

# **Stjórn málafræðideild**

**MA-ritgerð í alþjóðasamskiptum**

**New Security Threats and the  
Security Council; Climate Change  
as a Threat to Peace and Security**



**HÁSKÓLI ÍSLANDS**

**Þorvarður Atli Þórsson**

**Febrúar 2009**

Umsjónarkennari: Alyson Bailes

Nemandi: Þorvarður Atli Þórsson

Kennitala: 280982-3859

## **Summary**

The post Cold War Security Council has been experiencing an unprecedented change in the security environment. New security threats, such as climate change, have emerged and the question is if the Security Council has the skills, competence and the will do deal with them.

Security in broader terms is examined to set the foundation for the discussion on the new security spectrum which has replaced the traditional security spectrum of the Cold War. Climate change provides an example on how new security threats have materialized and no less how the Security Council has been dealing with them. An optimal scenario on how the Council could deal with climate change and new security threats, as well a more realistic scenario based on the current geopolitical realities, are finally presented.

The conclusion is that the Security Council is working on the basis of the new security spectrum and does have the skills and competence to deal with these new security threats, including the threat posed by climate change. However, the main question seems to evolve around the will of the Council which ultimately lies with the member states of the UN and the Council, though in particular with the five permanent members.

## **Preface**

The idea of the essay, or rather the interest in the topic of new security threats, was raised when the author attended the 61st session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. A part of the job was to sit through the long days of the Ministerial weeks of the Assembly and listen to and report on the speeches of various presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers. One of the recurring themes being addressed by the speakers was that of new security threats and a particularly intriguing aspect was that of climate change as a security threat, a topic which at the time had not reached the Security Council. It was interesting for someone relatively new to International relations to listen to small island states pleading with the international community for the life of their nations, seeing climate change as an existential threat to their survival.

When starting the study of International relations at the University of Iceland it was fascinating to go through the security changes that we are experiencing in today's world. My interest was raised on the connection and development of these threats vis-à-vis the work of the Security Council, which can be argued to be the most powerful security actor, also through its permanent members, in the world.

This master thesis is the final assignment in the MA studies of International Relations at the University of Iceland. It accounts for 30 ECTS credits and the instructor was Alyson Bailes, Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Iceland.

I would like to thank Alyson Bailes for excellent guidance and input while writing this thesis and no less throughout my studies.

## Table of Contents

1.0	Introduction .....	7
2.0	A New Security Spectrum .....	11
2.1	What is security? .....	11
2.2	What are threats? .....	16
2.3	Traditional security and the old security spectrum .....	18
2.4	New security threats and the new security spectrum .....	20
2.5	A multidimensional security concept.....	26
2.6	Climate change in the security spectrum.....	30
2.7	Conclusion on new security threats.....	34
3.0	Theoretical Approach on New Security Threats .....	37
3.1	Realism, international institutions and security .....	38
3.1.1	Realism, security and the perception of threat .....	40
3.2	Neoliberalism, international institutions and security .....	41
3.2.1	Neoliberalism, security and the perception of threat .....	45
3.3	Conclusion on theoretical approaches to new security threats .....	46
4.0	A New Security Council.....	48
4.1	United Nations and the Security Council .....	49
4.2	The work of the Security Council .....	52
4.3	Conclusion on a new Security Council .....	56
5.0	Theoretical approach to a New Security Council.....	58
5.1	The Security Council, its foundation and the Cold War period.....	58
5.2	A neoliberal Council? .....	62
5.3	Conclusion on a theoretical approach to the Security Council.....	66
6.0	A new Security Council in a new Security spectrum .....	67
6.1	The Security Council's approach to new security threats.....	68
6.2	The Security Council's thematic issues .....	76
6.3	The Security Council and peace operations.....	80
6.4	Conclusion on a new Security Council in a new security spectrum .....	85

7.0	Climate Change as a Security Threat. ....	88
7.1	Direct-Abrupt security scenario of climate change .....	89
7.2	Indirect- Current security scenario of climate change.....	92
7.3	How relevant is climate change as a security threat? .....	98
7.4	Climate, poverty and conflict- A vicious cycle for Africa?.....	102
7.5	Climate change on the agenda of the Security Council .....	105
7.6	Conclusion on climate change as a security threat.....	110
8.0	The Future, what lays ahead.....	112
	Bibliography.....	122
	Apendix 1 - Alyson Bailes Security Spectrum. ....	133

## **1.0 Introduction**

When attending the General Assembly of the United Nations one of the first thoughts that come to mind is the grandness of the event, as almost every state in the world meets to discuss and resolve international affairs. This picture is though quickly shattered when experiencing the full halls that listen to the President of the United States of America being starkly contrasted with that of speeches of small states such as Tuvalu, Kirabati and others where the halls are almost empty and those sitting behind the country placards of the countries of the world, seem not to pay much attention. This is easy to understand as the United States would be considered one of, if not the most, powerful state in the world while the others would be considered less so. This would also have held true for the years of the Cold War, where the actions of few had fundamental impacts of the life of all. The problem becomes that in today's globalized world, the worries of one actor, almost regardless of size, can turn out to be an issue for all to deal with. One of the recurring themes addressed by those speaking at the General Assembly was the challenge of new security threats, and a particularly intriguing aspect was that of climate change as a security threat, a topic which at the time had not reached the Security Council.

This thesis is intended to examine this changed security environment and how the Security Council has addressed it with a special focus on climate change. Below the research question that is addressed in the thesis will be presented and the reasons for addressing it, as well as laying out the structure of the text.

This changed security environment has also served as a challenge for one of the main schools of thought in international relations, namely realism. Liberalism, its main rival, had a hard time during the years of the Cold War but has now through the improvements put forward in neoliberalist thought become a real contender for its seat. In this thesis the approaches of realism and neoliberalism will be contrasted and presented as the contending theories for today's understanding of security.

The security changes affecting today's world should be dealt with by the Security Council (SC or the Council) as almost every state in the world has conferred upon the Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security".<sup>1</sup> The Security Council can be shown to have many ways to influence world affairs and would achieve a full score according to Robert Cox and Harold K. Jacobson's method of analysis which examines decision-making in and the power of international institutions.<sup>2</sup> To react to threats to peace and security in the world, the Council has a power base in the UN Charter and its permanent members not rivaled by any other institution in the world. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter give the Council power to intervene in conflicts and disputes around the world, impose economic sanctions and adopt binding resolutions for all members of the United Nations. The working methods of the Council should therefore be a good measurement of the workings of international relations, both due to the image that the Council has but no less because of the immense power the Council possesses. If one wants to get a good picture of how the international community is approaching new security threats, or if it is at all, the Security Council should thus be a good measurement of this. The question raised in this thesis is if the Security Council, working on the basis of the new security spectrum in the post-Cold War period, has the skills, competence and will to deal with the multidimensional security concept, the threat posed by climate change or other new threats.

---

<sup>1</sup> United Nations Charter, can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

<sup>2</sup> The categories are: representational, symbolic, boundary, programmatic, rule-creating, rule-supervisory and operational. See Cox, R. and Jacobson, H. K. *The framework for inquiry* in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado. Page 117.

The research question that emerges is thus:

Does the United Nations' Security Council (SC) have the skills, will and competence to deal with the multidimensional security concept that has emerged after the end of the Cold War? If so is, should the threat posed by climate change, or other new security threats, be dealt with by the Security Council?

To answer this question, the central part of this thesis examines how the SC's approach to its work has changed with the end of the Cold War, with a particular focus on climate change - a new emerging security threat.

Why should climate change be a relevant challenge for treatment by the SC? To establish the background for this question, section 2 will start off with a discussion of what security is and what are threats to security, to serve as a basis for a discussion of the old and new security spectrums and the traditional and new security concepts. Section 3 examines the theoretical framework for tackling security challenges as provided by major theories of international relations – realism, liberalism and their variants, in particular neoliberalism - and by the roles they assign to international institution. The Security Council is then presented in section 4 and the changes that it has gone through in the last two decades are traced: a discussion that will be continued in section 5, but with the main focus on the theoretical question of whether a 'neoliberal' Council has emerged since the end of the Cold War. In section 6 these two discussions will be merged and a new Security Council in a new security spectrum will be presented. One of the most interesting newcomers to the current security spectrum is climate change and to put the previous discussion into perspective, section 7 will be examining climate change within the framework of new security threats, evaluating its relevance and finally discussing how the Security Council has reacted to this emerging threat. The future and what may lie ahead is examined in section 8, with a discussion on both an optimal scenario and a more realistic scenario regarding the course of events on climate change as a threat to international peace and security to be dealt with by the Security Council.

The expected conclusion is that further engagement with the Security Council will be experienced because the small and medium countries, following a neoliberal approach to security through collective international institutions, will see it beneficial, while the bigger states such as the United States, following realist approaches, will to some degree be driven to address the real new security issues that the world faces. The shift that the world is experiencing in approaches to the international system may indicate that these threats will be dealt with in a cooperative way, not exclusively, but primarily by the Security Council. The question then becomes whether the Council will finally live up to its mandate to carry the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security?

## 2.0 A New Security Spectrum

From 1945 onwards a global war between the West and the East was an existential threat to the world that preceded all other possible threats in importance, hence the security agenda was dominated by the Cold War with its underlying simplicity. The end of the Cold War has forced the world to accept new frameworks and dimensions of security. The impact of the terrorist attacks on 11 September in the US, in addition to the attacks in London and Madrid, has shown the world the continuing challenges of security in the Post-Cold War era and the physiological effect of attacks that are of a non-military nature. This chapter will start with two questions to lay the foundation for further discussion, that is, what is security and what are threats? The main points of the old and new security spectrums will then be examined and their main distinctions will be drawn out, based in part on the discussions on security and threat. It will be argued finally, that a multidimensional security concept has emerged after the end of the Cold War, which climate change is genuinely a part of, and has coincided with changes in the *modus operandi* and decisions of the Security Council which will be discussed in chapter four (no assumption is made at this stage on the causal relation).

### 2.1 What is security?

Security is a difficult word to encompass; it can mean different things to different individuals, groups and states. In broader terms and as defined by dictionaries security is “Freedom from risk or danger; safety or even freedom from doubt,

anxiety, or fear”.<sup>3</sup> Different sources on security in international relations do not find it as easy as the dictionary to define the concept of security. Some analysts are eager to call the debate to order and say that “[t]here is a consensus that it implies freedom from threats to core values (for both individuals and groups) but there is a major disagreement about whether the main focus of enquiry should be on ‘individual’, ‘national’ or ‘international’ security.”<sup>4</sup> Another author also seems confident enough to claim to have reached an agreement on what security studies, the studies on security, entails. “The good news is that a consensus has emerged on what security studies entails – it is to do with threats to survival...”<sup>5</sup> The truth is that many different definitions prevail and they all display a difference of approach to the international system, some of whom have been displayed in the table below.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 1

Definitions of Security			
<p>A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.</p> <p>Walter Lippmann</p>	<p>Security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.</p> <p>Arnold Wolfers</p>	<p>In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. When this discussion is in the context of the international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity.</p> <p>Barry Buzan</p>	<p>Security-insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities- <i>both internal and external</i>- that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes.</p> <p>Mohammed Ayooob</p>

<sup>3</sup> Baylis, J. *International and global security in the post-Cold War era*, in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Edited by Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. Oxford university press, Oxford, 2004. Page 300.

<sup>4</sup> Baylis, J. *International and global security in the post-Cold War era*, in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Page 300.

<sup>5</sup> Collins, Allan. *Introduction: What is Security Studies?* in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. Page 2.

<sup>6</sup> Table adopted from both from Collins, Allan. *Introduction: What is Security Studies?* in *Contemporary Security Studies*, page 3 and Baylis, J. *International and global security in the post-Cold War era*, in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition, page 300.

The traditional approach, the one of the Cold War, was what can be called a ‘state centric’ view of security, where military force prevailed. States battle states with militaries, hence security and the study of security is defined in the same way.

Security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force. It explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states, and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war.<sup>7</sup>

This approach has acquired several critics, especially since the end of the Cold War. These critics believe that this interpretation is too narrow and does not encompass the threats faced by mankind in today’s globalized world. These threats could now be viewed with different eyes to include political, economic, societal, environmental, as well as, military aspects of security.<sup>8</sup> This involves states thinking about the security of their neighbors as being a part of their own security at the same time that security itself is increasingly defined in broader international and global terms, making the number of neighbors greater and greater.<sup>9</sup>

A few fundamental differences can also be found in these diverse approaches to security. They focus on different actors, or rather to say, encompass the possibility for them to do so. The traditional definitions see the state as the sole provider of security and threats as being solely directed against states while the new approaches allow for other actors. The clear difference between providers of security and users has also faded. When military security was provided by the national army the user was the state and all those that the state encompassed. Through the different array of new security threats that have proliferated, the providers have in many ways also become the users.<sup>10</sup> Economic security is for example partly provided by companies and individuals alike as well as by the

---

<sup>7</sup> Walt, S. The Renaissance of Security Studies, in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol 35, nr.2, taken from Mutimer, David. *Critical Security Studies: A Shismatic History*, in Contemporary Security Studies. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. Page 54.

<sup>8</sup> Baylis, J. *International and global security in the post-Cold War era*, in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Page 300.

<sup>9</sup> Baylis, J. *International and global security in the post-Cold War era*, in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Page 300.

<sup>10</sup> Bailes, Alyson and Þröstur Freyr Gylfason. ‘Societal Security’ and Iceland, in *Stjórnsmál og stjórnsýsla*. 2008, Vol 4, number 1.

state, just as well as individuals and groups may both commit and combat crime and terrorism. Another aspect that is of interest is that threats can now, according to the new approaches, be both involuntary and voluntary, that is both intentionally applied to produce harm against others or simply unintentional side effects of other acts or natural forces. What used to be solely an intentional threat by military force can now be a threat produced by different actors, be it the international physical threat from terrorism or crime, or damage from economic acts or natural disaster not directly caused by anyone, at least not intentionally.

By security threats, we mean forces originating from outside... that can harm...lives, property, or well being. These forces include military aggression, political subversion, economic instability, and environmental destruction. Such threats could come from foreign governments, terrorists, drug lords, criminal cartels, and multinational corporations.<sup>11</sup>

An important new approach to security that has yet to be mentioned is that of human security. Human security is important to note for two reasons, the first being that it contradicts and challenges the traditional 'state centric' view of security that has dominated as mentioned previously, the second being that policy makers have increasingly embraced the idea of human security and advocated for its application in international relations.<sup>12</sup> Canada put for example great emphasis on the notion of human security during its campaign for election and during its tenure on the Security Council during the years 1999-2000.<sup>13</sup>

Human security is first thought to have been put forward by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report where it defined human security in wide terms as belonging to seven different dimensions; Economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. This identifies the basic approach of human security as one that

---

<sup>11</sup> Shuman, Michael H. and Harvey, Hal. *Security without War: A post-Cold War Foreign Policy*. Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1993. Page 9. Accessed at: [http://www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Security/S93-23\\_SecurityWoutWar.pdf](http://www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Security/S93-23_SecurityWoutWar.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> Krause, Keith. *Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Policy Paper number 26. Can be accessed at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=45517>

<sup>13</sup> Malone, David M. *Eyes on the Prize: The quest for nonpermanent seats on the UN Security Council*. Global Governance, a review of multilateralism and international organizations, vol. 6, nr. 1. Jan-Mar 2000.

defines the referent of security considerations as the individual rather than the state.<sup>14</sup> The reason for the popularity of human security can be seen to be exactly that, namely that it helps to “catalyze a broader reframing of how scholars and practitioners thought of the different relationships between security, development, and human rights in world politics”, emphasizing the different approach to security from that of the state centric view.<sup>15</sup>

The concept of...human security represent, therefore, both a *horizontal* extension of the parameters of security policy to include an even larger set of problems, such as poverty, epidemics, political injustice, natural disasters, crime social discrimination, and unemployment, as well as a *vertical* extension of the traditional referent object of security policy to...below the level of the nation-state.<sup>16</sup> [Emphasis in the original]

Two different approaches developed from this basic argument of human security, one that encompassed the approach of the UNDP and was framed ‘freedom from want’ and the other that of the Human Security Network, a network of states and NGOs designed to achieve human security. The first one, freedom from want, encompassed the ideas of UNDP and believed human security to be about ensuring basic human needs in economic, health, food, social, and environmental terms.<sup>17</sup> The other approach, that was framed ‘freedom from fear’, was relatively narrower in scope than the previous approach and believed human security to be about removing the use of, or threat of, force and violence from people’s everyday lives.<sup>18</sup>

All these definitions have though in common references to some threats that linger and have the potential to, in some way, harm our existence and core values. The problem both lies in defining these threats and also in who *we* are and what our core values are. It thus seems straightforward that the issue of threat is the next subject to be examined.

---

<sup>14</sup> Krause, Keith. *Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda*.

<sup>15</sup> Krause, Keith. *Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda*. Page 10.

<sup>16</sup> Stares, Paul B. *Introduction*. in *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey*. Edited by Paul B. Stare. Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998. Page 15.

<sup>17</sup> Krause, Keith. *Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda*.

<sup>18</sup> Krause, Keith. *Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda*.

## 2.2 What are threats?

The first concern here is to clarify how human actors and especially decision makers address security, or rather the lack thereof. The lack of security is most often defined by the existence of a threat or threats.<sup>19</sup>

A threat analysis, the first step in determining risk, identifies and evaluates each threat on the basis of various factors, such as its capability and intent to attack an asset, the likelihood of a successful attack, and its lethality. Risk management is the deliberate process of understanding "risk"—**the likelihood that a threat will harm an asset with some severity of consequences**—and deciding on and implementing actions to reduce it.<sup>20</sup>  
[Emphasis added by the author]

Security can and should be evaluated in a two step process. First one evaluates the threats that can be found towards all aspects of society.<sup>21</sup> Threats can be defined here as both the possible *impact* an event entails, such as possible massive energy shortage, economic impact and health issues that a major volcanic eruption would cause, but also the *likelihood* that such an event would happen on that scale.<sup>22</sup> Measuring the likelihood is never an exact science but it is an aspect which unfortunately is often left out or misjudged when threats are evaluated. Threats are therefore here composed of the sum of the scale of impact and likelihood.

### **Threat = Likelihood + Scale of Impact**

This definition, though not perfect, provides a basis for evaluating security. Here below, the interplay between the likelihood and impact of a threat have been represented in a diagram of the threat level to give an idea of the threat evaluated with the possible threats ranging from low to critical.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> For discussion on the evaluation of threats and risks see: Bailes, Alyson. *Introduction: A world of risk*, Sipri yearbook, Stockholm 2007.


<sup>20</sup> *Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments*. 4 September 1998. Report to Congressional Requesters.

<sup>21</sup> It has also been argued that the process should be reversed, that is vulnerabilities to be evaluated and then threats are examined.

<sup>22</sup> Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia's revenge: Climate change and humanity's loss*. Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2007. Page 11.

<sup>23</sup> Picture on the next page taken from <http://www.charityvillage.com/cv/research/rom18.html>

Figure 2



The second step is to examine the vulnerabilities of the given society, not only towards the threats that have been defined but also from other aspects of society. Vulnerability does not need a threat to become a security issue as well as a threat does not need a vulnerability to become a security issue. But if these two coincide, such as in the case of terrorism where a well-defined threat coexists with open societies with many vulnerable targets; the security issue becomes even larger as the possible impact of the security threat would be greater.

In the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within societies than by the territorial boundaries between them. From terrorism to global disease or environmental degradation, the challenges have become transnational rather than international. That is the defining quality of world politics in the twenty first century.<sup>24</sup>

It needs to be noted that the cost of prevention and reaction could be added to this equation, bringing the equation closer to a cost-benefit analysis. That added dimension gives policy makers the opportunity to evaluate realistically what could

<sup>24</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. Northon & Company, New York, London, 2004.

be done to mitigate risk given the limited resources of the state. The formula can also therefore be displayed as:

**Threat = Likelihood + Scale of Impact (+ Cost)**

Finally, when discussing security it is also important to mention that threats can both be real or imagined, that is, real in the sense of having a basis for the threat or imagined in the sense of being perceived by the general public as being a threat without basis.<sup>25</sup> Both are important, and dismissing a threat as being highly unlikely or unrealistic does not make it any less threatening for the individual. A good remedy for such threats is simply to inform the general public on the faults of the perceived threat instead of simply stating that it is irrelevant for security considerations. This works both ways. That a threat is being perceived at one time to be highly unlikely or unrealistic does not necessarily make it an irrelevant threat.

### 2.3 Traditional security and the old security spectrum

Together, threat and vulnerability provide a picture of the security challenge to be dealt with. That picture has conventionally been one of military confrontation between states and security was thus termed military security. Military security is often defined as “perceived or actual freedom from the threat or use of organized violence for political purposes”.<sup>26</sup> This definition generally speaking excludes other forms of violence, such as crime, and acts committed by other actors.

National security used to be considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial might. To be dangerous, an enemy had to muster large armies. Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and unit trained and moved into place.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> Buzan, Barry. *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (2nd edition). L. Rienner, June 1991.

<sup>26</sup> Herring, Eric. *Military Security*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. Page 130.

<sup>27</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. Page 362.

Security is thus achieved by defending against foreign coercion, attack, and invasion through maintaining adequate military defenses.<sup>28</sup> The state both holds a monopoly on domestic security and the use of force and is the sole provider of security from external threats: the responsibility for the security of the state therefore lies firmly with the state.<sup>29</sup> States are considered to be secure when there is an absence of a military threat or there is sufficient military response available to protect the nation from external overthrow or attack.<sup>30</sup>

If this security spectrum is tested against the example of the Nordic countries, their approaches to security were quite straightforward during the Cold War. The Western Nordic states; Iceland, Norway and Denmark joined NATO as a means to deal with the military and existential threat posed by the Soviet Union.<sup>31</sup> Sweden strengthened its national military and pledged neutrality to minimize the threat it posed to the Soviet Union. If Sweden had joined NATO it would probably have upset the power balance that existed in the North.<sup>32</sup> Finland on the other hand had no other choice than to sign a cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union and lean to the East to protect itself from being overrun by the Soviet army, as other European states had experienced. This picture of states' strategic choices reflects a setting of zero-sum, military confrontation with the involvement of the major powers. It has a 'state centric' view and focuses on the tools of traditional military defense. This has been shown in the figure below which notes the major geostrategic orientation of each state.<sup>33</sup> Each of the Nordics only needed one decision on security status to meet its strategic needs: the security spectrum was thus quite simple and could be defined in traditional military terms.

---

<sup>28</sup> Stares, Paul B. *Introduction*. in *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey*. Page 13.

<sup>29</sup> Stares, Paul B. *Introduction*. in *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey*. Page 13.


<sup>30</sup> Stares, Paul B. *Introduction*. in *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey*. Page 13.

<sup>31</sup> Øberg, Jan. *Introduction: Norden in Europe 1990-1991*, in *Nordic security in the 1990s, options in the changing Europe*. Edited by Jan Øberg. Pinter Publishers, London, 1992.

<sup>32</sup> Øberg, Jan. *Introduction: Norden in Europe 1990-1991*, in *Nordic security in the 1990s, options in the changing Europe*.

<sup>33</sup> The picture is that of the author.

Figure 3



#### 2.4 New security threats and the new security spectrum

The old conventional military terms have, however, in the Post-Cold War era, proven not to be sufficient to describe the concept of security as discussed previously.<sup>34</sup>

The concept of security, once framed largely in conventional military terms, today must expand its frame of reference and take into account a range of evolving threats — international terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms dealing, trafficking in persons, institutional corruption, organized crime. In some countries, poverty, disease and environmental degradation increase vulnerability and help undermine human security.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Here it is important to note that criticism of the Cold War model had arisen before the end of the Cold War, even in the 1970, for being one-dimensional and shortsighted. These calls for a broader view on security were though ignored or politely considered without real interest. See discussion in Stares, Paul B. *Introduction*. in *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey*. Page 13.

<sup>35</sup> *On Multidimensional Security*. Organization of American States, can be found on: [http://www.oas.org/key\\_issues/eng/KeyIssue\\_Detail.asp?kis\\_sec=9](http://www.oas.org/key_issues/eng/KeyIssue_Detail.asp?kis_sec=9)

There is now a new and wider array of security threats that decision makers are being forced to deal with. The first thinkers to challenge the traditionalist view of military security were those advocating a focus on economic and environmental agendas in international relations in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>36</sup> Consideration of the relevance of economic security was first couched in relation to military security; a firm economic base was needed to support military security and economic targets could be targeted as a means to a military victory.<sup>37</sup> Now the economy as the foundation of society is considered a security aspect of its own as it can serve as a defender against other security threats, cause them and have a massive impact on a society. Environmental security was, in a similar way, firstly discussed in military terms, both as a means to sabotage opponents and as a side effect of war. The transborder aspect of many of the environmental threats has now elevated the latter into a security aspect of its own, as environmental problems or degradation has both the potential to destabilize fragile states and to undermine the prosperity and safety of richer ones. Energy security, another example of new fields of security, is a rising concern for all states, especially since the oil crisis of 1973.<sup>38</sup> The military itself and all functions of a modern society depend in one way or another on the delivery of energy and preservation of energy-using communications. The 'energy weapon' has also been used recently for political means: many claim the Gulf War of 1990-1991 as well as Operation Desert Storm in Iraq of 2003 to be about oil.<sup>39</sup>

Other new security threats already mentioned are terrorism and organized crime. In many states organized crime has the potential to seriously destabilize peace and security and even lead to further conflict. Somalia is a prime example of a lawless state in conflict internally and with other states, where organized crime leads to further destabilization of society. To a lesser degree Colombia can be mentioned where whole regions of the country were under the command of drug lords. Terrorism on the other hand is the new security threat which probably has been

---

<sup>36</sup> Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole and Wilde, Jaap de. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, United States, 1998. Page 2.


