springer for example has recently published an article in the special edition of Antipode on anarchist geographies called ‘Anarchism! What Geography still Ought to Be’ (2012). While he does stress the fact that it is a manifesto for anarchist geographies, it falls well into a range of articles and books that proclaim the importance of anarchism in geography, well in everything really. Other texts include the previously mentioned book by Graeber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology (2004), or Newman’s (2001a) book that I have mentioned multiple times. What connects all the works of these authors is the territorialization of anarchist thought into a semi-specific framework, including anti-hierarchical, horizontal, anti-authoritarian, etc. etc. and so on. I call it semi-specific since there is of course a mindset of diversity that dominates these anarchists. I don’t want to imply a conscious opposition to these ideals at all. The fact remains though that their texts serve as generalized concepts for a strategic purpose, for example the introduction of what is considered anarchism into academia. In relation to the idea of a minor literature, the question I put into the open is whether this sort of work leaves open lines of flight. Coming back to Simon Springer, I have to note that he has not only written calls for anarchist acceptance but writes on a variety of subjects. Still, in another article of his, ‘Why a Radical Geography must be Anarchist’ (n.d.), he falls into contradiction to his own critique when arguing against Steen Folke’s article ‘Why a radical Geography must be Marxist’ from 1972. Springer question’s Folke’s radicalness as he clearly did not approach the most radical thought within geographical traditions, the anarchist one. Even in his time authors such as Kropotkin and Reclus were known among geographers which shows, according to Springer, that anarchists were rejected on political grounds. Of course this is not surprising since the long split between anarchists and Marxists is well known, I mentioned it briefly in the beginning of this chapter.
Condemning Folke for not including anarchist perspectives into what he himself deems to be radical geography is however not better than proclaiming at the same time the greater radicalness of anarchism. While the title may be an analogy it proves to be of some truth to Springer’s arguments as he continues to show the importance of what he defines as anarchism for radical geography. Springer’s article climaxes in a very strange, yet interesting, chart that shows the amount of references made to anarchist authors, in particular Kropotkin, Proudhon, and Reclus in geographical journals in comparison to Marx and Engels. Picking up from what I so far said, I don’t have to actually copy the statistics, suffice to say, the three anarchists do not amount to much chatter in academic circles in comparison to the Marxist icons.

The goal of the above mentioned works of Springer is the acceptance of anarchism in society generally. Arguably however, Springer is not the only engaged in attempts to justify anarchism. Newman’s work, as well as Graeber’s, also present anarchism as something that has justification in society, and should as a consequence of this be given more recognition. More than acceptance it wants to have a seat at the table of accepted critiques in society. This seat is no doubt well deserved according to its proponents. Writing for this purpose however endangers abandoning what has made anarchist literature ‘minor’ in the first place. Graeber (2004) and Springer (n.d., 2012), but also Newman (2001a) may find it to be strategically important to streamline ‘anarchisms’ into ‘anarchism’, into a concise political agenda. Anarchist literature however should not imply a streamlined language, a set of ideas and concepts reproduced merely for the sake of creating a larger base, a growing collective of likeminded as was shown in the previous section with reference to the arguments of Barker and Pickerill (2012). To quote Deleuze and Guattari, the anarchism I propose encourages

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\text{to make use of the polylinguism of one’s own language to make a minor or intensive use of it, to oppose the oppressed quality of this language to its oppressive quality, to find points of nonculture or underdevelopment, linguistic Third World Zones by which a language can escape, an animal enters into things, an assemblage comes into play (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, 26-27).}
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This means creating an alternate understanding to the common dream of producing something major, something that defines a mainstream, from a bottom idea to the mainstream ideology. Minor is a becoming that cannot be fixed. It does not require the idea of freeing it to be lifted to a higher degree, that of the major. A pursuit of major I see for example in the one-size-fit-all approach that Lagalisse (2011), and Barker and Pickerill (2012) describe. Even anarchists tend to follow such approaches in their attempts to help communities struggle against outside agents that also proclaim
one-size-fit-all development ideas. The problem is that there is already a development, maybe even a development, of major ideas in anarchism. While embracing diversity and individuality, self-proclaimed anarchists are in a danger of already having embraced a developmental foundation, one that is continuously thrown forward to becoming major through various means, including literature.

So before criticizing the mainstream, the major, a literature has to realize that it cannot go without questioning its own foundation of perceived minor(ity) before arguing against what it sees to be major, of major concern. Let me connect this argument to the question of social movements that I have focused on so much over the course of the last chapters. I have argued that social movements often remain developmental as they internally and externally territorialize key aspects that define the core of their work. Day (2005) goes further and argues that social movements in their current form inherently develop as they achieve social change through the imposition of a majority over those who do not agree. Social movements have not managed to work against the representative democratic system that defines most countries that social movements are active in. They only reflect a more direct representative system that remains fundamentally bound to a belief that the many have the right to dictate the few how society should progress. Day does however, in comparison to Stirner, not deny society a group mechanism. Stirner only saw groups as agents of development. Day envisions social change carried through groups that are not developing. For him, social change, even if achieved by group dynamics, does not have to be developmental. Nomadic and rhizomatic approaches to social movements are a key to such a form of social change. Minor literature as application of nomadic and rhizomatic philosophical principles thus can directly help understand a different form of social movement activity. This would not abide to the current idea that sees majority support as justification for imposition on all that are bound by the changes anticipated. To clarify, Day sees how social movements can become agents of change that do not develop. The rhizome and nomadism are helpful tools to make this happen. Minor literature, as an extension of nomadism and the rhizome, applies these concepts and relates them more directly to social practice.

4.8 A Nietzschean Philosophy of Non-Development

Why do I turn to the philosophy of Nietzsche in order to outline a post-anarchist view on development? The answer to this is twofold. First, Nietzsche stands as an important influence to post-anarchism. Nietzsche’s philosophy in general enables other post-anarchists to set forth their argument about a stateless society. For me, Nietzsche not only reflects in an important manner on statism and development but also helps to confine the solipsism of Max Stirner, who I have talked about in the beginning of this chapter. The second answer to the question why I turn to Nietzsche lies
in the interpretation of Derrida. Derrida has taught me to read the philosophy of Nietzsche not only for its content but with regard to its style. Style relates directly to the previous discussion on Minor Literature, that I see as a possible anti-development form of written expression. I have also shown that the concept of minor literature can be applied in a wider sense and find application in regard to social movements.

Nietzsche’s style not only accompanies the articulation of his thought but stands in itself as an important factor. Nietzsche’s style relates my argument to the previous part on Minor Literature. Nietzsche’s style in fact is unique and enables him to express himself uniquely for the reader. Nietzsche’s style also defies a developmental agenda in self-deconstructing its thought. This can be seen in *Ecce homo* (1969) where Nietzsche radicalizes the notion of interpretation to the point where his statements become a case in point by contradicting each other, thus eschewing any unified meaning. Nicole Andersen (2003, 80–81) argues that “the assumption of a single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, where interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our conscious general”. The argument against a unified notion leads directly to Derrida and deconstruction, not deconstruction of merely something one engages with, but of even the own approach and what it signifies.

The anarchism I think is not a new system of thought and practice, or a conceptual basis for a different mode of social organization. It is rather a non-system since it undermines systematization of thought and practice. Instead of being a system, it is rather signified through a state of deconstruction. Deconstruction is not about passing meaning and signification from one state to another but should be practiced by a way of a double gesture overturning the existing structures. In Derrida’s book on Nietzsche with the title *Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles* (1979), Derrida argues that Nietzsche’s style is defined by a heterogeneous character which in itself serves as a means of deconstructing the text on the paper in front of the reader’s eyes. There is no single thread of thought that could lead the reader, rather meaning becomes twisted and questioned throughout the text, so that no single truth can emerge. Andersen (2003) describes this as a folding of unfolding that Derrida attempts in *Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles*. The result of such writing is the opening of interpretation, the foreclosing on a conclusion so to speak in which the reader is actively convinced by with the writer’s perspective on things discussed before. Nietzsche, it follows in Derrida’s interpretation, deconstructs his own thought. Few authors according to Derrida even attempt this self-critical process as they aim to situate a clear message, one that is not engaged in a discussion with its own position at the same time. Nietzsche however declares
“that things possess a constitution in themselves quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity is quite an idle hypothesis. It presupposes that interpretation and subjectivity are not essential, that a thing freed from all relationships would still be a thing” (Nietzsche, 1968, 560).

Styles as such are a thing of plurality, something that obviously finds expression in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s (1986) conception of minor literature, as I have shown. Nietzsche’s styles, as the proclamation of multiplicity in minor literature by Deleuze and Guattari’s, aim at a constant becoming of literature as a whole and authors in their individual approach to literature.

4.8.1 Zarathustra’s Development

One of his literary personas that can be seen as exemplary for Nietzsche’s style as interpreted by Derrida is Zarathustra. Despite saying ‘no’ to all that was said ‘yes’ to before, Zarathustra does not stand as a person that negates everything. His negation should rather be understood as an example of how he deconstructs everything that he is confronted with in his travels as well as in himself (Derrida, 1976, 2). Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1973) realizes in his encounters with others the importance of a self-deconstruction on his search for the Übermensch. The sentiment of pity is an example of what challenges him. Pity is according to Nietzsche a strong feeling that does more harm than good. Not only did god die of pity for man but all sorts of misdeeds have been done in the name of pity. The reason is that pity, according to Nietzsche, presupposes that which one feels pity for. I will not deepen a discussion on pity as it reflects an entire area of Nietzsche studies. Suffice to say that in the end of the book Zarathustra comes to realize that he himself, as much as he always strove to work against pity, could not to rid himself of the same feeling. Not only does Zarathustra realize his inability to overcome pity, but he is also approached by one of his guests, that he thought was a Übermensch, in regard to another sentiment, that of piety. Already in their first encounter this guest stated that Zarathustra himself may be more pious than he believes, as he redefines piety without eradicating it. Eradication of piety, so Zarathustra’s guest, is impossible. So in the last passage of the book Zarathustra realizes that he has one last sin that is based on the realizations he made. Not being able to overcome pity and piety has shown Zarathustra that he has to continue his path attempting to cast off the last sin, which is his pity for the overman. With this knowledge the last words of the book show the weakened Zarathustra getting strong again, glowing with his inner strength. Here the

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15 This is written in the translator’s preface to Derrida’s book Of Grammatologie (1976). Here Gayatri Spivak writes a rather unusually long preface that in itself might serve as a separate text to Derrida’s positions on deconstruction and Nietzsche, as well as other aspects of importance to the book, first of all the discussion of the classical binary of writing versus speech.
development of Zarathustra does not come to an end but is reignited. His last sin, which is pity, as well as his wish to find the overman, I argue, does not stand for an actual last deed, but the personal defined goal that he seeks. All his work, his former preaching and teaching was meant for the finding of something external that could not be found externally, but was residing in him the entire time, waiting to be recognized. Since there is no truth, nothing that Zarathustra sets as a goal can be achieved in a finite manner, everything leads to something and originates from somewhere. Everything is relational, thought as well as Zarathustra as a human being. Through the relational characteristic, everything develops. Everything is in a constant state of becoming.

