Is Russia Europe’s Other?
How the Ukraine Crisis Reinforces European Identity formation

Viktor Stefánsson

Lokaverkefni til BA gráðu í Stjórnmálafræði
Félagsvísindasvið
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Abstract

This thesis examines the possible construction of a European identity by viewing Russia as Europe’s “other”. The Ukraine Crisis has put Brussels on a collision course with Moscow as Russian involvement in the Ukraine Crisis has been heavily criticized by the European Union. After Russia’s decision to annex Crimea into the Russian state the European Union imposed tough economic sanctions on Russia only to receive similar sanctions in retaliation from Russia. For the last two decades, EU-Russian relations have deteriorated reaching an all time low in 2015. The aim of this thesis is to determine whether the European Union and its executives and important European political figures are using the Ukraine Crisis to form more unity within the European Union and reinforce European identity formation. A qualitative content analysis was conducted that indicated that neither EU executives nor European political leaders are using the Ukraine Crisis deliberately as a tool for identity construction.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Útdráttur</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  Identity</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 What is identity</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 National Identity</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Social Constructivism</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Why European identity is important to the European Union</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 European identity</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 The Eurozone crisis</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Lack of public interest</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Rise of Euroscepticism and the future of the European Union</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 The Ukraine crisis and the European Union</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Chapter 3: Content Analysis and Results</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Methodology</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Content analysis</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Conclusion</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

The European Union has come a long way since its establishment in 1952 when six European nations formed the Coal and Steel Community. Today the European Union consists of 28 member states that have chosen to undergo deep political and economic integration. Today the European Union faces many difficulties, EU integration has been met with increasing opposition with Member States opting out of integration in some policy areas and public rejection of new EU Treaties in referendums. The Eurozone crisis has created division between Member States and the European Union’s image has been badly affected by tough austerity measures. Euroscepticism and nationalism are on the rise giving them more political influence putting further EU integration at risk. The European Union is said to be facing an identity problem where EU citizens seem uninterested in European affairs as election turnout in European Parliament elections has decreased steadily for the past decades. The European Union is criticized for being an inefficient and complicated beaurocratic system which lacks democratic legitimacy and public trust. EU leaders face difficulties in building trust with the seemingly uninterested EU public as people tend to feel that the European Union is “too distant” and that they are unable to influence political outcomes on the European level.

Since the 1990’s Social Constructivism has contributed to academic debates on European identity creation and European integration studies. Social Constructivism is a way to examine how identities are formed or changed. This thesis will examine European identity and how the ongoing Ukraine Crisis could reinforce European identity formation. This thesis will try to answer the question whether EU executives and important European political figures are using the Ukraine Crisis to create more unity and a collective identity by using Russia as Europe’s “other”. By EU executives I mean the top executives of the European institutions and Commissioners, and by important European political figures I mean powerful Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Member States. In order to answer whether the Ukraine Crisis is being used by EU executives and political leaders to create a collective identity, a qualitative content analysis of news articles will be conducted. By analysing EU executive’s and European political figure’s remarks in news articles the researcher hopes to find a “unifying” rhetoric that will influence the readers’ perception of the European Union and the values it stands for against Russia.
1: Identity

1.1 What is identity

How do people identify themselves? How do people distinguish themselves from others? What is it that makes a person feel British, Polish, Asian, European and so forth? Identities are complex and they can be difficult to measure as people generally identify themselves in various ways. Nationality, religion, class, sexuality, sex and ethnicity are examples of the many identities a person can have. According to Haynes et al. (2011) identity is created when people form “in” and “out” groups, the frequency of a person’s group formation depends on how often the person encounters others (p. 402). In other words, groups distinguish each other by comparing “insiders” to “outsiders” creating their own identity in the process. Recent decades have been characterized by globalization, movement of people and intercontinental communication has never been as easy. The world is getting smaller and different cultures, different languages and traditions are more exposed to each other than before. The world is changing rapidly and as with any changes there are always some who dislike them, as a result identities become more politicized and therefore much more debated. In a way identities show that people have come to learn certain power struggles between different “in” and “out groups” (Samuels 2013, 149). Although this thesis will focus on national identity it is important to understand that people's identities are not all equally important to them. Religion may in some cases be much more important to someone than his nationality whereas another might identify himself by his national identity above all else. As we have seen throughout history and still today identities can be used as great tools for political mobilization and for that reason identities can play a huge role in both national and international politics. As this thesis will look into the significance of “Europeanness” to the citizens of the European Union some people identify much more with their local communities or national state than the European Union, owing their allegiance more to their national governments than the supranational institutions of the EU.

1.2 National Identity

When travelling abroad it is almost certain that you will be asked “where are you from” or “what is your nationality”. For many this is an easy question and for some a tricky one. A person born to Danish parents and raised in Denmark is very likely to answer “Denmark”,