<sup>37</sup> Sperling, James and Kirchner. *The Changing Definition of Security*. Paper delivered at the ECSA Conference Charleston, South Carolina, 11-14 May 1995. Can be found at: [http://aei.pitt.edu/7020/01/sperling\\_james.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/7020/01/sperling_james.pdf)

<sup>38</sup> Klare, Michael T. *Resource wars; The new landscape of global conflict*. Henry Holt books, New York, 2001. Page 32.

<sup>39</sup> Klare, Michael T. *Resource wars; The new landscape of global conflict*. Pages 33-34.

discussed the most in recent years. Terrorism as such is not a new thing but its widespread use, the emergence of new actors – including highly internationalized networks - as well as the higher profile of the attacks has caused them to be termed a ‘new threat’. The traditional target of the state that was the main focus of terrorism has now been blurred as has been seen by the indiscriminate attacks in Iraq.<sup>40</sup> Diseases, such as avian influenza, SARS and HIV, have now also started to be considered a security threat through their impact on the social fabric and the potential they have for destabilizing whole communities.<sup>41</sup>

Figure 4



A clear example of this shift is the transformation process that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has gone through in the last decade or so. NATO was built on Cold War military confrontation between states of the East and the West and had in many ways lost its *raison d'état* with the demise of the Cold War. It was now faced with what it deemed to be new security threats.

In 1999, the Allies agreed a new Strategic Concept. This document, which sets out the security threats faced by the Alliance and the way in which it seeks to address them, described the security risks as “multidirectional and often difficult to predict” and devoted special attention to the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. It also made clear that Alliance security interests could be affected by other risks of a wider nature, such as acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, as well as the disruption of the flow of vital resources.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Stepanova, Ekaterina. *Trends in armed conflicts*, in SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, page 3.

<sup>41</sup> Altman, Dennis. HIV and Security, in *International Relations*, vol. 17, no. 4, 2003, pp. 417-27.

<sup>42</sup> *NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Can be found at: [http://www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st\\_eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st_eng.pdf). The picture on the page is that of the author.

The increased attention given to examining all aspects of these new security threats has also made it clear that the state is no longer the only actor on the stage as suggested in chapter 2.1, either in the sense of being the only provider of security or as the only target against which threats are considered to be directed. Today's terrorist cells do not respect borders or governments, nor does environmental degradation and other new security threats. Individuals doing mischief, intentional or unintentional, causing meltdowns in nuclear reactors and so on, and organizations, both non-governmental and businesses alike, have become direct targets and no less been actors affecting security in various parts of the world. Big companies have wrought havoc in Africa at the same time that they are targets of criminal and terrorist attack and of natural hazards back in the West or East.

A variety of forms of armed violence perpetrated by non-state and state-affiliated actors are becoming widespread and increasingly interconnected in both conflict and post-conflict settings. In different combinations, these forms often account for much of the ongoing violence in areas affected by armed conflicts.<sup>43</sup>

This also means that the clear difference of providers of security and users has also faded. Through the different array of new security threats that have proliferated, the providers have in many ways also become the users.<sup>44</sup> Businesses have taken on security roles or hired security services to protect themselves and their interests, and so on. Reverting to the NATO example put forward previously, that organization has similarly realized that it is no longer the sole provider of security, and that to be able to address the threats which may affect allied security interests from anywhere in the world, it needs a global reach and new partners.

---

<sup>43</sup> Stepanova, Ekaterina. *Trends in armed conflicts*. Page 2.

<sup>44</sup> Bailes, Alyson and Þröstur Freyr Gylfason. 'Societal Security' and Iceland, in *Stjórnmal og stjórnsýsla*.

Although NATO members have occasionally disagreed over the most appropriate ways to respond to new security threats, all recognise that such threats may originate from beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, and that they cannot be solved by one organisation alone, nor by relying on defence structures designed to deal with conventional military conflicts. ... As a result, NATO has moved from being a geographically defined alliance to one that recognises that security threats are no longer limited in terms of their location and predictability and is prepared to address them whenever and wherever they occur.<sup>45</sup>

Some scholars say that this increase in actors in the international arena has been further advanced by the globalized nature of today's communication.

More recently, international relations (IR) scholars have invoked the network metaphor to depict loosely coupled cross-border associations of groups and individuals who act and interact in the international arena independently of—and frequently in opposition to—states. These include transnational social movements, organised criminal gangs and terrorist organisations, NGOs, and international associations of scientists and experts.<sup>46</sup>

These 'networks' tend to be highly decentralized with no clear head controlling the actions of the limbs, informal in nature with no clear hierarchy making them very hard to deal with.<sup>47</sup> This also translates into an even more fragmented picture of actors that play a role in security and puts an added pressure on international cooperation to deal with these networks.

---


<sup>45</sup> *NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

<sup>46</sup> Sangiovanni, Mette Eilstrup. Transnational Networks and New Security Threats. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2005, Volume 18, number 1, 7 – 13.

<sup>47</sup> Sangiovanni, Mette Eilstrup. Transnational Networks and New Security Threats. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*.

The impact of this change on the security spectrum can be seen in the figure below which shows how different organizations could now cover the complete security spectrum<sup>48</sup> (seen in shades of grey) of a Nordic country, for example Iceland. This security spectrum is defined here for simplicity's sake to cover functional security, human security, civil crisis management, environmental security and so on as well as traditional military threats as was the case during the Cold War. NATO is displayed as being able to deliver a certain aspect of security, referring to traditional military needs while the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the military arm of the European Union (EU) established since 1999, is shown to deliver civil crisis management capabilities.

Figure 5



It is important to note here as one of the fundamentals of this analysis that none of the security providers is necessarily or automatically in conflict with any other security arrangement or players, as its role only intersects that of other security arrangements partially. ESDP is therefore presented as complementing NATO, rather than fighting to take its place. The Nordic countries strongly oppose the idea that other security arrangements are to replace existing ones. They for

<sup>48</sup> For a view on the security spectrum we face refer to Alyson Bailes' security spectrum in Appendix I. The figure on the paper is the authors, the picture is simplified and of course various providers can overlap with others and the display here should not be considered exhaustive.

example support the ESDP based on its additional benefits to their security, not as a possible replacement for NATO.

The four Nordic countries' basic position towards the ESDP could be described as a theme with four variations. The theme is these countries' attempt to keep territorial defence or defence guarantees outside the EU, while generally accepting that the EU can undertake the Petersberg tasks. According to Nordic views, the EU should focus on the civilian part of crisis management, as a manifestation of a wider concept of security.<sup>49</sup>

The implication of this way of approaching security and its providers is that instead of depending solely on NATO as was displayed in the chapter on traditional security, the EU or other security arrangements for delivering security, also to cover the new threats they now face, the Nordic states have had and will continue to have the chance to diversify their means of pursuing security to match the way that their security needs have been and still are changing and diversifying. One can also argue that by tasking more organizations with the protection of security, one's vulnerability decreases in line with the 'principle' of not putting all one's eggs in one basket.<sup>50</sup> This may offer many new opportunities in the coming years for Nordic as well as other decision makers on security issues.

## 2.5 A multidimensional security concept

A multidimensional security concept refers to the combination of and preparation of a response to these new security dimensions which have been emerging. The new dimensions that warrant reference to a multidimensional national security concept can be seen in the 'Threat Triangle' displayed below.<sup>51</sup> These dimensions are new transnational human threats such as terrorism and crime, and other national threats such as functional security and socio-economic and corporate

---


<sup>49</sup> Græger, Nina, Larsen, Henrik and Ojanen, Hanna. *The ESDP and the Nordic countries, four variations on a theme*. The Finnish Institute for International affairs and Institut für Europäische Politik, Helsinki and Berlin, 2002. Page 219.

<sup>50</sup> "In addition, anchoring one's policies in several organizations makes one less vulnerable to the effects of sudden and radical changes that may originate from great power politics, e.g., a decrease of NATO's importance for the United States." Græger, Nina, Larsen, Henrik and Ojanen, Hanna. *The ESDP and the Nordic countries, four variations on a theme*. Page 234.

<sup>51</sup> The Threat Triangle taken from notes in Non-State Actors and Non-Military Security. Course taught by Alyson Bailes, University of Iceland. Picture is the authors, based on the threat triangle.

security or other non-military challenges to human security. Together with traditional military threats and conflict they make up a multidimensional security concept that requires decision makers to examine other threats to societies than were previously necessary or possible to cover.

Figure 6



The multidimensional security concept can be seen to have two main overarching features, *Interdependence* and *Human security*. Interdependence refers here to the fact that many of the threats that the world faces today do not originate in any one country and cannot be dealt with by a single country. International criminals have easier access across national borders, and global warming and other natural phenomena like diseases pose new and unprecedented threats. The common factor here is interdependence, the participation in the international world.

Another factor that can be seen in the multidimensional security concept is the emphasis on human security or what has been coined as a people-centered view of security, discussed above in chapter 2.1.<sup>52</sup> The focus is not on the effects that

<sup>52</sup> Krause, Keith. *Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda*.

these threats have on the state (even though state security is not contradictory to human security) but rather on the effect it has on individual survival. Only traditional military threats and terrorism have a more state-based security view while the other threats have at least a considerable human security component.

Finally, the widening of the spectrum has gone hand in hand with increased interest in the way that different threat or risk factors can interact with and aggravate each other. Such interactions are now better understood in relation to traditional armed violence or 'hard' security – i.e., the various non-military factors that can provoke conflict, can worsen its impact, and need to be addressed during reconstruction. But different dimensions of security can also become interlinked in 'peacetime' conditions as a result of major accidents, breakdowns or natural forces.<sup>53</sup> A notable example of this interplay could be considered that of energy security. The impact of energy shortages can have widespread implications for most societies. Modern societies in particular depend on oil for the functioning of society, leaving them more vulnerable to the provision of it than others. Most food production is dependent on oil in some way as well as the shipment of goods for their production, the provision of domestic security is also at risk, police and rescue services are all depend on oil for their function. Major civil disturbance could also be expected if the provision of energy would fail, as energy keeps houses warm and food on the table of ordinary people. The production of energy can be a threat in itself, the Chernobyl accident a case in point and oil spills of the coast of any state would have major consequences on its natural resources and so on. Less noticeable threats could also be mentioned. HIV or other infectious diseases can have devastating effects on the social fabric of any society if left unchecked and their impact felt in all sectors of the society, be that military aspects, economic and so on. The complexity of the threat and the possible widespread impact is the common theme of these security threats.

---

<sup>53</sup> An example of this is what can be called the food security crisis that took place in the world in 2008 were increased pressures to deal with climate change and raised oil prices led to the increased conversion of corn to ethanol, driven by energy security, which then had an impact on food security as food was now much more expensive. This again lead to instability in the poorest countries of the world as they were the countries worst prepared to deal with such pressures, see discussion in Dupont, Alan. The Strategic Implications of Climate Change, in *Survival*, June-July 2008, The International Institute for Strategies Studies, Vol. 50, Number 3., page 32.

As could be expected, this interdependency and the widening of the security spectrum have had a serious impact on the remedies possible to deal with the threats posed. Decision making and policy planning needs to be as complex and comprehensive as these new threats are, and it cannot be broken down into individual fields were policy makers can deal with them. Rather they need to coordinate their approach to them and no less the approach of the ever growing field of experts, states and organizations and even individuals that need to cooperate to deal effectively with the threats. The impetus for cooperation has thus increased significantly as the complexity of the approach to security has increased. This can be sharply contrasted with the old 'civil-military' concept were providing security could be secured by one actor and a unified command.

The 'war on terror' can be taken as an example of this complexity of approach. The sheer complexity of battling terrorist around the world, defending against the imminent threat and no less the long term threat is a complex task, involving military actors, development actors, financial experts in both state and private bodies, police activity, religious leaders and so forth. Most, if not all, have realized that state vs. state military action is an insufficient approach for battling terrorism. The highly contested Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT's) of NATO in Afghanistan give a clear example of how the operational approach has also diversified. Civilian development advisers are now deployed alongside or rather as a part of NATO's peace enforcement and peacebuilding activities in Afghanistan. Local actors, the government, NATO, UN, NGO's, individual states and individuals are all playing a part here in an intricate interplay of policy options.

All in all it can be concluded that the multidimensional security concept is a significantly more multifaceted approach than the old traditional security concept due to the increased complexity of the threats posed, thus adding strain to policy makers due to the increased interdependence and complexity of security in today's world.

## 2.6 Climate change in the security spectrum

But does climate change belong to this threat triangle as a new security threat? One of the corners of the threat triangle set out in the discussion of the multidimensional security concept above was that of natural threats, non-military challenges to human security. One of those threats that can be seen to belong to this part of the multidimensional security concept is the environmental dimension of security, which climate change belongs to.<sup>54</sup>

Environmental security threats can be defined as ‘behavior directed against the environment [which] might be seen as a threat to the security of the people or political entities associated with that environment.’<sup>55</sup>

The Security Council has in fact taken action on environmental threats, the first time in 1991 after the Gulf War mandated by the SC, partly acknowledging this connection. In the resolution adopted it said that Iraq could be held “liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources...as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”<sup>56</sup> Environmental damage was used as a weapon of war in this case.<sup>57</sup> Other links between environmental change and conflict that could be mentioned would be for example the impact warfare has on the environment; the fact that states may fight over dwindling supplies of resources; declines in food production due to environmental factors can lead to conflicts and cause societal stress, and so on.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup> Climate change can be seen to fit both within environmental security and human security, see Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia’s revenge: Climate change and humanity’s loss*, page 6.

<sup>55</sup> Tinker, Catherine. *Environmental Security: Finding the Balance*, in *Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Era: Lessons Learned*, 2nd edition. Editor W. Andy Knight. Palgrave, 2001. Page 203.

<sup>56</sup> Tinker, Catherine. *Environmental Security: Finding the Balance*, in *Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Era: Lessons Learned*, 2nd edition. Page 205.

<sup>57</sup> Referring here to willingly damaging the environment, for example by destroying oil wells, rather than referring to biological or chemical weapons being used.

<sup>58</sup> Homer-Dixon, Thomas. *Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict*, in *World Security: Challenges for a new century*, second edition. Edited by Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas. St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1998. Page 291. For further discussion on the link between environmental scarcities and violent conflict see above, as well as Homer-Dixon, Thomas. *Environmental scarcities and violent conflict; Evidence from cases*, in *New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 2004.

One of the main aspects of the threat posed by environmental issues and climate change is the issue of ecological carrying capacity which refers to environmental capacity to carry the human population in for example food production, water availability and so on.<sup>59</sup> With major environmental changes this carrying capacity can be damaged, causing conflict, involuntary migration which can put burden on the areas that receive those refugees, and so forth. Research has also shown that environmental systems “may exhibit sudden changes or “threshold” effects, which means that it may be much easier than previously thought to push a system from one equilibrium state to a very different equilibrium state.”<sup>60</sup> A case in point could be the ozone layer which showed evidence of massive environmental changes after hitting a tipping point of possible change.<sup>61</sup> An example of how this environmental scarcity could materialize would be a scarcity conflict over one of the 261 major river systems that are shared by two or more countries.<sup>62</sup>

Changes in the variability and distribution of rainfall could also exacerbate fresh water scarcity in water-deficient states. In a world where over 2bn people already live in countries suffering moderate to high water stress, and half the population is without adequate sanitation or drinking water, relatively small shifts in rainfall patterns could push countries and whole regions into deficit, leading to a series of water crises with global implications.<sup>63</sup>

Opinions are divided upon how much this water scarcity is currently a threat. There are those that hold that the link to conflict is clear, saying that the “environmental decline occasionally leads to conflict, especially when scarce water resources must be shared.”<sup>64</sup> Others have pointed out the fact that water

---

<sup>59</sup> Rogers, Paul. *Peace Studies*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, page 47. See also Klare, Michael T. *Resource wars; The new landscape of global conflict*, pages 15-21.

<sup>60</sup> Homer-Dixon, Thomas. *Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict*, in *World Security: Challenges for a new century*, second edition. Page 292.

<sup>61</sup> Homer-Dixon, Thomas. *Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict*, in *World Security: Challenges for a new century*, second edition. Page 292

<sup>62</sup> Barnett, Jon. *Environmental Security*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. Page 191.

<sup>63</sup> Dupont, Alan. *The Strategic Implications of Climate Change*, in *Survival*, page 33.

<sup>64</sup> Quote from Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. *The Environment and International Security*, in *World Security: Trends & Challenges at Century's Ends*. Edited by Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991. Page 366. Asia is already dealing with a decline in water availability of between 40% to 65%, a number that is likely to rise. "It is believed that by 2025 some 5bn people globally could be suffering from serious water shortages, half a billion of the mdue to climate change." By China's own estimates the Tibetan plateau are melting at a rate of about 7% a year, which is likely to adversely affect hundreds of millions of people that are dependent on the flow of glacier-fed rivers. See Dupont, Alan. *The Strategic Implications of*

scarcity leads to cooperation rather than conflict.<sup>65</sup> The threat still remains, especially in the unknown future under climate change and increased population pressures, and the fact that this is a contended issue that forces states to cooperate underpins the importance of water and the environment.

If climate change is now examined in particular it is first important to note the need to discuss climate change overall rather than just global warming as many do. Though a formal definition is hard to come by it can be said that climate change includes everything related to the increase in greenhouse gases, such as increased extreme weather conditions, changed rainfall patterns and so on.<sup>66</sup> Global warming on the other hand only addresses one part of climate change, that is the warming of the earth, which for example by the abrupt climate change scenario introduced in chapter seven might end up as global cooling instead of global warming. Climate change as a catch-all phrase for these changes will have to suffice for the time being. Climate change can be seen to firmly belong to the group of environmental threats though one stark difference can be made between climate change and other environmental threats. The majority of the environmental threats posed, with the major exception of the thinning of the ozone layer, have impacts at the intra-state or regional level and only a few could be called of an international nature.<sup>67</sup> Climate change is by its nature of a global scale and cannot be dealt with by those sub-global arrangements that could be employed to solve other environmental threats. It is important to note that

---

Climate Change, in *Survival*, page 33 and discussion in Klare, Michael T. *Resource wars; The new landscape of global conflict*, pages 12 and 138-190.

<sup>65</sup> For the argument for water leading to cooperation rather than conflict see: Pushkina, Darya with Faw, Leah. *Conflict or cooperation- water in central Asia*. Paper to be presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, March 2006. Can be accessed at: [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/0/9/8/5/1/p98511\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/8/5/1/p98511_index.html)

<sup>66</sup> IPCC formal definition says that climate change is “A change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.” Taken from IPCC website: <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/ipcc-glossary.pdf>. The dispute often revolves around what is human induced climate change, which according to IPCC is what the international community is dealing with and what therefore should be included. Though the large majority of relevant scientists believe climate change to be caused by human activity, see Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia's revenge: Climate change and humanity's loss*, page 4, this is an irrelevant discussion as for the purpose of discussing climate change as a security threat, this discussion does not have an impact in the short term as the security considerations still remain, irrelevant of who or what is causing the change itself.

<sup>67</sup> Homer-Dixon, Thomas. *Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict*, in *World Security: Challenges for a new century*, second edition. Page 291.

examining climate change as a security issue will likely bring new actors to the topic, while it is however unlikely to exclude others from it. If the Security Council addresses the issue it does not hinder the work of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or others who are fighting climate change.

When examining the security threat posed by climate change it is necessary to examine two different scenarios, as will be discussed in length in chapters 7.1 and 7.2. The former is that of an abrupt climate change scenario where climate change itself becomes a security threat. Though this may not happen as of today the risk posed needs to be assessed and the threat cannot be disregarded. The second one is closer to today's current reality and is already taking place or is quite likely to take place. It concerns the indirect impact of present and 'creeping' climate change on economic and human security and state behavior in a number of dimensions, including the sources and courses of armed conflicts. These indirect impacts can materialize in various forms, be it through forced environmental migration that destabilizes the local population or through increased pressures after a major weather incident leading to a humanitarian crisis.

Climate change is even considered likely to lead to energy conflicts through its pressures on demand and the way these energy supplies are obtained and secured.<sup>68</sup> The impact of those could be minor or medium in scale, leading to resource loss, impact on the societies in question and have major economic loss or gain, depending on the vulnerabilities in question. The economic security of societies could thus be in jeopardy together with its possible impact on other security dimensions. This impact could be furthered by the effect climate change may have as a conflict primer for other security threats. The link to energy management is particularly noteworthy as these two are interlinked in a causal relationship that will only be broken by extensive introduction of alternative, clean energy sources. The relationship flows both ways, as climate change is

---

<sup>68</sup> Klare, Michael T. *Resource wars; The new landscape of global conflict*. Pages 20, 140 and 188.

likely to have major impact on the delivery and discovery of energy in the years and decades to come.

Climate change needs to be examined as a *prima facie* security issue on its own merits rather than a part of the environmental security discussion as it likely to have a greater impact on its own than other aspects in the environmental security category.

## 2.7 Conclusion on new security threats

The end of the Cold War had an immense effect on the international community and not least on prevailing approaches to security.<sup>69</sup> It has been argued that the basis of this change was not the traditional change of power balance as some would maintain, but rather simply a change of approach to security. An all-out war that destroys all civilizations was no longer mankind's biggest threat and a redefinition of the concept of security was called for. Analysts and decision makers are now forced to take into consideration such new security threats as threats to human security, energy security and other new security risks that have proliferated in the last decades.

The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international system.<sup>70</sup>

One way of looking at this change is the different time horizon of threat that policy makers have adopted. During the Cold War the immediacy of the inter-

---

<sup>69</sup> Cottey, Andrew. *Security in the new Europe*. Palgrave, 2007. New York. See for example discussion in the introduction of the book.

<sup>70</sup> Secretary-General Kofi Annan, *In Larger Freedom*. Can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/> Article 78.

state military threat was so overwhelming that the time horizon was very short, and the only threat considered was the one that was imminent. Since that threat became smaller for most states in the international system, the horizon has both widened to include new threats and also grown longer in time-span, meaning that it now encompasses threats that take more time to present themselves. This has also resulted in a more complex security environment for decision makers to deal with both in assessing the threat posed by these threats, no less than in deciding what to do to prevent these threats from materializing. The increased time horizon discussed previously has also made the allocation of public and private resources a more complex task. The short term interests of politicians, for example electoral gain, might outweigh the long term needs in decision-making on security.

The wide array of new threats has also put pressures on increased planning and policy making to handle and coordinate the different approaches needed for the management of these threats. More institutional frameworks and actors, both governmental and private, now have a sway in security issues as providers, users and sometimes threats themselves, which makes decision making a fragmented process. This also means that the process is harder and harder to survey and to monitor effectively for the benefit of the public. Here another point from the previous discussion on threats becomes relevant, that of perceived threat and actual threat. The public concerns and public pressures might not be based on actual threats or vulnerabilities but rather a perceived threat that has been exaggerated by the media or other actors. This multidimensional security concept therefore carries a considerable inherent problem for decision makers and indeed society as a whole as the threats posed might not be entirely correct and no less the actions to prevent them.

The conclusion is that today's world is faced with and must live with multiple threats, and requires a multidimensional security concept in order to correctly identify these threats, their inter-relation, and the principles and priorities to guide responses. If the most important or most relevant threats are examined, a policy package based on human security and an interdependent world should logically emerge. Climate change, previously considered not as a threat on its own, but

rather as a part of the framework of environmental security, is now firmly within the framework of new security threats as a security threat in its own right. It is hard to say on the other hand that a clear actor or institution has emerged to deal with this security aspect of climate change though many frameworks have been established to deal with it in general. The question then becomes who or what should deal with climate change as a security threat?

### **3.0 Theoretical Approach on New Security Threats**

This question posed is not as straightforward as one could expect. Various frameworks and actors are available to deal with security issues in the international system but most will be likely to want to use different approaches to the system and the problem, depending on their view on the system and the problem.

Climate change is a security threat no single country would be able to deal with on its own, leaving it to the international community to set up or use existing frameworks for addressing the issue. These choices of actors or frameworks depend on the relevant approaches and analysis of international relations and, in particular, the way that those participating in the system employ the options available for them to deal with climate change as a security threat at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Here the two important theories of international relations, realism and neoliberalism, will be examined with the view of explaining these approaches to the international system and international organizations in particular. The view of security that they represent will additionally be shortly discussed. This is necessary to be able to correctly evaluate the question of agendas and responsibilities for action regarding climate change as a security threat.

### 3.1 Realism, international institutions and security

Although scholars manage to disagree about most things in international relations, there does seem to be a considerable consensus that realist thought has been a dominant school of thought for centuries.<sup>71</sup> Realism puts forwards a fairly dark and pessimistic view of the international community which the theory claims is no community but rather a system of anarchy where selfish states try to maximize their interests in every way possible in constant conflict with other actors in the system.<sup>72</sup> The role of the state is to ensure its survival, the ultimate pursuit is for power, war is inevitable and suspicion is high. One must expect an attack from all others at all times even though it is not always the case. Realist theory is fundamentally based in the sole player of the state on the international arena and others are simple extras with no lines. A principle of self-help exists as states cannot depend on other states or actors to secure the survival of the state. This means that the roles that international organizations and international law play are minimal and these are seen simply as potential tools for the realist zero-sum game of each state.<sup>73</sup>

A new strain of realism, neorealism, puts forward the idea that the international system is a force in itself and is the main explanatory factor in international relations.<sup>74</sup> It is not human nature, as realism puts forward, which is to blame for suspiciousness and fear towards other states in the system but the system itself leads to fear, jealousy and insecurity.<sup>75</sup> The basic theme in both theories remains,

---

<sup>71</sup> See for example: Thucydides as an example of early writing, in *Essential readings in world politics, 2nd edition*. Editors Karen A. Mingst and Jack Snyder. Norton and Company, New York and London, 2004; Machiavelli on his approach to realism in the Middle Ages; and Morgenthau and others on modern approaches to realism. Mearsheimer quotes Keohane and others and all seem to agree that realism has been a dominant theory for centuries, see Mearsheimer, J.J. *The false promise of international institutions*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

<sup>72</sup> Mingst, Karen A. *Essentials of International Relations, 3rd edition*. Norton and Company, New York and London, 2004.

