Nordic security dynamics: Past, present – and future?
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Abstract

The security situation that has traditionally characterized Norden has been described as a periphery under pressure. Despite being geographically peripheral the Nordic region has been the subject of considerable tension in the last centuries. The Nordic countries – albeit having significant cultural similarities - have not approached the security challenges of their region as a united security bloc but have rather chosen to follow distinctly national agendas while preferring practical and non-integrative solutions to some of the most pressing challenges. Their mutual cooperation has taken a ‘de-securitized’ form that is not uncommon in modern sub-regional institutions but has been elevated to a positive merit by some Nordic theorists.

Nordic divergence has been emphasized by the different security experiences the Nordics faced in the First and Second World War, and by the Cold War when national diversity enshrined in the ‘Nordic balance’ was seen as a force for peace. However, the Post-Cold War security environment has changed both the traditional understanding of the nature of security, and the concrete challenges and expectations facing Nordic states. Up to 2008, the different countries’ reactions to such pressures have shown as much divergence as convergence. The question is whether greater Nordic unity and ‘securitization’ of the Nordic cooperation agenda could be brought about by, first, a new set of proposals presented to Nordic Ministers in 2009 (the Stoltenberg Report), and second, the larger new security challenges emerging in the High North. The present analysis suggests that these particular two impulses may still be insufficient.
Preface

The decision to write about Nordic security relations was not taken at any specific moment in time but rather developed gradually throughout my studies at the University of Iceland. Throughout my studies I had been interested in the Nordic states, and in particular the special pattern of institutional alignments that characterizes the area. Nordic peculiarity or 'specialness' seemed to be a recurring theme in studying the Nordic countries and this 'specialness' served to increase my interest consistently. Another area of studies that fascinated me was the security changes we are experiencing in today's world. In my view this new security environment seemed to outdate some of the more basic security theories and concepts in international relations, and emphasized a need to address security in a way that was different from and more multidimensional than the more classical theories seemed to suggest. So when asked in my last semester what I wanted to write about, combining these subjects in some way seemed like an obvious choice and a good way for me to approach my final assignment.

During my work on this thesis I have benefited from the help of many of my friends and colleagues whom I would like to thank for their input and support. I would especially like to thank Baldur Þórhallsson and Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir for their guidance throughout my studies. For help provided with regard to sources, I would like to thank Alma Sif Kristjánsdóttir, Jón Kristinn Ragnarsson, Helgi Hrafn Gunnarsson, Kristófer Hannesson and Margrét Cela. I also would like to thank Pertti Joenniemi, Jean Marc Rickli and Louise Hamilton for their willingness to give their time and for their input and advice. Finally, I especially would like to thank Alyson Bailes for excellent guidance and input during the writing of this thesis as throughout my studies. Without the help of these people this thesis would not have been possible. Responsibility for the final contents presented here, is of course, entirely mine.

This thesis is the final assignment in the MA studies of International Relations at the University of Iceland. It accounts for 30 ECTS credits and the instructor was Alyson Bailes, Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Iceland.

Kristmundur Þórir Ólafsson.
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Introduction

The Post-Cold War era has brought about many new challenges and opportunities for the Nordic countries both as individual countries, and in terms of their mutual relations. In the area of security these challenges include a new international emphasis on 'new' or 'asymmetric' threats that are more transnational in their reach and broader in their application than traditional military security. The challenges of the 21st century security environment are driven on the one hand by global developments, as the increased interconnectedness of societies caused by globalization has contributed to the increased need for more concerted action. On the other hand, at regional level, the institutional structure of the larger Europe has changed dramatically with the formation of new structures of cooperation and the increased integration and enlargement of the region’s larger institutions. This has brought significant changes for Norden, notably through the accession of Finland and Sweden to the European Union which strengthened a pre-existing institutional division that existed within the area. As Finland and Sweden are not part of NATO, Denmark is still the only Nordic country that has opted for the double integration in both institutions: but it still retains four opt-outs from the European Union’s policy areas, one of which is the area of defence.1

The focus in this study will be on how these changes affect Nordic Cooperation. Nordic Cooperation has formally existed since the early part of the twentieth century. The five sovereign states which it covers – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – together with dependent territories like Greenland, the Faeroes and Åland - are not only geographically connected but are brought together by commonalties in culture, law, religion, language, economics and history that increase their affinity for each other and their sense of common interests. In spite of widespread cooperation concerning almost all aspects of society, Nordic Cooperation has yet to develop in the security field, except in some cautious and limited respects. During the Cold War this field was expressly excluded from the Nordic Cooperation agenda due to the different security

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1 In June 1992 the Treaty of Maastricht referendum in Denmark produced a wafer-thin victory for the ‘No’ vote. The treaty was eventually passed in a referendum thanks to a ‘National compromise’ that included four opt-outs concerning policy developments in Economic and Monetary Union, Union citizenship, Justice and Home Affairs and defence. For the official version of the opt-outs and their consequences see: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Danish opt-outs’, in 24.march 2009, URL: http://www.um.dk/en/menu/eu/thedanishoptouts/
solutions adopted by the five Nordic states.

The Post-Cold War security environment has been characterized by the increased interconnectedness of societies driven by the advent of globalization. Globalization and European integration both contribute to the changing political environment in the 21st century where increased interconnectedness, and therefore increased interdependence, has brought about new challenges and vulnerabilities to be dealt with. These changes have also created a strong impetus for Western thinkers to re-conceptualize traditional theoretical approaches in order to increase their explanatory value by refocusing them towards these changed realities. Integration and globalization have undermined the state-centric notion of power and revealed new vulnerabilities within societies, stemming from varying sources above and below the state level. These 'new' and 'asymmetric' threats force us to widen the focus of security studies and increasingly focus on the 'softer' dimensions of security. These changes not only force the Nordics and other states to re-address and think anew their security policies, but also engage other actors in society with regard to their contribution and interaction on these new challenges.

The first chapter below clarifies the theories and concepts used in this study, and is intended to illustrate how the mainstream Western understanding of 'security' as a concept is becoming wider and more inclusive than before. It addresses how 21st century realities challenge traditional approaches in security studies and how some new approaches can add value to the understanding of 'security' by addressing a wider array of threats to human welfare. It attempts to bring focus not only to the 'hard' security realities of conflict but also to the so-called 'soft' aspects of security not traditionally incorporated into security studies – ranging from organized crime to extreme weather. Illustrations are given of how different approaches in addressing these challenges affect international institutions and state interaction as well as how they incorporate and affect different actors in our societies. Particular attention is drawn to Ole Wæver's concept of 'securitization', which addresses the different implications of definitional and policy making approaches that shift the classification of a range of public policy challenges towards or away from the security concept as such.

The issue of sub-regional cooperation – the institutional category to which Nordic Cooperation belongs - is tackled in the second chapter, which illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of various sub-regional groupings in Post-Cold War Europe by probing their characteristics and functions within the global
institutional environment. What benefits can sub-regional cooperative institutions bring to a multi-sectoral approach to security? What roles are sub-regional groupings intended to fulfill? How natural is it to address security concerns at the sub-regional level? These questions are addressed with special emphasis on the characteristics and peculiarities of Nordic cooperation.

The history and evolution of Nordic cooperation up until the end of the Cold War is addressed in the third chapter. The main emphasis there is on illustrating the security dimension of Nordic cooperation and explaining why matters pertaining to security were formally kept off the agenda in Nordic relations in an otherwise broad and deep cooperation. By drawing on Nordic history in warfare up until and during the Second World War an attempt is made to clarify why Nordic countries have not been able to find a common denominator in security matters, but have rather dealt with their security concerns separately. This chapter explains how the different security perceptions, values, history, identity and geography among Nordic countries were among the factors contributing to the emergence of a security deficit in Norden during the Cold War. The desecuritized relations among the Nordics nevertheless created an area of stability (buffer zone) commonly referred to as the 'Nordic balance', thereby facilitating economic and cultural cooperation in an environment fraught with tension. Lastly this chapter illustrates Nordic examples in the formal and practical application of desecuritization, and probes the flexibility and resilience of (institutionalized) Nordic Cooperation by showing how that cooperation has been able to transform and re-invent itself in a changing environment.

Nordic cooperation in Post-Cold War Europe is the subject of the fourth chapter where the particular security challenges facing Norden today are explained. With the end of the Cold War one order came to an end and a new one began, bringing with it new challenges, new divisions, new vulnerabilities as well as new opportunities for the Nordic countries to examine anew the perceptions and prioritizations they hold in matters of security. The Post-Cold War security institutions have created new ideological and institutional divisions in Norden and this chapter addresses how various regional and global developments are pressuring the Nordic countries into more cooperation on security matters. This chapter addresses how different the new strategic environment is from the old one and why it might prove difficult for Nordic countries to maintain their peripheral and desecuritized approach in this new environment. Especially how the new environment has served to orient the interest of larger powers away from Northern
Europe and towards engagements outside Europe. Special emphasis is placed on how the increased absence of the US (as a strategic partner and guarantor) in Europe has affected the Nordic countries differently. The increasing tendency to securitization in European integration is explained, whereby the increased role and ambitions of the EU have put increased pressures on the Nordic states to participate in peace operations on the one hand, and on the other to address the security aspects of *inter alia* the environment, energy, and public health. The main questions asked are: How has the strategic situation in Norden changed? What make it hard for the Nordics to continue being peripheral and adopting a policy of desecuritization? What effect does the securitization of European integration have in Norden both with regard to the Union’s members and its partners? What particular challenges all the Nordic countries are facing and how have the responded to this new security environment individually?

The fifth chapter addresses the future of Nordic security cooperation and tries to identify some clues as to how the Nordic cooperation is going to deal with the 21st century security realities. It poses the question of how far the Nordics are going to be able to pull in the same direction in addressing their security concerns and in what way national sensitivities and different identities impinge on the possibilities and feasibility of cooperation. The central focus of this chapter is the newly published report by Norwegian former Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg and his suggestions about how Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy can be developed over the next 10-15 years. His report is then evaluated against the background of the analysis developed in the present study. The main question asked is how beneficial will it be for Nordic cooperation to securitize intra-Nordic relations now and what factors might push against or towards such development.

In the final chapter the emerging Arctic security agenda is examined and the instability, unpredictability and uncertainty of the effects further globalization will have on Nordic security is addressed. An attempt is made to pinpoint what the Nordic countries can do to contribute to management of the threats for their wider region following these developments, looking at the interplay between Nordic cooperation at the sub-regional level and the larger regional institutions in addressing issues pertaining to the Arctic. This chapter will address similar questions with regard to intra-Nordic relations and asks to what extent these developments have the potential to push the Nordics into securitizing their relations and increase the convergence of their security policy and outlook.
1. Theories and Concepts used in this study:

1.1. Old and new conceptions of security

Traditional (realist) approaches to security studies emphasize the importance of the state and its capabilities to survive and prosper in the international system. This approach presupposes that security and power are something to be maximized and treats the state as a unitary rational actor that tries to maximize its interests vis-à-vis other states in the system, in order to gain power over the minds and actions of other men (Morgenthau, 2004, pp. 49-50). War is the result of the anarchic structure of the international system where the absence of central authority forces states to protect themselves by the accumulation of military and economic power. One state’s accumulation of the means of security is therefore ironically the main impetus for strife; as such accumulation makes other states less secure. The result is a competition, a vicious spiral of security and power accumulation (Mingst, 2004, pp. 197-216). In such an approach war is not considered to be irrational, but rather an extension of the power politics where ... "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (Thucydides, 2004, pp. 18-20). Traditional theoretical approaches typically refer to a security spectrum that is somewhat restricted to its 'harder' elements, that is the area of military conflict. In order to constitute as a security challenge developments must threaten the existence of the state and its self-determination in a way that alters the premises for all other questions. States consider this kind of security to be a value to be maximized and increase their capabilities in order to survive and dominate in the anarchic world system.

While oriented towards the 'harder' elements of security, classical security studies are often also characterized by being territorially based and state-centric in their approach, which renders their frame of analysis quite useful when studying political developments before the end of the Cold War. The ‘softer’ (non-military) elements of security are not dealt with adequately by classical security theories as they do not adhere to territorial lines of demarcation or the realities of power. These elements are however demanding increasing attention today as they arguably constitute a graver risk to the welfare our societies and citizens than traditional state-to-state conflict, and in the Northern hemisphere also have more
widespread impact than the more deliberate forms of human violence.\textsuperscript{2} New approaches in security studies deal increasingly with threats like epidemics, extreme weather, infrastructure collapse, and pollution and the concept of 'soft' security is used to link such issues for clarification and demarcation. The fact that in the last twenty years more lives and property have been lost in the West due to extreme weather and epidemics than have been lost in conflict strengthens the need to look increasingly beyond state-centric notions of security and address the concept in a way more inclusive towards other actors.

If one is to think about security at some objective and natural level, a precise conception is most possible at the level of the state. The state offers a platform for a clear analysis that, to a degree, limits the confusion that 21st security realities beget, but as with any frame of analysis it imposes a pattern involving an element of exclusion. How natural and obvious that level of analysis is for addressing security matters is dependent on varying experiences and conceptualization: thus a state level of analysis can seem very natural when studying a single state or a group of states like the Nordic countries, but might not provide as much explanatory value in other areas where (for instance) states are weaker and threats ignore boundaries (Bailes, 2009(4)).

One of the central rationales for European integration has always been to avoid war ever again on the European continent, and protect the European citizen from the harm wrought by warfare and conflict by means of transnational cooperation. That cooperation has spawned a complex institutional community that changed the security order of Europe from a system of clearly spatially defined states into a community of highly integrated states. By eliminating the threat between them the European states the integration process in effect 'de-securitized' their mutual relations, which made it easier to facilitate cooperation in many sectors like business, policing, migration, culture, education and the like.

This integration reflects the interconnectedness of societies caused by the advent of globalization. Globalization and European integration both contribute to the changing political environment in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century where increased

\textsuperscript{2} According to the Emergency Database of Disasters (EMDAT database), during the period between 2000 and 2007, the EU-27 experienced 494 disasters which killed 79,342 people and had a total cost of €103 billion. The majority of deaths occurred in Member States affected by extreme temperatures, in particular during the 2003 summer, while floods caused most of the economic costs, in particular in 2000, 2002 and 2007. For more details, see: European Commission: A Community approach for the prevention of natural and man-made disasters, (European Commission, 2009).
interconnectedness and therefore increased interdependence has brought about
ew challenges and vulnerabilities to be dealt with. These changes have also
created a strong impetus for the re-conceptualization of traditional theoretical
approaches in order to increase their explanatory value and to focus them towards
these changed realities.

Traditional realist conceptions of security almost exclusively focus on state
interaction and dynamics in the international arena and therefore address sub-state
or non-state entities almost entirely by association. The alternative approaches to
security studies that have emerged in the Post-Cold War era, whether they are
labelled as a post-9/11 agenda, homeland security, societal security or human
security, increasingly widen the focus of security studies beyond the state and its
employees. They address how other actors both above and below the state level of
analysis affect and are affected by the changes in threats and vulnerabilities
caused by globalization. An important part of this re-conceptualization is to
address anew the security of the state in terms of its role in addressing the full
spectrum of risks, as well as the demarcation between internal and external affairs,
national boundaries and the limits of transnational cooperation.

The so called 'new' or 'asymmetric' threats are a category commonly used
to describe the new security policy focus that has emerged in the wake of the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US. It became clear with these
incidents – and the political and intellectual reaction to them - that integration and
globalization had undermined state-centric notions of power and revealed new
vulnerabilities within societies, and threats stemming from less defined sources
than the state. Threats like terrorist networks, influenza outbreaks, escalating
infrastructure breakdowns and national disasters are more multi-sectoral in nature,
and are harder to tackle at the national level (Rhinard, 2007, p. 11). New
approaches to security analysis increasingly place more importance on society, the
citizen, society’s institutions, property, the environment or food systems rather
than focusing explicitly on the state's territorial integrity. It is very apparent from
ongoing analysis, under headings like 'societal security' or 'functional security',
that a society's ability to govern and its ability to function, are now increasingly
becoming the primary objects to be protected (Rhinard, 2006, p. 514)

The likely long-term implication of this new security agenda is that a
wider area of social life will be more relevant with regard to public security
policy. A broader range of actors (e.g. business and NGOs) within society are
likely to be affected by this new agenda and there will be more interest in the extent to which they can contribute to a more secure society. In the shorter term, however, national answers to these challenges will vary as each country’s geographical position, security identity and interest will inevitably cause a difference in emphasis concerning the 'hard' and 'soft' aspects of its security. The George W Bush regime’s response to 9/11 might for instance be considered a very national and assertive policy addressing the 'harder' elements of the agenda, i.e. the deliberate physical violence represented by terrorism and nuclear proliferation, but downplaying to a degree its 'softer' aspects like environmental issues or the role of business. The roles played by non-state or sub-state actors in addressing the new agenda will therefore vary according to different emphases in policy adopted by state or regional actors (Cottey, 2007, pp. 174-175).

Here (see Table 1.1) an attempt is made to identify the relevance of different actors according to three different new approaches to security in comparison with a traditional Westphalian/realist agenda. The approaches represent a range from ‘harder’ to ‘softer’ security definitions as we move from left to right, starting with the Westphalian analysis based on inter-state competition, moving to the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 agenda as just described above, and then to approaches that look at wide-spectrum vulnerabilities for states and societies, or for the individual (‘human security’). The table is intended to illustrate how different approaches to address transnational security challenges cast societal actors in roles of differing relevance and marginality. Furthermore an actor's role will be labelled as either negative, passive or positive: negative when the relevant security approach casts it in a negative way; passive if it is viewed only as the object to be protected and unable to contribute to the security of itself and other actors; but positive where the actor’s input and contributions are recognized and considered relevant to the security of other actors and its own. For clarification and a more detailed illustration each box will also include examples of what aspects of the new security environment are deemed most relevant to each actor.
Table 1.1: Twenty-first century approaches to security: agendas and actors

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<td>Relevant and positive, Area of importance: Changing Structural conditions.</td>
<td>Relevant and positive, Area of importance: international law, anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation norms + actions</td>
<td>Relevant and positive.</td>
<td>Relevant and positive. Area of importance: Defining of international norms and individual rights.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marginal: Negative, Area of importance: Internal cohesion and stability</td>
<td>Relevant: mostly negative (security costs, ethnic strains) Area of importance: Anti-terrorist controls</td>
<td>Main focus on social resilience. Negative: Business failings, ?immigrants Positive: Business, civil groups +charities</td>
<td>Focus on treatment of the individual, social equality and mobility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barely relevant: very negative (challenge to state monopoly of force)</td>
<td>Relevant: mostly negative Area of importance: -Companies -Terrorist orgzns. - WMD smuggling</td>
<td>Relevant and fairly important. Negative: Organized Crime, Terrorism, irresp. companies Positive: CSR, NGOs.</td>
<td>Fairly relevant: Negative are violent NSAs, corruption etc and positive Companies, NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not relevant and very negative if challenging state</td>
<td>Quite Marginal: Mostly negative, targets for terrorism, organized crime. Positive: Alertness, Rights and liberties.</td>
<td>Important in principle Key Areas of importance: Positive: doctors, cops, firefighters, volunteers; societal resilience</td>
<td>Very relevant and negative. Drugs, food, alcohol, depression, age-ism.</td>
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The new 9/11 agenda for instance goes below the state level of analysis and addresses how different non-state actors (e.g. terrorism, organized crime) affect security challenges as well as the threats posed by failed states and WMD proliferation. This framing of the modern security environment is however somewhat limited in scope as it selectively (and mostly negatively) addresses the relevance of non-state actors. The relevance of individuals is quite marginal and mostly addressed in relation to the limitation of individual rights and liberties and
the legitimacy of those infringements.3

Functional or homeland security is a very useful term to address infrastructure vulnerabilities and the relevance of cyber-, energy, food and water security, and to handle border and immigration issues, as well as addressing how the global warming is affecting the security of the environment. As developed in the West it has tended to assume a clear and strong demarcation between external and internal security where the role of the state remains central in ‘protecting’ the territory and its people from new threats, shortages, supply interruptions etc as well as from traditional attack. At its extreme this approach risks casting society and individuals in a passive role as the objects to be protected, as well as downplaying the transnational nature of many functional risks and the need for more-than-national approaches.

