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Formation of Nordic Security Policies
The Importance of Values, Identity and History

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Final thesis submitted in partial fulfiment of a MA degree in International Affairs

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Abstract

The Nordic states are considered as a group of homogenous states. They share common values and interests but vary, however, when forming their security policies. In this thesis, I use a qualitative, multiple case study to analyse why the Nordic states have chosen different ways to enhance their security. I examine each state separately and then compare them with one another. The Nordic states have different relationships with the leading security institutions in Europe, i.e. the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I explore the relations the states have with these institutions to explain why some states choose membership, while others do not. I apply the theory of constructivism to show that it is not only material structures that impact decisions made and actions taken. Security is not only about the state and how its physical security is protected, but also about safeguarding its economy, politics, culture and environment. Hence, there are several different aspects of security that need to be considered when exploring the states' security policies. Constructivism explains how identity, history and relationships have a significant impact when forming the security policies of the Nordic states.

Útdráttur

Norðurlöndin hafa oft á tíðum verið talin einsleit, þar sem þau deila mörgum sömu gildum og hagsmunum. En þegar kemur að öryggisstefnum ríkjanna, má sjá að þau eru frábrugðin hvert frá öðru. Í þessari ritgerð nota ég eigindlega fjöltilviksrannsókn (e. multiple case study) til þess að bera löndin saman og rannsaka af hverju þau hafa valið ólíkar leiðir til þess að styrkja varnir lands síns. Hvert land fyrir sig er skoðað fyrir sig til að sýna fram á mismun í öryggisstefnum, sem og líkindi sem þær hafa með sér. Löndin hafa ólík sambönd við helstu öryggisstofnanir Evrópu, þ.e. Evrópusambandið og Norður-Atlantshafsbandalagið. Ég skoða tengslin sem löndin hafa við þessar stofnanir og skýri af hverju sum lönd hafa ákveðið að ganga í þær en önnur ekki. Ég nota kenningu mótunarhyggju innan alþjóðasamskipta, sem sýnir að það eru ekki einungis efnislegir þættir sem skipta máli þegar kemur að ákvarðanatöku og aðgerðum, heldur eru það einnig huglægir þættir sem hafa áhrif. Öryggi snýst ekki bara um að vernda landið sjálft, heldur einnig um að vernda hagkerfið, stjórnarkerfið, samfélagið og umhverfið. Það þarf því að líta á mismunandi hliðar á hugtakinu öryggi til þess að varpa ljósi á öryggisstefnur landanna. Mótunarhyggja útskýrir það hvernig sjálfsmynd ríkjanna, gildi, saga, og sambönd við önnur ríki og stofnanir hafa áhrif þegar verið er að móta öryggisstefnur Norðurlandanna.

Preface

The thesis accounts for 30 ECTS towards a master's degree in international affairs within the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Iceland. My motivation to write this thesis comes from my interests in the Nordic states, institution building and security in Europe. The thesis is written in the spring semester of 2020 and was conducted under the supervision of Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir. I want to thank her for all her constructive comments and advice throughout the process. I also want to thank my mother, Ásta Bára Pétursdóttir, for all her support through my years of studies.

Contents

1 Introduction

The Nordic states; Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland and Denmark, have different histories in their search for security. There is a lack of similarities in their security policies, even though they are all shaped by significant milestones in history, such as World War II, the end of the Cold War and Russia's annexation of Crimea in Ukraine. The Nordics have had different experiences regarding those events, mostly because of their geographic positions, which has led to divergent security policy choices.

The Nordic states are most often considered homogenous. They are all small, wealthy, and located in Northern Europe. They share history and language, have common values, such as democracy, safeguarding human rights, respecting the rule of law, protecting and fighting for women's rights, and fighting climate change. Further, they have a positive outlook on globalization and are committed to international cooperation. However, though the countries share many similarities, they have chosen different paths in their search for security. In this thesis, these differences are explored and discussed. The national security policies of the states are examined, and their main focus presented.

The focus of the thesis is twofold. First, I concentrate on how identity, shared values, history, along with new security challenges, shape the security policies of the Nordic states. The second focus is on the relationships the states have with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). NATO and the EU are two different institutions, but they do share common values, and both exist to protect and defend its members. Sweden, Finland and Denmark are EU members. Sweden and Finland both place high importance on their EU membership, declaring that it is the primary security provider of the state. Denmark, however, is also a NATO member and affirms that the military alliance is its leading security provider. It places, nonetheless, a great value on the EU to pursue its interests on a global level. Iceland and Norway are also members of NATO and both affirm that NATO is one of the key pillars in their security policies. Neither is a part of the EU, but both are in close cooperation with the Union. The most substantial difference in the Nordic security policies is the relationships they have with these institutions. Sweden's policy of standing outside of a military alliance is in its identity, which explains why it has not joined NATO. Finland's geographical position has strained the security policy of the state; however, as soon as it could, it joined the EU because of security reasons. Norway, Iceland and Denmark were all founding members of NATO, which

explains their allegiance to the alliance, as NATO is considered the strongest military alliance in the world with one of the strongest actors in the international system at its front.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse each of the Nordic states and explain how values, identity and history have shaped and moved the security policies of the countries in different directions. Each security policy is studied thoroughly, providing a clear view of the decision-making process from the perspective of each state. The aim is to review the Nordic security policies from a constructivist perspective to deepen my understanding of how values, identity and history can shape the security policy of a state. By studying the five Nordic states, I can analyse where their policies differ and where they overlap. Showing that although the countries share a collective identity, they have their own identity that has formed over the years and impacted their decisions and actions when forming their security policies.

The research question of the thesis is twofold. My two main research questions are: How has 'Nordicness' shaped the security policies of the Nordic states? And why have these states, that share common values and are considered homogenous, chosen different ways to ensure their security? These two questions are the basis of the research. Other subsidiary questions that are put forth to answer the main research questions and help with further exploring on the subject and deepen the understanding are: How can the EU and NATO provide security for the Nordic states? Is one institution more capable of providing security than the other?

The theory of constructivism is applied to answer the research questions. Constructivism is relevant because although these states are considered similar, they have chosen different paths in their search for security. Constructivism has brought in new ideas to the discipline of International Relations (IR). It suggests that norms, rules, identity, culture and language have an impact on the international system and how states make decisions, hence how states form their security policies. Security policies are shaped by history, identity, and relationships the states have with one another. By applying a constructivist perspective to how states form their security policies, the focus shifts from the traditional IR perspective of security, i.e. that states are self-interested and base their decisions on their capabilities and power they have in the international system. Constructivism explains how security is more than military security and adds other sectors, such as economic, political, societal, environmental and ecological security. Thus, security

entails more than just securing the state. In order to keep the state secure, stable, and for it to prosper, it needs to consider different aspects of security.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. The second chapter explains the theoretical framework and concepts of the research. The first subsection introduces the theory of constructivism. Then the concept of 'Nordicness' is presented; what it means to be Nordic, and how Nordicness can shape security policies, is discussed. Afterwards, the focus shifts to the concept of security; discussing different theoretical approaches to security, leading to the Copenhagen School and the notion of securitization, which broadens the concept of security. The chapter concludes with a history of Nordic security, explaining how history has shaped the security policies of the states. The third chapter describes the methodology of the research. The fourth focuses on the main institutions discussed in the thesis, i.e. NATO and the EU, and their role as security providers in Europe. The fifth chapter explores the security policies of the Nordic states. From the perspective of the states and with a focus on their memberships and/or relations with the EU and NATO. Starting with Sweden, then Finland, Norway, Iceland and Denmark. Chapter six is the analysis, comparing common themes of the Nordic security policies and discussing them from a constructivist perspective.