<sup>73</sup> Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B.C. *Realism in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Edited by Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. Oxford university press, Oxford, 2004. Page 166.

<sup>74</sup> Mingst, Karen A. *Essentials of International Relations, 3rd edition*. Page 68. Neorealism has also often been termed structural realism.

<sup>75</sup> Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B.C. *Realism in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Page 166.

however, a system of anarchy where states act to try to maximize their interest under different circumstances.

It is hard to put neorealism forward as a plausible theory on the work of the international system and organizations. Its proponents believe that international organizations are completely useless and that they even make things worse, as they create false hope among some states on the possible outcomes of international relations.<sup>76</sup> The emphasis has been almost solely on the anarchy of the system and the relations of states within that system. Realism on the other hand, while believing states to be the main actors of the international system, is open – unlike neorealism - to the idea of extras which can be used for gaining a better position in the international system, so long as this is more than other states get. For example, regarding the United Nations, it cannot be overlooked that this organization does participate in international relations, both as at least a partially independent actor and also as a platform for discussion and problem solving in the system. The Secretary-General of the UN has, both in the past and the present, taken on the role of a mediator and even tried to influence the discussion of important contemporary issues such as climate change.<sup>77</sup> The pressure exerted on permanent missions by NGOs has increased considerably and the international UN staff has considerable impact on the shape of the debate in international relations through its both positive and normative work on UN reports, statements and so on.<sup>78</sup>

Neorealism fails on many accounts to describe the functions of the international system and in particular for that of cooperation and the role of international organizations in the system, such as mentioned above. Why do states bother to participate in, and more importantly to pay for, international organizations if they

---

<sup>76</sup> Mearsheimer, J.J. *The false promise of international institutions*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*.

<sup>77</sup> See the discussion both in chapter 6.3 and chapter 8.0.

<sup>78</sup> See for example Abbot, K.W. and Snidal, D. *Why states act through formal international organizations*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado. Also Natsios, A. S. *NGOs and the UN system in complex humanitarian emergencies: conflict or cooperation?*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado. For a discussion on the role of NGO's, see Johnstone, I. *The role of the UN Secretary general; The power of persuasion based on law* in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado, for a discussion of the role of the Secretary-General of the UN.

do not even see them as a possible tool for achieving their realist agenda? Neorealism will thus not be considered as a plausible approach to the international system in general and international organizations in particular.

Within the realist doctrine there have emerged new approaches to try to incorporate or deal with the problems mentioned above. Joseph Grieco is a known realist who has discussed the idea of state cooperation in the system of self-help, but he claims that it is then harder to implement, to maintain and it depends solely on the power of states.<sup>79</sup> The reason for this is that states think more of relative than absolute gain in the system of self-help and this leads to less inclination to cooperate. This effectively means that a state needs to gain more relatively than other states participating in the international organization, if other states gain more they will become stronger and a bigger threat. In short, the realist view of international organizations is that their role in the international system is minimal or that they are simply overridden. The new approaches of realism do open for the idea that cooperation could be compatible to realist thought, but that it is difficult in almost every way as states are stuck in a game of relative gain.

### 3.1.1 Realism, security and the perception of threat

The realist definition of security and threat is purely in ‘state centric’ terms, as could be expected from the previous discussion.

Approaches to security focused on states have long dominated international relations thinking, in two senses. First, states have been the central actors in international affairs. Second, security has been considered their most important concern. As a result international relations theory and analysis has long sought to explain the core elements of *security relations among states*. [Emphasis in the original]<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>79</sup> Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B.C. *Realism in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Pages 166 and 176. This type of realism has also been termed rational choice realism. See also Grieco, Joseph M. *Understanding the problem of international cooperation: The limits of neoliberal institutionalism and the future of realist theory*, in Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate. David A. Baldwin, editor. Columbia University Press, New York 1993.

<sup>80</sup> Morgan, Patrick. *Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches*, in Contemporary Security Studies. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. Page 14.

This discussion relates back to relative and absolute gain as it creates in the mind of realists a security dilemma. Additional military power gained by other states in the system will make them less secure and less able to thwart an attack, which forces them to increase their own military power. This in turn is seen by other states in the system and the state that originally added military power as a security loss for them, and a vicious cycle or a security dilemma emerges.<sup>81</sup> A secure world is thus one where there is a power balance between those that have power and those states do not try to seek more power. To the realist this is an unlikely scenario and therefore the international system is not secure and is constantly seeking its power balance.

Power is thus a basis for security and one gains power in the international system by either defending territory and the power base it provides or gaining other territories by any means necessary. Security is a military term for the realist, and the realist approach to security is therefore tied to an understanding of traditional military security and the old security spectrum of the Cold War.

### **3.2 Neoliberalism, international institutions and security**

The counterpart theory in international relations to the realist school of thought is what has been termed as liberalism. According to liberal thought, man is good in his nature and with more and better knowledge he will realize his error and change his behavior.<sup>82</sup> It is the system that is broken, not the human. As Immanuel Kant, one of the founding fathers of liberalism, said:

---

<sup>81</sup> Morgan, Patrick. *Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Page 18.

<sup>82</sup> Mingst, Karen A. *Essentials of International Relations, 3rd edition*. Page 68.

Reason provides the discipline to balance the selfish side of human nature. ... Nations, too, will gradually move from international anarchy to order when reason dictates that wars are too costly and unprofitable.<sup>83</sup>

By building up international organizations and putting emphasis on cooperative measures in the international system, cooperation as an alternative to conflict can be achieved and lead to peace.<sup>84</sup> Liberalism, contrary to realist thought, is ready to allow more actors on the stage than the state, such as for example non-governmental organizations, individuals and businesses. The state is also not seen as a unitary actor with a common approach and goal, but rather a compromise between interests within it that may also not be clearly defined. Different approaches within liberalist thought can be divided into four branches, mercantile, democratic, social and neoliberal institutionalism.<sup>85</sup> The last named addresses international organizations in particular and is most often referred to as neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism has focused on questioning realist approaches to the international system and asking why countries freely rather choose to cooperate in an international system of anarchy?<sup>86</sup> Neoliberalism comes to the same conclusion as liberalism but the basis for that conclusion is not the same. The reason for cooperation in the international system is that states are not meeting other actors for the first time when they meet, but rather can be said to be participating in a constant and repeated version of a 'Prisoner's dilemma' whereby they learn to recognize the behavior of other states and learn to avoid bad decisions in the model. As they are learning entities, they are more inclined to cooperate closely with states with similar goals and objectives and try to resolve their disputes with other states: the fact that behaviour is not new and unpredictable makes it easier for states to try to maximize their benefit within the system.

---

<sup>83</sup> In Bennet, A. LeRoy and Oliver, James K, *International Organizations; principles and issues, seventh edition*. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2002. Page 8. Here Kant says 'Nations' but not 'States' but from the context it can be understood to refer to states here.

<sup>84</sup> Mingst, Karen A. *Essentials of International Relations, 3rd edition* Page 62.

<sup>85</sup> *Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B.C. Realism in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Third edition*. Pages 166 and 176. Mercantile liberalism refers to interdependence because of mutual trade, resulting in lower probability of warfare, democratic liberalism believes that by spreading democracy wars can be avoided as democracies do not wage wars on each other and social liberalism believes that with globalization and increased social connections, information flow and others the cost of war is increased and the likely of war decreases.

<sup>86</sup> Mingst, Karen A. *Essentials of International Relations, 3rd edition*. Page 63.

It is important to note that here neoliberalism differs significantly from liberalism; it claims that states cooperate because it maximizes their benefit, not because man is good and is by nature prone to cooperation as liberalism believes. Neoliberalism sees institutions in the international system, both formal and informal, as a way to achieve and facilitate that cooperation and in that way contribute to the security of states. The role of states within neoliberalism is also more related to that within the realist approach than liberalism, as neoliberalism accepts the idea that states are in fact the main actors on the international arena and the 'system' is in an anarchic state. There are even those who believe that neoliberalism should be grouped with the realism doctrine rather than the liberal school of thought.<sup>87</sup> Realists and neoliberals do differ, though, on the level of anarchy in the system and to what extent other actors do have influence in the system.<sup>88</sup>

Liberalism is on the other hand normative in its nature and wants to display the world as it should be, while realists claim that they are describing the world as it is. Less emphasis is put on explaining the behavior of states than on suggesting how it should and could be. The liberalist view is therefore often too optimistic on the nature and role of international organizations and its approach tends to be unrealistic:

As sovereign entities, states are free to bring their disputes to an international agency or refuse to participate. They are free either to bargain or to make no concessions at all. They may accept decisions and comply with the spirit of resolutions agreed to by a majority of members of the agency, or they may refuse to cooperate in carrying out these recommendations. If a state must be coerced, it will be by the action of other states. International organizations generally have no independent means of carrying out coercion.<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup> Keohane, one of the most active advocate for neoliberalism believes that the theory does in fact borrow as much from realism as it does from liberalism and it can be viewed as somewhat of a middle way, a compramize. For further discussion on neoliberalism see: Keohane, Robert O, *institutional theory and the realist challenge after the Cold War*, in *Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate*. Edited by David A. Baldwin. Columbia University Press, New York 1993. Page 271.

<sup>88</sup> Baldwin, David A. *Neoliberalism, neorealism, and world politics*, in *Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate*. David A. Baldwin, editor. Columbia University Press, New York 1993. Page 14.

<sup>89</sup> In Bennet, A. LeRoy and Oliver, James K, *International Organizations; principles and issues, seventh edition*. Page 3.

Neoliberalism is a better approach in the discussion on international organizations, as it puts more emphasis on understanding and explaining their actual role than liberalism does; it is positive rather than normative; and it embraces the realist assumption that everything is not automatically good in the world.

One of the main arguments against neoliberalism is that it may serve as a workable theory, but only for the soft issues of politics, such as for economic issues.<sup>90</sup> In his article *The false promise of international institutions* John Mearsheimer takes a firm position against the importance of international organizations and the theories that have emerged explaining their existence, such as neoliberalism. He criticizes the theory as being too focused on economic, environmental and other soft issues while not being able to apply the same theories to security behavior.<sup>91</sup> The growth of first-order security threats as was discussed in second chapter cannot be disregarded as for the fact that states do cooperate in the international system, often benefiting other states disproportionately and thus acting against the realist doctrine. Mearsheimer's objections are not sufficient to disregard the neoliberal approach to security, though they may have rung true during the Cold War period.

As noted, neoliberalism shares with realism the fundamental ideas of the state being the primary actor in the international arena and the international system being in a state of anarchy. They disagree on the other hand on how absolute these claims are and how much room they leave for the influence of other actors and the possible impact of cooperation in the system. Neoliberalist thought emphasizes absolute gain within the system while realists will only think about relative gain. With the new realist theories that are emerging, such as Grieco's rational choice realism, one could simplify this even further and state that the dispute on relative and absolute gain is the main dispute between the schools of thought.

---

<sup>90</sup> Baldwin, David A. *Neoliberalism, neorealism, and world politics*, in *Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate*. Page 11.

<sup>91</sup> Mearsheimer, J.J. *The false promise of international institutions*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*. Page 67.

### 3.2.1 Neoliberalism, security and the perception of threat

The neoliberal or liberal definition of security and threat is, contrary to realism, not expressed in 'state centric' terms as could be expected from the previous discussion. These schools are ready to see other actors on the stage that can affect security, with the implication that threats are not entrenched in the system, transactions are no longer zero-sum and thus, one's gain is not necessarily another's loss.

A central conclusion of liberalists, in theory and practice, is that the security dilemma is not inherent in international politics. States can, and many do, reach such a satisfactory level of agreement and cooperation that being heavily armed, even with weapons of mass destruction, does not lead them to regard each other as intrinsically threatening.<sup>92</sup>

Neoliberalism and liberalism do argue that security can be reached by cooperation while the world may be somewhat within the realm of realism as is. This security cooperation is best achieved within international organizations and regimes.

Ultimately, this invites thinking of international politics as the gradual construction and further evolution of effective international community, global or regional. People and governments come to accept that security is interdependent - seeking security unilaterally is ultimately futile. ... They take a global view on the environment, terrorism, epidemics, disasters –not a narrowly national one – as the only practical basis for coping with those problems.<sup>93</sup>

The theory is ready to take on the new aspects of security as security is not defined solely in military terms. The neoliberal approach to security can therefore be tied to the understanding of the new security threats and the new security spectrum of today's world.

---

<sup>92</sup> Morgan, Patrick. *Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches*, in Contemporary Security Studies. Page 23.

<sup>93</sup> Morgan, Patrick. *Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches*, in Contemporary Security Studies. Page 23.

### 3.3 Conclusion on theoretical approaches to new security threats

Climate change, as has been pointed out, is a security threat that seems to be a threat that one single country would be unable to deal with on its own, leaving it to the international community to set up or use existing frameworks for addressing the issue. The two theories of international relations, realism and neoliberalism, seem to offer the most plausible approaches to explain different approaches within the international community to the issue of security as well as the approach of different actors towards the frameworks available for dealing with climate change.

As noted, realism as a theory does not account for the existence, or more accurately the functions, of the United Nations or the Security Council in particular. This becomes even clearer when discussing new security threats such as climate change, which, according to realist thought, should not be a security issue to be dealt with by the international community as the gain is unequally distributed around the world - the most vulnerable states are likely to gain the most from action on climate change.

At this point those that favor liberalism might claim victory. As has been pointed out, however, this interpretation cannot account for the behavior of states that do not seem to be working for the common human good and is simply too optimistic to be realistic. If liberalism would prevail then climate change would be firmly dealt with by the UN or its bodies and there would be no need for any debate on this. As it turns out this is not the case.

Neoliberalism is thus likely to be the most relevant theory to explain the approach of the international community to the UN system, the Security Council in particular, and to new security threats that are emerging, such as climate change. States' understanding of security has only recently advanced to what is now understood to be a common and global element of the threats posed to all and where they have seen common action as the solution.

This can be felt by the increased attention paid to the United Nations, which, also in accordance with neoliberal thought, seems to have been deemed more effective for dealing with these new threats. But why should such hopes be attached to the

UN and particularly the Security Council? To answer that question it is necessary to examine the development the UN and in particular the Security Council has been experiencing. This is necessary to be able to correctly evaluate the question of agendas and responsibilities for action regarding climate change as a security threat and to firmly place today's Security Council in the neoliberal approach as has been suggested here.

## 4.0 A New Security Council

As discussed in the introduction, when analyzed according to the theory of Robert Cox and Harold K. Jacobson which examines decision-making in and the power of international institutions, the Security Council can be shown to have many ways to influence world affairs and would achieve a full score under their analysis.<sup>94</sup> To react to threats to peace and security in the world the Council has a power base in its Charter and its permanent members not rivaled by any institution in the world. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter give the Council power to intervene in conflicts and disputes around the world, set up economic sanctions and adopt binding resolutions for all members of the United Nations. The working methods of the Council should therefore be a good measurement of the workings of international relations, both because of the image that the Council has and no less because of the immense power the Council possesses. As the issue at hand is to examine these new security threats it would be easy to conclude that if in fact there has been this shift in security paradigms as has been discussed in chapter two they should be visible in the working method of the Security Council due to the reasons discussed above.

When examining whether there has been a change in the work of the Security Council it is most productive to split the debate in half: first of all to examine the pattern of activity of the Council, which can be seen in for example the number of resolutions adopted and meetings of the Council, and secondly to examine the output of the Council, which can be seen for example by the use of the veto and the nature and number of cases that the Council is dealing with. This chapter does not examine the expansion of the substantive work of the Council which will be

---

<sup>94</sup> The categories are: representational, symbolic, boundary, programmatic, rule-creating, rule-supervisory and operational. See Cox, R. and Jacobson, H. K. *The framework for inquiry* in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*. Page 117.

examined in chapter six and it will be argued that the Security Council has moved into the new security spectrum.

This chapter will thus examine the background of the United Nations and the Security Council in particular. The Security Council's mission and its guiding ideas are introduced, and it will be argued that the Security Council has transformed its role in some ways after the end of the Cold War. Data on different aspects of the Council's pattern of activity will be presented to support the thesis that there is in fact a new Security Council working today, closer to the ideas of the "founding fathers" of the UN.

#### 4.1 United Nations and the Security Council

It is important first to define what an international organization is in the international system. A common mistake is to confuse the terms institution or regime with that of an organization and to apply them without reservation.<sup>95</sup> International institutions refer to the equivalents of social contracts and rules of the system in the same way that for example a marriage or the right to property are institutions in man's everyday life. International organizations on the other hand refer to those organizations that manage those institutions in the international system.<sup>96</sup>

International organizations have only been a part of the international system for a relatively short time while international institutions have longer been a part of the system.<sup>97</sup> They did not become an established trait of the international system until after the Second World War and their number has spiraled during the last

---

<sup>95</sup> Najam, A. *The case against a new international environmental organization*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

<sup>96</sup> Najam, A. *The case against a new international environmental organization*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*.

<sup>97</sup> Mearsheimer, J.J. *The false promise of international institutions*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*.

decades.<sup>98</sup> These changes have raised questions on the role of international organizations in the international system and scholars believe that such change will continue, but different ideas exist on the causes of this development.<sup>99</sup> Their nature has also been evolving; there are now all kinds of international organizations, formed by states or non-governmental actors and with multiplication of states in the international system. International organizations have certain traits which make them distinguishable from institutions, most notably; 1) a permanent institutional structure; 2) free association in the sense that states are not forced to participate; 3) a basic document that puts forward the goal, organization and realm of competence, 4) a deliberative body that has similar traits to a parliament and is expected to represent the wishes of the general members and 5) a permanent staff.<sup>100</sup> All of the above can be seen in the structure of the United Nations.

The United Nations is also the international organization that has been given the most attention, on account of the number of functions it performs, its influence, and not least because representatives from a large majority of the states belonging to the international system also belong to it.<sup>101</sup> The organization was founded in 1945 and was at least in part, based on the League of Nations.<sup>102</sup> Today 192 states belong to the United Nations and only a handful of states and territories stand outside it. The United Nations organizational structure is in large part based on that of the League of Nations, but the founders of the United Nations set out with the notion of correcting the flaws the League of Nations had displayed and which

---

<sup>98</sup> Pevehouse, J., Nordstrom, T. and Warnke, K, *international governmental organizations*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

<sup>99</sup> In Bennet, A. LeRoy and Oliver, James K, *International Organizations; principles and issues, seventh edition*, it is claimed that international organizations are here to stay while the opposite opinion is presented in Mearsheimer, J.J. *The false promise of international institutions*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*.

<sup>100</sup> Bennet, A. LeRoy and Oliver, James K, *International Organizations; principles and issues, seventh edition*.

<sup>101</sup> It can not be avoided mentioning the notable exemption of 22 million Taiwanese that are not represented in the United Nations, in the same way as for example the inhabitants of Western Sahara. Discussion in the introduction, *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2005.

<sup>102</sup> For a detailed discussion on the formation of the UN refer to: Meisler, Stanley. *United Nations: The First Fifty Years*. Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 1995.

caused its downfall.<sup>103</sup> The United Nations, like the League of Nations, was tasked with preserving peace and security in the world, while it was given means to achieve that goal which the League was not given:

Then, unlike during the League period, they gave the United Nations the authority to enforce the peace through diplomatic, economic, and even military action in response to “threats to peace... acts of aggression or... breaches of peace.”<sup>104</sup>

According to the Charter of the Organization its powers are divided into six different parts: the General Assembly, where all members of the organization have a voice; the Security Council, composed of the permanent five and ten elected members; the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), where international economic, social, cultural, educational and health issues are discussed; the Trusteeship Council, which was entrusted with administering territories that fell short of a sovereign state and were unable to administer themselves; the International Court of Justice, tasked with serving as the main court of the United Nations; and the Secretariat, tasked with managing the day to day activities of the organization.

Of these bodies two have been distinguished as handling issues related to security. The Security Council was given the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with the Charter while the General Assembly was tasked with managing the “general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security.”<sup>105</sup> Of the two, the Security Council has clearly emerged as the dominant actor in matters related to security.

---

<sup>103</sup> For a discussion on the League of Nations and the errors that the founding fathers of the UN set out to correct see: Weiss, T.G., Forsythe, D.P. and Coate, R.A. *United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Westview press, Colorado, 2004.

<sup>104</sup> Weiss, T.G., Forsythe, D.P. and Coate, R.A. *United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Page 18.


<sup>105</sup> United Nations Charter, can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> See chapter IV on the General Assembly.

## 4.2 The work of the Security Council

The first barometer for activity of the Council that will be examined is how often the Security Council meets to discuss issues within its competence. Meetings of the Security Council can be roughly split into two categories, formal meetings and informal meetings. During the years of the Cold War it was customary to settle issues and discuss the topics of the Council in formal, open meetings but now the issues are mostly discussed in informal, closed meetings of the Council.<sup>106</sup>

In the 1990s the meetings of the Council went from around a 150 meetings in the year 1989 to over 500 in the year 2002. In the *working year* 2005-2006 this number had risen to over 610 meetings and the development seems set to continue.<sup>107</sup> In the figure below the trend becomes obvious in the year 1991.

Figure 7



<sup>106</sup> Bailey, Sydney D. and Daws, Sam. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Third Edition*. Oxford Publications, 1998.

<sup>107</sup> The picture is taken from Global Policy and can be accessed at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membership/veto.htm>. It is also important to note that informal meetings of the Council can last hours while formal meetings tend to be exactly that, formal, and last for a short period of time.

This increase becomes an even sharper contrast when compared with that of the work of the Council during the Cold War. After 1948 there was a constant decrease in the meetings of the Council which reached its lowest point in 1959 when the Security Council met only five times.<sup>108</sup> The number of meetings increased slowly though from that point on until the dramatic changes at the end of the Cold War discussed above was witnessed.<sup>109</sup> Around 1995, sharp criticism was voiced within and outside the Council on the increase of informal meetings versus the number of formal meetings.<sup>110</sup> The Security Council reacted to that criticism by increasing the number of meetings open to the whole membership of the UN to address the Council on thematic issues, and furthermore by introducing other forms of interaction between the Council and important stakeholders which can be seen *inter alia* in the increased numbers of meetings with troop contributing countries.<sup>111</sup>

The same increased activity can be seen when examining the number of resolutions adopted. Around 1990 there was a leap in the adoption of resolutions in the Security Council. During the Cold War the Council never adopted more than 30 resolutions a year but has not gone below 50 resolutions since the end of the Cold War, with the annual output usually averaging around 70 resolutions.<sup>112</sup> This increased can clearly be seen on the figure below were the sharp increase after 1989 can be contrasted against the low level of activity during the Cold War. The fact that the Council is now adopting more resolutions may seem trivial but the fact remains that more resolutions passed indicates a more active involvement in world affairs. This can also serve as an indication of the increase in topics discussed within the Council which will be discussed further in chapter six.

---

<sup>108</sup> Bennet, A. LeRoy and Oliver, James K, *International Organizations; principles and issues, seventh edition*. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2002. Page 71.


<sup>109</sup> Dedring, Juergen. *The Security Council*, in *The United Nations at the Millennium: The Principal Organs*. Edited by Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, Continuum International Publishing Group, 2000. Page 78.

<sup>110</sup> Wallensteen, Peter and Johansson, Patrik. *Security Council decisions in perspective*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

<sup>111</sup> See chapter 6.2.

<sup>112</sup> Wallensteen, Peter and Johansson, Patrik. *Security Council decisions in perspective*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. The picture on the following page displaying the number of resolutions passed is taken from the same source, page 18.

Figure 8




In addition, the Council has been witnessing an increased use of the presidential statement, which is issued by the president of the Security Council on behalf of the whole Council, and thus requires consensus within the Council. Their number has also increased significantly, averaging of fifty-three a year since 1993, yielding another indicator of an increase in output of the Council, but also a clear indicator of the increased cooperation as each text presented on behalf of the Council is adopted by the concurrent vote of all members of the Council in an informal session before it is presented.<sup>113</sup>

The third measurement provided in this chapter for the increased activity of the Council is the increased cohesiveness and cooperation of the Council members, also partially seen above on the increase of presidential statements. After the end of the Cold War there was a sharp decline in conflict within the Council and cooperation rose, at least to the public eye. All matters are dealt with before they are brought to a vote and when a veto is about to be cast it is clear to all members

<sup>113</sup> Hulton, Susan C. *Council Working Methods and Procedure*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004 Page 238.

of the Council before the voting process starts.<sup>114</sup> On the figure below the development of the use of the veto can be seen. The Soviet Union was the most frequent user in the first years of the UN, but this is partially misleading as two thirds of the vetoes cast by the Soviet Union were on the admittance of new members to the UN and reflected a simple calculation on how to maintain the Cold War power balance within the organization.<sup>115</sup> The two periods during the Cold War period where there is a decline in the use of the veto can be attributed simply to the fact that the Council was inactive at times as been pointed above.