The concept of human security has been developed in context of the 'developing' states, addressing the neglect of basic human needs, equal opportunity and human rights as well as how AIDS, crime, ecosystem damage or pollution are affecting the security of individuals and nations. It often involves a very extensive securitization of society. It often addresses non-state actors and international organizations in very positive terms especially in their role in defining international norms and rules of conduct while addressing the individual often implicitly as a victim to be cared for but not as a contributor. Furthermore states are framed as part of the problem in such an approach and those arguing for international intervention to help ‘human security’ victims explicitly challenge the principle of sovereignty.

By widening the focus of security studies, a new emphasis seems to be emerging that emphasizes the softer dimensions of security. Security no longer exclusively refers to the logic of Realpolitik but to a state’s ability and duty to provide its citizens with protection against other threats, whether they are of human origin or not. (E.g. AIDS, nuclear pollution, pandemic disease, terrorism, environmental degradation, cyber-sabotage) This change does not need to come as a surprise, as globally and especially in Western states the frequency and probability of actual conflict has decreased dramatically at the same time as the increased openness and technological nature of advanced societies has left them increasingly exposed and fragile. So while the threat caused by actual war has

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3 The 9-11 strategy and the interpreted implications are based on 2002 The National Security Strategy of the United States. (Council, 2002)
declined, the relative importance of other threats increases and popular and/or governmental perceptions are naturally turned elsewhere, in fact towards the softer elements of security (Bailes, 2009(4)).

The problem with applying the security concept to a broader agenda is knowing when to stop. If one thinks about security on the individual level or international level, one can make everything a potential security problem, and as the concept is applied to more and more aspects of social reality it becomes more emptied of content. Concepts like Individual security or international security, environmental security, or societal security are new and ambiguous because there is no history or tradition of “security” in non-state terms. What is happening has thus far been more of a critique, an ongoing debate within the tradition of national security discourse, a revision of its established set of discourse and practices.

Although broadening the analysis with “not only,” ”also,” and ” more than” arguments can help us understand how national security links up with various dynamics and political processes at the international and individual level, invoking the concept of security still evokes for many people a specific field of practice where the issue of national survival and resisting the challenges to sovereignty remain privileged. These classical conceptions of security are linked to the security environment before the end of the Cold War, but precisely because security has for centuries been used almost explicitly in terms of national security, the security concept itself does not have an independent, stable, context-free meaning. The set of connotations determined by the traditional security studies are still extremely influential, e.g. allocating to the state an important role in addressing a problem, viewing things in terms of 'threat/defence' or 'us/them' criteria, calling for urgent responses or extraordinary means, etc. Thematizing something in security terms still means, for the great majority, reading it through the lens of national security (Wæver, 1995, pp. 47,50-53).

The next section will look more closely at the different ways 'security' can be used in discourse and how 'security' as a word and the connotations attached to it can affect the agenda that emerges when used by different actors in different contexts. The effects are important not only with respect to the evaluation of threats but also because of the difference the nature and degree of ‘securitization’ can make to perceptions regarding the relevance and legitimacy of different actors. But how should we understand securitization itself?
1.2. (De)Securitization, Security as a speech act.

The examination of security as a 'speech act' can be considered a novelty in security studies that can help us further today’s understanding of security matters. This theoretical approach is characteristic of the Copenhagen school of international relations which involves inter alia looking at how ‘security’ can be applied in discourse and the effect of its application. It takes its starting point from the assumption that security is articulated from within institutions by society’s elite, who lay out the security interests of the state. It is important to bear in mind that the explanatory value of such theorization (as with all theories) is often most illuminating when used critically and in conjuncture with other theories.

Securitization is therefore a speech act applying the name of security to a specific field of activity. According to a classical analysis of securitization it is considered as a method a state/institution can use in order to assert its own control over the issue/activity in question. The institutional utterance of security frames an area of activity in a way that makes it a matter for the security elite to handle. It is therefore a consensus choice to discuss something in or away from the context of security, with both positive and negative implications. By speaking the language of security the elite can invoke the set of connotations connected to security studies and bring the relevant political development into the area of security. In this definition something becomes a security problem when the elites declare it to be one. By speaking the language of security an elite subtly re-emphasizes the survival of the structure which it heads, and claims a special right to use its own means of dealing with a given challenge, whether that means stopping political change, mobilizing a society’s population, legitimizing the use of extraordinary means or just emphasizing an issue of importance (Wæver, 1995, pp. 54-57).

In contrast desecuritization can be used to bring an area of activity away from the state and deal with it in a less zero-sum or constrained way. By articulating developments in a non-security related way a matter is increasingly thematized as a part of politics, economy, culture and so on, not as intrinsically connected to national security with all that that implies. The dynamics of securitization and de-securitization become clear if one stops thinking about security as a value to be maximized and turns it from a positive meaning to a negative one. De-securitization can open up the avenues of political change in the
same manner as securitization can close and direct them (Wæver, 1995, pp. 52-57).

The traditional reading of securitization involves treating security as a political concept detached from people’s everyday sense of values and welfare and referring instead to the field of national security and the discursive traditions derived from Westphalian or realist presuppositions. It deals with security as it applies to state relations and the risk of traditional war but is exclusive with regard to other actors and alternative conceptions of security. Such a conception of security and securitization can be very useful when describing 'high politics' or the political developments in Norden prior to the end of the Cold War, when national security was indeed considered first and foremost in terms of territorial survival and the price to be paid for independence: but might prove insufficient when the security discourse is widened to include the 'softer' aspects of the new security agenda.

These 'new' or 'asymmetric' threats are very interesting in relation to the dynamics of securitization/de-securitization as national security identities and values can often raise difficult choices for governments as they try to adapt to a new environment. On the one hand, as seen with the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 agenda described above, new non-state threats may be ‘securitized’ in a realist spirit so that the obvious response is to ‘make war’ on the new ‘enemies’ and the state can argue that other social, economic, legal etc considerations can must be subordinated to success and national survival. On the other hand, 'softer’ security dynamics at the societal or global level like financial instability, supply shortages, pandemic disease or extreme weather can pose such a threat to society and state that securitizing/de-securitizing them is not really much of a choice. The government is then forced to deal with these issues and determine its policy vis-a-vis other states and institutions, but also in its relation to other societal actors, and in a context where classic realist tools of military force, deterrence, or negotiations with enemies have no place.

In this more modern context it is important to keep in mind that while the elite can have a choice in what, when and why they securitize something, that choice is not absolute in any sense. Furthermore if one treats security as a speech act, the question that comes to mind is why should not other actors (including the media) have the option to securitize developments as well as states? For example, the EU’s Eurobarometer survey regularly does research on national differences in
the concerns ordinary people have regarding their security. These security fears of course vary according to exposure and experience, but in Europe ordinary people's responses often emphasize the more soft and individual aspects of security not explicitly conceived of as national security. May it not also be considered as a speech act of securitization when such concerns are articulated or expressed, as the emphasis of a majority of citizens must make it hard for states (and/or the EU itself) to avoid dealing with them? In this case it is non-state actors who are constricting the state’s choices through the definitions and priorities they adopt, not vice versa as in Waever’s classic theory.4

The subsequent chapters will address the past utility of desecuritization in Norden and attempt to build a bridge between the theoretical conception offered here and the concrete policy choices adopted by the Nordic countries, illustrating how the utility of such choices was determined by factors external and internal to the Nordic region in Pre-Cold War Europe. In chapter four these pressures for desecuritization are then contrasted with the Post-Cold War security environment, where the objective pressures are growing for greater and wider securitization of public policy and the separateness and peculiarism of Norden is being reduced by the salience of more transnational or common European challenges.

4 Admittedly opening up the possibility of securitization by non-state actors can be risky and troublesome. It runs the risk of securitization of identity, raising questions on societal issues like the securitization of immigration or excessive securitization of individual affairs. It invokes a series of questions that cannot be addressed in this study but would be an interesting aspect of further research. This includes, who speaks for society, companies or individuals? Is security applicable to all aspects of society or not? What effect securitization can have on resource distribution? In what ways can cooperation on security transcend zero-sum logic? And can the articulation of security by other actors change how we think about security?
2. **Sub-regionalism**

2.1. **Characteristics of sub-regional cooperation**

The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a gradual and dynamic process of increased cooperation and institutionalization in Europe. Where the Cold War divide had barred regular contacts and prevented close cooperation, today's Europe is characterized by an inter-locking and overlapping framework of institutions that fosters interaction and cooperation in the broadest sense.

The term sub-regional is far from exact but it refers to a geographically and/or historically reasonably coherent area whose states share a sense of commonality, whether that is thought of in terms of political, geographical, historic or cultural similarities. Nordic Cooperation, the Benelux cooperation\(^5\), the Central European Free Trade Agreements (CEFTA), the Visegrad group,\(^6\) the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) among others constitute groups that are commonly referred to as sub-regional. They are sufficiently distinct from larger institutions such as the EU or NATO to constitute different entities in the institutional framework of Europe, bringing to it, their own set characteristics, strengths and weaknesses. These groups have received relatively little analytical attention and are often perceived as weak as they lack the economic power of the EU, the military power of NATO and the standards-setting role of the pan-European OSCE (Cottey A., 1999, pp. 3).

Since the late 1980s the numbers and diversity of these institutional groupings has increased significantly as there emerged a belt of new sub-regional groups that stretched from the Barents to the Black Sea (BEAC, CEI, BSEC, CEFTA, CBSS). These new sub-regional institutions as well as the longer-standing cooperation in Norden and Benelux have played an important part in sustaining cooperation across previous lines of demarcation, and helped avert the

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\(^5\) A primarily economic grouping of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands

\(^6\) Created by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland after the Cold War and now including both the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
development of new divisions in Europe.

Although the aforementioned groups vary significantly some common characteristics can be found between them and the comparative weaknesses and advantages of such institutions vis-a-vis the bigger institutions may be addressed in a manner that illuminates the way these institutions contribute to different aspects of security (see Table 2.1). As each group is specifically designed to cater to the specific needs of its region, extensive differences can be found with respect to historical background, economic situations, number of actors and the geography these institutions are shaped by as well as the different agendas, instruments and norms they encompass.

The smaller groupings like Benelux, the Visegrad group and Nordic cooperation consist of few very similar neighbours. The smallness of the groups increases the effect historical familiarity and divisions have on the cooperation. The proximity of the members increases the perception of common interests making it easier for the states to pursue common interests and standards. This smallness can increase the depth of cross-border cooperation between the states in particular areas but has limiting affect on the given group’s resources and external transformative power, rendering it more dependent on the bigger European institutions concerning the provision of security. On the other hand, the Benelux and Visegrad groups have shown they can also stick together at least for some purposes when entirely enclosed in the larger institutions.

The new somewhat larger (medium sized) sub-regional groups formed at the end of the Cold War like CBSS and BEAC have been particularly important in stabilizing relations across old dividing lines and handling the tensions caused by the enlargement of EU and NATO. They constitute a politically acceptable institutional environment that facilitated Russia's re-engagement with the West by integrating it in a wide variety of structures designed to promote cooperation and dialogue, while also enabling states to explore their national identify in a non-confrontational and open-ended way. By preempting destructive competition among neighbours and partly preventing the damaging effect of economic fragmentation and protectionism, such sub-regional cooperation offer a platform for removing old damaging perceptions and allowing more positive forms of interaction to grow between states through cross-border cooperation. This sub-regional cooperation has revitalized old and new institutional dividing lines by enhancing cross-border transactions and also coordinating efforts on many soft
security issues in a way that contributes to real local needs in a way that remains somewhat detached from geopolitical realities (Bailes A., 1999, pp. 167-169)

The CEI, BSEC and the Arctic Council are very large and diverse groups which makes it hard for them to develop cooperation on a broad spectrum. They often provide governance in areas that otherwise might suffer from administrative deficit and be somewhat neglected. Like other sub-regional institutions they fill in the gaps in regional agendas and create a political platform where different actors can come together in order to discuss and cooperate on specific regional issues in a flexible and non-binding political forum that empowers sub-state and non-state actors. For smaller and newer states like those of South-eastern Europe and the former Soviet region they also offer training in the formation of national diplomacy and the creation of clear but non-confictual identities.

Sub-regional cooperation is therefore not only a product of Europe's new security environment but has rather been an important contributor to it by providing local actors with more freedom to pursue cooperation with their neighbours. Characteristic of sub-regional groups is that they tend to be very inclusive bringing together a broad range of actors across a broad set of issues. They tend to be less administrative, rigid and restrictive in their organization and constitute a flexible tool empowering and bringing to the table sub- and non-state actors like individuals, professionals, non-governmental organizations, cultural associations, political communities, municipalities and private companies. The value of personal contacts formed at all these levels is often easily forgotten, but the value of these informal connections can be considerable in facilitating mutual understanding, political dialogue and the awareness of common interests and interdependence among neighbours.

Sub-regional cooperation has never been considered as a reasonable alternative to the bigger regional institutions. These groups cannot offer anything like NATO's defence guarantees, or go beyond freer trade to a single market similar to the EU. The Visegrad cooperation had an overt security mission of dismantling the Warsaw Pact and achieving its members’ fast entry to NATO, but none of the other groups were set up in order to address 'hard' security issues; they have been considered either too small or too large (and hence too diverse) to assume any of the classic security functions such as peacekeeping, acting as a framework for military cooperation and defence modernization, 'hard' arms control etc. (Bailes, 1999, p. 166).
The absence of security concerns seems to be characteristic of sub-regional organizations as matters of 'hard security' cannot be sensibly addressed in sub-regional frameworks. The practicalities of nuclear proliferation, disarmament, military imbalances or defence guarantees are issues that are detached largely from anything local, and in accordance with the rule of subsidiarity sub-regional frameworks are clearly inappropriate frameworks for tackling such issues. Sub-regional contributions to hard security are therefore highly dependent on the openness and inclusiveness of the larger and 'harder' European structures. Sub-regional institutions' avoidance of/inability to deal with hard security issues makes room for a desecuritized vocabulary to be employed within them, allowing them to cushion traditional geopolitical divisions and contribute to security in more subtle ways.

Sub-regional cooperation has not been based on binding international legal commitments and rarely has any direct legislative affect within the member states. Such groups do not exert discipline or constraint over their members and lack the authority to enforce compliance. They rather build on political consent and are able to accommodate different motives, allowing member states to pursue diverging and even contradictory agendas provided that they all maintain their preference for continuing cooperation (Bailes, 1999, pp.158-159). Their inclusive and desecuritized nature enables them to add value to their members and neighbours more easily as they are not perceived as threatening to anyone and are considerably detached from zero-sum security dynamics.

These sub-regional groups’ security role is most evident in the realm of 'soft security'. They contribute on the one hand by positive pre-emptive and preventive measures like raising the living standards in the region; facilitating the development of trade and mutual investment, building common infrastructure and the cooperative management of borders. On the other hand they add value by averting and dealing with threats of a non-military nature to human welfare and survival e.g. pollution and other environmental challenges, disease control, joint handling of accidents and emergencies, immigration, refugee control, and anti-smuggling (Cottey, 1999, p.253). The multi-functional nature of these groups allows them both to address such issues very rapidly and to harness the added value non-state and sub-state actors can provide to their common security.

Sub-regional organizations therefore hold an important place in the institutional constellation in Europe. They seem to have the potential to span large
dimensions of security which few other institutions manage to reach - internal and international - and complement other institutions and processes in a way that illustrates the meaning and benefits of subsidiarity (Bailes A., 1999, pp. 158-170).

Table 2.1: Pros and cons of security-building at sub-regional level.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Issue</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A. Small, directly contiguous area (but less so if around sea) | More comparable issues  
Historical familiarity  
Possible common interests (lobby-forming potential)  
Scope to promote cross-border.  
Popular legitimacy easier. | Limited spectrum — of understanding and capacity.  
Historical divisions / tension cooperation–local asymmetries |
| B. Resource availability | Clearer local rationale and pay-back.  
Easier coordination, targeting and monitoring.  
Could combine state and non-state inputs, scope for sub-state Delegation of spending | Region’s own limitations  
‘Selfish’ national priorities  
If outside funding, risk of dependence/distorted agendas |
| C. ‘Soft’ rather than ‘hard’ security | Closer to grass-roots preoccupations/real local needs.  
Can coexist with, and offset, tensions in Machtpolitik and ‘hard’ agenda  
Fill gaps in other agendas  
Easier sub-state and non-state engagement, uses more varied expertise. | Cannot tackle major threats including asymmetries  
Risk of ‘false security’ or reality/discourse gap(also in national policies)  
Not ‘sexy’, hard to grab both local and external attention |
Easier political acceptability (i.a. among differing political systems)  
Flexibility, Empowerment of diverse actors | No legislative power.  
Little ‘centralization’ let alone chance of supra-nationality  
Risk of weak coordination and confusion, over-complication of ‘process’ for its own sake.  
Risk of lack of discipline (coherence, follow-up etc)  
Limited ‘transformative’ power |

2.2. Sub-regional cooperation in Norden

Scandinavia or Norden is the customary term for the five Nordic countries in Northern Europe plus their sovereign possessions. Commonality in these countries can be traced back to the beginning of history with the Nordic-Teutonic

7Taken from course material “A Secure Europe in a Better World: The Security Role of European Institutions, University of Iceland. Fall 2008” with permission of Alyson J. K. Bailes.
race inhabiting the area. While sharing a common origin the Nordic peoples are first and foremost united by the cultural similarities. A shared language, religion, history, law, literature and other aspects of social life created the ineradicable ties Nordic people still share today (Wendt, 1981, pp.11-15).

Nordic cooperation is a prime example of a small sub-regional grouping where extensive cross-border cooperation exists and extends to most aspects of society. Because of geographic proximity Nordic cooperation has per se always existed in some form, but the Nordic Council and the Nordic inter-parliamentary organization have since 1952 been the main forums of formal co-operation. Today’s formal Nordic Cooperation structure is based on the 1962 Helsinki agreement (Helsingforsaftalen) where the Nordic countries commit themselves to develop cooperation in the fields of law, culture, economics, transport and environmental protection. (Nordic Council, 1962) But the real scope and structure of Nordic cooperation is hard to evaluate because the bulk of interaction and cooperation takes place at informally at the administrative level.

Nordic cooperation is not only relevant to intra-Nordic activities. The states cooperate extensively in global institutions, both formally as within the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and informally within the UN where they have agreed on rotating their candidacy for the Security Council. The intricacies of Nordic relations help to provide a safety net for Nordic citizens outside Norden. In the case of natural disasters or terrorism outside Norden the Nordic embassies and consulates co-operate to provide for the safety for all Nordic citizens. A further example of Nordic convergence outside its area is that the Nordic embassies in Germany are located in the same building.