2 Theories and Concepts

In this chapter, the theoretical framework is presented. First, constructivism is introduced, the theory is important for the analysis of the thesis because it focuses on how identity, values and history can influence the decision-making process and actions. In chapter 2.2, the concept of Nordicness is explained and how it can impact when making policy choices. Katzenstein's (1996, pp. 34-35) "layers" on how nations form security policies is presented. The layers are later applied to the cases of the Nordic states in the analysis. The concept of security is put forth in chapter 2.3. The definition of security is to show that there are several aspects of security that need to be looked at when forming security policies. Security is not only about the state and its military security. It is also about its economic, political, societal, environmental and ecological security. Chapter 2.3.2 broadens the concept of security further and explains that any issue can be securitized if the referent object in question is seen as existentially threatened. Finally, the history of Nordic security is then reviewed, which is essential when analysing the states individually, as history will indicate why policy choices have been made.

2.1 Constructivism

Constructivism is a theory within IR that assumes that the world is socially constructed through our meanings and understandings. The theory entered the IR discipline in the late 1980s, and it seeks to explore how identity and norms shape world politics. It is a theory that addresses both philosophical and empirical issues (Farrell, 2002, p. 52; Fierke, 2016, p. 161; Hurd, 2009, pp. 1-2). It became more prominent in the IR discipline at the end of the Cold War, because constructivism was able to explain its end, which was something that the mainstream theories of IR (realism and liberalism) had failed to do (Flockhart, 2016, p. 81). The main themes of IR, such as the balance of power, meaning of anarchy, identity and interests of states, and change in the international system, have been dominated by these mainstream theories. Constructivism can bring an alternative understanding and a different perspective on those themes (Hopf, 1998, p. 172). Wendt (1992, pp. 396-397) argued that the foundation of constructivism was that the international system is built through meanings that individuals have towards objects and/or actors. The international system is an act of human creation. It is constructed and given meaning by humans through social norms, values and assumptions. States, alliances and international institutions are a social phenomenon and products of human interaction, i.e. history, culture and politics (Fierke, 2016, pp. 162-163; Flockhart, 2016, pp. 81-82; Hopf, 1998, p. 177).

There are four key tenets of constructivism throughout the IR discipline (Flockhart, 2016, p. 84). First is the belief that the world is socially constructed through social facts. Constructivists assume that the reality we live in is constantly under construction. The world is continually changing through meanings and understandings of individuals. There is no single objective reality, and the world is coming into existence rather than being a pre-given entity (ibid.).

Social facts refer to "portions of reality that are regarded as facts only through human agreement and which are made observable only through human practice" (ibid.). These facts differ from 'brute facts', which are aspects of reality that exist but have different meanings attached to it depending on the actor. Individuals often attach different meanings to similar material objects depending on the actors involved, which will imply different practices and decisions when it comes to making policy choices. Many of the most essential concepts of IR, such as the state, are social facts. These social facts will only exist through collective agreement and shared knowledge. Hence, the object or the phenomenon will only exist as long humans will attach meaning to it (Fierke, 2016, p. 163; Flockhart, 2016, pp. 84-85).

The second tenet of constructivism is the importance of ideational and material structures. Norms, rules, values and languages are as important as material forces when trying to understand the international system (Flockhart, 2016, p. 84). Norms and rules are essential because they help us understand how we should behave in certain situations. They tell us what is appropriate behaviour and what is not. Norms are important when establishing relations because to become a member of a particular entity, certain rules need to be followed. Without norms, the exercise of power or actions would not have any meaning. Constructivists believe that new identities and new relationships are constructed with changes in norms and rules. The structure of the international system should be understood both from material and ideational factors. Shared knowledge about material objects, norms, rules, languages and symbols is vital because this knowledge shapes how humans interpret the world and this interpretation will decide on actions taken. The collective meaning which emerges from the shared knowledge is what forms the structure and organizes the actions taken (Agius, 2016, p. 76; Fierke, 2016, p. 163; Flockhart, 2016, pp. 85-86; Hopf, 1998, p. 173).

The third tenet focuses on identity and how it can influence decisions made and actions taken by the actors. Identity is how the actors understand themselves and their role in the

world, and how they perceive their relationships. Identity is important to have some level of predictability in the international system. Identity can explain and help to predict a state's interests, preferences and actions. If there were no identity in the world, it would be chaotic with a considerable amount of uncertainty. Identities are a part of the historical context and the process of interaction. States will act in a certain way because of their identity. Hopf (1998) argued that long-lasting "expectations between states require intersubjective identities that are sufficiently stable to ensure predictable patterns of behavior" (p. 174). States want to uphold their image to the outside world, as it will determine what behaviour and action are appropriate and what is not. Flockhart (2016) mentioned a "logic of actions" (p. 84), which refers to the actions taken in certain situations. Actors will try to do what is 'right' according to their identity, but this action depends on the situation and context each time (Agius, 2016, pp. 71-72 & 76; Flockhart, 2016, pp. 87-88; Hopf, 1998, pp. 174-177).

The last core tenet of constructivism is the assumption that agents and structure are mutually constituted (Flockhart, 2016, p. 84). Structure refers to institutions and shared meanings, and agents refer to the entity or the actor of the case in question. Structures influence agents and agents influence structures through practice. The routinized practice is important to constructivists because it is through practice that social facts are brought to reality and habituated. It is also through practice that phenomena such as self-help and cooperation are embedded in society. A stable cognitive environment can only be ensured through practice. This environment will make the individual's identity stronger and provide agents with the confidence that their world will be reproduced (Flockhart, 2016, pp. 88-90; Hopf, 1998, p. 180; Hurd, 2009, p. 303).

The theory of constructivism has received the criticism of being more of an approach, and not a theory because it does not identify the primary actors in the global system or specify the main issues and problems of IR. It is neither optimistic nor pessimistic and it does not provide solutions to specific issues or advise any particular policy direction. Constructivists are seen to have unrealistic ideas because they believe in the power of ideas, knowledge, culture and language (Flockhart, 2016, pp. 81-82).

Four main features separate constructivism from other major IR theories (realism and liberalism). These features are first that constructivism is an alternative to materialism; neoliberalism and neorealism are approaches that assume material objects to be the factor that affects the outcome. These approaches seek to explain the behaviours in the

international system in a materialistic way, i.e. the more material forces a state has, the more power it has in the international system. Constructivism suggests that we cannot develop a full understanding of IR by only looking at the material objects. Constructivism does not want to replace materialism altogether, but rather seeks to give an understanding of the material forces, because they are defined and given meaning by individuals. Without the meanings attached to them, the material forces would not have the power they hold. The change from materialistic emphasis to one on social construction was controversial in the early 1990s but has with time become widely accepted within studies of world politics (Hurd, 2009, pp. 300-302).

The concept of power is an important phenomenon for both mainstream and constructivist theories, the conceptualization is, however, exceedingly different. The mainstream theories focus on material power and assume it is the most crucial element when it comes to power. Constructivism assumes that both material and discursive power is essential to understand international relations (Flockhart, 2016, p. 85; Hopf, 1998, pp. 177-178; Hurd, 2009- pp. 300-301).

The second feature that separates constructivism from other theories is the focus on state interests. State interests are the ideas about the needs and intentions of the state. Non-constructivists would argue that state interests are primarily for practical purposes and would include the desire for survival, power, wealth and security. Constructivism focuses on social relations among states and how historical construction forms the state's interests (Hurd, 2009, pp. 302-303).

The third feature is the constitutiveness of structures and agents mentioned before. Non-constructivists believe that agents are influenced by the situation and the interaction they have with one another. Constructivists believe that the state's actions make the international system, e.g. by establishing institutions and social norms. These institutions and norms become a part of the international system and help to define, socialize and influence states (Hurd, 2009, pp. 303-304).