Nietzsche’s realization about pity and piety are very important in regard to seeing eradication as a possibility. For Nietzsche, pity and piety are aspects that in themselves may be carried in a drive to eradication of the same. Zarathustra’s attempt to get beyond pity was itself defined by pity. His teaching against piety at times was determined by a pious undertone. Here, Nietzsche describes what I have applied to postdevelopmentalism in the previous chapter. Sachs (1992), Escobar (1992a, 1995), Esteva and Prakash (1998) all wish to eradicate development without realizing the developmental tendencies of that which they propose as alternatives. But also Rouselle (2012) and Bryant (2011) aim at the eradication, not of development, but of essence. Essence in their writings, I have argued, relates to development in that essence is seen as a practice of developing society through the capture of the social complexity into fixed frames. Essence, as development, however, is seen as fixations. For Nietzsche, it is getting beyond essence and consequently beyond any notion of right and wrong. Without a right and a wrong, people will realize that they do not develop other people, but enable a development free of imposition. This does not mean that one may not be developed, as people can always actively place themselves into developmental contexts. Development becomes de-antagonistic in that it becomes choice.

4.8.2 Zarathustra and Teaching/ Being Taught

Development is a mechanism that is predominantly carried by forms of educative means. Even when approaches became very imposed, structural adjustment policies stand out as one of the most imposing forms of development, there is always a certain understanding of teaching those who are in need of education. For Zarathustra, teaching does not mean accepting blindly and repeating knowledge but doubting, questioning, and reasoning. Zarathustra sends his disciples, who started to follow him without his initial consent, away as he notes that they never doubted him. He might have betrayed them without them realizing it as they blindly followed. He continues stating that they, the disciples, had not found themselves when they found Zarathustra. Blindly accepting for Zarathustra is
how believers come to their faith. That is why their faith is worth so little. It is based on believing an
external other without reconciling the given knowledge with oneself by doubting, arguing, engaging
what one believes in for the purpose of gaining more knowledge. In Ecce homo (1969) Nietzsche
argues that Zarathustra, who at times may seem like a seducer, in reality defies the idea of a teaching
that is meant to convince the pupils of some truth. This is reflected in the way that Zarathustra
speaks. His teaching is untypical for someone who attempts to teach in the conventional way.
Zarathustra speaks in a self-critical and self-deconstructive way reflecting on his own speech
primarily instead of focusing on how to effectively bring about the message expressed.

More than a mere deconstruction, Nietzsche continues to push for a war-machine that is inherent in
his works and specifically in Zarathustra. Zarathustra’s entire path reflects on this as he will, I argue,
ever fulfill the wish to find his Übermensch, his overman, as he continues to realize how what he
perceived to be is not what he hoped to find. In short people always will be flawed in regard to what
Zarathustra seeks to find. In Ecce Homo (1969), Nietzsche notes that his humanity is not defined
through compassion for how man is but the tolerance for the fact that he sympathizes for man. In
short this refers to a self-employed overcoming (Nietzsche, 1969, 271). This is the state in which
Zarathustra finds himself at the end of the book. It is a state that however cannot be fully achieved
since one will always find new feelings, new character traits that have to be accepted; compassion is
an ever growing pool of overcoming. This may become clearest in Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche,
1989). Here pity is judged against itself and evaluated in more depth as a human expression that
becomes more than a mere negative form of human compassion. In sense it is “pity against pity”
(Nietzsche, 1989, 154):

We see how man makes himself smaller, how you make him smaller – and there are
moments when we behold your very pity with indescribable anxiety when we resist this pity
– when we find your seriousness more dangerous than any frivolity. You want, if possible -
and there is no more insane “if possible” – to abolish suffering. And we? It really seems that
we would rather have it worse than ever (Nietzsche, 1989, 153).

This again relates directly to my critique on postdevelopmentalism. Postdevelopmentalists aim to
dismantle the concept of development, removing pity, or getting rid of development, altogether. This,
however, is based on a frivolous foundation of developmental understanding, one that cannot
involve an ‘if possible’. Development resists any notion of fixation. Even authors writing in the
tradition of postdevelopment, as I have shown in Chapter Two, are able to trace the idea back into
the past, one further than the other, arriving with ease as it seems in the classical antiquity of Greek
philosophy. So rather than following the path of removal, this thesis is to open up, sow salt in the
wound of development. I want to deepen what is constantly framed and fixed to certain conditions. In short, I want it worse than ever...

4.8.3 The Question of Morality

Morality in the general sense is the focus of Nietzsche’s book Beyond Good and Evil (1989). “To recognize untruth as a condition of life – that certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way, and a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil” (Nietzsche, 1989, 12). The word beyond for Nietzsche reflects an understanding of resisting fixation and essence in general. Untruth as a condition of life means that there cannot be a single perspective and answer to problems of any kind. This statement underlines the importance of Beyond Good and Evil as addition to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (1973), who I have attempted to interpret as an anti-developmental character of developmental type. In Beyond Good and Evil (1989), a philosophy of no that does not deny a ‘yes’, a critique put forth in awareness of the shadows it casts, is formulated and set into a context of development. Beyond good and evil means that one does not take a perspective and regards it as inherently ‘true’. No morality is righteous. Still, for Nietzsche, this does not mean that all moralities are equally valid. For Nietzsche, morality always remains something that is not antagonized, and thus, he proclaims a certain morality that he sees fitting. But this only affirms his own perspective.

I argue that Nietzsche’s conception of development can be related to the contemporary development discourse. The concept of development is, I argue, beyond notions of good and evil. Development’s existence is neither good, nor evil. Development is and this being cannot be answered from one perspective. People will always have perspectives, but these should not be proclaimed as the inherent true ones. The logic behind what Nietzsche clarifies as good and evil are motivations to render one logic extinct, the evil one, while reinforcing the other. Good and evil however can only work as perspectives. Neither logic can have essential and universal truth as they merely show different perspectives on an issue. In regard to development postdevelopmentalists, but also anarchists such as Graeber, present a one-sided evaluation of development that marks it as ‘evil’. That is not to say that postdevelopmentalism and the arguments of Graeber are entirely wrong either. Rather, they show a particular perspective that is not universally right or wrong. But especially

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16 Nietzsche argues against essentialist concepts of the human being. Yet, women become highly essentialist beings in some of his writings. He for example describes them as passive love-desiring housewives that serve and belong to men. Nietzsche’s philosophy is known for being full of contradictions, and this is an example for one of them.
the postdevelopmentalist proclamation of beyond development carries a tremendously different character than Nietzsche’s understanding of beyond. Postdevelopmentalists see a beyond as a revolutionary practice, one that removes the old in an attempt to open space for something new. For Nietzsche ‘beyond’ does not refer to something else to come. For him, it refers to a philosophical signification that distinguishes itself from a notion that something good will vanquish something evil. For Nietzsche, revolution is not a change of guards, but a change of thinking inside the old without having to visualize a new concept. In reference to Derrida (1979), one can see a deconstructive society that attempts to see through what is there rather than establishing something new that remains unclear. Development, I argue, is always and cannot be philosophized away. People may be engaged in problems that development produces, the concept of development however will remain as it is fundamentally connected to the human conditions. This condition is the interrelationship of individuals to a social environment, society.

4.8.4 A Closer Look at Essence

There is yet another aspect in Nietzsche’s literate style that supports my approaching development from a post-anarchist perspective with caution. I stress the fact that I approach it with caution. I have shown that even anarchists, and post-anarchists, may in fact reproduce developmental notions that set up as antagonisms or essences. Deleuze (2002) notes that Nietzsche aims among other things at a transcending of resentment in human existence, more precisely in the human becoming as becoming defines being. Through the argument that Bryant (2011) makes (see section ‘Renewed Approaches to Antagonism and Essence’ on page 63) one can however continue to resentment which reproduces a path that Nietzsche already tried to abandon. This links to the issue of essence that has become a major concern of poststructuralist approaches as well as in the self-proclaimed post-anarchist literature. Bryant argues that essence has merely been ‘disavowed’ rather than eradicated. Reading Nietzsche however one does not approach such a direct eradication of essence as seen by Bryant (2011) and Rouselle (2012). Rather, Nietzsche attempts to bring the singularity which for him defines the structural thinking of essences back into the multiplicity that defines every being. Everything is made up of a multiplicity; nothing can be reduced to a single determination. Only through a multiplicity can things be fully grasped. “Multiplicity is the affirmation of unity; becoming is the affirmation of being. The affirmation of becoming is itself being; the affirmation of multiplicity is itself one. The one is the many, unity is multiplicity” (Deleuze, 2002, 24). Essence in this entanglement is only a strong sense of affinity towards one aspect of the multiplicity. It is in sense a territorialization of multiplicity to a singularity within the multiplicity. Essence thus is not something to destroy or
antagonize but part of a larger whole that is multiplicity. Singularities are merely points that have become focus of affinities. Despite this though, they cannot themselves stand without the connectivity to other aspects of the multiplicity that defines its character. At the core of this philosophy lies the struggle against taking essences as inherent truths. It is also a struggle against the proclamation of essences’ independence from a larger body or force that according to Nietzsche is inherently entangled within the single affinity of essence. Newman (2001a, 2002) and Rouselle (2012) attempt to remove essence as a possibility altogether and thus deny a singularity-thinking. Their arguments do not essentialize in Nietzsche’s way as they could return to the multiplicity according to that. For them, essence, or singularity, is entirely removed and along with it the whole concept of thought. If singularity cannot exist for them, they have once again removed one concept from Nietzsche’s multiplicity. This however must be yet another essence. Here it is a singular aspect taken to a faith of antagonism. Thus, one can see how post-anarchist conceptions potentially remain antagonistic as well as essentialist in their strict vision at eradication of the same. From Nietzsche’s arguments one may take that all that is thought and brought into relations of forces is worth existence. His position generally is not to destroy but to reevaluate, to bring meaning to a meaningless society, to show bigotry its inner self, turn the world upside down and treat its sickness with written punchlines.

Nietzsche’s multiplicity thinking also relates directly to the question of social change as administered by top-down agents such as the IFIs. Development institutions follow a path that they deem positive for some other people in areas that are considered underdeveloped. Due to the fact that the decisions they take remain a Western perspective, even in so-called participatory approaches that I mentioned in the previous chapter, they cannot possible represent a multiplicity-thinking. One variable, the one of the people in the place to be developed, always remains unrepresented, or at the last underrepresented. There is thus a fundamental problem in the development cooperation. The problem resides in the belief that one specific set of ideas, the Western singularity, is sufficient to direct everyone into the right direction of the multiplicity that is defined by all that are part of this world. A global approach has to regard the entire global multiplicity as active influence, not just a small section of it.