Nordic cooperation has been able to cushion the effect of different institutional affiliations of the Nordic countries; just as the resilience of Nordic affinity and the flexibility of Nordic institutions has enabled the Nordic countries to continue their cooperative venture despite pursuing diverging and even contradictory political agendas.

Nordic convergence has however not yet developed in the area of security and defence and has hitherto been far removed from developing anything resembling a defence community. Traditionally Nordic countries have avoided extensive discussion on matters concerning security and defence. Different Nordic experiences of conflict especially in the 20th century have contributed to the development of differing geo-strategic outlooks and different values and
perceptions in security matters. Understanding these differences and the effect they have had on Nordic cooperation is of central importance in order to understand how Nordic counties individually and in combination are going to adapt and address the profoundly different security demands of the 21st century. In order to assess how well and to what extent the Nordic countries are going to be able to address these demands in cohesion, it is first necessary to address what has hindered common approaches in the past; and to understand how differences in national outlooks and perceptions shape current attitudes towards these new security demands, it is vital to understand how national histories and experiences shape those perceptions.
3. Nordic Cooperation

3.1. A brief overview of developments in Norden’s security environment

Scandinavia has not always been a peaceful, harmonious corner of Europe. During the Viking age (793-1066), warriors from Scandinavia earned a reputation for their brutality and strength which they used to wage war overseas and with each other. Within Norden as in all parts of the world there has been a competition for influence and power among its peoples (Ingebritsen, 2006, pp. 5-7). This rivalry and the sheer size of the Nordic area are significant factors in explaining why the Nordic cultural similarities did not translate into a corresponding political unity. The closest the Nordic countries have come to political unity was in the Kalmar Union (1397-1523) where they shared a king as well as a foreign and defence policy, but the countries retained independence in domestic matters (Wendt, 1981, p. 13). Power was not shared equally between the states, as Sweden and Norway were subordinated to Denmark, making Copenhagen the centre of power. The Union could not be sustained and had a relatively short lifetime as the Swedish nobility withdrew from the Union in 1523. The period is however considered to be a benchmark of regional cooperation, symbolized by the image of three crowns.\(^8\) (Ingebritsen, 2006, pp. 5-7).

The demarcation lines and frontiers of different Nordic states have been quite fluid throughout history as severe fighting was commonplace between the Denmark-Norway and Sweden-Finland states that existed between 15\(^{th}\) and 18\(^{th}\) century, and this was also the case in their participation in the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) (Wendt, 1981, pp.12-14). Rivalry and wars between the two oldest Nordic powers had disastrous consequences for the region. By drawing in foreign actors in many of those wars, the Nordic states effectively reduced themselves to second-rate powers in the international system as they failed to impose their will on one another. The damaging effect and futility of Nordic conflict is perhaps best

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8Although united under a single monarch, the two kingdoms of Sweden and Denmark fought fierce battles, for control of southern Sweden and the Baltic Sea area. One such conflict was the “Stockholm Bloodbath” in 1520 where the death toll of eighty-two victims was the outcome of long standing rivalry during the reign of Christian II of Denmark.
revealed by the fact that national territories in 1720 were the same as in 1523 when the Kalmar union was dissolved and two centuries of war and strife had quite literally brought the countries nothing (Wendt, 1981, pp. 14-18).

Table 3.1:  Political configurations in Norden.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Century</th>
<th>Political entities in Norden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>Denmark (EU) Iceland Norway Sweden (EU) Finland (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>Denmark Iceland Norway Sweden Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>Denmark Sweden⁹ (Sweden-Norway in personal union) Russia¹⁰ (Grand Duchy of Finland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>Denmark Sweden (or Sweden-Finland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>(Denmark-Norway in personal union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>Kalmar Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If one looks past these episodes of regional war, one can say that Nordic cooperation has always existed in some form, but was most often hampered by political fragmentation within the region. Since the 18th century the course of Nordic history in the area of security and defence has become increasingly *sui generis*. Other small European states have generally developed common security approaches for one of two reasons: because they fear each other, and security cooperation is one way to bind each other’ hands, or as a reaction to a common external threat (Bailes, 2008(1), p.1). The Nordic countries have however not developed cooperative structures or common security approaches to deal with security challenges to their region, but have rather been disunited and followed diverging national strategies. Why have the Nordic countries not had any common or coherent model for dealing with security issues, despite their history of regional conflict, and despite them having had to live with the common external threat in

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⁹Just after Napoleon was defeated in Germany 1813, Carl Johan Bernadotte crown prince of Sweden sent his forces to Norway, compelled the King of Denmark to cede Norway to the Swedish Crown by the Peace Treaty in Kiel 1814; (Bernadotte, 1814)

¹⁰The sovereignty of Finland and Åland was transferred from Sweden to Russia by the Treaty of Frederikshamn in 1809; (Frederikshamn, 1809)
the shape of Soviet/Russian power, and at times, Germany?

The reasons to be found are of course many, both external and internal to the region. To start with the region’s internal dynamics, it is evident that even though the Nordic countries have fought each other in the past, their relations in the last couple of centuries have been increasingly peaceful. Their cooperation has gradually become both wider and deeper and currently reaches to almost all sectors of society, though to a lesser degree in their foreign and defence policy. Inter-Nordic relations have for the last couple of centuries have been characterized by two mutually reinforcing processes. On the one hand cooperation between the Nordic countries has become deeper and wider, increasing the costs of conflict and sharpening the awareness of common interest. On the other hand Nordic relations have become increasingly desecuritized and demilitarized, precisely in order to keep the way open for increased cooperation in other fields. So despite having fought each other in the past, on reaching the modern era the nations’ relations have become increasingly peaceful and cooperative. The impetus for defence cooperation in order to tie each other down gradually weaned away as the states' cooperation increased. As their relations became friendlier they were less prone to perceive each other as threats to each other’s security.¹¹ This taming of the Vikings happened gradually during the Age of Enlightenment as domestic institution building took priority over military engagements (Ingebritsen, 2006, p. 10).

Nordic relations have been very peaceful in modern history, and the independence processes of Norway, Finland and Iceland have also taken place without lasting damage to Nordic relations (Ingebritsen, 2006, p. 9).¹² Their independence most likely pushed further towards desecuritization of Inter-Nordic relations, as in order to preserve their national sovereignty and particularities the newer Nordic countries tended to avoid being entangled within common security structures, choosing rather to adopt national approaches to address their own particular security defence challenges and to retain more freedom of play in the international environment. For their part Sweden and Denmark held back from seeking an overt regional leadership for fear of the burdens involved, as well as in the awareness of their neighbours’ sensitivities (Bailes, 2008(1), p. 2).

¹¹This process in Norden has been referred to by Karl Deutsch as the emergence of a “security community”; a group of states where the prospects of waging war has become unthinkable.
¹²As Finland transitioned from a Russian duchy to an independent nation it lead to an outbreak of civil war, but in each instance when Scandinavians relinquished authority to another part of Scandinavia, Conflict was averted.
Difficulties in reaching a consensus on foreign and defence matters can be explained further by various demographic, geographical and historical factors within the region, as well as by how the contrasting fates of the Nordic peoples have shaped their political alignments and national identities. National security identities, interests and policy developments of course evolved over time in response to a wide array of historical experiences such as those aforementioned in the 15th-18th century, but have since been shaped even more profoundly by the historic developments of the last century.

While the reasons for Nordic states’ habit of desecuritization and reluctance to develop any common or coherent model for dealing with their security issues can be explained by political dynamics internal to the sub-region, external to the Nordic region one can spot a number of factors that would seem to push – even more powerfully - for securitization of Nordic relations. The Nordics have faced a common external threat in the shape of Soviet/Russian or German power, even more clearly expressed by the spillover on to (most of) their territories from two world wars being fought on their continent. So why have the Nordics not developed common security structures to meet common external pressures?

The answer seems fairly straightforward. While the Nordic countries did not cause enough threat to each other to push them towards defence cooperation, the asymmetry of the threat facing them traditionally from the East but also at times from Germany was just too big. With huge and exposed territories and relatively small populations, the Nordic countries could not have hoped to be able to deal with these challenges by developing defence cooperation between themselves, without outside help (Bailes, 2008(1), p.2). So while other small countries tend to adopt defence cooperation between them because of external and internal threats, in Norden the internal threat has been too small and the external one too large for the Nordics to securitize their relations and develop cooperation on their defence.

While Nordic countries have often dealt with the threats and hardships of war in different ways, a wide array of formal and practical instances of desecuritization can be identified in their individual policies as well as in the relations between them. Desecuritization allowed them to retain their national preferences in security while also reflecting their will to avoid involvement in the region’s conflict. Focusing on cooperation in other areas than security the Nordics
were able to maximize the internal strengths needed to deal with the practical challenges of war, while by desecuritizing that cooperation they retained their principled distance from it. Desecuritization in such a setting cannot be restricted to formal national policies; rather it can encompass various policy layers that have both formal and practical application. Desecuritization is commonly promulgated in a unilateral fashion e.g. by a countries' declarations or its actions, but can also be the subject of bilateral and multilateral agreements. If one looks at desecuritization with respect to Nordic history its relevance to different layers of national policy becomes clearer (see Table 3.2.). The table below illustrates the different formal and practical applications of desecuritization and is intended to illustrate how the models outlined in the previous theoretical chapter can have a more concrete and direct relevance.

**Table 3.2:** *Examples of formal and practical Desecuritization*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Status</th>
<th>Internal Security</th>
<th>Relations with Neighbours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal</strong></td>
<td>De-militarization (total or part of region)</td>
<td>No mutual guarantees (local or larger alliance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>Mutual support for demilitarization, neutrality, arms limitations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No armed forces</td>
<td>No armed forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limitations on force types and numbers</td>
<td>Limitation on police equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Practical</strong></td>
<td>Non-membership of alliance</td>
<td>Minimal definition of 'security' and 'defence'</td>
<td>Limit discussion on security challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimal 'defensive' defence, non-interference, non-aggressive</td>
<td>Low militarization of society Police not armed</td>
<td>Joint security challenges articulated away from security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on 'altruistic' mission (PKO's)</td>
<td>Focus on 'altruistic' missions and roles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The intention here is to discuss Nordic national commonalities and differences with regard to developments in the first and Second World War, as
well as those pertaining to the Cold War, in the hope of clarifying and illustrating security developments in this sub-region. The aim is first of all to explain why Nordic cooperation has so far not developed in the security field; secondly, to illustrate how the convergence and divergence in modern Nordic security outlooks, security cultures or identities can be explained by reference to historic developments in the 20th century; and thirdly, to draw out various instances of types of desecuritization employed throughout the period.

3.2. Nordic cooperation, during and after the Great War

One of the most important eras in the development of Nordic cooperation took place during the Great War of 1914-1918, the first great conflict to affect Norway and Finland as independent (modern) nations. The Nordic governments were brought into closer contact and cooperation and issued joint declarations of neutrality, issued identical protests over interference with Nordic shipping and organized a product exchange to deal with the shortages the war caused. Nordic monarchs and foreign ministers were at the forefront in widening the Nordic cooperation, giving it wider practical importance. The dangers and hardships faced during the war made such Nordic cooperation more prominent in the eyes of the public than ever before, and that spirit of cooperation was in large part preserved in the peacetime to follow. This Nordic convergence did not however spill over into the area of joint military action or active cooperation for security and defence, further than the adoption of joint neutrality declarations (Wendt, 1981, pp. 20-24).

The development of sub-regional cooperation at this time is very interesting with respect to the foregoing discussions on sub-regionalism and securitization. As avoidance of matters pertaining to 'hard security' is characteristic of sub-regional cooperation because of the practicalities of war. As already noted, continent-wide military imbalances, patterns of defence guarantees or zero-sum interest calculations are largely detached from anything local which makes it impractical to try to address them at the sub-regional level (Bjurner, 1999, bls. 14). The Nordic countries were too small to be able to solve their problems in a securitized way, yet logically enough came together in joint neutrality declarations. By leaving security and defence policy to the margins of their cooperation, the Nordics were able to desecuritize their relations, which both
strengthened perceptions of the Nordics as non-threatening countries in the war and also made it easier for them to pursue cooperative ventures among themselves during and after the hostilities.

Cooperation in trade was quite extensive and important for all the Nordics during and after the war. Product exchange and cooperative measures to protect Nordic shipping were among the concrete practicalities Nordic cooperation evolved and retained in the troubled years after the war. As the economic problems made themselves more seriously felt in the years of the Great Depression, the value of Nordic cooperation became clearer. This emphasized and increased the value and prestige of Nordic cooperation within Norden and the perception of common Nordic interests. Nordic countries made good use of their common interest especially when they were faced with stern trade policy demands from Britain in 1933. By working together they prevented London from playing one against the other; by sticking together they were able to improve their standing on the world market (Wendt, 1981, p. 24).

A good example of the fast development of Nordic cooperation in the Great War period can be seen in the League of Nations in the final phases of the war, where Nordic cooperation developed very fast and economic and social cooperation brought increased convergence in Nordic foreign policy. This common stand on foreign policy became even stronger when the economic sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Italy in the Abyssinian War crumbled. The Nordic countries all stated reservations concerning possible future sanctions and once again declared their intention to remain neutral in conflicts between great powers (Wendt, 1981, pp. 23-26).

Perhaps the most profound changes in Norden around the Great War period were the achievements of independence by Norway and Finland, enabling them to make their own distinctive contributions to Nordic cooperation. Norway gained independence from Sweden in 1905 and Finland in the wake of the Russian Revolution. Iceland also received a greater degree of home rule and sovereignty in 1918 as part of its independence struggle from Danish rule which was concluded with the full independence as the Republic of Iceland in 1944 (Wendt, 1981, pp. 26-30). It is interesting to note that in the last century three states within the region gained their full independence. Even though the processes

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Iceland, upon gaining its sovereignty according to the Act of Union between Iceland and Denmark, the treaty stated that 'Denmark will announce that Iceland declares itself to be perpetually neutral' (Chillaud, 2006, p. 8).
of their independence were handled peacefully the effect on the region’s strategic unity cannot be underestimated. The appeal of historic and cultural individuality characteristic of the Romantic Movement had had enormous effect in the area as emotional separation was promoted by the growth of national feeling. Iceland did gain its independence a bit later but the Romantic inspiration had great effect within the country, and under the leadership of Jón Sigurðsson the movement towards political independence started to gain momentum in the late 1850’s. This development strengthened the significance and richness of inter-Nordic relations; even though it increased the tendency towards political fragmentation, the rich cultural revival during the 19th century provided a stimulus to Nordic culture as a whole and the countries grew richer and stronger through diversification (Wendt, 1981, pp. 17-18).

3.3. Nordic cooperation during and after the Second World War

When unconcealed German re-armament commenced in 1935, Germany once again became a dominant naval power in the Baltic and a latent threat to the Nordic countries. The Nordic countries felt that they were in a danger zone and this awareness gave life to the idea of a Nordic defence union. Until the start of World War II the Nordic countries maintained their determination to remain neutral in great power conflicts. They were able to maintain their solidarity until Hitler invited them to conclude bilateral non-aggression treaties with Germany in 1939, when the Danish government signed such a pact but the other Nordics did not (Wendt, 1981, pp. 25-26).

The Nordic countries’ wish to avoid involvement in hostilities was in vain. Finland was the first to be attacked and the Winter War in Finland stirred very strong emotions in the other Nordic countries: even though there was not any united political stance against the USSR nor could military troops be provided, the sense of Nordic affinity and perceptions of common interest were very clear. Large collections started in all the other Nordic counties, homes were opened for children from the war zone and many volunteers went to Finland to fight with the Finnish army. Sweden tried to help by working through diplomatic channels to conclude a peace treaty before Finnish resistance was broken (Wendt, 1981, pp. 26-29).

The direct aftermath of the Finnish-Soviet peace treaty of April 9, 1940
was that the Finnish government asked Norway and Sweden whether they were prepared to consider a defence alliance between the three counties and the countries were eminently willing to do so. But this defence union never came to be despite Nordic interest as the Soviet foreign minister, Molotov, said that a Finnish defence union with Norway and Sweden would be a breach of the just-concluded peace treaty. Barely a month after Finland had signed the treaty, Germany attacked Denmark and Norway. Nordic relationships were abruptly severed by the German offensive and the British occupation of Iceland and Faeroe Islands that soon followed (Wendt, 1981, pp. 24-26).

The Nordics’ inability to form a defence alliance in order to address their security problems collectively can again largely be explained by the fact that the threat was just too big. As the five nations encompassed huge and exposed territories but relatively small populations, the asymmetry of size, population, military power with the USSR or Germany could never have been balanced by the Nordics alone14(Bailes, 2008(1), pp.1-2). The Nordic inability to solve their military problems collectively and the absence of wider military cooperation left the Nordics to address these issues separately according to each country’s peculiar situation.

The experiences and fates of the Nordic countries in the Second World War are characterized by almost completely contrasting situations. Finland fought two wars with the Soviet Union, Norway and Denmark were occupied by Germany, Iceland was occupied by the British and later witnessed the first American military presence in the country, while Sweden was able to remain neutral behind a strong military guarantee. These diverging experiences are of great significance when considering today’s persistent differences in strategic culture and identity within Norden, as reflected in military prestige, difference in security values and geo-strategic outlooks.

Despite these divergences, the shock and suffering of the war generated strong emotions within Norden and provided a fertile soil for Nordic cooperation in the post-war years. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia 1948 generated fears of Soviet expansion in Europe and in Norden, this caused a renewed interest in inter-Nordic defence cooperation. Preparatory studies commenced, but Finland could not participate in them because of the Treaty of friendship cooperation and

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14This also explains why the Nordics were surprised when thinkers in the UK and US suggested in the mid-90s that they ought to look after the Baltic states' security through purely local arrangements.
mutual assistance (YYA) it had concluded with the USSR in April, 1948. Under the treaty Finland was obliged to resist armed attacks against Finland and against the Soviet Union through Finland. The treaty otherwise allowed Finland to remain outside great-power conflict and adopt a ‘neutral’ policy. The remaining Nordic countries, however, concluded that a joint military stance prepared in peacetime and set in the framework of a defence union would greatly improve the security of the Nordic states (Wendt, 1981, pp. 27-28).

The political views of the Nordic states diverged extensively on the alternative frameworks for cooperation. The Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic Prime Ministers - Einar Gerhardsen, Hans Hedtoft and Stefán Jóhann Stefánsson respectively - were very concerned about the Communist takeover in Prague and the need to improve their standing with the Western powers. This view was most extensively held among the Norwegians and was supported by the fact that supplies of strategic raw materials and goods were vital to Norden since the countries were not self-sufficient in that respect (Ingimundarson, 1996, pp. 80-83, 95-101). Furthermore Danish and Norwegian defence establishments had been completely destroyed under German occupation and the countries were virtually defenceless. Iceland was in a more comfortable position since the USA had an active base on the island under the so-called Keflavík Treaty (1946). Finland was still a signatory of the YYA Treaty. The Swedish idea was for a non-aligned status of the proposed Nordic Union avoiding inclusion in the two superpower-led blocs, and in concrete terms meaning that the whole group would remain outside NATO. These Swedish views did not convince the other Nordic countries and they were considered outdated. Attempts to create a defence alliance seem to have broken down because of the divergence of Nordic views and interest. The protection and security that a non-aligned Nordic bloc could have provided de facto can be doubted because of the asymmetry of threat. When the USA made arms deliveries to Norden conditional upon Nordic membership of NATO, that spelled once again the end for the Nordic Defence Union (Wendt, 1981, pp. 23-27).

