The Future of Transatlantic Relations
Lessons from disagreements between the United States and Europe from 1954-2009

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Abstract

The goal of this thesis is to predict future prospects for transatlantic relations by analyzing the major political disagreements between the US and Europe in the area of security and defense, from the beginning of the Cold War until today. A special focus is placed on the rift following the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The research is based on existing literature on the topic as well as interviews with academics who have focused on it in their studies. The literature includes books, articles, reports, newspapers, journals, policy papers, and other similar written resources. The conclusion is that the well being of transatlantic relations is undisputedly in the very best interests of both parties, at least today and for the next decades. It is fair to suggest that that fact will keep preventing the transatlantic alliance from falling apart in the foreseeable future, since Europe will remain the best ally of choice for the US, and vice versa. It would be self-destructive for both parties to weaken these important ties, as well as harmful for international security as a whole. In a more distant future, it can be foreseen that the transatlantic alliance might even become more important, with the likely rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China, and the US’s and Europe’s relative decline in world influence. At that point the transatlantic allies might fully reunite in order to balance the new global powers. Another possibility is that a multipolar world would emerge, with four or five global powers relatively independent from one another. Alliances in a multipolar system are in general flexible and constantly shifting. Consequently, the transatlantic alliance might become weaker in such kind of a system.
Útdráttur

Preface

The ultimate reason transatlantic relations became a potential topic for my final thesis was the vast amount of interesting books on the subject at the National and University Library of Iceland. The books were a gift from the American Embassy in Iceland to the Institute of International Affairs at the University of Iceland. Having lived and studied both in the United States and Europe I soon saw the potential of an interesting hands-on thesis on the intriguing high impact relationship between the US and Europe.

The thesis is 30 ECTS and was written in Iceland from the beginning of October 2008 until April 2009, although research work started as early as April 2008. I would like to thank my advisor, Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir, for her brilliant advice and support. I would also like to thank Alyson Bailes for her invaluable consult and comments, as well as others I interviewed; Christopher Coker, Giovanni Gasparini, Pál Dunay and Coleen Graffy. Then I would like to thank my supervisor, Pia Hansson, for all her support and advice. Finally I would like to thank my father, Guðjón Einarsson, for his editorial advices and support, and my mother, Bryndís Jónsdóttir, for all her support.
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Introduction

The United States (US) and Europe\(^1\) share a common heritage dating back to the Enlightenment, built on Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, Christianity and Latin. Its characteristics are Catholicism and Protestantism, European languages, separation of spiritual and temporal authority, social pluralism, representative bodies and individualism.\(^2\) Today Western societies are generally identified as being democratic market economies that respect the rule of law, fundamental human rights, and civil and political liberties. Common values and interests have long been believed to be the glue binding the US and Europe together and the foundations of the transatlantic alliance\(^3\). During the Cold War the US and Europe were seen as a group of countries that saw the world in similar ways, shared common institutions and values and would promptly seek collective action.\(^4\) However, academics who have studied transatlantic relations, such as Geir Lundestad, Thomas S. Mowle, David M. Andrews, Stanley R. Sloan and Simon Serfaty, agree that the whole strategic basis of the transatlantic alliance was the common threat of the Soviet Union, rather than shared values and beliefs. During the Cold War there were constant frictions between the allies but there was an academic consensus on the assumption that it was this common threat and the overriding common interest in maintaining European stability that kept the alliance from falling apart.

Since the fall of communism this shared sense of a clear and present danger no longer exists, although academics such as Andrews, Lundestad and Hubert Zimmermann wonder if terrorism will become its equivalent. The distribution of power in the international system has also shifted. With the Soviet Union in ruins, the US became the world’s only superpower whilst European countries worked their way up from ruins, regained their strength and united into the European Union (EU). As a result of its increased relative global power the US has gradually stopped seeing the essentiality of European approval of its foreign policy. Most recently, the former President George W.

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\(^1\) When referring to Europe the focus is on Western European countries and to some extent the European Union. The view given is the general view amongst European countries.


\(^3\) When referring to the transatlantic alliance the focus is on the strategic transatlantic relationship in general, not NATO per se.

Bush administration’s unilateral behavior regarding the war on terror brought this perspective more clearly into light.

In March 2003 relations between the US and Europe faced a historical downturn, following the US administration’ decision to invade Iraq without the consent of its biggest European allies. Although there had been disagreements across the Atlantic ever since the founding of the transatlantic alliance, Lundestad concludes that this rift suggested a fundamental break with the practice of the preceding years and signaled something new and deeper than the many transatlantic crises that preceded it.5

Today the US and Europe are increasingly incapable of cooperation on the grand strategic issues of the day. Theorists blame the lack of a common threat, a common security interest, or divergent strategies for meeting agreed threats. Furthermore, the Bush administration’s unilateral decision-making, especially regarding the invasion in Iraq in 2003. Still others blame the new post-Cold War world order, European unification or the ideological differences between the US and Europe. Many believe it is some mixture of these aspects, all of which will be analyzed further in the thesis, and an attempt will be made to predict future prospects for transatlantic relations accordingly.

Methods

The thesis was written in Iceland from the beginning of October 2008 until April 2009, although research work started as early as April 2008. Its goal is to analyze the future prospects of transatlantic relations, by surveying political disagreements between the US and Europe in the area of security and defense ever since the beginning of the Cold War until today. Disagreements regarding other types of security will not be included, such as economic security, border security, migration control, anti-crime and smuggling, health security, transport security, food security, climate change control and environmental security. Furthermore, disagreements in the area of economic cooperation and global trade will not be included.

Transatlantic relations reached certain crossroads in 2003. The rift between the US and Europe over Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US gave rise to concerns about the future of the transatlantic alliance. Many academics who have analyzed transatlantic relations, such as Lundestad, Ivo Daalder, Christopher Coker and Wolfgang Ischinger, conclude that a redefinition of the transatlantic alliance is now needed. The future of transatlantic relations is of great relevance and importance to all Americans and Europeans alike, in a world where hatred of the West is growing, new types of threats are emerging every day, and the Western powers’ relative global influence is declining. Consequently, the topic is not just very interesting, but also urgent.

When researching transatlantic relations I found that a comprehensive analysis, covering transatlantic disagreements in the area of security and defense from the founding of the transatlantic alliance until day, was missing. In my view the best way to predict future prospects for the alliance is to firstly provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis, followed by a broad examination of past and present disagreements between the allies, in accordance. I recognize the fact that basing the analysis solely on publicly available resources may have limited my review and somehow affected my conclusions. During the Cold War, the power struggle between the West and the East was by and large psychological, and one can thus assume that “uncomfortable” material never caught the public’s eye. However, my hope is that these limitations were somewhat loosened once the Soviet Union had collapsed, and that the information available since then (which applies to a vast majority of my resources) is consequently more open and thorough. All the same, politically sensitive information is often kept away from the public, and even more so in the area of security and defense. So, one can assume that the analysis falls somewhat short in this regard.

The thesis is based on existing literature on the topic as well as interviews with academics who have focused on it in their studies. The literature includes books, articles, reports, newspapers, journals, policy papers, and other similar written resources. I took most of the interviews in the starting phases of my research, so my questions touched on a wide range of issues relating to transatlantic relations. Most of them are thus not used as direct sources in the thesis but served as a great help to narrow the thesis’ focus and widen the search for appropriate resources on the topic in question.
The thesis is divided into five chapters, followed by a final summary and conclusion chapter. The first chapter looks into how different theories can help explain transatlantic relations, focusing on realism and neorealism as the most suitable theories in that regard. The following three chapters analyze transatlantic disagreements during three distinct periods of time, firstly the Cold War Era, secondly the Post-Cold War Era, and thirdly during the run up to and follow up of the War on Terror Era (September 2001-2004 approximately). Lastly, future prospects for transatlantic relations will be set forth, based on the preceding analysis.
2. Theory on Transatlantic Relations

Although theories of international relations have not provided perspectives to analyze transatlantic relations specifically many of them can be of great help in explaining why the relationship has developed the way it has. My focus is on the strategic security and defense relationship between the US and Europe, which I find the hard power oriented perspectives of realism and neorealism best in explaining.

Realism focuses on power politics in the effort to explain international relations, covering amongst other things the characteristics of the international system, alliances, polarity, balance of power, and bandwagoning\(^6\), things that can all in some way shed a light on transatlantic relations from the beginning of the Cold War. Neorealism can on the other hand shed a light on how change in the distribution of power, and consequently in the structure of the international system, can help explain changes in transatlantic relations. Although constructivism does see power as an important variable it focuses on the power of ideas, culture and language, and will thus not be included in the main theoretical analysis. The same goes for postmodernism, which focuses on ideologies, beliefs and values in its efforts to explain international relations. Those parts of constructivism and postmodernism that relate somewhat to the main discussion will however be introduced in a subchapter.

Given that the main focus of my analysis is the strategic security and defense relationship between the US and Europe, I have not included liberalism and neoliberalism in my discussion, since the theories focus mostly on economic cooperation. The same goes for Marxism, which focuses on the evolution of capitalism as the basis of economic change and class conflict.

In an effort to give a theoretical analysis of transatlantic relations over the last 60 years the period is divided in two, firstly analyzing relations during the Cold War Era, and secondly during the Post- Cold War Era and the following War on Terror Era. In addition neorealism is analyzed specifically as an overall perspective since although it

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\(^6\) Bandwagoning refers to when weaker states join a stronger power or coalition within balance of power politics. Bandwagoning is referred to as the opposite of balancing.
could have been added to both of the discussions previously mentioned it offers a
different perspective with its system-level approach versus the state-level approach.
Lastly, constructivism and postmodernism will be introduced as subordinate
perspectives.

2.1 Theory on Transatlantic Relations during the Cold War
The US and Europe disagreed on a variety of things during the Cold War. Some
disagreements were more serious than others but no one serious enough to permanently
scar the transatlantic alliance. Realism can help shed a light on how, despite numerous
disagreements, the alliance stayed intact during this unique time in history.

Realism is based on the presumption that the key actors of international relations are
international systems and states, which are power seeking units solely following their
own national interests. According to realism the international system is anarchic and
reaches stability in a balance of power system. The term balance of power refers to the
general concept of one or more states’ power being used to balance that of another state
or group of states. According to the balance of power theory states do not always
balance against the strongest actor, sometimes smaller states bandwagon on the most
powerful state. After the Second World War European countries were in ruins and did
dnot have the capacity to try to contain the US so they bandwagoned on it instead. The
fact that Europe and the US shared a common security interest was also a crucial factor.
According to the balance of power theory states may seek to balance threats rather than
raw power. Although the US was a greater power than the Soviet Union after World War
II (WWII), Europe joined forces with the US because it was less of a threat to Europe
than the Soviet Union.

The US and Europe formed an alliance after WWII to coordinate their actions in order to
prevent the Soviet Union from spreading communism globally and eventually taking
over the world. Realism claims alliances can be smaller states’ most important power
elements, like the transatlantic alliance was for European countries during the Cold War.

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York: Knopf.
York: Pearson/ Longman.
For great powers the structure of alliances shapes the configuration of power in the system. The US needed an alliance with European countries to be a viable counter-balancing power to the Soviet Union. According to realism alliances are important components of the balance of power. They are based on national interests and can shift accordingly, which helps the balance of power process to operate effectively. Alliance cohesion refers to the ease with which the members hold together an alliance and it tends to be high when national interests converge and when cooperation within the alliance becomes institutionalized and habitual.\(^9\) This was the case for the transatlantic alliance during the Cold War, the US and Europe shared a common interest in keeping the Soviet Union contained and they increased their alliance’s cohesion by institutionalizing it with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

### 2.2 Theory on Transatlantic Relations during the Post-Cold War Era and the War on Terror Era

Ever since the Cold War ended transatlantic relations have been getting ever more strained. The US’ preemptive strike on Iraq in 2003, without the approval of European allies, was seen as a major crisis, even the beginning of the end of the transatlantic alliance (see chapter 6.3). Again, realism can help shed a light on this development. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US and Europe no longer shared a common threat and the US was the world’s only superpower. The balance of power theory would predict that other powers would try to somehow balance the power of the US. This could help explain the growing disagreement between Europe and the US. Europe has strongly opposed US positions on a number of issues for the last decade or so. These issues are very often defense related; ranging from missile defense and biological weapons to small arms trade, and most significantly the US’ intervention in Iraq in 2003. The balance of power theory would explain European countries’ opposition towards the US’ stand on major global issues as simply an act of power balancing.\(^{10}\) Robert J. Art asserts that a looser version of the balance of power theory can be used to explain Europe’s position towards the US. This version assumes that states are concerned about the adverse effects of a rise in the power of another state, both political and economic. In line with this

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\(^9\) Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 181-186.
\(^{10}\) Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2007, p. 77.
approach Europe has not showed any hard balancing behavior against the US after the Cold War since the US does not represent a direct military threat to Europe’s security. There has on the other hand been some soft balancing against the US, first by France alone, then by France together with Great Britain and most recently by France and Germany. Moreover, the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) can be seen as a result of fear in Europe of loosing US protection, as well as a desire for autonomy from the US and in gaining more influence over the US. There is now a clear element in the ESDP towards making Europe stronger relative to the US. The purpose, however, can be seen as not to protect Europe from the US, but rather to give Europe more weight to influence US policies.\textsuperscript{11}

Realism asserts that when states with divergent interests form an alliance against a common enemy, the alliance may come apart if the threat subsides. To realism this presumption can also be seen as one of the reasons for the recent crisis in transatlantic relations. From this point of view the alliance is now falling apart since the US and Europe no longer share a common threat. In addition, a different polarity has its effects; today we have a unipolar system with only one center of power, the United States, although other powers are growing stronger. According to realists, the predominance of a single state, hegemony, tends to reduce the incidence of war since the hegemonic state performs some of the functions of a central government and somewhat reduces anarchy in the international system. From the perspective of less powerful states, however, such hegemony may seem like an infringement of state sovereignty, and the order it creates may seem unjust or illegitimate.\textsuperscript{12} Now that European countries do not need US power to protect them from the Soviet Union any longer they are willing and able to frown upon and object to any predominant act by the US in the global arena, and demand multilateralism as opposed to unilateralism. This can be seen as an objection to an infringement of state sovereignty and in many respects it is reasonable to assume that Europe sees the US’ predominant behavior in the global arena as illegitimate and unjust.

\textsuperscript{12} Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2007, p. 82.
Robert Kagan asserts that “it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world“.\(^{13}\) In his belief it is all a question of power, “the efficiency of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power“\(^ {14}\). Kagan claims that the reason for the divide between the US and Europe has everything to do with different perspectives and psychologies of power and weakness. According to this realist approach great military powers are more likely to see force as a useful tool in international relations than those with less military power, that are prone to have a higher tolerance for threats than the risk of removing them. Kagan argues that this different view of power is the main reason for Europe’s and the US’ different views on world governance, the proper balance between force and diplomacy, and the role of international institutions and international law.\(^ {15}\)

2.3 A System-Level Approach: Neorealism

International Relations has in general remained very firmly fixed on a state level of analysis. In the late 1970s and through the 1980s this position began to change, partly due to the development of neorealism.\(^ {16}\) Neorealists try to explain patterns of international relations in terms of the system structure, which is based on the international distribution of power, rather than the internal makeup of individual states. Neorealism is thus also called structural realism and it can give a good overall perspective of the development of transatlantic relations for the last 60 years or so, both during the Cold War Era, and in the Post-Cold War and the War on Terror Era.