6
while a person born to Icelandic parents raised in France could complicate the answer. Being born in a specific country does not guarantee an emotional attachment to the state. Many immigrants, for example, may adopt most of the local traditions and develop much emotional attachment to their new home, perhaps even more than they did to their old one. Some countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, are multicultural and multilingual where a part of the citizens have parents or ancestors from different identity groups. As David J. Samuels (2013) explains in his book *Comparative Politics* “In such situations, some people choose one identity over another, but some develop affinities to multiple groups” (p. 157). Then there are also nations that have no official statehood as the Kurdish or the Roma people despite having a collective sense of a community and distinct cultures, languages and shared history. Kurds may live in Turkey, Syria and Iraq but distinguish themselves by their kurdish national identity and not to the official states despite what their passports say. Modern borders do not always reflect ethnic divisions as some borders were drawn up by European colonizers who focused on natural resources but not the different ethnic groups living in the colonies. So how do we define *national identity*? National identity can be defined as an emotional attachment to a specific territory, its government or to a certain kind of political system, traditions, local languages and more. Benedict Anderson (1983) suggested that the real definition of a nation is “an imagined political community” due to the fact that members of small or large nations will not know, talk or see every single member of the nation but still feel a connection with them due to a sense of a shared community (p. 49). That raises another important question, can national identities be created and if so how? Traditional international relations theories such as Realism suggest that identities are “fixed, stable and based around the states” (Haynes et al. 2011, 411) implying that identities are not easily changed nor created and that they are stable and bound to the states and the people that inhabit them. Identity politics are therefore much less important in realism than for example social constructivists suggest. But could realism be underestimating the importance of identity politics? As we have mentioned before, people can identify themselves with various different groups, as well as different national identities such as immigrants and their descendants. Europe is a continent formed by many different nations, diverse cultures and different languages yet after the Second World War European states decided to undergo major political and economic integration in order to encourage European cooperation and safeguard peace in Europe (European Union 2015). European integration has changed the way politics work in Europe, Europeans move freely within the EU, may work where they please and move goods and services between all member states. Due to these
major changes in recent years it is not impossible that EU citizens, despite language barriers and cultural differences, have developed a sense of a collective identity.

1.3 Social Constructivism

There are different ideas about how identities are formed, some suggest that people are born with certain identities or that people gain their identities due to heavy influences of pre-existing identities from One’s family and community in early childhood. People form their identities and form “natural” connections to their local communities, religion etc. but not out of necessity, practicality or personal choices. Their identities have become an irrevocable part of them which in the same way divides us “naturally” from other religions, races and languages (Bacova 1998, 31). Those who believe in this idea believe in primordialism. Social constructivists, on the other hand, believe that political identities are flexible and that they can change, even though they appear primordial. Social constructivism is a way to explore how identities are formed and change. Social constructivism acknowledges the fact that biology does not allow us to change, for example, our race but it does, however, allow us to change our political identities, such as religion or nationality as mentioned before (Samuels 2013, 157). Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener (1999) point out in their paper The Social construction of Europe, that there seems to be a connection between some core elements in neo-functionalist theory and social constructivism, elements such as learning process and redefinitions of interests among other elements (p 530). Social constructivism has contributed greatly to theorizing on identity and European integration after its first appearance in the theoretical debates in the 90’s (Risse 2009, 144). Despite this social constructivism should not be viewed as a theory of international relations such as neo-functionalism, liberalism or realism but as a different viewpoint on the subject of identity (Christiansen et al. 1999, 530). What characterizes the history of social constructivism is that it seeks to position itself in the middle between varying theories which therefore creates a broad range of ideas and approaches to the many “-isms” in international relations. Constructivism is therefore not a coherent church of ideas but a mixture of many that have become influential and very mainstream in recent theoretical debates, not necessarily specific to IR but is multidisciplinary within social sciences (Haynes et al. 2011; 217-219).

Social constructivists do not deny the important role of interests in policy making but seek to find out how these interests are constructed and argue for the importance of identity and culture in the process. Take the European integration as an example, Germany has been
one of the major contributors and staunch supporters of the European project despite the fact that the integration has not always or directly served their best interests at times. Germany has often chosen to give up certain positions in order to achieve more cooperation within the European Union (Haynes et al. 2011; 212-214.). Social constructivists believe that social science cannot be researched as natural science as social realities are created by an agreement but not by nature. “By nature” can be interpreted as impossible to change and universal while social realities are often bound to “the local” rather then “global” and if created by people it can be changed by people as well (Christiansen et al. (1999); 530-31). In social constructivism human agency influences and shapes our reality, the construction is a social process driven by people and social interactions. Our environments are therefore being produced by our behaviour and are always changing respectively (Risse 2009; 145-47). As mentioned before, social constructivism has contributed greatly to the research on European integration as it offers great ideas to how it might affect citizen’s identities and future changes within the EU.

The European integration is very likely to have had great impact on European politics and its member states or as Christiansen et al. (1999) mention that “European integration itself has changed over the years, and it is reasonable to assume that in the process agent’s identity and subsequently their behaviour and interests have equally changed”. The European Union could be a prime example of a group of different cultures creating their own through socialization and greater cooperation. Norms of behaviour between two different actors can change due to increased social interaction with each other as European integration deepens (Haynes et al. 2011; 220). In the next chapter I focus on why a European identity is important to the European Union and European integration and how the Ukraine Crisis could reinforce European identity formation.
Why European identity is important to the European Union