The failure of Scandinavian defence alliance negotiations did not weaken the more general aspects of Nordic cooperation; on the contrary it made the leading politicians in Norden realize that it was necessary to achieve results in other areas to avert the consequences of disagreement on foreign policy. In consequence, the Nordics established new cooperative frameworks like the parliamentary Nordic Council (1952) followed by the Nordic Passport Union.
(1954) in order to give their cooperation a more dynamic profile and a broader field of activities than before. Post-war Nordic Cooperation therefore became a very de-securitized cooperation because when it was formed, the pattern of foreign policy and defence had already been set in stone. Norway, Denmark and Iceland were part of NATO, Finland was somewhat ‘neutral’ according to the FCA Treaty with the USSR from 1948 and Sweden remained neutral. Cooperative measures taken up by the Nordics were issues that did not disturb the stability of the security environment. Nordic cooperation covered mainly social, economic, cultural and educational activities, including sharing of experiences and practical help, which have helped raise the standards of living throughout the area to this day.

This non-legalistic, resource efficient mode of cooperation strengthened the notion of a natural community among the Nordics irrespective of their different strategic affiliations or the specific security environment they each faced. Given the Finnish position at the time the avoidance of defence and security issues came quite naturally to the cooperation. Desecuritized relations were seen as very practical, as the only way the Nordic peoples could reap the benefits of cooperation while avoiding becoming overshadowed and divided by their security environment at the time (Bailes, 2006, p. 4).

3.4. The Nordic balance

The map of Nordic security that had arisen after the Second World War became set in stone for almost four decades (i.e. the years 1949-89). What is often called the “Nordic Balance” was partly based upon national policies of the Nordic states, but also the recognition of those policies by the two superpowers of the Cold War. The security environment of the time made it essential that the Nordic Council and the related meetings of Nordic ministers refrained from considering foreign policy and defence issues. This did not alter the fact that the foreign policy objectives of all the countries aimed for similar goals, notably to preserve peace and protect the sovereignty of their countries, but they feared that overt discussions on security and defence issues could harm their cooperation in other fields and cause more problems than it could solve (Wendt, 1981, pp. 343-354). Desecuritization also allowed some Nordic countries to harness the benefits of the strategic interest of Atlantic powers in the region. Though the Nordic countries
could not control the degree of foreign activity in their area they could use their institutional rights to influence its manifestations to some degree, usually in the direction of restraint as will shortly be seen. At times some of the Nordic countries were also able to harness considerable financial benefits from foreign interest as Iceland did in its relations with the US (Thorhallsson, 2004, pp. 119-121)

A further step towards de-securitizing the Nordic area was a discussion on the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Norden, in order to protect the region further from the peacetime impact of superpower rivalries and from the risk of the first spark of war being struck in the North. The suggestion came from the Finnish Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen and was thought of as a way to retain the de-militarization momentum that was then a feature of super-power relations. Great Britain, the USA and the USSR had signed the Moscow Agreement in 1963 to stop all nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, the sea and outer space. It was argued that a nuclear weapon-free zone in Norden would not alter the balance of strength in the world and would therefore not threaten any other state’s interests. Serious reservations about these attempts came, however, on the one hand from the Swedish and Finnish governments, and on the other from NATO which saw the effects of any limited zone as being strategically asymmetrical in Moscow's favour. The conclusion was that a treaty creating a weapon-free zone would weaken rather than strengthen the assurances the relevant countries had given individually, while avoiding it was in line with the fact the security and defence issues would not be among the issues the Nordic cooperation dealt with (Wendt, 1981, pp. 343-348).

Other actions were nevertheless taken in this period to desecuritize Northern Europe. When Iceland joined NATO (1949) it did so with the stipulation that no foreign forces should be permanently stationed in its territory. Similar gestures were made by Norway and Denmark as Norway in the Same year forbade the permanent stationing of NATO troops in Norway in peacetime, followed by a similar restriction concerning the stationing of nuclear weapons a year later, and the regulating of NATO’s military activities in Northern territories of Norway in the 1960's. Denmark forbade the establishment of airbase and launching facilities for intermediate-range ballistic missiles in 1953 as well as the

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15 Norden had already formed a de facto nuclear weapon-free zone, due to the unilateral decision of individual states including Sweden’s abandonment of its post-war research on a nuclear deterrent at the time of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, these policies could be rescinded at any time as they were not binding.

The de-securitized nature of Nordic relations not only served the goals, values and identity-building of Nordic national governments in an ideological sense, it helped them to deal with a lot of their practical problems at the time. All the Nordic states had some trade relations with the USSR despite Iceland, Norway and Denmark being part of an opposing alliance at this time, and the de-securitization concept both allowed and justified the profits gained from such exchanges. As an expression, it thus does capture an aspect of Nordic behaviour at the time that was very profitable and served to ease tensions (Bailes, 2009(4)). The Nordics were not pushed towards national measures that could have led them to damage one another but kept their de facto common market running. A desecuritization strategy seems to have been strongly anchored by the fact that it could serve Nordic interests in security matters and could allow for more practical cooperation in the area of trade, as well as being in line with the general interests and values characteristic of small and medium seized states, especially the Nordic ones.

3.5. The history and evolution of Nordic relations

When evaluating the history of Nordic states’ relations in the security field one can see a difference between their behaviour before the Great War and after it. Before the Great War the Inter-Nordic battles and the political fragmentation of the area had disastrous consequences for the region. One can imagine that these experiences came to instil in the Nordic people the belief that war was inevitably destructive and harmful to them, and that by bringing other powers to back them within the region the Nordic countries were undermining their own position.

The Great War in a way served to underline these sentiments, as its dangers and hardships made Nordic cooperation more prominent in the eye of the public, creating a fertile soil for Nordic Cooperation to develop in the inter-war period. Internally and externally the Nordic countries came to emphasize their determination to avoid involvement in the hostilities.

This trend seems to have continued in the Second World War despite increased divergence in Nordic experiences and fates. The security environment during and after the war made it very natural for the Nordic countries to refrain from considering foreign policy and defence issues jointly and to focus instead on
the protection of their sovereignty. The search for common stances on foreign policy could in effect have highlighted the states’ intrinsic differences and damaged cooperation in other areas. The decision not to create a separate Nordic Neutral block in the wake of the war served to stabilize relations in the area and to avert a militarization of the concept of Norden.

Nordic cooperation since then has derived a lot of its strength by refraining from top-down approaches to mutual relations, such as a military alliance or the like would have required. Instead a more practical, bottom-up approach seems to have allowed the individual states to retain more freedom of play in the international arena while also enabling them to capitalize on the cultural similarities that unite the Nordic peoples. The securitization of their relations could have damaged or altered Nordic relationships significantly by controversies concerning military and foreign policy matters as well as infringing the strong sentiments of national individuality in Norden.

Nordic cooperation offers an interesting example when thinking about security and securitization in a negative way. The notion here is that it could be beneficial to thematize issues away from security in order to conceptualize them in potentially more useful ways. By shying away from cooperation in defence and security and therefore shying away from securitizing their relations, the Nordic countries were able to improve domestic conditions by opening up the avenues of political change: whereas securitization (on the Waever analysis) raises issues to the principled level of Realpolitik and results in the closing of options.

By narrowing the field of security and defining things that other nations might have called threats as challenges, it was possible to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to a sphere where they could be handled by ordinary means of politics, economy, culture, international law, diplomacy etc. Such experiences explain why Nordic thinkers have speculated that it could be more effective to deal with security problems in a de-securitized way (Waever, 1995, pp. 52-58)

The de-securitization was perhaps most essential in Cold War period where the asymmetry in terms of military capabilities between Norden and the two superpowers was frankly off the charts. The Kola Peninsula was at the time one of the most militarized areas in the world, and in case of a nuclear war the missiles would literally fly over Norden, making the weakness of Nordic states never more apparent. The asymmetry between USSR and Nordic capabilities at
the time can bring one to doubt whether the Nordics could have chosen any other way than de-securitization to deal with the problems they faced. Militarization of their own communities would hardly help them no matter how extensive. At the same time, their national sense of particularism and their experience rendered them unprepared to become someone's proxy and accept strategic over-dependence on one power. Balancing, stabilizing and de-securitizing seem to have offered one of the few viable regional strategy options at the Nordics’ disposal during the Cold War.

External to their area, however, these countries participated actively in UN peacekeeping and other mediation, arms control, peacemaking work and had high levels of development aid, all of which were distanced from their regional configuration and to a certain extent balanced or offset local strategic restraints (Bailes, A., 2009(2), pp.133-134). While the Nordic countries showed reluctance or inability to securitize their regional security policies, Norway Sweden and Denmark were generous in their contribution in development aid and peacekeeping. Contributions to peacekeeping operations during the Cold War were considered a political and altruistic practice rather than a potential extension of self-defence, as the actions the Nordics joined were undertaken by the United Nations (UN) as a neutral third party, to prevent conflict escalation. By contributing to such missions the states could enhance their national and international prestige and thus add to the political cost of violating their neutrality (Rickli, 2008, p. 312).

Nordic cooperation seems to have gained momentum in the aftermath of both world wars, when it helped the Nordics deal with the hardships the war caused. When the Great War ended, Nordic cooperation surged in the international area, especially in the League of Nations. In the aftermath of the Second World War the Nordic cooperation became more formal as the Nordic Council was formed and new institutions were designed to give Nordic cooperation a more dynamic profile and broaden its activities. Despite the Nordics’ failure to create a defence alliance between them, their cooperation served to strengthen their relationships and enabled them to serve security in more indirect and subtle ways.

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16 It is not inconceivable that Nordic troops had joint practices or operations while away on peacekeeping missions, improving their relations and coordination.
4. Norden in Post-Cold War Europe

'Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.
The violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.'

(European security strategy)

4.1. A change in strategic situation

Being peripheral states at the northern edge of Europe has traditionally benefited the Nordics and allowed them to stay somewhat detached from continental competitions and conflicts. Contributions to global security and the projection of military power were mainly demanded from the larger and more central countries in Europe, as security considerations were highly constricted to the 'harder' aspects of security or conflict and the provision of extensive resources. Exporting security was in fact largely conditioned on the possession of the political and military resources only available to the larger countries.\(^{17}\) Geopolitical developments in Northern Europe during the World Wars and Cold War (covered in chapter 3 above) illustrate the Nordic security situation in very concrete terms, as a peripheral area of considerable strategic importance for the bigger powers. The Nordic countries did in fact not have to make any special efforts to attract the security interest, and potential protection, of bigger actors because security developments in Norden were relevant to the bigger powers' own calculations. A situation of strategic importance facilitated the Nordic adoption of a passive (or at least, nationally contained) and desecuritized approach to security. The Cold War approach to defence planning was everywhere (even for neutral states) based on identified territorial threats arising from the bipolar structure, where the perceived threat of invasion served to emphasize the value of a collective defence doctrine, but also allowed or encouraged countries to tailor their defence to fulfil their territorial and local micro-strategic needs. (Rickli, 2008, pp. 308-313) As discussed in Chapter 1 the conception of security employed at this time was very static, non-inclusive and state-centric but importantly

\(^{17}\)During the Cold War these military resources were exclusive to the USA and USS because of their nuclear capabilities.
favoured concerns of sovereignty in national security policy (Rieker, 2006, p.313). In Norden the pressures for local and relative desecuritization coincided well with the protection of national autonomy. (Rickli, 2008, pp.310-314) The region's strategic importance, engaging bigger powers and institutions in their own right and interest, ensured that strategic protection and foreign cooperation were in fact made available to the Nordics at relatively cheap price: while the Nordics' own measures of restraint helped the superpowers also to reduce risks of their local balance flaring into actual conflict.

The security agenda that has emerged since the end of the Cold War for European states, and developed states generally, has brought several new dimensions of complexity to national strategy making without necessarily resolving or outdating the older agendas (Rieker, 2006, p.313). As our societies have become increasingly interconnected through social and technological evolution so has the vulnerability of those societies. Different policy fields and actors are getting increasingly intertwined, rendering the earlier categorization and understanding of security inadequate. It has become increasingly hard to distinguish where the interface between internal and external security, or security and politics lies, as well as the balance between relevant roles played by governments, business, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations in protecting the welfare of our societies. Just as there is no simple definition of security, there is today no simple prioritization, guideline or approach for dealing with security challenges.

The end of the Cold War has not only changed many of the preconditions and incentives for handling small state security in general: in combination with other sub-regional developments in Norden it contributes to a strategic situation considerably different from the ones previously experienced. The territorial threat pattern of the Cold war has been subsumed into a more multifaceted and uncertain one that brings with it increased demand for cooperative strategies, both in 'exporting' security in order to prevent, defuse or minimize risks before they erupt abroad, and to deal with the internal threats that the changed environment has begotten.

These global aspects of the new security environment put pressure on all states irrespective of their size and geographical position to contribute human or material resources to meet these challenges. For small states these pressures to take an active part in cooperative security are increasingly demanding, while
giving them only limited influence concerning how the policy prescriptions are formulated. The non-territoriality of such leading present-day challenges as terrorism, climate change, disease, or economic crisis clearly portrays how different the Post-Cold War challenges are from the security challenges in Norden in both World Wars and the Cold War.

While the Cold War made Europe into an area of possible conflict and constant tension, today's security environment in Europe and Norden is characterized by the absence of military threat, while the security priorities and operational efforts of bigger powers and institutions (EU and NATO) have been reoriented away from Europe. The impact for Norden is evident as the area's enormous military and security significance in the Cold War has dramatically decreased and moved elsewhere. This is perhaps most clearly portrayed by changed perceptions concerning Russia, which has gradually (if with ups and downs) moved away from being the supreme military challenge for Europe towards being considered increasingly as an economic and governance one. While bigger powers and institutions previously provided strategic protection at a relatively cheap price, nothing is to be had for free in this new environment and Nordic countries have to exercise active courtship and persuasion or be ready to 'pay more' for foreign interests and engagement in their area. (Thoughts on how this might be changing with respect to developments in the Arctic are covered in chapter 6)

It has become increasingly difficult for the Nordics to maintain or follow a strategy of desecuritization and restraint, as the strategic protection of the bigger institutions cannot simply be guaranteed by gaining formal membership (especially with Nordic-style opt-outs), but requires a constant input of resources and contributions to operations (Bailes, 2009(2), p.137). Today, being on the periphery does not mean that you only have to do the jobs of the periphery but that you are expected to equally contribute to collective and de-territorialized challenges, such as peace missions and continent-wide defences against non-military threats. The new environment brings with it an increased incentive for small states in their own interest to bandwagon with larger powers like US, EU or NATO and adopt more outgoing, cooperative strategies in general (Rickli, 2008, pp. 311-316).

In the following sections, the different kind of pressures for policy change by Nordic states will be covered in a more detailed way. On the one hand this is
intended to underline the challenges presented to small European states and in particular illustrate the way the securitization of European integration affects the Nordics as a group and as individual countries. On the other hand the following sections will draw attention to the particular Nordic answers adapted so far to this new security environment both as a group and as individual countries in an effort to draw out their commonalities and differences.

4.2. What makes it hard to stay peripheral and desecuritized?

4.2.1. A shift of security agendas: Military policy

The recent European Security strategy symbolically starts with the words: 'Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history' (European Union, 2003, p.1). This development has gradually taken place with the expansion and development of Europe's larger institutions, NATO and the EU: thereby transforming the relations between states in Europe by increasing their democratization and cooperation (European Union, 2003, p.1). This pacification in Europe and the emergence of 'new' threats make demands for the exporting of security increasingly relevant as 'the first line of defence' concerning these new threats and for Western interest 'is often abroad' (The European Union, 2003, p.7).

This new emphasis is clearly identifiable in the development of the European Union and NATO in recent years. European Integration has deepened and expanded as the Union has been given more credibility, relevance and self-sufficiency as a security actor, has acquired its own military arm (with the launch of a European Security and Defence Policy in December 1999) and deployed European missions abroad to places like the Balkans, East Timor and the DRC. NATO has increasingly gone 'out of area' as the end of the Cold War removed the Alliance's initial raison d'être and forced it to look for new roles. This reframing of the alliance was facilitated by the outbreak of the Balkan conflict which drove NATO to deploy its forces actively for the first time on peacekeeping and intervention tasks. Following this new task the Alliance has developed new flexible frameworks for cooperation with countries in Central and Eastern Europe (though the Partnership for Peace) and with Middle Eastern states through the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (Cottey, 2007, pp.67-71). The alliance seems to
have moved from being a territorial defence organization towards an increased role global interventionism, as its current involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan bears witness. The changes and reframing of the security roles of the EU and NATO have brought about new pressures for all Nordic states to contribute highly trained and specialized forces to their missions.

While the Nordics have witnessed a decrease in big power and institutional interest in their region they are being pressured like other developed, rich and peaceful countries to 'export security' by the contribution of financial, material and human resources. This is very evident concerning military intervention and peacekeeping where the Nordics have participated in missions under various auspices of the EU, UN or NATO. While interventions exploiting the ability for joint power projection have rapidly become the hallmark of Post-Cold War, European strategic culture, they make considerable demands on national military forces. They need to be able to sustain extensive combat operations beyond the nation's territory, and increased interoperability between nations becomes vital to allow their military, civilian and civil-military assets to be plugged into a pool of multinational forces. This in turn has led everywhere, albeit at varying speeds, to the further de-territorialisation, professionalization and specialization of national military forces (Rickli, 2008, pp. 307--314).

Overseas missions require contributing countries to adopt greater and greater specialization of their armed forces and produce highly trained manpower, both of which can impose a number of challenges for the Nordic states. The high requirements of ‘peacekeeping missions’ are considerably different from the typical requirements of conscript based home defence. As small states the Nordics lack resources by definition, but the previous security situation that emphasized territorial defence allowed them to solve their with tailored national solutions and overwhelmingly local investments. The specialization demands of the new expeditionary agenda put Nordic defence budgets under considerable strain as military restructuring is inherently costly, demanding either an overall increase in defence expenditure or cutbacks in the ‘homeland’ dimension. Absent radical increases in defence expenditure, the development of a national security policy has to find a balance between professionalization of forces and territorial defence. It is true that increased professionalization and good-quality mission contributions may fill the gap in national defence sufficiency in a new way by earning the approval and protection of the countries keenest on such missions (=}
the USA); but the political as well as strategic repercussions can be serious if it becomes obvious that national forces can no longer (for instance) man remote provinces or defend the whole national territory. Put bluntly, Nordic defence budgets are strained to a point where something has to give.