According to one of the best known realists of all times, Hans Morgenthau, it is the nature of the international system that determines the foreign policy of a particular state. The state’s location in the international power structure is the determining factor, and values and personal motives of decision-makers at each period in time have no real stake in that regard.\(^ {17}\) Another known realist, Kenneth Waltz, asserts that the system structure imposes a security dilemma on all states, since each state has to ensure their own

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
\(^{15}\) Ibid, pp. 27-37.
\(^{17}\) Morgenthau, 1948.
security without increasing the fears of other states in the system. According to Waltz these factors are systemic and he agrees with Morgenthau that they are not affected by the units that make up the system. As a result he asserts that we have to theorize at the level of the international system in order to be able to explain international relations.¹⁸

“The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly. The relations that prevail internationally seldom shift rapidly in type or in quality. They are marked instead by dismaying persistence, a persistence that one must expect so long as none of the competing units is able to convert the anarchic international realm into a hierarchy one. (Kenneth Waltz’ views on the international system).¹⁹

International power distribution can be described in terms of polarity, which refers to the number of independent power centers in the system and encompasses both the underlying power of various participants and their alliance groupings. During the Cold War the system was bipolar, with two great rival alliance blocs, the United States and the Soviet Union. According to neorealism alliances seem to be held together by an ideological glue under bipolarity, and are hierarchical, each dominated by one superpower. The theory also states that alliances do not shift and ideological differences seem to be at the very root of the division of the world. This describes the situation during the Cold War quite well. The bipolar distribution of power encouraged certain kinds of behavior during the Cold War and a shift to a different distribution of power was bound to encourage others.²⁰

With the collapse of the Soviet Union the international system became unipolar. The US became the world’s only superpower, experiencing very strong economic growth in the 1990s, military triumphs of the Cold War, former Yugoslavia and initially Afghanistan and Iraq. The US’ growing tendency towards unilateralism on the world stage derives from this relative strength as well as the heightened sense of vulnerability world dominance tends to bring. The distribution of power has changed in the US’ favor and as a result the US feels it no longer needs the support of its European allies, like it did during the Cold War. It perceives itself strong enough and in need to take unilateral

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¹⁹ Ibid, p. 66.
²⁰ Hollis and Smith, 1990, p. 103.
action whenever it feels its security interests are threatened, such as the preemptive strike on Iraq clearly demonstrated.21

Given all this, it is clear that from the neorealist perspective the current divide in the transatlantic alliance has nothing to do with political processes, the lack of a common threat, ideological differences, or the Bush administration per se, but is simply a consequence of a changing international power structure. The world is now unipolar, and its only superpower, the US, feels it is powerful enough to take unilateral actions without seeking approval from allies across the Atlantic. At the same time, Europe has gotten powerful enough to object to this unilateral behavior. According to neorealism power is still the most important variable, the attempt to maximize power being what drives actions and the distribution of power what determines the interactions of states.22

2.4 What is missing?

As we can see realist theories can be of great help in explaining why the relationship between the US and Europe has developed the way it has. However, there are some things they do not explain thoroughly enough. Realism asserts that when states with divergent interests form an alliance against a common enemy the alliance may come apart if the threat subsides. Why then has the transatlantic alliance not come apart? Although the alliance has not fallen apart yet it is fair to say that from a realist point of view growing disagreements between the allies can be seen as the beginning of the end for the transatlantic alliance. That is to say, unless a different common global threat arises in the meantime. Realism also cannot explain why there were constant disagreements between the US and Europe during the Cold War, a time when the transatlantic alliance had a common threat to contain and it was in both parties’ utmost national security interest to maintain a good relationship. Although this fact does not fit perfectly with realism’s assertions one has to point to the fact that the alliance did hold throughout the Cold War, and that perhaps the disagreements were just a part of a normal diplomatic power game between allies.

21 Lundestad, 2005, p. 17.
22 Waltz, 1979, pp. 114-115
Realist theories do not assume that individuals or political processes and policies can shape state behavior, as constructivism argues. The same goes for ideologies and values, contrary to postmodernist views. Constructivism and postmodernism can, however, to some extent be of relevance when explaining transatlantic relations.

2.4.1 Constructivism

Constructivism asserts that state behavior is shaped by elite beliefs, identities, and social norms, and that state and national interests are the result of the social identities of these actors. No distinction is made between domestic politics and international politics.23 This theoretical approach is in stark contrast with both realism and postmodernism (see next chapter), which are state-level analyses, and neorealism, which is a system-level analysis. To constructivists, the transatlantic crisis following 9/11 did not just rise from domestic or international factors, but was constructed by individual actors for specific purposes, i.e. by former President Bush and the Republicans (especially those following neo-conservatism), in their pursuit of maintaining US world dominance.

US foreign policy has in general been influenced somewhat by whether Democrats or Republicans rule the Congress and/or the Presidency at each period of time. In general, Republicans have a realist view of the world, viewing the use of force as a natural aspect of international relations. The neoconservatives within the Republican Party are very prone towards unilateralist measures. In general, their goal is to fulfill US ambitions towards world dominance and the spread of democracy to regions of the world that follow other political systems. Democrats, on the other hand, are in general more liberal in their views, straining from the use of force and preferring multilateral peaceful approaches to world affairs. Their emphasis is on international law, international organizations, and morality.

During the Cold War, the era of military competition, realism was clearly the dominant approach (as discussed in previous chapters). The need to think primarily in terms of national security and military force was apparent.24 The US administration thus

remained fixated on realism, both as a way to explain the situation and predict future development, as well as a guide to appropriate measures. This applied both to Republican controlled Congresses and or/ Presidencies as well as Democrat controlled Congresses and / or Presidencies. During the Post-Cold War Era Republicans ruled Congress (from 1994) while a Democrat ruled at the White House, former President Bill Clinton (from 1993-2001). In general, Clinton was viewed as a balancer to the realist views of the Republican ruled Congress, pursuing a relatively moderate foreign policy. Here it must be noted that since the Cold War was over, the clear need for a realist perspective in US foreign policy was no longer apparent. Then in 2001 a Republican, George W. Bush, took control of the Presidency, so both Congress and the Presidency were under Republican control when the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred. The foreign policy style that followed was very much in line with Republican views, especially the neoconservatives. The underlying global philosophy for the US was to guarantee its own global military dominance by keeping potential competitors from ever aspiring to a larger regional or global role. Preemptive strikes and ad hoc coalitions seemed in this regard to be considered the best means to achieve that goal.25

Although constructivism gives an interesting approach to explaining international relations, including transatlantic relations, it can easily be argued that realism and neorealism give a much more comprehensive explanation in that regard, especially when looking at the bigger picture and long term. Individuals are often influenced by very many factors and accordingly it is extremely difficult to pinpoint exactly why and how certain individuals take certain decisions at any given time. Consequently, basing an analysis of any given development in the international system solely on the choices of individual decision-makers can be difficult and incomplete. Accordingly, constructivism will not be at the forefront in the following analysis of transatlantic relations, although it will be taken into question whenever appropriate.

2.4.2 Postmodernism

One way to explain the ever growing divide between the US and Europe is to look into how the European project and the postmodern perspectives proceeding and maintaining it affected the process. After the Second World War postmodernism was well received in

European countries more than willing to reject the realist power politics that had brought them so much misery. What followed was a perspective the US historically cannot relate to, such as the emphasis on negotiations, diplomacy, and seduction over coercion, international law, commercial ties, and multilateralism over unilateralism. It was by these means that Europe was rebuilt after the devastations of WWII and it appears as if Europe now feels it is its mission to spread the “European lesson”. However, the biggest threat to this mission is the US’ doubts concerning the European way of things. The fact that the US undermines international law gives rise to concerns as to whether European law, on which the EU is built, could be undermined as well. Accordingly, the divide grows. To Federico Romero this growing perception of cultural and social differences is eroding the sense of transatlantic commonality built over the last half a century. Europeans now favor the European model which is most strongly defined by its difference from the US. The US’ intervention in Iraq in 2003 further deteriorated the unfavorable image of the US in the eyes of Europeans and “the image of the benign US hegemony that most Europeans had valued for 50 years was replaced by the perception of an overbearing imperial power”.

According to postmodernism the transatlantic relationship is driven by ideologies, beliefs and values rather than power distribution and core national interests. The postmodern perspectives introduced above can in some ways help explain the ever growing divide in transatlantic relations. However, as with constructivism, it can easily be argued that realism and neorealism give a much more comprehensive analysis when explaining transatlantic relations. Although European integration has surely strongly effected transatlantic relations, the argument here is that the relative global power element in that regard is much more important than the impact of ideologies and beliefs. Accordingly, postmodernism will not be at the forefront in the following analysis of transatlantic relations, although it will be taken into account whenever appropriate.

28 Ibid, p. 34.
2.5 Future Prospects

Although most theories do better in explaining past events than predicting future ones, one can note some potential future developments for transatlantic relations, based on the theories discussed above. The current debate on the future of transatlantic relations evolves a lot around whether the new US President, the Democrat Barack Obama, will be able to turn transatlantic relations back to their normal, relatively amicable state. Constructivists would like to believe so. As noted earlier, neorealism asserts that ideologies, values and beliefs are not crucial factors in international relations, and in that respect a democratic Congress and Presidency will not be the determining factor in this regard. This does, however, not mean that there is need for pessimism; although the exact policy preference in the US at any given time is perhaps not the determining factor, transatlantic relations need not be any worse for it. What is more likely to determine future developments, according to realist theories, is the relative power of the US and Europe, and the distribution of power in the international system.

Regarding a more distant future, it is important to note that the relative global power of the US and Europe is likely to decrease substantially for the remainder of this century. At the same time, powers like Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) are likely to grow much stronger globally.29 In light of the balance of power theory, this could mean that the US and Europe would fully reunite and join forces to try to balance the new global powers, in an effort to shape the configuration of power in the global system. The US might in fact come to really need Europe on its side to counter-balance these new global powers. With decreased strength, the US is thus likely to diminish its unilateral behavior and turn towards multilateralism. Likewise, with Europe’s relative global power also decreasing, it is likely that it will be more prone towards full cooperation with the US than it has been since the end of the Cold War. All this relates directly to the neorealist view of the distribution of power in the international system being its most important characteristic. In that regard, the new power structure would impose a security dilemma on the US and Europe and determine their actions, in their attempt to maximize their relative power. Another perspective is that a multipolar system would emerge, with four or five relatively independent centers of power (according to Alyson Bailes they would

29 Goldman Sachs asserts that the fast growing economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) could become a large force in the global economy over the next 50 years or so. See “BRICs and Beyond”: http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/BRICs-and-Beyond.html
most likely be the US, Europe, China, Russia and perhaps India\textsuperscript{30}, which have not grouped into alliances. In light of this perspective the US and Europe might drift further apart, each representing an independent center of power. According to realism, the power centers in a multipolar system may form a coalition of some sort for mutual security. Consequently, a less integrated transatlantic relationship is possible in that regard.\textsuperscript{31} Lastly, the possibility of a common security threat developing, similar to that of the Soviet Union, must be taken into account. Terrorism or some combination of threats created by non-state actors are the most plausible in that regard (see chapter 6.2.3).

\textbf{2.6 Conclusion}

Realist and neorealist perspectives do a good job in explaining transatlantic relations from the beginning of the Cold War until today. Constructivist perspectives can also give an interesting insight into how individual actors and policies have had an effect in that regard, and postmodernism rightfully gives European integration a place in the argument.

Realism does well in explaining the founding of the transatlantic alliance and the fact it held throughout the Cold War. The theory’s assertions that sometimes smaller states bandwagon on the most powerful state applies to the fact that Europe joined the US bloc after WWII. The theory’s argument that states may seek to balance threats rather than raw power also applies since although US power was greater than Soviet power at that time it was less threatening to Europe. According to realism alliances are an important component of the balance of power, they are based on national interests and its cohesion tends to be high when national interests converge and when cooperation within the alliance becomes institutionalized and habitual. All this applies to the transatlantic alliance during the Cold War and can thus explain why it held throughout the period. Finally, realism asserts that alliances are held together by an ideological glue under bipolarity, that they are hierarchical and each dominated by one superpower. This was the case during the Cold War, when liberal capitalist Europe and the US fought the communist Soviet Union. Same goes for the theory’s assertions that alliances do not


\textsuperscript{31} Hollis and Smith, 1990, p. 103.
shift and that ideological differences seem to be at the very root of the division of the world during bipolarity.

Realism can also be helpful in explaining the divide in transatlantic relations in the Post-Cold War Era. According to realism the balance of power theory would explain European countries’ opposition towards the US’ stand on major global issues as simply an act of power balancing. Realists have tried to explain why this balancing has not been more powerful by stating that a soft looser version of the balance of power theory can apply. This soft version asserts that states are concerned about the adverse effects of a rise in the power of another state, both political and economical. In this regard, the soft balancing by Europe towards the US in the Post-Cold War Era can apply. Realism also asserts that when states with divergent interests form an alliance against a common enemy the alliance may come apart if the threat subsides. This presumption can be applied as one of the reasons for the divide in transatlantic relations, but only as being seen as the beginning of the end of the transatlantic alliance, unless a new common threat emerges. Another way realism can shed a light on the recent crisis are its assertions that the predominance of a single state may seem like an infringement of state sovereignty to less powerful states, which might respond by using stronger balancing against the predominant state.

Neorealism sheds a light on how patterns of transatlantic relations can be explained in terms of changes in the structure of the international system. Relative global power is the determining factor in that regard. Personal beliefs and values of policy makers do not matter, nor policy processes or different ideologies across the Atlantic. Accordingly the Bush administration did not cause the rift in transatlantic relations, nor neoconservative Republican views. From this perspective the current rift in transatlantic relations is simply a consequence of a changing international power structure. The international system is no longer bipolar like during the Cold War, but unipolar. Its only superpower, the US, feels it is powerful enough to take unilateral actions without seeking approval from allies across the Atlantic. Europe has on the other hand gotten powerful enough to object to this unilateral behavior.

Constructivism, on the contrary, asserts that the Bush administration’s unilateral policies and personal style are largely to blame for the rift in transatlantic relations. On the same
note, that having Republicans in office (controlling the US Congress from 1994-2006 and the US Presidency from 2001-2009) led to the unilateralism characterizing US foreign policy for the last decade, and therefore to the stand-off with Europe. The theory argues that state behavior is shaped by elite beliefs, identities, and social norms, and interest are thus based on the elite’s social identities.

Postmodernism can show us how different ideologies across the Atlantic have shaped transatlantic relations and how European “identity” comes into the equation. According to postmodernism the reason for the divide is Europe’s devastation after WWII and the perspective that followed, which the US cannot relate to. This refers to the emphasis on for instance negotiations, diplomacy, international law, and multilateralism. Europe now feels it needs to spread the European way of life; the only problem is the US’ doubts in that regard. Accordingly the divide grows.

Although constructivism and postmodernism can give an interesting insight into the development of transatlantic relations, realism and neorealism give a much more comprehensive explanation in that respect, especially when looking at the bigger picture and long term.

Regarding future prospects for transatlantic relations, realist theories would predict that a Democrat controlled Congress and Presidency will not be a determining factor, in contrary to constructivist views. The relative power of the US and Europe, and the distribution of power in the international system, however, will. In that regard the decreasing relative power of both the US and Europe might facilitate future cooperation. In a more distant future, when the BRIC countries are likely to have become global powers, the US and Europe might even need each other more than ever before, in order to be able to balance the new global powers. So although the outlook for the US’ and Europe’s future stand in the world is looking a bit grim, there seems to be no certain need to be pessimistic regarding the future of transatlantic relations, given these perspectives. Another possibility is that a multipolar system of four or five power centers would emerge, each one relatively independent of one another. That would mean that the US and Europe would become less interdependent and turn towards a looser coalition at times when specific interests collide. Lastly, it must be noted that the threat of non-state actors and terrorism might still eventually become the new strategic basis of the
transatlantic alliance, and unite the allies in a similar way the Soviet threat did during the Cold War.
3. The Cold War Era

During the Cold War the US and Europe disagreed on a variety of issues. Some disagreements grew more serious than others but the transatlantic alliance stayed intact and NATO in many ways proved to be a success. The strength of the alliance derived from the overriding common security interest in keeping the Soviet Union contained. Europe needed to join the US bloc to guarantee its own security, and the US needed Europe on its side to be a viable counter-balance to the Soviet Union. The alliance was held together by an ideological glue; the liberal capitalist Europe and the US were fighting the communist Soviet Union.

3.1 How It All Began

The transatlantic bargain originates in a series of political decisions and diplomatic events in the mid- to late 1940s. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt saw the failure at the end of World War I (WWI) to engage the US in the League of Nations as a contributing factor to the rise of Adolf Hitler and the events leading to WWII. As a result he wanted the US to lead the construction of a new international system under the auspices of a United Nations organization.

In 1950 the Korean War proved to shape transatlantic relations and resolve the argument France was having with the US on West German rearmament. The Korean War was seen as demonstrating the global threat of communist aggression, serving to defeat congressional resistance to a substantial deployment of US forces on the ground in Europe. Such a commitment by the US was essential in easing France’s concerns about the potential of a resurgent West Germany.32

US foreign policy towards a united Europe has been consistent ever since the end of WWII when the Marshall Plan was introduced and NATO established. One of the most dramatic shifts in US foreign and security policy occurred in the aftermath of WWII. Before the war, the US’ core national interest was the protection of the homeland. As the conflict between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, accelerated after

1945, containment became an important factor, since it was perceived that Soviet expansion could erode homeland security. By pledging itself to European security through the Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5, the US made its commitment to European security a national interest.

In 1947 the US introduced the Marshall Plan, an aid package of 13 billion dollars to help rebuild European economies after WWII. Europe was still devastated by the war, and reconstruction was seen as essential, both for humanitarian reasons and to stop the potential spread of communism westward. In order to receive the aid, European nations were required to co-operate and draw up a rational plan on how they would use the aid. They would in fact have to unite and act like a single economic unit. Although the Marshall Plan also benefited the US economy, it was seen firstly as a US national security interest. The Plan was a success and by 1953 Europe was standing on its own feet again. Furthermore the aid included West Germany which was thus reintegrated into the European community. The Marshall Plan did in fact not only help put Europe back on its feet, it also led to the Schuman Plan, the starting point of what we know today as the European Union.