Today the European Union is going through challenging times. The European integration has been met with growing public opposition as witnessed when the Swedish and Danish refused to join the Eurozone, when the European Constitutional Treaty was rejected in 2005 and when Ireland rejected not only the Nice treaty in 2001 but also the Lisbon treaty in 2008. The Eurozone crisis has created much division between Eurozone members and great public criticism of European institutions in handling the crisis. The structural problems of the common currency and the Eurozone crisis have put a strain on the Euro’s reputation as people's trust in the Euro has fallen in the Member states that have not yet adopted the Euro (Eurobarometer 2015b, 8). Although recent opinion polls show that the majority of the Eurozone citizens still support the common currency, the public image of the European Union has fallen sharply after the crisis began (Joensen 2013; 50-52). As the recession in Europe deepened many eurosceptic political parties alongside nationalist parties have gained popularity as unhappy voters punish the traditional mainstream political parties. This trend has caused great concern as the eurosceptic parties have become much more influential in national politics (Fligstein et al. 2012; 116). The rise of euroscepticism in Europe could endanger the European project and see the return to nationalist governmental policies rather than the cosmopolitan hopes of the European Union. The European Union also faces a lack of public interest in the European project and experiences low voter turnouts in European elections. This has been viewed as a part of a problem called democratic deficit which undermines the Union’s legitimacy. One way of explaining the apparent lack of interest in European affairs is the lack of identification with the European Union but a collective identity has been seen as necessary to improve the legitimacy of European institutions (Bruter 2004). In this chapter I will try to define European identity, the Eurozone crisis, why a formation of a European identity is important to the future of the European Union and finally examine how the Ukraine crisis could influence identity formation in Europe.

2.1 European identity

The European Union has come a long way since its establishment in 1952, at first it’s founders had the goal of creating a single market and a customs union that would tie the member states together economically and thereby eliminating the chance of future conflicts.
Today the European Union is growing ever more important to ordinary citizens since EU laws and policy making directly affect many major national policies. As European integration advances, more and more policies are being moved from the national level to the European level through common decision making. These policy issues range from environmental issues to economic, social and energy issues to name a few. In 1961 Ernst Haas developed a theory that as European cooperation would increase so would people’s interests in the EU and eventually identify more with the EU and its institutions. He called this a “spill-over”, gradually shifting people’s attention to Brussels from their national governments. Over time this integration would lead to shared interests and values among EU citizens that would unite the different peoples of Europe and create a shared sense of European nationalism (Haas 1961). Many things Haas predicted have come true, the growing cooperation between the European member states lead to the creation of European institutions to manage the ever increasing cooperation. The Eurozone crisis has in many ways proved some of Haas’s predictions as, for example, Eurozone citizens have protested against austerity measures implemented in other Eurozone states. Debates on a common fiscal policy for the Eurozone have emerged and citizens’ attention has been increasingly directed from their national governments to the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt, to the European Commission in Brussels and to Angela Merkel in Berlin.1

So, how do we define European identity? In the paper “European Integration, Nationalism and European Identity” written by Fligstein et al. (2012), European identity is considered to be a civic type of nationalism rather than an ethnic type of nationalism. This means that anyone who accepts a certain set of values or a certain political, ideological or social system can become a member of the community. Whereas ethnic nationalism is based on common ancestry, language, traditions, religion and, of course, being born as a member of the community (pg.112). As mentioned by Fligstein et al. recent academic works2 suggest that


Many other articles are floating around on Eurozone integration that are not mentioned here.

2 see (Green, 2007; Kufer, 2009; Risse, 2010) as cited in Fligstein et al. (2012)
people who identify themselves as European identify with a set of values that characterizes the European Union; peace, multiculturalism, liberalism, tolerance, democracy and human rights (pg. 111-113). By identifying as a European it is likely that the person is a supporter of this set of values. In eastern Europe, the European Union has become a symbol of modernity, representative democracy, the rule of law, anti-corruption. The Iron Curtain that once separated Europe is now gone and as the European project develops so does eastern Europe (Pollack 2000). It is therefore not unlikely that EU flag-waving demonstrators who protest against government corruption in eastern European countries, such as Ukraine, identify with Europe because of the European values of anti-corruption and liberalism while at the same time feeling Ukrainian. As mentioned in my previous chapter, people identify themselves in various ways but people’s identification can also depend in the context of things. If a person discovers while travelling abroad that he/she is labelled as a “European” or possibly faces discrimination for being from Europe, One’s “Europeanness” can become an influential part of One’s identity but not so important in other situations (European Commission 2012; 8). Being “European” is therefore identifying positively with the core elements of the European project as well as identifying with Europe geographically. While European nationalism is considered to be civic there are however some evidence that show that EU citizens feel some sense of belonging in relations to Turkey and their EU application (Haynes et al. 2011). Many Europeans are hesitant to approve of Turkey’s membership of the EU, possibly due to history and religion. Turkey lacks, however, many of the core values needed for the civic “European identity” as described above, a stable democracy and respect for human rights, liberalism and so on.

Evidence indicates that the more you are involved in the European project, either working for or with the European Union, the more you identify with Europe. Evidence also suggests that the higher you are on the socioeconomic scale the more European you feel. Young students who enjoy fast and easy communications, who travel within Europe and have participated in student exchange programs such as ERASMUS are far more likely to identify themselves with Europe. Older people, on the other hand, are more likely to identify with their nation states as it can be more difficult for them to learn new languages than younger
people. They are also less likely to have sought education in other European states and less likely to have travelled as much within Europe. Lower socioeconomic groups are also more likely to identify with their nation state but not with the European Union (Fligstein, 2008; Fligstein et al., 2012). So what explains the differences between the educated and non-educated, and the higher income groups and lower income groups? People with higher income are more likely to travel between different European countries due to work or simply because they can afford to travel or live in different places. The single market and the Schengen area benefit the wealthy and political elites as doing business and travelling between different capitals has never been easier. As consumers, lower income classes do however benefit greatly from both the Schengen area and the single market but they are less likely to travel due to work or afford many cultural trips to different EU capitals. They are more bound to their local communities and rely more on their national governments or municipalities. Educated people cooperate with other academics or professionals throughout Europe, young people are offered a great variety of ways to see and explore the continent, study through exchange programs, make friends and colleagues throughout Europe and so forth (Fligstein et al., 2012). It is therefore likely that the younger generation will identify much more with Europe than previous generations as they are born after the creation of the single market and the Schengen area. There is no politics without the EU for many young EU citizens as that is what they are used to.