The Nordic countries have tried to expand practical intra-Nordic defence cooperation partly as a way to respond to the pressures of defence modernisation and force professionalization. One of the most significant developments in that regard was the reframing and updating of the Nordic Armaments Cooperation\textsuperscript{18} (NORDAC) in 2000-2001, which was intended to reduce national expenditure on defence purchases and associated support activities by sharing its costs and to support a Nordic defence industrial base. This allowed the countries to cooperate bilaterally as well as multilaterally and has brought some benefits and savings to the Nordic countries although it success has otherwise been limited (Hagelin, 2006, p.170). This cooperation has been hampered both by factors internal and external to the sub-region. On the one hand Nordic defence cooperation remains highly unbalanced by Swedish superiority; on the other hand, all Nordic countries and agencies have remained unwilling to harmonise and give up the traditional elements of their technological base, and have continued to deal with suppliers outside the region\textsuperscript{19} Sub-regional defence activities in general are being pressured to fit within broader regional goals of the EU. Defence cooperative goals and capabilities are consequently more likely to be defined mainly by more important member states, institutions and producers, with the establishment of the EDA aggravating these pressures even further (Hagelin, 2006, pp. 174-175, 180-184).

4.2.2. A shift of security agendas: Non-Military security

Many of the future and present day security challenges are detached from local or regional security concerns. For instance terrorism, climate change, poverty, migration, AIDS and WMD proliferation are by no means restricted to any one region but global in their impact, demanding answers across the broadest international span. Comprehensive approaches to such challenges need to have political and financial resources behind them, of a kind that can only be coordinated and brought to bear at the highest level of international cooperation in

\textsuperscript{18}For more detailed information see 'http://www.nordac.org'/
\textsuperscript{19}By far the largest portion of regional imports comes from the USA. E.g. During the period 1993-2003 it accounted for 43% of Danish major arms imports, 74% of Finnish, 46% of Norwegian (Hagelin, 2006, pp. 174-175).
forums like the UN or the G8. This is not to say that these problems do not make themselves felt at the national level but rather that these threats bridge the external and internal interface and require answers to be formulated at the sub-national, national, sub-regional, regional and global levels. Good answers to them, in fact, need to and are calculated to combine and strengthen the interplay between these levels of governance (Ekengren, 2006, pp.271-272).

Although the militarized aspects of the new security environment - *inter alia* terrorism, WMD proliferation and rogue states - are perhaps the more publicized and obvious examples of a changed environment, non-military security challenges (e.g. global warming and financial instability) are becoming increasingly relevant and pressing. Answers to some of these challenges like energy and food security, infrastructure breakdown, social welfare nets, and domestic crime can give increased primacy to solutions and policy adoption at the national level supported by transnational cooperation. Other non-military aspects of this new agenda like epidemics, disruptions in trade, natural disasters, pollution, smuggling, and immigration require answers and policy adoption at the regional level.

As well as calling for new inter-state cooperation in varying degrees, these challenges demand a multi-sectoral approach within countries and organizations, overturning old assumptions of the governmental monopoly and the traditional division of roles between civil and military actors (Ekengren, 2006, p.268). As discussed in the theoretical section above, the context is entirely different than the *Realpolitik* of old and the narrow notion of military defence has shifted increasingly towards the safeguarding of basic functions of society. As a local example, the main threat for the Nordics stemming from the former Soviet territories has changed functionally (Ekengren, 2006, p.274) towards the spreading of crime, pollution, disease and trafficking. Whereas former military challenges were dealt with by a static stand-off and pushed in the background by desecuritization, these new issues demand active and sustained cooperation between the Nordics themselves, with Eastern neighbours in the broader regional context, and often at European or Euro-Atlantic level.

Albeit Nordic thinkers have been interested in non-military security for a long time and indeed helped to shape some of its concepts and focuses<sup>20</sup>, the rising profile and priority of today’s range of non-military challenges poses a

<sup>20</sup> For example, Gro Harlem Bruntland "Our common future" World Commission on Environment and Development A/42/427" Sustainable development. Taken from URL: “http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-cf.htm"
number of governance issues for the Nordic states. In the past the Nordic tendency to stress these agendas rather than their hard military realities fitted quite naturally with the desecuritized approach of their indirect security management and was later transferred to the sub-regional cooperation schemes set up in Northern Europe in the mid-1990s (Bailes, 2009(2), p.140). (as covered in chapter 3)

Today, however, the relative raising of the importance of non-traditional security aspects and the increased attention paid to them by the United States and the EU might be pushing their articulation and governance of these issues in a direction that is not as obvious and comfortable to the Nordics (Rieker, 2006, pp.310-313). As for instance the United States and some countries in Europe might place more emphasis on tough regulation and surveillance at the cost of individual liberties and privacy than Nordic populations might be willing to accept. Especially since the Nordics have so far not had to deal with terrorism in their internal security policy. Moreover, insofar as the USA under GW Bush and the EU sometimes had very different emphases in their approach to the ‘new threats’ – as reflected in the National Security Strategy (NSS)\(^{21}\) of the US and the corresponding European Security Strategy (ESS)\(^{22}\), Nordic nations with a primary loyalty to NATO or to the EU respectively might find themselves pulled in different directions (Rieker, 2006, p.309).

A further challenge to the Nordic states lies in the fact that many of the most effective coordination and cooperation solutions for an array of these new threats demand more centralized coordination both with regard to the region as well as the rest of Europe. Given the Nordic attachment to national independence (recent independence of Norway, Finland and Iceland covered in chapter 4) and reluctance to get tangled up in integrative structures, it is hard for Nordic governments to justify a radical break from these traditions towards a more integrative approach, but also hard to resist the tide in the longer run.

\(^{21}\)The exercise of military strength is emphasized more explicitly In the NSS. ‘It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength’. (The White House, 2002, p. 29) The strategy is tilted towards US unilateralism and preemptive measures. ‘We will be prepared to act apart when our interest and unique responsibilities require’(The White House, 2002, p. 31).

\(^{22}\) The ESS emphasis is tilted away from the military sphere and champions preventive in stead of preemptive measures. Multilateralism is emphasized strongly as is the Union’s rejection of unilateralism. ‘There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own ... we should look to develop strategic partnerships with all those who share our goals and values and are prepared to act in their support’(European Union, 2003, p.13-14)
4.3. Securitization of European Integration

4.3.1. The securitization of European Integration.

The securitization of European Integration.

The deepening and enlargement of the European integrated space has always partly been security-driven as one of its central rationales is the avoidance of war on the European continent and the protection of the European citizen from the harm wrought by warfare and conflict. By eliminating the threat of war between them the European states in effect 'de-securitized' their relations which made it easier to facilitate cooperation in many sectors like business, policing, migration, culture, education and the like.

The intent here is to give a short illustration of the Union's recent development as a security actor, the evolution of its instruments and policies in that area, and the (varying) effect that this has had on the Nordic countries slow development in the security field early on left the EU as the only multilateral framework without a substantial security policy legacy from the Cold War period. The late development in security matters facilitated the development of a somewhat innovative approach to security that emphasizes the value of combining different security policy tools in order to tackle the various aspects of the 21st century security environment, especially in fields of 'soft' security (Rieker, 2006, p.303). The securitization of European integration is a complex and evolving process but one that serves well to illustrate the peculiarities of the different security environment talked about in Chapters 1 and 2 above. Defining and testing security functionality in terms of the territorial security of spatially defined units of analysis can be largely inappropriate and misleading when discussing the EU, and this misconception is partly reinforced by the three pillar structure where the second pillar (CFSP) is contrasted and separated formally from the 'internal' domains of the first (European Community) and third pillar (JHA) – meaning that the cumulative security effect of the Union is not seen at any single point. Indeed it is hard to apply the usual external/internal security duality in a political entity that is not first and foremost territorially defined but rather has had the aim of eroding borders for the purpose of inter-state security (Ekengren, 2006, p.269).

As already argued, the transnational nature of the 'new' threats and the interconnectedness of societies logically demands tackling many of them on a regional basis. The Union provides an obvious framework for this and has the collective expertise, as well as resources and tools, to formulate high quality
policies that accommodate the interests of the participating states (Missiroli, 2007, pp.24), (Ekengren, 2006, p.267). This could prove to be a considerable asset when dealing with the new strategic environment. On the other hand, the creation of highly specialised security institutions above the nation-state level is not very democratic. The Union's security development of these policies at the EU level has taken place at a time when demand for an 'Ever closer Union' has suffered some setbacks, because of political fragmentation concerning the Iraq war, but also because of lack of popular support and understanding as shown by a failed Constitutional Treaty and rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the Irish referendum (Rhinard, 2006, p.512).

The Union’s development across the security spectrum is ultimately dependent on the political will of its members and its progress has been constrained by members' concerns over national sovereignty as well as popular scepticism. These obstacles have so far stood in the way of the Union’s developing into a fully guaranteed defence community of the NATO kind, as well as having anything like a single army or even a substantial standing security force. Nevertheless, the Union’s development as a security actor and increased self-sufficiency in this area has changed the structural conditions in European security, reducing direct reliance on foreign actors and bringing other changes in the interaction of European states with outside powers. Among others the Union’s relationship today with Russia has transformed dramatically: while its Eastern neighbour was formerly seen as a major threat (to be dealt with by NATO), EU cooperation with Russia has been widened to cover a wide array of issues, most importantly cooperation on global matters of security in the UN and G8 fora inter alia, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, organized crime, pollution etc. – and the largely unsolved issue of energy. Overall, the development of the Union's security policies and instruments remains a product of the political realities that shape the Union and the enduring tensions between national and supranational authority that are especially relevant in the area of security and defence.

The Nordic countries’ association with this development differs according

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23 The EU’s draft Treaty of Lisbon has preserved language originally created for the proposed ‘Constitutional Treaty’ that commits countries to come to each others’ aid under military attack, but any practical effect is negated by references reasserting the primacy of NATO for its members and preserving the non-allies’ right to their distinctive national policies.

24 The idea of a European defence community with a single army was rejected by the French National Assembly back in 1953 and the ESDP ‘Headline Goal’ is something much looser. For another suggestion pertaining to the creation of European Union forces see the Barnier report. (Barnier, Michel (2006). For a European civil protection force: Europe aid. Brussels.)
to their patterns of integration but they are all arguably strongly affected by these changes in European security. The securitization of European Integration has brought with it new venues and opportunities for member states and various categories of partners (including Norway and Iceland through the EEA) to consolidate their efforts for the common good of the European citizen, both through new multilateral relationships and by combining the EU’s many different competences – political, economic and functional – relevant to security. The issues arising for different categories of Nordic states are looked at next.

4.4. The effect on EU members

The relationship between the Nordic EU members and the Union is shaped by many of the same or similar dynamics that have characterized the Union’s general development in the area of security: the dynamics of giving and taking, national concerns of sovereignty, and the EU’s development through interdependence towards solidarity. In terms of solidarity, the three Nordic EU members\(^{25}\) have been brought into a framework of increased integration and cooperation that serves to decrease the peculiarities of their security policies. The Nordic members are in fact no longer autonomous international actors independent of other states in the EU and they face pressure for increased commonality and convergence with respect to security matters as well as legal, institutional and political ones (Christensen, 2006, pp. 159-162). By pooling their resources with other members, Nordic members have stood to gain from the benefits and coverage that the cooperation has spawned. This has meant that Finland and Sweden have had to distance themselves from their previous national policies and culture of neutrality and particularism by increasingly adopting common European policies and strategic culture. The Copenhagen criteria for EU accession in 1993\(^{26}\), the adoption of the Petersberg Tasks as a programme for the

\(^{24}\)When discussing the Nordic EU-members Denmark is not always affected in the same way (notably in the military field) due to the national opt outs. For more detail see footnote 1.

\(^{26}\)In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council decisive steps were taken towards the fifth enlargement, agreeing that conditional upon fulfilment of certain criteria the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desired should become members of the European Union. Thus, the ‘Big Bang’ Eastward enlargement was no longer a question of ‘if’, but ‘when’. Taken from “http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm” at 10.april. 2008
EU’s own military crisis management policy in 1999\textsuperscript{27}, The European Security Strategy of 2004\textsuperscript{28}, the 'solidarity declaration' adopted following the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the 'Solidarity Clause' in Lisbon Treaty\textsuperscript{29} are but the main examples of the advancement of the EU as a conduit for common European strategic goals and interests. This convergence extends to the military sphere as the European Defence Agency (EDA) has facilitated armaments and procurement cooperation (Cottey, 2007, p.146). The military aspect of European securitization has been typified in Norden by the development of the EU Battle group project\textsuperscript{30} where all the Nordic countries have shown interest and where Sweden became the Framework Nation of a Nordic Battle group (NBG) that was on standby during the first half of 2008. Besides Sweden, the force consists of troops from Finland, Norway, and Estonia. Denmark has been a notable non-participant in this and in some other ‘hard’ defence cooperation projects in Norden, making Copenhagen marginal in the process of securitization of Nordic relationships even as Denmark’s security ties with the US, UK and sometimes Europe as a whole have increased.

On the other hand, the Nordic countries have a seat at the table and are

\textsuperscript{27} The creation of a military crisis management capacity in the EU can be traced back to the Helsinki European Council decisions of 10-11 Dec 1999. These stated that ‘The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operation in response to international crisis. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army’ (Council of European Union , 1999, Article 27). The “Petersberg tasks” are an integral part of the European security and defence policy (ESDP). They were explicitly included in Article 17 in the Treaty on European Union (also called the Treaty of Maastricht) and cover: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. This formula was originally found in the ‘Petersberg Declaration’ adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992. (http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm)

\textsuperscript{28} The ESS is a comprehensive document that deals with the ‘new threats’ agenda. It is a European reaction to USA’s National Security Strategy (NSS) published in September 2002. It served to bring European states together for a more comprehensive approach to the new security threats.

\textsuperscript{29} The ‘solidarity clause’ providing for mutual assistance in cases of major terrorist attack and natural disasters was first drafted for the Constitutional Treaty but was pulled out and adopted by all EU states as a political declaration in March 2004 following the Madrid bombings. (Ekengren 2006, pp.462-463) It is retained as a formal Treaty provision in the current draft of the Lisbon Treaty (Article 188r).(http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=510&Itemid=51) . (See also note 23 above on the relationship of solidarity to military defence.)

\textsuperscript{30} The EU Battle groups have been fully operational since 1 January 2007. The Battle group Concept calls for two Battle groups to be on standby at the same time during a six month period, ready to be deployed on two separate operations, if necessary. One or more countries provide Battle groups following a rotating schedule. Sweden is the Framework Nation of the Nordic Battle group (NBG), which was on standby during the first half of 2008. Besides Sweden, the force consists of troops from Finland, Norway, Estonia and Ireland.(http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9133/a/82276) (the EU as a regional security actor. t. tardy bts 19)
able to participate in shaping the development of Union’s security role. They have used this to bring in increased interest in their region and to take initiatives in 'uploading' national goals onto the broader EU-agenda. The active engagement of Finland and Sweden led to the Petersberg tasks being taken on by the EU as its definition of crisis management in the ESDP decisions of 1999 (see note 28) (Cottey, 2007, pp.156-157, 208). Increased EU institutional interest in the Nordic area was also mirrored in the 'The Northern Dimension' programme launched under the Finnish EU Presidency in 1999, which focuses on matters like the region’s fragile environment, health and social well-being, cultural diversity and issues involving indigenous peoples, with a view to sustainable development, welfare and stability (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The Northern Dimension was re-launched during the Finnish presidency in 2006 where it was transformed into a genuinely regional policy co-owned by the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland. It serves as a good example of how a Nordic country has increased the EU’s engagement in dealing with many of the soft-security challenges originating from Russia. It is also a model of gaining increased influence at the level of international politics that perhaps was traditionally out of reach for a small state.

It remains uncertain but is more than likely that the EU will evolve towards full military guarantees in the future. In fact the ESDP has developed a certain dynamic of its own and has been one of the few areas least affected by the latest stalling of the Lisbon Treaty. This direction might be hard for Finland and Sweden to block, and would force the countries to make some choices on securitization – in the ultimate form of mutual defence guarantees - that might not be in line with public sentiments. Opting out on the other hand could lead to marginalization from the European 'hard core' (Bailes, 2009, p.138).

4.5. The EU’s impact on non-members and Nordic convergence.

As the contemporary security demands heighten the importance of civilian resources and capabilities, the development of the EU as a security actor and its multidimensional reach make it important to all countries in Europe irrespective of the nature of their formal association with the Union (Lindley-French, 2009, p.51). The securitization of European integration has brought about a need for non-members to cooperate in some way with the Union, enhancing their own
involvement in multilateral approaches to security. Indeed subregional cooperation (covered in chapter 2) has been one of the more popular avenues for such cooperative ventures, allowing those European members that have chosen not to pool their sovereignty with the Union or neighbours that are not able to join for any reason to cooperate with full EU states.

In Norden semi-integrative solutions have been highly favoured by the non-EU Nordics as a way to cooperate extensively with the Union while allowing them to preserve their national sovereignty and freedom of play. In fact Norwegian and Icelandic participation in Schengen exceeds the involvement of some European member states, e.g. the United Kingdom, in some of the associated programmes. As in the case of the Nordic battle group the securitization of European integration is a driver for increased policy convergence within Norden itself especially on softer security issues. Being part of European Economic Area (EEA) and Schengen brings all the Nordics together with other European countries in the adoption of a comprehensive approach to security and joint protection of their borders and people. The Schengen cooperation is particularly important in this respect, as are the access by Norway and Iceland to law enforcement cooperation in the Europol\(^{31}\) and Eurojust\(^{32}\), plus other cooperative ventures such Frontex\(^{33}\), The External Borders Fund\(^{34}\) and the Dublin Cooperation\(^{35}\). Such varied and non-binding cooperation frameworks help to draw in non-members of the Union as an integrated part of its increasingly important role in comprehensive security management.

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31 Europol is the European Law Enforcement Organisation which aims at improving the effectiveness and co-operation of the competent authorities in the Member States in preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international organised crime.

32 The goal of this cooperation is to enhance the effectiveness of the competent authorities within Member States when they are dealing with the investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border and organised crime.

33 An EU agency based in Warsaw, was created as a specialised and independent body tasked to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of border security. The activities of Frontex are intelligence driven. Frontex complements and provides particular added value to the national border management systems of the Member States.

34 The instrument establishes a financial solidarity mechanism to support the states who endure, for the benefit of the Community, a lasting and heavy financial burden arising from the implementation of common standards on control and surveillance of external borders and visa policy.

35 Dublin cooperation ensures that asylum seekers make only one application for asylum within the Dublin area. The Dublin criteria establish which country is responsible for dealing with an asylum application and thus ensure a more even distribution and sharing of burdens.
4.6. Integration patterns: 'soft' and 'fuzzy' solutions

Today, despite the pressures for increased securitization discussed in this chapter, integration patterns in Norden are still quite distinct and different from the mainstream of Europe. The countries still seem to retain a preference for limiting their integrative commitments in order to gain more freedom of play in the international arena. As explained in chapter 4, these preferences can to a large degree be traced to a security culture in Norden that is deeply affected by national experiences in the World Wars, and by the Cold War which encouraged individualistic and desecuritized approaches to a point that made disunity seem virtuous. These approaches coincided with and were reinforced by strong sentiments of national autonomy in the region given the relatively recent independence of Finland, Norway and Iceland.

At the same time, the Nordics have mitigated the divisive effects these policies have had on their security by increasing their cooperation in security and defence in a pragmatic manner. Their method for dealing with the regional

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATO Membership</th>
<th>Partnership for Peace</th>
<th>EU Membership</th>
<th>Eurozone</th>
<th>EFTA/EEA</th>
<th>Schengen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
challenges posed largely by Russia has been to create and work within subregional organizations like the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the Council of Baltic Sea States, which do not encroach on their autonomy and provide a flexible framework for pragmatic cooperation (Bailes, 2009(2), pp.131-139).