The situation in Europe after WWII era also led to the establishment of NATO, a North Atlantic defense alliance, moreover an anti-Soviet alliance. During the Cold War, NATO's role and purpose were clearly defined by the existence of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and the Organization demonstrated that it had the capability to satisfy the security needs of the US and Europe. In the US Defense Department’s 1995 report on the US’ Security Strategy for Europe and NATO it is clearly stated that the US has vital interests in a Europe that is “democratic, undivided, stable and prosperous, open to trade and investment opportunities, and supportive of political, economic and military cooperation with the United States in Europe and other important parts of the world”.

33 Article 5 states that an attack on any NATO member shall be considered as an attack on all members.
3.2 The Transatlantic Bargain

It is fair to say that the transatlantic alliance was based both on national interests and shared societal ideas. Put simply, the deal was that the US would contribute to the defense of Europe and to Europe’s economic recovery from the war, if the Europeans would in turn participate in the defense efforts against the Soviet Union and use the economic aid it received efficiently. Europe was quite successful in fulfilling the latter requirement, by amongst other things creating the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 to coordinate the Marshall Plan assistance from the US and to promote European economic cooperation. What then followed was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in 1957, together the precursors of today’s European Union. Regarding the first part of Europe’s side of the bargain, however, the active participation in the defense against the Soviet Union, Europe did not perform. The reason was lack of unity amongst European countries, which was seen as essential for Europe to be able to contribute successfully to Western defense. Thus, among all the changes in the transatlantic bargain over the years many see the step by step development of European integration of the greatest importance and the future of the transatlantic alliance dependent on whether the process will produce coherence within the alliance’s framework.37

3.3 Serious Disagreements

During the Cold War there was confusion about the role the US would eventually play in Europe. Many European governments were concerned that the US would not take an active enough interest in their affairs, whilst the US wanted the alliance to be as supranational as possible. Although economic cooperation between the allies was proving to be quite successful they constantly disagreed on approaches to global security and defense related matters.

The following disagreements within the transatlantic alliance were identified as being the most significant ones during the Cold War. Whether they regarded the structure of NATO or transatlantic unity when dealing with outside developments, they all affected the strength and cohesion of the alliance as a whole in a negative way vis-à-vis the

Soviet Union. During the Cold War there was an urgent need for a coordinated policy toward the Soviet Union, and the following disagreements show the disarray and bitterness which was sometimes evident within Western orders, clearly only benefiting the Soviet Union and weakening the transatlantic alliance. All the same, these disagreements did not constitute a rift in the bargain or a state of a serious crisis within the alliance. As mentioned earlier, the common threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the overriding common interest in maintaining European stability kept the relationship from falling apart, despite significant disagreements like the following.

3.3.1 The defeat of the EDC – the rearming of West Germany

The European Defense Community (EDC) was a plan proposed by France in 1950 as a response to the US’ call for the rearmament of West Germany. The US pushed the EDC treaty forward, seeing the treaty’s success as a sense of relief from the burdens of European defense. European countries, especially France and Italy, remained concerned that once the EDC was in place the US would remove its forces in Europe, leaving France to deal with West Germany. The Mutual Security Act of 1953 required that the US administration would withhold a portion of the aid intended for EDC nations that had not ratified the treaty. In 1954, when only France and Italy had not ratified the treaty, a modified form of the provision was thus incorporated in the Mutual Security Act, preventing future deliveries of military equipment to the two countries in question. In June 1954 the French government tried to get the treaty modified and the Belgian government submitted a set of compromise proposals which all countries involved (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and West Germany) accepted, except France. A few months later the French government rejected the original treaty. France’s fear of a resurgent West Germany was seen as the main reason it rejected the treaty, although things like Soviet influence, France’s defeat in Indochina and the country’s bleak economic outlook were also thought to have had its effects.38

The failure to establish a European defense community was seen by many as a tragic chapter in the history of Western postwar alliance construction. The US viewed the EDC as means to rearm West Germany as part of the transatlantic alliance against the Soviet

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Union. It had a backup plan to this end which included ending the occupation of West Germany and it to join NATO, which it did in May 1955.39

The overall effect of the collapse of the EDC, besides the fact it halted the post-war alliance construction, was that the transatlantic alliance became dependent on substantial US military presence in Europe to give credibility to NATO. The practical effects were that Europe would not have to shoulder a proportionate share of the defense burden against the Soviet Union, and that doing so did not have any serious consequences for the transatlantic bargain, although the US had threatened that it would.40

3.3.2 The Suez crisis in 1956

Less than a year after the EDC crisis, another disagreement between the US and Europe followed. In 1956 the US had a bitter conflict with its two main European allies, Great Britain and France, over the Suez Canal in Egypt. The crisis marked the humiliating end of imperial influence for both Great Britain and France. At that time many European politicians still believed that their countries had a right to run the affairs of others and when faced with provocation the instinct was to go to war. After 1951 Great Britain was confined to the Suez Canal zone. In 1956 the Egyptians wanted to nationalize the Suez Canal which Great Britain and France strongly objected, both countries having economic and political interests at stake. Accordingly, the two countries started to co-ordinate plans for a military invasion of Egypt and a reoccupation of the Canal Zone. The US was very skeptical of these plans. Great Britain and France reluctantly played along with the US, until Israel provided a way out. The plan was for Israel to invade Egypt and race to the canal, France and Great Britain would then invade, posing as peacekeepers to separate the two sides and to occupy the canal. After Israel invaded, however, Egypt rejected the peacekeeping offer so Great Britain ended up bombing Egypt’s air force on the ground.41

The US felt very much betrayed and was determined to put a stop to the project. It did so by striking at Great Britain’s fragile economy by refusing to allow the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to give emergency loans to Great Britain unless it called off the

39 Ibid.
invasion. In addition the US also worked through the United Nations (UN) by demanding a cease-fire, which ultimately led to the assembling of an international emergency force, which became the first UN peacekeeping mission in history.\textsuperscript{42}

The lesson that France drew from the event was that Great Britain would always put its relationship with the US above its European interests. So France leaned towards West Germany, believing that the only way to play a decisive role in the world would be to unite Europe. Shortly a common market of six European states was born, the precursor of today’s 27-member EU.\textsuperscript{43} The fact that the US forced its two partners to stop their invasion in mid-track strongly affected future relations between the three countries.\textsuperscript{44} The crisis ended any pretense of strategic equality between Europe and the US inside NATO, it signaled the relegation of Europe’s two leading powers from the top power league, and drove a wedge between France and Great Britain. Disputes between France and the US and Great Britain proliferated further after that. France kept Great Britain out of the EEC for as long as it could, or until 1973 (see next chapter). By then France had tried to make itself completely independent of US military power by building its own nuclear deterrent and leaving NATO’s integrated command structure in 1966 (see chapter 3.3.4). The main lesson Great Britain drew from the Suez crisis was that the country would never be able to act independently of the US again. Unlike France, which has sought to lead Europe, Great Britain has in general seemed content to play second to the US.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{3.3.3 France denying Great Britain EEC membership in 1963}

Charles de Gaulle came into power in France on June 1\textsuperscript{st} 1958 and his main objective was to strengthen the position and glory of France. By 1960 it became apparent that de Gaulle would represent a challenge to US leadership in NATO, and the divergence between France and the US kept growing steadily. The US was keen on Great Britain joining the EEC, as to strengthen the Community’s Atlantic orientation.\textsuperscript{46} It tried to play down the “special relationship” between the US and Great Britain so as to increase Great Britain’s chances of becoming accepted, whilst secretly hoping that “if England went

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Lundestad, 2005, p. 12.
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into Europe, it would take a sense of the “special relationship” with it, and that we [the US] could then have a “special relationship” with Europe”. On July 31, 1961 Great Britain applied for membership of the EEC and it appeared that US preference and pressure had a lot to do with that development. On the 14th of January, 1963 de Gaulle vetoed British membership of the EEC, largely and perhaps solely because of the “special relationship” between the US and Great Britain. The US was seen as Great Britain’s sponsor in the negotiations with the EEC and according to de Gaulle the EEC with Great Britain as a member “would appear as a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and direction, and which would quickly have absorbed the community of Europe”.

De Gaulle’s veto instantly led to a feeling of distress in the US government. It did not react strongly towards this development though, hoping that the crisis would be temporary. That perspective, however, changed swiftly when de Gaulle’s veto was followed by a treaty between France and West Germany just one week later. The US’ positive position was immediately reversed and George Ball, Under-Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs at the time, made it clear that West Germany might soon have to “make a difficult choice between its relationship with France and its ties with the rest of Europe and the US”.

The US’ main fear at the time was that France would try to strike a deal with the Soviet Union which would also include West Germany. The US decided to continue to encourage a united Europe and strengthen the relationship between the US and Europe, but make no effort to stop the ratification of the treaty France and West Germany were negotiating. In the end the US managed to persuade the West German government to modify the treaty, so that it would include a declaration of loyalty in its preamble. West Germany really had no choice but to side with the US since it was its primary security guarantor. De Gaulle’s rapidly growing independence and the sympathies he had aroused in West Germany did not lead the US to abandon the goal of European integration. The traditional reasons for the US’ support in that regard were still in

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place.\textsuperscript{50} France, however, kept rebelling against the US, by amongst other things publicly condemning the Vietnam War in 1963-64 (see chapter 3.3.5) and, as formerly mentioned, opting out of NATO’s military arm in 1966-69 (see next chapter).

3.3.4 France opting out of NATO’s integrated military command in 1966-1969

De Gaulle withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command structure in 1966. The act was seen as a culmination of attitudes and frustrations related to doubts about the reliability of the US and concerns about US domination. France wanted to be considered to have rights and powers superior to that of West Germany within NATO. The structure of the Organization, however, granted equal rights to all members (in theory), although its framework of course provided for some US dominance. For France, other things came into play, such as the US’ failure to provide assistance to France in their war in Indochina and in its struggle in Algeria, as well as the US’ opposition during the Suez crisis. The lack of support from the US during these crises was in France’s view unilateral changes of the original transatlantic bargain.\textsuperscript{51} As Michael Harrison put it: “NATO’s value to France never recovered from the allied failure to support her cause in Africa, from the American reaction to Suez, and from the conviction that the United States had morally and materially turned against France and violated the Alliance tie”\textsuperscript{52}

De Gaulle’s decision to leave NATO’s integrated military command meant that NATO had to remove its headquarters, forces, and facilities from French territory by April 1st, 1967. Militarily this decision weakened the infrastructure for supporting NATO’s frontlines and for bringing in new supplies, the Organization’s line of supply and communications weakened, and reinforcements were closer to the front and more susceptible to enemy interdiction. Politically France’s withdrawal had even greater effects since it greatly altered the political balance within NATO, making it even more dependent on US leadership than before.\textsuperscript{53} All this came at a time when Europe was becoming more powerful within NATO, as a result of its economic strength, the growing strategic importance of France’s and Great Britain’s nuclear forces, and the increasingly important role of West Germany’s forces. Ironically, France’s withdrawal increased the

\textsuperscript{50} Lundestad, 1998, pp. 69-73.
\textsuperscript{51} Sloan, 2005, pp. 43-45
\textsuperscript{53} Sloan, 2005, pp. 45-46.
importance of West Germany’s role within NATO, making it the second most influential ally and the leading European member. The withdrawal also diminished the chances for strong defense cooperation between the European members within NATO. Although NATO actively tried to find ways to expand cooperation with France, political conditions imposed by France’s qualified participation in the Organization severely limited the options available for closer defense cooperation among the European allies. In one regard, however, NATO may actually have benefited from France’s withdrawal, since it produced additional complications for Soviet strategy and enhanced Western deterrence. On balance, however, the withdrawal was detrimental to the long term viability of NATO.\textsuperscript{54}

\section*{3.3.5 The Vietnam War 1959-1975}

De Gaulle was the only European leader to publicly challenge the US’ policy in Vietnam. Amongst the other leaders there was, however, a great lack of any enthusiasm to support the US’ policy. That derived from the fact that European leaders did not consider the war to be a reaction to communist aggression, which could affect the whole world, but a general national struggle between the US and Northern Vietnam. The political risks the leaders would face at home if they supported an unpopular war also had its effects.\textsuperscript{55}

The US completely ignored France’s experience in Indochina, believing that it was waging a different kind of war. Great Britain’s “special relationship” with the US was put to the test, with Great Britain toning down its support of the war and launching several peace initiatives. According to Serge Ricard it has been argued that Great Britain and the US struck a secret deal, which required the US to support the Sterling pound in exchange for Great Britain maintaining its military presence at Suez and supporting the war in Vietnam. Europe saw the war as a “David versus Goliath confrontation”\textsuperscript{56} and the US’ greatest supporters in Europe withdrew their support, at least publicly, seeing the war as morally questionable and ill fated. The West German government used economic diplomacy as the most low-key support available, by delivering humanitarian aid and

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, 2005, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, p. 881.
credits to South Vietnam, buying large amounts of US weapons to offset the dollar cost of US troops in Europe, and refraining from exchanging excess dollars for gold.57

As mentioned above de Gaulle was the only European leader who openly criticized the war in Vietnam. His criticism increased and became more convincing from 1963-1964, influencing the international community’s view of the war. The problem for the US was that de Gaulle was seen to be voicing loudly the kind of disapproval other European leaders were muttering. Recently accessible NATO archives reveal that although France’s objections carried some weight amongst the European members, it did not convince them that “Vietnam was a symbol of American domination of the West”.58 The common menace, communism, was still seen as a great threat and the US did in fact receive qualified support for their aggression from 1961-1964. These grievances did not seriously affect transatlantic relations although the dominant leadership and authority of the US within NATO was somewhat damaged, as a consequence of the war.59 France, however, kept up its rebellion against the US, being a major player in Europe’s resistance to the US’ demands against a Soviet pipeline through Europe in 1982 (see next chapter).

3.3.6 A Soviet pipeline through Europe

After the Vietnam War ended, transatlantic relations were back on relatively amicable terms and remained that way until a dispute over a Soviet pipeline through Europe arose in 1982. The dispute regarded a 3,000 mile 10 billion dollar pipeline, through which the Soviet Union hoped to deliver up to 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from its Siberian tundra, over the Urals, across Ukraine and through Czechoslovakia, all the way to the homes and factories of Europe. In the US’ view the pipeline would not only make Europe dependent on Soviet energy (exposing the continent to Soviet blackmail in the form of an energy cessation) but it would also increase its dependence on a growing web of economic ties with the Soviet bloc. The US administration also argued that the deal would give the Soviets additional resources to pursue their military buildup. European countries in return claimed that although the natural gas from the Soviets would in eight years time account for an average of 30% of Europe’s total gas needs, the Continent's overall energy dependence on the Soviet Union would only rise to 5%.

57 Ibid.
Moreover, that the EEC’s trade with the Soviet bloc had in general remained small. European leaders were resentful of the US’ demands and actions at a time when the unemployment level throughout Europe was the highest since the end of WWII, and the US itself had sold 3.2 billion dollars worth of grain to the Soviet Union in the prior year (1981) alone.\textsuperscript{60}

The US imposed an embargo which prohibited US companies and their foreign subsidiaries from selling equipment to build the pipeline. The US administration then broadened the restrictions to penalize foreign businesses that sold the Soviet Union pipeline equipment that used technology licensed from US businesses. That included businesses in Italy, France, Great Britain and West Germany. The governments of all of these countries, except West Germany, defied the US administration by ordering the businesses in question to honor all pipeline contracts. European officials delivered a formal protest on August 13\textsuperscript{th}, 1982, arguing that the embargo was “an unacceptable interference” in EEC affairs, and that it contained “sweeping extensions of US jurisdiction which are unlawful under international law”.\textsuperscript{61} France openly defied the sanctions, with France’s Prime Minister at the time, Pierre Mauroy, stating that “France cannot accept unilateral measures taken by the United States“.\textsuperscript{62} West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that “by claiming the right to extend American law to other territories the US is affecting not only the interests of the European trading nations but also their sovereignty”.\textsuperscript{63} Even British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, whose country would not become linked to the Soviet network, publicly rejected the US’ stand.\textsuperscript{64}

The East-West pipeline, the largest single East-West deal to date, provoked one of the greatest controversies in the history of the transatlantic alliance, with the US first trying


\textsuperscript{62} Bolte, Bonfante, and Painton, 1982.


\textsuperscript{64} Bolte, Bonfante, and Painton, 1982.
to convince European countries from agreeing to the deal, and then imposing an embargo on the export of key components to delay the pipeline’s construction. The subsequent failure of the embargo, due to resistance by Europe and vigorous countermeasures by the Soviet Union, showed the limits of economic leverage and marked a turning point in the alliance’s policies on East-West trade. The outcome was a political victory for the Soviet Union and a setback for the unity of the transatlantic alliance. The alliance all the same stayed intact and did not suffer any long term consequences from the pipeline debacle. The threat of the communist Soviet Union still existed and thus the basis of the transatlantic alliance. Less than seven years later, however, the Soviet Union collapsed. The main basis of the alliance became irrelevant at that point, and its future unknown.