4.9 The Relationship between Development and Development

This brings me to the last aspects of Nietzschean work that I want to utilize. In The Birth of Tragedy (1907) Nietzsche’s focus lies on what one might call polarities of life. The dichotomy which Nietzsche describes forms around the Dionysian and the Apollonian forms of expression, wherein Dionysius
takes the form of intoxication, loosely described as the letting go of oneself into the artistic rhythm of life. Apollonian forms take the form of structure in the understanding of the natural shape. While Apollonian styles manifest a certain aesthetic to life as well as presenting notions of stability, Nietzsche himself situates life as a positive, affirmative and active, expression into the Dionysian theatre. In this sense, I argue, the Dionysian approaches is essential to understanding a more individualistic and self-determined notion of development. That is not to argue that development or the individual that develops is conceived solipsistically as disconnected from the forces of the social body surrounding it but the opposite. As the body (any form of relational forces) is an actively engaging and forcing/willing being, one might also state that society is rather a surrounding force just as much as it is a force that the individual surrounds itself with as the condition of life is active and passive in the same stroke. The Dionysian experience for an individual becomes a state of pure intoxication, in experiences alone, but especially in group experiences. Dance is an example for such group experience according to Nietzsche. It is the Dionysian in which a being reveals its inner truth, thus development wills there but cannot be taken from its relation to the Apollonian. The Being is thus particularly acknowledged in their Dionysian relation to other beings. But even in the Apollonian relations lies human acknowledgement. ‘Schein des Sein’ (appearance of being) defines the Dionysian, whereas the Apollonian reflects as the ‘Schein des Scheins’, the appearance of appearance. This does not at all infer the appearance to be a lie in Apollonian sense but shows it as simple appearance, one that is rather copied of natural shapes rather than an inner feeling that defines ones true being, body of forces. To clarify, forces, according to Nietzsche, form a body. The body is made of forces that are set into relation, consciously as well as unconsciously. For Nietzsche, everything is force and it follows that everything is constructed out of a play of forces (Deleuze, 2002; Sigurður Porgeirs dóttir, 1996). The human is according to this ontological model an interplay of forces that come together to (artistically) form(ulate) a body. This body in relation to the intoxication of a cultic expression however is defined through the artistic expression of forces, wherein the being is playing with intoxication rather than giving itself to it. This active play is art in life, art in the body of human existence. It is about engaging life, affirming its being through a development that can only be

17 Here I refer to the conditions of the ‘Will to Power’ that will be again picked up in the epilogue.
18 Theatre here is to mean two things. First, life is a theatre of forces that manifest themselves in the dichotomy of Apollonian and Dionysian. Second, the tragedy as experienced in the Greek theatre combines both of these experiences to something that Nietzsche sees lost in contemporary play. It is his attempt to reconnect the Dionysian and Apollonian once again into a unity that engulfs both, actor and spectator, into a pure artistic experience, one of Apollonian beauty and Dionysian truth.
19 See footnote 14.
20 I use the word form(ulate) since in this presentation it refers to an active part, “formulate” as well as less passive one that is the “to form”. While something may form or be formed, it is a being alone that can formulate. Form(ulate) thus opens the possibility of both, an consciously active deed as well as a more passive one that being has less power over.
found inside the individual and its examination of the forces that make up the world. This examination strongly relates to society as forces are heavily determined and formed by social contestations. The individual cannot be regarded solely as made up from and through itself. Individuality always stands in relation to an outside, in relation to outside forces molded together with the individual. The individual is the creative expression, an expression that is a result of an emancipation from restrictive forces.

The understanding of development that emerges from the above stands in a strong contrast to the concepts of Stirner. For Stirner, individuals remain only free if they develop as emancipated bodies from society. Society cannot be an enforcing power, rather, people have to free themselves from the social imposition. Nietzsche on the other hand shows that the social cannot be separated from the individual. Both are linked, dependent on the other. This, however, also means that individuals are always developed as society cannot be expected to remain an entirely passive entity. In fact, society is molded into the forces of an individual. People cannot disconnect themselves from these forces as everyone stands in relation to other people. This shows that even if considered as a passive actor that only exists in distance, society would continue to influence an individual. This is because one at some point was part of society, through ones parents for example. Having been part of it means that one always puts oneself in relation to it, even if this relation is based on distance. Zarathustra lives in distance to society but always continues to remain connected. In short, the individual would be developed partially while developing on his/her own terms even if society was distant, as it continues to represent a force. Forces develop and as long as something becomes a force, one stands in relation. This shows that development and development cannot simply be separated; they are part of one plurality, or multiplicity, of forces. One cannot fully disconnect oneself from the forces of development. One can only distance oneself from it. This is what Zarathustra does when he retreats to the mountains. But this is also what Stirner does when he proclaims individuals that disconnect themselves from the developmental tendencies of society.

4.10 Conclusions of the Fourth Chapter

I have started this chapter with the post-anarchist critique on classical anarchism. This critique is largely based on the conception that classical anarchists had a skewed understanding of power. For them power was something to be overcome and abolished. For post-anarchists, authors considered classical also reproduced notions of essences in their writing. Even some, who aimed their full force against this, contradict their own critical arguments. Max Stirner ’s ideas have been used as a case in point to demonstrate this tendency as he merely resettles the essences that he attacks by
formulating a renewed essence for the human ego. Ryan Knight (2013) argues against post-anarchists and shows that post-anarchist critique is characterized by an underestimation of classical texts and their respected anarchist authors. Knight shows that while their understanding of power and their essentialist notions of the subject were criticized, one can also find examples of attempts that display efforts to overcome these shortcomings. One other aspect of contemporary anarchist critique, and by anarchism I have shown that one has to be cautious of framing what this actually means, is the question of antagonism. This point is directly linked to the question of power, arguably part of it, in relation to the binary of statism and anarchism that is central to the literature considered anarchist. The questions of power and antagonism show an interesting argument as it is picked up by post-anarchists from the poststructuralist positions and utilized for example through the writings of Max Stirner. Knight shows that even other anarchists, such as Bakunin, did also conceive of an undogmatic and anti-essentialist anarchism, one that does not rely on antagonisms.

Saul Newman (2001a, 2002) proclaims Stirner to be a proto-poststructuralist in the way that he offers a justification for anarchism’s existence as a political philosophy. Newman along with other anarchist thinkers has attempted to ‘modernize’ anarchist thought. Like his predecessors, he is influenced by poststructuralism. Post-anarchism differs from classical anarchism and has deemed classical notion partially ‘unanarchist’. This includes the already mentioned localization of power to the state alone and the proclamation of essences in authors’ works. Post-anarchism as a label for works that to various degree conflate anarchism of sort with the thought of French philosophers, notably Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Guattari, Baudrillard, as well as others, situates itself as a political philosophy of radical anti-authoritarian socialism that has distanced itself to an to somehow still imposing classical anarchism that dominated until the 1980s. Post-anarchism is thus one new current of thought that has managed to establish itself within an anarchist philosophy since Hakim Bey’s call for a renewal of anarchist philosophy towards a more postmodern influenced literature (1987). The overall goal of the post-anarchism nonetheless remains the same as in classical anarchism. The goal is to create a society freed of hierarchic relationships. Freedom that is at the core of anarchist writing is defined by less hierarchy in between people.

David Graeber, who labels his own writings New Anarchism, approaches the question of development far more directly than the writers of post-anarchism. Graber aims his critique right at the development institutions, in particular the IMF. I argue that Graeber’s work fits in within theories of postdevelopmentalism. It is the constraints of development institutions that in Graeber’s analysis

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21 Todd May (1994) argues that one may be able to see the first distancing of anarchism from its ‘classical’ foundation in Colin Ward. Following Hakim Bey (his real name being Peter Lamborn Wilson), who wrote an essay called ‘Post-Anarchism Anarchy’ (1989) that called out for a reformation of anarchist thought, post-anarchism became a philosophy around the works of the early 1990s that are mentioned above in the text.
render the so-called developing world continuously lacking behind as countries never achieve independence from the Western hegemony. The continuous dependence directly hinders developing countries from managing their own affairs and Western countries exploit for their own advantage. Exploitation is for Graeber based on harnessing resources, exploiting labor force according to capitalist values that enhance the superiority and competitiveness of Western power elites at the cost of those that are under the grip of the development apparatus. One may argue that Graeber’s view of the traditional institutions that shape large parts of the world, the development institutions only being one among many, only reforms the concept of hegemony. Graeber who criticizes the classical anarchist placement of the state as an ultimate evil continues to formulate an approach that situates the development institutions in a similar spot as one-sidedly negative and hegemonic, here not based on statism but institutionalism.

In Hardt and Negri’s book *Empire* (2000), the notion of hegemony is also elaborated from a more poststructuralist perspective similar to Graeber’s reformed notion of hegemony. The problem of hegemony as a concept defined through a hierarchy alone however remains a strong argument in political literature. Hardt and Negri, as well as Graeber and postdevelopmentalist theoreticians in general, see exploitation merely in the form of institutionalization. They do not see how the same structures of power that define these apparatuses can be found all over in societies. All these authors though see power as a two-way-street in which all actors have power, no one is entirely powerless. This understanding often relates to Foucault. Despite this, however, Graeber, as Hardt and Negri and postdevelopmentalists, continue to overstress the importance of institutional ideologies as merely institutional and not part of a relational structure that includes those under scrutiny of the institutions. In short, they see a structural difference between how institutions and society function. These functions are seen as incompatible, more antagonistic towards each other. Society in their view functions best without institutions, and institutions without a society that attempts to counter their decisions. It is here that self-proclaimed anarchist movements that aim to dismantle antagonisms remain faithful to the concept as they rebuild antagonisms between what they term institutionalism and society. Graeber’s position on the IMF for example shows a renewed antagonism in anarchist thought. More, Graeber totalizes the discourse on how things can be changed for the better. Without noticing he has fallen into rhetoric that the development cooperation is heavily criticized for. This is defined by a lack of local consideration. Graeber sees the big picture, monetary issues and the regulation of markets, as the main factor inhibiting development (See page 76 for Graeber’s three point program). This perspective does not offer tools to detect local problems that lie deeper in the social strata. I have drawn on the arguments of Barker and Pickerill (2012), and Lagalisse (2011) to show that an approach like Graeber’s reproduces mainstream criticism of
development. This is defined by someone in the West that tells those in developing countries how best to overcome their misery. That is not to say that Westerners have no word in the matter or should refrain from making any suggestions, but a simplified vision such as Graeber’s continues the one-size fit all approach that Western policy has brought to foreign countries. Undogmatic approaches are a key of poststructuralist literature that is seen as a corner stone of a contemporary anarchism. Barker and Pickerill (2012), as well as Ince (2012) and Lagalisse (2011) tackle the issue of development and anarchism directly. They come to the conclusion that many self-proclaimed anarchists have fallen into a similar problematic relationship as the ones they initially criticized. By utilizing approaches that affirmed old Western hated policies in new guises they have reproduced and continue to reproduce politics of paternalism that follow the developmental premise that I described in the first chapters. This means that anarchists develop others with a distinct wish and hope to improve society, and because of this their activity may be regarded also a politics of development. Obviously I see some light at the end of the tunnel, inside anarchist literature as well as outside of it. I have drawn on the same literature as post-anarchists before me, specifically on the works of poststructuralists such as Deleuze and Guattari, and Derrida. I also utilized older relevant authors for both lines of thought. These older authors are Stirner (2006, 2009) and Nietzsche (1907, 1968, 1969, 1973, 1989). I have drawn on the concept of ‘minor literature’ (Deleuze and Guattari) as well as on the thought of Derrida to argue for an undogmatic approach to political literature. Minor literature is an application of the concepts nomadism and rhizome. Through this, minor literature attempts to produce an approach that does not dogmatically proclaim a particular idea to be righteous. Such a process would stand in opposition to something else and antagonize that which it critically engages. Minor literature is a radical step away from the proclamation of a group ideology. It enables individual creativity and approaches that are not imposed from a social group context. Minor literature, however, also relates to a potential form of social movement activity. The critical approach to social movements of Lagalisse (2011), and Barker and Pickerill (2012) does not attempt to eradicate social movements altogether. Rather, the critique is aimed at the negative aspects of social movements. Social movements are, and continue to be, a valid form of social resistance. Still, some aspects should be deconstructed internally so that the activity continues to represent that which it stands for. This is a form of an anti-developmental individual influence over any form of issues. Nomadic and rhizomatic approaches have the potential to help develop such social resistance (Day, 2005).