The fourth feature is the multiple meanings of anarchy. Non-constructivists might argue that anarchy is just a set of predictions about the behaviour of the actor, behaviour such as self-help and self-interests. Constructivists argue that these behaviours would not exist unless the actors would see each other as rivals. These rival relationships are neither fixed nor natural and can change over time. Anarchy is therefore not given or fixed; it is

an idea, and if the actors believe the world is anarchic they will act accordingly (Agius, 2016, p. 72; Hurd, 2009, pp. 304-305).

2.2 The Concept of 'Nordicness'

What does it mean to be Nordic? Wæver (1992, pp. 77-79) argued that there are different aspects of what it means to be Nordic. From a military perspective, it meant to have less tension than central Europe, and from a socio-economic perspective, it meant not to choose either capitalism or communism, but rather find a third way and keep the superpowers of the Cold War at a distance. Further, he argued that being Nordic was to have an enlightened and anti-militaristic society, that was considered higher in quality than old Europe. However, what it means to be Nordic varies and changes over time. The Nordic states are now considered to be a group of homogeneous states, they are small, wealthy states with good social welfare, have a positive view on globalization, are committed to protecting the environment and practice liberal world order, have similar languages (apart from Finland), and are all located in Northern Europe. The Nordic states differ culturally and politically from the European core, they rely on being a part of Europe but are very independent. They have been considered sceptical of European integration as well (Herolf, 2013, p. 5; Hyde-Price, 2018, p. 435).

Brommesson (2018b, p. 391) argued that 'Nordicness' is the meaning of being Nordic, and how that influences the formation of Nordic security policies. It is how the Nordic role is perceived and recognised, what it is to be Nordic and how it affects foreign and security policies of the states (Åsberg, Rönnblom & Koobak, 2012, pp. 75-77; Brommesson, 2018a, p. 355). The sense of Nordicness became more prominent with different crises within Europe and the possible Russian threat, which led to further cooperation among the Nordic states. In 2009, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO)[1] was established and a joint statement of solidarity was agreed upon. This was followed by the Stoltenberg report in 2009 and several bilateral or multilateral agreements between the states (Brommesson, 2018a, p. 355).

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[1] The NORDEFCO is a collaboration among the Nordic states. The goal of this cooperation is to strengthen and increase the common defences of the states. Objectives include making a comprehensive approach to defence-related matters, to recognize defence policy issues that the states share and have a common interest in. Further, the aim is to increase the quality of the armed forces and the ability to act jointly. As well to make the defence industry more competitive and to cooperate stronger (The Nordic Defence Cooperation, n.d.).

Katzenstein (1996, pp. 34-35) stated that foreign and security policies are shaped by the environment we live in. Further he argued that there are three "layers" to how national foreign and security policies are made because of the cultural environment, in this case Nordicness. First is the layer of institutions and security regimes, such as NATO. Second is the layer of world political culture, which refers to rules and norms of sovereignty and international law. It refers to what is appropriate behaviour for sovereign states. Lastly, the layer of amity and enmity, i.e. the relationships between states and how they perceive each other. Hence, norms and values, institutions and culture, along with domestic and international features play a big part when making security policies.

Moreover, Katzenstein (1996, p. 53) argued that cultural elements of the states, i.e. norms can shape national security policies of the states, its interests and identity. Identity can vary and change with time, which affects the security interests and policies of the states. Further, he argued that configurations in states' identity also affect the interstate structure, i.e. regimes and security communities. Hence, norms, identity and relationships play a big role when making national security policies.

The Nordic states have formed a collective identity. Wendt (1994, p. 386) defines collective identity as a "positive identification with the welfare of another, such that the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the self, rather than independent." Having a collective identity does not mean that the states do not have their own interests. States will form collective interests and pursue them as a whole if it is in their interests. However, Wendt (1994, p. 387) notes that collective interests will not replace individual interests of states and that states are self-interested and egoistic in general.

The Nordic identity has developed as a set of beliefs that differentiate the Nordic states from "outside patterns and structures of power" (Parker, 2002, p. 355), especially the states in southern Europe; hence there was a sense of 'us' and 'them'. Laatikainen (2003, pp. 409-410) argued that the Nordics had been seen as a separate community from the rest of Europe because of shared identity and cultural ties. This distinction has, however, been less prominent since the end of the Cold War. The Nordic states are more integrated into European affairs than before, especially in economic aspects. In military aspects, the Nordic states have as well been integrated, e.g. Sweden and Finland abandoned their neutrality policy and depend now on a bigger group of states, such as institutions. The Nordic states have formed their policies using soft measures such as norms, identity and

culture. Although they share a form of collective identity, they differ from one another and have different perspectives (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 22; Parker, 2002, pp. 355-357 & 361).

2.3 Security

2.3.1 Defining Security

Security is a complex phenomenon, which has been difficult to define, as it entails a lot of different aspects and perspectives on the concept. The main focus has been on the military aspect but has with time expanded and now comprises further aspects such as economic, political, societal, political, and individual security. Security is not just about the state anymore; it is about a lot of different actors of the international system. The international system is, however, biased and the state is often the primary actor "endowed with security tasks" (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998, p. 37) and the most capable one to secure the state (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 37; Collins, 2016, pp. 1-2; Rothschild, 1995, p. 61).

Despite the complexity in the field of security, the consensus is that security has something to do with threats. These threats can be of different kinds; these are military, political, societal, economic and ecological threats. Military threats can impact the state the most. These threats can bring distortion and destruction to the state and are considered the highest priority when it comes to security policy decisions. Political threats are directed at the structure of the political system within the state and its stability. The targets of the threats are usually the identity, ideology and institutions of the state. Societal threats occur most often within the state; it is when the culture, language, ethnic identity and religion are threatened. Economic threats affect the state and its economy, along with its institutions and ideology; changes on foreign imports, restrictions on export, sanctions and prices can all affect the state and its economy. Ecological threats can damage the state physically; these threats can be natural disasters and pandemics (Buzan, 1991, pp. 112 & 116-134).

The traditional approaches to security have been the realist and liberal notions. Realism and liberalism assume that the state is the main referent object that needs to be secured. Theories such as critical theory and feminism have broadened the concept of security and have tried to move the focus from the state to the individual, i.e. human security rather than state security. The state often is the actor diminishing the security of individuals, and a large number of threats go beyond the state or are within it. (Smith, 2015, pp. 12-13; Malik, 2015, p. 72).

The realist approach established itself as the primary security approach during the Cold War when the international system was bipolar, and the threat of nuclear weapons was prominent. Realism focuses on the state, anarchy, and power. States are assumed to be rational actors, and they make decisions based on their interests and their capabilities. These decisions are made strategically, and how other states will react and respond, is taken into consideration. Realists presume the world is anarchic; there is no international authority that makes up the rules and laws. Power is an essential feature within the realist approach, if states are wealthy, have a large population and a lot of resources they are perceived to have more power and more ability to protect themselves. In an anarchic world with no international authority, this power is important because out there it is every state for itself. There is, however, a division in realism's approach towards security, while structural and offensive realism would argue that international structure would constitute more competitive policies, defensive realism would argue that international cooperation would be the best strategy to secure the state (Glaser, 2016, pp. 13-15 & 31; Smith, 2015, pp. 12-13).

Liberalism focuses on the state but is attentive to actors such as international governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Liberalism assumes that the global system can affect the behaviour of actors. Nevertheless, it is the power and preference of the domestic actors and the nature of the domestic political system that determines the state's behaviour in the international system. Liberalists do not believe that states are sole actors of IR. They believe that cooperation among states can constitute international peace and that democracy is the most effective way to prevent inter-state conflict (Smith, 2015, pp. 11-13 & 19).