3.4 Conclusion

As previously noted, all the disagreements discussed above affected the strength and unity of the transatlantic alliance as a whole in a negative way vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Firstly the rearming of West Germany was seen as an important factor towards strengthening the alliance. The decision of France to reject the treaty to establish the EDC (which would have meant the rearming of West Germany) thus halted the post-war construction of the alliance. In 1956 the US went directly against its two main European allies, Great Britain and France, and in fact sided with the Soviet Union, on the ownership of the colonized Suez Canal in Egypt. That undoubtedly weakened the unity of the transatlantic alliance. In 1963 France denied Great Britain membership of the EEC, with the EEC being seen by the US as a major component in getting Europe more militarily active in the alliance’s fight against communism. A few years later France, one of the most powerful European allies in NATO, opted out of NATO’s military arm. That development clearly weakened NATO militarily and some might even say ideologically since France did not let the communist threat affect its decision. During the Vietnam War, a war that the US was allegedly fighting against the transatlantic alliance’s common threat, communism, European countries came short in support. That obviously weakened the alliance’s position and worked in the advantage of the Soviet Union, although the US’ utter failure in Vietnam also did its part in that regard. Lastly the East-

West pipeline deal produced a bitter quarrel between the US and its European allies, making the transatlantic alliance’s stand on the Soviet Union seem in disarray, with the Soviet Union reaping the benefits of that as well as economic benefits of the pipeline itself.

Despite all this, these disagreements do in my opinion not constitute a rift in the bargain or a state of serious crisis within the transatlantic alliance. The transatlantic bargain was revised and reshaped to adapt to global changes almost constantly throughout the Cold War. Although some internal battles were hurtful to the alliance it experienced more success than failure overall during the Cold War and stayed intact. Despite severe differences the level of disagreement never reached the level of rupture; the fundamental reason for that being the common threat of the Soviet Union. No matter how much they disagreed with the US the underlying mutual security imperative caused Europe to remain closely allied with the US to make sure US forces would stay on European soil and protect European countries if they were to be exposed to a Soviet threat. The transatlantic alliance was both parties’ most important power element, held together by an ideological glue. Accordingly the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1989 unavoidably meant fundamental changes for the alliance.

There were other transatlantic disagreements in the area of security and defense during the Cold War than those discussed above. They did however not, in my opinion, affect as negatively the strength and unity of the transatlantic alliance as a whole vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Disagreements worth mentioning in this regard include different views on the Soviet launch of Sputnik (the world’s first orbiting space satellite in 1957), ostpolitik, the neutron bomb and the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Furthermore, the deployment of intermediate range nuclear missile (INF) in Europe in the 1980s caused some frictions, as well as different approaches to revolutions in Central America and to the apartheid in South Africa in the 1980s.
4. The Post- Cold War Era

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transatlantic relationship, which had been relatively stable for over 50 years, entered a new, uncertain phase. The asymmetric dependency that had been apparent between the US and Europe changed and consequently foreign policy strategies altered. There was also a new focus on internal affairs on both sides. Moreover, geostrategic aspects were changing with the US focusing more on the Middle East whilst Europe was turning its focus on Africa, Asia, the Balkans, and the Caucasus.

4.1 A New World Order

According to neorealism, major changes in international relations arise from changes in the distribution of power, which can be described in terms of polarity. During the Cold War the system was bipolar, with two great rival alliance blocs, the United States and the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union a unipolar distribution of power emerged, with changes for international politics in general and the transatlantic alliance in particular. The US and Europe no longer shared a common enemy, the US was the world’s only superpower, European integration was growing and Europe was not as heavily dependent on the US for security as before. Consequently, the US started to act more unilaterally than before, generating from its strength, and European countries tried to balance these unilateral acts more forcefully than during the Cold War. Transatlantic disagreements thus took a new turn after the Cold War, characterized by US unilateralism and European balancing acts.

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66 The period from November 1989 (the fall of the Berlin Wall) until September 2001 (the terrorist attacks on the United States) is identified as the Post- Cold War Era.

67 Geir Lundestad concludes that these three aspects; the end of the Cold War, US unilateralism and European political change, are the primary reasons for concern when looking at the continued close relationship between the US and Europe, in his article “Toward transatlantic drift?” in the book The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq”, edited by David M. Andrews and published in 2005.
4.2 US Unilateralism

The US’ drive towards unilateralism during the Post-Cold War Era generated from increased strength and power on the world stage. Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro argue that “[growing US] power naturally led strategies and policymakers from across the political spectrum [in the US] to contemplate the many possible uses of American power and to implicitly question the constraints of alliance interaction that had prevailed during the Cold War”.

On the other hand, US unilateralism derived from increased sense of vulnerability, generating from its increased relative global strength. As a result of this vulnerability, the US reserved itself the right to strike preemptively against anything or anyone that might threaten the US’ rapidly expanding security interests.

The level of US unilateralism in the Post-Cold War Era was also affected by the fact that Republicans controlled the US Congress from 1994, somewhat restraining the Democratic President Clinton, in his multilateral efforts. This was evident by Congress’ unwillingness to fully support US deployment to the Balkans, its attempt to punish European companies doing business in Iran, Libya and Cuba (through the Helms-Burton and Iran-Libya Sanctions Acts, discussed in chapter 4.4.2), halting the payment of US dues to the UN, and rejecting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (see chapter 4.4.3). These positions foreshadowed some of the further clashes between the US and Europe that would emerge once a Republican President came into power in 2001.

During the Post-Cold War Era US unilateralism became most evident in its interactions with multilateral institutions, when working with allies to find a common solution to global problems. The US was becoming more reluctant to multilateral solutions to issues that affected US interests in any considerable manner. This led to a series of disputes, with the divergence coming clearly to public attention briefly in 2001 when the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) voted the US off its Human Rights Commission. The incident brought attention to the troubled transatlantic alliance and the increasing level of US unilateralism.

69 Lundestad, 2005, p. 17.
70 Ibid, p. 18.
4.3 European Balancing

According to Lundestad, fundamental changes in European political behavior emanated primarily from changes in France, Germany and the EU itself. During the Cold War France and West Germany relied on a security guarantee from the US in the time of crisis but with the fall of the Soviet Union they suddenly had freedom of action when it came to international affairs. France used this freedom to become the leader of the opposition against the US. Germany, which was finally united and on good terms with its many neighbors, including and most importantly, Russia, felt freer to take a stand against the US than before.\(^\text{72}\)

Europe has been integrating gradually ever since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. After the Cold War the pace of integration grew faster than before, amongst other things in the area of security and defense. The history of collective defense between European countries after WWII dates back to 1948 with the defense pledge established by the Treaty of Brussels. Signatories included Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The purpose of the pledge was to bring forth greater collective security, against the threat of communism.\(^\text{73}\) The act also helped to convince the US to participate in European security arrangements. The failure of the EDC (see chapter 3.3.1) meant that another way had to be found to integrate West Germany into the Western security system. In 1954 West Germany and Italy were thus invited to join the Brussels Treaty. The treaty was formalized by the Paris Agreements, which also created the Western European Union (WEU). From 1954 to 1973, the WEU’s role was to advance the development of consultation and co-operation in Europe.\(^\text{74}\) In the early 1980s there was a revival of the debate on European security, and the WEU was reactivated in 1984. The goal was to develop a common European defense identity, by strengthening the European pillar of NATO and promoting cooperation among its members in the area of security.\(^\text{75}\)

\(^{72}\) Lundestad, 2005, p. 20.


In 1992 the EU set up the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The novelty of the CSDP was that it was supposed to include all questions relating to the security of the EU, including the eventual framing of a defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense. Furthermore, the EU was able to request WEU to carry out concrete actions in the military field.\textsuperscript{76} EU integration in the area of security and defense took a new turn with the development of the CSDP, which can be identified as increased balancing against the US in light of Europe’s independence from the US’ security guarantee. In 1996 NATO developed the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), as to rebalance the relationship between the US and Europe, and support Europe’s wishes to take a greater responsibility for its common security and defense.\textsuperscript{77} In 1997 the EU went on to establish a post of a main coordinator of the CSDP, called the “High Representative”. Two years later things took yet another turn with the EU’s establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy. This European move showed that France and Great Britain had given up on NATO’s initiatives, the ESDI and the WEU, as ways towards a separate European mission. This caused some controversy between Europe and the US.\textsuperscript{78}

One can note several other developments in the 1990s and onwards that reflect increased balancing by Europe towards the US, in light if its independence from it. In 1997 Europe and other participatory states decided to accept the Mine Ban Treaty without US participation, when the US made nonnegotiable demands (see chapter 4.4.3). Europe and other US allies also adopted the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 1997, without including provisions demanded by the US. [Although the issue is not yet a security and defense related one, it is included here because of its global value and scope]. In 1998 the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established, in explicit rejection of US preferences (see chapter 4.4.5). Demonstrating its independence from the US, Europe had, along with other US allies, reached an agreement on three important international agreements. It was clear that Europe was exploring its new found freedom to take a

\textsuperscript{76} Bailes, A. (n.d.). "Development of EU “Foreign Policy” In a Nutshell“. Unpublished course material, received at the University of Iceland on the 31\textsuperscript{st} of March, 2009.
\textsuperscript{78} Bailes, A. (March 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2009). Personal Communication.
4.4 Disagreements in the Post-Cold War Era

There were disagreements between the US and Europe over a range of issues during the Post-Cold War Era, just as during the Cold War itself. The difference was the nature of the disagreements, seeing that they stemmed to a larger degree from US unilateralism and European balancing acts against the US than the disagreements during the Cold War. In addition to being considered the most serious ones during the Post-Cold War Era, the following disagreements were identified as the ones most clearly characterized by the end of the Cold War, US unilateralism and European balancing.

4.4.1 Bosnia 1992-1995

The most pressing geopolitical issue in Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War was the continuing civil war in the Balkans. It originally elicited little response in the US, as it was seen as a European problem and the US in many ways no longer felt that it had much at stake in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, the US’ failure in Somalia in 1992-1993 led to resistance to take risks in the Balkans for humanitarian purposes. As Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister at that time (which held the EC’s rotating presidency), Jacques Poos, stated, the Yugoslavian crisis signaled “the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans”.

With the Cold War over, Europe was planning on playing a more autonomous foreign policy role in the world, through its developing institutions, exploring its newfound independence from the US. Ultimately, Europe, however, proved incapable of tackling the Yugoslav crisis without US leadership, which led to a complete humanitarian crisis in the heart of Europe, leaving over 200,000 dead. The threat of disturbance spreading throughout southeastern Europe directly affected US and European security interests and threatened to undo many of the gains of the Cold War. Even NATO itself was seen as to be at stake. The US came to the conclusion that it had to intervene, since otherwise it

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would anyways be obliged to rescue European peacekeepers if the Europeans were forced to withdraw. In 1993 the US resolved to lift the Bosnian arms embargo and initiated air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, only to shortly after move away from the practice of air strikes and toward the European approach of establishing “safe havens”, delaying forceful action for another two years. In this way the US still allowed the desire for allied support from Europe to create delays and indecision in the transatlantic alliance, something that would take a turn in the late Post-Cold War Era. 

In the summer of 1995 the US took the lead and set about convincing the European allies of the necessity for forceful action through the mechanisms of NATO, demonstrating that the US would keep on using NATO for US involvement in Europe. The debacle in Bosnia proved to be a lesson for both the US and Europe, showing the former that it could not afford to ignore European development and the latter that it was a long way from possessing the internal consensus or the military capacity to act without US leadership. When war broke out in Kosovo in 1999 it became apparent that these lessons had been learned (see chapter 4.4.4).

4.4.2 Rogue states

The tensions between the US and Europe over how to deal with the threat from rogue states, specifically Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba and Libya, first became a serious issue during the 1990s. While Europe leaned towards dialogue, trade, and cooperation within international institutions to promote political change, the US preferred direct support to opposition forces, coercion in form of economic sanctions, and even the threat of direct military action.

These differences first became serious as a result of efforts by the US to enforce sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya. Europe had long circumvented US sanctions and even though the US complained about it, it did not seek to prevent European firms from doing business in these countries at first. However, with the end of the Cold War and growing US power the US started to become less tolerant towards what they saw as Europe’s free-riding on US efforts to provide international security.

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82 Gordon and Shapiro, 2004, pp. 31-36.
83 Ibid.
84 States that are considered threatening to world peace.
85 Gordon and Shapiro, 2004, pp. 31-36.
86 Ibid.
In 1996 the US Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act\(^\text{87}\) (known as the Helms Burton Act) and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)\(^\text{88}\). The Acts asserted the US’ right to impose sanctions on any company investing in Cuba or investing more than $40 million in the Libyan or Iranian energy sector.\(^\text{89}\) European governments unanimously condemned the very principle of secondary boycotts and refused to abide by them. This led to a series of transatlantic disputes over whether the US would follow through on the threats contained in the Acts. Initially the EU threatened to take the US to a complaints panel of the World Trade Organization (WTO), over the extra-territorial effects of the Helms Burton Act, which made the embargo apply to foreign companies. The issue never went that far however since the EU negotiated an agreement with the US which alleviated the effects of the Helms-Burton Act on European companies.\(^\text{90}\) The main provisions of the agreement were a renewable six-monthly waiver of the extra-territorial effect of the Act, an indefinite waiver to the EU of the exclusion from the US of “traffickers” in US property, and lastly no action against EU companies or individuals under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, with similar waiver provisions.\(^\text{91}\)

Given the US’ growing power on the world stage, it felt free to take a unilateral stand against the interests of its European allies. In a similar way Europe felt free to take a firm stand against the US on this issue, and managed to inhibit the US from enforcing the Acts. The issue of rogue states continued to cause frictions in transatlantic relations, with the issue of Iraq later becoming the source of the biggest feud in the history of the transatlantic alliance.

### 4.4.3 Security and defense related treaties

During the Post-Cold War Era the US’ approach to various defense and security related treaties became ever more unilateral than before. In 1997 the US rejected the Ottawa Convention of a Total Ban of Anti-Personnel Landmines (the Mine Ban Treaty), after

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\(^{87}\) The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ114.104

\(^{88}\) The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_cr/h960618b.htm

\(^{89}\) Gordon and Shapiro, 2004, pp. 31-36.


\(^{91}\) Ibid.
trying to modify it to include exceptions for certain aspects of its own use of landmines. Europe and other US allies, however, took a stand against the US, rejecting its nonnegotiable demands and accepting the Treaty without US participation. In 1999 the US rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was designed to prohibit nuclear weapon development. Then in July 2001 the US both rejected the UN accord to enforce the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and threatened to leave the UN Conference on Small Arms, objecting to any interference with the US’ right to bear arms and consequently watering down the initial agreement. In light of its increased relative power on the world stage, the US was slowly turning its back on multilateral decision-making.

4.4.4 Kosovo
When the crisis in Kosovo erupted the US took a much firmer stand than most European countries, after Serbia’s expulsions of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians from the troubled province. The US had significant influence on EU policies over the conflict. Whenever there was a difference between the policy preference of the US and Europe, the latter would seemingly reform its position. It was apparent that Europe had learned its lessons from the disaster in Bosnia and accepted the fact it was not able to act alone without US leadership. The US had also come to the conclusion that European security affairs were part of their own security interests. The US’ view on multilateral engagement, however, was changing, alongside its increased power on the world stage. Many viewed the campaign more as a meddling in Europe’s interests than the US’, by helping out allies who lacked the abilities and willingness to act themselves. Allowing the other NATO states to have their say on how the war campaign in Kosovo should be run was seen to have prolonged the conflict, as a consequence of political considerations prevailing over military needs. The US was gradually moving towards a more unilateral security policy on the global stage, with Condoleezza Rice, who one

93 Ibid.
94 Toje, 2008, pp. 50-78.
year later became US Secretary of State, openly questioning the concept of multilateral engagement as a feasible form for US foreign policy.95

A report from the EU Institute for Security Studies concluded: “The Kosovo conflict confirmed Europe’s military shortcomings and the ambiguities of America’s international position”.96 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hegemonic ambitions in the US, soon to be characterized by unilateral foreign policy decisions and lack of interest in the thoughts of its European allies. At that time, it seemed like Europe had accepted its military shortcomings after the failure in Bosnia. Although it did not agree with the US in many aspects it did not try to balance US power like with other issues during the Post-Cold War Era, but rather gave in and cooperated without much resistance. This was an exception from Europe’s main characteristic in its behavior towards the US during this period in time, namely strong balancing against the US, as discussed above.

4.4.5 The International Criminal Court

The US has been reluctant towards the ICC ever since the founding treaty for the Court was created in July 1998 and signed by 95 states, including most European countries. It is intended to hold individuals accountable for the four core crimes of genocide, war crimes, the crime of aggression and crimes against humanity. Whereas the EU considers the ICC as an expansion of its national sovereignty and its sphere of influence, the US views it as an infringement on its constitutional rights and national sovereignty.97

The US signed the ICC agreement98 in the year 2000 but has not of yet ratified it. This reflects the US’ turn towards unilateralism after the Cold War. With growing power the US started to spread its influence all over the world, by amongst other things establishing additional army bases worldwide and invading Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The deployment of armies around the world can easily lead to charges of

aggression and allegations of violations of humanitarian law. 99 With the increasing worldwide presence came increased vulnerability for the US, and it was thus not willing to accept that an international organizational body like the ICC would be able to affect its establishments. Europe, exploring its newly found independence from the US’ security guarantee, established the Court anyway along with other allies of the US, in explicit rejection of US preferences.