Post-anarchists (May, 1994, Newman, 2001a) have argued that their philosophy allows seeing into the hidden works of anarchist literature and thought. In short, they argue that post-anarchism helps deconstruct anarchism. This is only one of many arguments that are drawn from the poststructuralist
heritage that finds its way into a current post-anarchism. Here one may see a trace of Derrida’s deconstruction that I have mentioned to be of great importance to a discussion of development (Derrida, 1976, Caputo, 1997). Rouselle and Adams (2013) show that there is a need to deconstruct post-anarchism as there is an increasing tendency to produce a canonic tradition. Koch, May, and Newman, all have worked in similar fashions arguing from same perspectives with a canonic tendency that now lures over the entire school of post-anarchist thought. To hinder this development from continuing, post-anarchists should deconstruct the post-anarchist tradition itself and approach it from different angles with different authors that enable to see even into the inner works of post-anarchism itself. It is not enough to deconstruct that which one engages, but there is also a need to deconstruct oneself. The cases of anarchist social movements that I have described in depth at hand of Barker and Pickerill (2012) show that a deconstruction of anarchist social change mechanisms has to be deconstructed so that social change occurs to lesser degree on developmental premises. Deconstruction thus connects to social resistance that is described just before. More than rhizomatic and nomadic, there is a need to continuously deconstruct one’s own resistance so that inherent issues can be resolved.

Inspired by Derrida as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s (1986, 1987) texts, I have thus shown that development is also a non-institutional process in society. It is even part of the resistance to development itself. There is thus not a possibility to eradicate development. The focus should be laid on reducing the negative impacts that development has. Development should be approached more as a way of conduct than an antagonized structural phenomenon. Development may be found just as much in daily routines and even cherished relationships in our daily lives as in the IFIs that are seen as ultimate evil in postdevelopmentalism and also Graeber’s texts. According to the poststructuralist understanding of power there is no outside to power. I apply this approach to development and argue that there is no outside to development. There is no getting beyond it or dismantling it for something else to emerge, something else than development, as the postdevelopment vision proclaims. I argue that development has to be deconstructed to become a less patronizing process. This thought is obviously heavily linked to the anarchist focus of this entire work as I trace the problematic of development away from socially produced forms of administration and organization alone to relationships that occur between individuals within societies. Both, institutional and non-institutional aspects have to be considered. A precursor to the approach I advocate can be found in the works of Stirner (2006, 2009) who with his strong individualist perspective on society opened a discourse on the issue of the individual’s development confined to a society that serves and helps, as well as restricts and limits the individual’s ego. Stirner, however, overstresses the individual egoistic notion. Despite all the criticism of Stirner’s hyper-individualism (Clarke, 1976), the general argument
of an individual struggle inside a larger social framework remains an important issue to date. In regard to Stirner, I have also shown that his idea of a self-development as foundation for any sort of education or teaching can be related to Nietzsche, or even Derrida’s concept of deconstruction, because both thinkers argue not for societal solutions as the means to improve society alone but also for a strong sense of deconstruction on the individual level. Self-development, just as Nietzsche’s self-defined Zarathustra, are examples of such thinking. Thinking of this kind as implies a will to being (Stirner, 2009). The will however is strongly linked to the forces that Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1968, Deleuze, 2002) describes as factors making up life. Forces are relational and cannot be delinked from the social environment of an individual. Individuals always stand in relation to others. This is also part of Stirner who arguably develops this relationship to a lesser degree in The Ego and its Own (2006). Nietzsche manages to pose the problem of development and society much less dogmatically than Stirner. Stirner sees the individual and society almost antagonistic. Nietzsche shows that both are insurmountably connected and intertwined. In regard to dogmatism, one of Nietzsche’s main arguments reflected in his philosophy is an undogmatic approach, an unlinear philosophy that defies territorialization, or fixing as Stirner calls it. For Nietzsche as I have shown development is a concept that arises from self-determination supported by a philosophy that does not dogmatically fix the individual to norms, morals, or social hierarchies. In regard to tackling development, I use Nietzsche’s style(s) and arguments to show that development does not have to be so developmental. Nietzsche suggests a path of an affirmative and active being that wills to being and self-determination in the Will to Power (1968) and The Birth of Tragedy (1907). This path however does not disconnect the being from its environment, social and non-social. Rather it connects it through the affirmation that individuality has to stand in relation to the social. In Nietzsche, development and development cannot be separated as they are intertwined. The individual development is strongly related to the development of its environment, the environment that produces forces that make up every being. Forces, however, even exist if one attempts to disconnect oneself from something, in my case, a society that develops. This applies to all forms of antagonism and essence in Nietzsche, not only to development. Development exists and will always do so. In order to tackle it, one cannot attempt to eradicate it. Rather, one has to understand how and why one attempts to develop others. Social movements also often are agents of development, as I have argued. Thus, it is not about seeing social movements outside development, but show how and where social movements deny development at the same time as they produce development. As Graeber (2013) has shown, 22 Here, morals refers to Nietzsche’s work Genealogy of Morals, a work not referred to in the main text. The main argument that Nietzsche follows in the book is the fixing of morals in Western Christian societies. By situating himself to a morality of the opposite Nietzsche tries to show how ridiculous either morality, or anti-morality is. The book may well be linked to Beyond Good and Evil where Nietzsche follows a similar path to criticizing morality in its foundation.
there are always possibilities for social movements to remain undogmatic, to produce social change not defined by a developmental premise.

I will now turn to the next chapter where I will bring together and discuss in depth the arguments from the previous three chapters.
Chapter Five

Discussion; or The Good, the Bad, and the Developing Developer

5.1 Origins to Development and the Postdevelopment Position

Let me start this chapter by reconnecting to the beginning of this thesis. I began by giving an overview over what development authors have deemed the beginnings of development. There is a consensus among authors that development has been created or invented at one point or another. From that specific point onwards development became produced and reproduced in an increasingly institutionalized framework. The process of narrowing down what development implies has been itself object of debates as new definitions of the term emerge that only vary slightly from the ones preceding them. The development picture inevitably boils down to be of politico-economic significance despite all the concessions that are made to other fields. I have drawn on the connectivity to Orientalism (Said, 1979) in the first part of my work and argued that Orientalism as a concept has more than merely structural similarities that are recognized by Escobar (1995). Due to the narrow understanding of what development is, or should be, postdevelopmentalists such as Escobar and Esteva do not more but to approach these fields by recognizing their existence. Relating development to Orientalism in a postdevelopmental sense becomes difficult as Orientalism draws the attention away from the antagonistic relationship that postdevelopment literature is built on. In the first instance Said’s (1979) description localizes Orientalism in the medieval Catholic Church that sought to establish a knowledge base of its own antagonistic other, the Muslim world. Said along others who I have mentioned (Illich, 1970; Blussé, 1995; Mersland et al., 2013) attempt to trace a form of development, one that postdevelopmentalists only marginally acknowledge as such, to older forms of social establishments. For them the Christian churches are seen as a dominant driver of developmental practices. Illich (1971a, 1979) relates this mainly to the Catholic Church of his time, the 1950s to 1970s, in an approach to bring the understanding of development and religion closer to each other. Illich’s main focus on the 20th century does not mean that the issue to him is one of purely modern concern but Illich doesn’t ever go further than arguing that the Catholic Church has been an agent of development for some time. Illich does not contribute to the picture of a structurally defined development. He rather proclaims a radical step away from all other forms of educational development that can be found in Western societies (1971b). This includes the school systems just as much as capitalist mechanisms that imprint on the human. Regardless of being a child or grown-up, all people are developed on a daily basis through external mediums and practices that...
unwillingly dominate daily routines. For Illich, one aspect of looking at a society freed of the socially imposed forms of development can be found in the concept of ‘conviviality’ (Illich, 1973). Conviviality roughly equates to an individual sense of free creativity. It is a way of approaching individual expression, freed from the framing social boundaries that a society implies on the individual. Machines for Illich are the opposite of convivial visions as they not only are made to produce repeatedly the same but enforce their duty onto those that come into contact with them or their products. Conviviality is a way out of development, out of enforced impositions by systems and systematic machines.

The postdevelopmental perspective sees development as a construct of a specific economic condition that manifested itself over the entire globe through the means of colonialism (Ferguson, 1990; Escobar 1992a, 1995; Esteva and Prakash, 1998). This condition already started in the colonial periods of imperialism but manifested itself in the end of WWII when neo-colonialism slowly took over with the US-hegemony establishing itself in a decolonizing world. One can conclude that the postdevelopmentalist critique is situated mainly in the framework of a capitalist society and does not look beyond the boundaries of what this defines as such. Even those who attempt to broaden the scope of postdevelopmentalism find themselves in this same thought, tracing further into the past without leaving the capitalist framework.

Despite the separation that often is made between religion and secular approach, Cowen and Shenton (1996) show how entangled development becomes with religion in the earlier periods that they define as potentially developmental. Saint-Simonianism, particularly through the work of Comte, in this context stands out not only as the earliest development movement that Cowen and Shenton describe but as a strongly religiously influenced movement that based its philosophy on Christian values. Despite this, however, development always remains a modern notion that in its definition is devoid of religious meanings. Mersland et al. (2013) see this as a fundamental problem of critical development literature. Stirrat (2008) shows how the religiously dominated picture of a missionary is applicable to most contemporary development activity, even that which defines itself secular. For Stirrat, the idea of a missionary is reflected in the wish to alter others, develop with the self-conscious knowledge and the belief that inevitably development will bring about positive changes. Typical grounds of contemporary missionaries, Stirrat argues, are NGOs. In NGOs, views are proclaimed on the basis that these are superior to the ones practiced in the local setting that the NGO is active in. In short, Stirrat sees NGOs to be in the same position that religious institutions, represented by missionaries, were in the past.
Connecting a religious understanding of development with a market oriented notion is also the approach of Leonard Blussé’s (1995) analysis of Dutch colonization in Formosa, today Taiwan. In opposition to the perspective of others that I have mentioned (Ferguson, 1990; Escobar, 1992a, 1995; Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Esteva and Prakash, 1998), Blussé does not relate development to the narrowly defined emergence of capitalism which is set to the mid-18th century, but engages the Dutch colonization of the early 17th century. Departure for the developmental aspect in this particular case is the tension between what Blussé describes as the harsh colonial administration and the Dutch Reformed Protestant church that had to send a missionary to the colony to serve the colonists’ religious needs. On Formosa, development occurred in a context that is disconnected from what Cowen and Shenton (1996) call ‘doctrines’, the large scale policies of developmental kind. For postdevelopmentalists, it is these doctrines that led to the ‘real’ development that started with Harry Truman and the US-dominated global universalizing institutional hegemony. Blussé (1995) shows a very interesting picture that not only hints at the importance of religion but makes religion a departure of developmental thinking and practice. The second anchor of his argument is once again a colonial setting that is defined by economic interests and the control of territory. Striking to the picture portraits development as a hegemonic tool is that Blussé shows not the colonial institutional framework to be of significance to the occurring development but the opposite of the same. Here, development originated from a resistance to the administration that was seen as overly brutal and harsh towards the locally living peoples. Candidus arrival brought about a new relationship between the Sinkan, the neighboring people of Fort Zeelandia, the Dutch colonial trading fort, and the Dutch colonists. For Blussé it is Candidus’ approaching the Sinkan that ultimately led to the conversion of a majority of the village as well as rendering them dependent politically on the Dutch through the expropriation of decision making processes that were passed on to the Dutch directly. The end result can be seen in the traditional picture of an institutional development as the Dutch colonial administration formally took on the roles that Candidus and Junius created in the first place. The emergence of this all however lies in fact in a religious origin. Missionaries as Candidus’ and Junius’, on Formosa and in other places, should however not be placed into a general picture of a solely developing clergy. To conclude from one religious branch to another would be taking a wrong shortcut.