Towards NATO and the EU the Nordics have again kept a pragmatic focus and fully exploited all the statuses available for partnership, association and ad hoc cooperation. And although Norway\textsuperscript{36} and Iceland\textsuperscript{37} are not formally associated with the ESDP they have 'opted in' on some of its operations. Conversely, Finland and Sweden have maintained an active role in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) increasing the convergence of their defence postures with that of NATO in fields of planning, modernization and interoperability. These countries have been well placed within the European Union in matters concerning defence and contributed some innovative solutions to the institutional and policy development of the CFSP and ESDP (Strömvik, 2006, pp.208-209).

Denmark is still the only Nordic country that is integrated into both EU and NATO, but has at various stages had a very turbulent relationship with these institutions. The years 1982-1988 in NATO were called the footnote period where the Danish government became increasingly critical of NATO's policies. Denmark has been very reluctant in EU integration and still retains four opt-outs from the Treaty of Maastricht. The defence opt-out has the effect that Danish defence forces can only be used under UN or NATO auspices or in a coalition of the willing and as soon as the EU becomes involved, Denmark must end its involvement or provide only civilian elements (Pedersen, 2006, pp.46).

Norden thus seems still to be characterized by 'special' integrative solutions that are different from the mainstream of Europe, and which states have clung to despite major shifts in the security environment and considerable pressures for securitization. In contrast to the Baltic States and every single state of Central Europe and the Balkans, the Nordics have not responded to these pressures by opting for double integration in the bigger European institutions. What makes this picture even stranger is that despite all the securitization pressures the Nordics

\textsuperscript{36} Norway contributes to the ESDP in a number of ways, i.e. through the multinational Swedish-led EU Battle Group currently on stand by for EU and through force contributions to the EU force catalogue and EU-led military operations(e.g. ‘Operation Althea’ ongoing in Bosnia and ‘Operation Concordia’, 2003, in Macedonia)

\textsuperscript{37} Albeit not having any military forces Iceland had contributed to the ESDP through its involvement in the Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and kept its involvement in ‘Operation Concordia’ in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia FYROM, when it was transferred from NATO to the EU in March 2003 (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2006, pp.333-335).
are facing, they do not seem to have translated directly into increased defence expenditure. This does not fit at all with the analysis in chapters 1, 2 and 4 above of the securitization of European Integration and trends in the Post-Cold War security environment, which seemed to indicate that all Europeans would need increased financial contributions to national security provision, notably to meet the needs of military professionalism and interoperability for overseas engagement, as well as increasingly cooperative and integrative approaches to security in general. In fact, if one looks at the defence expenditure of the Nordic countries in the period of 1988-2006 it becomes evident that defence expenditure has gone down markedly in three of them, and slightly in Finland, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).

This preference for non-integrative solutions and the absence of increased funds seems to suggest that the Nordics have dealt with these strategic realities by specific national and subregional means. The Nordics put up the NORDAC framework that facilitated selective and pragmatic cooperation between them despite its limited success, but otherwise have responded by developing special national solutions. The time has come to look briefly at the particular national solutions the Nordics have adopted in order to explain their reactions more thoroughly.

Table 4.2: Defence expenditure as percentage of GDP 1988-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Iceland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
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<td>2,9</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
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<td>2,7</td>
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<td>1995</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>1,4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>1,5</td>
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<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: SIPRI database on military expenditure, at http://www.sipri.org)
4.7. Reacting to changes: Current national strategies in Norden.

4.7.1. Denmark:
The fact that Denmark's foreign security policy has traditionally been very reactive is quite natural considering its geographic position on the doorstep of Germany. The country’s behaviour as an uneasy, small and exposed state has been called the '1864 syndrome' and affected Danish policy far into the Cold War. As noted in a previous chapter the security situation in Norden demanded that Nordic countries showed restraint in their defence configurations, and Denmark was no exception (Pedersen, 2006, p.40). This reactiveness reached its extreme peak in the 1980s in the so called 'footnote period' when Denmark distanced itself from various military and nuclear policies of NATO. The Danish economy was in a shambles at the time and the Socialist People’s Party was part of a parliamentary majority; at the time the Danish parliament was considered sympathetic to Soviet positions.

On the other side, Danish contributions to peacekeeping have for a long time been formidable and for instance Denmark held out large contingents of personnel in Congo, Gaza and Cyprus during the decades after the Second World War. A more general change came after the aforementioned 'footnote period' when a Danish defence commission reported in august 1988 that the whole strategic and political context had changed, predicting more need for flexibility in the coming years. This report gave Danish military planners a head start compared to most other countries in adapting to modern military demands. Since the 1990s Denmark has been radically changing its defence forces away from territorial defence and towards being more mobile and better equipped (Pedersen, 2006, pp.43-45). Denmark has adopted the greatest degree of reliance on professional forces among all the Nordic countries and only about 20% of each age group enters the armed services. The length of compulsory service has furthermore been reduced from ten months to four (Cronberg, 2006, pp. 317-322).

Since the 1990s Danish foreign policy has become increasingly assertive and multilateralized. During the start of the Balkan crisis Danish forces were involved in UN peacekeeping operations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and later took part in NATO’s KFOR and later SFOR operations. In the late 1990s Denmark took the initiative in the UN framework for the establishment of the multinational standby high readiness brigade for United Nations operations.
(SHIRBRIG) with its planning staff based in Denmark. The country deployed in 2000/2001, peacekeeping forces to Ethiopia and Eritrea and currently Danish forces are deployed under NATO's auspices in Kosovo and in Iraq.38

Modern ambitions for the Danish security forces include extending their capabilities to be able to maintain 2000 troops abroad at any time and to keep Denmark among the leading countries in the world with regard to international operations. Denmark seems in fact to be trying to maximize its potential influence abroad by a high degree of de-territorialization of its strategy and forces (Pedersen, 2006, pp.45).

At the same time, civilian capabilities have been strengthened within the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) which prepares and handles responses to some of the newer threats like terrorism and national disasters, industrial accidents and international crisis situations. By strengthening and professionalizing the country’s civilian and military intervention capacities the Danish Government hopes to be able to use them in various combinations also for new-style domestic emergencies, providing increased justification for the move away from traditional territorial defence (Ministry of Defence of Denmark, 2004(1), pp.12-16).

Denmark has lately been considered to have adopted a very ‘Atlanticist’ stance in its defence. It still has responsibility for the protection of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, which are hard for the Danish navy to patrol (especially Greenland) and which Denmark could not defend from any attack. This has made Denmark dependent on the USA for the strategic protection of Greenland, which the USA has readily taken on.39 The special relationship between the USA and Denmark is perhaps enhanced by the fact that Denmark has isolated itself from the ESDP by its defence opt-out from the Maastricht treaty and is perhaps trying to compensate for this by orienting further towards the USA. Whether this ‘Atlanticist’ orientation will change when Denmark opts back in – and in the light of the large policy changes from President Bush’s time to President Obama’s - is however an open question.

38 Denmark was until a very late stage a contributor to the USA's ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in Iraq. Denmark takes part in NATO's training programmes for Iraqi personnel but also supported the Multinational Force by sending more than 500 personnel (the report says a ‘Battalion sized Unit’ which is traditionally considered to be 500-1500 personnel) to Iraq during the campaign (Ministry of Defence of Denmark, 2004(1), pp.12).
39 USA has the Thule air base in northern Greenland and it is part of its early forward warning radar system and perhaps of USA ballistic missile defence system.
Although Denmark has not increased its defence expenditure the country has been one of the countries that have responded most radically to the changed security environment. Denmark has dealt with new pressures in securitization (and the associated financial pressures) by cutting back on territorial defence but grooming its troops for two new tasks: peace missions and civilian support at home. Denmark remains the only 'doubly integrated' Nordic state but still retains its opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty which inter alia excludes cooperation with the ESDP. Denmark has rather chosen to cooperate more with the USA and tried to win its favour and good will. This is quite understandable considering the fact that the Faroe Islands and Greenland make Denmark quite attached to security developments in the Atlantic, but it also reflects a historic turn-around in Denmark’s relations and status within NATO – culminating remarkably in the choice of Danish PM Anders Fogh Rasmusson to become the next Secretary-General of NATO in April 2009.

4.7.2. Finland:

Finland's choice to join the European Union soon after the fall of the Soviet Union was clearly a decision that was based in part on security factors. After having been constrained somewhat by its eastern neighbour in history it saw its accession to the Union as an option to multilateralize its security concerns to a certain degree (Ingebritsen, 2000, pp.93-101). Since then, as discussed above. the European Union has emerged more strongly as a security actor and provides for the security of its members also through declarations of political intent that concretize the Union's coherence, solidarity, and common commitments in this area (Cronberg, 2006, p.320). Finland thus represents the strongest case in Norden of the so called European approach to security and participates fully in the development of the Union's common security and defence policy. It has also joined Schengen as soon as it became possible, and has been positive regarding questions on enlargement of the Union.

Finland has, however, been unable to join NATO so far out of fear of the reaction of its eastern neighbour which has been very concerned about the expansion of NATO to its sphere of influence and would undoubtedly view Finland's membership as provocative. This does not however mean that Finland has no connection to NATO: Finland traditionally benefited from the USA's presence in Europe and NATO although it has not been a member. It has
participated in the Partnership for Peace since 1994, since before it joined the EU. Finland's participation in the KFOR mission in Kosovo is a good example of Finland's level of cooperation with NATO where Finland currently provides about 400 peacekeepers, plus an additional 100 troops for ISAF. Finland will most likely participate further under NATO under the auspices of the NATO Response Force initiative (NATO, 2008).

As the stability and absence of traditional military threats to the Nordic has become more evident, NATO and the EU have found more common ground for cooperation with Russia and view the latter mainly as a strategic partner, not an enemy. Finland has been at the forefront at policy formulation concerning Russia and as it actively tries to bring increased focus to its regional matters. The most evident result of which is the Northern Dimension of the ESDP (Cronberg, 2006, p.320). Finland managed to influence the shape of a common policy on Russia for the EU. Although mentally and geographically peripheral to most member countries Finland’s Expertise on Russia was welcomed. The Northern Dimension is a long-term approach for promoting sustainable security and strengthening the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU.

Recent security developments have caused all Nordic countries to give more attention to internal aspects of security and at the same time towards international interventions reflecting the global nature of these threats. This has pushed strongly against traditional territorial defence and towards a more professional army and emphasis on the 'softer' aspects of security (Cronberg, 2006, p.318). Denmark, Norway and Sweden have dealt with this changing environment by making institutional reforms in their countries that address and redefine the relationship between internal and external security. For these three states the practical implications have included a reduction in the level of conscription level and in the importance of territorial defence in order to commit a larger share of their defence budget to international interventions and the technological development of the armed forces (Cronberg, 2006, p.321). Finland's case reflects a different choice based upon a still essentially realist security policy. Despite general rhetoric about the new threats conscription levels have remained relatively unchanged with approximately 80% of the male population being conscripted into the army. Territorial defence is still the main purpose of the Finnish army as self-reliance seems to be the starting position of Finnish security thinking and the aim of the Finnish defence is to be able to
respond to all threats and crises using national resources (Sallinen, 2007, p.162). However, in the latest version of defence policy the level of mobilization of Finnish defence has been forced into reconsideration and caused a reduction in the mobilization target from 450,000 men to 350,000 men (Cronberg, p.319).

This high level of conscription enjoys a strong support from the population in Finland and the role of the military in defence of the country is an intricate part of the national identity. The military is viewed very favourably and continues to be the most trusted institution in the country. There are close relations between the armed forces and society which seems to indicate that Finland has not moved very far from the concept of 'total defence' (Sallinen, 2007, p.164). At the same time, this typically Cold War concept seems to have been cast in a more modern and effective form by the development of a doctrine of 'protection of the vital functions of society'\(^40\) that includes an extremely wide range of threats/risks. This strategy, first published in 2006 and now integrated into the overall defence policy, places emphasis on situational awareness, and management support systems where the structures and premises of planning and communication can be reliable in all conditions. This goal is then realized through strengthened broader cooperation between NGOs, private citizens and Business and the public authorities (Government of Finland, 2009, p.83).

The new security agenda is sure to test the current Finnish model in the future particularly with a reference to budgetary issues. The increasing demand for a professionalized army for international interventions and the rising costs of acquisition and maintenance of defence material are strong incentives for Finland to reduce the size of its territorial troops or at least seriously increase its emphasis on cost-efficient action. Up to now it has squared the circle largely though a lower degree of mechanization than Sweden and more stress on individual skills and training: it also, of course, has a much smaller arms industry to support.

Finland's most recent security policy report seems comprehensive and addresses military threats together with other security challenges and threats that create often widespread cross-border hazards in an interdependent and globalised world. The new policy addresses both the constant changes and unpredictability that characterise the modern environment and the need for transnational action. Regarding territorial defence the policy paper mentions that the Finnish

government does not expect military pressure or armed aggression from the outside world but has not moved away from territorial defence as a concept. The Finnish policy states the country's intent to be engaged in developments within the EU as well as to remain an active partner of NATO, and increase its defence appropriations by 2% annually as of 2011 (Government of Finland, 2009, p.125).

4.7.3. Iceland:

Iceland has traditionally viewed military establishments as foreign and undesirable and Iceland has refrained from establishing armed forces throughout its existence as a modern independent state. Icelandic needs for security and defence have traditionally been safeguarded by a bilateral agreement with the USA since 1951 based on its NATO membership (Iceland was a founding member of the Alliance in 1949). Although the Icelandic Defence Force subsequently provided by the USA and based at Keflavik has been seen as an offence to the country’s independence and values it has provided the country with huge economic benefits in terms of foreign exchange earnings and employment (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2006, p.329).

Until very recently Icelandic foreign policy has been very reactive, including in NATO where the country has been a recipient of security rather than a provider. Discussions on the possible benefits of European Union membership revolve almost entirely around economic factors and do not portray the Union as a possible security solution (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2006, p.332). Security issues in Iceland have traditionally been viewed in Realist Westphalian terms at the cost of 'softer' conceptions of security. The nation’s main security interests have been seen as synonymous with the Atlantic solidarity and the converging of US and European interests.

This reactive Realist stance can be explained both with relation to the island’s experiences during the second half of the twentieth century, and by its remoteness which has kept it relatively safe from external pollution, terrorism, international crime and thus in many ways decreased the affect of those aspects that are at the forefront of the new security discussion (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2006, pp.329-330).

Recently Iceland has started taking security issues more seriously, especially as a result of the USA’s change of position on keeping its forces in Iceland. This increased the country's impetus for a more active commitment to
security matters which came to a head with the unilateral US withdrawal in autumn 2006. Recently Iceland has been more active in NATO, trying to shake off the image of being solely a consumer of security. Iceland's failure to preserve the military base in Keflavík has put security matters in Iceland in a state of flux and pushed for a greater institutional reform and greater activity in international interventions (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2006, pp. 336-337). Iceland has responded to these concerns by looking towards its European neighbours for the provision of regular aerial surveillance, in particular its Nordic neighbours. The situation has made the ESDP a more attractive in terms of security as it provides protection in terms both of 'hard' and 'soft' security and the country has opted in on some of ESDP’s activities. Iceland is a member of the Schengen agreement and already cooperates with the EU on such relevant security issues as border control and international crime prevention.

Iceland established its own, civilian crisis response unit – The Iceland Crisis Response Unit (ICRU) - in 2000 and has the official aim to enlarge it enough to be able to have 50 personnel working abroad on its behalf at any given time. This capability is designed to be able to be used under the auspices of the EU as well as NATO, UN or the OSCE. Since its inception ICRU has been activated and its first large project involved contributions to NATO and EU missions in the Balkans, including the running of Pristina Airport under the auspices of KFOR and NATO from October 2002 to April 2004. After this successful mission ICRU took on running the Kabul Airport in Afghanistan for a six month period, which remains the unit's largest assignment yet. These missions have been quite high profile and have contributed to changing Iceland’s security image, underlining its ability to contribute to international security although it does so in a non-military fashion (Bailes & Thorhallsson, p.333-337).

Since the US withdrew its forces from Iceland the government’s budget on defence has increased somewhat. If one puts the ICRU aside the main factors in this increase have been mainly threefold: first the country has taken over financial responsibility for the Icelandic Air Defence Radar system, second it is co-financing regular NATO exercises held in Iceland and thirdly it is increasing its civilian security capacity (Gisladóttir, p.1-3). The increase in civilian capacity has involved strengthening the Icelandic Víkingasveit (special forces), buying of new

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41Iceland has signed agreements with Denmark, Norway and Britain declaring a will for cooperation on security, defence, preparation and rescue on the North Atlantic.

42The country has contributed to EU's police mission in Bosnia and as of September 2005
ships for the Icelandic Coastguard and new aircraft to strengthen its emergency rescue services that traditionally depended a great deal on the US assets in Keflavik. 43

Iceland is still in the process of reassessing its security following the unilateral departure of US troops from the island. This reassessment of policy has recently been delayed somewhat by the economic crisis that the country is suffering from since October 2008, which has made the future developments in Iceland hard to predict not least in political terms. One of the key factors of recent work was the launch of a risk assessment commission under the foreign ministry which was supposed to provide a basis for further policy development. This groups’ report came out on March 2009 and suggested the adoption of a national strategy based on a broader conception of security including global, social, military factors and their interconnection. (Utanríkisráðuneyti Íslands, 2009, p.23). The effect that this will have on government policy is however deeply uncertain as it challenges the Icelandic leadership’s hitherto very traditional understanding of security (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2006, p.346). This conception has again been reaffirmed with recent items of security legislation passed by Alþingi which are restricted to dealing with security in limited Realist/Westphalian terms. These texts refer consistently to the state (or its territory) as the object to be protected, and they maintain a clear separation between military and civil security and between the external and internal aspects of security44 (Ómarsdóttir, 2008, p. 154).

This picture might however change in the aftermath of the next elections which are to be held in Iceland at the end of April 2009. European issues have scored high on the agenda of the electoral campaign so far, increasing the chances of membership discussions commencing in the next government’s term.

4.7.4. Norway:

Norway's attachment to notions of sovereignty has been quite evident in relation to European affairs, where the country has not become seriously engaged but rather held a special position at the edge of European Integration. Although

43The Icelandic Government decided on 4.march 2005 to renew ships and airplanes under the command of the Icelandic coast guard: For detailed information see URL:’http://www.domsmalaraduneyti.is/frettatilkynningar/nr/1019’

44For a detailed and comprehensive study of recent security legislations see: Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir,(2008). Öryggissjálfsmynd Íslands, Úmræða um varnarmála- og almannaþáttur á Alþingi vorið 2008.
Norway has made three applications to join the EU and its predecessors, it remains outside the Union. Norway keeps till this day an intensive cooperation with the Union both through its participation within the EEA trade framework and Schengen and the country has opted in on several of the Union's operations abroad. Norway's political will to cooperate is clear even though the form of its future relations with the Union remains uncertain. Norway for instance participates with Finland and Sweden in the EU Nordic battle group and cooperates strongly on the general technical and practical aspects of peacekeeping forces, thus ensuring interoperability and flexibility (Udgaard, 2006, p. 323).