4.4.6 Iraq from 1996-2001

Transatlantic disagreements over Iraq began to grow in the mid-1990s. Although the US and Europe both agreed that sanctions and forceful containment had failed to remove the threat of Iraq’ President and Dictator Saddam Hussein, they disagreed on how to solve the problem. In 1997-1998 the US consistently tried to remake the containment regime and recreate a consensus within the UN Security Council (UNSC), without success. Ultimately the US and Great Britain launched a four day air and missile strike on targets in Iraq considered to be crucial to Saddam’s regime, destroying any pretense of international consensus on the subject. 100

This development can be identified as growing US unilateralism. Although the US and its partners continued to seek UNSC consensus on the issue for a few years after the air strike, the US was skeptical of the UNSC’s willingness to enforce its mandate and doubtful of Iraq’s intentions to abide by them. 101 It seemed as if the US was slowly getting ready to go at it alone in the Iraq issue, without a consensus or allied support. Once both the US Congress and the US Presidency were in Republican hands, those speculations came true.

The failure to agree on Iraq was one of the most alienating issues within the transatlantic alliance during the Post-Cold War Era, and would shortly become the cause of one of the biggest transatlantic feuds since the foundation of the alliance. Gordon and Shapiro claim the discords at the UN between the US and Europe over Iraq created a “legacy of bitterness and betrayal that seriously damaged both sides’ belief in the other’s good faith

101 Ibid.
as well as the belief that the UN could effectively cope with problems like Iraq”. They furthermore concluded that this development had an important impact on the split over Iraq that emerged in 2002.

4.5 Conclusion

The end of the Cold War marked an end to the transatlantic alliance as people had come to know it and its future was unknown. The strategic environment no longer drove the allies together and the distribution of power in the international system was shifting. As a consequence the nature of transatlantic disagreements changed. The US’ growing world power led to increased unilateralism in US foreign policy. Europe’s independence from the US’ security guarantee, and its integration in the area of security and defense within the EU resulted in stronger balancing against the US. The disagreements discussed above all show clear examples of this development. The crisis in Bosnia deteriorated in many ways because of the fact that with the Cold War over the US at first felt that European affairs were no longer a security interest for the US. Furthermore, Europe felt it was strong enough and free to act without US leadership. The end of the Cold War and growing US power likewise led to the US becoming less tolerant towards what they saw as Europe’s free-riding on US efforts to provide international security, especially in regards to rogue states. The US took a unilateral stand on the matter, posing the Helms-Burton Act and Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which asserted the US the right to impose sanctions on any company investing in Cuba or investing more than $40 million in the Libyan or Iranian energy sector. The Republican run Congress played a big part in that development. Europe, however, felt free to take a firm stand against the US regarding the issue, and managed to inhibit the US from enforcing the Acts.

The US’ unilateral decision-making soon became the rule rather than the exception after that, with the US rejecting the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999, the UN accord to enforce the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, and the UN conference on Small Arms, also in 2001. Europe and other US allies took a stand against the US regarding the Land Mine Treaty, rejecting the US’ nonnegotiable demands and accepting the Treaty without US participation. When it

102 Ibid, p. 43

103 Ibid.
came to the war in Kosovo in 1998 the US took a much more unilateral stand than on the war in Bosnia. Europe did however not take a firm stand against the US in that matter.

In 2000, the US refused to ratify the treaty on the International Criminal Court. Europe, and other US allies, however, established the Court in explicit rejection of US preferences. Regarding Iraq, the US started taking a more unilateral stand on the issue as early as 1998, when it (together with Great Britain) launched an air strike on Iraq, without a consensus with its European allies. That kind of unilateralism regarding the situation in Iraq continued for the rest of the Post-Cold War Era.

As a whole the development following the end of the Cold War weakened the transatlantic alliance and was in many ways bound to lead to a crisis in transatlantic relations, which indeed became the case in the beginning of the 21st century.

There were other transatlantic disagreements during the Post-Cold War Era than those discussed above. They can however not, in my opinion, be as clearly characterized by the end of the Cold War, growing US unilateralism and/or Europe’s balancing acts, or as being as serious as the ones discussed above. Disagreements related to NATO enlargement are worth mentioning in that regard. The issue of the US abandoning the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 was not discussed specifically, since although it reflected growing US unilateralism, it cannot (at least not yet) be considered a strategic security and defense issue.
5. The War on Terror Era\textsuperscript{104}

The US led Iraq invasion in 2003, following the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC on September 11th 2001, would come to reinforce the ever growing disagreement between the US and Europe. The invasion was not supported by the US’ biggest European allies (including France and Germany) and caused a major crisis in transatlantic relations. The development can be seen as strong European balancing against what they saw as the US’ illegitimate and unjust unilateral behavior. From a realist point of view this development can also be seen as the beginning of the end for the transatlantic alliance; unless a different common global threat arises.

5.1 9/11

Immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks European countries showed great solidarity with the US, both amongst the EU and within NATO, which agreed to evoke the Organization’s Article 5 for the first time. According to Serfaty this was at the time believed to confirm that the transatlantic community of values that like-minded countries on both sides had come to form over the previous 50 years “could reason and act as one when these values were at risk”.\textsuperscript{105} There was strong political support in Europe for the US’ initial policy responses to the attacks. Europe supported the US’ military campaign in Afghanistan (starting as early as October 2001) and its pressure on Pakistan to stop harboring al-Qaeda networks and promoting madrasas that preached hatred of the West. It also welcomed the US’ resistance towards the notion of a clash of civilizations and a full blown war against Hussein. In many ways Europe was relieved by what at first seemed to be a turn towards multilateralism in building a large anti-terrorism coalition. Europe’s only problem was its minor role in the military campaign in Afghanistan. In general, Europe accepted US leadership right after 9/11, before it knew that the US was headed in a totally different direction from the one Europe wanted to go.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{104} The period from September 11th, 2001 until late 2004 (approximately) is identified as the War on Terror Era.


placed an emphasis on diplomacy, nation-building efforts, economic aid, peacekeeping, and assisting in the promotion of democracy. The US on the other hand focused on the nexus between terrorism, rogue states, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and regime change by force if necessary. The US preferred fighting this new enemy unilaterally, without having to come to a strategic agreement with its European allies. It was feeling on one hand vulnerable and very much threatened, which was a sense most Europeans did not share, and on the other hand stronger on a global scale than ever before. European countries were free to join the coalition, but it would be under absolute US leadership and central command. As seen in previous chapters the US and Europe had always had their policy differences in the past but according to Daalder the near zero tolerance in the US for those who might see the world differently was a new development.

The al-Qaeda terrorist attacks did not recreate the same level of unity as the Soviet threat had done during the Cold War. According to Mowle there is currently no strategic consensus on terrorism that would be able to replace Soviet containment in keeping the transatlantic alliance together. The war on terror even became another source of disagreement instead of a source of unity. As Bailes puts it: “On September 11 it would have seemed hard to think of a new agenda with a more uniting effect than terrorism, but we all know what happened next”.

5.2 The Rift
The development following the end of the Cold War weakened the transatlantic alliance, but the US’ unilateral behavior in the gradual aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a full blown crisis in transatlantic relations. The resentment started to grow after Bush’ State of the Union Address in January 2002, escalating further following US Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s statements at the Munich Security Conference in early February 2002. It finally led to a full blown crisis in transatlantic relations in March 2003, when the US invaded Iraq without a consensus with its European allies.

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From the US’ standpoint, Europe’s dissent with US leadership and a surge of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in Europe was the main cause of deteriorating relations.111

5.2.1 The State of the Union Address and the Munich Security Conference

“If September 11, 2001 changed America’s perception of the world, the world’s perception of America was changed on January 29, 2002...”112 Those are the words Serfaty uses to describe the effects of Bush’ State of the Union Address in January 2002. In the speech the President neither mentioned the solidarity within the EU nor NATO following the 9/11 attacks, and also indicated that US allies (mostly European countries) would not play a key role in the fight against terrorism, which they had explicitly committed to do in coordination with the US following the attacks. Furthermore, the President’s references to the “axis of evil” (referring to Iran, Iraq and North Korea) and convictions like “with us or against us” and “bring him to justice, dead or alive”, in addition to his indications of a possible attack on both Iraq and Iran, left European countries fearful of what might happen next, whether in terms of other terrorist attacks aimed at Europe or the US’ targets close to Europe.113

What further triggered the rift were Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz’s statements at the Munich Security Conference in early February 2002, where the message essentially was that the transatlantic alliance was not that important to the US and would be replaced by an ad hoc group of US subordinates.114 Wolfowitz stated, citing Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, that one of the most important lessons from the current war against terrorism was that “the mission must determine the coalition; the coalition must not determine the mission”.115 The US thus reserved the right to determine the mission and then search for suitable allies which would not interfere with the US’ strategic military planning. Regarding Iraq, Wolfowitz only stated that the US

113 Ibid.
government was not close to a decision. Fellow US delegates, however, spoke out openly in support of a preventive strike against Iraq. Wolfowitz furthermore admonished Europe for lagging behind the US in the technological revolution in military affairs, fielding inefficient armed forces, and for not being able to fight alongside the US. He also warned European countries against provoking the US by trying to influence US policy making in exchange for military contributions.

According to Elizabeth Pond it was probably not until late 2002 that European countries fully grasped the change in US policy post 9/11, “from a status-quo guardianship of stability as practiced during the cold war to revolutionary destabilization of the existing order to create a better world.”

### 5.2.2 The Iraq invasion

The failure to agree on Iraq was one of the most alienating issues in the transatlantic alliance during the Post-Cold War Era, and would now cause one of the biggest transatlantic feuds since the foundation of the alliance. In general, European countries viewed Hussein as effectively contained by UN embargos and enforcement of Iraqi no-fly zones by US and Great Britain’s airplanes. They did not see a clear connection between Iraq and terrorism and its intelligence indicated that Iraq was still several years away from getting the materials needed to make nuclear weapons, and that it was possible to keep it that way in the future. They asserted that an invasion into Iraq was perhaps the only thing that might induce Hussein to launch chemical weapons. They furthermore feared the destabilizing consequences an attack on Iraq would have on the entire Middle East, and while they accepted that the use of force in defense of stability and the status quo was moral, they concluded that the use of force in a “revolutionary gamble” was not.

In August 2002 Vice President Dick Cheney advocated a war on Iraq to effect regime change and thus preempt a possible future threat from Hussein. The new US strategy of


119 Pond, 2005, p. 35.
“preemption” took on solid form from that point on. Germany’s reaction was to defy US policy, with its Chancellor Gerhard Schröder stating that Germany would not join any war on Iraq, even though the UNSC would agree on it. Other European countries were puzzled by Cheney’s speech, and whether it meant a great departure from previous US policy, or whether Europe should give the US the benefit of the doubt in the matter. In November 2002 the UNSC agreed on Resolution 1441, which called on Hussein to allow international inspections in Iraq to resume, and threatened unspecified “serious consequences” if he was found to remain in violation of longstanding UN bans on Iraqi WMD programs. In January 2003 Germany teamed up with France in hardening up an opposition to the coming war, and to the second resolution that would determine and allow the so-called “serious consequences” of Resolution 1441. France threatened to veto the second resolution and successfully began collecting support from a majority of UNSC members. At that point, eight European countries, Spain, Great Britain, Portugal, Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy, Denmark and Hungary, wrote a major opinion essay supporting the approaching war in Iraq. Public opinion throughout Europe, however, strongly opposed the war. At that point, the US gave up on getting a second resolution agreed upon in the UNSC.

What followed was a confrontation within NATO over the support of advance military planning to help Turkey defend itself in case of war. The US wanted to maximize the pressure on Iraq by getting Turkey to support the approaching war. 94% of Turks were against an invasion. Germany, Belgium and France voted against the proposal and the decision was moved into NATO’s Defense Planning Committee, where France did not have a seat. According to Pond, the very survival of NATO was at stake at that point. The Financial Times argued that the prospect of war had “divided the UNSC, riven the most enduring military alliance of modern times, and split the EU”. France kept debating with the US over the inclusive UN inspections of Iraqi nuclear programs, trying to prolong the inspections, but the US was at this point ready to go to war. US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Great Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair brought forth

121 Ibid.
122 Ibid, pp. 45-47.
evidence about the threat of Iraqi WMD, evidence which was used as the strongest reason to invade Iraq and later proved to be based on false pretenses.\textsuperscript{124}

On March 19\textsuperscript{th}, 2003 the US led an invasion into Iraq, backed by Great Britain’s forces and smaller contingents from Australia, Spain, Poland and Denmark. In addition, Italy gave the US permission to use its air space, military bases and transport infrastructure for technical needs.\textsuperscript{125} 99\% of the military forces were US and Great Britain soldiers. When Blair had problems with getting majority support in the British Parliament just days before the invasion the US declared it would have no problem with tackling the mission alone. It did however not come to that, since Blair got his majority in the end. The mission took three weeks and Hussein was captured just over eight months later. In stabilizing postwar Iraq, however, US strategy was severely flawed. Decadence in civilian security and failure in nation-building made it close to impossible for the US to persuade European critics that it had been right all along. The fact that no WMD were ever found in Iraq reaffirmed the opposite. It became known in the spring of 2004 that the US administration had started to plan an invasion into Iraq as early as November 2001, without Europe’s awareness.\textsuperscript{126}

\textbf{5.2.3 The aftermath}

In the aftermath of the invasion many hoped that the transatlantic allies would put their differences aside and reunitie in rebuilding Iraq. That has not succeeded so far, mostly due to deeply flawed US strategy for post-war Iraq and the absence of WMD.\textsuperscript{127}

In the summer of 2004 transatlantic relations improved moderately, mainly due to the fact that Europe’s threat assessment became more similar to the US’, and “US triumphalism was belatedly toned down”.\textsuperscript{128} EU enlargement, to include seven countries from the former Eastern bloc, also had some positive effects since the new members had a more positive view towards the US, seeing it as a reinsurance against threats from Russia. This improvement in relations, however, did not last for long. Developments that followed and kept the transatlantic rift from healing included the abuse and torture of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{124} Pond, 2005, pp. 47-52.
\item \textsuperscript{125} People’s Daily Online. (November 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2005). “Italy has reservations about Iraq war: defense minister”. Retrieved April 6\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200511/01/eng20051101_218029.html
\item \textsuperscript{126} Pond, 2005, pp. 47-52.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid, pp. 49-55.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Ibid, p. 53.
\end{itemize}
Iraqi prisoners by US soldiers in Abu Ghraib jail and the fact that Hussein had not had any links to al-Qaeda. Furthermore, that the war in Iraq had in fact diverted substantial resources from the fight against terrorism and at the same time made the world a less safe place instead of a safer one. Lastly, that the invasion did not secure oil for world markets and that the situation in Iraq was erupting into a full blown civil war.\textsuperscript{129}

At the same time, the EU was moving forward with its independent security and defense efforts. In 2004 the EU established the European Defense Agency (EDA), and set up a defense force, which was in fact a target to have 60,000 men overall always available for rapid deployment on crisis management. The development was a new turn and was met with resentment in the US, which raised questions about Europe diverting resources away from NATO.\textsuperscript{130} The European defense force has carried out a number of military operations since 2003, including missions in Bosnia (taking over from NATO), Congo, and Aceh in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{131}

5.3 The Difference from Past Disagreements

As noted earlier Lundestad concludes that the diplomacy in the run-up to the Iraq war suggested a fundamental break with the practice of the preceding years and signaled something new and deeper than the many transatlantic crises that preceded it. In his view the shift was from a relationship characterized by periodic crises of high politics toward a greater overall drift and distance between the allies.\textsuperscript{132} In 2003 former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ranked the disagreement as the worst between the US and Europe in half a century.\textsuperscript{133} On the same note, Daniel S. Hamilton asserts that the differences over Iraq produced the most serious crisis in transatlantic relations since the birth of the transatlantic alliance.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid, pp. 52-55.
\textsuperscript{131} Bailes, A. (March 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2009). Personal communication.
\textsuperscript{132} Lundestad, 2005, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{133} Kissinger, H. (March 27\textsuperscript{th}, 2003). “Role Reversal and Alliance Realities”, \textit{Washington Post}.
When taking a closer look at how the rift following 9/11 can be characterized as being different from other transatlantic disagreements, one can point out several factors. Firstly, the fact that France and Germany went directly against the US in a matter extremely important to the US, having been loyal US allies for over half a century. During the Cold War European governments would generally avoid directly opposing the US’ active, and sometimes aggressive, foreign policy, and the US would likewise refrain from undermining the European integration project. Secondly, the fact that the US was willing to make the fundamental policy change of going it alone, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. Thirdly, the rise of anti-Americanism in Europe to an unknown degree, especially after it became known that no WMD were to be found in Iraq.135 In October 2003 a Gallup Europe poll showed that 53% of all European respondents concluded that the US was a threat to peace in the world, going up to 88% in Greece. When asked the same question regarding countries like Syria and Libya the score was around 35%.136 Lastly the conflict demonstrated a serious divide between Great Britain and those European countries that highly supported US leadership in the world (mostly countries from the former Eastern bloc) on the one hand, and France, Germany and their supporters on the other. The US was no longer dealing with a relatively united ally, like during the Cold War, but many different allies that were completely divided on this critical issue.137

5.4 Why the War on Terror Led to a Crisis

As has been noted in preceding chapters the transatlantic rift following 9/11 and the Iraq war came to a great extent as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, characterized by US unilateralism and European balancing acts. However, the reason why the war on terror and the Iraq invasion in 2003 led to the crisis can be explained by looking into the underlying differences between the US and Europe when it comes to their views towards terrorism and WMD.