The Dutch Reformed Protestant Church for example emerged in wake of the reformation that swept across Europe. As a revolutionary religious movement one should not make the argument that the deeds of one essentially imply others would do things similar. That means that religion, particularly the Dutch Reformed Church, is one expression of development. To argue otherwise would require a more detailed analysis of just this factor. I put it this way. Through Candidus’ and Junius’ work Blussé
(1995) shows how religious thinking became a means of carrying the message of development that fits to the contemporary understanding of the concept. For Cowen and Shenton (1996), such religious developmental notions can be traced to Saint-Simon and in relation to him, Auguste Comte, a follower of Saint-Simon. Their approaches however are not seen as development yet despite the religious importance that underlies their work. Also Illich (1971a, 1979) and Said (1979, 1993) have shown in this thesis that developmental approaches can be found in at least one other Christian religious denomination. For them, Catholicism similarly developed as the Dutch Reformed Protestant Church that Candidus and Junius were part of.

Rist (1997) traces development back to Aristotle, further than Illich (1979), Said (1979), or Blussé (1995). In his sense, development becomes a purpose for being, individually as well as societal. Development occurs at all levels. This of course departs greatly from the postdevelopmental notion while it helps to conceptualize development as something more than an institutionalized power apparatus that postdevelopmentalists describe, or Empire as Hardt and Negri (2000) phrase it. Either perspective, that of postdevelopmentalism or that of Hardt and Negri, critically discusses the superstructure that in Marxist writings is seen as the object to be conquered by revolutionary forces in order to transform society to a state of Marxist socialism. This transformation following Marx has a strong sense of development (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). While arguably there is a lot of truth to the problematic of superstructural development as shown by postdevelopment, it is postulated as an unnatural state, one that has been brought about by power. Resistance to this occurs at the revolutionary bottom of society, the working class. In traditional Marxism this bottom of society is regarded as the proletarian class, in postdevelopment it takes the shape of third world citizens, the third world subaltern so to speak which is not to an insignificant part made up of indigenous people. I have shown how Kiely (1999) and Bebbington (2000) touch on this in their critical assessment of postdevelopment literature. For them, the positioning of a specific group is a renewed setting of the ‘noble savage’ that is considered an outside to the invasive influence from the poisoning Western world. The noble savage thus has retained a pure form that enables him, or it for that matter if one is to situate that issue more gender neutral, to return to a the primal state of being, the pure form that is natural to its existence. While this may over stress a notion of singular answer in postdevelopmentalism, in the core it hints a fundamental problematic of the critical literature in general. I have noted how poststructuralism influences the analysis of postdevelopmentalists. Escobar (1995) attempts to work a Foucauldian understanding of power into his works, despite this though the notion of poststructuralist power becomes molded into the already previously existing understanding of previous Marxist influences, for example dependency theory. The inherent paradox is that both conceptions, the somewhat Marxist influenced postdevelopmentalism on the one hand,
and a Foucauldian power concept on the other, cannot easily work together as one proclaims a static location of power while the other, poststructuralism, stresses the fluidity of the same. The same can be said about Hardt and Negri’s *Empire* (2000) in its reproduction of Marxist hegemony, or more precisely the Gramscian concept, with a slight spicing of poststructuralist power. Both approaches open up the concept of hegemony showing how power operates not only vertical but on all direction, horizontally, vertically, and everything in between. However in the end Escobar, and Hardt and Negri return to the old standing paradigm that the top, the superstructure, controls it all to a large degree. The superstructure continues to stand strong and steady. Hardt and Negri (2000) draw direct links to the IMF and World Bank in a similar fashion as postdevelopmentalists in the way that they perceive of their action as purely hegemonic and part of the superstructure that has to be toppled.

An alternate approach to the reigning paradigm of Western *development* is sought out in social movements. Being a popular source of resistance, social movements emerged very strongly in the 1990s. To development critics Escobar and Esteva, the Zapatistas that set foot into the public in 1994, have been an inspiration to their idea(ology) of post-development. I have shown how Esteva and Prakash (1998) describe a movement of movements, social organization as an extension of social movement activity. In opposite to centralized state apparatuses that according to postdevelopmentalism are highly perceptive to Western developmental influence and hegemonic control, postdevelopment is defined by a decentralized order in which social movements, each with their respective focus, cooperate to discuss and formulate a locally determined politics. Social movements are idealized into pools of resistance that struggles for a liberal, anti-globalized, anti-capitalist future. With this approach postdevelopmentalism has marginalized the negative political effects that this system may produce. I have discussed the political concerns of such as system in regard to Esteva’s (2010) analysis on Oaxaca. There, the political situation enabled social movements of a large variety to effectively seize control over an urban population of few hundred thousand. Rather than playing out as a case example of postdevelopmentist excellence, the entire situation became a blur of positive and negative political actions that at the same time as enabling local decision making processes opened up corruption and power seizure by individual groups or people. This is not to say that the situation was overall negative but it shows that social movements alone cannot be seen or conceptualized as the alternative to *development*. I argue that the problem goes deeper than social movements alone. One needs to search in the processes that define not social movements, but the political will to change that is inherent in social movements just as much as in other forms of social organization. This also applies to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). It is not the argument of this thesis to dismiss social movements, rather to look how they can enable political power to individuals while refraining from some form of imposition that directly or indirectly
affects people inside and outside the movement. Social movements, as I argue, are not the beacon of social justice they are made by postdevelopmentalists. This also applies to many anarchists who see social movements overly positive. But I will discuss the anarchist angle in depth in just a moment. Social movements, as all social organization, are in themselves part of practices of development, positive and negative at the same time.

Postdevelopmentalism in its approach has manages to open space on the international scale, pushing for more locally determined decision processes but at the same time it does not question these with the same scrutiny that it applies to the large international framework. Instead it homogenizes social movements into small scale political entities that each individually come together in order to bring about global change. The G8 demonstrations that Graeber (2011) and Escobar (2001, 2009) discuss stand as an example of a process of producing a seeming homogeneity. In this context social change is seen as collecting a critical mass against development in a global fashion that can bargain politically for change that is seen as positive.

5.2 The Postdevelopment Critique Discussed

From the overall departure of this thesis, the postdevelopment perspective, I continued down the path of anarchism in general, and post-anarchism in particular, in an attempt to visualize a notion of development that becomes more related to a broader social application.

I started the excursion into anarchism by showing that classical anarchists of the 19th century were themselves part of what one might call developmentalties. Authors such as Kropotkin (1990) or Bakunin (1972a, 1872b) argued against societies of hierarchies while proclaiming an approach that build on the revolutionary spirit of those exploited by states and the capitalist economic system. In a similar fashion as Marxists at the time Kropotkin and Bakunin became entangled in revolutionary approaches that sought to overthrow the leaders of the social framework for the remodeling of the entire system according to anarchist ideals. These ideals however did not account fully for the complexity of ‘power’, the main enemy of anarchists at that time. What defined the philosophical approaches was the understanding that power could be transcended and abolished once hierarchies were dismantled. Anarchism was seen as the tool, the crowbar, to unhitch the individual from the hierarchic place that it occupied in society. An anarchist society was thus showing an outside to power. It created freedom by eradicating the hierarchic structure of the state. For Kropotkin (1972a), I have shown that technology was one way of achieving a liberating anarchist society that he thought out in community. Community is an important concept to regard in this entire issue of development.
as Kropotkin, but also Bakunin and most other self-proclaimed early anarchists, were part of creating a philosophy of societal scale. The goal was to erect a new form of society that was built without hierarchies, but in cooperation of individuals that respected each other and largely altruistically came together to form ‘communities’ (Kropotkin, 1972a). Kropotkin thus thought of community as a potentially non-development al social form of organization. Community, however, was also understood as a medium-sized conglomerate of people that share similar thoughts, practices, ideologies, and visions. Community thus has more of a seclusive signification that allows people of the same state of mind to come together.

Communities that were part of Kropotkin’s repertoire continue to form and reform in different shapes often in anarchist circles and are referred to as collectives. Barker and Pickerill (2012) show that the basis of what is collectives works on very typical developmental practices. These are the setting up of collective spaces that are founded on principles that are not shared to the same degree outside the group. In their research, Barker and Pickerill specifically look at cases where anarchists have moved into indigenous communities with the acceptance of the local people. Newly created collective spaces did serve as a way of breaking up old negatively viewed practices in communities. However, rather than simply breaking up what was affecting marginalized and disempowered in the community, collectives emerged as a force that attempted push for changes that were controversial. To this end, collectives attempted to grow and enlarge their reach over the entire community. In developmental fashion attempts were made to include more and more people so that a critical mass could be reached that then was able to push for social change on the communal level. That is not to say that all of such attempts were essentially only reflecting the needs of those of the collective. I have argued that those who develop usually wish to improve a situation. There is thus a positive idea behind development, at least outside postdevelopment theory which sees it evil from the root upwards. The result of collectives and movements that accumulate an ever increasing social body to support their cause can be seen as developmental as a majority or strong enough mass, a critical mass, used its power to dictate the rest how to act. Grassroots activity bypassed the commonly in place democratic structures and produced its own form political authority over societies. Thus, movements only reproduced the democratic structures of communities which enable some to execute their will over others. Already Ferguson (1990) showed how such behavior initiated by development agents has created struggles within communities. Ferguson and postdevelopmentalists in general consider this approach developmental when initiated from the outside, or the hegemonic international to be precise. I argue that even if originating from the inside a community, this behavior reflects a developmental process. Once again, I stress though, that social movements are not essentially bad. The anarchist angle of Barker and Pickerill (2012), just as the example of Ferguson
(1990), shows that social movements, despite being a developmental actor, did not one-sidedly produce negative effects. Social movements have to be seen as agents of empowerment and disempowerment. In some regards, they reduce developmental aspects while in others they continue to practice them, as the forces that the social movements resist.

For Day (2005) an anarchist philosophy that traditionally has placed a certain importance on the individual should not attempt to produce a social majority that uses its position to influence, or even control society as a whole on this basis. For him imposition from a social majority is one of the key problems in contemporary social change, or development. It is a system based on the assumption that those who can rally most support gain more. One might also state it different. A system that develops most to gain support achieves most. It has to be stresses that in many instances decisions are not even controlled directly by those who had the majority behind their back. In the institutionalized system that postdevelopmentalists see as a linchpin in the entire debate on development, often times no support has to be rallied as political decisions that continue to designate and justify procedures were ratified far in the past when support was given or are even decided behind closed doors. What concludes from the discussion of Day is that only where decisions are left to non-strategic societal behavior, that attempts to gather large scale support, a society emerges that one may argue is freed of development. This is not a statement against development per se as one could see how there was no progress in a society without a common denominator. Rather developmental processes have to be negotiated better in within societal approaches. Day does not deny society its justification, as Stirner did. Day envisions social change as a less strategic approach. I have related Day’s approach to the concept of minor literature as nomadic and rhizomatic perspectives enable to see undogmatic and imposing societal approaches. This means that for Day development is not something to be found in institutional frameworks such as the IMF, World Bank, or even states. For him, it originates in behavioral structures that underlie the named institutions as well as societies everywhere. I mentioned Stirner, so let me discuss his importance in regard to development.