2.2 The Eurozone crisis

The Eurozone crisis started out as a banking crisis in 2008 when the American economy weakened and the housing boom went bust resulting in homeowners to default on their mortgages. The Lehman brothers investment bank, the 4th largest one in the USA, went bankrupt due to bad investments and debts. This caused a domino effect where other investment banks collapsed as loans were harder to acquire. The failure of the banking sector then began to affect national economies. European governments reacted by bailing out collapsing banks in order to keep the economy from crashing (European Commission 2014). In the years leading to the banking crisis, some European governments did not follow the agreed rules of the Monetary union and did little to coordinate their financial policies with other Eurozone member states which resulted in major economic differences between member states that shared the common currency. As Europe entered recession in 2009 it became clear that some European governments had been running budget deficits and accumulated huge
amounts of debt. The governments had become dependent on loans from the private market to finance its budget imbalances but when the banking sector worsened investors became anxious over the bad shape of the economies and borrowing became more difficult. The banking crisis therefore became a sovereign debt crisis (European Commission 2014b). Unemployment soared in southern Europe, economies stagnated and austerity measures were implemented in order to get a bailout program from the European Union. Today the Eurozone crisis has lasted 6 years, the crisis has created a division between member states and high unemployment rates and austerity have made the public impatient. Voters dissatisfaction with the EU’s handling of the crisis can be clearly seen in opinion polls as the Union’s image has dropped significantly after the crisis started (Joensen 2013; 50-53). Despite the negative attitude towards the EU Joensen’s findings indicate that the majority of the public still believes that best way to tackle the Eurozone crisis is through European cooperation giving the EU an important role in the outcome (Joensen 2013; 53). As mentioned earlier in this chapter support for the Euro still remains high within the Eurozone but in the member states that have not yet adopted the Euro the support for the adoption of the common currency has declined, suggesting a lack of trust towards the Euro (Eurobarometer 2015b, 8). The Eurozone crisis has raised questions concerning the institutional setup of the Monetary Union and its ability to weather out economic difficulties. The European Union and national governments knew about the structural weaknesses of the Euro and the fact that large, well developed economies with balanced checkbooks shared a currency with weaker economies and historically bad finances. Germans for example have been known for their good economic management while Greece has humorously been called a “serial defaulter” as it has defaulted 6 times over the past 200 years (Elliot 2010; 1). Despite this known fact the EU and the member states believed that Eurozone membership would with time lead to necessary market reforms and coordination. But that did not happen. All of a sudden the weaker economies gained access to cheaper interests rates which did not encourage debt reduction. Now the Eurozone seems to be slowly recovering while Greece agrees to more austerity for their renegotiated bailout program. However the Eurozone’s future will be, its crisis has greatly influenced European politics and the people’s perception of the European project. Interestingly enough, despite all of the pessimistic opinion polls Joensen’s qualitative content analysis indicates that despite dissatisfaction and frustration between Member states there have been increasing calls for solidarity and unity among Eurozone members indicating to an advancing development of a collective identity (Joensen 2013, 34-37)
2.3 Lack of public interest

Throughout the first decades of the European project it was believed that there was a common consensus among the people of the member states regarding the development of the European project and that the national governments would work in accordance with their citizens’ wishes within the Council of Ministers. As European integration advanced national governments handed increasingly more power over to the supranational institutions of the European Union and its executives. It was not until 1979 when the public was given access to the European level by direct elections to the European Parliament. Before 1979 the European Parliament was manned by delegates from the national parliaments and it was only a consultative body as European policies were mainly negotiated by national governments in the Council of Ministers and in the European Commission (Norris 1997, 273-276). Today the EU is a “one of a kind” intergovernmental organization of corporate bodies, the European institutions and the member states, with supranational features (Apostolovska & Runcheva 2012, 3). Over the decades the EU has expanded greatly from only 6 member states to 28 states that have chosen to undergo deep political and economic integration and to commit themselves to cooperation and common policy making. Looking back, national governments have been more interested in further economic integration rather than more political integration. Likely to encourage better trading and maximizing the opportunities of a single market while at the same time maintaining the core of national sovereignty (Apostolovska & Runcheva 2012, 2-3). But many people believe that a democratic deficit is being created as national governments hand power from the democratically elected national parliaments over to the European institutions without passing democratic accountability nor enough representation along with it (Norris 1997, 273). Eurosceptics believe that there is a major “gap” between EU policy-making and its citizens as they cannot influence EU policy-making since policies are proposed by the European Commission and its unelected commissioners and negotiated behind closed doors in the Council of Ministers. In theory national governments and their decisions within the Council of Ministers are supposed to mirror their citizens’ wishes however national governments can choose to ignore them during the negotiations or possibly be outvoted by the Qualified Majority Voting rule (Apostolovska & Runcheva 2012, 3). Therefore decreasing the national parliament’s say in the policy-making. Eurosceptic political parties tend to mention the democratic deficit as a major reason why the public should demand power from Brussels back to the national governments as the European
Union is run by overpaid, nonelected bureaucrats that cannot be called accountable for their actions.