Figure 9



<sup>114</sup> Malone, David M, *Introduction*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004 The figure on the veto is taken from the Global Policy and can be accessed at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membership/veto.htm>, the author set up in new format.

<sup>115</sup> Bailey, Sydney D. and Daws, Sam. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Third Edition*. The picture is taken from the website of Global Policy, adopted by the author. See page for the original picture: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membership/veto.htm>

After the end of the Cold War the use of the veto has almost exclusively been limited to the United States and then almost always on issues related to the state of Israel. The change is clear; cooperation has emerged as the means of conducting business within the Security Council.

### **4.3 Conclusion on a new Security Council**

The first half of this examination of whether there has been a change in the activity of the Security Council seems to show a clear increase, seen by the increase in meetings and resolutions and the decrease in the use of the veto. This change is not exclusive to the Security Council. Other international organizations, as well as international cooperation in general, seem to be on the rise with increased cooperation among the major powers. Notable examples are the increased G-8 activity and Russia-EU dialogue, and even in the security sphere there is increased cooperation as can be seen on for example by the Russian-NATO dialogue and the Chinese-Russian Shanghai Cooperation.

This change has not been taking place in a power vacuum and can be clearly based in the geopolitical changes that have been taken place after the fall of the Soviet Union. These changes have had significant impact on the relations and agendas of all the major powers, if not every actor in the international system. This fundamental change in the approaches of these actors have allowed a new approach to issues of the Security Council that is less adversarial and does not contain the same zero-sum character that the Security Council of the Cold War was based on.

This also applies to what can be called a rising power, China, and its power within the Security Council. China has taken on a leadership role within the United Nations on behalf of the G-77 states, giving it a strong position in addition to its veto power within the Security Council. It has thus a vested interest in an effective UN and Security Council which works to reinforce its power in the international system. Russia is struggling with maintaining its status in the international system

and the Security Council is an excellent forum for its efforts. Similar sentiments could be felt to apply to the United Kingdom's and France's engagement with and within the Council.

Other factors have also led to increased cooperation in the Security Council. The rise of 'rogue states' that are not a satellite state of any of the big powers has presented the permanent members with common enemies of some sort which are more effectively dealt with collectively and with the backing of the Security Council. The recent example of piracy off the coast of Somalia could be viewed as an example of a problem of the 'global commons' deemed to be better approached collectively. Functional threats such as terrorism can be seen as another example of this increased common interest of the permanent members. All the permanent members benefit from the action taken on terrorism as they all could claim to be fighting or likely soon to be fighting some form of terrorism within their own borders.

Experiences with some of these 'rogue states' states, Iran and Sudan as a case in point, have however revitalized the discussion about implications for the UN when 'rogue states' have the backing of one of the permanent members of the Council: in this case Russia and China respectively, which have been backing these two countries on the basis of their energy interests in their territories.

## **5.0 Theoretical approach to a New Security Council**

The question then becomes what is likely to be the theoretical approaches reflected in the way that states approach the Security Council and how has this changed since the Cold War? To seek explanations for this, the dynamics behind the SC's operation will now be examined in the light of theory and practice, leading to an analysis of the character and the drivers of its new activity of the Council. This leads in turn into the final part of this discussion on the work of the Security Council in chapter six where the expansion of the substantive work of the Council will be examined.

This analysis provides a conceptual basis for the conclusion that new ideas, soft security issues and concerns belonging to others than the leading powers – e.g. small states - have an opportunity to influence agendas and action within the SC. It will be argued that neoliberal theories can best describe and explain the change in the working of the Council. While this holds true for the general work of the Council, realism is only in decline while it has not disappeared.

### **5.1 The Security Council, its foundation and the Cold War period**

The theoretical base of the foundation of the United Nations and the existence of the Security Council can broadly speaking be related to the school of thought of 'collective security' which the League of Nations was based on as well. According to that theory, all states take collective responsibility for the security of all, and protect other states against those that violate the convention that the collective is based on. The idea of collective security is rooted in the liberal school of thought, discussed shortly in chapter 3.2, and on the idea that such regimes or

institutions can make it so costly for states to go to war that they will not risk it.<sup>116</sup> Known realists were said to have declared at the foundation of the United Nations that:

There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, balances of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.<sup>117</sup>

Most can agree that this statement, as history has shown, did not have a foundation in reality and may also have served the new organization badly. Expectations of its success were driven too high by the euphoria of those who had just finished a brutal war.

Some have argued that the founding ideas of the United Nations were in fact not based on those views or at least, that they were never put into practice. It can for example be questioned whether the great powers ever intended to join the organization with the intent to provide security for all within the system.<sup>118</sup> It can be argued that they did exactly the contrary, i.e. pushed for the foundation of the organization to solidify the power they had accumulated by their victory in the Second World War, or even to advance their power by putting in place international rules and codes of conduct written in large part by themselves. The veto power of the United Kingdom and France can be given as an example of states that have used their UN role to advance their power relative to their objective status in the international system, which has been diminishing.

It can thus be claimed that the founders of the United Nations were in fact realists and their goal was to secure their position in the international system rather than to protect all states.<sup>119</sup> “The new organization was not intended to be a

---

<sup>116</sup> For a discussion on collective security see: Weiss, T.G., Forsythe, D.P. and Coate, R.A. *United Nations and Changing World Politics*.

<sup>117</sup> Eban, A. The U.N. Idea Revisited. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1995. Vol 74, Number 5. Can be accessed at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19950901faessay3387/abba-eban/the-u-n-idea-revisited.html.com>

<sup>118</sup> Weiss, T.G., Forsythe, D.P. and Coate, R.A. *United Nations and Changing World Politics*.

<sup>119</sup> Kennedy, P. and Russett, B. ‘Reforming the United Nations’. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1995. Vol 74, Number 5. Can be accessed at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19950901faessay3393/paul-kennedy-bruce-russett/reforming-the-united-nations.html>

supranational entity (or a world government), and the UN Charter enshrines the doctrine of state sovereignty.”<sup>120</sup> During the years of the Cold War the affairs of states that fell within the power sphere of either superpower, or conflicts involving states that had their support, were not discussed. The power balance among leading states was of utmost importance as shown by the use of the veto previously. The Soviet Union’s attempt to use the veto to maintain the power balance within the UN is a clear sign of realist calculations.<sup>121</sup> The Security Council in fact turns out to embody realist thought, as this example shows: it was not intended to serve as a body of collective security, but rather to be used as an ideological playing field where the opponent could be attacked.

The Security Council did most of its work in public those days, and much of its news was generated when the ambassadors, especially the Soviet and American ambassadors, battled with fiery words and nasty barbs. While diplomats like to call the Security Council a world forum, it was more like a world theater with the most histrionic ambassadors credited with accomplishing the most for their governments.<sup>122</sup>

Another example of this could be taken from the reaction of the Council to the Korean War that was fought largely along the lines of the Cold War. The conflict could not be discussed until the representative of the Soviet Union was absent, having pulled out to protest the status of the People’s Republic of China. The United States then seized the opportunity and passed a resolution that rendered South Korea all help, including military help, to thwart the attack from North Korea.<sup>123</sup> It was clear to anyone that the Council was not working on the basis that it was intended to work on and “[i]n essence, Security Council resolutions on Korea provided international legitimacy to U.S. decisions that would have been the same with or without the United Nations.”<sup>124</sup> On some other issues, however, the Council did manage to agree on less aggressive actions that in no way or in at

---

<sup>120</sup> Weiss, T.G., Forsythe, D.P. and Coate, R.A. *United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Page 24.

<sup>121</sup> Bailey, Sydney D. and Daws, Sam. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Third Edition*

<sup>122</sup> Meisler, Stanley. *United Nations: The First Fifty Years*. Page 137. See also pages 74 and 78 in Dedring, Juergen. *The Security Council*, in *The United Nations at the Millennium: The Principal Organs*.

<sup>123</sup> Weiss, T.G., Forsythe, D.P. and Coate, R.A. *United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Page 44.

<sup>124</sup> Weiss, T.G., Forsythe, D.P. and Coate, R.A. *United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Page 44.

least a very limited way were connected to the conflicts of the Cold War: an example of this could be the economic sanctions that were levied against the South-African apartheid regime.

In the early years of the United Nations, the enforcement mechanisms of chapter 7 remained inoperable, mainly due to Cold War tension. It was seen as a major achievement of the Council when it acted under chapter 7 against a member state in 1977 (South Africa, due to its apartheid policies) for the first time, a full thirty-two years after the founding of the UN.<sup>125</sup>

This points in the same direction that the Council was not fully functional, at least not according to the principles laid out in the Charter of the UN. It is not hard to understand the viewpoint of scholars who have said that the Council in that time did not even manage to be a negotiating forum where states could reach a compromise. In most cases the Council simply did not reach a conclusion and states worked towards their goals outside of the Council.<sup>126</sup> This view is clearly displayed in the former Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's first report to the UN in September 1982. He described the Security Council as:

[U]nable to take decisive action to resolve international conflicts. He said that its resolutions, even when passed unanimously, "are increasingly defied or ignored by those that feel themselves strong enough to do so."... "[T]he prospect of realizing such measures is now deemed almost impossible in our divided international community." He concluded, "We are perilously near to a new international anarchy."<sup>127</sup>

It could be said that the traditional role of the Security Council during the Cold War revolved around military security, state security and the power balance of the great powers. State sovereignty was a cornerstone of the Council's approach to

---

<sup>125</sup> Smith, Courtney B. *Politics and process at the United Nations; The global dance*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2006. Page 170. It needs to be emphasized that the reference to chapter VII use for the first time talks about member state instead of state which means that the use of the chapter VII for example against North Korea does not count in this tally as it was against a non-member state of the UN, North Korea joined the UN in 1991.

<sup>126</sup> Smith, Courtney B. *Politics and process at the United Nations; The global dance*. Page 170.

<sup>127</sup> Meisler, Stanley. *United Nations: The First Fifty Years*. Pages 239-240.

conflicts as clearly laid out in the Charter.<sup>128</sup> Both are classical signs of realism, the emphasis on military security and the sovereignty of states. The fact that the permanent members viewed their work in the UN as a waste of time, unless to get a cheap shot in the media, can also be associated with the thesis of realism that international organizations are not beneficial. The few more positive examples like the case of South Africa serve mostly to show clearly the kind of impact that the Council could have had if it functioned as planned. It can thus with fair certainty be said that the Security Council did work on a basis of realist thought throughout the Cold War.

## 5.2 A neoliberal Council?

In September 1987 the Party Chairman of the Soviet Union Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, encouraged the international community to entrust the United Nations with a bigger role in international relations. Even though this declaration was met with mixed reactions by the Reagan Administration it could be seen as a turning point indicating a new era of work for the United Nations, as presented in chapter four above.<sup>129</sup> The figures presented there show the significant change that took place around 1990 in the number of resolutions, the significant decrease in the use of the veto as shown and the increase in informal and formal meetings. In the same way it will be shown in chapter six that the number of resolutions under Chapter VII increased significantly during the same period; as well as the deployment of peacekeeping forces, all clear signs of a changed Council. These changes are hard to explain under the realist school of thought, according to which the United Nations - and the Security Council in particular due to its work in the security sphere - should be absolutely powerless, shunned and disregarded.

---

<sup>128</sup> United Nations Charter, can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> State sovereignty is stated clearly in chapter 1, article 2(7) where it says: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

<sup>129</sup> Weiss, T.G., Forsythe, D.P. and Coate, R.A. *United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Page 60.

Though these changes have not gone so far as to make it possible to discuss them as a “new world order” in the liberal sense of the word, they do clearly indicate differences both in relations between the actors concerned and the judgements made by these actors on the nature of security needs and remedies.

According to neoliberal thought, for example Keohane and Nye, one could see some fundamental changes in the work of the Security Council if it was indeed working according to the neoliberalist logic. These changes would include: (1) increased connection between states and other actors and acknowledgement of the many ways international relations can develop between actors across borders; (2) a new agenda of international relations with no difference between ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics; and (3) a decrease in the efficiency of military action as a part of diplomacy and foreign policy.<sup>130</sup>

The first point seems to be clearly happening, it seems clear that an increased connection between states and other actors has been taking place as discussed in the previous chapter on the work of the Security Council. States dedicate their time and resources to the Council and the UN as a whole making it clear that they do feel as the Council is at least more effective than other options available in the international system. Cooperation has also increased as discussed and political showcasing has also decreased significantly and issues are discussed in informal meetings where solutions can be sought without loss of face.<sup>131</sup> Turning to the second point, a new agenda of politics is in the process of being formulated, as will be discussed in chapter six, though it is too early to conclude that no difference will be made in future between ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics. It can however be said that this distinction has been fading slowly away. Finally, regarding the third point of decreased importance of military action it is hard to conclude definitively though it can be stated that its importance has been

---

<sup>130</sup> Lamy, S.L. *Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism*, in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Edited by Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. Oxford university press, Oxford, 2004. Page 213.

<sup>131</sup> A notable exception of this would be the lead up to the 2003 US-led Iraq war, where political showcasing took place in open meetings, for example were Colin Powell ‘demonstrated’ the existence of chemical weapons in Iraq. Another example where this takes place and were Cold War factions can still be found is in the discussion of the Palestine issue at the Security Council.

decreasing, seen by the fall in inter-state conflicts and a rise in intra-state conflicts.<sup>132</sup>

Another clear indication of a neoliberal Security Council is the collective information that the Council members use for decision making, information coming from the UN Secretariat, as well as from reports made on behalf of the Secretary-General and approved by the Council. This means that the UN's own institutional analysis has a significant sway on what gets through to Council members, though much more on the non-permanent members as their institutional memory, as well as intelligence services are generally less active and competent than that of the permanent members. Yet another point is the monitoring work carried out by the UN Secretariat, in following up on decisions of the Council. A well-known example of this is the work carried out on the follow up on Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security but its implications can be felt on other fields than literally expressed in the Resolution as well as Resolutions 1373 and 1540 that will be discussed in chapter 6.1. Here in the same way the Secretariat of the UN plays a significant role in how information is disseminated. Both these points, related to information flow, would point in the direction of a neoliberal institution rather than a realist approach as it does not allow for other actors to have an impact on the decision making in the Council.

A final point to examine, and possibly the most significant so far in the discussion on a neoliberal Council, is the legitimacy that the Council possesses. This legitimacy, which can be viewed to have increased after the end of the Cold War, also indicates a turn towards neoliberal thought over realism.<sup>133</sup> In the previous discussion on the Korean War it was stated that the US gained international legitimacy by getting a resolution passed on UN-backed intervention. In what has been termed as the biggest post Cold War crisis, the second Gulf War in 2003, a similar scenario had a different outcome: the US tried to gain international

---

<sup>132</sup> Though the number of inter state conflict has decreased the number of intra state conflicts have increased.

<sup>133</sup> See for example Hurd, I. *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton university press, 2007.

legitimacy for an intervention in Iraq and did their utmost to get a resolution through the Council, but could not gain a majority. In the event the US invaded Iraq with a limited coalition of supporters, basing its case on a previous UNSC resolution and on the claimed imminence of the threat from Saddam Hussein. Widespread lack of support for the US's reasoning in this case was both cause and effect of the failure to gain explicit UNSC authorization. The leaders of the coalition were, however, obliged to come back to the Security Council after overthrowing Saddam Hussein, to establish a legal status for the occupation of Iraq that would allow urgent matters such as Iraqi debts and sanctions to be addressed. Today's Council might thus be described as bringing together representatives of different approaches and ideas that are working together to find a compromise, rather than sworn enemies as previously was the case, and the legitimacy of the Council can be perceived to have increased as a result. Today's resolutions have gone through a negotiation process where different representatives, bringing different approaches to the table, have likely had an impact on the decisions of the Council.

The politics of legitimacy is central to international relations. When states perceive an international organization as legitimate, they defer to it, associate themselves with it, and invoke its symbols. ... The Council's authority depends on its legitimacy...<sup>134</sup>

The fact that the United States tried fervidly to seek the legitimacy of the Council before acting unilaterally in Iraq and even then trying to hide behind former resolutions, seems to confirm the point that the Council holds greater legitimacy than during Cold War periods.

It seems to be clear from the discussion above that the work of the Security Council and its role in the international system has changed from the end of the Cold War. Scholars do not seem to deny that a change has taken place but rather debate how great it has been and how big an impact it has had. The changes identified seem mostly, if not all, to point in the same way and to support the

---

<sup>134</sup>Hurd, I. *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*.

theory that the Council now reflects the approach of neoliberal thought rather than the realism it was based on during the Cold War.

### **5.3 Conclusion on a theoretical approach to the Security Council**

The conclusion is that the approach to the Council seems to have changed due to the changing security and political environment after the end of the Cold War, as discussed in chapter 4.3 and argued in this chapter. What was previously a Security Council based on realist approaches has now, and still is, gradually moving towards an institution where norms and values seem to be of an importance, issues are discussed not solely out of the sheer self-interest of each state regarding the Council, and its activity and its importance have significantly increased.

As discussed previously, the Council has increasingly started to address threats that relate more to human security than traditional military security through the thematic issues it has addressed, such as on women, peace and security and children in armed conflict. Such 'soft' security issues should not be on the agenda of the Council according to realists. In the same way it is clear that issues related to such states as Myanmar, North Korea and others would not have made it to the agenda of the Council in the Cold War as they would have been argued to be internal affairs and the Chinese and Russians would have blocked such advances by other states. If these statements hold true, as will be argued in the next chapter, neoliberalism seems to account for the approach of the majority of countries to the work of the Security Council after the end of the Cold War. It is however unlikely that this neoliberalism will materialize into a world run according to liberal thought.

## 6.0 A new Security Council in a new Security spectrum

As the issue at hand is to examine these new security threats, such as climate change, it would be easy to conclude that if in fact there has been this shift in security paradigms as has been discussed in chapter two they should be visible in the working method of the Security Council. At the same time the most important indication that the Council has turned towards a neoliberal paradigm with a new view on global security is the output of the Council or the substantive work of the Council, including how it is addressing the individual cases of security breaches.

As discussed in the introduction to chapter four it is beneficial when examining whether there has in fact been a change in the work of the Security Council to split the debate in half. The pattern of activity of the Council has been examined in chapter four; and now the output of the Council will be examined by looking at three distinct features in the work of the Council.

The first factor, and arguably the most significant change and clearest example of how the SC has reacted to the changing perceptions of the security spectrum, is its approach to individual issues and the deepening of its approach to individual cases on its agenda. This can be seen on the increased use of resolutions under the enforcement Chapter VII of the Charter and the nature and number of cases that the Council is dealing with.

The second factor that will be examined is that of thematic issues that the Security Council has identified in approaching new threats (or new dimensions to threats) will be introduced and it will be argued that these approaches have had an impact on understandings of security by the Security Council and improved its work and coverage of the security spectrum.

The third change in approach experienced is the Council's approach to conflict and peacebuilding. New issues have made their way on to the agenda of the Council and the approach to each conflict can be seen on the change to peacekeeping methods employed to encompass both non-military instruments and targets for the non-military transformation of problem locations.

This discussion will lead to the conclusions that the two ideas, of the new Security Council and the new security spectrum, have in fact merged and serve as a basis for the following discussion on climate change as a new security threat within the scope of the Security Council.

## **6.1 The Security Council's approach to new security threats**

In the Cold War the Security Council believed its role to be to facilitate the big powers' attempt to prevent other wars and conflicts between states, often with associations to the big powers, escalating into World War III.<sup>135</sup> Other issues were simply secondary and believed to be better addressed in other venues. An example of this, as stated previously, is the Council's approach to the issues of state sovereignty which it has always taken very seriously: sovereignty can even be named one of the cornerstones of the Council's approach to peace and security.<sup>136</sup> The issues on the agenda of the Council have, however, been moving gradually away from traditional conflicts between states to conflicts within states or civil wars; and in recent years the awareness of the impact of refugees, natural resource issues, and other topics that had traditionally been labeled 'soft' security issues or individual security issues has increased considerably. The UN-mandated 1990-1991 Gulf War has been considered to mark a key turning point for this change

---

<sup>135</sup> For a further discussion see: Malone, David M, *Introduction*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*.

<sup>136</sup> United Nations Charter, can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> State sovereignty is stated clearly in chapter 1, article 2(7).

and the increased involvement of the Security Council in security issues around the world.<sup>137</sup>

In a meeting of the Security Council on the 31 January 1992, the heads of state and/or government of the SC met to adopt a Resolution that can be seen somewhat as a blueprint for the new agenda of the Council. In the final declaration it is stated that:

The absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not in itself insure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters.<sup>138</sup>

Recognizing at the same time the increased role of the Council in acting to resolve these issues, the declaration has been called a “timely recognition of the fact that there are new favorable international circumstances under which the Security Council has begun to fulfill more effectively its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.<sup>139</sup> The Security Council seems to have taken this new approach to heart and this can be seen on various factors.

The Council did for example expand its reach into domains that traditionally were considered out of its reach. This can be seen particularly well in its change of stance towards the issue of sovereignty since the Gulf War.<sup>140</sup>

---

<sup>137</sup> Hume, Cameron R. *The Security Council in the Twenty-First Century*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004 Page 609. Here all reference to Gulf War refers to the UN mandated, US-led intervention in the invasion of Iraq in Kuwait, 1990-1991.

<sup>138</sup> Presidential statement of the Council, UN Doc. S/23500 (31 January 1992), taken from Tinker, Catherine. *Environmental Security: Finding the Balance*, in *Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Era: Lessons Learned*, 2nd edition.

<sup>139</sup> Dedring, Juergen. *The Security Council*, in *The United Nations at the Millennium: The Principal Organs*. Edited by Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, Continuum International Publishing Group, 2000. Page 85.

<sup>140</sup> Hume, Cameron R. *The Security Council in the Twenty-First Century*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*.

The principle of inviolability, as stated in Article 2(7), is no longer understood as defending absolute conceptions of state sovereignty, as was demonstrated repeatedly by Security Council action on Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Albania (1997), and East Timor (1999).<sup>141</sup>

Cases where the Council has respected state sovereignty in recent practice, such as Sudan, have not always been based on the sovereignty claim though it has been used as a cover for ulterior motives. Sudan is a prime example of this as China holds back on Security Council action primarily in exchange for access to massive oil fields that China controls. Another case in point would be the widening of the spectrum to include other new conflicts such as intra-state conflicts.<sup>142</sup>

The Council specifically designated Iraqi repression of the Kurds as the source of refugee flows that 'threaten international peace and security'. Both the Cambodian and Yugoslav peacekeeping missions attempted to remedy internal ethnic or political conflicts. The Somali relief mission responded to humanitarian problems created by internal clan rivalry.<sup>143</sup>

Some might be inclined to say that the fact that some of these missions, such as Somalia, failed to some extent do not warrant the discussion of this change. But the fact remains that the Council did take unprecedented action towards internal conflicts, as it had not done previously without the clear consent of the state in question.

Another point to examine is the use of resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The enforcement mechanisms of the UN Charter were particularly difficult to agree upon during the Cold War as has been discussed previously. The Iran-Iraq War saw the first collective action for a considerable time under Chapter VII, where the permanent members collaborated over imposing a cease-fire, threatening to use sanctions if either party did not

---

<sup>141</sup> Hume, Cameron R. *The Security Council in the Twenty-First Century*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Page 613.

<sup>142</sup> Hume, Cameron R. *The Security Council in the Twenty-First Century*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Page 609.

<sup>143</sup> Smith, Edwin M. *Collective Security: Changing Conceptions and Institutional Adaptation*, in *Adapting the United Nations to a Post-Modern Era: Lessons Learned*. Edited by W. Andy Knight. Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, 2001.

comply.<sup>144</sup> The change from the Cold War period is clear as over 90% of all resolutions referring to Chapter VII of the Charter have been adopted after the end of the Cold War.<sup>145</sup> Now the Council adopts roughly one such resolution a week while previously it adopted one such resolution or not even one every month. This increase can be seen on the figure in chapter 4.2 where the number of general resolutions is also displayed and discussed. The importance of the increase in Chapter VII resolutions can be sharply contrasted from that of other resolutions because they carry more weight for the parties to the dispute and the international community as they have a binding nature, while all other resolutions adopted have not.<sup>146</sup> The indication is that after the end of the Cold War the Council seems to take “stronger” decisions regarding peace and security, that is, it is more willing to use the stronger enforcement measures available to it.

A final point to examine would be the number of conflicts that the Security Council examines, which has also risen. The approach of the Council to conflict has also become more in-depth with each occasion.<sup>147</sup>

[T]he impact on the Security Council was swift and massive, and resulted in a quick succession of major breakthroughs in nearly all ‘regional conflicts’. This list includes the Iran-Iraq war, and the crises in Afghanistan, Central America, Namibia, Cambodia and, a few years later, South Africa. Suddenly it appeared as if there were no problem that could not be solved in the new spirit of goodwill, harmony and common security.<sup>148</sup>

Now, and from 1970, more than 90 percent of all disputes that are referred to the United Nations are referred to the Security Council rather than the General Assembly, a ratio that is likely to have increased even further since the end of the

---

<sup>144</sup> Hume, Cameron R. *The Security Council in the Twenty-First Century*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Page 607. See also Pétur Dam Leifsson. *Öryggisráð SP frá sjónarhóli þjóðréttar*. A speech at the University of Iceland’s Þjóðarspegill 7 December 2007. Chapter VII refers to the enforcement actions due to threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression while Chapter VI refers to peaceful settlement of disputes.