Despite this cooperation and opting in on several European missions, Norway harbours no illusions about being made part of the underlying political decisions, and so long as it is not part of the Union it will have to accept being outside the formation of the European Union as a defence actor. Its readiness nonetheless to keep up active engagement with the Union might be explained by the fact that Norway feels increasingly marginalized within the European security enterprise and active cooperation might be a way to mitigate that marginalization (Udgaard, 2006, p. 323).

The current Norwegian strategy states the aim of upholding the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the country by the exercise of authority to safeguard the nation’s interest. While being articulated in a language that is characteristic of a territorial/Westphalian conception of security, Norway's latest official security report from 2008 mentions the need both to protect Norwegian society against external threats and to ensure the functioning of key infrastructures and public services in a framework of societal security (samfunnssikkerhet) (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2008, p.6). By paying attention to the balance between military and civil preparedness, Norway is at the same time acknowledging that geographical distance is no longer the determining factor in security and the increased participation in translational cooperation is important to Norwegian security. Norway has actively participated in Afghanistan (ISAF), Kosovo (KFOR) and NATO's training mission in Iraq, and has a strong tradition of national conflict mediation – having for instance until recently been actively engaged in the Sri Lanka peace process. All of these missions have either been based on UN Security Council mandates or on an invitation from the authorities.

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of the country concerned.

Strategic issues concerning developments in the High North have been considered to demand considerable strategic priority for Norwegian security in the years ahead. The Norwegian government has been active in the development of a High North Strategy that deals with the sustainable management and exploitation of the region’s resources. (Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2006, p.7) Norway has actively engaged both the EU and Russia\textsuperscript{46} in order to develop their cooperation, and sought to exercise considerable influence over the recent initial formulations of their Arctic policies by both the EU and NATO (see more below). It remains uncertain, however, how extensively Norway will be able to lead on the Arctic issue once the ‘big boys’ get engaged and future developments will probably give increased salience to voices within the EU. The long-term fate of Norway's partial engagement in European integration is too early to predict.

4.7.5. Sweden:

The traditional pillars of Swedish defence policy have been independence, neutrality in wartime and military non-alignment. A policy of neutrality was reinforced by a passive, anti-invasion defence force built upon conscription and a relatively huge national defence industry base\textsuperscript{47}. The premises of Swedish national defence policy have however been changed dramatically in the Post-Cold War era where independence has been replaced by interdependence and a policy of neutrality and military non-alignment \textit{de facto} abandoned. Swedish security forces are in a process of radical change that is intended to bring about “\textit{more usable armed forces with increased operational effectiveness. This will be done by redistributing resources from support and administrative activities in the Swedish Armed Forces and other defence agencies to operational activities}” (Ministry of Defence of Sweden, 2008, p.1).

The most recent set of published priorities for Swedish security seems very practical and emphasizes increased emergency management capacity. (Ministry of Defence of Sweden, 2008(1), p.1) Emergency preparedness has been strengthened especially by the establishment of 'The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency'

\textsuperscript{46}Cooperation with Russia takes place in many sectors but the cooperation concerning the 'Stockman' oil and gas field in Russia's Northern waters is of specific relevance to matters in the High North and to the energy connection.

\textsuperscript{47}Weapons systems were often designed to have a “Swedish profile” that excluded interoperability in order to strengthen commitments of military non-alignment,
(SCCA) on 1 January 2009. The agency is intended to bring increased efficiency and effectiveness in the civil protection field by administrative reforms and increased coordination of information and experience between national, regional and local bodies.\textsuperscript{48} (Ministry of Defence of Sweden, 2008(2), p.1-2) One of the more recent Swedish policy documents (The Defence Commission report: Defence in Use) places increased emphasis on increased capabilities for overseas deployment and the rapid preparedness. Central to the increased international capabilities is the country’s undertaking to become the framework nation responsible for the Nordic EU battle group. Swedish ambitions include the aim of maintaining up to 2000 personnel deployed abroad simultaneously and the development of a rapid evacuation and reinforcement operation using up to 300 personnel. (Ministry of Defence of Sweden, 2008(2), p.2-) Through Swedish participation in PfP and especially its defence planning provisions, Swedish regulations, doctrines, procedures and equipment have increasingly been made interoperable with those of NATO (Wedin, 2006, p.145).

While there have been increases in emergency preparedness and professionalization of military forces, however, there has been decreased emphasis put on forces and systems that are primarily intended for national purposes. Substantial reductions have been made in territorially based personnel and ground based air defence. Furthermore significant reductions concerning the numbers of tanks, heavy combat vehicles and combat aircraft are foreseeable. (Ministry of Defence of Sweden, 2008(2), p.4). Swedish large-scale defence industry has undergone extensive reductions and restructuring that exceeds what other Nordic countries’ (much smaller) defence sectors have experienced. The most obvious and concrete aspect of this restructuring is the vast increase in foreign ownership in Swedish defence industry and the re-evaluation of the scale of weapons procurement, directly linked with budgetary reductions. This helps explain why Sweden has pushed so hard lately for joint equipment purchases with Norway and/or Sweden that would restore to its producers some benefit of scale (Bailes, 2009, p.139),(Hagelin, 2006, pp.176-177),(Ministry of Defence of Sweden, 2008(2), p.4).

A determining factor in the restructuring of Swedish defence policy is the country’s accession to the European Union. Sweden has been actively engaged in

\textsuperscript{48}Large parts of the activities of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency and the National Board of Psychological Defence was or will be transferred to this new agency (Ministry of Defence of Sweden, 2008(1), p.1-2).
European defence and security development where it has on the one hand advocated increased EU’s crisis management capabilities, and on the other hand sought to block all movements towards common defence (Wedin, 2006, p.142). The Swedish population has been considered one of the most Euro-sceptic in the EU, as manifested both in the negative outcome of a referendum on adopting the Euro in 2003 (and the strength of the Anti-EU lobby generally), and in a Swedish EU policy that emphasizes the value of intergovernmentalism – above all in the ESDP (Wedin, 2006, pp.143-145). For this and other reasons, the real popular attitude to Sweden’s national security transformation is a moot question. Several of the current changes would theoretically conflict with the traditionally strong mental attachment of the Swedish population to independence and neutrality. These sentiments might however be changing, and given the relatively positive Swedish attitude concerning Nordic defence cooperation there seems to be at least cause to say that these blockages are at least not as strong as before.49

The big question that remains concerning Swedish security policy is the credibility of territorial defence. While the country is distancing itself from older territorial concepts including mass conscription, at the same time it takes a stand against the development of common security guarantees at the EU level. The absence of its NATO membership begs the question of how Swedish territory is defended. The absence of military alliances and decreased capabilities in territorial defence might suggest that Sweden would be in a very vulnerable position if attacked, and indeed the Chief of Defence has warned that he is not confident of defending (for instance) the outlying islands or even the Stockholm region.

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49The latest security policy document states that “In Sweden there is broad political support for a further development of bilateral and multilateral Nordic military cooperation.” (Ministry of Defence of Sweden, 2008(2), p.).

5.1. General remarks and introduction: The level of ambition

Despite historic differences and different forms of institutional association, the Nordic countries face capability demands and vulnerabilities that are increasingly converging. By the emergence of a new security environment, Nordic countries are facing an array of new challenges, both in their immediate geographical proximity as well as in the international arena. There is in fact a rising demand and desire to increase Nordic Cooperation in the field of foreign and security matters. The increased need for cooperation among Nordic counties was addressed on the 16th of June 2008, when the Nordic foreign ministers asked former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg to make an independent study into the potential for closer foreign and defence policy cooperation over the next 10-15 years (Nordic Council, 2008).

Historically, as recounted earlier in this thesis, Nordic relations in security matters have been characterised by political divergence where limited and practical engagements have been preferred over wide reaching political commitments. Nordic cooperation in the security field has been rooted in practicality and often conducted between the larger Nordic countries in bilateral or trilateral relations.50 This has at times served to marginalise Iceland and Denmark (or more accurately also Greenland and the Faroe Islands).

The report produced by Stoltenberg and his team seems to be sensitive to this preference for practicality and restraint regarding political commitments. At the same time its proposals address the demands of a new security environment in an increasingly Pan-Nordic way that would allow for a more comprehensive approach to the region’s challenges, and for the more efficient use of resources. The report consists of 13 separate but specific proposals for strengthening Nordic cooperation. Although in some of the proposals it would be most natural for two or more countries to initiate cooperation, the report is designed with the view of

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50 A good example of which is the practical cooperation in the development or procurement of defence technology and equipment (NORDAC), where the bigger Nordic countries have made use of the economics of scale allowing both cost effective solutions and increased interoperability.
enabling all the Nordic counties to participate and/or selectively cooperate on the policy aspects most beneficial for themselves and their respective sub-region.

How far this report will be able to move Nordic cooperation along remains to be seen and is currently far from evident. Building the report up in this loose way of separate proposals with some synergy between them, instead of an overall comprehensive strategy report, might serve to bring Nordic cooperation forward by allowing a ‘pick and mix’ approach, especially with regard to projects already underway.

5.2. Relevance and appropriateness.

The following table is intended to give an illustration of the Stoltenberg proposals with regard to their content and reach. Each proposal – albeit deserving a more detailed analysis - is explained briefly and compared with the level of current or past cooperation in the relevant field. The highest level of prior engagement is rated as ‘A’ which indicates significant cooperation among at least some Nordics, while a rating of ‘C’ would mean that the relevant cooperation was minimal or absent.

Table 5.1: Stoltenberg’s suggestions on Nordic security cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Proposal name</th>
<th>Short description of suggestion.</th>
<th>Level of previous cooperation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Nordic Stabilisation Task Force</td>
<td>A Nordic stabilisation task force should be established that can be deployed to states affected by major internal unrest or other critical situations where international assistance is desirable. It would be responsible for stabilising the situation and then creating an environment in which the state and political processes can function properly. It should include both civilian and military personnel. The task force should have four components: a military component, a humanitarian component, a statebuilding component (including police officers, judges, prison officers, election observers) and a development assistance component.</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nordic cooperation on surveillance of Icelandic airspace</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>The Nordic countries should take on part of the responsibility for air surveillance and air patrolling over Iceland. Initially, the Nordic countries could deploy personnel to the Keflavik base and take part in the regular Northern Viking exercises, which are organised by the Icelandic authorities. After this, they could take responsibility for some of the air patrols organised by NATO. Thus, Nordic cooperation on air patrolling could become an example of cooperation between NATO member states and partner countries that have signed Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreements. The Nordic cooperation could be developed in three phases as described below. (Closely linked to suggestions number 3 and 5)</td>
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<th>Nordic maritime monitoring system</th>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>A Nordic system should be established for monitoring and early warning in the Nordic sea areas. The system should in principle be civilian and be designed for tasks such as monitoring the marine environment and pollution and monitoring of civilian traffic. The existing military surveillance systems are not particularly designed to carry out these tasks. A Nordic maritime monitoring system could have two pillars, one for the Baltic Sea (&quot;BalticWatch&quot;) and one for the North Atlantic, parts of the Arctic Ocean and the Barents Sea (&quot;BarentsWatch&quot;), under a common overall system. (Linked to proposals 4, 5 and 12)</td>
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<th>Maritime response force</th>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Once a Nordic maritime monitoring system is in place, a Nordic maritime response force should be established, consisting of elements from the Nordic countries’ coast guards and rescue services. It should patrol regularly in the Nordic seas, and one of its main responsibilities should be search and rescue.</td>
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<th>Satellite system for surveillance and communications</th>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>By 2020, a Nordic polar orbit satellite system should be established in connection with the development of a Nordic maritime monitoring system. Such a satellite system could provide frequently updated real-time images of the situation at sea, which is essential for effective maritime monitoring and crisis management.</td>
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<th>Nordic cooperation on Arctic issues</th>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>The Nordic countries, which are all members of the Arctic Council, should develop cooperation on Arctic issues focusing on more practical matters. The environment, climate change, maritime safety and search and rescue services are appropriate areas for such cooperation.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td><strong>Nordic resource network to protect against cyber attacks</strong></td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td><strong>Disaster response unit</strong></td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td><strong>War crimes investigation unit</strong></td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td><strong>Cooperation between foreign services</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td><strong>Military cooperation on transport, medical services, education, materiel and exercise ranges</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td><strong>Amphibious unit</strong></td>
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The Nordic governments should issue a mutual declaration of solidarity in which they commit themselves to clarifying how they would respond if a Nordic country were subject to external attack or undue pressure.

The report does logically reflect or respond to a number of factors in the new Nordic security environment as presented in this thesis. While the justification for many of its suggestions is focused and brief, leaving room for further development and thinking on some of them, there are however three themes that are noted quite consistently. Firstly, there is a significant emphasis on specifically regional security challenges in the report, pertaining especially to developments in the Arctic and issues regarding cooperation with Russia. Secondly, it argues for the broadening out or intensifying of the relationship between Members and Partners in both NATO and EU, where the Nordics could technically strengthen these partnerships by creating a more integrated Nordic system, which would facilitate increased interoperability and mitigate the effect of different institutional associations. Thirdly an emphasis is placed on the benefits to be derived from economies of scale: increased cooperation would bring about a more efficient use of resources in dealing with some of the new challenges, as well as a more comprehensive policy for addressing them.

The relatively strong regional focus in the report could be seen as a reaction to the fact that developments since the end of the Cold War have steered the efforts of larger nations and institutions increasingly away from the region towards more troubled areas. This has not however absolved the Nordics from their regional security demands that make themselves clear both with regard to Russia but even more strongly in the prospective Arctic developments. The functional change from territorial threats to transnational ones, from a military emphasis towards a civil one, is underlined in the report which consistently advocates increased civil capabilities or increased fusion of civil/military components. The non-state, multi-dimensional nature of the new security challenges is also made clear by the report which has a limited focus on global issues such as rogue states, nuclear issues, peacekeeping and environmental factors, while relatively more emphasis is placed on the Nordics' larger neighbourhood. The report focuses largely on building capacities designed for use in the Nordics’ more immediate surroundings in particular by proposing increased
surveillance, search & rescue capabilities, ecological protection, protection of critical infrastructure, etc. By means of increased cooperation between the Nordic countries and with foreign actors a more comprehensive approach is advocated and a clear need for increased capabilities is portrayed with special emphasis on the Arctic. (Stoltenberg, 2009, pp.1-7)

The increased emphasis on transnational threats is accompanied by discussions on transnational solutions. A strengthening of Nordic cooperation towards increased convergence in the security field would facilitate the expansion and broadening out of the NATO and EU partnership programs and facilitate cooperation with these institutions as with other actors (Stoltenberg, 2009, pp.10-13). Increased Nordic cooperation would in fact bring about increased coherence and synthesis of projects currently underway in the respective institutions and bring about increased comprehensiveness and convergence of policies and interests. This more transnational approach would allow Nordic cooperation to become a step between the national and supranational and facilitate and supplement the interplay of these different levels of governance.

The Stoltenberg report is clearly preoccupied with the demands for increased national defence expenditure that characterise the new security environment and especially the resource crunch some of the Nordics are currently dealing with. While increased demands for resources have thus far been solved by special national solutions and particularly cutbacks in conscription and territorial defence, the feasibility of such national solutions can be doubted in the long run. As stated in the report, “Looking 15-20 years down the road, none of the Nordic countries will be able to maintain their armed forces at their current size and quality without closer Nordic cooperation.” (Stoltenberg, 2009, p.28). The report emphasizes that by investing in Pan-Nordic capabilities, the Nordics could reduce the need for investments at the national level and cut running costs by more effective use of current resources. Further cooperation would also give the Nordics a better negotiating position in the procurement of new equipment and technology (Stoltenberg, 2009, pp.28).

The analysis put forward in the Stoltenberg report thus serves to underline and supplement previous arguments concerning the changed security environment and the increased focus on civil emergencies. It does so in a manner that is takes to heart the 'specialness' and 'peculiarity' of Nordic security and the preferences for practical solutions and limited integration by Nordic countries. Yet it also does
so in a forward looking manner that could serve to bring the Nordic countries out of a traditional regional role of desecuritization and passiveness, towards active engagement and a level of convergence and activity unheard of hitherto. The flexibility of subregional institutions and the civilian focus of subregional security building, addressed in an earlier section of this thesis, would make an interesting point of comparison with this report. The connection is plausible given Stoltenberg’s experience with subregionalism especially with regard to the formation of the BEAC in 1993 (Joenniemi, 1999, pp 24). Especially interesting is that both schemes have a rational of achieving a more active and equal interplay with Russia. And strengthen the regions stance vis-à-vis the European cooperation.

5.3. The question of political acceptability and the positive and negative effects of values and perceptions.

The report makes a strong case for increased Nordic security cooperation, both with respect to the increased need for one and its general financial practicalities. Increased cooperation and convergence might in fact be a very smart way for the Nordics to respond to the current security environment. But then again if logic were the only determining factor, double integration in NATO and EU would probably seem like a logical choice as well. The point here is that while Stoltenberg’s report might have provided the right logical answer to modern challenges, some of the suggestions are not as politically feasible as others. According to our analysis the traditional incoherence in Norden can be explained by the different geographical positions of the countries and by the different experiences in the major wars in the previous century, which served to maintain this Nordic incoherence for decades. Nordic differences with regard to security can largely be explained by differences in national security identities and perceptions. The probability of some of the proposals in the Stoltenberg report being actualised will not exclusively be determined by logical reasoning but above all by their political acceptability. Although there is not room here for exhaustive analysis of actual and potential national responses, a variety of factors both positive and negative can be identified that could both push for or deter Nordic convergence in this regard.
5.3.1. The Positive factors pushing for the proposals:

**A good structure:**

The structure of the report allows for a special or limited ‘package deal’ that could serve to move a common security agenda forward on a selective basis. Even though all the proposals will not be adopted the probable impact of the report might be significantly increased on the account of its structure.

**Some projects are already underway:**

Some of the proposals are based on expanding cooperation already underway on national, bilateral or trilateral levels and need only to be connected and brought into a Pan-Nordic setting for further convergence.

**Detachment from hard security:**

The level of detachment from hard security and military matters that characterises both the report and the new security environment in general might serve to make such cooperation more acceptable in Norden. A more openly securitized approach to the region might not only run into Nordic populations’ often negative perceptions regarding military (Westphalian / realist) capacity building, but also magnify concerns about Russian reactions (see below).

**The political acceptability of Norden as a unit:**

Although the Nordic countries have been reluctant towards political convergence and preferred a practical but limited approach, this integrative reluctance might be tempered by the political acceptability of Norden in most countries’ current political discourse. The cultural and historic similarities might make it more acceptable to integrate further in the limited subregion instead of the larger forum.

5.3.2. The negative factors obstructing the proposals:

**Some of the problems being too big or Norden being too small.**

One of the reasons that inhibited the Nordic countries from developing their cooperation during the last century was that the problems they were facing
were too big for them to handle. This might also be the case now and the
Nordics too small a group to provide a comprehensive answer to some of the
problems. The provision of policies and answers to problems pertaining to
global issues e.g. climate change, rogue states and state building will in large
part be addressed by the bigger European institutions and other big actors on
the international scene and therefore not primarily by Nordic countries, with
solutions that may not particularly adhere to their preferences and values. This
might also be true in the case of other transnational threats. Whether it is
immigration, search and rescue, cyber security, air patrols or satellite
surveillance systems these issues might be more naturally addressed at the
larger EU/NATO forums that will in large part 'set the agenda' for many of the
answers. Although EU and NATO approaches can be strengthened and
supplemented by increased Nordic cooperation, the Nordics might see their
interest in avoiding the marginal investment (Nordic cooperation) and focus
on influencing developments in the bigger forum.