The European Parliament is thought of as the public gateway to European Affairs. The platform where European citizens can influence politics on the EU level. Yet the public seems to be lacking interest in European affairs as voter turnout in European elections have decreased steadily over the decades (European Parliament 2014). The European Parliament is too weak and does not provide the public enough influence to participate, despite the fact that over the past 20 years the European Parliament has been empowered with the last few treaty reforms. Co-operation procedure between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers was introduced in the Single European Act in 1987 then in 1993 the co-decision procedure was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty and again in 1999 in the Amsterdam Treaty. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, has notable changes that were designed to tackle the democratic deficit. The co-decision procedure has now become the standard procedure where a policy or an act can only be adopted with the approval of both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The Lisbon treaty also extended the co-decision procedure to 40 other areas of decision making including policy areas on border control, asylum, police cooperation, immigration among many other policy areas (Apostolovska & Runcheva 2012, 6). The European Parliament chooses the President of the European Commission out of proposals from the European council, the Parliament must then approve the list of European Commissioners which are proposed by the Council of Ministers and the newly elected Commission President. Despite the changes and despite the seemingly democratic procedures the European Parliament lacks a fundamental element of a traditional, powerful parliaments. The ability to put forward pan-European law proposals and raise taxes. That is still only in the hands of the Commission and its executives (Apostolovska & Runcheva 2012, 6-8). In the past, national governments have been hesitant to give the European Parliament more power in new EU treaties. A more powerful European Parliament, possibly with the ability to put forward pan-European laws, would not only undermine the member states’ governments back home but also decrease their chance to influence European policy-making through the Council of Ministers. National elections revolve around domestic issues, issues that are closer to home than the European elections. European elections are therefore nothing more than “mid-term contests” for national ruling parties as Apostolovska and Runcheva put it. Decreasing even more the already low public interest as the “European” elections are not really about Europe, but the competing national political parties.
Apostolovska & Runcheva (2012) also point out that low election turnout and apparent lack of public interest can be explained by the fact that the public is not changing a government by participating in the European elections. In national elections people go to the polls to cast their votes for their party of choice and the majority forms a government. As described earlier, the Council of Ministers consists of governmental ministers and they appoint the European Commissioners. Unlike at the national level, the Commissioners do not come from the European Parliament and are therefore not accountable to it nor the voters, as governmental ministers are accountable to their national parliaments. This has also called the EU’s legitimacy into question as whether the EU and its policies and laws are lacking one of the most fundamental part of a democratic government, legitimacy (pp. 6).

Lastly, the European Union is viewed as being too distant from the public for similar reasons that I have mentioned earlier. Despite Joensen’s (2013) findings that showed that people generally favour European cooperation in finding a common solution on important issues. However the public can only influence this cooperation indirectly through its national governments and that is simply not enough. The lower socioeconomic classes are sizable portions of the voters but they are much more dependant on their national governments and municipalities than the European Union. European affairs could therefore not interest them enough to participate in the elections. The lack of a common European identity is likely a major reason for the disconnection between the public and the EU as it is vital for any government that its citizens can identify with it. A legitimate government can demand loyalty from its citizens and that the citizens will abide by its laws and decisions because the citizens themselves believe the government (or in this case the EU institutions) has the right to demand it of them (Bruter 2004, 186).

Although One might raise the question, to what extent can an intergovernmental organization be democratic without becoming a federation. As with the European Union. Eurosceptics slam the EU for its apparent democratic deficit and unelected eurocrats at the very same time they oppose further political integration and loss of national sovereignty.

2.4 Rise of Euroscepticism and the future of the European Union

It therefore seems clear that in order to further and deepen the European integration EU citizens must identify more with the Union and participate in the project. The public must understand the growing importance of the European Union and be able to influence EU policy-making. Bruter (2004) believes that a collective identity is crucial for a new political
community to gain legitimacy. New laws have to be based on the norms and values of this community and need to be debated and contested in order to gain full legitimacy. People need to believe they are a part of something, that they have something in common and are able to influence the outcome of European politics. Emmanuel Castano argues that "collective identities are a matter of economic rationality" (Castano, 2000; 9). If people benefit from the European Union with personal wealth, better trading, access to healthcare or welfare, it is likely that a person will identify positively with the European Union. Thus creating a sense of European identity. As we have come to understand, different people have different needs and interests, while some may identify positively with a certain EU policy others might not.

Dalton & Eichenberg (1998; 254-255) argue also that people will favour EU policies if they are likely to benefit from them personally but oppose those that will cost them something. However, as mentioned before, the European Union is criticised for being "too distant" from the general public, physically and psychologically. And even worse, the public seems to be lacking basic understanding in how the EU generally works and does not recognize the main executives of the EU (Sementelli 2012; 7).