Constructivism rejects the state-centric notion and has brought new ideas into the studies of security. Constructivists believe that IR are socially constructed through ideational and material structures, and they depend on actor's interpretations of the environment and the meanings attached to the material world. Concepts such as identity, culture and norms are critical when specifying a threat to the state. How identities are formed, and meanings attached to material objects are important to constructivists, i.e. both ideational and material structures are essential. Material structures depend on the meaning and interpretations individuals give to the object in question. Here the human perception and the material world are mutually constituted, as they construct each other. The emphasis that constructivism puts on identity and interests are important for security studies because

they are continually changing over time and can help explain a state's behaviour. Actors form their identity through interaction with one another. The actors will then establish relationships based on those interactions; these relations can be friendly, conflictual or anything in between. Culture is another essential aspect of constructivism. Culture can determine the relationship states have with one another, and it is vital when constructing the norms and values that form the identity of the state. One state might fear the culture of another state and therefore act accordingly. Constructivism stresses the importance of the process that leads to the establishment of state policy as well. That is where the Copenhagen School and the notion of securitization come in (Agius, 2016, pp. 72 & 76; Malik, 2015, pp. 73 & 78-79)

2.3.2 The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School is a school of thought that tries to widen the definition of security, and believes that "security is a function of social construction" (Malik, 2015, p. 80). The school emerged at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and seeks to explain the structures and processes of security problems. It moves from the traditional perspective of security studies that focus on the military and adds four other sectors that are non-military. It is, therefore, a multi-sectoral approach with five sectors, i.e. military, economic, political, societal and environmental security. The Copenhagen School adds these other sectors, while still maintaining the military context, giving more depth to the concept of security. The Copenhagen School studies how a specific subject gets removed from the political process to the security agenda, and how we can rethink security with the notion of securitization and desecuritization, it also broadens the concept of security by encompassing non-state actors (Balzacq, 2011, p. 1; Emmers, 2016, pp. 168-169).

Securitization is the act when a particular phenomenon is announced to be an existential threat to the referent object and requires emergency measures. The securitization process is performed through a speech act with securitizing actors and referent objects. These securitizing actors securitize issues by performing a security speech act and by declaring something, e.g. the state, sovereignty, religion, economies and identities, existentially threatened. The issues declared threatened are the referent objects and "have a legitimate claim to survival" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). Even though there can be many referent objects, it is usually the state or the nation. The difference between the state and the nation is that when a state seeks to survive, it wants to protect its sovereignty, whereas the nation wants to protect its identity. Societies, states and

individuals are all able to construct a threat and therefore securitize it (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 36 & 40; Emmers, 2016, pp. 168-169 & 171; Malik, 2015, p. 80).

The speech act is considered to be the starting point of securitization. The securitizing actor uses language to make the security issue clear and distinct to the audience. This lets the securitizing actor use measures that are not per traditional rules while conditioning the audience. A speech act is successful when there is a combination of language and society; when the securitizing actor manages to reach the group, which will authorize the speech. The process of securitization is in two stages. The first stage regards declaring issues as existential threats to the referent object and is done by state and non-state actors depending on different sectors of security. Although the securitizing actors can be non-state, it is most likely that the actors will be the state and its elite. In the second stage of the securitization process, the securitizing actor must persuade the audience and make them believe that the referent object is existentially threatened. When the audience is convinced, securitization has been successfully completed and extraordinary measures can be taken (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 32-33; Emmers, 2016, pp. 170-172).

The Copenhagen School suggests that any matter or issue can be non-politicized, politicized or securitized. A non-politicized issue is when it is not a part of the public debate and does not require state action. When an issue becomes politicized, it is managed within the standard political system, it is in the hands of the government to decide on actions taken regarding the issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). A matter becomes securitized when an issue requires actions that go beyond the standard security procedures of the state. The issue becomes a security issue through the act of securitization when the securitizing actor makes an issue that has been politicized, clear as an existential threat to the referent object. Any subject can end up on this spectrum, depending on the circumstances. Issues such as religion might be politicized by one state and not another, and some might securitize culture, and some will not. No issue is a threat until it becomes securitized through a political act of discourse. A successful securitization depends highly on the position held by the actor. Actors that have more power, such as the state, will be more successful when securitizing an issue, rather than an actor that holds less power. The desecuritization process happens when the issue is no longer seen as an existential threat, it is no longer an emergency issue and is put back on the political agenda (Balzacq, 2011, p. 1; Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 4, 23-24 & 31; Emmers, 2016, pp. 169-172).

Constructivism and the Copenhagen School are important to the concept of security because neither of these notions accepts the premise that the international system is reflected by material and objective circumstances. Constructivism assumes that the material world needs to be interpreted by humans; this interpretation happens through identities and ideational structures. Securitization theory is built on the interpretations of individuals, groups or other collectives on events, and how these individuals, groups or collectives construct their environment and therefore contribute to the threats that they create (Malik, 2015, pp. 82-83).

2.3.3 Nordic Security

The Nordic states have different histories when it comes to their search for security. There has been a lack of similarities and common patterns in Nordic security policies over the years. Security issues are, nonetheless, of high interest with the Nordic states. The Nordic view on security according to Herolf (2013) is that the states "endorse the comprehensive approach, in which development aid, civil crisis management and other areas of non-military character are included" (p. 5). They will support military actions and activities if they are taken up under a United Nations (UN) mandate. Since the mid-1990s there has been a focus on crisis management and peacekeeping missions within the UN, the EU and NATO rather than territorial defence (Forss & Holopainen, 2015, p. 1; Herolf, 2013, p. 5). Three important milestones in world history are essential to look at to explain these changes in Nordic security policies. These are the changes after World War II (WWII), after the Cold war, and after Russia's annexation of Crimea, Ukraine.

After WWII, Denmark and Norway were traumatized, both states were occupied by Germany and not able to forcefully defend their state or make any relevant contribution to defeat Nazism. Finland was severely affected by the war, being involved in three military conflicts. Sweden remained neutral. Iceland was occupied by British troops during the war and therefore, less affected by it (Kujamäki, 2012, p. 86; Nordic-Cooperation, n.d.).

The threats that the states faced after WWII were the Soviet threat and a possible conflict between the two superpowers. These threats led to changes in the Nordic security policies. Norway, Iceland and Denmark were founding members of NATO, while Sweden continued to aim for neutrality, and Finland was in close cooperation with the Soviet Union. The arrangements made were all intertwined in the security order that had emerged in Europe. In 1948-49 Denmark, Norway and Sweden tried to establish a Nordic defence alliance but failed because the states did not agree. Norway insisted that such a community

should create links with other democratic states of the West, Sweden did not concur, and Denmark was somewhat in the middle. Denmark and Sweden, therefore, opted out, as the alliance would not have been strong enough to deter the Soviet threat. Sweden remained successfully neutral, Denmark wanted to establish connections and be a part of the international relations in Europe. Norway had not had an independent policy. Sweden's decision not to join NATO and Denmark and Norway's decision not to accept armed forces from NATO or have nuclear weapons placed on their land during peacetime created a 'Nordic balance' (Rieker, 2004, p. 369). Iceland had gained independence during WWII, was a founding member of NATO in 1949 and signed a bilateral defence agreement with the United States in 1951. The defence agreement was to both defend and preserve peace in Iceland, and the North Atlantic area and it gave the US army permission to enter the state and set up a base. Finnish foreign policy was restrained because of the Soviet Union. The Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union prevented Finland from cooperating with other states, leaving it non-aligned. Because it was non-aligned, aiming for neutrality and with a superpower as a neighbour, it had to try to defend the state from all directions. Plans were only made for possible Soviet attacks, as an attack from the West was highly unlikely to occur. Despite all these different directions in security policies among the Nordic states, the area remained stable and peaceful (Bailes, Herolf & Sundelius, 2006, p. 4; Forss & Holopainen, 2015, pp. 7 & 10; Herolf, 2013, pp. 3-4; Holst, 1984, pp. 195-197; Ómarsdóttir & Bergsson, 2010, p. 191; Stenius, Österberg & Östling, 2011, p. 11; Varnarsamningur milli lýðveldisins Íslands og Bandaríkjanna á grundvelli Norður-Atlantshafssamningsins introduction/1951).