<sup>145</sup> Wallensteen, Peter and Johansson, Patrik. *Security Council decisions in perspective*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*.

<sup>146</sup> Pétur Dam Leifsson. *Öryggisráð SP frá sjónarhóli þjóðréttar*. A speech at the University of Iceland’s Þjóðarspegill 7 December 2007.

<sup>147</sup> Though the number of inter state conflict has decreased the number of intra state conflicts have increased.

<sup>148</sup> Dedring, Juergen. *The Security Council*, in *The United Nations at the Millennium: The Principal Organs*. Page 81.

Cold War.<sup>149</sup> The sheer number of conflicts referred to Council would mean that it is believed to be, at least, the ‘best worst’ solution available.

The substantial number of disputes submitted to the United Nations reflects a need that is fulfilled by the existence of such an organization and a willingness on the part of some of the parties to rely on UN contributions to seeking solutions to the problem. Small states have been especially willing to request UN aid in conflict resolution.<sup>150</sup>

The same can be seen as well from the increased number of thematic issues dealt with.<sup>151</sup> In the figure below the issues on the Security Council agenda can be seen, with thematic issues that are the topic of the next chapter displayed in green.<sup>152</sup>

---


<sup>149</sup> Bennet, A. LeRoy and Oliver, James K, *International Organizations; principles and issues, seventh edition*. Pages 142-143.

<sup>150</sup> Bennet, A. LeRoy and Oliver, James K, *International Organizations; principles and issues, seventh edition*. Pages 142-143.

<sup>151</sup> Wallensteen, Peter and Johansson, Patrik. *Security Council decisions in perspective*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*.

<sup>152</sup> The picture is the authors, based on the *Annual report of the Security Council; Report to the General Assembly on its work*, can be accessed at: [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/annual06\\_toc.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/annual06_toc.htm) and [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org)

Figure 10



The Security Council has even gone further and taken on or rather started to live up its role as a norm setter in international relations and international law, both by following those norms and no less by setting new ones. Such approaches can be considered to be peripheral during the Cold War but for some time now have been actively used.<sup>153</sup> The most notable of these are in the field of weapons of mass destruction and the issue that has lately received the most attention, terrorism. The importance of the issue to the Council can be seen by the fact that about “a third of the resolutions regarding terrorism have been taken under Chapter VII, both before and after September 11.”<sup>154</sup> Contrary to common perception though, the Security Council was very much active in addressing terrorism prior to the attacks

<sup>153</sup> Hurd, I. The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992–2003, *International Organization*, Cambridge University Press 2005, Volume 59, number 3, pages 495-526.

<sup>154</sup> Wallensteen, Peter and Johansson, Patrik. *Security Council decisions in perspective*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Page 29.

of September 11.<sup>155</sup> Sanctions against Libya, Sudan and against the Taliban regime had all been adopted before these attacks and the Council had also adopted some of these resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Following the 11 September attacks, it has further involved itself in the domestic realm of states through its counter-terrorism 'legislation', in particular on measure that states should take to suppress terrorist financing.<sup>156</sup>

Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001 can however be seen as a turning point in many ways for the Council as in this Resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council created a Counter-Terrorism Committee, tasked with among other things the monitoring of financial networks supporting terrorism and safe havens for terrorists.<sup>157</sup> The Resolution was unique, not only for its global reach and binding effects for all member states of the UN, but no less for the norm setting nature of the Resolution, bordering on a legislative function. The Council clearly expanded its reach with this Resolution.

The Security Council of the Cold War attempted to secure the military security of states and to prevent the risk that a great power conflict would break out. Its cornerstone was the sovereign state. As was predicted by Keohane and Nye, the issues addressed by the Council have little by little been moving from traditional conflict to conflict within states and civil wars; and in the last years the impact of refugees on conflict, the role of natural resources, and other issues traditionally considered 'soft' security issues - including human security - have started to make

---

<sup>155</sup> Malone, David M, *Conclusion*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004 Page 629.

<sup>156</sup> Roberts, Adam and Zaum, Dominik. *Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945*. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers nr. 395, 2008. Page 57.

<sup>157</sup> Malone, David M, *Conclusion*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Page 630. The corresponding resolution in the case of weapons of mass destruction is UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted on the 28 of April 2004 established for the first time binding obligations on all UN member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials and setting up a committee to monitor compliance with the Resolution. For further refence see Resolution 1540 (2004), [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_resolutions04.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html)

their mark on the Council. These issues, among others, are generated and characterized by the increased interaction between other actors than states, trans-border phenomena, and most importantly the decreased role of the military.

Underlying many of the Security Council's innovations, in particular those that have come about since the end of the Cold War, has been an important normative shift that has manifested itself in the expansion of what the Council considers a threat to international peace and security.<sup>158</sup>


The substantive approach of the Council has thus widened and most importantly deepened, and the Council now addresses more issues including even issues that were considered taboo during the Cold War period, displayed in the figure below.<sup>159</sup> The figure displays well the change that has been taking place from hard security to that of including internal conflicts and terrorism, issues closer to the softer end of the spectrum. The role of natural resources, climate change, refugees and other cross-cutting issues have then moved the Council further along the security spectrum and broadening its approach. The only part of the whole security spectrum that the Council seems not to have addressed in itself is human security in its purest form, though the Council has done so indirectly through its approaches to thematic issues which are the subject of the next discussion.

---

<sup>158</sup> Roberts, Adam and Zaum, Dominik. *Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945*. Page 56. A clear contrast from the Cold War period is when India tried in 1971 to justify an intervention in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) on humanitarian grounds, highlighting human rights violations on the Bengali population which were resulting in massive refugee flows to India. It failed to gain support of the Council, save USSR and Poland, while these arguments would have held better ground after the end of the Cold War, most notable could be the cases of Rwanda, Haiti and Somalia.

<sup>159</sup> Figure on the following page is constructed by author, among other based on the ideas of Alyson Bailes on the Security Spectrum seen in Appendix 1.

Figure 11



## 6.2 The Security Council's thematic issues

Human security can be seen to be the purest form of individual security, as discussed in chapter 2.1 on security. This concept was actually first popularized in the work of UN agencies on 'human development', but has started to appear also in the approach of the Security Council since the end of the Cold War.<sup>160</sup> Its influence can be seen most notably in the range of thematic issues addressed in UNSC texts such as Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security and Resolution 1379 (2001) on children and armed conflict.

If the thematic issues themselves are now looked at more specifically, they can in fact be viewed as being an answer to demands on the Security Council to deal with these new, 'softer' security issues, though their topics of course also reflect the specific concerns giving rise to resolutions and arising in individual countries

<sup>160</sup> For further discussion refer to chapter 2.1

and areas. Thematic issues are usually, if not always, placed on the agenda and the discussion of the Council defined by the presidency of the month, which rotates between the permanent and non-permanent members of the Council.<sup>161</sup>

In contrast to the full-year term of the General Assembly's president, the presidency of the Security Council rotates monthly by English alphabetical order of states. The president has some control over the agenda – the calling of meetings and Council debate – but his rulings are subject to challenge by the Security Council.<sup>162</sup>

The idea of thematic issues is, as previously discussed, for the Council to be able to address cross-cutting issues that relate to peace and security in the world. Example of such thematic issues are; *natural resources and conflict, small arms and light weapons, terrorism and the protection of civilians in conflict*. These resolutions are thought to have achieved certain results that would have been hard to address in country-specific resolutions as they transcend borders, dealing with issues that may not have a territorial base and means of expression, and can also be a matter of concern in cases involving no overt armed conflict. An example of such a resolution is Resolution 1325 (2000) on *women, peace and security* which has for example increased the number of women deployed in peacekeeping missions, making them more capable of reaching the women of the societies in conflict. Another example of such a resolution could be Resolution 1368 (2001) on *threats to international peace and security caused by terrorism* and various resolutions on *children in armed conflict*, including Resolution 1379 (2001). These resolutions have been mentioned in particular as they have focused attention on the given issue and thereby have affected the political approach to the topic in international relations.<sup>163</sup> The division between issues of all meetings of the Security Council for a working year has been displayed on the figure below,

---


<sup>161</sup> Letter dated 19. February 2004 from the Permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. 20 February 2004. United Nations, document nr: S/2004/135, and Letter dated 26. June 2006 from the Permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. 30 February 2004. United Nations, document nr: S/2006/483.

<sup>162</sup> Bennet, A. LeRoy and Oliver, James K, *International Organizations; principles and issues, seventh edition*. Page 72.

<sup>163</sup> Letter dated 19. February 2004 from the Permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. and Letter dated 26. June 2006 from the Permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

where it can be seen that thematic issues account for only four percent of the total meetings of the Council.<sup>164</sup> This can be misleading as the impact of these thematic issues has repercussions across many individual, national or regional issues, as reflected both in the choice of security issues that the UN chooses to address in the first place, and in the wider range of functional tasks the UN now considers necessary in handling individual conflicts and peacebuilding (eg gender advisors in DPKO).

Figure 12



A certain frustration can be detected among the permanent members of the Council with the increase of all these new topics and they have now started to try to restrain their number.<sup>165</sup> Another criticism that is sometimes heard is that even

<sup>164</sup> The picture is the authors, based on the *Annual report of the Security Council; Report to the General Assembly on its work*, can be accessed at: [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/annual06\\_toc.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/annual06_toc.htm) and [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org)

<sup>165</sup> *Letter dated 19. February 2004 from the Permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.* and *Letter dated 26. June 2006 from the Permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.* This can also be seen as a typical realist approach to the new security spectrum as the new 'softer' issues do not fit into their schedule. It can also simply mean that the Council is overworked with all the conflict of the world.

though the Council has turned towards a more involved and complex role in international peace and security it has not been able to see through all of the topics it has addressed and remedies it has proposed into the implementation phase. The credibility of the Council has suffered from adding more resolutions to the existing pile of resolutions that cannot be implemented. It is better to have fewer, better decisions that can be followed through and implemented.<sup>166</sup>

No position is taken here for or against those arguments but the importance of the non-permanent members' ability to add new security concerns to the agenda of the Council becomes relevant if there is a possibility that the permanent members are not willing to do so. In the final report of the Danish Permanent Mission to the UN on their contribution during their term in the Security Council for the years 2005-2006 indicates that it is indeed hard for smaller states to initiate and follow through on issues such as the new security issues and a great amount of effort is needed to do so. Most non-permanent members of the Council will thus most often stick to the agenda and try to avoid offending the bigger countries on the Council.<sup>167</sup> The Danish did nevertheless, for example, manage to put the Peacebuilding Commission, with help from other non-permanent members of the Council, on the agenda of the Council as they worked hard for its inclusion.<sup>168</sup> Another example would be Colombia, as when presiding over the Security Council, initiated a presidential statement on the practical issues that the Council could address to hamper the negative impact of small arms on security.<sup>169</sup> A new view or a new perspective on security, such as Colombia could claim that it possessed based on its own experience on the impact of small arms, was here an important aspect of the logic of including the issue on the agenda of the Council. "[S]maller delegations can make a difference in the Security Council, but usually because they have a very strong ambassador with a strong personality, or because

---

<sup>166</sup> Letter dated 19. February 2004 from the Permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. and Letter dated 26. June 2006 from the Permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

<sup>167</sup> Løj, Ellen Margrethe. *Denmark's Membership of the UN Security Council: what came out of it?* in the Danish foreign policy yearbook 2007. Edited by Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, Danish institute for international studies, 2007.

<sup>168</sup> Løj, Ellen Margrethe. *Denmark's Membership of the UN Security Council: what came out of it?*

<sup>169</sup> (S/PRST/2001/21) Discussion on the thematic issue of *small arms* and the role of Colombia can be found at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/articles/art-indx.htm>

he or she has much to contribute in substance on certain issues.”<sup>170</sup> It is therefore possible for smaller, less powerful states to address these new security concerns at the Council, even though the permanent members are not encouraging it.

### 6.3 The Security Council and peace operations

Another indication of this change in the workings of the Security Council is the increased number of peacekeeping missions that the Council mandated in the 1990s, which multiplied in a short time. The picture shows the timeline of operation of peacekeeping mission that the Security Council has mandated since its foundation. As clearly displayed with the orange color on the figure below the number of missions mandated in the 1990s has substantially increased and is multiple that of the Cold War.<sup>171</sup> “During the 40 years from 1948 to 1987, only 13 operations were authorized by the Security Council and the General Assembly. In the following twenty years (1988-2007) the Council established a further 50.”<sup>172</sup>


---

<sup>170</sup> Pröstur Freyr Gylfason. *The distinctive characteristics and behaviour of smaller states which have been elected members to the United Nations Security Council*, BA-thesis in Political Science, instructor: Ragnar G. Kristjánsson, University of Iceland, 2004. Page 51.

<sup>171</sup> The picture on the following page is taken from the webpage of the UN Department: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/>, and the number of missions mandated after the year 2000 is not reflective of all mission to date.

<sup>172</sup> Roberts, Adam and Zaum, Dominik. *Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945*. Page 54.

Figure 13



As discussed earlier, when security was defined in military terms and conflict was between states, actions to preserve peace were also defined in military terms and led to peacekeeping being defined in the same way. In his Agenda for Peace, former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali put forward in 1992 new approaches to peacekeeping which can be seen to reflect the UN's and the Security Council's approach to this changing security environment. He felt it was clear that the peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts of the Cold War were insufficient to deal with the new conflicts that were flourishing within states. Boutros Ghali believed that the peace efforts of the UN and the Security Council in particular could be divided into four categories, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

*Preventive diplomacy* can include everything from sending fact finding missions to preventive deployment of peacekeepers, as was done in the FYR of Macedonia, and even early warning systems of conflict. *Peacemaking* refers to actions under Chapter VI of the Charter such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement between the parties to the conflict, but no less to all forms of sanctions, like those applied in the case of Iran. *Traditional peacekeeping*

revolves around troops being deployed to stand in between the parties to the conflict that have reached a ceasefire, with the task of monitoring or maintaining peace while a political settlement is reached. *Peacebuilding* refers to actions that have come to be understood as prerequisites of peace as the understanding of the complex interplay between peace and the rebuilding of societies has grown, and most people have realized that it is necessary to support societies that are in the early stages of recovering from conflict.<sup>173</sup> This new task can include traditional peacekeeping, but in this context it is designed to support civil structures in post-conflict reconstruction with the aim of stabilizing and promoting peace. With the interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Afghanistan it became clear that a new approach, *peace enforcement*, was necessary to encompass those deployments where the consent of the parties to the conflict is absent. This can also be related to the prevalence of new security actors as discussed previously. For example, NATO and the US were mandated by the Security Council to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia despite the lack of consent from parties to the conflict: to an extent there was no real, functional government, but there were also so many different actors that any form of consent would have been hard to secure. As these missions were mandated by the Council to, at least partially, enforce peace their rules of engagement had to be wider and more powerful than previous missions. Such actions had indeed been used by the UN in the Korean War, but those actions can hardly be used as an example for post-Cold War conditions as they were approved by the Security Council, with the Soviet delegate absent and against the Soviet Union's will.<sup>174</sup> The scope of activities that the UN peacekeepers fulfill has thus widened significantly since the supervise ceasefires and patrolled buffer zones of the Cold War.<sup>175</sup>

---

<sup>173</sup> Bellamy, Alex J., Williams, Paul and Griffin, Stuart. *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Polity Press and Blackwell Publishing, Cambridge, 2004. For a fuller discussion on the issues discussed here belonging to conflict prevention, such as that of the preventive diplomacy and some of the peacemaking tools please refer to Cousens, Elizabeth M. *Conflict Prevention*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

<sup>174</sup> Bellamy, Alex J., Williams, Paul and Griffin, Stuart. *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

<sup>175</sup> Roberts, Adam and Zaum, Dominik. *Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945*. Page 54.

Peacekeeping operations have been responsible for the organization and monitoring of elections (e.g., UNTAC in Cambodia and MONUC in the DRC); have supported refugee return (e.g., UNPROFOR in Bosnia and UNAMIR in Rwanda); have implemented programmes to disarm and demobilise former combatants (e.g., UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone and UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia); have supported the delivery of humanitarian aid (e.g., UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and UNOSOMs I and II in Somalia); and have been deployed to prevent the spillover into a country of a neighbouring conflict (UNPREDEP in Macedonia).<sup>176</sup>

Figure 14

Name	Description	Conciliatory actions	Enforcement Actions	Military actions	Consent of parties	Social reconstruction
Preventive diplomacy	Fact finding missions, early warning of potential conflicts, confidence-building measures and preventive deployment	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Peacemaking	Negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement between the parties to the conflict, in addition to all forms of sanctions	Yes	Yes	No	Yes/No	No
Peacekeeping	Stand in between the parties to the conflict that have reached a cease fire and are intended to monitor or maintain peace while a political settlement is reached	Yes/No	Yes/No	Yes	Yes	No
Peace enforcement	Intended to enforce peace mandated by the SC under Chapter VII of the Charter and have for that a wider enforcement mandate and rules of engagement	Yes	Yes/No	Yes	No	Yes/No
Peacebuilding	Can include traditional peacekeeping but it's function is to support civil structures in post-conflict reconstruction with the aim of stabilizing and promoting peace	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Here above these different reactions to threats to peace and security in the world have been displayed for ease of comparison.<sup>177</sup> They have been categorized according to whether they include conciliatory actions, enforcement actions, and military actions; whether the consent of parties is needed, and if they include

<sup>176</sup> Roberts, Adam and Zaum, Dominik. *Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945*. Page 54.

<sup>177</sup> The table is constructed from ideas put forward in Bellamy, Alex J., Williams, Paul and Griffin, Stuart. *Understanding Peacekeeping* and Boutros Boutros-Ghali. *Agenda for Peace*, Report of the Secretary-General, pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. General Assembly resolution A/47/277 – UN document reference S/24111. For a fuller discussion of B.B. Ghali's Agenda for Peace see: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/ghali/2002/0203ten.htm>.

social reconstruction. The table clearly displays the different degrees of approaches by the Council.

What previously was considered an absolute rule, namely the consent of parties to the conflict, was now starting to matter less as peacemaking and peace enforcement missions increased substantially. Social reconstruction, an issue thought previously to belong to the field of development, was now related to security and peace and thus moved up the agenda of the Council.<sup>178</sup> The most important factor of this change in the approaches to peace is the fact that the “tool box” of the Council was enlarged and made the Council more able to deliver on its mandate.<sup>179</sup>

Figure 15



Whereas peacekeepers had before placed themselves between parties to conflict and often helped to prolong ‘frozen’ conflicts, as of the 1990s the Council could now react to conflict in a more varied way. The fact that a large portion of those states that experience conflict will fall into conflict again within ten years is likely to have had an impact on this, as it increased the understanding that states should

---

<sup>178</sup> For a fuller discussion of this topic please refer to: Security Council addresses comprehensive approach to peace-building: <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/sc7014.html>, and the UN’s lessons learned on “Multidisciplinary peacekeeping: lessons from recent experience”: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/lessons/handbuk.htm>

<sup>179</sup> Wallensteen, Peter and Johansson, Patrik. *Security Council decisions in perspective*, in The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century. The picture on the page is the authors.

be monitored, built up and their status as a peaceful state secured.<sup>180</sup> Here above this process has been displayed as a cyclic figure to present the idea that this can be a continuous process instead of a simple line that has a beginning and an end. It is also necessary to see that more than one peace action can be used at the same time.

#### 6.4 Conclusion on a new Security Council in a new security spectrum

Even though the Security Council is based on the same Charter rules as it was during the Cold War it can be asserted in no unclear terms that a new, functional Security Council has emerged on the basis of the old one.<sup>181</sup> The number of meetings and resolutions has dramatically increased, the Council now more often reacts unanimously and deals with an increased number of issues as well as more complex ones.

Some might be inclined to dismiss this line of argument as one-sided, too narrowly focused on the positive changes in the Council. Yet the simple fact is that the most notable changes in the work of the Council have been of a positive nature. Even so, the Council still does not fully “use” its mandate and some problems of the Cold War persist. The five permanent states have the most information necessary for effective decision making which they do not always share. This also holds true for the staff of the UN: they forge a long term relationship with the P-5 states and non-permanent members will thus not get as much information as the permanent states. An example is the claim that during the Rwanda genocide, reports from the peacekeeping force were withheld by the Secretariat from the Council which of course led to uninformed decision making

---

<sup>180</sup> Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2003) ‘Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy’ World Bank.

<sup>181</sup> Smith, Courtney B. *Politics and process at the United Nations; The global dance*, page 164. See also Wallensteen, Peter and Johansson, Patrik. *Security Council decisions in perspective*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*.

in the beginning of the crisis by some states.<sup>182</sup> Another problem that still persists is that tradition dominates the Council, which puts the non-permanent members at a disadvantage and the permanent members in a dominant position thanks to knowing the details necessary to be effective within the Council. The General Assembly is also resisting what it sees as a power grab from the Security Council on many issues traditionally in its own power domain, so a certain power struggle can be experienced between the two bodies.<sup>183</sup> The experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan have also put this change into perspective. It is hard to claim that a brave, new Council has taken up leadership for the world when it sat and watched endlessly while human suffering was taking place and still is taking place. The assessment of the ‘new’ SC is in no way a black and white picture.

It is important to note that this change may also not go unchallenged. The dominance of the United States in the international system may make other states call this increased activity of the Council into question.

US-dominated consensus raises greater difficulties with the apparent expansion of the Council’s mandate by redefining threats to international peace and security. Continued resort to these non-traditional initiatives may lead UN member states to express serious reservations about the Council’s actions. With its new status as the sole superpower, the United States may be even more suspect in non-Western eyes. Without broader representation, the Council itself may fall subject to the same doubts.<sup>184</sup>

This fact is believed to have materialized in the Council’s involvement in Haiti, driven by US action, and the Council’s inaction in Rwanda, believed to have been

---

<sup>182</sup> “What is more surprising is that none of these warnings was presented to the members of the Security Council. While the permanent members with their considerable intelligence gathering ability had some knowledge of what was prepared, and particularly the governments of France and the US, no specific information was ever shared with the non-permanent members on the Council.” Melvern, Linda. *The Security Council: behind the scenes*, *International Affairs*, 2001, Vol 77, nr. 1, pages 101-111.

<sup>183</sup> Bailey, Sydney D. and Daws, Sam. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Third Edition*. Page 3.

<sup>184</sup> Smith, Edwin M. *Collective Security: Changing Conceptions and Institutional Adaptation*, in *Adapting the United Nations to a Post-Modern Era: Lessons Learned*. Edited by W. Andy Knight. Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, 2001. Page 45.

driven by US inaction.<sup>185</sup> Another explanation for this selectivity is also believed to reflect the political realities that the Security Council acts within: rather than the unwillingness to act, member states are simply not willing to provide the forces needed for the Council to fulfill its role. The increased activity of Russia and China, although at first instance it may seem to hinder the work of the Council, may indeed also serve the long term interest of the Council as it ensures that UN action serves the interests of a broader set of member states and counters US dominance, thus minimizing the risk of reservations being made.

How do these changes reflect upon the single new security threat that was distinguished from the others in the previous chapters? This is hard to judge unless climate change is clearly established as a security threat. The next section will therefore, elaborating on the introduction in chapter 2.6, consider to what extent climate change presents the picture of a new security threat in the context of the new Security Council.

---

<sup>185</sup> Roberts, Adam and Zaum, Dominik. *Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945*. Page 8. An interesting fact in relation to environmental security is that one of the reasons cited by the Department of Defence for the societal decay in Haiti was deforestation, soil erosion and water pollution. See Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia's revenge: Climate change and humanity's loss*, page 6.

## 7.0 Climate Change as a Security Threat.

The underlying causes of conflict are often overlooked when dealing with the complexity of armed conflict. One of the factors that is regularly overlooked is the security implications of climate change and the impact climate change has as a conflict primer.<sup>186</sup> The new, emerging security threat of global climate change has until recently mostly been defined in economic terms. It can however be shown that it is a part of that larger multidimensional security concept that needs to be dealt with in today's globalized world; principally in the continent of Africa where vulnerability to this threat is particularly high.<sup>187</sup>

Chapter 2.6 above set out the general argument for characterizing climate change as a security issue within an inter-related, multidimensional security spectrum. Here the argument will focus on its connection with other issues addressed by the UN and SC, leading to the conclusion that the SC can and should address itself to the issue and help finding solutions. Indeed, the case of climate change will be used in order to argue that the SC is likely to move further into holistic approaches to security situations of nations or societies in the future.

As already noted, when examining the security threat posed by climate change it is necessary to examine two different scenarios. The former is that of an abrupt climate change scenario where climate change in itself becomes a security threat.

---

<sup>186</sup> Though the issue of climate change as a security threat is now on the rise it has been argued that climate change has always been linked to security, supported by historic examples of climate shifts or extremes of weather triggering conflict and even contributing to the rise and fall of civilizations and nations. Climate change is believed to have (at least partially) caused the Huns and German tribes to attack the Roman empire in the fourth and fifth centuries CE and the Muslim expansion into the Mediterranean in the eighth century. The fall of the Chinese Tang dynasty could also be connected to climate change as well as the disappearance of the Mayan world, see Dupont, Alan. *The Strategic Implications of Climate Change*, in *Survival*, page 31.

<sup>187</sup> The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability was Africa, due to its low adaptive capacity and also the possible interplay between the impact of climate change and other societal problems in the continent. See discussion in chapter 7.4.

Though this may not happen as of today the risk posed needs to be assessed and the threat cannot be disregarded.