The bigger the better:

Economics of size and cost reduction might provide an impetus to spend more
effort on building common EU or NATO approaches, where the ultimate
economies of size and cost efficiency might prove to be all the more beneficial
for the Nordic states.

Russian perceptions and reactions might be negative:

Although the proposals in Stoltenberg’s report are particularly tilted towards
civil challenges and civil capabilities there is a significant military aspect in
some of them. This level of securitization might be too extensive for Russia to
sit by and watch. Extensive securitization of the Nordic relationship might
change perceptions and discussions in a way that in turn might damage
relations with Russia and undermine effective peaceful solutions. This
could be particularly true of the proposals that imply a ‘break out’ by various
elements of Swedish and Finnish forces, normally focussed on the Baltic, into

\[51\] For example: A day after the Stoltenberg report was published or the 10 February, 2009 Russian
news media covered it under the title "Nordic military alliance to challenge Russia in Arctic."
taken from URL: http://www.russiatoday.com/Politics/2009-02
10/Nordic_military_alliance_to_challenge_Russia_in_Arctic.html?page=8 on 18.05.09
high northern waters where Norway and Iceland have so far been alone against Russia and even the NATO presence has been cautious.

Too much securitization?

Given the fact that Sweden has been very reluctant to take up joint territorial defence commitments in the EU and has a special history in military matters that emphasises military non-alignment and neutrality, the level of securitization found in the report might be a deal-breaker for Sweden. The risk of securitization, giving among other things a ‘harder’ quality to its own duties, might dissuade Sweden from taking a leading role in the development of Nordic cooperation. Furthermore it might be hard to justify such securitization to Nordic populations.

Benefits of foreign interest.

Developments in the Arctic might make Norden more central due to the opening up of shipping lines and communication. This might draw in increased foreign interest which might serve to benefit the Nordics. The Nordics might be hesitant to finance increased capabilities if those investments could partly or wholly be made easier by increased foreign involvement in the area – and possibly, as in the Cold War, at relatively reduced risk to themselves.
6. The Arctic agenda and its influence on Nordic cooperation:

6.1. An Introduction to general developments. What is the Arctic agenda?

The changes underway in the High North will have a significant impact on international affairs. The combined effect of the shrinking of the Arctic ice cap and the recent technological advancement serve to increase the strategic and commercial importance of the region more significant in the coming years and decades. The largest factors are, firstly, the possibility to alter global transportation patterns by opening up Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the North-West and North-East Passages or directly across the Polar Basin. Secondly, a possibility of increased utilization of the region’s energy and mineral resources made easier by increased accessibility and better technology. Estimates suggest that the Arctic Circle may contain as much as 25 percent of the undiscovered global petroleum reserves that extend both to legally disputed and undisputed areas (Holtsmark, 2009(1), pp. 3-4).

Although the Arctic has been inhabited and exploited throughout modern history, its significance has been somewhat diminished by the ice blocking the transcontinental passages. The potential strategic, economic and ecological impacts of increased regional activity have brought with them an array of questions pertaining to the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead. It is far from certain how the constellation of governance in the Arctic will develop in the future and recent activities in the area have been characterised by competing claims by relevant stakeholders, plus continued and gradually increasing military operations. The international community needs to address these changes and find ways of creating an environment that is characterised by stability, shared prosperity and mutually agreed regimes, thus avoiding a negative spiral of militarization or securitization that could undermine more constructive approaches.

At the forefront in solving the challenges in the Arctic are the five Arctic Ocean states: Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark(Greenland) and
Norway, but countries in the immediate neighbourhood and those that have vital interests in the developments are likely to influence developments to some extent (e.g. China, Iceland, EU, NATO). The five Arctic littoral states have all issued authoritative Arctic policies and have expressed a will to use the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) as a basis for the legal framework for the region (Arctic Council, 2008,). It is interesting to note that four out of the five Arctic Ocean states (plus Iceland) are members of NATO making it natural to assume that the key for Arctic stability and prosperity is largely dependent on the peaceful relationships across old dividing lines, between East and West (Holtsmark, 2009(2), pp.1-3).

During the Cold War the Arctic was a region of considerable strategic significance both with regard to nuclear deterrence and especially with regard to the USSR’s military build-up in the Kola-Peninsula. Following the end of the Cold War the strategic priority of the High North decreased dramatically and the interest of major Western powers was oriented increasingly towards the Mediterranean and points East. This was facilitated by the emergence of new “out of area” threats and changing relations with Russia that were increasingly cooperative and non-confrontational. The melting of the ice-cap will serve to reinvigorate the strategic importance of the region and bring in increased engagement and interest from all large powers.

The imperative of achieving active cooperation and compromise solutions is underlined by the multidimensional nature of the challenges in the North. If the area is to be peaceful and stable, a multilateral framework needs to be established (or in the possible case of the Arctic Council, strengthened) in order to facilitate on the development of a coherent approaches to issues like search and rescue, surveillance, emergency response, environmental standards, fishery protection, piracy and terrorist prevention etc. This must also be supplemented by cooperative ventures in solving the remaining delimitation and jurisdictional disputes in order to evade inter-state conflicts. The bottom line is that without a relatively stable regional environment the extraction of natural resources and regional transportation will become increasingly difficult (Holtsmark, 2009(2), p.2-6).
6.2. Could Arctic developments facilitate Nordic policy convergence?

Developments in the Arctic bring focus to both new and traditional regional challenges in Norden. As good cooperation with Russia, seems to be a prerequisite for a peaceful and comprehensive approach in the High North (Joenniemi, interview in 2009). The increased strategic importance of the region might have significant consequences for the Nordics in particular concerning transport via the North-East passage. Increased transport via the North-East passage and Arctic developments in general might bring the Nordics back into something like the position of centrality that they had during the Cold War albeit in a potentially more positive sense. This might turn the tide of foreign interest in the Nordic region (Joenniemi, interview in 2009).

The opening up of the Arctic has already brought about increased activity in the Nordic area, such as the increased number of Liquefied Natural Gas tankers passing through their waters and the increased activity of Russian strategic bombers that regularly pass close to Icelandic and Norwegian airspace, as part of their renewed long-range training flights (Holtsmark, 2009(1), p.1-3). Although the challenges that Russia presents for the Nordic region are increasingly civilian ones, the renewal of major military capabilities in the Kola-peninsula has not gone unnoticed and serves to illustrate that Russia's military capabilities are still part of the larger picture that has to be considered (Holtsmark, 2009(1), p 1-5). Although different Nordic states’ immediate answers to the Arctic developments might differ, long term answers to these challenges increasingly demand cooperative solutions. How far these solutions will serve to bring the Nordics further into cooperation is an open question but it might be hard for these countries to respond to or influence developments to a any significant extent individually.

Norway has in many ways been very assertive in its Arctic strategy and placed it at the top of the government’s domestic and international agenda. Norway will probably continue on this path as for geographic reasons it is arguably the Nordic country that is most exposed to both the civilian challenges as well as the military challenges that recent developments have brought with them. Norway also has cooperation with Russia concerning the development of oil and gas inter alia in the Shtockman field52 (Hydro. 2009). Norway is likely to be at the forefront or central to any common Nordic policies to the Arctic.

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52 Shtokman is the world's largest gas field discovered. It is located at the deep sea shelf on the Russian side of the Barents Sea about 500 kilometres outside of Murmansk. For more information see: URL: 'http://www.oil-and-gas.net/index.php?page_id=3631'
Prima facie, one can identify some factors that might encourage the Nordic countries to develop common policies or approaches to the Arctic. All the Nordics wish to avoid excess militarization or securitization of regional developments. If the respective members fail to make use of the hard-won lessons from the strategic confrontation during the Cold war, East-West dialogue could deteriorate into negative cycles of confrontation, with demonstrative political moves and destabilising counter measures. Such developments would seriously undermine the security of the entire Nordic region. A return to Cold War patterns of interaction, dominated by securitized or militarized zero-sum thinking could arguably increase the impetus for Nordic convergence.

Just as Nordic convergence is encouraged by the negative aim of avoiding the worst, in contrast the positive argument points towards the same conclusion. That is, working towards strengthening of multilateral/institutional approaches built upon the rule of law and predictability rather than Westphalian power play is one aspect where Nordic interests converge. As small states the multilateralization of Arctic governance would serve to strengthen the Nordics’ interest against larger powers, as it detaches their relations somewhat from the realities of power (ie, through the way that institutionalization pushes towards sovereign equality instead of asymmetries in economic and military capabilities)(Bailes, 2009(1), p.1).

Another factor that might bring the Nordic states together is that they have all been active in the area of environmental protection, and are not considered as resource hungry as many other states. The Nordics are therefore more likely to work towards the exertion of restraint that would allow for the resources of the region to be used responsibly and the environment protected. The Nordics are likely to advocate more environmental controls as a measure to contribute to the battle with climate change but also as a way to protect the local natural conditions and population from being overly disrupted by increased activity.

Lastly, the more general point of avoiding marginalization could be a factor pushing for a common Nordic strategy. The increase in activity in the Arctic is likely to bring in powerful players – national, institutional and commercial – that might have their own conflicting claims and pressing agendas. The Arctic dialogue will consist of many voices and if the Nordics want theirs to be taken into account the development of collective policies and position within Norden would increase their chances in that regard.
6.3. What are the factors pushing for divergence?

History seems to suggest a pattern of Nordic divergence with respect to the security implications of their region. Differences in institutional alignments, national security solutions, security values and perceptions were caused and reinforced by historic developments in the last century, and they in turn will influence current and future policies (mutatis mutandis) to some extent. The current policies of the Nordics currently diverge in regard to a series of security issues as they have not adopted any common coherent policy. Factors already mentioned but especially relevant to Arctic policies include Denmark's relative pro-US stance, Swedish reluctance in adopting a leading role in Nordic security relations, Iceland's peculiar situation after US departure from the island and the experiences of economic collapse, and Norwegian cooperation with Russia in the field of energy. This might suggest that the Nordics might prefer to work instead for specific national interests that might conflict with adoption of Pan-Nordic policies. The increase in foreign interest might reinforce policies of divergence by tempting states to work for or with some larger power (and/or institution), especially if any state believes it can acquire significant economic or security related benefits thereby.

The different geography of the states including the nature of, or lack of, their territorial claims in the Polar basin could also serve to decrease the chances of common positions being developed between the Nordics. The geographical difference might be reinforced by different institutional alignments where Sweden and Finland might take a separate route in developing security measures in the Baltic Sea area, and Denmark, Norway and Iceland would be left dealing with the more direct consequences of Arctic developments. Such development might also take place with regard to Denmark and its self-governing dependencies. (Bailes, 2009(1), p.2)\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{53}Greenland’s population decided in a referendum on November 25 2008 to increase independence from its former colonial master and attempt to create an economy based increasingly on natural resources. A total of 75.54pc voted 'Yes' to the proposal, which was drafted jointly by Danish and Greenlandic politicians. For more information see URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,592880,00.html
6.4. Is the Arctic a 'Big Boys'' game?

In the Cold War the asymmetry of capabilities between the Nordics and the nuclear powers was a determining factor that pushed the Nordics into passivity and made them increasingly dependant on the policies adopted by larger powers. Their security environment was dominated by dynamics of nuclear deterrence brought in from abroad. This nuclear balance was maintained 'over their heads' and set the regional security dynamics into stone, well outside the reach of Nordic influence.

Just as the issue of nuclear deterrence was a game exclusively reserved for the 'Big Boys' or the larger powers in the international system, the significance of Arctic developments today might be out of the Nordics’ reach in a sense and the decisions and policies taken concerning the Arctic could be dominated – willy-nilly - by the needs and polices of larger powers. It might be hard for the Nordics to influence or achieve a good negotiating position vis-à-vis the larger states, whether on their own or in cohort. Prima facie one would suspect that, the greater the material resources in the area, the greater the change that developments will be characterised by power play as each state tries to secure its vital interest. This might suggest that in an attempt to secure their interest the Nordic states might be better off working with larger actors, especially the larger European institutions where they might be in a better negotiating position than in direct multilateral discussions with larger powers like the US, Russia, Canada and even China, Japan and Korea.

This brings the focus back again to the issue of securitization, that is Nordic interests in working towards desecuritization. The application of a largely desecuritized approach to future Arctic management would not only serve the Nordic states’ interest with regard to relations with Russia, but would further increase their ability to influence the developments, as increased securitization would increasingly bring the Arctic agenda into the sphere of bigger powers and increasingly push the Nordics into passivity.
7. Conclusions

The mainstream Western understanding of 'security' as a concept has consistently been widened and been made more inclusive than before. Our analysis of the new security environment facing the Nordic countries today is significantly different from traditional approaches in security studies. Particular attention was drawn in Section I above to Ole Wæver's concept of 'securitization', which addresses the different implications of definitional and policy making approaches that shift the classification of a range of public policy challenges towards or away from the security concept as such. It served to validate conceptually the Nordic choices tending towards 'de-securitization' during the 20th century, but would not necessarily fit so neatly in other environments.

In the changed post-Cold War setting, new approaches can add value to the understanding of ‘security’ by addressing a wider array of threats to human welfare. Current concepts typically aim to bring focus not only to the 'hard' security realities of conflict but also to the so-called 'soft' aspects of security not traditionally incorporated into security studies – ranging from organized crime to extreme weather. Illustrations were given above of how different approaches in addressing these challenges affect international institutions and state interaction as well as how they incorporate and affect different actors in our societies. The conclusion was that the state-centric and territorially defined approaches of older theoretical frameworks cannot capture the peculiarities of the new security environment that has arisen since the end of the Cold War. Just as a new security environment-challenges traditional academic the Nordic states with respect to their security policy formulation.

Despite enjoying a wide array of similarities the Nordic countries have not been able to deal with the security situation of their region in a collective and cohesive way. Ever since the 15th century the Nordic region has been a region characterized by tension and conflict. Nordic countries fought each other extensively early on as each of them tried to force its influence upon the other with the help of foreign powers. This fierce competition between the Nordic countries imposed serious sufferings upon their people without gaining any significant political benefits in return. The Nordic states effectively reduced themselves to second-rate powers in the international system as they failed to
impose their will on one another.

Political developments from the 17th century onwards were characterized by a relatively peaceful coexistence among the Nordics that can partly be explained by past experiences of warfare, but also by the fact that the Nordic position in the international system had changed and was increasingly influenced by political dynamics in central Europe. These peaceful relations have been maintained by the Nordics to this day. By the 20th century, however, the Nordic countries security situation of the Nordic countries had changed and was increasingly characterized as a periphery under pressure. The Nordics themselves were not in a position to influence developments to any significant degree but had to cope with the pressures and challenges the continental wars bought with them. During this time the political constellation of the region changed dramatically with the independence of the new nation states of Norway, Finland and Iceland. All five Nordic states however retained a common preference for the protection of sovereignty and more freedom of play in the international arena. The fragility of these aims was underlined by the different experiences the Nordics faced during the Second World War, where Denmark and Norway were invaded by Germany, Iceland was occupied by Britain, Finland fought two wars with the Soviet Union and Sweden remained neutral. These different experiences are significant factors to consider when the different policy choices made by the Nordic countries in the Cold War and present are examined.

This diversity brought about during the Second World War became set in stone with the advent of the Cold War where the Nordic countries’ strategic choices were very different and based on national factors. The security situation in Norden came to be known as the ‘Nordic Balance’ both because of the different national polices adopted by the Nordics and the recognition of those policies by the larger powers.

Reviewing this period of history in the light of the concept of ‘securitization and desecuritization’, we asked why the Nordic cooperation that became formalized after World War Two did not extend to the security field. The answers we provided were that on the one hand the Nordic countries no longer had an impetus to cooperate out of mutual distrust or fear, having arrived at what can be called a security community where war between them had become unthinkable; and secondly, the asymmetry of threat that the Nordics were facing from the Soviet bloc was so great that the Nordics could not have hoped to
counter it just by working together. As a result, Nordic security matters have mainly been dealt with on a national basis and according to each country’s institutional alignment, geographical position and values. These security approaches – albeit different - were all characterized by the practical application of desecuritization to the Nordics’ own region and a preference for practical cooperation that did not impede on national sovereignty. The Nordic states have, further, maintained a semi-integrative approach with respect to the larger European institutions. They have preferred to deal with the regional challenge (Russia) by integrating it into subregional frameworks that enable the Nordics at the same time to multilateralize their relations, and to respond to an array of security challenges in a way that remains desecuritized inasmuch as it allows common efforts with strategic rivals and appeals to other common rationales.

These Nordic peculiarities are being seriously challenged by the security environment that has arisen since the end of the Cold war. The Post-Cold War security environment has been characterized by the increased interconnectedness of societies driven by the advent of globalization, spreading new challenges and vulnerabilities, and also by the intensification and growing ‘securitization’ of the European integration process. These changes have also created a strong impetus for the Nordics to re-conceptualize or rethink traditional security approaches. European Integration and globalization have undermined the state-centric notion of power and revealed new vulnerabilities within societies, stemming from varying sources above and below the state level. As well as widening security studies to focus increasingly on the ‘softer’ dimensions of security, these changes are driving the Nordics – like other states – both to re-think their official security policies and to engage other actors in society whose contribution and interaction is needed for the new challenges.

At the level of specific policies, all Nordics with armed forces have been under pressure to increasingly abandon territorial defence and internationalize and professionalize their defence forces in order to participate in interventionist missions abroad. At the same time they have had to respond to the emergence of a new threat pattern that is characterized by being transnational in its effects and demands increased cooperation, since major natural emergencies, terrorism, organized crime, infrastructure breakdown, cyber security, etc. can simply not be solved on a national basis.

An analysis of individual Nordic defence and security policies since 1990
shows all states responding in some measure to these pressures, but also a continuing pattern of divergence both old – the divided Nordic institutional membership – and new, such as Denmark’s recent extremely pro-US orientation and virtual abandonment of territorial defence. Finland’s deep engagement in EU integration and its clinging to high levels of conscription are equally distinctive at the other end of the scale. If nearly twenty years of the new environment have still not brought a decisive turn towards Nordic unity and openly securitized cooperation, could some further new developments do so?

Two such factors are the newly published Stoltenberg Report on Nordic security and defence cooperation, and developments in the Arctic. Our analysis of the Stoltenberg report drew out significant themes in the report and evaluated them with respect to Nordic peculiarities. The Report recognizes the new security agenda, tries to find aspects of it on which all five Nordic states could work together, and consistently refers to the financial benefits of increased cooperation which would serve to ease the pressures the national defence budgets in Norden are facing. The Report seems to provide the right logical answers to the new challenges the Nordics are facing: but the political acceptability of the respective proposals is uncertain.

Concerning Developments in the Arctic will probably challenge the Nordic states for quite some time. The opening up of new sea lines of communication might serve to increase the centrality of the Nordic area, bringing economic benefits but also risks of new disasters, pollution and militarization that might in turn increase the pressures for closer Nordic strategic cooperation. It remains to be seen how far the Nordics can overcome the obstacles to a common sense of purpose on this agenda, but also how much real influence they could have on the outcome even if acting jointly. Whether the formation of a comprehensive common Nordic security agenda will emerge in the near future, or if that will only happen once they are all inside at least one of Europe’s larger institutions, remains an open question. The answers are after all, up to them.
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