After the fall of the Soviet Union, there were new options for Finland and Sweden to cooperate. Both joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme[2] in 1994, and both states joined the EU and could no longer be seen as neutral. Finland's decision to join the EU was mainly because of a possible Russian threat, believing member states of the EU would want to provide security if the threat came to reality. Sweden joined because its government saw the potential to make its own contributions to international security through the EU. The policy of neutrality remained in Swedish identity, explaining why Sweden has a policy of staying out of military alliances. Denmark was a member of both

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[2] A program that was operated under the authority of the North Atlantic Council and would establish new security relationships between NATO and Partners for Peace (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1994).

the EU and NATO. Still, it was not a part of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, indicating that Denmark prioritized its NATO membership. Denmark suggests that any instability in the world can be a threat to the state and did not want to focus on direct national defence, international activity is therefore vital for Denmark. Iceland had not formed its own security policy and still relied on the defence agreement with the United States, meaning that the US had shaped and enforced the security policy of Iceland. It was not until after 2006, when the US army left Icelandic soil, that Iceland started to cogitate security issues more intensely. An Icelandic Defence Agency was established, which was responsible for the security and defence policies of Iceland. In 2011 this agency was abolished, and its assignments contributed to other institutions, such as the Icelandic Coast Guard, and Office of the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police. Norway applied to become a member of the EU in 1992, but the Norwegian public voted against it in 1994. At the time, Norwegian security policy was dominated by its NATO membership. Norway was also highly sceptical towards European integration and feared that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU would weaken NATO's position in Europe, and, therefore, the contributions and work Norway had put into the alliance. This led to Norway's "'not-quite-membership' strategy" (Bailes et al., 2006, p. 9). The foundation of this strategy was with the European Economic Area (EEA), which brings EU members and three states (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) economically together. The EEA gave Norway and Iceland access to the Single Market as if they were members of the EU. Moreover, they did not need to go by the internal policies of the EU, nor follow the EU's CFSP (Bailes et al., 2006, pp. 8-11; EFTA, n.d.; Herolf, 2013, p. 4; Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, n.d.b; Kaljurand, 2019; Ómarsdóttir & Bergsson, 2012, pp. 191-192 & 197; Rieker, 2006, pp. 301 & 305; Varnarmálalög no. 23/2008).

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Nordic states Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark have started re-evaluating their security policies. The events in Crimea made both NATO and non-NATO members exposed to threats. Norway sent troops to the Baltic Sea through its NATO cooperation. Norway wanted to increase its presence in the North, where the states meet, emphasizing the Arctic in their defence and security policies. Finland being geographically close to Russia grew a stronger connection with NATO since Crimea and NATO membership was more willingly discussed, even though most Finnish citizens were opposed. Sweden emphasized strong European

cooperation after the events in Crimea, with the EU as the central platform. Sweden and Finland maintained close collaboration with NATO and have put more focus on territorial defence to prevent an armed attack. Denmark being both an EU and NATO member, emphasized the importance of communication with Russia, as well as sending personnel and equipment to the Baltic Sea. It did not change its territorial defence but is seeking more security cooperation with neighbouring states. The events in Crimea have led to closer cooperation among these states and to a further collaboration with NATO. The Nordic states want to be on good terms with Russia; however, as international laws have been violated, it is difficult for the Nordics to stand by and do nothing, and they are not afraid of cooperating and possibly provoking Russia (Fiskvik, 2016, pp. 1-4; Forss & Holopainen, 2015, p. 1).

2.4 Summary

The theory of constructivism focuses on how norms, identity and rules shape the international system. Actors and objects are given meaning, and it is through social actions that the world is shaped. These meanings have created the global system, which is always changing. The four key tenets of constructivism are firstly the belief that the world is socially constructed and continuously changing. Second, ideational and material structures are both important, i.e. norms, rules and languages are valued the same as material forces. The third is the focus on identity; it helps us understand the world and can aid when trying to predict the interests and actions of states. Last key tenet is the belief that structure, and agents are mutually constituted, i.e. that agents influence structures and vice versa. The theory of constructivism and its key tenets bring us to the concept of Nordicness, which explains what is to be Nordic and how that can shape the national security policies of states. The Nordic norms, culture, identity, domestic and international factors all shape the security policies of the Nordic states. They are affected and shaped by significant events in history, such as WWII, the end of the Cold War and Russia's annexation of Crimea.

The main focus in security studies has been on the military aspect of security, this has changed over the years, and now the concept has broadened and comprises economic, political, societal, individual and environmental security as well. Constructivism brought new ideas into security studies by focusing on identity, culture and norms. It stresses the importance on how securitizing threats are essential to establish state security policy, which leads us to the Copenhagen school and the process of securitization. Securitization is the act when the referent object, e.g. the state, is declared as existentially threatened and

emergency measures need to be taken to protect it. Any issue can be securitized, and no issue is a threat until the securitization process has been successful.

3 Methodology

A case study is broadly defined as an "in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon" (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 2016, p. 2). This thesis is a qualitative, multiple case study, and it is explanatory. An explanatory case study is appropriate, as it lets me develop my understanding of the problem in a real-life context, and it is advantageous when answering 'how' and 'why' research questions. Further, an explanatory case study lets me examine complex decisions and the effects those decisions have on the phenomenon (Feagin et al., 2016, p. 10; Harrison, Birks, Franklin & Mills, 2017, para. 28).

A case study lets me analyse each state and its decisions regarding their security policies. I research the security policies of the countries, and the units of analysis are the five Nordic states: Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland and Denmark. Each state and its security policy are examined and explored as a single case, and afterwards I compare the states and discuss patterns and themes that emerge (Chmiliar, 2010, pp. 583-584).

The theory of constructivism is applied to explain and interpret why decisions on security policies have been made. A multiple case study lets me compare the states to understand why they differ from one another. I explain how norms, values, identity and history of the states can have an impact when forming a security policy, as the policies can be different even though the norms and values are similar.

A case study can be exploratory, explanatory, interpretive and descriptive. Each of these can then either be a single or a multiple case study. The units of the case study can be "organizations, individuals, groups, or social situations" (Stewart, 2017, p. 6). It is essential to study two units or more to understand where they differ and where they compare. Hence, there can be many different options in case study research. Case studies seek to explore, understand and demonstrate meaning from the actors involved. The main purpose of a case study is to make an in-depth analysis, to understand the issue from the participants' perspective. It is used to investigate phenomena within their real-life context. It requires a thorough analysis and investigation of the phenomenon in question. Multiple sources of data are needed, that will show the details of the study from the perspective of the participants (Harrison et al., 2017, para. 15; Tellis, 1997a, p. 3; Tellis, 1997b, p. 6).