The second scenario is closer to today's current reality and is already taking place or is quite likely to take place. It concerns the indirect impact of present and 'creeping' climate change on economic and human security and state behavior in a number of dimensions, including the sources and courses of armed conflicts.

### 7.1 Direct-Abrupt security scenario of climate change

A daunting report was published in October 2003 named "An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security".<sup>188</sup> There had been others before and more would follow, but this report in particular was of interest as it was prepared and paid for by the U.S. Department of Defense, the Pentagon.<sup>189</sup> That the Pentagon was ready to support a report of this nature, despite the well-known fact that the Bush Administration did not believe climate change to be real, can be considered quite a statement.

The conclusions of the report might be surprising as it suggests war will break out due to drops in temperatures, rather than increases as the world is currently experiencing. The authors base this on evidences from previous periods in the earth's history.

---

<sup>188</sup> Appendix one in Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia's revenge: Climate change and humanity's loss*. Other reports have followed for the same audience, for example: *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*, CNA Corporation, 2007. Can be accessed at: <http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/>

<sup>189</sup> The report was commissioned by Andrew Marshall, a long time head of the US Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessments and arguably the most influential thinker in the Pentagon over the past three decades. See Dupont, Alan. *The Strategic Implications of Climate Change*, in *Survival*, Page 30.

The research suggests that once temperature rises above some threshold, adverse weather conditions could develop relatively abruptly, with persistent changes in the atmospheric circulation causing drops in some regions of 5-10 degrees Fahrenheit in a single decade. Paleoclimatic evidence suggests that altered climatic patterns could last for as much as a century, as they did when the ocean conveyor collapsed 8,200 years ago, or, at the extreme, could last as long as 1,000 years as they did during the Younger Dryas, which began about 12,700 years ago.<sup>190</sup>

The authors argue that this tipping point can be reached at any given point in the future climatic change, unleashing a catastrophic climate scenario, resulting in massive resource shortages, environmentally induced migration on an unprecedented scale and global conflict as a result.<sup>191</sup> Here the possible impact on the ocean conveyor can be considered as an example of such an abrupt climate change scenario. The picture below shows the Gulf Stream and its flow down from the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic where it mixes with other streams and currents. The stream functions, in much simplified terms, is due to the difference in weight of hot and cold water and more salted water and less salted water. Change in salt water in the Northern part or temperature changes in the South could thus impact the cycle.<sup>192</sup>


---

<sup>190</sup> Appendix one in Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia's revenge: Climate change and humanity's loss*. Page 164 in book, page 2 in appendix í skýrslu. Research has shown, as discussed in chapter 2.7, that environmental systems “may exhibit sudden changes or “threshold” effects, which means that it may be much easier than previously thought to push a system from one equilibrium state to a very different equilibrium state.” From Homer-Dixon, Thomas. *Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict*, in *World Security: Challenges for a new century*, second edition. Page 292.

<sup>191</sup> Appendix one in Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia's revenge: Climate change and humanity's loss*.

<sup>192</sup> For more discussion of the nature of the Gulf Stream see Quadfasel, Detlef. The Atlantic heat conveyor slows, in *Nature*. December 1 2005, Volume 438. The picture of the Gulf Stream on the following page is taken from the same source.

Figure 16



One of the likely effects of the abrupt scenario is that this stream is turned off and stops pushing warm water up towards the west coast of the US and Northern Europe. This could happen due to a number of reasons, for example the push of cold water from the melting Greenland glaciers flowing into the stream, disrupting the balance of more and less salted water and thus turning the conveyor off. For many this may sound unlikely, but oceanic evidence suggests that the Gulf Stream has already decreased in power by as much as 30% since the 1960's.<sup>193</sup> The effects of such a change, the single most important one being the possible collapse of the ocean conveyor, at least for Europe, could be devastating and have wide spread affect on all aspects of modern day life. Europe would be fighting over resources and migration from the North would increase pressures on already stretched populations, all in all a catastrophic scenario.


---

<sup>193</sup> Quadfasel, Detlef. The Atlantic heat conveyor slows, in *Nature*. Scientist disagree on the likelihood of such an event, some arguing it to be minimal while others go so far as to believe it to be over 50%, see discussion in Dupont, Alan. *The Strategic Implications of Climate Change*, in *Survival*, page 44.

## 7.2 Indirect- Current security scenario of climate change

Climate change has though, as is, not materialized in this way and is in itself not very tangible. The bigger impact of climate change is likely to be the *indirect threat*, to be experienced through other effects triggered by climate change. The basic argument goes that the environmental threat has an impact on the economic and social security of individuals, in particular in conflict zones. Lack of economic and social security, for example lack of clean water due to extreme weather or lack of rainfall, can have an impact on peace and stability in many instances. Conflict can then have a negative impact on the environment in many ways.<sup>194</sup> These connections can flow both ways, causing a vicious cycle.

Figure 17



Contrary to what may be common belief, the United Kingdom was not the first state to speak out on climate change as a security threat. States such as the Maldives, Tuvalu and other small island states have been trying to put the issue on the agenda of the international community for many years, and have been leading nations in the international arena on the issue of climate change as a security

<sup>194</sup> Kerr, Pauline. *Human Security*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. Page 93. The picture is that of the author.

threat. The United Kingdom was on the other hand the first permanent member to take the initiative to develop the issue as a security threat. In her speech to the General Assembly of the UN in 2006, Secretary of State Margaret Beckett, stated this opinion clearly:

Our collective responsibility to each other is nowhere more evident than in the huge challenge posed by climate change...When the Prime Minister appointed me as his Foreign Secretary in May [2006], he specifically charged me with putting climate security at the heart of our foreign policy. Our climate presents us with an ever-growing threat to international security. Dealing with climate change... Is no longer a choice, it is an imperative.<sup>195</sup>

The United Kingdom then went on to initiate a thematic debate in the UN Security Council on the 17 April 2007, but no resolution was adopted.<sup>196</sup> In its concept paper on the issue, the United Kingdom permanent mission to the United Nations laid out the fundamental security threats that climate change is likely to have on international peace and security, seen in the figure below.<sup>197</sup> The story of this SC initiative will be told in full in section 7.5, but here an initial sketch is given of each of the connected issues shown in the figure.


---

<sup>195</sup> Beckett, Margaret. *United Kingdom's Secretary of State, speech at the 61 General Assembly of the United Nations*, 22 September 2006.

<sup>196</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper. 28 March 2007. Can be accessed at: [http://unfccc.int/files/application/pdf/ukpaper\\_securitycouncil.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/application/pdf/ukpaper_securitycouncil.pdf)

<sup>197</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper.

Figure 18



### a) Border disputes

Growing populations of the earth, especially in developing countries, are likely to put strains on current resources. The countries of the Middle East and North Africa for example share important sources of water, both potable and for irrigation, and borders between the nations of the world have not all been settled. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former Foreign Minister of Egypt and United Nations Secretary-General, said in 1988 that “The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics.”<sup>198</sup> Though these disputes have so far been managed peacefully there is no guarantee that they will be in future when both population pressures and climate change will increase. Melting ice and rising sea levels will also put pressure on existing borders.

### b) Migration

First it is important to recognize that it is in no way a new phenomenon that environmental pressures shape human migration and settlement patterns.<sup>199</sup> The overpopulation of the earth and the environmental changes associated with

---

<sup>198</sup> Klare, Michael T. *Resource wars; The new landscape of global conflict*. Page 12. The picture is that of the author.

<sup>199</sup> Salehyan, Idean. *Refugees, climate change and instability*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be found at: <http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Salehyan.pdf>, see as well: Reuveny, Rafael. *Environmental Change, Migration and Conflict: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Explorations*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be found at: <http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Reuveny.pdf>

climate change are likely to result in sea level rise, lack of fresh water and extreme weather conditions that will substantially change current migration patterns and force more people to move against their will.<sup>200</sup> Some estimates have projected that up to 200 million people may be displaced due to climate change by the middle of the century.<sup>201</sup> This will put pressure on existing population's and is known to alter the economy, land distribution, access to water and political power balances in the receiving areas.<sup>202</sup>

Migration does not in itself lead directly to conflict. But it can alter the ethnic composition and population distribution within and between states, which can increase the potential for instability and conflict - particularly in situations of resource scarcity, and in already sensitive cross-border areas.<sup>203</sup>

Nationalistic ideas are already resurging in some states and societies that are facing these new pressures, creating the potential for internal conflict or forceful measures against the states of origin. Academics disagree, however, on whether the link to conflict is direct - that is, if environmental refugees contribute to conflict in their location - or indirect, that environmental refugees fleeing a climate war contribute by other means to conflict in their host region.<sup>204</sup>

### **c) Energy supplies**

Energy is by no means a new conflict primer, be it over oil or other sources of energy. Both US-led Gulf Wars have been attributed to motives linked with United States energy security, Russia has used natural gas as a means of settling disputes with its former satellite states, and China has blocked consensus on the conflict in Darfur due to its oil interests in the region. These are examples of cases where energy supplies are fought over, as in the case of Iraq, and where energy

---

<sup>200</sup> See for example Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia's revenge: Climate change and humanity's loss*. Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2007.

<sup>201</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper. Drought migration in East Africa, hurricanes in the Caribbean region, and flooding in Bangladesh have been cited as cases where people have left uninhabitable regions, see Salehyan, Idean. *Refugees, climate change and instability*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005.

<sup>202</sup> Reuveny, Rafael. *Environmental Change, Migration and Conflict: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Explorations*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Page 13.

<sup>203</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper.

<sup>204</sup> For a voice of dissent see Kibreab, Gaim. *Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of the Current Debate in Disasters*, 1997, Volume 21, number 1, pages 20–38.

supplies play a major geopolitical role in determining the outcome of conflict. Another case in point would be Angola, where, since fighting came to an end in 2002, the government has continued to use oil as a currency, both to maltreat its population and equally to buy protection from friendly nations.<sup>205</sup> Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State of the United States, made this second point clear in 1997, speaking on a Chevron oil platform off the coast of Angola. "Angolan oil already accounts for seven percent of U.S. imports -- three times as much as our imports from Kuwait in early 1990."<sup>206</sup> The intended comparison with the first Gulf War is clear; the US will defend Angola in the same way it defended Kuwait. Climate change is expected to complicate this relationship between energy and conflict even further, as changes continue both in energy consumption patterns and in the way these energy supplies are obtained and secured.<sup>207</sup>

#### **d) Other resource shortages**

Climate change is likely to make essential resources (notably freshwater, cultivable land, crop yields and fish stocks) more scarce in many parts of the world, particularly in already vulnerable societies. Resource scarcity threatens people's livelihoods, especially when changes occur relatively quickly. Much depends on the adequacy of adaptation strategies.<sup>208</sup>

Climate change is likely to affect food security, water security and other aspects of human security as populations and competition grows in those countries that already could be considered to be vulnerable, countries of the developed world. Research has for example shown that the "risk of hunger in Mali may increase from 34% of the population to 44% due to land degradation and further to 64 and 72% due to climate change..."<sup>209</sup>, moving Mali from category 4 to category 5, the

---

<sup>205</sup> *Human Rights Watch*, can be found at <http://hrw.org/doc/?t=africa&c=angola>.

<sup>206</sup> Koné, Elizabeth M. Jamilah, *The Right of Self-Determination in the Angolan Enclave of Cabinda*, Paper presented at the Sixth Annual African Studies Consortium Workshop, October 02, 1998. Can be accessed at: <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Workshop/kone98.html> in a chapter on "The enclave of Cabinda" paragraph "Local Actors in Cabinda".

<sup>207</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper.

<sup>208</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper.

<sup>209</sup> Page 373 in Butti, T. A., McCarl, B. A., Angerer, J., Dyke, P. T. and Stuth, J. W. The Economic and Food Security Implications of Climate Change in Mali, in *Climatic Change*, 2005, Volume 68, pages 355–378.

highest risk category in FAO's food security ranking.<sup>210</sup> Where limited resources become even scarcer, the competition over those resources could easily lead to conflict.<sup>211</sup> Resource shortages may not only lead to conflict in areas of shortage but also in areas where resources are abundant. This could for example be seen in the history of conflict in Somalia, where the environment was harsh and environmental change impacted the society but more importantly, warlords fought to secure areas which contained resources. It could be shown that these regions were less stable than those that already had limited resources.<sup>212</sup>

#### e) Societal stress

An underlying cause of poverty has been shown to be conflict. This causal effect does not flow in only one direction; poverty is also likely to lead to conflict.<sup>213</sup> Climate change is likely to hit the poorest the worst, not least because they will not be able to mitigate the effects or deal effectively with extreme weather conditions. Some states cite climate change as their most serious threat in meeting the UN Millennium Development Goals<sup>214</sup>: a view that the 2006 Stern Report on the economics of climate change supports, noting that "Climate change is a grave threat to the developing world and a major obstacle to continued poverty reduction across its many dimensions".<sup>215</sup> This may not lead to conflict entirely on its own but coupled with other conflict primers - such as inequality, weak states and ethnic disparities - may contribute to political violence and conflict both within and between nations.<sup>216</sup>

---

<sup>210</sup>Page 373 in Butti, T. A., McCarl, B. A., Angerer, J., Dyke, P. T. and Stuth, J. W. The Economic and Food Security Implications of Climate Change in Mali, in *Climatic Change*, 2005, Volume 68, pages 355–378.

<sup>211</sup> Klare, Michael T. *Resource wars; The new landscape of global conflict*.

<sup>212</sup> Webersik, Christian. *Reinterpreting environmental scarcity and conflict evidence from Somalia*. Paper presented to the 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, University of Kent at Canterbury, UK, 8-10 September 2001. Can be found at: [http://www.columbia.edu/~cw2266/Webersik\\_Canterbury\\_2001.pdf](http://www.columbia.edu/~cw2266/Webersik_Canterbury_2001.pdf)

<sup>213</sup> Justino, Patricia. *On the Links between Violent Conflict and Chronic Poverty: How Much Do We Really Know?* CPRC Working Paper 61, Chronic Poverty Research Centre.

<sup>214</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper.

<sup>215</sup> Stern Review: The economics of climate change. Executive summary. Can be accessed at: [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview\\_summary.htm](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_summary.htm) Page vii.

<sup>216</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper.

## f) Humanitarian crises

Humanitarian crisis on a larger scale can contribute to societies being destabilized. Drought, floods or other extreme weather conditions are likely to follow climate change and likely to impact most heavily on vulnerable nations, which are also the states most likely to fall into conflict.<sup>217</sup> Frankly speaking, if Hurricane Katrina was of such a scale that the richest country in the world could not deal effectively with it, how can the developing countries that are lacking infrastructure such as Myanmar or the poorer countries of Africa be able to do so? Such weather patterns can lead to societal stress, migration and direct loss of life in the societies affected.

### 7.3 How relevant is climate change as a security threat?

As argued above, it is now generally acknowledged that the issues generally termed ‘soft’ security can threaten peace and stability in the world, and that it is not possible any more to separate the agenda of traditional security from conflict threats based on the new security threats, such as climate change.<sup>218</sup> Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, stated this in 2006 in no unclear terms:

Climate change is a threat to peace and security. Change in rainfall patterns can increase tension between states and communities, lead to conflict and cause forced migration, particularly in states where poverty and instability are great. Because of that climate change needs to possess the same position in the minds of politicians as conflict, poverty and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>219</sup>

If the two overall, abrupt and gradual scenarios outlined above in section 7.1 and 7.2., are considered in global terms it will be seen that the threat assessment is

---


<sup>217</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper. See also Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. *The Environment and International Security*, in *World Security: Trends & Challenges at Century's Ends*. Pages 371-372.

<sup>218</sup> Cottey, Andrew. *Security in the new Europe*. Page 32.

<sup>219</sup> *Kofi Annan ávitar stjórnmálaleiðtoga*. Article in the newspaper “Morgunblaðid”, 16 November 2006, page 16.

different for each one. On the abrupt scenario, the authors of the Pentagon report themselves said that they have “created a climate change scenario that although not the most likely, is plausible, and would challenge United States national security in ways that should be considered immediately.”<sup>220</sup> If the threat assessment that was presented in chapter 2.2 above is applied to climate change, it becomes clear that the security implications of an abrupt climate scenario are considerable. The scale of impact would be devastating in many ways and the impact would be felt worldwide. The debated question is the likelihood of such a scenario. Most would say that the likelihood is low and therefore the threat would be medium.<sup>221</sup> The scale of impact is however of such a magnitude that this scenario could not be underestimated. Further research is needed to be able to estimate the likelihood correctly and to ensure that it is not being underestimated.

Figure 19



<sup>220</sup> Appendix one in Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia’s revenge: Climate change and humanity’s loss*.

<sup>221</sup> Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia’s revenge: Climate change and humanity’s loss*. Gaia’s revenge. Page 19. Picture taken from <http://www.charityvillage.com/cv/research/rom18.html>, edited by author.


The second, indirect or current, security scenario is more difficult to dissect. Above some of the possible impacts of climate change were put forward in a non-exclusive way or in any ranking of importance. The likelihood of different impacts of climate change leading to conflict or causing other threats to security can be seen to be different, as well as the possible impact of each one. Disruption of energy supplies has for example a relatively high likelihood and the possible impact is rising with rising demand for energy. Conflicts are already happening that are related to energy supplies, as in Sudan.<sup>222</sup> The risk of this can be considered medium and in certain cases the level has reached high. At the same time other threats, such as direct border disputes, have yet to materialize or the climate link to previous disputes has yet to be established. There is a certain difficulty with assessing this threat as the indirect threats can be hidden under layers of other reasons such as ethnicity or the will to gain territory. Until this link has been established the threat has to be evaluated low or at most medium. Water shortages and other shortages of natural resources are however likely to move this threat up the scale. When occurring together as they often will, the sources of indirect threat can raise the impact to medium and occasionally even to high, and the likelihood can be, as has been shown in the discussion above, ranging from low to high. This ranks the threat from indirect climate change scenario as medium to high, and in certain instances reaching critical levels.<sup>223</sup>

---

<sup>222</sup> Klare, Michael T. *Resource wars; The new landscape of global conflict*.

<sup>223</sup> Picture taken from <http://www.charityvillage.com/cv/research/rom18.html>, edited by author.

Figure 20



Applying the concept of security assessment discussed in chapter two, it is clear that climate change in general is a security threat. As to the implications, the *impact* could be devastating - as shown above - and wide ranging and the *vulnerabilities* associated are great. The troublesome part of this debate is the evaluation of the *likelihood* of the threat. The point of departure needs to be that with growing scientific backing for the hypothesis of man-made climate change, it will be hard for the international community to dismiss the possibility or ignore the threat as very unlikely.<sup>224</sup> This leads to the conclusion that decision makers worldwide are and will be obliged to deal with climate change as a credible threat.

<sup>224</sup> The case of the ozone layer can serve as a frightening warning against underestimating or dismissing the likelihood of the abrupt scenario of climate change. “When British scientists announced the appearance of a continent-sized “hole” in the ozone layer over Antarctica in 1985, the discovery sent shock waves through the scientific community. Although stratospheric ozone depletion had been the subject of intense study and debate for more than a decade, no one had predicted the Antarctic hole and no theory could account for it.” The lesson must be that the current knowledge on how our planet works is not sufficient to take it as an absolute truth and the possibility of a nasty surprise can not be dismissed. Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. *The Environment and International Security*, in *World Security: Trends & Challenges at Century’s Ends*. Page 373. See also discussion in Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia’s revenge: Climate change and humanity’s loss*, page 51, for a discussion of “creeping threats”. Jeffrey Mazo in Mazo, Jeffrey. Thinking the Unthinkable in *Survival*, June-July 2008, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 50, Number 3, simply believes that the “root problem of communicating climate risk is that the scale of consequences is so difficult to grasp. There simply is nothing in modern human

#### 7.4 Climate, poverty and conflict- A vicious cycle for Africa?

It has already emerged from the above discussion of security implications of climate change that the vulnerabilities associated with the latter are not distributed equally for all societies around the world. A common theme in describing the security problems associated with climate change, at least from the indirect threats, is that climate change will have a more serious impact in developing countries due to their perceived vulnerability.

In the absence of adaptation, climate change is expected to hit LDCs harder than DCs (IPCC, 2001b, 2001c). Key concerns in LDCs include threats to food security and health, economic decline, inundation of coastal areas, and (in some cases) physical existence. Key concerns in DCs generally are less extreme and more localized, including coastal erosion, damage to coastal property, adverse impacts on tourism, rising insurance costs, and declining crop yields. At the same time, LDCs have a lower capacity to adapt to climate change than DCs due to poverty, less technological advancement, and higher dependence on the environment for subsistence.<sup>225</sup>

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability was Africa, due to its low adaptive capacity and also the possible interplay between the impact of climate change and other societal problems in the continent.<sup>226</sup>

An example of this vulnerability is the case of West Africa which alone contains 11 of the world's 25 poorest countries and is currently one of the unstable regions

---

experience that prepares us for the devastating potential consequences of climate change...The response to the threat among the general public represents, in part, a failure of imagination.”

<sup>225</sup> LDC's here referring to Less Developed Countries and DC's to Developed Countries. Reuveny, Rafael. *Environmental Change, Migration and Conflict: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Explorations*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Page 23.

<sup>226</sup> Page 1146 in Brown, Oli, Hammill, Anne and McLeman, Robert. Climate change as the new security threat: Implications for Africa, *International Affairs*, 2007, Volume 83, number 6. Pages 1141–1154. For a discussion on the possible environmental change that Africa is likely to experience in the next decades see same source, pages 5 and 6.

of the world.<sup>227</sup> The region shares 25 trans-boundary watercourses and has experienced a marked decline in rainfall ranging from 15 to 30% depending on the area. The result is that the region's major rivers, the Niger, Senegal and Volta, are experiencing between 40 to 60% decrease in average discharge, having the potential of destabilizing the region.<sup>228</sup>

The case of Nigeria also shows how the interplay of oil and climate is well on its way to ravaging the land. The oil companies have control over 50% of agriculturally productive lands in the Niger Delta, the Sudan savannah ecology is changing to pure Sahel conditions, and the influence of the Sahara is increasing southwards leading the Fulani herdsman of the lower Sahel and Sudan savannah ecologies to move south. This puts existing populations in North Nigeria under pressure in addition to the extreme rainfall patterns experienced there, ranging from the most recorded rainfall in the 1950s to the least recorded rainfall in the 1980s.<sup>229</sup> Of the 37 cases of communal clashes reported in the same region in the years 1990-2005, 19 of these cases were related to land resources, 13 were related to agricultural land use and 4 related to oil and environment issues, though most of them materialized as ethnic or communal clashes.<sup>230</sup> Another study found that of all conflicts in northern Nigeria, including household/family conflicts, over half were resource related.<sup>231</sup>

---

<sup>227</sup> Draman, Rasheed. *Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship*. Prepared for the Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Prandram, Addis Ababa, May 19-23, 2003. Can be accessed at: [http://centroparlamentario.org/povertyreduction/seminar1\\_e.pdf](http://centroparlamentario.org/povertyreduction/seminar1_e.pdf)

<sup>228</sup> Niasse, Madiodio. *Climate-Induced Water Conflict Risks in West Africa: Recognizing and Coping with Increasing Climate Impacts on Shared Watercourses*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be accessed at: <http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Niasse.pdf>, Page 2.

<sup>229</sup> Fasona, Mayowa J. and Omojola, A.S. *Climate Change, Human Security and Communal Clashes in Nigeria*, A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be accessed at: [http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Fasona\\_Omojola.pdf](http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Fasona_Omojola.pdf), Page 2.

<sup>230</sup> The 15 years of conflict data was correlated with weather patterns of the preceding six decades. See Fasona, Mayowa J. and Omojola, A.S. *Climate Change, Human Security and Communal Clashes in Nigeria*, A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Page 2. See also Obioha, Emeka E. *Climate Change, Population Drift and Violent Conflict Over Land Resources in North Eastern Nigeria*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be accessed at: <http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Obioha.pdf>

<sup>231</sup> Nyong, Anthony. *Drought related conflicts, management and resolution in the West African Sahel*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be accessed at: [http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong\\_Fiki.pdf](http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong_Fiki.pdf)

This leads to the conclusion that contrary to common perceptions, climate conflicts are not a thing of the future, i.e. something to be aware of and take into consideration for future planning.

A new understanding of today's threats are at the same time emerging. In that way a new report from the United Nations Environmental Programme on the situation in Darfur in Sudan, that war-torn country, is a clear testimony on how **natural environment**, poverty and population increases have a intertwined impact and can be the root cause of conflict and terrible tragedies. In the report it is warned that a strong link exists between **environmental factors, land destruction, desertification and conflict**. This tells us that a richer understanding exists that sustainable development can be seen as precondition for a sustainable peace [Emphasis added by the author].<sup>232</sup>

Today's conflicts in Africa are grounded, at least partially, in climate change as displayed in the cases above. Another well-known claim is that the violence in Darfur and Somalia are based on the lack of access to food and water.<sup>233</sup> The civil war in the Ivory Coast is believed to have been based in part on ethnic clashes after a great number of people fled the northern part of Burkina Faso.<sup>234</sup> It can therefore be concluded that climate change is a credible and important security threat for Africa:

The Christian Aid charity warns that 184 million people could die in Africa alone as a result of climate change before the end of the twenty-first century, through floods, famine, drought, and conflict. Similarly, Oxfam relates climate change to droughts in northern Kenya, in turn leading to conflict between the Turkhana pastoralists and their neighbors.<sup>235</sup>

---

<sup>232</sup> Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladdottir. *Alþjóðasamstarf á 21. öld og öryggisráð Sameinuðu þjóðanna*. Speech by Iceland's Foreign Minister at the University of Iceland, 7 September 2007. Can be accessed at: <http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/frettaefni/raedurISG/nr/3831>

<sup>233</sup> Ban Ki Moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations. A Climate Culprit in Darfur, *The Washington Post*, Washington, DC, 16 June 2007, Can be found at: [http://www.globalsolutions.org/issues/darfur/ban\\_climate\\_culprit/](http://www.globalsolutions.org/issues/darfur/ban_climate_culprit/)

<sup>234</sup> Sachs, Jeffrey D. Climate Change Refugees. *Scientific American*, 1 June 2007. Can be accessed at: <http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=E82F5561-E7F2-99DF-36D3CB7EB5DA209C>

<sup>235</sup> Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Nordås, Ragnhild and Salehyan, Idean. *Climate change and conflict-The migration link*. Working paper series "Coping with crisis", International Peace Academy, May 2007.