In an attempt to return to the individual back to its right place, Newman (2001a, 2002) in particular draws on Stirner’s strong individualism that defines society not as the locus of individual fulfillment but as a confinement of the individual’s freedom of expression and being. Stirner (2006) does situate society to be essentialist constraining but he does not conclude that society in itself should be disregarded or abandoned. For him society becomes a playground in which one may be encouraged to alienate oneself. More than this, for Stirner an egoistic being has to distance oneself since only such a being can emancipate, only an emancipated being can form a union. I have shown how Stirner conceptualizes society to be a union of egoists where each individual retains its sovereignty to the
highest possible degree before submitting to any social entity in which it places itself. For Stirner, society is thus not a passive entity that one is born into or joined by the will of others, for example parents, but a rather fluid concept that is always actively willed by an individual. People may choose to join social frameworks that they themselves conceive as positive and helpful. One is one’s own agent of development as only the individual being has the right to decide one’s path. Nothing, no right or individual sovereignty, is given to an outside being. Stirner’s notion of individualism arguably takes the author to a drastic and radical place of being, where the social becomes a battleground of individual contestations. Stirner does not deny the influence that a social outside can have on an individual, but stresses the importance of individual interpretation and signification. Since everything happens out of individual interests or selfish reasoning, even love or hate, one might argue that Stirner aims to place being outside of development contexts. To state it again, I have shown how development as a concept is based on the understanding of one party influencing another with the belief of improving the ones that are being developed.

Through Clarke (1976), I have shown that the social connections that Stirner draws for an individual often cannot confine the hyper-individualism that defines Stirner’s work. This generally leads to problems in regard to seeing the individual not purely egoistic. While stressing the importance of the individual in regard to development, Stirner has to be seen with caution despite his attempts to also approach a more socialized human subject. Kaplan’s (1997) main definition of development isn’t very far from Stirner, however relies on the social as an agent to bring self-development to the human being. For Kaplan development is about teaching or improving the self-consciousness of anyone. The development practitioner is a very important aspect in an individual’s development. A philosopher that retains a strong sense of individualism like Stirner without postulating an overly detached human subject from its social environment is Friedrich Nietzsche.

Nietzsche puts individualism into a constant struggle with its social and non-social environment. For Nietzsche, the interplay of the individual with its environment always produces what can be called the development of a person. Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1973) stands as the strongest individual character in Nietzsche’s philosophy that encounters the problematic relationship of himself with the world that he travels. For Zarathustra, individualism and solitude always stand in a distinct relationship to his travels that he makes down from the mountain where he lives alone in a cave. Even in times of solitude however Zarathustra is not a detached being from the world he lives in. Development for him occurs on not only on the social level but also his relationship to the animals that live among him as well as the sun that is a major anchor for him, one that he talks to as if it was answering being. Development lies not only in the social, but also the non-social. Everything that one encounters produces development and in a way even the non-social develops.
Development remains a strong notion in Zarathustra’s life, be it in times of solitude or in his teaching and being taught among other people. In Zarathustra’s overall understanding of life, one can find an opposing notion to Stirner’s hyper-individualism. Zarathustra’s search for the Overman is a search for a solution to development, the answer to the question how man or society can achieve a final state. This search, however, has to occur not in Zarathustra alone, but in the human society that he again and again visits. Only in the end does Zarathustra realize that his endeavor has had a distinct impact on himself. Where Zarathustra argued against pity, piety, and resentments within the societies that he visited, he comes to realize through the people that he invited that he himself has not been able to rid himself of these traits. This becomes motivation to continue developing and searching, a search that will never end as Nietzsche shows that there is never an end to human development. There is no Overman, just as there is no end to development. Zarathustra becomes a mirror of Nietzsche’s philosophy that works against notions of linearity. The Overman does not exist, more, it can only stand as a fixation of thought into categories. This is a Dionysian realization of Zarathustra. Nicole Andersen (2003) and Deleuze (2002) argue that Nietzsche always defied fixation and thus stands as an author that self-deconstructed himself on paper in front of the reader’s eyes. Derrida’s (1976) concept of deconstruction also builds on the premise of Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole. Derrida elevates what he refers to as a Nietzschean style to the level of a philosophical concept, the concept of deconstruction. Deconstruction’s purpose is not to overthrow systems, it rather stands as a tool to reflect on concepts, argument, morality, everything really. Where many authors including classical anarchists and postdevelopmentalists imagine something new, a new world emerging from the ashes of the old, deconstruction stands as a practice that analyses that which exists. Through an analysis, a deconstruction, of the inner meaning and underlying foundation of thought and practice, society can be changed. I have shown that not only classical anarchists and postdevelopmentalists have taken paths that produce revolutionary spirits of a critical kind. Also post-anarchists that utilize poststructuralist thought including the concept of deconstruction, find themselves in antagonisms. This occurs despite their attempt to overcome the antagonisms that classical anarchism has produced. Rouselle (2012) and Bryant (2011) argue against classical anarchist notions of power that according to them antagonize the state as the ultimate evil of freedom. In the same line these authors also argue against the notion of essences that define the human subject and society as a whole in the classical texts. What has emerged from their arguments against essence especially, however, is a renewed antagonism. Instead of essentializing the human subject and society authors have come to antagonize essence in itself. This is reflected in a total anti-essentialist philosophy that goes far beyond that of Nietzsche. Nietzsche (1968) also argues against essence on the individual level but does not ontologically deny essences. For him essence reflects as a singularity-thinking that always has to stand in relation to the multiplicity that the singularity is part
Singularity is not more but a stress on one aspect of the multiplicity. Nietzsche always engages singularity, or essence, in a way that allows it to remerge with the multiplicity. In fact, essence has to stand in this relationship to multiplicity. As a being one is always focusing onto aspects that cannot be comprehended in their full complexity, connectivity, or multiplicity. Thus one always tends to produce singularities, essences. This is also the case in post-anarchists’ approaches, such as the one of Rouselle and Bryant. Bryant (2011) has argued that post-anarchism in general has merely disavowed essence as authors can only theoretically deny the application of essence. Bryant in fact goes further and argues that post-anarchists have continued this disavowal that already poststructuralists have begun. Bryant’s argument, however, misses an important aspect that defines the work of authors that he criticizes, for example Derrida and Deleuze. From Nietzsche’s view on essence, or singularity, one can draw the conclusion that it is not about denying essence as such; it is about seeing it as part of something bigger that it can be returned to. This also connects to my perspective on development in an important manner. Development has been defined as taking influence upon others. Through Stirner I have shown that this development always reflects the will of some individuals that is reflected upon society, or a group to speak more general. Similar, as essence is merely a overstressing of a single strain of thought that always exists in a multiplicity. Development is thus not something to be overcome, as postdevelopmentalists, Graeber (2011), or Hardt and Negri (2000) proclaim, but something that has to be seen in the context that it stands. This is a society made up of individual characters that somehow have to compromise to form a society. The problem of development is that it pushes for the wish of a few or even only one. For development to accept the multiplicity that exists it has to firstly be aware of its singular aspects that allow for a patronizing behavior. So far however, development still reflects the view that a group has the right to influence other. This does not limit itself to the so-called developing world. In the so-called developed countries this practice has also its justification in the way that societies function. This function is always based on some having more influence than others, some arguably even have none. Development is thus not a process occurring where Western countries, the developed countries, take influence but also in any other country including the Western ones. Nietzsche is especially important to my argumentation in one regard. I have argued that development is part of human interactions in developing and developed countries. More than this, development occurs between individuals on a daily basis. Development describes a particular way of relationship that sees one person as imposing knowledge on another person with the intention of improving that person. This shows a strong connectivity between people in regard to a personal development and their development through external influences. In Nietzsche, one can see how development and development are intertwined. Both occur in the same instance. While people are developed, they develop; and vice versa. They
have to relate to each other since they occur on the same plateau, the same plane of human experience.

Deepening the discourse on development, I have continued the path down poststructuralist authors. Deconstruction as a tool to engage and deconstruct development is not the only one of interest to me. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) have introduced the philosophical concept of the rhizome. The rhizome stands for a structure that is a plateau. This plateau represents all that is without every producing hierarchy. If one is to imagine all that the plateau reflects as points on the plateau, the rhizome further does not connect each point to another through a single connection but connects all points to all other. This insures the ability of connecting everything theoretically to everything, no hierarchies even within the plateau can emerge. The rhizome reflects a thinking that defies hierarchies as well as essences as nothing can be essentially connected to another thing alone. Everything is open and remains open to re-interpretation. Full connectivity defines the rhizome as Deleuze and Guattari argue. The rhizome arguably relates well to Nietzsche’s view on essence. For Deleuze and Guattari it is about keeping open possibilities, keeping the multiplicity functioning without ever turning into a singularly determined structure. The focus of this philosophy is also strongly linked to nomadism. Nomadism is an important link to the rhizome as it further opens the eyes to how a deterritorialized or unfixed structure functions. While the rhizome visualizes a system of kind that defies fixation into hierarchies, nomadism is the process that denies the fixation in a continuous manner. Nomadism and the rhizome relate to the problems that I identified in regard to development. Development represents a process of fixation through the proclamation that certain ideas are ‘good’ and should be strived towards. Rhizomatic processes, and nomadism, allow for lines of flight that defy fixation. Without fixation, individuals are free to develop outside of developmental frameworks.

A concrete example of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy that in itself is also influenced by Nietzsche can be found in their concept ‘minor literature’ (1986). Minor literature stands as a work that puts the rhizome and nomadism into action. The book argues for a literature that does not let itself be fixed by norms and styles. Literature should stand as a way of individual expression. Minor predominantly defines a way of thinking that is inseparable from the rhizome and nomadism. Minor literature also is not strategic. It denies fixation and the strategic thinking that attempts to fix categories. Minor literature thus stands as an idea that expresses itself through anti-hierarchic structures that always leave lines of flight. Stagnation, fixation, ranking, all are aspect that a minor literature engages.
5.3 Some Words on Development and Development

The question that arises at last is following: Where does this all leave us in regard to development? How can anarchism continue a debate on development without falling into the dilemmas that other have before? The answer to these questions is not simple. More than this, it cannot and must not be simple. I have argued that development is based on a process of fixation and framing. This concludes that one should not already in writing produce an analysis that itself frames a message into certain categories, frames and fixations. This would only leave development to reemerge in a new disguise. I have noted how Stirner (2006) calls such a renewed faith a ‘spook’.