It is essential to consider the aim of the study when choosing a methodological position of the study and select a design that is in alignment with the researcher's worldview. The goal with this alignment is to make a connection with the researcher's philosophical view,

the research question and the methods of the study (Harrison et al., 2017, para. 20). Different approaches can be used in case studies. Here, I employ a constructivist approach, where the assumption is made that reality is socially constructed through meanings and understandings of the actors. The goal is to explain the phenomena and bring an understanding of it. It is essential to conduct the same analysis for each case of the multiple case study. How the study is approached is up to the researcher; there is no wrong or right way. Applying a method that correlates with the researcher's beliefs is therefore important otherwise the research might lead to non-optimal results (Harrison et al., 2017, para. 24-25; Stewart, 2017, pp. 5-6 & 11).

The problem with case studies is that they tend to generalize and that they lack rigour. Stewart (2017, p. 13), however, argues that the case study is though not flawed. To form a well-conducted case study, one should choose a suitable methodology to answer the research question.

> [I]t is only when the methodology used is either inappropriate to answer the research question, or when it is not conducted with sufficient foresight and planning, satisfactory attention to the detail of gathering the data, or adequate analysis of the findings, that it leads to a poorly-conducted case study (Stewart, 2017, p. 13).

Hence, it is crucial to contemplate if the case study is the right method for the research prjoect in question (ibid., pp. 12-13). I study each state's security policies, and official documents such as agreements, press releases and fact sheets along with information from governments or ministries. The sources are found on official websites of each state's government and ministry for foreign affairs and/or defence, and from the websites of the EU institutions, and NATO. I analyse the sources by researching the states seperately, each as an individual case. I focus on the values, identity and history of the states, how they perceive themselves and what their primary objectives are for their security policy. The security policies are long and entail a lot of aspects. To be thorough, I focus on the leading security institutions in Europe (EU and NATO), and discuss the relations the Nordic states have with these main institutions and other important actors, such as the United States (US). Then I analyse the states together and apply the theory of constructivism to explain why decisions have been made to make a certain security policy choice. Using a multiple case study gives a more extensive description and explanations of the security policies, and the comparison develops an in-depth understanding (Chmiliar, 2010, pp. 583-584).

4 Institutions

In this chapter, the two primary security institutions of Europe are introduced, and their history, role and purpose are put forth. The institutions are essential for the analysis, as they show that states seek different relationships with several institutions to enhance their security. The significance of NATO and the EU as security institutions is shown and how they provide security in different aspects. These various aspects of security are important when explaining how NATO and the EU can provide security for the Nordic states.

4.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO was established in the aftermath of WWII, with the US as its leader, to secure peace and stability in Europe, promote cooperation and safeguard the freedom of its members. NATO members are determined to protect their common heritage and civilisation based on their shared values of democracy, the rule of law and individual liberty. The original purpose of the alliance was to ensure collective defence to its members because of the Soviet threat. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the purpose of the alliance was questioned. But in the mid-1990s, a new role started to emerge. NATO began to form partnerships with non-members, both states and institutions (such as the EU and the UN), making the connections and cooperation stronger than before, making it the strongest military alliance in the world. Today it still ensures collective defence, along with promoting security through partnership and collaboration. Its role goes beyond securing Europe as NATO conducts operations and missions all around the world, including in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Mediterranean Sea and Iraq. Recent events, i.e. Russia's annexation of Crimea in Ukraine and its military build-up near NATO's borders, and the security situation in the southern neighbours of Europe have caused a loss of life and illegal migration, along with smuggling and trafficking. The former has caused NATO to reinforce its defence posture in the Baltic Sea region and the latter to support international efforts to promote peace and security outside NATO territory (McCann, 2015, pp. 367-368; NATO, 2017).

The foundation of NATO is the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949. Solidarity is the heart of the founding treaty, and collective defence is the fundamental pillar, with collective defence the members are bound together and committed to protecting one another. The most important article of the founding treaty that the members agreed to is Article 5, which declares that an armed attack on one member is considered an attack on all members. Members will take any necessary action to assist the member under attack. Each state will determine what is a necessary action in the situation; it does not have to be

military actions. The members will consult with one another and decide what should be done "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area" (North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Article 5). Article 5 has only been invoked once in NATO's history (North Atlantic Treaty, 1949; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2019).

4.2 The European Union

The primary goal of the EU was to bring peace and stability among states in Europe after WWII. The EU was to bind its members together economically, so that conflict among them would not only effect one but all members. Today conflicts in Europe are considered unthinkable. Through the years, the EU has developed and is now one of the strongest international actors in the Western world. After the Cold War the EU started to rethink their role, which led to the establishment of the CFSP (McCann, 2017, p. 368).

The CFSP was established with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on 7 February 1992. This policy aimed to protect common values and interests of the EU, enhance the security of the EU and its members, and strengthening international security. It is essential to preserve peace, protect human rights and democracy, and respect the rule of law. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an indispensable part of the CFSP. The CSDP allows the EU to take the lead in peacekeeping missions, both to avert conflict and to strengthen regional and global security. Further, the CSDP should be developed progressively to make a collective defence policy. EU members should make their contributions and make their civilian and military capabilities available. Members should also continue to improve their military capabilities (Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C 191/1).

Article 42.7 of the TEU is a mutual defence clause which requires the states to be ready to help in case another EU member is under attack. The article is as follows:

> If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Further, it states that:

> Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

Additionally, article 28 B of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, allows the EU to use all "civilian and military means to contribute to the fight against terrorism". Moreover, Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the solidarity clause, states that the EU and its members should collaborate if one member suffers "a terrorist attack, natural or man-made disaster". The EU members should make all resources available, including military ones, to avert terrorist threats and protect EU civilians from attacks (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C 202/13; European Parliament, 2016; Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community [2007] OJ C 306/1)

Over the past few years, new security challenges and threats have been prominent in Europe and the world, these include Russia's aggression in Ukraine, right-wing populist movements, the war in Syria and instability in Libya, along with tensions in Iran and EU's relationship with the US. Members of the EU now face more significant challenges, and the EU faces a greater responsibility to protect its citizens. No member state can withstand the current threats alone. The citizens of the EU want a synchronized plan to respond to threats that might occur. The EU should take responsibility for its security and be able to secure and defend its citizens. Furthermore, it should also be a global security provider, sharing the responsibility with other major actors in the world (Centre for European Reform, n.d.; European External Action Service, 2018a; European External Action Service, 2018b).

To face the new security challenges and threats, the EU and its members need to work in close cooperation. Effective and coordinated responses at a European level are required to face these threats. The EU believes that long-term engagement is necessary to secure and stabilize Europe. Every EU citizen has the right to feel secure, and safe at home and the EU should be the actor providing that security. To achieve security in Europe, the EU should deny terrorists the means to act, and they need to intensify information sharing, invest more in cybersecurity and protect the borders of its members (European Commission, 2019, pp. 1-2; European Union, 2008, p. 1).

4.3 Summary

NATO and the EU are two different institutions. They do, nonetheless, share common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. NATO is a military alliance, founded to defend its members, while the EU is more political and was founded to bring peace to the states of Europe after WWII. Conflict among members of these institutions is

unthinkable, and if any differences come up, then they are to be settled peacefully. The members of these institutions are, therefore, not threatened by each other, but by outside threats. Being a part of regional or international institutions will bring more security to the members (McCann, 2015, p. 367). The Nordic states, therefore, lay great value to these institutions in their security policies. Article 5 of the NATO treaty and the defence and solidarity clause within the EU framework will protect and defend the members in case of an attack or a disaster. Facing new security challenges that have a global effect is also more manageable in a collective group of states.