## 7.5 Climate change on the agenda of the Security Council

States such as Kiribati, Samoa, Micronesia, St. Lucia and Tuvalu as well as the United Kingdom and African states have put forward the view that climate change is a threat to peace and security in their speeches in the General Assembly. Most of those that are already threatened by climate change belong to the groups of states called Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Pacific Island Forum, and Caricom as well as the African group.<sup>236</sup>

Figure 21

Small Island states on Climate change			
<p>...<b>Kiribati</b> is particularly vulnerable to the impact of global warming and sea level rise. For countries such as Kiribati global warming and sea level rise are critical security issues.</p> <p>Vice president Teima Onorio</p>	<p>Climate change issues remain a priority for the Pacific region. In our small islands, natural catastrophes are capable of destruction that devastates the entire country.</p> <p>Prime minister of <b>Samoa</b>, Tuila'epa Malielegaoi</p>	<p>As an island nation comprised mostly of low-lying small islands with large coastal areas, <b>Micronesia</b> is vulnerable to the adverse impact of climate change. Exposed to the effects of extreme weather events, our livelihood and traditions as island people, in fact our whole civilization, are under greater threat than ever before.</p> <p>Vice president Redley Killion</p>	<p>No other challenge to global security is more serious and threatening than the impacts of climate change... Please do not let <b>Tuvalu</b> sink.</p> <p>Ambassador Enele Sosene Sopoaga</p>

The Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) have in particular advocated fiercely for the Security Council to discuss the abrupt scenario and for the Council to examine and address climate change as a direct security threat. In a speech to the General Assembly the spokesperson for the PSIDS group, H.E. Mrs.

<sup>236</sup> The SIDS group consists of 37 states, Pacific Island Forum 14 states, CARICOM 15 states and the Africa group 53 states, though some states belong to more than one group. The table is compiled of speeches of the states, mentioned in bold in the table, from the 61 General Assembly.

Fekitamoeloa 'Utoikamanu, permanent representative of the Kingdom of Tonga made this intention very clear:

The PSIDS have drafted resolution titled “the threat of climate change to international peace and security”. The draft resolution was made available in June [2008] to all UN Member States, and the resolution will be discussed during the current 62<sup>nd</sup> session of the General Assembly. We have consistently spoke about the security implication of climate change; and now we are seeking the support of the full UN Membership to recognize climate change as a threat to international peace and security by adopting resolution at the 62<sup>nd</sup> session of the GA. The resolution simply asks the Security Council to consider and address the threat posed by climate change to international peace and security... The adoption of the resolution will be a positive reflection upon the shift of paradigm of UN Member States, to recognize the cross-cutting nature of climate change and fully recognize climate change as a threat to international peace and security.<sup>237</sup>

The reason why this issue has, nevertheless, not yet ranked higher on the agenda of the Council is that those states that have the most power on the Council have yet to feel the implications of climate change. Those states that already face the most direct implications of the change, as discussed above, do not carry much power in the international system or have resources to advocate for its inclusion, as they are mostly poor or small states.

The 2007 debate in the Security Council which has been mentioned here above marked a clear change as it was led by one of the permanent members, the United Kingdom. The opening of the UK concept paper makes this clear:

The focus of the debate will be on the security implications of a changing climate, including through its impact on potential drivers of conflict (such as access to energy, water, food and other scarce resources, population movements and border disputes). No other international forum has yet addressed these issues at this level.<sup>238</sup>

The discussion did, however, in the event focus exclusively on the indirect implications of climate change and this seems to reflect a certain compromise. Clearly, the Council was not ready to address the abrupt scenario that the

---

<sup>237</sup> 'Utoikamanu, Fekitamoeloa, Permanent representative of the Kingdom of Tonga, *Speech to the General Assembly as the spokesperson for the PSIDS group*, New York, 8 July 2008. Can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/ccact/psids.pdf>

<sup>238</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper.

countries mentioned previously, as well as the United Kingdom on this occasion, may have hoped that the Council would set its stamp on.

The immediate drivers of conflict are likely to remain national and regional power struggles; ideology; ethnic, religious and national tensions; and severe economic, social or political inequality. **The cumulative impacts of climate change could exacerbate these drivers of conflict, and particularly increase the risk to those states already susceptible to conflict**, for example where weak governance and political processes cannot mediate successfully between competing interests.<sup>239</sup> [Emphasis in the original]

Though at first sight this part of the UK draft might seem to imply skepticism on whether the abrupt and direct threat scenarios from climate change are real, in fact it probably reflects acceptance that there was not a consensus in the Council to include these issues in the first debate held.<sup>240</sup> It is also understandable that the Council would be more inclined to address the wider, current threat which was assessed above as being objectively a matter of medium or high threat for the world as a whole, and in its extremes capable of being at times both a low threat and also a critical threat.

One of the main worries of those opposing the thematic discussion of climate change in the Security Council, the most notable of them being China, was linked with the general concern of many that the Council has been invading the territory of other institutions of the UN, such as the General Assembly, or the ground covered by specific agencies and instruments such as in this case, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.<sup>241</sup> The United Kingdom mission took great pains to emphasize that it did not intend the SC discussion to overtake that of other bodies that have been addressing climate change.

---

<sup>239</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper.

<sup>240</sup> The UK governments position was clearly that the issue should have been dealt with as a whole, seen by the statement of the UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett above, chapter 7.2., as well as the statements of Tony Blair “there will be no genuine security if the planet is ravaged by climate change” and his chief climate-change adviser, Sir John Houghton, that believes climate change to be “a weapon of mass destruction” and at least as dangerous as international terrorism. See Dupont, Alan. *The Strategic Implications of Climate Change*, in *Survival*, page 29.

<sup>241</sup> *U.N. Council Hits Impasse Over Debate on Warming*. Article in the New York Times, April 18 2007. Can be accessed at: [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/18nations.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/18nations.html?_r=1)

A Security Council discussion will therefore make a useful initial contribution, while recognising that it is for other UN bodies (in particular the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) to pursue other aspects of climate change ... which are not within the Security Council's mandate... While the physical effects of climate change and what can be done about them are important issues, it is their potential impact on security that is the proposed focus of this Security Council debate.<sup>242</sup>

Another claim was that the Council had moved outside the scope of its mandate, not only in addressing climate change as a security issue, but in raising other similar issues that either were being addressed elsewhere or that it simply was not the role of the Council to deal with. Article 39 of the UN Charter, however, clearly sets out the fact that it is in fact the Security Council itself that determines “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression“, and more importantly decides itself “what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security“. <sup>243</sup> If the Council has been able to extend its reach into domestic affairs of states contrary to even the Charter of the UN itself, and to adopt far reaching and binding resolutions for all members of the UN while resting on this foundation in the Charter, it is hard to see why the Council should not be able to address the new issues of human security, such as that of climate change.<sup>244</sup> It is thus safe to assume that the:

Security Council has the legal authority to address the causes and consequences of climate change, and that its recent counter-terrorism and non-proliferation measures provide an illustrative institutional framework within which to address this emerging ‘threat to international peace and security’.<sup>245</sup>

Simply put, the powers of the Council are wide-reaching when it comes to security and it is therefore a powerful tool to address these new security threats.

---

<sup>242</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper.

<sup>243</sup> United Nations Charter, can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

<sup>244</sup> United Nations Charter, can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> Chapter 1, article 2(7).

<sup>245</sup> Penny, Christopher K. Greening the Security Council: climate change as an emerging “threat to international peace and security”, in *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, Volume 7, number 1, pages 35–71.

In the case of climate change this tool has not, however, so far been used fully to address its security implications. No resolution or presidential statement was adopted at the SC session on the 17 April 2007 as was done for many of the other new security threats, meaning that no decision was implemented. The discussion was not continued in 2008, although regular discussions on the thematic issues have also been a custom even if they do not need to be held yearly. This is thought to be mainly related to the loss of interest from the main contributor on the issue within the Council, namely the United Kingdom. The initiative in 2007 is thought to have originated directly from Tony Blair, a Prime Minister who took climate change to heart and fought hard for its inclusion. When Gordon Brown took over as Prime Minister the issue seems to have been put on the back burner, and UK action on remedial work was diverted to other forums like the EU, at least for the time being.<sup>246</sup> This may be attributed not only to the personal disputes between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown but also to the fact that the UK saw that the issue was a non-starter for the US under George W Bush and that no progress would have been made without their support on the issue.<sup>247</sup> The Chinese objections are also likely to have hindered further movement on the issue.

The Chinese and Americans may have been right to question the motives of the European permanent members which through the EU have invested great political capital in the issue of climate change and could be considered likely to start such a discussion simply to push for increased efforts on economic and technical remedies in the upcoming post-Kyoto negotiating process.<sup>248</sup> No conclusion on such motives will be offered here but this shows simply how complicated the process of working on new security threats within the Security Council can be.

---

<sup>246</sup> *Informal meeting with Colin Keating*, the Executive Director of Security Council Report, information on Mr. Keating can be found at:

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.1074753/k.CA22/STAFF.htm>

<sup>247</sup> *Informal meeting with Colin Keating*, the Executive Director of Security Council Report

<sup>248</sup> “The motive behind the debate was to open a new front in tackling climate change. If the defence establishment could be persuaded that climate change intensified the terrorist threat and fostered dangerous instability in strategic regions, then they would become a powerful ally in fighting global warming.” Harvey, Fiona. At boiling point, in the *Financial Times*, September 15 2008. Can be accessed at: [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d2fef714-7b0e-11dd-b1e2-000077b07658,dwp\\_uuid=5f962f4c-83f9-11dd-bf00-000077b07658.html](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d2fef714-7b0e-11dd-b1e2-000077b07658,dwp_uuid=5f962f4c-83f9-11dd-bf00-000077b07658.html)

There is no doubt, nevertheless, that in the eyes of many this debate was a big step and addressed a real need that the UN would sooner or later have to face up to in a more substantial fashion.

But we are not fully succeeding through our international cooperation. Perhaps it is because we have been treating climate change principally as an environmental issue. At best we recognise its socio-economic implications. But with this open debate in the Security Council, climate change is finally being recognised for what it is: Climate change is a significant security issue that requires the highest attention of world leaders.<sup>249</sup>

## 7.6 Conclusion on climate change as a security threat

This text has not offered any discussion of whether climate change is actually happening. For that the reader is referred to the IPCC and its extensive research on the matter.<sup>250</sup> Those who disagree on climate change most often do not dispute that environmental change is happening. They rather dispute whether the change is the result of human activity or a part of a natural cycle that would have happened regardless. For the purpose of discussing climate change as a security threat, this discussion is not relevant in the short term.<sup>251</sup>

Only the strongest opponents of climate change would believe climate change not to be a direct or indirect security threat. This is made clear, *inter alia*, by the fact that the US military has been considering climate change as a threat multiplier, that is, a force that can exacerbate other threats and increase the threat posed by

---

<sup>249</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Statement by Ambassador Hjalmar W. Hannesson, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the United Nations at an open debate at the Security Council on Energy, Security and Climate, 17 April 2007. Can be accessed at: <http://www.iceland.org/securitycouncil/Iceland-and-the-UN/Speeches-and-Statements/Speeches-and-Statements/nr/3866>

<sup>250</sup> *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, can be accessed at: <http://www.ipcc.ch/>

<sup>251</sup> IPCC formal definition says that climate change is “A change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.” Taken from IPCC website: <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/ipcc-glossary.pdf>. The dispute often revolves around what is human induced climate change, which according to IPCC is what the international community is dealing with and what therefore should be included. Though the large majority of relevant scientists believe climate change to be caused by human activity, see Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia's revenge: Climate change and humanity's loss*, page 4, this is an irrelevant discussion as for the purpose of discussing climate change as a security threat, this discussion does not have an impact in the short term as the security considerations still remain, irrelevant of who or what is causing the change itself.

them, regardless of the views held by President Bush as Commander in Chief.<sup>252</sup> The US national security act of 2010 is even expected to formally address climate change as a threat and the planning required for the US to deal effectively with the threat, set in motion during the Bush administration.<sup>253</sup> Retired Admiral T. Joseph Lopez has argued publicly that the war on terror will be extended due to factors rooted in climate change.<sup>254</sup> As is stated in no unclear terms in the UNDP Human Development Report of 2006:

Climate change now poses what may be an unparalleled threat to human development. Much of that threat will be transmitted through shifts in hydrological cycles and rainfall patterns and the impact of higher surface temperature on water evaporation. The overall effect will be to exacerbate risk and vulnerability, threatening the livelihoods, health and security of millions of people.<sup>255</sup>

Climate change may be dismissed as only an underlying cause of conflict that tips the balance of fragile societies towards conflict. But such objections are limited to a simplistic A to B connection. The truth is that today's world is complex and the challenges mankind faces are equally complex. No country or society is able to face these challenges on its own and consensus has been growing on the need for concerted and coherent efforts to combat these new, emerging security threats. All the analysis above suggests that states need to build a consensus on the fact that the environment is changing and that the international community needs to address the short term security concerns now while it continues discussing the long term impact. In sum, the international community needs to give increased attention to the security threat posed by climate change; especially in the case of Africa where vulnerabilities leave countries more exposed to its direct and indirect effects.

---

<sup>252</sup> Yackle, Terri A. *Global Climate Change: Threat Multiplier for AFRICOM?* Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2007.

<sup>253</sup> Yackle, Terri A. *Global Climate Change: Threat Multiplier for AFRICOM?*

<sup>254</sup> *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*, CNA Corporation, 2007. Can be accessed at: <http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/> page 17.

<sup>255</sup> *United Nations Development Report Human Development Report 2006*. Can be accessed at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/> Page 159.

## 8.0 The Future, what lays ahead

Regardless of whether the international community manages to strike an ambitious deal to follow the Kyoto Protocol, the inherent inertia of the climate system (whereby past emissions will cause future warming) means that a certain amount of climate change is ‘locked in’. Whatever happens to greenhouse gas emissions over the next few decades, Africa will still be faced by a range of serious challenges that will fundamentally change the productive landscape of the continent, redrawing the maps of rainfall, water availability, food production and population distribution.<sup>256</sup> The security implication of these changes cannot be underestimated. But how can this threat be addressed by the international community?

This distinction between threats and vulnerabilities points to a key divide in security police, namely, that states can seek to reduce their insecurity either by reducing their vulnerability or by preventing or lessening threats. These alternatives underline respectively, the ideas of national and international security. In other words national security policy can either focus inward, seeking to reduce the vulnerability of the state itself, or outward, seeking to reduce external threat by addressing its sources.<sup>257</sup>

One of the conclusions of chapter four was that the most important factor of the change in the approaches to peace of the Security Council is the fact that the “tool box” of the Council was enlarged and made the Council more able to deliver on its mandate. In terms of climate change and new threats this becomes particularly relevant, as previous forms of peacekeeping can only be seen to apply to the traditional threats to peace.

---

<sup>256</sup> Brown, Oli, Hammill, Anne and McLeman, Robert. Climate change as the new security threat: Implications for Africa, *International Affairs*. Page 13.

<sup>257</sup> Buzan, Barry. *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (2nd edition).

When there is a potential for conflict arising, the UN or the Council can implement preventive diplomacy in any form it sees fit: send peacekeepers as a preventive deployment, send diplomatic envoys, or in the case of climate change and other new security threats, warn of the potential connection between climate-driven root causes of the conflict that is rising so they can be corrected before conflict breaks out.<sup>258</sup> If moving on to prescribe or organize action, the Security Council could either seek to mitigate the root cause (i.e. the impact of climate change), or to minimize the risk that it will increase armed violence and seek to contain its general harm to human security. The second approach is examined here as the first approach seems, at least according to the view of most UN members, to be outside the current scope of the Security Council.

The main focus of such an approach would be to use the tools currently available to the Council, most importantly that of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding. In the case of peacemaking, aside from the extreme method of deployments for peace enforcement, these would include both negotiations and the softer enforcement mechanisms of the Council, such as economic sanctions. All or any of these could be applied to prevent, halt or end conflicts where climate impact was seen as a driver of conflict and more importantly intervene before these underlying factors due trigger conflict.

In the peacebuilding stage the society in question is assisted in rebuilding to avoid future conflicts. Knowledge of the root causes of the conflict are key here to prevent the society from relapsing into conflict, be it due to new security issues or traditional ones.<sup>259</sup> Logically, in a climate-influenced case the UN's efforts for this purpose would include identifying the climate-driven element in tensions and supporting local policies to solve the given problems in a more peaceful and effective way.

---

<sup>258</sup> For a fuller discussion of preventive deployment and its possibilities for preventing conflict please refer to Williams, Abiodun. *The United Nations and Preventive Deployment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, in *Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Era: Lessons Learned*, 2nd edition. Editor W. Andy Knight. Palgrave, 2001, where the deployment of preventive forces to FYR of Macedonia are discussed and lessons learned are analysed.

<sup>259</sup> Bellamy, Alex J., Williams, Paul and Griffin, Stuart. *Understanding Peacekeeping*, page 250.

The ‘tool’ of preventive diplomacy warrants a special examination in the case of climate change. Various UN Secretary-General’s have pointed out that the institution should increase its share in preventive action, the most recent of them being Kofi Annan in his report “In larger freedom”:

No task is more fundamental to the United Nations than the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Prevention, in particular, must be central to all our efforts...Although it is difficult to demonstrate, the United Nations has almost certainly prevented many wars by using the Secretary-General’s “good offices” to help resolve conflicts peacefully. And over the past 15 years, more civil wars have ended through mediation than in the previous two centuries, in large part because the United Nations provided leadership, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination and the resources to implement peace agreements.<sup>260</sup>

In his report “Agenda for peace” in the year 1992 the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, put forward similar ideas on the reform of the work of the institution. He addressed the need for an early warning system to warn of potential conflicts and the task of the UN to deal with conflict before it breaks out if possible, instead of trying to mediate ongoing conflict and deal with the aftermath of conflict.<sup>261</sup>

In the concept paper prepared by the UK mission in preparation for the discussion on climate change this idea was raised in one of the questions. “How can the Security Council play a part in a more integrated approach to conflict prevention as foreseen in UNSCR 1625, including greater emphasis on climate-related factors?”<sup>262</sup> Resolution 1625 (2005) is a declaration of the Council on how the UN can “enhance the effectiveness...in preventing armed conflicts and to monitor closely situations of potential armed conflict”.<sup>263</sup> It also requests the Secretary-General to assess “regularly the developments in regions at risk of armed conflict” and encourages “the Secretary-General to provide information to the Council on

---

<sup>260</sup> Secretary-General Kofi Annan, *In Larger Freedom*. Can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/> Article 106 and 108.

<sup>261</sup> Agenda for peace can be found at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html> The ideas that B.B. Ghali use are “early warning of potential conflicts” and “preventive diplomacy”. For a fuller discussion on the issues discussed here belonging to conflict prevention and how the Security Council has dealt with such issues please refer to Cousens, Elizabeth M. *Conflict Prevention*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*.

<sup>262</sup> *Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper.

<sup>263</sup> All references from this point are taken from Resolution 1625 (2005) can be accessed at: [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_resolutions05.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm)

such developments pursuant to Article 99 of the Charter.”<sup>264</sup> Article 99 of the Charter gives the Secretary-General the right to bring before the Council “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”<sup>265</sup> This view was reaffirmed in a presidential statement adopted by the Security Council on August 28 2007 which concluded that the UN should do more on preventive measures, such as addressing the root causes of conflict, developing early warning systems, mediating disputes and coordinating the efforts of U.N. bodies, regional organizations and others trying to prevent new wars.<sup>266</sup> The lack of resources allocated to preventive measures can also be starkly contrasted with the \$18 billion the Council has spent on peacekeeping efforts.<sup>267</sup> This is not to say that this was money that should not have been spent but it is easy to see that preventive measures should be considerably cheaper to deploy without even factoring in the cost associated for the communities in conflict. As thematic issues have become a part of the new Council’s work on the new security threats they can in many ways be seen to belong to the field of preventive work by the SC, based on the ideas of Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros Ghali which have been mentioned above. Even though there seems to be a certain weariness that has emerged on thematic issues they are still serving as impetus for change. A policy making resolution on climate change and conflict, similar to that of women, peace and security (1325), children in armed conflict (1261 or 1314) or even the stronger resolutions of the Council such as that on terrorism (1373) or weapons of mass destruction (1540), could have been adopted to emphasize and concretize the role of the UN and the Security Council in dealing with the security threat of climate change. Such a resolution could include setting up a monitoring body which could do research on the connection between climate change and conflict, and could offer predictions on where conflict would break out on the basis of climate change, be it for lack of water, floods or other environmental changes. According to Article 29 of the UN Charter “[t]he Security Council may

---

<sup>264</sup> All references from this point are taken from Resolution 1625 (2005) can be accessed at: [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_resolutions05.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm)

<sup>265</sup> United Nations Charter, can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>, article 99.

<sup>266</sup> *U.N. spent \$18 billion on peacekeeping in past five years, but not enough on conflict prevention*. Article in International Herald Tribune, August 29, 2007. Presidential statement on Maintenance of international peace and security, S/PRST/2007/31 of 28 August 2007. Can be accessed at [http://un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_pres\\_statements07.htm](http://un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_pres_statements07.htm)

<sup>267</sup> *U.N. spent \$18 billion on peacekeeping in past five years, but not enough on conflict prevention*. Article in International Herald Tribune, August 29, 2007.

establish such subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions<sup>268</sup> and in Article 34 it says that “[t]he Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”<sup>269</sup>

Precedents can also be found for the Security Council setting up institutions for following up on its resolutions, although the examples are not related to climate change. With Resolutions 808 (1993) and 827 (1993) the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and with Resolution 995 (1994) the Council set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).<sup>270</sup> The Security Council has also founded a special working group which is tasked with preventing and solving conflict in Africa.<sup>271</sup> That working group is intended to deliver reports to the Security Council on how to facilitate cooperation with other institutions of the UN in their approach to Africa.

One could even imagine a scenario were the Council would simply impose measures regarding climate change under Chapter VII as the Council has done with some of the new security threats, most notably on terrorism with UNSC Resolution 1373 and on weapons of mass destruction with UNSC Resolution 1540, as discussed in chapter 6.1. These Resolutions both set binding requirements on all members states of the UN as they were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter and set up monitoring committees for their implementation. More importantly they were norm setting in nature, even bordering on legislative, and addressed new security threats such as climate change has shown itself to be.

---

<sup>268</sup> United Nations Charter, can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>, article 29

<sup>269</sup> United Nations Charter, can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>, article 34

<sup>270</sup> *United Nations handbook 2005/06*. Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand, 2005.

<sup>271</sup> *United Nations handbook 2005/06*. Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand, 2005.

The Council did in fact set up a monitoring and a reporting mechanism in 2005 on the issue of the protection of children in armed conflict that would report on behavior of individual states.<sup>272</sup> In addition the Council reaffirmed its intention:

to consider imposing, through country-specific resolutions, targeted and graduated measures...against parties to armed conflicts on the agenda of the Council and in violation of applicable international law relating to the rights and protection of children in armed conflict.<sup>273</sup>

This setup could be imitated when setting up a system for climate change. In addition there is also a body which the Council could either defer power and resources or simply put under its control. This is the Global Climate Observing System, a partnership of UN agencies including the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the African Union (AU) which agreed in 2006 to intensify monitoring of global warming trends in Africa in a new initiative called ClimDev Africa but lacks resources for effectively delivering on this mandate.<sup>274</sup> The Council can thus refer to various previous actions in its decision to deal with climate change.

The ideas above are what can be seen as the optimal solution, and similar proposals might be developed with equal justification for other new threats to security, such as energy security which has been closely linked with climate change. What is likely to happen may be a more moderate version of the above, not because the Council does not have the skills, means or competence to deal with them as has been shown by the examples above, but rather because the will of the states in question is harder to predict. The change of leadership in the US is

---

<sup>272</sup> *Security Council establishes Monitoring, Reporting Mechanism on use of Child Soldiers, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1612 (2005)*. Press release on the 5235<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Security Council, 26 July 2005. Can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8458.doc.htm> and Resolution 1612 (2005) can be found at: [http://un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_resolutions05.htm](http://un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm)

<sup>273</sup> *Security Council establishes Monitoring, Reporting Mechanism on use of Child Soldiers, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1612 (2005)*.

<sup>274</sup> *U.N. to intensify Africa climate change monitoring*. Reuters AlertNet, 19 December 2006. Can be accessed at: <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L19513390.htm>

a good starting point for the Security Council to be able to address these threats, in particular climate change.