Development is a concept that in itself is difficult to bring to a point as I have shown. For postdevelopmentalists, development conveys a strong sense of imperialism and hegemony (Ferguson, 1990; Sachs, 1992; Escobar, 1995; Esteva and Prakash, 1998). I have shown that this oversimplifies the problem in regard to the social functions that underlie development. First, development cannot simply be eradicated through the dismissal of the international paternalistic Western development system. I have shown that development in many instances comes close to development. The distinction that I draw between development and development has been shown in the introduction but let me recite it here in short. While development implies a direct and actively willed intervention into someone else’s development, the word development is commonly understood as a natural process of development. What poststructuralist, anarchist, and post-anarchist approaches have shown in this thesis is that often times these two separated concepts are not easily distinguishable. Where the individual alone develops without interference, a development exists. Stirner (2006, 2009) has overpowered the ability of an individual to develop according to this understanding in a social context. Postdevelopmentalists on the other hand have mistaken local and social movement development for development. They have produced a geographical dichotomy of place. One place is inherently bad, another place is inherently good. For them social movements are devoid of development and represent a form of development. I have argued Nietzsche has managed to situate the individual’s dilemma of being developed in a life where it wishes to develop best. Nietzsche’s (1968, 1973, 1989) positioning of the human subject shows that both concepts are connectable, not necessarily antagonistic to each other. To me, Nietzsche manages to situate the individual – I have drawn heavily on the individual character Zarathustra – into a social context in which both, development and development, are linked in a manner that leaves room for individuality. For Nietzsche in general, and Zarathustra in particular, development and development rely upon each other. The relation of one to the other has to be approached individually as well as societal.
In this problematic condition, I believe anarchism, in particular post-anarchism, can help with its strong notion of an individual subject. I argue that post-anarchism as a philosophical thought stages a situation in which the border between what individuals conceive as development and development may be debated better than currently possible within a system of hierarchic structures (May, 1994; Newman, 2001a). That is not to argue the common conception of anarchism that all hierarchies are unanimously bad. Oftentimes, development as well as development builds on certain hierarchies. These however I argue from the anarchist perspective should remain open to discussion from the sides of both, the developer and the developed. A relationship as such leaves lines of flight, routes of escape for both involved (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, 1987). A relationship between two individuals, or even more for that matter, can also be described by a strong sense of a deconstructive will. Deconstruction (Derrida, 1976) as I have shown is a breaking of fixations, an examination everything in itself and its relation to everything else. This includes the relationship between developer and developed. Kaplan (1997) has argued for a rather simple definition of development. For him it is basically a thought and teaching of increasing consciousness. Self-consciousness does relate itself to deconstruction in the way that a conscious being is the premise of deconstructive thought. Everyone engages in it on daily basis. For Derrida however deconstruction infers to not an individual process alone but also a societal.

I argue that development must become a choice, a decision of development, where individuals are not pressed into development, but freely chose to join and leave developmental situations. Only where chosen can development become development. Such a developmental situation however also implies a rhizomatic environment (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). The relationship between those who develop and those developed should not be paternalistic as the current relationship between the so-called developing and so-called developed world that postdevelopmentalists describe in depth. As I have argued, developmental relationships are also to be found in many other forms of relationship additional to the grand picture of ‘first’ and ‘third’ world. I have talked briefly about the educational system (Illich, 1971b, 1973; Stirner, 2009), but also the dominating working arrangement and the societal systems of representation are largely based on a developmental premise.

In regard to written expressions – after all I am writing a thesis here – I argue that a literature that invokes an anti-developmental sense without leaving the development arena could potentially be called a minor literature (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986). I state this as an anti-developmental literature that does not leave the developmental field as I have argued that development cannot be eradicated or transcended. The characteristics of Minor literature, however, can also influence other areas of development. One focus of this thesis has been placed on social movements. I have described how aspects of social movements remain developmental despite their attempts to transcend
Minor literature attempts to revolutionize literature, but the same mechanisms can also find application in other social practice. Nomadism and the rhizome can find application in social movements in the same way that they are situated in minor literature. Both concepts tackle a key argument of minor literature. This is the idea that ideas are not produced in an attempt to produce a major framework. This is also one of the problems of social movements, according to Day (2005). He argues that social movements continue to build societal frameworks rather than proclaiming the independence of individuals from such frameworks. Social movements thus often reflect the will to a society that is still defined by majority decision making processes. This occurs despite the wish of social movements to resist large frameworks that see as imposing, or developmental. Minor literature opens possibilities to see how change is administered without claiming a large majority framework, without using mass as justification for change. Minor literature thus opens a radical perspective to see change not as a socially framing aspect that always imposes, speak develop, on some who did not agree. Minor literature enables to see social change through nomadic and rhizomatic, speak deterritorializing, conceptions.

In the first chapter I posed the question whether development in fact has an origin. Postdevelopmentalists all agree on some origin, be it in the 20th century or earlier. Even critiques that engage the postdevelopmentalist belief of an origin in US-hegemony formulate an origin to development. Rist (1997) puts this arguably furthest into the past and traces the concept to Aristotle. Others remain in a capitalist framework (Larraine, 1989; Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Hart, 2009) or one that conflates religion and capitalism (Illich, 1979, Blussé, 1995). Also development ideas, or ideals as I have referred to them in the first chapter, are not new but a constantly changing territory. I have shown how the development debate relates strongly to other academic fields that have engaged so-called ‘third’ world countries on other grounds. The connection to religion that Illich and Blussé draw creates a link to Orientalism in one regard. Orientalism (Said, 1979) however, as post-colonialism in general, approach development from differentiating angle than postdevelopmentalists. Through Said’s approach to development for example one can relate potential development thinking already to the early 14th century. That is not to say that this marks an origin. Said is only interested in the beginning of Orientalism. Orientalism in its beginning however already built on a developmental premise. This argument of mine is almost supported by Escobar (1992b) himself, who notes that both Orientalism and development share structural similarities. It follows that development is not a merely imperialist, new, and exploitative system of control as proclaimed by postdevelopmentalists.

I have however also looked critically on contemporary anarchism and in specific the post-anarchist school of thought. I have shown that there is a tendency to territorialize ideas into certain anarchist
frameworks (Rouselle and Adams, 2013; Jeppesen, 2011). Anarchist frameworks become territorialized around certain ideas such as definitions of what constitutes anarchism and what does not. This is an aspect that is already seen as problematic in Derrida’s poststructuralist approach to deconstruction (Caputo, 1997). Territorializing literature is in danger of producing what Anderson (1983) refers to as an ‘imagined community’. Such a community would be imagined since it is a belief alone that connects one being to another. Produced connections were fabricated and do not in reality. Thus while possible alternatives exist, a community would not allow for these alternatives to be regarded. It has fixed a theoretical field to a territorial imagination.

Territorialization is generally considered as a bad practice in poststructuralism and post-anarchism. There is however a tendency to conceive of classical anarchist notions, I have specifically approached the concepts of essentialism and antagonism as described by anarchist authors, as essentially bad, or un anarchist. This practice resembles territorialization and has led to a drastic reversal of some aspects that while considered rightly problematic, are turned upside down to resemble yet another essentialist and antagonistic relationship. I have noted on how post-anarchism has situated itself as anti-essentialist on a poststructuralist foundation that arguably is not there as such. This relates directly to the question of antagonism as post-anarchist have become antagonistic towards the concept of essence it its roots. I have shown with the help of Nietzsche (1973, 1989) that essence has to be seen in its full relationship to a multiplicity that always defines it. In regard to development this means that an argument against development in its postdevelopmental understanding should not rely on essential conceptions as the one proclaimed by either, postdevelopmentalists or some (post-)anarchists (Rouselle, 2012, Bryant, 2011). This applies similarly to notions of antagonisms. Nietzsche dissembles antagonisms in his philosophical arguments as well as his literate style. In my arguments development and/or development should not be built on an antagonistic relationship as this is the foundation for an imposing paternalism that postdevelopmentalists and post-anarchists engage fundamentally.

The title of this chapter is ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Developing Developer’. This may serve as a last aspect of this chapter, as it nicely concludes this excursion. Everyone is subjected to development. At the same time everyone develops others. It concludes that according to the postdevelopment understanding, which states that development is something bad, everyone is ‘bad’ at the same time as everyone is ‘good’. The human being is a developing developer. It depends on the situation that one finds oneself in whether the first or the second is the case. The best situation is one where both, being developed and developing others, are negotiated. The relationship between being developed and being the developer should be a negotiation where all involved have to be able to define their participation or retreat if they wish. Development should become a self-willed possibility rather than
a forcing domination. Individuals’ development would then, despite some remaining form of imposition that I have described as always being present in development, be willed by individual people. Beings would place themselves into a developmental hierarchy, a hierarchy over which they retain control and can leave whenever they wish. At the same time they can continue to be developed, so that it may enhance their being and they are responsible for their development.
Chapter Six

Conclusions

This thesis departed from the critical approaches of postdevelopmentalists to the concept of development. I have shown how this critique is based on a view that postulates an US-American hegemony to be the dominating drive for an international process of control. This control is also described as neo-colonial by postdevelopment authors as it continues the former colonial power in a new form with a new single supreme regent at the top, the USA. In many ways, the postdevelopment perspective thus produces a spatial analysis that is at the heart of a geographical analysis. Postdevelopmentalism sees a spatial dichotomy wherein some space is essentially imposing - the development apparatus defined by the US-hegemony- and another space is liberating. The liberating space is the field of social movements. Development, in the argument of postdevelopmentalists such as Ferguson (1990), Escobar (1992b, 1995), and Esteva and Prakash (1998) is a universalist agenda that became manifested through US-hegemony, that emerged after World War II with the policies of Harry Truman. With the help of the development policies, political influence was aimed at controlling governments in so-called developing countries. The establishment of the international development institutions, most importantly the World Bank and the IMF, further strengthened the neo-colonial aspirations as the US and its allies of the Western world could directly influence economic tendencies of entire countries that became labeled ‘underdeveloped’. According to postdevelopmentalists, all effort that has been made by the international, as well as national institutions, to develop the so-called developing countries was merely a false pretense for creating control and extracting resources that Western countries had and continue to have need for. To make it short, development is a new political form of old imperialist practices. But rather than controlling territory in itself, development is an apparatus that controls states through the medium of international institutions.

There has been much critique on the postdevelopment perspective, even from within. Postdevelopmentalists, according to Mosse (2005), Pieterse (1998), Kiely (1999), and Bebbington (2000) among others, have demonized development cooperation. Development, according to the critiques of postdevelopmentalism, does not one-sidedly exploit developing countries. The base line of the critique goes along the lines of a statement has often been repeated. This stresses the structural problems that development encounters and underlines the mistakes that were made in the past. Nonetheless, authors including Rist (1997) and Mosse (2005) argue that there is also something positive to be seen.
My critical perspective on postdevelopmentalism departs from the issues that Rist (1997) or Mosse (2005) focus on. Their attention engages a structural improvement of development processes while I approach the basis of postdevelopmentalists’ alternatives to development. I have summarized the alternatives to be of two sorts. First, there is strong sense that the international institutional framework of development is inherently problematic for a self-defined local development of peoples. The second approach of postdevelopmentalists focuses on social movements. These are seen as the key to resisting development. The institutional problem that postdevelopmentalists see is based on the premise of the second argument, as I have argued. This is an embrace of local development.

I have argued that the postdevelopmentalist assumption of a US-dominated world falls short in light of national institutions also being part of the problem of developing people according to their beliefs of what is best. This means that even national agents develop. This connects to my argument that development is not only an international process but one that occurs in all countries at all times, developed as well as so-called developing. Presenting the international institutional framework as the primary target diminishes the role that other levels have on cost of a highly political stance against the US-dominated hegemony.

Visualizing social movements as a counter to development and development also falls on false pretenses as I have argued. While social movements are not generally built up as institutions their structural characteristic is not freed of developmental tendencies. I have drawn on the work of Verancini (2010), Lagalisse (2011), and Barker and Pickerill (2012) to show that social movements often repeat mistakes that are being made by development agents. The example of Oaxaca that Esteva (2010) describes also shows that even a postdevelopmentalist perspective has to see social movements with more caution. Thus, social movements, even if radically engaging institutional development, may well pose a different form of development. This form does not fundamentally differ from the development criticized by postdevelopmentalists. Still, social movements are not entirely negative either. I have shown that social movements can become agents of the change that I have envisioned. Social movements can adapt to form approaches that are based on the concept of minor literature that I have applied not only to literature but also the activity of social movements. But let me continue a little more before I return to minor literature.