5 Nordic Security Policies

In this chapter, the security policies of the Nordic states are introduced. The first section starts with Sweden, the second with Finland, then Norway, Iceland and Denmark. The order of the states is according to their memberships in the EU and/or NATO. Sweden and Finland are both EU members. Norway and Iceland are both NATO members, and Denmark is a member of both institution. This order of the countries helps when comparing the states in the analysis. The states that are a part of the same institutions often share interests on security issues. Each section starts with a broad view of the policy, explaining the main goals and what values the state seeks to promote to pursue its interests. Then its relations with the EU and NATO are explored.

5.1 Sweden

Human rights, democracy and the rule of law is the foundation of the Swedish foreign and security policy. The most important task of the Swedish security policy is to prevent threats and risks, along with protecting the life and health of Swedish citizens. The security policy is pursued directly in relation to other states or through institutions such as the EU or the UN. Sweden cooperates with other states and institutions according to international law and agreements, and rules that intend what behaviour is appropriate. Sweden perceives itself as being generous and ambitious in international development cooperation, which is distributed through the EU or the UN (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2019, pp. 3 & 12; Prime Minister's Office Sweden, 2017, p. 6).

In a statement of foreign policy from the Government of Sweden from 12 February 2020, it declares that the goal of Swedish foreign and security policy is to secure the state and to create security around the world. Events that are occurring outside of Swedish borders, such as conflict, climate change, and refugee flows affect Sweden because the world is getting closer and becoming interconnected. Sweden stresses the importance of international cooperation. "International problems require international responses" (Government of Sweden, 2016, p. 1). Sweden needs international cooperation and well-functioning laws to be secure. By promoting cooperation, diplomacy and dialogue, Sweden can defend its interests and make the world a more secure place. The EU is the most important actor for Swedish security policy and will guarantee security and peace in Sweden. It will continue to stand out of military alliances because that has served the state well over the years (Prime Minister's Office Sweden, 2017, p. 6).

Furthermore, Sweden believes that diplomacy and cooperation will play an important role in preventing conflict. "We stand up for diplomacy, dialogue and cooperation. This is how we defend our interests, values and security. This is how we make the world safer" (Government of Sweden, 2020, p. 1). Moreover, it wants to enhance defence cooperation, exchange information and close contact to aspire to achieve collective security. Close cooperation with the Nordic states, the EU and the Baltics are vital, along with the transatlantic link, to secure Sweden and Europe. Sweden is also a part of the UN, the OSCE, is in partnership with NATO and participates in NORDEFCO (Prime Minister's Office Sweden, 2017, p. 6).

5.1.1 EU-Membership

Sweden affirms that Europe should take responsibility for its security. The EU is the prime forum for Sweden's foreign and security policy and Sweden asserts that the Union has strengthened both its prosperity and security. It states that no other actor can secure Sweden's security, economy and peace as the EU. "Sweden will participate fully in EU cooperation and in shaping it in a way that safeguards Sweden's interests" (Government of Sweden, 2020, p. 2). To achieve security both within and outside the EU, members must present a united front in their security objectives. EU cohesion is, therefore, valuable because no EU state can face new security challenges alone. Sweden seeks to strengthen the EU as a security actor by building up its capabilities in military and crisis management. Further, Sweden will establish strong relations with powerful member states, such as Germany and France. These relationships are essential to secure the region and make it sustainable (Government of Sweden, 2020, pp. 1-2; Prime Minister's Office Sweden, 2017, p. 16).

Sweden and the EU must promote their common values and maintain close relations to the rest of the world to achieve peace and security in Europe. These relations are advantageous for the EU to develop economically, politically and socially. By promoting peace, democracy and human rights, along with keeping a stable economy, the EU can develop security in Europe. Sweden wants to ensure that the EU will develop policies with Eastern Partnership states, to support democracy and economic developments in these countries. Further, Sweden seeks to ensure that the EU is actively engaging in peace processes in the Middle East. Moreover, Sweden places a high value on the EU having a free trade agreement with Japan. Sweden is in close cooperation with states in North Africa

and insists that the EU will enhance its support for stability and developments in these countries (Government Offices of Sweden, 2016; Government of Sweden, 2020, p. 3).

Sweden did not join the EU because of security reasons. It, nonetheless, has become an active participant in both the CFSP, and been involved in every civilian and military CSDP operation. Sweden wants the CSDP to be further developed and strengthened in order to promote EU values and interests on an international level. Sweden longs for the EU to increase its civilian and military crisis management and the application of the UNSC resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in its CSDP. It is vital to stand up for women's peace and security, along with women's sexual and reproductive rights. Sweden and France have, within the EU framework taken an initiative to improve gender equality in the EU, and "are establishing a feminist trade policy" (Government of Sweden, 2020, p. 7). Further, Sweden promotes closer cooperation between the EU and other strong institutions, such as the UN, NATO and the OSCE. Sweden takes EU solidarity seriously and affirms that "Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or a Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack" (Government of Sweden, 2020, p. 4), it further states that it will expect the same if Sweden is under attack or faces a disaster (Fägersten, Danielson & Håkansson, 2018, p. 2; Government Offices of Sweden, 2016).

5.1.2 NATO Cooperation

In 1994 Sweden joined the PfP programme, and in 1997 the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.[3] It is also a part of the Enhanced Opportunity Partners (EOP) (with Finland, Australia, Georgia and Jordan), who contribute to NATO operations and objectives and have, therefore, more opportunities to cooperate with the members of NATO. Sweden has participated in many exercises with the PfP programme. The Swedish Armed Forces International Centre has trained the military forces of other NATO members. These trainings focus "humanitarian assistance, rescue services, peace-support operations, civil preparedness and the democratic control of the armed forces" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2018b, para. 12). Further, Sweden was a part of planning the Trident Juncture, a NATO defence exercise that took place in Norway in 2018 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2018b).

Since Russia's actions in Crimea in 2014, the security environment in Europe has worsened. Russia has shown that it is willing to use military means to reach its political

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[3] A platform for dialogue and information exchange for all members of NATO and its partners in Europe and the Atlantic region (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2018b).

goals, both within and outside of Europe. Both NATO and the US have increased their military presence in the Baltic area, which has led Sweden to work in closer cooperation with NATO. Sweden now actively engages in dialogues with other NATO members in the Baltic Sea region (Prime Minister's Office Sweden, 2017, p. 12).

The then US Secretary of Defence Jim Mattis and the Swedish Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist had a meeting on 18 May 2017. At this meeting, the actions of Russia were discussed, and Jim Mattis expressed that he was pleased that the partnership between NATO and Sweden was growing stronger. He further stated that even though Sweden is not a member, NATO sees Sweden as a "friend and an ally", and will stand with all democracies (Hultqvist, 2020).

In the statement of foreign policy from 2020, no detailed NATO cooperation is discussed. Sweden does not seek membership because of its policy of military non-alignment. Although membership would increase defence and deterrence in the area, changing the doctrine would be substantial alteration on Swedish security policy (Prime Minister's Office Sweden, 2017, p. 12; Wieslander, 2019).

5.1.3 Nordic Cooperation

Sweden is a member of NORDEFCO. It believes that collaboration with the Nordic states will improve national defence and security abilities. Sweden held chairmanship in NORDEFCO from 2019 until 1 January 2020. With its chairmanship, Sweden sought to highlight Nordic cooperation. Its priorities were to maintain and enhance the transatlantic link with the Nordic states. Further, it tried to develop knowledge and collaboration among the states and make NORDEFCO the platform for crisis consultation. Developing Nordic cooperation on peace, crisis and conflict is of great significance. Sweden seeks to strengthen NORDEFCO as a platform for security dialogue to reach regional security (Nordic Ministers of Defence, 2018, pp. 1-2).