The Soviet threat during the Cold War was quite different from the terrorist threat of today. Firstly, the Soviet threat was almost completely shared by the US and Europe, but

137 Lundestad, 2005, pp. 9-11.
not by other countries or regions, whilst the terrorist threat today is a global threat. Secondly, and more importantly, the US and Europe in general view the source and nature of terrorism differently, and thus with which methods to fight it. The US wants to address the problems militarily whilst Europe wants to deal with what they see as the economic and political causes of the problem. In addition the US sees the war on terror and the war in Iraq as the same thing whilst Europe does not, seeing the Iraq war as having increased the overall threat of terrorism in the world. Furthermore, the US and Europe disagree on how to handle WMD. Lastly, the sources of these new potential conflicts are mostly located outside Europe and therefore outside NATO’s traditional geographic focus, and Europe tends to dislike the US’ emphasis on areas outside of Europe.

5.4.1 Different views on the source and nature of terrorism

The US’ overwhelming military power on the world stage after the end of the Cold War and its heightened sense of vulnerability respectively can to a large extent explain its responses today towards national threats such as terrorism. Before 9/11 the US viewed terrorism as an international and foreign policy issue. Its citizens, policies, and interests had long been popular targets for international terrorism, counting for around 63% of all terrorist incidents worldwide in 2001, with a vast majority of them taking place on foreign soil. Ever since the 1970s the US government employed a range of measures to combat terrorism, from diplomacy and international cooperation and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, protective security measures, undercover activities, and military force. However, following 9/11 US public perception of terrorism as mainly a foreign issue changed dramatically and US policy moved from deterring and punishing state sponsors of terrorism towards direct military force against terrorist groups, especially and most importantly al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the 9/11 attacks. This change in the US’ reaction towards terrorism can be seen as a result of its increased vulnerability on the world stage, following its increased relative global power.

138 Bailes, A. (March, 2006). “The USA, the EU, and Terrorism: Two Continents Divided by Shared Threats?”. Outline speaking notes for a speech held at the University of Nottingham on the 15th of March, 2006, p. 2-5.
Europe’s responses towards terrorism, however, cannot be seen as deriving mainly from its lack of military resources. Europe’s long experience with terrorism shapes the way it views the source and nature of it. On the one hand Europe experienced terrorism during colonial times, when European countries occupied developing countries that would rebel against the Europeans, amongst other things using terrorist measures, in their fight for independence. After the freedom fighters had won the battle and regained control over their country, they would often cooperate with their former occupiers. On the other hand Europe has experienced terrorism which is tied to specific political, ethnic and religious disagreements. That kind of terrorism is viewed as manageable, as long as the underlying problems are addressed. This experience has shaped Europe’s view of terrorism, making it view it as a problem which will never be completely solved, but can be managed, and accepting that. Since Europe has lived with and survived terrorism for so long, it does not view it as an existential threat like the US has done since 9/11. Most European countries do not accept the idea of “a war” on terror and prefer dealing with terrorism with less extreme methods like they have always done; by using intelligence services, the police, and the justice system, for instance. Europe fears that the US is engaging in an endless war without considering all the possible consequences and that going to war against countries that are developing WMD is highly questionable if those countries are neither committing provocative acts nor attacking others.

One way to explain Europe’ approach towards terrorism is to look back into the European project and the postmodern perspectives proceeding and maintaining it (discussed in chapter 2); especially the emphasis on negotiations, diplomacy, international law, and seduction over coercion. According to Bailes, Europe’s way of seeking cooperative responses is institutionalized and legally based, which is in stark contrast with the US’ responses. Once a threat has been defined as of supreme national interest to the US, it’s strategy is to select a limited group of loyal friends, “drive wedges between them and enemies, bypass institutions, and when necessary defy law including in the supremely sensitive realm of military intervention.” In the US there is a much sharper distinction in strategic thinking between domestic and foreign threats, and it

141 Bailes, 2006, pp. 3-4.
143 Ibid, p. 4.
opposes any kind of intrusion or violation on its land, including by international organizations and laws. According to Pond, Europe greatly underestimated the psychological impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in triggering “fierce American patriotism that focused on America’s combined sense of victimhood and unassailable power into a can-do global war on terrorism.”

5.4.2 Different views on weapons of mass destruction

As noted earlier Europe showed great solidarity after the 9/11 attacks and fully supported the US’ decision to invade Afghanistan. The 9/11 attacks could be clearly linked to al-Qaeda and Taliban supporters in Afghanistan. To Europeans and Americans alike attacking them seemed to be the logical thing to do, given that the Afghan government was not likely to be able to be of great help tracking down those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The difference with Iraq was the nature of the attack. The focus shifted from terrorism to WMD. It had never been successfully proven that Hussein had WMD, that he was in fact supporting terrorists, or that he was planning to attack the US. Furthermore, no one had attacked the US with WMD, so there was no clear link to the 9/11 attacks. Consequently, the attack was not a logical retaliation like the decision to invade Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, but rather a preemptive war based on unsupported intelligence. It represented the new US agenda post 9/11, which was worrying more about asymmetrical and non-state threats. This was characterized by the neoconservative goal of spreading democracy to the Middle East and ambitions towards US world dominance.

The general view in Europe was that Hussein did not have any WMD, since he had been forced to get rid of them. Furthermore, if he did have them, he would rather use them against Iran or Israel than the Western world; but even so, it was not believed that he had the capacity to deliver WMD. Finally, the European view was that it made no sense to deal with a state having WMD by going to war against it. Firstly, the state might use it against the attacker, and secondly because it might induce it and other states to acquire more nuclear weapons. As Bailes summarizes Europe’s perspective: “The Europeans

144 Bailes, 2006, p. 5.
146 Bailes, April 3rd, 2009.
could see all these problems before hand, so they thought it was the wrong war being fought, on the wrong issue, in the wrong place, likely to cause more problems.\textsuperscript{147}

5.5 Conclusion

The 9/11 terrorist attacks came to reinforce the ever growing disagreement between the US and Europe after the end of the Cold War and ultimately led to a full blown crisis. The US preferred fighting this new enemy unilaterally, without having to come to a strategic consensus with its European allies. It was feeling on one hand vulnerable and very much threatened, and on the other hand stronger on a global scale than ever before. Since terrorism had not become the new strategic basis of the transatlantic alliance, the alliance’s cohesion was diminishing. New polarity gave rise to US unilateralism, and consequently European balancing acts against the US. As seen in previous chapters the US and Europe had always had their policy differences in the past but the severity of the Iraq issue was a new development.

The reason why terrorism triggered the inevitable crisis in transatlantic relations lies partly in the fact that the terrorist threat of today is a global threat whilst the Soviet threat was not. In addition the US and Europe view the source and nature of terrorism differently, and thus which measures to use to fight it. The reason why Iraq became the cause of the rift and not Afghanistan was the nature of the attack, being preemptive but not an act of logical retaliation. Divergent views between the US and Europe on how to handle WMD also had its effects, given that Europe does not see war as the right way in that regard. Postmodern views on European integration can help explain Europe’s views on terrorism and WMD, seeing it as the result of Europe’s long history of discrediting the use of force, given the experience of imperialism and WWII.

The crisis in transatlantic relations following the Iraq invasion caused cause for concern regarding the future of the transatlantic alliance. The alliance had reached certain crossroads after the end of the Cold War and just over a decade later it had simply become crucial to fully figure out the meaning of this historical development for transatlantic relations, and to shape the alliance’s future accordingly.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
6. Future Prospects

According to Daalder the transatlantic alliance will not survive much more drifting, that there is too much resentment for the drifting to continue indefinitely without causing irreversible damages to transatlantic relations. He believes that the changing structure of relations between the US and Europe means that a new basis for the relationship must be found, otherwise relations will deteriorate further and ultimately break up the transatlantic alliance.  

6.1 The Basis of the Transatlantic Alliance

The end of the Cold War led academics such as Francis Fukuyama to ask whether “the West” does in fact still exist, or whether it was indeed only a product of the common Soviet threat. Views on that differ greatly. In 1993 Owen Harris suggested that the concept of the West as it existed during the Cold War “did not reflect a natural or enduring community of interests but was rather the product of a common, overarching Soviet threat and could not be expected to endure for long past the Cold War’s close”. On the same note Lundestad argues that history shows why future cooperation between the US and Europe will be more difficult, with the end of the Cold War and the greatest challenges today being “out of area” issues, which the transatlantic alliance was never as good at tackling as transatlantic challenges. Kagan asserts that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less”. Kagan argues that the need to prove that the West was unified and coherent no longer existed after the Cold War ended, and thus the US no longer wanted to take on the burden of solving crises whilst Europe wanted to establish itself as a unitary actor apart from the US. In Kagan’s view, the declining significance of “the West” as an organizing principle of foreign policy came as a consequence of both US realist-nationalism and European nationalism.

Ischinger has a different view, arguing that the US and Europe still share both common values and common interests. He argues that the 9/11 attacks only reinforced the shared

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150 Lundestad, 2005, p. 16.
152 Ibid, pp. 76-85.
belief in common Western values across the Atlantic, and that threat perceptions in the US and Europe are remarkably similar, with terrorism being a top priority for both sides. Furthermore, Ischinger asserts that there is little evidence of a widening gap in general foreign policy objectives, overall view, or sympathy and mutual trust between the two sides. Although Europe may resent what they view as US insolence and missionary ambitions, there is more continuity than change overall, despite resentments in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq invasion.153 In the same way, Walter Russell Mead argues that common interests and values still bring the US and Europe together, and that few future time periods are likely to contain as many shocks and rifts as the one from September 2001 until 2004.154

Tod Lindberg stresses similar views, claiming that there are no fundamental disagreements or differences between the US and Europe, that the differences that exist are often more apparent than real. He argues that when the disagreements are real, they are “in all consequential cases actually agreements to disagree”155. He thinks the allies’ views have been converging for some time and will continue to do so. In his view it is not only the governments of the US and European countries that get along but that the people of both sides make up a singular transnational ethical community, “the Atlanticist community”, mainly because of their persistence on reconciling their disagreements peacefully.156

6.2 Redefining the Transatlantic Alliance

According to Andrews there is a “shared sense across the Atlantic that the project of building and maintaining an Atlantic community is at serious risk”.157 In his view the alliance’s strategic purpose is unclear and its domestic support greatly weakened in many of the key countries involved. Andrews asserts that it will take a rearticulation of the transatlantic alliance’s central meaning, in terms that relate more closely to the

156 Ibid., p. 220.
desires of citizens and organized interests on both sides of the Atlantic, for the alliance to prosper in the new century.\textsuperscript{158}

\textbf{6.2.1 Divergent views}

Lundestad concludes that sooner or later there has to be a redefinition of the transatlantic alliance. In his view, it will be a difficult task, given that the US has never had a truly balanced relationship with Europe. Following its independence in 1776 the US kept its distance from Europe, fearing that the “Old World” would corrupt the “New World”. Then for years after WWII the US had grown so strong that it did not have to worry about European influence. Today he thinks it is impossible for Europe to be an equal to the US while it remains dependent on its military might. All the same, Lundestad thinks that the need to define a new basis for Atlantic cooperation is rising.\textsuperscript{159}

As formerly noted, Daalder argues that transatlantic relations will not survive much more drifting. According to Daalder there is nothing in the new world structure today that preordains an end to transatlantic co-operation and partnership. He does however assert that US unilateralism in the wake of 9/11 has had a profoundly negative impact on European elite and public opinion. In his view the aftermath of the Iraq war may turn out to be the test case for the sustainability and duration of the transatlantic alliance. In that regard, an effort to build complementary and mutually supportive policies to rebuild Iraq and stabilize and reform the Middle East could restrengthen the alliance, whereas a decisive decision by the US to take unilateral actions, or fail to engage its European allies sufficiently, may have severe consequences for transatlantic relations. Either way, US-European relations will be very different for it.\textsuperscript{160}

In Daalder’s view two dominant factors characterize global politics today, on the one hand total US dominance, and on the other hand globalization. The way he sees it, policy differences across the Atlantic derive from the fact that the US believes that its own world dominance is the defining feature of this day and age whilst Europe concludes that globalization is the most defining factor. As a consequence US foreign policy focuses on maintaining the US’ global dominance, whilst Europe’s focuses on international

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} Lundestad, 2005, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{160} Daalder, 2005, pp. 40-41.
cooperation, as the best means to deal with the effects of globalization. Daalder sees the future of transatlantic relations as depending on the US, “which as the senior partner has the greatest power to put the Alliance back on track or to derail it completely”.161

According to Coker the rift in 2003 is more serious than others preceding it because it was seen as a clash of values. In his view the rift should be considered a wakeup call for the transatlantic alliance. Now that powers in other regions are likely to become global powers, and Europe’s and the US ‘influence is declining, it is time for the transatlantic alliance to get its act together. In his view a redefinition of the relationship should lie in defining it solely by interests, and not by values. He argues that the US and Europe have more common interests than they think, interests that other regions do not share with them. In Coker’s view an interest based transatlantic alliance would generate a much healthier state of affairs between the US and Europe. He argues that NATO is becoming a drag by forcing consistency and coherence, when a transatlantic view point through private diplomacy between corporations, foundations and NGOs is what it is all about.162

Ischinger argues that the transatlantic alliance needs a coherent strategic debate to redefine its priorities, objectives, and strategic concepts, especially for dealing with the Middle East and the proliferation of WMD. In his view, many of the challenges can only be solved if the US and Europe cooperate, and in that respect the US will have to abide to international rules whilst Europe must agree to the occasional use of force when needed, entrenched in an affirmed political strategy of conflict resolution.163 He quotes Henry Kissinger’s saying that “The ultimate challenge for US foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility”.164 In Ischinger’s view the differences between the US and Europe are substantial, but manageable, and he sees that as very good news for transatlantic relations, as well as for the international community as a whole.165

161 Ibid, p. 58.
165 Ischinger, 2005, p. 92.
Andrews asserts that the obstacles to continued transatlantic cooperation are real, and that overcoming them will not be easy. He does however conclude that although historical factors help form the fate of nations, they do not determine them, and that it is possible to rectify the alliance in harmony with a vision of shared interests and responsibilities. He believes in the power of diplomacy in this regard and that leaders from both the US and Europe can still, if willing, construct a new understanding that harmonizes more closely to the existing needs of the transatlantic alliance’s member states. In his view it is “Far better to delineate the shape of the future Atlantic partnership than to allow it to become a casualty of war, and of the bickering of policy underlings”.166

6.2.2 Solana’s four principles

Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, wrote an article back in 2003 on the state of affairs between the US and Europe, called “The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Reinvention or Reform?” In the article Solana claims that the crisis in transatlantic relations following the 9/11 attacks and the US led invasion in Iraq is an important opportunity to deal with issues that need to be sorted out if the two sides are going to construct a relationship capable of addressing the challenges of the 21st century.

In Solana’s view the transatlantic alliance should determine the mission and not vice versa, as US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld so famously asserted a year earlier. Solana argues that a common transatlantic purpose can be found if the US and Europe commit themselves to four key principles. Firstly, both sides would have to reaffirm that they are committed partners and allies, by choice, now working through conviction more than of a geopolitical need. Secondly, both sides would have to commit to fair contributions (stating that Europe needs to spend more and wisely). Thirdly, the transatlantic alliance would have to tackle causes, and not just symptoms, which applies to challenges such as climate change, sustainable development and regional conflagration. In that regard, while not ignoring the might of their enemies, both sides would also have to address the motivations that drive them to obtain those capabilities. Fourthly, the allies would have to act together to sustain and strengthen a world based on rules (stating that sometimes

European countries have tended to forget that law and international norms have to be backed by force, and in the same way the US has forgotten that force needs to be backed by legitimacy). In that regard, the allies would need to make sure that the fight against terrorism is seen as legitimate, by basing it on a wide international consensus.