The European Union is either dealing with growing pains or public backlash after the Eurozone difficulties. The future of the EU remains uncertain, will the EU integrate deeper or will the growing influence of eurosceptic political parties halt the process or perhaps take a step back? The EU should not underestimate the importance of eurosceptic parties as they are growing by the minute. Radical left and right, anti-establishment parties grew significantly in the 2014 European elections taking almost a third of the European Parliament seats (The Economist 2014). In 2015 the Front National party took 25% of the votes in French regional elections, 3% more than the ruling Socialist party of Hollande, the UKIP party in Britain has caused Prime Minister David Cameron to take a tougher stance on immigration and promise a referendum on a “Brexit”, the UK leaving the EU (BBC News 2015). The Nordic countries have seen substantial growth of euroscepticism, the anti-immigration Swedish Democrats came in third in the Swedish Parliamentary elections, the eurosceptic Finns Party in Finland is currently in a coalition government and the Danish People’s Party in Denmark gained 21% of the votes. New Polish President Andrzej Duda has expressed his will to “devolve Brussel’s power back to the member states (Day 2015; Economist 2015; Euractive 2015; ). Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece are both radical left parties challenging the European Union and gaining supporters after years of austerity. And there is likely more to come in the next few years. However, not all eurosceptic parties in Europe are against great cooperation between the European countries. The Alternative party wants Germany to leave the Monetary Union
but not the European Union. Many eurosceptics believe that the ideal Europe is a continent of sovereign states and that the European Union works for the national governments. Or as Charles De Gaulle put it, “Europe of the Fatherlands”, where the different cultures of Europe work together without any hegemony or decreased sovereignty (Fligstein et al 2012, 10). Europe is at a crossroads, the future of the European project is likely to continue but it is safe to say that Europe’s political elites can no longer expect a general approval for the changes necessary to deepen European integration. The Eurozone crisis will likely lead to some more economic integration as the Eurozone tries to fix its institutional structure but whether it will lead to a deeper political integration, as a common budget is uncertain. Given that France and the Netherlands, two of the founding nations of the European project rejected the Constitutional Treaty back in 2005.

2.5 The Ukraine crisis and the European Union

Since 2013 Ukraine has been in a state of crisis after pro-Russian separatists began fighting against the new western-aligned Ukrainian government and seized control over administrative centers of three Russian-speaking regions, Luhansk, Donetsk and Crimea (The Telegraph 2015b). The crisis has left thousands of people dead, displaced 825,000 people within Ukraine, caused major damage to Ukrainian infrastructure and put Brussels on a collision course with Moscow (UN Refugee Agency 2015). In 2013, Ukraine’s government was supposed to sign an important free-trade agreement with the European Union that would integrate the EU and Ukraine economically. However, as the historic agreement approached Yanukovych cancelled the signing of the treaty after his political party rejected important parliamentary bills necessary to signing the agreement and after political talks between the Russian and Ukrainian Prime Ministers. Despite the fact that opinion polls showed that the majority of the public favoured integration with the European Union rather than Russia. The Ukrainian government announced that it would turn to Russia and renew talks of economic cooperation with the Eurasian Customs Union (Now the Eurasian Union). The Russian-made rival of the European Union (Grytsenko & Traynor 2013). The cancellation of the signing of the free-trade agreement is believed to have been of major geopolitical importance to Russia as it tries to keep its political influence in eastern Europe intact. Following the cancellation of free-trade agreement pro-EU demonstrators occupied the Maidan Square in Kiev where they demonstrated for weeks until the protests reached its climax when government snipers shot and killed almost 100 protesters (The Telegraph 2015). Viktor Yanukovych fled the country
resulting in the changing of government to a pro-EU government. After President Yanukovych fled, pro-Russian separatists took control over administrative buildings in Crimea, declaring it independent from Ukraine. A referendum was held on the 16th of March where the Crimean voters voted yes to joining the Russian Federation and two days later Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, signed the annexation of Crimea despite international outcry (BBC 2014). Pro-Russian separatists began fighting in Ukraine’s easternmost regions, Donetsk and Luhansk where conflict still rages today.

The Ukraine Crisis marks a turning point in EU-Russian relations and is an important test of European cooperation and solidarity as the European Union does not have a common foreign policy. The European response to the Ukraine Crisis is debated between Member States as they are very economically interdependent with Russia. In 2013 Russian trading with the EU accounted for 57% of Russian exports, 46.5% of its imports and 9.5% of European trade was with Russia. Europe is also, and more importantly, heavily dependent on Russian energy as some Member States get almost all their gas supplies and large amounts of oil from Russia (European Union Committee 2015, 12-14). The Crisis could therefore have a major impact on European economies at a time where many Member States are struggling with economic difficulties. Since the European Union does not have a common, comprehensive foreign policy, European Member States coordinate and debate on international affairs through various institutions of the EU such as the Council of Ministers, the European Council and the European External Action Service (European Union, 2015).

The Ukraine Crisis is an interesting case for researching identity formation in Europe as resurging Russia is possibly becoming the Europe’s “other”. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began major economic and political reforms. The country established a multiparty democratic system and liberalised its economy. It assumed friendlier relations with the European Union (Then the European Community) through the Partnership and Cooperation treaty among others, where Europe supported institutional reforms, infrastructure investments and civil society development. However, in the recent two decades EU - Russian relations have declined due to increasingly authoritarian style of governing, corruption and human rights violations (The European Committee 2015, 17-18). Under both President Putin and President Medvedev, Russia has created an opposing ideology to the European based on Russian ethnic nationalism, conservative values and the Russian Orthodox church. This new ideology and the increasingly anti-western rhetoric contributes significantly to the debate within Russia between those who believe Russia is an integral part of Europe and those who
view Europe as Russia’s “other” and a political rival. The European Committee of the British House of Lords (2015) believes that Russia is increasingly defining itself as a rival to the EU with the creation of the Eurasian Union and possibly constructing a Eurasian identity (18-19).