Day (2005) argues that social change through the means of gathering a wide support is in itself problematic. Societies today, defined as a merger of individuals, always remain developmental in respect to how some manage to influence others by manifesting control over the entire social fabric, for example a nation state. Development as a consequence of being a group dynamic can thus only be fully deconstructed by viewing it from a more individualist perspective. Only as individuals can
people detach themselves from any form of development. This is however not where postdevelopmentalists wish to take their argument against development. For them, development and development always happen in the social. A purely individualistic picture is neither a perspective on development that I have argued for.

Through the example of Max Stirner I have shown how individualism can take a too drastic form. Stirner (2006) positions the individual in a hyper-individualism in which all deeds are pleasing the individual ego and nothing but the ego. For Stirner altruism is a self-pleasuring deception that despite the seeming good will helps the ego most. For Stirner, a society has thus to be understood as a ground where individuals may cooperate without inhibiting their radical individual tendencies. As a consequence Stirner envisions a union of egoists. In a union, everyone joins for their own reasons rather than committing to a consensus that one may in fact not believe in. Stirner did make some concessions to the radical individualism that defines his work *The Ego and its Own* (2006) in an article that he published later (Stirner, 2009). Nonetheless, his arguments for a possible society are not convincing in regard to the drastic picture that he paints and defends in *The Ego and its Own* according to Clarke (1976). Despite this though, I argue along Saul Newman (2002) that Stirner should not be neglected in an overall debate on development, as he shows the struggle of an individualistic being in a society that works on ground of a uniting ethic of nationalism. This struggle is important to understand for an anarchist, and particular post-anarchist, approach to development that I follow in this thesis.

Post-anarchists before me (May, 1994, Newman, 2001a, Koch, 2011) have engaged classic notions of anarchism and proclaimed a renewed philosophy of anarchism on the basis of poststructuralism. Post-anarchists thus serve as a meeting ground for my discussion of development that basis itself on poststructuralist and anarchist authors. Along this I focused on Nietzsche who himself has been of importance to both schools of thought, post-anarchism and poststructuralism. In my analysis of poststructuralist authors I approached mainly Derrida (1976, 1979), and Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1986, 1987). In regard to Derrida, I looked at ‘deconstruction’ as approach to development. In Deleuze and Guattari, I focused on their concept of the rhizome, nomadism, and a minor literature. All concepts have supported my approach to development that attempts to see the relationship of those developed and those developing in a more complex and relational manner than postdevelopmentalists have argued.

*Development*, I argue against the common postdevelopment conception, is not a structural framework that can be eradicated. There are no simple solutions to problematic frameworks of developmental processes. In fact, one cannot eradicate development at all, but only change the
imposing character that it entails. Deconstruction may be used as one tool for that. For Derrida, deconstruction is a revolutionary practice that looks at the thought and practice of society instead of seeking a solution in new mechanisms. Deconstruction thus connects to Stirner’s concept of the spook that I have described. Deconstruction however also connects to Nietzsche as he already in his philosophical style deconstructed his own thought. Derrida (1979), Andersen (2003), and Deleuze (2002) argue that Nietzsche relies on heterogeneous characteristics in his literature that allows him to circumvent any fixation of categories as manifested by postdevelopment authors in regard to the concept of development. Working against fixation is also one key aspect of Deleuze and Guattari’s approaches that I have used. The rhizome stands as a structure that denies fixation and hierarchization. Nomadism, as the term implies, also works against the notion of fixation in that it conceives of societies as movement that enable lines of flight.

All aspects of poststructuralist approaches, I see to some degree present in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1986) concept of a ‘minor literature’. Minor literature in itself stands as a means of literate signification that defies fixation and hierarchies. It however also proclaims a distinct aspect of deconstruction that Deleuze (2002) connects, as Derrida does, to Nietzsche. Minor literature also engages the problems that I have identified within anarchist literature as whole and post-anarchist approaches in specific. These are a renewed essentialism in sense of an anti-essentialism, an antagonism in itself (Newman, 2001a, Rouselle, 2012). The concept of minor literature also finds application in social movements, as I have shown. Rhizomatic and nomadic approaches to social change are already part of some social movement activity. I have referred to Occupy in regard to this. Still, most social movements continue to territorialize a multitude of thought into a single core message or vision. This applies to anarchist social movements (Barker and Pickerill, 2012) as well as non-anarchist ones (Freire, 1996; Lagalisse, 2010; Day, 2005).

Despite this, I argue that post-anarchism, enables a perspective that continues the critique of postdevelopmentalists without falling into the same problematic aspects of idealizing social movements. With a post-anarchist understanding social movement can become less developmental. Post-anarchism also opens ways to perceive of institutions in a less hegemonic sense. All in all, I have shown that both, social movements and the development institutions have to be seen in a more reflected light that does not idealize the one while demonizing the other. This antagonism rests on the assumption that local self-determination, in form of social movement activity, is development-free. I have shown that development also occurs where institutional frameworks are resisted (Veracini, 2010, Lagalisse, 2011; Barker and Pickerill, 2012) and social movements have taken over power from the development apparatus (Ferguson, 1990; Esteva, 2010).
Utilizing my critical perspective from post-anarchism and Nietzsche, I have described a picture of development that relieves itself of the constraints that postdevelopmentalists have attached to it. Development becomes a concept less antagonistic towards a particular framework of domination, the international Western development apparatus for postdevelopmentalists, as well as less antagonistic towards post-anarchist conceptions of essence. Through Nietzsche I have described development to be closer to development than others have allowed. Development, written in italics to show its separate meaning from development, has been described in this thesis as an active will of taking influence over someone else with the intention of improving their lives. Development, on the other hand, implies an individually defined development without outside imposition and constraints. Through Nietzsche, one can see how the one is interrelated with the other, how development and development occur on the same plateau. Both have to be placed into closer proximity to each other. Instead antagonizing one for the other it becomes important to negotiate the relationship of those that develop and are developed. This can be achieved through an anarchist understanding that undermines the hierarchies that are inherent to all developmental frameworks. These frameworks are part of societies of all countries, so-called developing as well as so-called developed. Thus, it is important to look beyond the mere international development apparatus that postdevelopmentalists describe and attempt to trace development in other social aspects as well. This tracing however, as I stressed, should not go along with a simple attempt to eradicate these as development cannot be eradicated it itself. Rather, the relationship has to be deconstructed and opened to become one of choice. Individuals will always be influenced, developed by others, the question is thus not whether, but how this occurs. Radical individualism as proclaimed by Stirner (2006) does not sufficiently describe the complexity of the human relation to other individuals and society as a whole. Stirner’s anarchism overstresses the individual while postdevelopmentalists idealize a conception of community as seen through the arguments on social movements. A Nietzschean understanding of post-anarchism serves to clarify the individual dilemma to me. A post-anarchist approach should not overstress the individual notions of development and development. Both occur in social environments and individualism. As anarchism sees the individual as the key to freedom, one has to put individualism into boundaries that do not deny the positive character even of development. The common anarchist definition of freedom as less hierarchy should not presuppose that all human interaction is hierarchic and consequently negative and developmental. This is one of the shortcomings of Stirner’s anarchism. This dilemma of each individual is reflected in the will to develop while being developed by other parts of the social environment that a human being is part of. Nietzsche shows that a developing being is always also developed and developer. Thus, one cannot eradicate the one aspect from the other as it would undermine the individual in its own strive to develop and ‘develop’.
To clarify, *development* and development are inseparable. One is building on the foundation of the other, and vice versa. Being implies a *development* as well as development. Both occur at the same time. While I develop, I *develop*. While I *develop*, I develop. There can be no black and white understanding of this relationship since I, a being, am relational to others. This means that social resistance also occurs in an environment where while people resist *development*, they are *developed*. There is thus no outside to development, no pure space where no development occurs. There is no geography of dualistic *developmental* spaces. All *development* occurs in the same space as development. Everything is situated on the same plateau.
Epilogue – Pelevod’s Will to Power

The light returns and the curtain falls. The end credits are still running while everyone rushes out into the darkness. It is night and the movie has ended. Once again there is time to let the mind wonder off. There is time to reconnect to Pelevod.

The intermission concluded that everything develops, no matter how disconnected to a social environment that being is. Development is in being. I have started to talk about Nietzsche and his work *The Will to Power* (1989) in the intermission but deepened the analysis in chapter four. From this emerged the understanding that life is a multiplicity of forces that are created through being. Forces have to manifest themselves against resistance Nietzsche writes (Nietzsche, 1989, 346). This seemingly contradicts the conclusion from the intermission. I argue, however, that even pure individuality potentially produces resistance. Being is multiplicity in itself and out of this resistance occurs. Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s focus lies on the social aspect of forces.

Forces rely on resistance to emerge, but it is the Will to Power that interprets these forces (Deleuze, 2002, 53). Forces are signified through feelings. That however does not mean that the will to power is a mere predicament to forces. This means that Will to Power is neither a supplement, nor is it an internal characteristic of force. It cannot be traced into a relationship or territorial location. What it is, is either an affirmative, or a negative signification (Nietzsche, 1989). Being in itself in a sense is Will to Power and thus one cannot equate the Will to Power to a will per se. Will to Power determines at the same time as it is determined (Deleuze, 2002, 63). Deleuze asks: Who wills the Will to Power? and answers that the question in itself is absurd since being is by itself Will to Power (49).

I argue that Will to Power for Nietzsche is the underlying source of an individual’s development. Only through he Will of Power does one make sense of the forces that make up the individual’s relation with the world. The will to power is that which gives my being an understanding of what happens to me. Since being is Will to Power and being exists in a state of total nothingness, as Pelevod finds itself in, even Pelevod has a Will to Power. Pelevod is being as I have defined in the intermission. So then, I argue that being, or Will to Power, is a potential source of development for Nietzsche. Since development and development are interrelated, Will to Power is that which produces this relationship. While it is forces that entice my Will to Power to development, it is the expression of the same Will to Power that signifies development in relation to other beings. These other beings themselves are made up of forces that produce a distinct reaction from their own Will to Power. In conclusion it is my Will to Power that relates my development to other people’s forces that produce
development in their beings. As a consequence the opposite is just as true. Their *development* relates their Will to Power my forces that relate to my Will to Power.

Since Pelevod is in total seclusion this looks different. It is merely the engagement with itself that entices change in its forces. As a consequence Pelevod’s Will to Power can only express itself towards the forces of its own being. Pelevod thus can only *develop* itself, a process that in all approaches that I have analyzed in this thesis is referred to as development (non-italic).

This all means one thing. Only a being in total seclusion, a being in a state of nothingness, can develop, while everyone is doomed to a state of development with distinct parts of *development*. I wish to argue that it is rather the opposite in regard to who is doomed. The doomed one is Pelevod. Already its name is nothing but an anachronism on the word develop. Without *development* what entices but one’s own being. Nietzsche put it this way: “A living thing wants above all to discharge it force: preservation is only a consequence of this” (Nietzsche, 1989, 344). I put it this way: What is more interesting than engaging other beings, other people’s Will to Power.
Bibliography