\subsection*{6.2.3 Will a new strategic basis emerge?}

Andrews concludes that although shared fears of terrorism have not yet led to a new strategic consensus within the transatlantic alliance, they might do so eventually. In his view a slow transition to a new security doctrine is fairly natural, since it takes time to adjust to new challenges. Stateless terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the spread of biological weapons can be difficult and puzzling subjects, and the development of an international consensus on appropriate responses can take decades. Andrews argues that a reasonably stable situation can not arise until a “shared understanding among leading actors of international roles, responsibilities, and appropriate behavior”\footnote{Andrews, D.M. (2005). “The United States and Its Atlantic Partners”, The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq, p. 73. Andrews, D. M. (ed). United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.} emerges. So even though the transatlantic alliance can play a crucial role in the fight against terrorism, it will not do so until a consensus is reached on how to tackle the problem. If and when that happens the US and Europe will again have a compelling case to put the transatlantic alliance in the forefront of their global policy, like it did during the Cold War.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 72-73.}

According to Bailes there has been some convergence between the US and Europe on the seriousness of terrorism, especially after the terrorist attacks on Europe in 2004 and 2005. In her view both sides have learned some lessons about the challenges of crisis
management in fragile states and about the limits of sheer military power in that context.  

6.2.4 Conclusion

The discussion above shows how academics and politicians alike conclude that a redefinition of the transatlantic alliance is now needed, although they differ on how exactly it should be redefined, and what will define it. In Ischinger’s view the alliance needs a coherent strategic debate to redefine its priorities, objectives, and strategic concepts. He believes that many of today’s challenges can only be solved if the US and Europe cooperate, and in that respect the US will have to abide to international rules and share responsibility whilst Europe must agree to the occasional use of force when needed, embedded in an agreed political strategy of conflict resolution. According to Daalder there is nothing in the new world structure today that preordains an end to transatlantic co-operation and partnership. In his view the aftermath of Iraq will be a test case for the sustainability and duration of the transatlantic alliance. Coker argues that a redefinition of the alliance should lie in defining it solely by interests, and not by values. In his view the US and Europe have more common interests than they think, interests that other regions do not share with them. Andrews believes in the power of diplomacy in this regard and that leaders from both the US and Europe can construct a new transatlantic understanding.

EU’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, argued in 2003 that a common transatlantic purpose can be found if the US and Europe commit themselves to four key principles. Firstly, both sides would have to reaffirm that they are binding partners and allies; secondly, they would have to commit to fair contributions, thirdly: the transatlantic alliance would have to tackle causes, and not just symptoms, and fourthly: the allies would have to act together to sustain and strengthen a world based on rules. In that regard, the allies would need to make sure that the fight against terrorism is seen as legitimate, by basing it on a wide international consensus.

Although shared fears of terrorism have not yet led to a new strategic consensus within the transatlantic alliance, there is the possibility that it might do so eventually. Stateless terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the spread of biological weapons are all threats that

are shared by the US and Europe, and a transition to a new security doctrine might just
take time.

6.3 Post-Iraq Invasion

In the spring of 2006 The Economist claimed that recent evidence suggested that the
common diplomatic ground between the US and Europe had been growing, amongst
other things on how to tackle Iran's nuclear ambitions, Syria's meddling in Lebanon and
conflicts in Africa. Furthermore, strategic dialogues on a policy towards China were
taking place as well as regular talks on developments in Russia. Although the allies had
obviously not started to agree on everything, they at least seemed to agree more on the
most difficult issues. It seemed as if the US was starting to seek multilateralism again
and did not see military force as the best way of achieving its goals any longer, although
it still sought to remain the world’s pre-eminent power. The unilateralism that had “cast
a chill over transatlantic relations”, in the aftermath of 9/11 seemed to be on the way
out.171

6.3.1 Developments from 2006-2009

By 2006 NATO had reformed itself to become a more global alliance, by getting ready
to take over security duties in Afghanistan, helping earthquake victims in Pakistan; and
helping lift African Union peacekeepers into Darfur in Sudan.172 Although NATO has
made some achievements since the Cold War, like bringing former communist countries
into NATO and helping to stop a humanitarian disaster in the Balkans in the 1990s, the
mission in Afghanistan, however, remained (and still remains) NATO’s biggest
weakness.173 Ever since 2006, when NATO troops were deployed in Southern
Afghanistan and were hit by a full-fledged insurgency, the situation has been getting
worse each year. Thousands of Afghan civilians have now been killed, by both NATO
forces and the Taliban, an increasingly bigger part of the country is now unsafe for
humanitarian workers and provinces around Kabul are becoming ever more

171 The Economist. (March 23rd, 2006). “Foreign policy: How to go global”, p. 4. Retrieved February 20th,
dangerous.\textsuperscript{174} All this has caused increased tensions in transatlantic relations, with European countries, amongst other things, denying US requests for additional European troops on the ground in Afghanistan (see chapter 6.4.2).

In 2007 the US and Europe were working closely together in places like Afghanistan, Kosovo and Lebanon. According to The Economist the allies had not “magically started to see the world alike”\textsuperscript{175} but rather that they were suppressing their differences, and the US was leaning towards multilateralism regarding Iran solely because it lacked other alternatives. The two sides did not agree on the exact strategy towards Iran but agreed to disagree and continued talks. Although US plans to plant missile shields in Poland and the Czech Republic divided European countries amongst themselves and from the US, the disagreement did not grow into a rift of any kind.\textsuperscript{176}

In 2008 the allies disagreed on NATO enlargement, with the US favoring work towards full membership of Ukraine and Georgia whilst Europe wanting to postpone it for some time.\textsuperscript{177} The issue was whether Ukraine and Georgia should be upgraded from “intensified dialogue” with NATO to a “membership action plan” (MAP), which is basically a promise to join NATO after fulfilling a set of political and military requirements.\textsuperscript{178} France and Germany blocked that upgrade during a NATO Summit in Bucharest in April, and the two Eastern European countries were instead given obscure promises of eventual membership and a review of their MAP requests by the end of that year.\textsuperscript{179} In December that year NATO’s Foreign Ministers had an official meeting and it soon became clear that Georgia and Ukraine would not be upgraded to MAP status. Georgia’s clash with Russia in August that year and Ukraine’s political chaos made the US and Europe agree on postponing the issue, as to avoid further tension between the

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\textsuperscript{174} The Economist. (October 16\textsuperscript{th}, 2008). “Afghanistan: No time to go wobbly”. Retrieved February 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, from \url{http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12429524} \\
\textsuperscript{175} The Economist. (April 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2007). “Charlemagne: Transatlantic Tensions”, p. 5. Retrieved February 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, from \url{http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8960350} \\
\textsuperscript{176} The Economist, April 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2007. \\
\textsuperscript{177} The Economist. (June 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2006). “Charlemagne: An old couple still rubs along”. Retrieved February 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, from \url{http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_SDRSQQV} \\
\textsuperscript{178} The Economist. (April 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 2008). “The NATO summit: With allies like these”. Retrieved February 21\textsuperscript{st}, 2009, from \url{http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10981434} \\
\textsuperscript{179} Brunndstrom, D. (December 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2008). “U.S. to press NATO for Georgia, Ukraine boost”, Reuters. Retrieved February 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, from \url{http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE4AT1KC20081201?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&sp=true}
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East and West.\textsuperscript{180} Both Georgia and Ukraine are still in an “intensified dialogue” with NATO.

According to Bailes the reason for this unusual tranquility in transatlantic affairs for the last three years or so, is that neither side has had an interest in drawing attention to the differences within or the failures of the transatlantic alliance. This results from fear of its own problems intensifying, its weaknesses being revealed, or third parties who have an interest in a divided West getting encouraged.\textsuperscript{181}

When looked at more closely it is safe to say that there is a certain mood of trouble and uncertainty within NATO. In addition to the failure of the Afghan mission, so far, and the disagreement over further enlargement, relations with the EU are somewhat strained and Europe’s reluctance to increase defense spending is causing tensions.\textsuperscript{182} Disagreements over how to deal with Russia have also been rising. It was clear in last August, when Russia invaded Georgia, that NATO does not have high leverage power against Russia, given that many of the Organization’s biggest member states depend on good relations with the country. On one hand, Germany, most importantly, and other European countries as well, are dependent on Russian oil and gas. On the other hand the US needs to sustain a good relationship with Russia in order to secure essential foreign policy interests of its own, such as preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{183}

One of the biggest development in transatlantic relations since the Iraq invasion in 2003, is France’s decision to rejoin NATO’s military arm, which it abandoned back in 1966 in relation to doubts about the reliability of the US and concerns about US domination.\textsuperscript{184} (See chapter 3). France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy and top NATO officials began a diplomatic endeavor last February to persuade the French Parliament to agree to

\textsuperscript{180}Cassata, P. (December 5\textsuperscript{th}, 2008). “NATO says ‘no’ to Georgia and Ukraine...for now”, Atlantic Council of the United States. Retrieved February 21\textsuperscript{st}, 2009, from http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato-says-no-georgia-ukraine-for-now

\textsuperscript{181}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{182}The Economist. (January 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2009). “NATO: Who can unite the allies?”. Retrieved February 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, from http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12972589


\textsuperscript{184}Sloan, 2005, p. 43-45.
Sarkozy's plans, in time for NATO's summit meeting in April. On March 17th the French government won a parliamentary confidence vote to rejoin NATO's military command. The US was already in February finishing details over which command posts France would be offered. Sarkozy has been very cautious when publically discussing the topic, affirming that “The alliance with the United States and the alliance with Europe do not call the independence of my country into question, it strengthens its independence. This is something I am going to explain to the French people.” NATO's Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has assured France that it will not lose any of its sovereignty by returning to NATO's military command, and promised it key posts within the Organization. According to Bailes the arrival of a French president who wants to succeed in Atlantic relations is an interesting development, seeing that if “France can find something to agree on with Washington, it is hard to imagine anyone else in the EU not being willing to go along”.

The Economist argues that the old partnership is still held to an impossible standard, given the fact that other powers are now rising rapidly and the US and Europe no longer dominate the world stage. The transatlantic allies can, however, at least work together in a reactive way, helping to build plausibility and momentum. This can have a significant meaning in diplomacy, characterized as follows: “Where Europe and America do co-operate, they can at least make themselves better off—which is hardly to be sneezed at”.

6.3.2 Conclusion

It is fair to say that transatlantic relations have improved since the Iraq invasion in 2003, bearing in mind that perhaps the only way was up at that point, or towards a total breakup of the transatlantic alliance. As discussed earlier relations improved moderately

190 The Economist, June 22nd, 2006.
in the summer of 2004, only to worsen again because of developments that followed the Iraq invasion. That included the torture of Iraqi prisoners by US soldiers, the absence of a link between Hussein and al-Qaeda, and the full blown civil war that was materializing in Iraq.

In the spring of 2006 diplomatic relations between the US and Europe seemed to be improving, with the US taking a more multilateral approach to world affairs. In 2007 the US and Europe were working closely together in places like Afghanistan, Kosovo and Lebanon. However, this high level of cooperation came more out of lack of other options than of a sudden commonality in the view of the world. Indeed, within NATO resentment had been growing, mainly because of the failure of the Afghan mission, disagreement over further enlargement within NATO, Europe’s reluctance to increase defense spending, and disagreements on how to deal with Russia. However, France’s recent decision to return to NATO’s military command structure can without a doubt be seen as a positive sign for the transatlantic alliance.

Developments since 2003 suggest that, for now at least, transatlantic co-operation will only last as long as diplomacy between the two sides does. If questions arise regarding the use of force against Iran, for instance, transatlantic relations would very likely be in a serious crisis all over again. After all, the common threat of the Soviet Union has not been replaced, and the transatlantic alliance will thus still remain weaker than before.

6.4 New US Foreign Policy Direction

As discussed in a previous chapter, US foreign policy in each period of time can often be characterized somewhat by whether Democrats or Republicans control the Congress and/or the Presidency. The Republicans had the upper hand back in 2001 when the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred and the foreign policy style that followed was thus very much in line with Republican views, especially the neoconservatists. In the fall of 2006 Democrats took over the Congress and last January a Democrat, Barack Obama, became the 44th President of the United States. According to constructivism, these developments will surely result in the US developing a more stable and amicable relationship with its allies, characterized by multilateralism instead of unilateralism. Obama has already vowed to reestablish the US’ strong partnership with its European allies, to treat them with respect, “repair America’s damaged moral authority, and recreate a mutually
beneficial partnership with valuable partners”. At the same time, he intends to ask more of the US’ European allies, in regards of upholding its responsibilities on issues such as Afghanistan, Africa, terrorism, Iran, and the environment.

6.4.1 Expectations

According to Tomas Valasek there are two schools of thought on the effects a new US president will have on transatlantic relations. On one hand there are the optimists that argue that relations will improve immensely, assuming that much of the resentment Europe has towards the US is aimed towards former President Bush rather than the US itself, and that once he leaves, transatlantic ties will return to their normal, relatively amicable terms. This view is very much in line with the constructivist perspective that state behavior is shaped by elite beliefs, identities, and social norms. On the other hand there are the pessimists that argue that the US and Europe have fundamentally different views on security, that Europe misperceives the continuity in US foreign policy and that the next US president will pursue a foreign policy similar to that of former President Bush. Furthermore, they argue that transatlantic relations will perhaps even deteriorate further, when Europe becomes disappointed in the fact that Obama turns out to be not as liberal and multilateral as they had hoped. This view is very much in line with the realist perspective that it is the distribution of power in the international system that determines the foreign policy of a certain state, not political processes or individual actors.

In Valasek’s view the pessimists’ last point is a very valid one; that Obama’s victory in the elections is bound to “generate expectations that no president could fulfil”. Support in Europe towards the US would thus only initially increase and then inevitably decrease. Valasek does however think that a long-term improvement in transatlantic relations is possible, but that it depends on Obama’s conduct towards the US’ European allies. In the past US presidents have been able to combine aggressive leadership with

192 Obama for America, n.d.
Europe’s preference for multilateral solutions and diplomacy. Support in Europe for US leadership in the world had remained high before the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq unilaterally; at 64 per cent in 2002. The number had dropped to 36 per cent by September 2008. As noted earlier Obama vows to listen more carefully to the US’ allies than Bush did, which is believed to give headway to increased support in Europe for the US once Obama has settled in at the Oval Office. A recent research published by Transatlantic Trends is quite promising for the US in this regard, recording that 67 per cent of Europeans think that Europe should seek collaboration with the US rather than pursuing foreign affairs independently. This makes it likely for Obama to be received positively in Europe.

Adding to all this, it was the war in Iraq that caused the major rift in transatlantic relations back in 2003, and now, 6 years later, Iraq has become more stable and less prominent as a political issue in Europe. Valasek asserts that the issue could soon largely disappear from transatlantic debates, since Obama always opposed the war and has already laid out plans to withdraw all US forces from Iraq before the end of 2011.

Lastly, Valasek argues that US foreign policy has become less aggressive in the last three or four years, with the US opening up talks with North Korea and endorsing Europe's nuclear diplomacy with Iran, giving hope that the US will lean more towards multilateralism in its foreign policy approaches than in the past. Even so, the US’ special relationship with Israel, which Obama has praised, is bound to cause some frictions across the Atlantic. Last year Obama declared that “Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel” and that “it must remain undivided” and dismissed the Palestinian “right of return”. These views go directly against the general view in most European countries. His views on trade could also cause transatlantic tensions. While he declares himself a free-trader, he has denounced the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and favors stricter standards on labor and the environment in trade deals.

196 Ibid.
197 Valasek, 2008.
199 Valasek, 2008.
In Karsten D. Voigt’s view Europe should not expect everything to change with Obama as president, but he is optimistic regarding issues that both Obama and Europe place as a high priority. This includes stabilizing international financial markets and the global economy, progressing on climate protection, developing sustainable energy, new initiatives on disarmament and arms control, and handling regional crises, most importantly in the Middle East.\(^{201}\) All the same, Voigt points out that the US will remain a superpower and that multilateralism will have its limits, even under Obama. After all, Obama made it clear during his presidential campaign that he would not rule out the use of military force, and would take unilateral action if the US would face a serious threat. Voigt concludes that despite all this the election of Obama offers a great opportunity to strengthen transatlantic relations and make progress on issues that are important to both sides.\(^{202}\)

### 6.4.2 Increased demands

“It's time to strengthen NATO by asking more of our allies, while always approaching them with the respect owed a partner”.\(^{203}\)

Obama has also said that he intends to send additional US forces to Afghanistan, as means to demand more help from allies, and that he will give those allies which feel they were snubbed by former President Bush, a bigger role in global missions. This gives headway for a bigger global role for Europe, which it has been demanding.\(^{204}\)

The US has long been disappointed with Europe’s lack of response to the US’ calls for an increase in defense spending, most recently regarding a troop increase in Afghanistan. According to Nick Witney, Europe has used its resentment against Bush and his war on terror as an excuse for resisting increasing their role in NATO missions, such as the one in Afghanistan. Witney argues that with a new president in the White House, Europe will no longer have an excuse when asked to play a greater role in the new global

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\(^{202}\) Ibid.


order. However, recent news suggests the opposite. The US had indeed hoped for a bigger contribution from Europe in the wake of Obama's election and his announcement mid-February of the deployment of 17,000 extra US soldiers to Afghanistan. However, recent evidence shows that most European countries are probably to a large extent going to ignore the US’ demands in this regard. US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, condemned this development when speaking before a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Poland last February. According to The Telegraph, Europe’s reluctance comes as a result of increased public opposition to the Afghan war in Europe, as well as general worries over the command structure in Afghanistan. During NATO’s summit meeting in the beginning of April European countries did, however, agree to deploy 5,000 extra troops, to cover the Afghan presidential election in August.