From the moment the Ukraine crisis began the European Union has supported the Ukrainian government and condemned Russia’s actions in the crisis. The EU and the Ukrainian government finalised the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement that will integrate Ukraine with the Union both politically and economically. European leaders have met on numerous occasions to coordinate their stance on Russia, which at first was a difficult endeavour as Member States remained divided on how to respond to the crisis. While the Baltic states and Germany have called on the Member States to form a comprehensive policy, as they view Russia’s actions as a direct threat to European security, other governments such as those in Cyprus, Greece and Italy have taken a softer stance as they fear more economic difficulties with escalating tensions with Russia (European Committee 2015; European External Action Service 2015). However, as the Crisis has progressed European governments have become more willing to counter Russia’s behaviour. European unity has strengthened as witnessed by Europe imposing economic sanctions on Russia as a punishment despite losses of trading revenues in the process. In return, Russia imposed sanctions on the EU and its allies (European External Action Service 2014). The economic sanctions, Russian annexation of Crimea, increasingly authoritarian governance, increasingly conservative approach to LGBT rights and other human rights violations are clear examples of issues that could influence European identity formation as Russia adopts more and more opposing positions than the EU. This raises an interesting question, could the top EU executives and other important European political figures be using the Ukraine Crisis to create more unity among Member States to reinforce European collective identity formation by using Russia as Europe’s “other”? Samuels (2012) claims that identities can become politicized because someone or some group has interests in that outcome (pg. 159). As mentioned before one of the fundamental problems that the European Union is said to be facing is a lack of a collective identity. By highlighting the differences between European values and Russia’s new ideology the European Union could make more people identify themselves with Europe and legitimize its existence in the process (pg. 159). The European Union could therefore benefit enormously from their defiant stance against Russia by connecting European symbols, EU’s liberal values as the alternative of Putin’s new ideology.
3 Chapter 3: Content Analysis and Results

3.1 Methodology

The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the Ukraine Crisis is being used by the top EU executives and other prominent European political figures to enhance European identity formation by using Russia as Europe’s “other”. In order to examine how EU executives and political figures use the Ukraine Crisis to influence European identity formation, a qualitative content analysis will be used where the researcher will examine news articles containing an EU executive’s and/or a European politician’s remarks on the Ukraine Crisis, the annexation of Crimea or the EU-Russian sanctions. The researcher will examine news articles and try to detect if the executive or the politician is using a certain unifying, “European” rhetoric in order to evoke civic nationalist attachment by the reader to the European Union and its decisive stance on Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. If words such as “European values”, “(we) Europeans” or simply “Europe” are being used, in the context of things, as a call for more cooperation, a call for more solidarity between Member States or possibly being used to show the different nations that form the EU as a united community with shared values and interests. This chapter will also answer the question whether the Ukraine Crisis can influence European identity formation without deliberate attempts by EU executives or politicians. The content analysis will therefore mirror the researcher’s interpretations of the various news articles. The content analysis consists of a sample of 20 news articles from various different news publishers that contain an EU executive’s or a leading political figure’s remarks on the Ukraine Crisis.

3.2 Content analysis

The qualitative research that I conducted focused on remarks on the Ukraine Crisis between 18th March 2014 when President Putin signed the annexation of Crimea into Russia and to the recent extension of EU-Russian sanctions in September 2015. The reason for my decision not to restrict the time frame to media coverage on specific events was due to the fact that interviews with EU executives and political leaders are being conducted all year round as negotiations with Russia continue. Although there are many important political figures within the European Union the political figures in my sample are the following: Angela Merkel,
Dalia Grybauskaite, David Cameron, Ewa Kopacz, Francois Hollande and Matteo Renzi. The EU executives in my sample are: Catherine Ashton, Donald Tusk, Federica Mogherini, Jean Claude Juncker, Herman Van Rompuy, José Manuel Barroso and Maroš Šefčovič. Throughout all the news articles there was a clear sign that the European Union is taking action against Russia and putting pressure on the Member States to form a united approach. All of the political leaders spoke out against what they claimed to be Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. The only political leader in my sample who did not appear as decisive against Russia was Matteo Renzi as his approach was a much softer as he talked about “elements of division” over Ukraine (Dyomkin & Piovaccari 2015). Italy, as mentioned before, is a reluctant supporter of the Russian sanctions as it already struggles with economic difficulties. The most outspoken of the executives was Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council. Not only is he the former Prime Minister of Poland, which very likely influences his position on Russia, but he is also the EU executive that has the power to shape the EU agenda. Tusk repeatedly asserted his position that if the Member States want to discuss sanctions on Russia they will only “discuss the strengthening of the sanctions” until the Minsk Agreement is respected (Donahue & Neuger 2015). He also claimed that Russia is trying to divide Europe during the Eurozone crisis and that Greece staying inside the Eurozone would not only be of economic importance but of geopolitical importance (Traynor 2015).

The purpose of this content analysis was to find out if the European executives and prominent European political figures were using the Ukraine war to create more unity and form a European identity by “othering” Russia. The results of my content analysis do not indicate that the European executives or European political leaders are using the Ukraine Crisis as a tool to deliberately form a collective identity with a certain unifying rhetoric. This might come as a surprise given since every sample in my analysis contained calls for European unity. The EU’s response is in accordance with its already established and recognized principles and is responding to the Crisis as expected of the EU. The European Union works according to its fundamental principles of the rule of law, peace, democracy and human rights. Despite the fact that the European Union might want Ukraine to be EU aligned in geopolitics, the European Union responded quickly when situation deteriorated in Ukraine. When it became apparent that Yanukovych’s regime used violence in the Maiden protests and that Russia is likely to have supported pro-Russian separatists in Crimea. The EU stepped in by promoting its already acknowledged principles and imposing sanctions on Russia due to their violation of international laws. Since the European Union does not have a common
foreign policy it could have been expected that the EU would try to coordinate the Member State’s policies towards Russia in order to form a powerful response to Russia. The European Commission introduced a plan of creating an “Energy Union” that would integrate all 28 energy markets into one including the building of a new pipeline to the Caspian region (Neslen & Traynor 2015). Thereby decreasing the EU’s energy dependence on Russian gas. This was also expected of them whereas the EU is too dependent on Russian gas, especially now when relations are worsening. However, although my content analysis did not indicate that EU executives or political figures are deliberately using Ukraine to create a European identity it does not mean that the Crisis cannot influence collective identity formation. When the EU imposes sanctions on Russia as punishment for violating international law, and urges unity and solidarity between Member States it automatically leads to more cooperation between member states, possibly more integration therefore contributing to the formation of a collective identity in Europe.
4 Conclusion