Global warming is one the greatest threats of this century. The basic facts are no longer in doubt... Unless we change course now, disruption of our climate system will wreak havoc on countless millions of lives in the decade ahead... For years, the US has lagged as other nations took the lead in meeting these threats. That much change. As president, Barack Obama will lead the US and the world in addressing climate change... But truly taking on climate change requires global cooperation. As president, Mr Obama will invite the world back to Washington and make it known that the US is ready to rejoin the community of nations in this challenge.<sup>275</sup>

The United Kingdom has already taken on leadership for the issue and France would likely follow suit as climate change is a priority for the EU as a whole. Russia is a wild card in this discussion. The move to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was a big gesture by Russia but the reasons behind it, whether designed to put more pressure on the US or simply wanting to address the issue and gain a seat at the table, remains unclear. China is likely to be the main source of opposition to such a resolution, seeing it as a possible power grab on behalf of the Security Council from the General Assembly or from the negotiation process on the agreement intended to replace the Kyoto Protocol.<sup>276</sup>

Seen with the lens of the two schools of thought that were presented above, the change in the presidency of the United States can have major consequences on the approach of all members of the Council, most notably the permanent members. China's view is a typical realist zero-sum approach as it questions the motives of the other permanent members in bringing the issue of climate change to the Council. China is left wondering if it is solely for the idealistic reasons proclaimed that these countries want the Security Council to examine climate change, or are they trying to blow smoke into the eyes of their negotiating partners in Copenhagen, where the states of the world will be meeting this year to discuss a

---

<sup>275</sup> Kerry, John. *Reach out to the World* in the *Financial Times*, September 15 2008. Can be accessed at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d574bb42-7b03-11dd-adbe-000077b07658.html>, page 19. Note that the article is written by John Kerry on behalf of Barack Obama.

<sup>276</sup> *Informal meeting with Colin Keating*, the Executive Director of Security Council Report. See also page 610 in Hume, Cameron R. *The Security Council in the Twenty-First Century*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*.

post-Kyoto climate agreement? Only time can show the Chinese the real motives of the other members as they will learn from the behavior of these states what their real intentions are. The arrival of president Obama, as discussed before, is likely to shake things up in any event, even for the Chinese realists. All in all, what is likely to happen is that there will be further engagement with the Security Council on the issue because the small and medium countries, following their typical neoliberal approach to security through collective international institutions, will see it as beneficial, and the bigger actors such as the United States will have increasingly strong realist motives - as the importance of the issue in the world's new security spectrum becomes more obvious - for addressing it in a forum where their own control and the leadership of Western ideas are still so strong a feature.

The truth is that predicting the future of the Security Council behavior is difficult for the simple reason that most of the Council members believe that they can resort to any action, given that they have the political support for it.<sup>277</sup>

The Security Council also considers itself to be above the law. In theory, the Council is bound by the provision of the Charter. But the Charter does not contain any constraints on the functioning of the Council except laying down the majority required for adopting decisions. Nowhere does the Charter say that the Council cannot deal with a particular subject or issue. The only restraint on the authority of the Council is the practical one of a country intending to raise an issue mustering the necessary political support within the Council.<sup>278</sup>

All scenarios are therefore plausible; for instance if two permanent members work together with the consent of the others, they can bring change as president Obama so eloquently promised in his campaign. Even non-permanent members can have a significant impact in this way, again with the consent of the permanent members, as was seen in the case of the Peacebuilding Commission.<sup>279</sup>

---

<sup>277</sup> The power of the permanent members is great and their control over the work of the Council means that they can in fact lead the Council in the direction they want to, see: Neill, Barry O. *Power and satisfaction in the Security Council*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*. Edited by Paul F. Diehl.

<sup>278</sup> Gharekhan, Chinmaya R. *The Horseshoe Table: An Inside View of the UN Security Council*. Pearson Education, New Delhi, 2006, page 4.

<sup>279</sup> Løj, Ellen Margrethe. *Denmark's Membership of the UN Security Council: what came out of it?*

In relation to climate change this can be taken to mean that measures to deal with the direct threat of climate change itself are not likely to be dealt with by the Security Council, save through the thematic, lesser policy making resolutions on security. The real security providers in this aspect are likely to be those dealing with the long term issue of climate change such as the UNEP, IPCC and even other international actors such as the European Union.<sup>280</sup> It is unlikely that anyone is interested to revolutionize the institutional framework already in place to deal with those issues just so that they can be debated, as such, in the Security Council. It seems clear that containing and reversing climate change is judged by all parties to be an issue outside the scope of the Security Council, thus the scope for disagreement lies in how far the Council can go in discussing the security implications and examining the future implications of, say, inaction on reversing climate change.

The Security Council is however likely to deal with the indirect threats of climate change as discussed above, both because they relate more to the conventional demonstrations of conflict, and no less for the simple reason that these aspects seem as of today, at least according to the threat assessment in chapter 7.3, to be more of a threat. Developing an analogy from other existing issues:

About a third of the resolutions regarding terrorism have been taken under Chapter VII, both before and after September 11. In contrast, none of the decision concerning women, children, conflict prevention, and sustainable development were adopted under Chapter VII. The Council in this way may have made clear that its primary concern is the management of crisis and armed conflict. Broader concerns are seen in relation to that.<sup>281</sup>

The indirect threats caused by climate change are thus most likely to end up in the Council's future approaches to the issue of climate change as a new security threat.

---

<sup>280</sup> As containing or reversing climate change is a matter of energy management and economic behavior these are the areas where long term climate change would be addressed. These are also the security areas where the Security Council has not been very active.

<sup>281</sup> Wallensteen, Peter and Johansson, Patrik. *Security Council decisions in perspective*, in The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century.

In the beginning of this thesis, the following question was asked:

Does the United Nations' Security Council (SC) have the skills, will and competence to deal with the multidimensional security concept that has emerged after the end of the Cold War? If so is, should the threat posed by climate change, or other new security threats, be dealt with by the Security Council?

The Security Council, working on the basis of the new security spectrum in the post-Cold War period, does seem to have the skills and competence to deal with the multidimensional security concept, including the related threats posed by climate change and other new threats. The main question seems to evolve around the will of the Council which ultimately lies with the member states of the UN and the Council, though in particular with the five permanent members. The shift currently being experienced in approaches to managing security in the international system may indicate that these threats will be dealt with in a cooperative way, and not exclusively but primarily by the Security Council. If so, the Council may finally live up to its mandate to carry the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

## Bibliography.

Abbot, K.W. and Snidal, D. *Why states act through formal international organizations*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

Altman, Dennis. HIV and Security, in *International Relations*, vol. 17, no. 4, 2003, pp. 417-27.

*Annual report of the Security Council; Report to the General Assembly on its work*, can be accessed at: [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/annual06\\_toc.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/annual06_toc.htm)

Bailes, Alyson , *Introduction: A world of risk*, Sipri yearbook, Stockholm 2007.

Bailes, Alyson. *Multi-dimensional security: Headaches for public policy*, Presentation in *Non-state actors and non-military security*.

Bailes, Alyson. *Security Spectrum*, a sheet distributed in the course *Non-state actors and non-military security*.

Bailey, Sydney D. and Daws, Sam. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Third Edition*. Oxford Publications, 1998.

Bailes, Alyson and Þróstur Freyr Gylfason. ‘Societal Security’ and Iceland, in *Stjórnmal og stjórnsýsla*. 2008, Vol 4, number 1.

Baldwin, David A. *Neoliberalism, neorealism, and world politics*, in *Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate*. David A. Baldwin, editor. Columbia University Press, New York 1993.

Ban Ki Moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations. *A Climate Culprit in Darfur*, *The Washington Post*, Washington, DC, 16 June 2007, Can be found at: [http://www.globalsolutions.org/issues/darfur/ban\\_climate\\_culprit/](http://www.globalsolutions.org/issues/darfur/ban_climate_culprit/)

Barnett, Jon. *Environmental Security*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Beckett, Margaret. *United Kingdom’s Secretary of State, speech at the 61 General Assembly of the United Nations*, 22 September 2006.

Bellamy, Alex J., Williams, Paul and Griffin, Stuart. *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Polity Press and Blackwell Publishing, Cambridge, 2004.

Bennet, A. LeRoy and Oliver, James K, *International Organizations; principles and issues, seventh edition*. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2002.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali. *Agenda for Peace*, Report of the Secretary-General, pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. General Assembly resolution A/47/277 – UN document reference S/24111.

Brown, Oli, Hammill, Anne and McLeman, Robert. Climate change as the new security threat: Implications for Africa, *International Affairs*, 2007, Volume 83, number 6. Pages 1141–1154.

Butti, T. A., McCarl, B. A., Angerer, J., Dyke, P. T. and Stuth, J. W. The Economic and Food Security Implications of Climate Change in Mali, in *Climatic Change*, 2005, Volume 68, pages 355–378.

Buzan, Barry. *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (2nd edition). L. Rienner, June 1991.

Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole and Wilde, Jaap de. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, United States, 1998.

Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. World Bank, 2003.

Collins, Allan. *Introduction: What is Security Studies?* in Contemporary Security Studies. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

*Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Prandram Investments*. 4. september 1998. Report to Congressional Requesters.

Cottey, Andrew. *Security in the new Europe*. Palgrave, 2007. New York.

Cousens, Elizabeth M. *Conflict Prevention*, in The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

Cox, R. and Jacobson, H. K. *The framework for inquiry* in The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

Deutch, John, Lauvergeon, Anne and Prawiraatmadja, Widhyawan. *Energy Security and Climate Change*. Trialateral Commission, Washington, Paris, London, 2007.

Draman, Rasheed. *Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship*. Prepared for the Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Prandram, Addis Ababa, May 19-23, 2003. Can be accessed at: [http://centroparlamentario.org/povertyreduction/seminar1\\_e.pdf](http://centroparlamentario.org/povertyreduction/seminar1_e.pdf)

Dupont, Alan. The Strategic Implications of Climate Change, in *Survival*, June-July 2008, The International Institute for Strategies Studies, Vol. 50, Number 3.

Baylis, J. *International and global security in the post-Cold War era*, in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Edited by Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. Oxford university press, Oxford, 2004.

Dedring, Juergen. *The Security Council*, in *The United Nations at the Millennium: The Principal Organs*. Edited by Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, Continuum International Publishing Group, 2000.

Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B.C. *Realism* in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Edited by Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. Oxford university press, Oxford, 2004.

Eban, A. The U.N. Idea Revisited. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1995. Vol 74, Number 5. Can be accessed at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19950901faessay3387/abba-eban/the-u-n-idea-revisited.html.com>

*Energy, Security and Climate*. Security Council open debate: UK concept paper. 28 March 2007. Can be accessed at: [http://unfccc.int/files/application/pdf/ukpaper\\_securitycouncil.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/application/pdf/ukpaper_securitycouncil.pdf)

*Energy, Security and Climate*. Statement by Ambassador Hjálmar W. Hannesson, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the United Nations at an open debate at the Security Council on Energy, Security and Climate, 17 April 2007. Can be accessed at: <http://www.iceland.org/securitycouncil/Iceland-and-the-UN/Speeches-and-Statements/Speeches-and-Statements/nr/3866>

*Essential readings in world politics, 2nd edition*. Editors Karen A. Mingst and Jack Snyder. Norton and Company, New York and London, 2004.

Fasona, Mayowa J. and Omojola, A.S. *Climate Change, Human Security and Communal Clashes in Nigeria*, A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be accessed at: [http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Fasona\\_Omojola.pdf](http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Fasona_Omojola.pdf)

Gharekhan, Chinmaya R. *The Horseshoe Table: An Inside View of the UN Security Council*. Pearson Education, New Delhi, 2006.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Nordås, Ragnhild and Salehyan, Idean. *Climate change and conflict-The migration link*. Working paper series “Coping with crisis”, International Peace Academy, May 2007.

*The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Third edition.* Edited by Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. Oxford university press, Oxford, 2004.

Grieco, Joseph M. *Understanding the problem of international cooperation: The limits of neoliberal institutionalism and the future of realist theory*, in *Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate*. David A. Baldwin, editor. Colombia University Press, New York 1993.

Græger, Nina, Larsen, Henrik and Ojanen, Hanna. *The ESDP and the Nordic countries, four variations on a theme*. The Finnish Institute for International affairs and Institut für Europäische Politik, Helsinki and Berlin, 2002.

Harvey, Fiona. At boiling point, in the *Financial Times*, September 15 2008. Can be accessed at: [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d2fef714-7b0e-11dd-b1e2-000077b07658,dwp\\_uuid=5f962f4c-83f9-11dd-bf00-000077b07658.html](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d2fef714-7b0e-11dd-b1e2-000077b07658,dwp_uuid=5f962f4c-83f9-11dd-bf00-000077b07658.html)

Herring, Eric. *Military Security*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. *Environmental scarcities and violent conflict; Evidence from cases*, in *New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 2004.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. *Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict*, in *World Security: Challenges for a new century*, second edition. Edited by Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998.

Hulton, Susan C. *Council Working Methods and Procedure*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

*Human Rights Watch*, can be found at <http://hrw.org/doc/?t=africa&c=angola>.

Hume, Cameron R. *The Security Council in the Twenty-First Century*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

Hurd, I. *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton university press, 2007. Senda út.

Hurd, I. The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992–2003, *International Organization*, Cambridge University Press 2005, Volume 59, number 3, pages 495-526.

Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladdottir. *Alþjóðasamstarf á 21. öld og öryggisráð Sameinuðu þjóðanna*. Speech by Iceland's Foreign Minister at the University of Iceland, 7 September 2007. Can be accessed at: <http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/frettaefni/raedurISG/nr/3831>

*Informal meeting with Colin Keating*, the Executive Director of Security Council Report, information on Mr. Keating can be found at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.1074753/k.CA22/STAFF.htm>

*Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, can be accessed at: <http://www.ipcc.ch/>

*International Handbook on Risk Analysis and Management*. Beat Habegger (ed.) Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. Can be found at: [www.crn.ethz.ch](http://www.crn.ethz.ch).

Johnstone, I. *The role of the UN Secretary general; The power of persuasion based on law* in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

Justino, Patricia. *On the Links between Violent Conflict and Chronic Poverty: How Much Do We Really Know?* CPRC Working Paper 61, Chronic Poverty Research Centre.

Kennedy, P. and Russett, B. 'Reforming the United Nations'. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1995. Vol 74, Number 5. Can be accessed at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19950901faessay3393/paul-kennedy-bruce-russett/reforming-the-united-nations.html>

Keohane, Robert O, *institutional theory and the realist challenge after the Cold War*, in *Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate*. Edited by David A. Baldwin. Colombia University Press, New York 1993.

Kerry, John. *Reach out to the World* in the *Financial Times*, September 15 2008. Can be accessed at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d574bb42-7b03-11dd-adbe-000077b07658.html>

Kibreab, Gaim. *Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of the Current Debate* in *Disasters*, 1997, Volume 21, number 1, pages 20-38.

Klare, Michael T. *Resource wars; The new landscape of global conflict*. Henry Holt books, New York, 2001.

*Kofi Annan ávítar stjórnmalaleiðtoga*. Article in the newspaper "Morgunbladid", 16 November 2006, page 16.

Koné, Elizabeth M. Jamilah, *The Right of Self-Determination in the Angolan Enclave of Cabinda*, Paper presented at the Sixth Annual African Studies Consortium Workshop, October 02, 1998. Can be accessed at: <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Workshop/kone98.html>

Krause, Keith. *Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Policy Paper number 26. Can be accessed at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=45517>

Kerr, Pauline. *Human Security*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Lamy, S.L. *Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism*, in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Third edition. Edited by Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P. Oxford university press, Oxford, 2004.

*Letter dated 19. February 2004 from the Permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council*. 20 February 2004. United Nations, document nr: S/2004/135.

*Letter dated 26. June 2006 from the Permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council*. 30 February 2004. United Nations, document nr: S/2006/483.

Liotta, P.H. and Shearer, Allan W. *Gaia's revenge: Climate change and humanity's loss*. Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2007.

Løj, Ellen Margrethe. *Denmark's Membership of the UN Security Council: what came out of it?* in the Danish foreign policy yearbook 2007. Edited by Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, Danish institute for international studies, 2007.

Mahbubani, Kishore. *The Permanent and Elected Council Members*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

Malone, David M. *Eyes on the Prize: The quest for nonpermanent seats on the UN Security Council*. *Global Governance*, a review of multilateralism and international organizations, vol. 6, nr. 1. Jan-Mar 2000.

Malone, David M, *Conclusion*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

Malone, David M, *Introduction*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. *The Environment and International Security*, in *World Security: Trends & Challenges at Century's Ends*. Edited by Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991.

Mazo, Jeffrey. Thinking the Unthinkable in *Survival*, June-July 2008, *The International Institute for Strategies Studies*, Vol. 50, Number 3.

Mearsheimer, J.J. *The false promise of international institutions*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

Melvern, Linda. The Security Council: behind the scenes, *International Affairs*, 2001, Vol 77, nr. 1, pages 101-111.

Meisler, Stanley. *United Nations: The First Fifty Years*. Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 1995.

Mingst, Karen A. *Essentials of International Relations, 3rd edition*. Norton and Company, New York and London, 2004.

Morgan, Patrick. *Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Mutimer, David. *Critical Security Studies: A Shismatic History*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Najam, A. *The case against a new international environmental organization*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

*National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*, CNA Corporation, 2007. Can be accessed at: <http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/>

*NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Can be found at: [http://www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st\\_eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st_eng.pdf)

Natsios, A. S. *NGOs and the UN system in complex humanitarian emergencies: conflict or cooperation?*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

Neill, Barry O. *Power and satisfaction in the Security Council*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*. Edited by Paul F. Diehl.

Niasse, Madiodio. *Climate-Induced Water Conflict Risks in West Africa: Recognizing and Coping with Increasing Climate Impacts on Shared Watercourses*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be accessed at: <http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Niasse.pdf>

Nyong, Anthony. *Drought related conflicts, management and resolution in the West African Sahel*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be accessed at: [http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong\\_Fiki.pdf](http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong_Fiki.pdf)

Obioha, Emeka E. *Climate Change, Population Drift and Violent Conflict Over Land Resources in North Eastern Nigeria*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be accessed at: <http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Obioha.pdf>

*On Multidimensional Security*. Organization of American States, can be found on: [http://www.oas.org/key\\_issues/eng/KeyIssue\\_Detail.asp?kis\\_sec=9](http://www.oas.org/key_issues/eng/KeyIssue_Detail.asp?kis_sec=9)

O'Neill, B. *Power and satisfaction in the Security Council*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson. *Climate Change and New Security Issues*. A Speech by the President of Iceland at Carnegie Council, New York. 1 April 2008.

Pétur Dam Leifsson. *Öryggisráð SP frá sjónarhóli þjóðréttar*. A speech at the University of Iceland's Þjóðarspegill 7 December 2007.

Penny, Christopher K. *Greening the Security Council: climate change as an emerging “threat to international peace and security”*, in *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, Volume 7, number 1, pages 35–71.

Pevehouse, J., Nordstrom, T. and Warnke, K, *international governmental organizations*, in *The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. Colorado.

Pia Hansson. *Against all odds; Small states candidature and membership of the United Nations Security Council*. Master thesis in International relations, instructor Baldur Thorhallsson, University of Iceland, 2006.

Presidential statement on Maintenance of international peace and security, S/PRST/2007/31 of 28 August 2007. Can be accessed at [http://un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_pres\\_statements07.htm](http://un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_pres_statements07.htm)

*The politics of global governance; International organizations in an interdependent world*, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2005.

Pushkina, Darya with Faw, Leah. *Conflict or cooperation- water in central Asia*. Paper to be presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, March 2006. Can be accessed at: [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apr\\_research\\_citation/0/9/8/5/1/p98511\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apr_research_citation/0/9/8/5/1/p98511_index.html)

Quadfasel, Detlef. The Atlantic heat conveyor slows, in *Nature*. December 1 2005, Volume 438.

Reuveny, Rafael. *Environmental Change, Migration and Conflict: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Explorations*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be found at: <http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Reuveny.pdf>

Roberts, Adam and Zaum, Dominik. *Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945*. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers nr. 395, 2008.

Rogers, Paul. *Peace Studies*, in *Contemporary Security Studies*. Edited by Alan Collins. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. Climate Change Refugees. *Scientific American*, 1 June 2007. Can be accessed at: <http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=E82F5561-E7F2-99DF-36D3CB7EB5DA209C>

Salehyan, Idean. *Refugees, climate change and instability*. A paper presented at a conference on Human Security and Climate Change, Asker 21–23 June 2005. Can be found at: <http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Salehyan.pdf>

Sangiovanni, Mette Eilstrup. Transnational Networks and New Security Threats. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2005, Volume 18, number 1, 7 – 13.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan, *In Larger Freedom*. Can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>

*Security Council establishes Monitoring, Reporting Mechanism on use of Child Soldiers, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1612 (2005)*. Press release on the 5235<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Security Council, 26 July 2005. Can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8458.doc.htm>

Security Council report. *Update report nr. 2 on Energy, security and climate*. 12 April 2007. Can be accessed at the website [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org)

Smith, Courtney B. *Politics and process at the United Nations; The global dance*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2006.

Smith, Edwin M. *Collective Security: Changing Conceptions and Institutional Adaptation*, in *Adapting the United Nations to a Post-Modern Era: Lessons Learned*. Edited by W. Andy Knight. Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, 2001.

Sperling, James and Kirchner. *The Changing Definition of Security*. Paper delivered at the ECSA Conference Charleston, South Carolina, 11-14 May 1995. Can be found at: [http://aei.pitt.edu/7020/01/sperling\\_james.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/7020/01/sperling_james.pdf)

Stares, Paul B. *Introduction*. in *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey*. Edited by Paul B. Stare. Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998.

Stern Review: The economics of climate change. Executive summary. Can be accessed at: [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview\\_summary.htm](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_summary.htm)

Stepanova, Ekaterina. *Trends in armed conflicts*, in *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

*The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. Northon & Company, New York, London, 2004.

Tinker, Catherine. *Environmental Security: Finding the Balance*, in *Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Era: Lessons Learned*, 2nd edition. Editor W. Andy Knight. Palgrave, 2001.

*U.N. Council Hits Impasse Over Debate on Warming*. Article in the New York Times, April 18 2007. Can be accessed at: [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/18nations.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/world/18nations.html?_r=1)

*U.N. spent \$18 billion on peacekeeping in past five years, but not enough on conflict prevention*. Article in International Herald Tribune, August 29, 2007.

*U.N. to intensify Africa climate change monitoring*. Reuters AlertNet, 19 December 2006. Can be accessed at: <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L19513390.htm>

United Nations Charter, can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

*United Nations Development Report Human Development Report 2006*. Can be accessed at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/>

*United Nations handbook 2005/06*. Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand, 2005.

‘Utoikamanu, Fekitamoeloa, Permanent representative of the Kingdom of Tonga, *Speech to the General Assembly as the spokesperson for the PSIDS group*, New York, 8 July 2008. Can be accessed at: <http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/ccact/psids.pdf>

Wallensteen, Peter and Johansson, Patrik. *Security Council decisions in perspective*, in *The UN Security Council; From the Cold War to the 21st century*. Edited by David M. Malone. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

Webersik, Christian. *Reinterpreting environmental scarcity and conflict evidence from Somalia*. Paper presented to the 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, University of Kent at Canterbury, UK, 8-10 September 2001. Can be found at: [http://www.columbia.edu/~cw2266/Webersik\\_Canterbury\\_2001.pdf](http://www.columbia.edu/~cw2266/Webersik_Canterbury_2001.pdf)

Weiss, T.G., Forsythe, D.P. and Coate, R.A. *United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Westview press, Colorado, 2004.

Wendt, Alexander. *Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics* (1992), in *International Theory: Critical investigations*. Edited by James Der Derian. New York university press, New York, 1995.

Williams, Abiodun. *The United Nations and Preventive Deployment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, in *Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Era: Lessons Learned*, 2nd edition. Editor W. Andy Knight. Palgrave, 2001.

Wirth, David A. Catastrophic Climate Change, in *World Security: Trends & Challenges at Century's Ends*. Edited by Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991.

Yackle, Terri A. *Global Climate Change: Threat Multiplier for AFRICOM?* Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2007.

Øberg, Jan. *Introduction: Norden in Europe 1990-1991*, in *Nordic security in the 1990s, options in the changing Europe*. Edited by Jan Øberg. Pinter Publishers, London, 1992.

Pröstur Freyr Gylfason. *The distinctive characteristics and behaviour of smaller states which have been elected members to the United Nations Security Council*, BA-thesis in Political Science, instructor: Ragnar G. Kristjansson, University of Iceland, 2004.

All resolutions referenced here can be found at the Security Council webpage, [www.un.org/sc](http://www.un.org/sc). In addition [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org) can be useful for summaries or special information on the working of the Council on specific issues.

**THE SECURITY SPECTRUM**

*(Underlining = elements usually included in 'human security')*

**Traditional Military**

(inter-state conflict, arms races, state-owned WMD)

Proliferation of WMD

Intra-state conflict

'Warlike (mass casualty) attack by terrorists  
- attack with WMD

'New threats'

**Terrorism in general**

[Violent] international crime, sabotage

Breakdown of order, no 'rule of law'

Man-made accidents

Major natural disasters (transport lines)

Long-term climate and environment change

'Natural hazards' and environmental security

'Functional security'

Diseases of people, animals, crops

Infrastructure failure  
- cyber-collapse

Energy shortage

Socio-economic and 'corporate' security

Food, water, other resource shortage

Uncontrolled migration, refugeeism, IDPs

Social vulnerability and instability

- disorder, alienation  
- ageing populations  
- [multi-ethnicity]

Economic vulnerability and instability

<sup>282</sup> Bailes, Alyson. *Security Spectrum*, a sheet distributed in the course Non-state actors and non-military security.