6.4.3 The debated impact of individual actors and policies

When discussing the possible impacts of a Democratic Congress and Presidency, especially of new US President Obama, it’s important to note that, as discussed in a previous chapter on theory, realist perspectives assert that views, values, identities and policies of individual actors are not the determining factor for transatlantic relations in the long term. The distribution of power in the international system at any given period, however, is. The presumption here is that discussions on how Obama or a Democratic Congress will affect and form the future of transatlantic relations are incomprehensive and suggestive, when looking at the bigger picture.

6.5 The Importance of the Transatlantic Alliance

Academics such as Serfaty, Sloan, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Lundestad agree on the great interest of both the US and Europe in maintaining and strengthening transatlantic ties. A divided and unpredictable alliance is likely to cause problems, instability, and even danger for the world as a whole. For now at least, Europe is clearly the US’ best ally of

207 Ibid.
choice, for dealing with future international security challenges. As Serfaty puts it: “Within the world, thinking about the US without the institutional access to Europe provided by NATO is to imagine an isolated America adrift in a hostile world – a power that would remain without peers but also would be lacking the support and comfort of like-minded allies.”

Likewise, Europe’s first choice when looking for a reliable ally that is the most compatible to its interests and values is clearly the US, even with all its flaws. Europe would most likely prefer an imperfect US order any day, rather than the discord likely to rise without it. According to Voigt Europe cannot solve the global challenges it faces without the US. He also concludes that albeit all its power, the US still needs partners in order to find solutions to today’s emergent problems.

On this note, Sloan argues that neither the US nor Europe is likely to “allow the unilateralism versus autonomy conflict to destroy the transatlantic bargain.” Another view point, from Lundestad, is that it would be self-defeating for the US to leave NATO, since it has been the US’ main control instrument in Atlantic affairs, and the EU is the only power able to challenge the US in the foreseeable future. In the same way, it would be self-destructive for European unity if some European countries would go directly against the US, since as noted earlier European countries have very different policies towards the US. Some European countries are always going to side with the US when a rift between the US and Europe occurs, simply because they are militarily dependent on the US. They have to bandwagon on the US for the sake of their own security. As Bailes puts it: “It is paradoxically better for a united Europe if you have a friendly US.”

Serfaty concludes that the war in Iraq confirmed that the US and Europe will not do everything together, but that it has not ended the need to make sure that together the US and Europe will do everything. In his belief the loosening of transatlantic ties would be to the detriment of all, and in absence of the transatlantic alliance the future would be less promising and even more dangerous. He sees US anti-Europeanism as the primary and greatest danger to transatlantic relations today; there is, if the US would no longer want to preserve its commitment to an ever closer, larger, and stronger Europe, as the

211 Mead, 2005, p. 179.
216 Ibid.
US’ partner of choice. Nicolaidis asserts that elevated and continued rivalry between the US and Europe would lead to global instability, which would then weaken the competence of international organizations, specifically the UN, which he concludes that the US would soon become to look at as irrelevant.

6.6 A More Distant Future

When looking at a more distant future, the likely rise of the BRIC countries as global powers needs to be taken into account. Soon the US will no longer be the economic giant it has been for the last 50 years, especially given the economic stagnation that is bound to follow the current global economic downturn. The US is simply very likely to lose its superpower status in the coming decades, and by that time the US’ close relationship with Europe might become more important than ever. In the same way, Europe’s relative decline in world influence will most likely continue to grow, economically, politically and militarily. Demographic and structural factors are likely to decrease Europe’s economic growth, prospects for increased political cohesion are dim, and Europe’s global military status is likely to continue to be relatively low, even with greater integration. As discussed in chapter 2 on theory, this could possibly result in Europe and the US fully rejoining forces to balance the new global powers. Another possibility is that a multipolar world would emerge, with four or five global powers relatively independent from one another. Alliances in a multipolar system are in general flexible and constantly shifting. Given these perspective the transatlantic alliance would weaken if a multipolar world emerges, with the two sides only cooperating loosely when certain interests collide, but not maintaining a strong cohesive multi-purpose alliance.

6.7 Conclusion

Views vary on whether transatlantic ties are built on values or sheer security interests, or both. As seen in the previous discussion many academics conclude that in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the rift following the Iraq invasion, a redefinition of the transatlantic alliance is now needed. Developments post-Iraq invasion have shown both negative and positive signs of what to expect in the foreseeable future. Although

219 Mead, 2005, pp. 175-177.
relations have been on relatively positive terms since 2006, realists would conclude that transatlantic co-operation will only last as long as diplomacy between the two sides does. If questions arise concerning the use of force, for instance, transatlantic relations would very likely be in a serious crisis all over again. Terrorism might still take the Soviet Union’s place as the strategic basis of the transatlantic alliance. If the US and Europe will be able to reach a consensus on terrorism the alliance could be in the forefront of their global policy again, like it was during the Cold War.

New policy directions in the US, with a Democratic Congress and a Democratic President give hope for at least some short-term improvement in transatlantic relations. After all, Obama has vowed to listen better to the US’ European allies than his predecessor did, and to treat them with respect. Realists, however, argue that Europe misperceives the continuity in US foreign policy and that the next US president will pursue a foreign policy similar to that of former US President Bush. In their view transatlantic relations might even become worse, when Obama becomes unable to fulfill the high expectations European countries have of him. Furthermore, the US has long been frustrated with Europe’s reluctance to share the defense burden with the US on the global stage, which might cause further resentment. Obama’s loyalty towards Israel as well as his views on free trade might also cause tensions.

Despite all this, the well being of the transatlantic alliance is undisputedly in the very best interests of both parties, at least today and for the next decades. It is fair to suggest that that fact will keep preventing the alliance from falling apart in the foreseeable future, when Europe will remain the best ally of choice for the US, and vice versa. It would be self-destructive for both parties to destruct these important ties, as well as harmful for international security as a whole. In a more distant future, it can be foreseen that the transatlantic alliance might even become more important, with the rise of the BRIC countries and the US’s and Europe’s relative decline in world influence. At that point the alliance might fully reunite in order to balance the new global powers. Another possibility is that a multipolar world would emerge, with four or five global powers relatively independent from one another. In light of this perspective the US and Europe might drift further apart, and form a less integrated and cohesive transatlantic alliance.
Summary and Conclusion

The goal of this thesis was to predict future prospects for transatlantic relations by analyzing political disagreements between the US and Europe in the area of security and defense from the beginning of the Cold War until today. A special focus was placed on the rift following the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The analysis started with an overview of how different theories on international relations can help explain developments in transatlantic relations over the last 60 years. What followed was an analysis of transatlantic disagreements during this period in time and a discussion on the future prospects of transatlantic relations. Three distinct periods in time were identified. Firstly the Cold War Era, secondly the Post-Cold War Era, and thirdly the War on Terror Era (from September 2001-2004 approximately). When giving the theoretical analysis the second and the third period in time were combined, identifying the former as a lead up to the latter.

Realism, neorealism, constructivism and postmodernism can all in some way explain developments in transatlantic relations from the beginning of the Cold War until today. Realism’s assertions of bandwagoning, balance of power theory and the characteristics of alliances, do well in explaining the founding of the transatlantic alliance, the reason why it held throughout the Cold War and why a divide developed after the Cold War ended. Neorealism focuses on the distribution of power in the international system, and accordingly the development of transatlantic relations is explained in terms of changes in the system structure. In this regard, the power of the US and Europe respectively, as well as of other global powers, is what influences the transatlantic alliance. More distinctively the bipolar distribution during the Cold War and the unipolar one that followed after the end of the Cold War, which encouraged US unilateralism and stronger European balancing. Neorealism asserts that personal beliefs and values of policy makers do not matter when explaining international relations, or policy processes in general. Constructivism, on the contrary, sees the disagreements between the US and Europe as being constructed by individual actors for specific purposes, i.e. by former President Bush and the Republicans (especially those following neo-conservatism), in their efforts to maintain the US’ global dominance. Postmodernism does well in portraying how European unification and the postmodern perspectives proceeding and maintaining it can
help explain the transatlantic divide following the end of the Cold War. This mainly refers to Europe’s and the US’ different views on the use of force, amongst other things in the fight against terrorism. Although constructivism and postmodernism can give an interesting insight into the development of transatlantic relations, realism and neorealism were seen as giving a much more comprehensive explanation in that regard.

Regarding future prospects for transatlantic relations, the theories in question of course offer different perspectives. Constructivists would argue that a Democrat controlled Congress and Presidency will be the determining factor. To the contrary, neorealism would assert that the relative power of the US and Europe, and the distribution of power in the international system, will determine future outcomes. Regarding a more distant future, it is important to note that the relative global power of the US and Europe is likely to decrease substantially for the remainder of this century. Brazil, Russia, India and China are on the other hand seen as rising powers on the global scene. In light of realism’s balance of power theory, this could mean that the US and Europe would fully reunite and join forces to try to balance the new global powers. Another perspective is that a multipolar system would emerge, with four or five relatively independent centers of power, which have not grouped into alliances. According to realism, the power centers in a multipolar system may form a coalition of some sort for mutual security, so a less integrated transatlantic alliance is possible in that regard. Lastly, it must be noted that it is still possible for a common security threat, similar to that of the Soviet Union, developing. Whether it would be terrorism or some combination of threats created by non-state actors remains to be seen.

Disagreements between the US and Europe during the Cold War were numerous and some quite severe. The fundamental reason why the transatlantic alliance stayed intact all the same was the underlying security imperative caused by the common threat of the Soviet Union. Accordingly the disappearance of this threat in 1989 had a fundamental impact on the alliance, which entered a new, uncertain phase. Not only did the strategic environment no longer drive the US and Europe together, the distribution of power in the international system had automatically shifted with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US was suddenly the world’s only superpower, and consequently started to lean more towards unilateralism. Europe, at that point stronger than ever in light of increased integration in the region and the collapse of the Soviet Union, was now suddenly
independent from the US’ security guarantee (at least to a large extent). That resulted in stronger balancing against the US. As a whole the development following the end of the Cold War weakened the transatlantic alliance and was in many ways bound to lead to a crisis in transatlantic relations, which became the case just over a decade after the Cold War ended.

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States Europe showed great solidarity and fully supported the US decision to invade Afghanistan. In general, Europe accepted US leadership right after the attacks, before it knew that the US was headed in totally different direction from the one Europe wanted to go. Europe placed an emphasis on tackling the underlying social, political and economic sources of the problem, by using diplomacy, nation-building efforts, economic aid and peacekeeping. The US on the other hand saw terrorism as an existential threat to its national security after the 9/11 attacks, to be fought with direct military force. The US thus preferred fighting this new enemy unilaterally, without having to come to a strategic agreement with its European allies. The reason why terrorism triggered the inevitable crisis in transatlantic relations lies mainly in the fact that the US and Europe view the source and nature of terrorism differently, and thus how to fight it. In light of Europe’s historical experience, both during colonial times and the decades that followed, it does not view military means as the way to solve it. The US, on the other hand, stopped seeing terrorism as an international and foreign policy issue that could be solved with “soft” power after the 9/11 attacks. The reason why Iraq became the cause of the rift and not Afghanistan was the nature of the attack, being preemptive but not an act of logical retaliation. Divergent views between the US and Europe on how to handle WMD also had its effects, given that Europe does not see war as the right way in that regard. Furthermore, Europe does not see the war on terror and the war in Iraq as the same thing like the US does, but rather that the Iraq war has only increased the overall threat of terrorism in the world.

Many academics who have analyzed transatlantic relations, such as Lundestad, Daalder, Coker, Ischinger and Andrews, conclude that a redefinition of the transatlantic alliance is now needed. Ischinger suggests that the alliance should launch a strategic debate to redefine its priorities, objectives, and strategic concepts. Daalder sees the future of transatlantic relations mostly in the hands of the US, as it has the capacity to either
renew it or bring it to an end. In 2003, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, put forth four key principles that he viewed as necessary for the US and Europe to commit to, so that a common transatlantic purpose could be found. In his view a shared transatlantic agenda does exist, and a common purpose can be advanced by a recommitment to some fundamental transatlantic principles.

Although shared fears of terrorism have not yet led to a new strategic consensus within the transatlantic alliance, they might do so eventually. On the outside, the alliance’s organizational tool, NATO, seems to have adjusted itself nicely to the new world order. Its focus is now largely on “out of area“ regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, instead of on defending its own borders like during the Cold War. NATO member states met in Strasbourg last April for the Organization’s annual summit. According to the Summit Declaration NATO is committed to renovate, in order to be able to better address current threats and anticipate future risks. It reaffirmed “the values, objectives and obligations […] which unite Europe with the United States and Canada, and have provided our [the Organization’s] transatlantic community with an unprecedented era of peace and stability”.220 NATO sees terrorism and the spread of WMD as the most likely threats for the next ten to fifteen years, as well as instability in relation to failed states, regional conflicts, the upsetting of gas and oil flow, and growing availability of conventional weapons.221 Although NATO has made some achievements since the Cold War, like bringing former communist countries into the organization and helping to stop a humanitarian disaster in the Balkans in the 1990s, the failing mission in Afghanistan, however, remained (and still remains) NATO’s biggest weakness, causing increased tensions in transatlantic relations.

To realists transatlantic co-operation will only last as long as diplomacy between the two sides does. Consequently the transatlantic alliance would be in crisis all over again if questions would arise regarding the use of force. Constructivist hope that a Democratic President with the support of a Democratic Congress will bring about improved relations across the Atlantic. Realists, however, point out that there is certain continuity in US

foreign policy and consequently things will not change that much. As they see it relations might even get worse when Obama does not fulfill the Europeans’ high expectations. The US’ frustration with Europe’s reluctance to share a larger part of the global defense burden with the US, as well as Obama’s loyalty towards Israel and his views on free trade, might also cause further tensions.

Despite all this, the well being of transatlantic relations is in the best interests of both the US and Europe, at least today and for the next decades. That fact is likely to keep the alliance intact for the time being. Given the circumstances of global affairs today, Europe is the best ally of choice for the US, and vice versa. As noted earlier, the transatlantic alliance might even become more important for both sides in a more distant future, with the possible rise of the BRIC countries and the US’s and Europe’s relative decline in world influence. That might result in the alliance fully reuniting to be able to balance the new global powers. A multipolar world might also emerge, with four or five global powers relatively independent from one another. Since alliances in a multipolar system are in general flexible and constantly shifting, the transatlantic alliance might become less integrated and cohesive in such kind of a system.

It is important to note that other factors, which do not fall under the security and defense dimension of this analysis, will undoubtedly also have an impact on the future prospects of transatlantic relations. For starters, the high economic interdependence of the US and Europe is an important factor, and consequently the global economic recession that recently hit the world with full force. It is unclear what effects the recession will have on the transatlantic alliance; whether the relative power of both parties will decrease faster than anticipated as a result, or whether the global effect will keep a certain balance in that regard. Furthermore, it is still unclear how the power distribution in the international system will evolve. Russia might keep rising or collapse, for instance due to falling oil prices because of the global recession. Likewise, it is unknown what effects the recession will have on the other BRIC countries, China, Brazil and India, countries that are highly dependent on exports to the US. Other types of security issues are also bound to have its effects, especially energy security and climate change control.

Lastly it must be recognized that basing the analysis solely on publicly available resources is likely to have affected my research and thus my conclusions. It is for
instance difficult to predict whether a new threat, that could fully reunite the US and Europe, will emerge, given that classified intelligence information was not a part of my research. Likewise, it is difficult to predict the future rise of the BRIC countries, given that there might also be some information lacking in that regard. Despite all this, however, the future prospects for the transatlantic alliance seem relatively good, at least for now. Whether the US and Europe will continue their close cooperation in a more distant future, and whether a close transatlantic alliance will in fact still be in both sides’ best interest at that point in time, remains to be seen.
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Appendix: List of Acronyms

BRIC  Brazil, Russia, India and China
BWC   Biological Weapons Convention
CSDP  Common Security and Defense Policy
CTBT  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council
ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community
EDA   European Defense Agency
EDC   European Defense Community
EEC   European Economic Community
ESDI  European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP  European Security and Defense Policy
EU    European Union
EUROTOM European Atomic Energy Community
ICC   International Criminal Court
ILSA  Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
IMF   International Monetary Fund
INF   Intermediate Range Nuclear Missile
MAP   Membership Action Plan
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECE Organization for European Economic Cooperation
UN    United Nations
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
US    United States
WEU   Western European Union
WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction
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