It is interesting to think of what will characterize the European integration for the next decades. The European Union is going through difficult times that will without a doubt change the Union. At the same time the Eurozone Crisis has caused division between Member States’ governments it has contributed to the formation of a European identity as people have come to understand the importance of reforming the Monetary Union that will likely lead to further integration of the Eurozone as can be witnessed by the discussions on creating a common Fiscal policy that have surfaced as a result of the Eurozone crisis. The rise of nationalism and euroscepticism will inevitably lead to deeper discussions on the European Union’s future. Will the European Union integrate even further, will the Member States hand over more sovereignty to Brussels in hope of tackling the claimed democratic deficit in Europe? How will the ongoing Refugee crisis effect the European Union? Will it lead to a common border control, will it lead to further co-operations of European police departments? Will the Ukraine Crisis and the Russian expansionism lead to further European co-operation in the field of foreign affairs. Jean Claude Juncker has proposed the creation of a European military, an idea that might seem radical but endorsed by France and Germany. The future of the European Union is unclear but the consequences of the Eurozone crisis and resurging Russia could lead to more European co-operation and integration. European identity formation is likely to continue unconsciously as Europeans get used to ever more European co-operation. This thesis explored the possibility of European executives and politicians using Russia as the Europe’s other to encourage European identity formation. The results of the content analysis showed that EU executives and leading political figures are not using the Ukraine crisis as a tool for European identity creation. The European Union is simply acting according to its fundamental principles. However, as European Member States co-operate more the European identity will continue to form.
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Appendix

List of news articles that were used in the content analysis and how I interpreted them.

1. We need a European army, says Jean-Claude Juncker
   Paper: BBC
   Date: 9 March 2015

2. Ukraine Crisis: EU signs association deal;
   Paper: BBC
   Date: 21 March 2014

3. Ukraine: Putin signs Crimea annexation
   Paper: BBC
   Date: 21 March 2014

4. Ukraine crisis: EU ponders Russia sanctions over Crimea vote
   Paper: BBC
   Date: 17 March 2014

5. Van Rompuy: Ukrainian people gave their lives for closer EU ties
   Paper: Euractiv
   Date: 27 August 2014

6. Ukraine President warns Europe nearing the “point of no return”
   Paper: The Guardian
   Author: Kevin Rawlinson
   Date: 31 August 2014
7. José Manuel Barroso: Not everything I did was right;  
   Paper: The Financial times  
   Date: 4 November 2014  
   Author: Peter Spiegel  
   http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4624563a-640b-11e4-8ade-00144feabdc0.html#slide7

8. EU leaders focus on investment boost and Russia tension  
   Paper: BBC  
   Date: 18 December 2014  

9. François Hollande suggests sanctions on Russia should be lifted and says Putin 'does not want to annex eastern Ukraine – he has told me that';  
   Paper: Dailymail  
   Date: 05 January 2015  
   Author: Damian Gayle  

10. Sanctions stay until full Minsk deal is in place, Mogherini says.  
    Paper: France 24  
    Date: 6 June 2015  

11. Tusk Sees Possible Early Extension of EU’s Russia Sanctions;  
    Paper: Bloomer Business.  
    Date: 07 June 2015  
    Author: James G Neuger, Patrick Donahue  

12. Hungary’s Orban get cold shoulder in Poland After Russian Deal.  
    Paper: Bloomberg  
    Date: 19 Feb. 2015  
    Author: Piotr Skolemowski
13. Ambitious EU blueprint for Union loosen Russia’s grip on gas:
   Paper: The Guardian
   Date: 24 february 2015.
   Author: Ian Traynor, Arthur Neslen

14. EU leaders want to tackle Russian 'disinformation' on Ukraine war;
   Paper: Reuters
   Date: 11 March 2015
   Author: JAN STRUPCZEWSKI

15. Donald Tusk: Putin’s policy is to have enemies and to be in a conflict;
    Paper: The Guardian
    Date: 15 March 2015.
    Author: Ian Traynor

16. Merkel says Russia sanctions to stay as Ukraine seeks EU ad.;
    Paper: Bloomberg Business
    Date: 27 April 2015
    Author: Kateryna Choursina, Arne Delfs, Daryna Krasnolutska

17. Angela Merkel: “Russia remains an important partner”:
    Paper: Die Deutsche Welle
    Date: 05 juni 2015
18. Cameron: Europe must take pain to stay united on Russian sanctions.
   Paper: Reuters
   Date: 7 June 2015
   http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-cameron-idUKKBN0ON0FM20150607

19. Italian Prime Minister welcomes Putin but mentions differences;
   Paper: Reuters
   Date: 10 June 2015
   Author: Denis Dyomkin, Giulio Piovaccari
   http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/10/uk-italy-russia-putin-idUKKBN0OQ16B20150610

20. Europe must act quickly to stop bloodshed says Van Rompuy;
    Paper: The Guardian
    Date: 31 August 2014