Sweden lays a great importance on its bilateral relations with Finland, as both states stand outside of a military alliance. In the Government's statement from 12 February 2020, it declares, that "active, broad and responsible foreign and security policy" (p. 3) with Finland is required to achieve security in northern Europe. The cooperation between Sweden and Finland covers planning for all security situations. The states share common locational interests and perspectives on security. Enhancing cooperation is, therefore, beneficial for both states. Both states acknowledge their obligations in the EU and take its defence cooperation developments into consideration. The main aims of this cooperation

are to strengthen the defence capabilities of both states. They want to create preconditions for collective military actions in all situations. Securing the Baltic Sea region is critical for both states, as they share common interests because of their location. Further, the states will combine its resources and increase its capability to collaborate both on a domestic and international level. The cooperation entails crisis, war and peace, and there are no pre-set limits when it comes to deepening the cooperation. Other areas of collaboration are the protection of territorial integrity, along with granted access to each other's land for military forces, information sharing, and training and exercises. Further, it entails research and development, strategic communication, crisis management and personnel exchange (Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on Defence Cooperation, 2018, pp. 1-6).

5.2 Finland

The 2016 Government Report of Finnish foreign policy states that the main objectives of Finland's foreign and security policy are to keep it out of military conflict, promote security and ensure its prosperity. Other significant goals are to strengthen the position of Finland on an international level, along with securing its independence and territorial integrity. Further, it states that the security and wellbeing of the Finnish population should be improved, which is done by having a stable economy. Finland seeks to promote its values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, along with international stability and equality. Finland's foreign and security policy is based on its interests, the situation within the state, the perception that the state has on itself, along with threats that have occurred or might emerge (Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, pp. 7, 12-13 & 17).

The most important actors for Finland are the strongest ones in the international system, i.e. the US, China, Russia and, the EU, along with the ones that are geographically close (Sweden and the Baltic states). It is also a member of the UN, NORDEFCO and the OSCE. Finland looks at the EU as the main security policy actor in Europe, and as the most vital actor in Finland's foreign and security policy. Nordic cooperation is significant, especially relations with Sweden, as these states share values and a security environment. Security in the Baltic states is essential as well, and the tension in the Baltic Sea region has led to further cooperation with NATO. Finland is also a part of the OSCE. It believes that the OSCE promotes security and stability in Europe. The institution emphasizes both traditional military and political security, as well as on economic and environmental security. Within the OSCE Finland has promoted mediation, improvement of the position

of women. Furthermore, it has been active in arms control issues and has supported the OSCE's role in Ukraine (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, n.d.; Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, pp. 7, 12 & 16)

When forming its security policy and determining how to strengthen its security, Finland considers how it can influence the development of the unpredictable environment we live in. It considers how cooperation can be intensified and enhanced, and how the state will respond and eventually take advantage of opportunities that the global risks might bring. Finland has a vision of its foreign and security policy until 2025. The main focus areas of this policy are; strengthening the EU as a security provider, Nordic cooperation, relations with Russia, bilateral relations, relationship with NATO, focus on the Arctic region, sustainable development, external and internal security, equality and human rights, conflict management, mediation, strengthening rule-based action and crisis resilience (Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, pp. 19-30).

5.2.1 EU-Membership

Finnish foreign policy was restrained during the Cold War, so after the fall of the Soviet Union, Finland was quick to move from the East to the West. A referendum was held in 1994, in which 56.9 percent of the Finnish public voted for EU membership. The membership would place Finland with other similar states that share history and culture (Raunio & Wiberg, 2001, pp. 65 & 67).

Now Finland perceives itself as an "active, pragmatic and solution-oriented" (Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, p. 19) EU member. The EU is the main actor in Finland's security policy. It wants to strengthen the EU as a security community, which refers to the state in which countries are integrated into a community and will try to use means other than war to settle their differences. The security community will bring peace among its members (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 3).

Finland exercises influence through international institutions, such as the Council of Europe (the Council) and the OSCE. The Council is the institution that promotes European values, i.e. democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Finland wants to develop the Council's relationship with the EU and the OSCE and strengthen the cooperation among these institutions and make the Council an umbrella organization for Europe. Promoting human rights is important for Finland, and it has been in the front line in the Council when human rights issues have been brought to the table (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, n.d.; Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, p. 16).

Finland emphasizes that strengthening the EU's CFSP will increase security and stability in Europe. Finland supports and fully participates in the development of the CFSP. It wants to emphasize on preventing conflict and pre-empt action. Defence cooperation within the EU is important to face future security challenges and "to improve their crisis resilience" (Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, p. 20). Finland believes that the EU is the actor that should defend its members and its territory. It highlights the mutual defence clause (Article 42.7, TEU) and the solidarity clause (Article 222, TFEU) in its foreign and security policy. It believes that the clauses require members of the EU to be prepared to assist in case of an emergency and be ready to support each other to prevent threats. Defence cooperation is also significant for the EU, and it is essential to develop this cooperation together with NATO. This collaboration would be in Finland's interests (Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, pp. 19-21).

5.2.2 NATO Cooperation

Finland has a long history of non-alignment policy when it comes to military alliances. In 1994, it joined NATO's PfP programme, and later in 1997 joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO enhanced its cooperation with both Finland and Sweden because of the Russian threat with the focus on securing the Baltic Sea region. This collaboration entails dialogues, information exchange, and training and exercises. Further, it includes the development of collective understanding, along with awareness and willingness to address shared threats, and joint actions, if required. Finland has assessed the possibility of a NATO membership. A membership would be a fundamental change in Finland's foreign and security policy. It would need a lot of consideration, it is, though, regarded logical because of the shared security environment with NATO in the Baltic Sea region (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2018a; Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, pp. 23-24).

Finland wants to develop a relationship with NATO because NATO is a crucial actor in advancing security and stability in Europe. It recognizes that military operations with NATO are necessary when developing its national defence, and the capabilities to defend the state's territory. For these reasons, Finland actively and widely participates in NATO's exercises and training. It is important to note that as Finland is not a member of NATO, and Article 5 of NATO's founding treaty about collective defence does not apply to Finland. There are no security guarantees or obligations for Finland in case of an attack

(North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2018a; Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, pp. 23-24).

5.2.3 Nordic Cooperation and Bilateral Relations

Nordic cooperation is crucial for Finland, as it believes that acting as one, the states can strengthen their security in the region and increase their global influences. Finland has a close relationship with Sweden; the states share history, values, and their economies are widely integrated. It is in Finland's interests to maintain and further develop bilateral cooperation with Sweden because both these states have a similar evaluation of their security environments. The security policy collaboration with Sweden entails a lot of aspects and there are no limits when it comes to enforcing it to promote the common interests of the states. The goal of the defence cooperation with Sweden is to enhance the defence capabilities of both states and to secure the Baltic Sea region. With this collaboration, both states elevate their defences in case of incidents and/or attacks (Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, pp. 21-22).

Finnish foreign and security policy entails a lot of bilateral and multilateral relations. Finland believes that international cooperation will assist to achieve the goals of its security policy. It is vital to have strong economic and trade relations for the state to prosper. Finland has a lot of important bilateral relations with states such as China, Japan, the US, and countries in the Middle East and Africa. With China, the relationships are economic and political. They are more intense when it comes to matters that are in Finland's interests and development of China, "such as environmental technology and renewable energy as well as topics associated with good governance and rule of law" (ibid., p. 23). Keeping good relations with Japan is essential for the Finnish economy. Finland's relations with the US are of great importance because the US is one of the most powerful actors in the international system, and it plays a key role in global and regional issues that are of high value to Finland. States in the Middle East and Africa are neighbours to Europe, that is why it is critical for Finland's security to have good relations with the countries of these areas. These relations will also strengthen the international position of Finland (ibid., pp. 7 & 23).

5.3 Norway

In 2017 the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a report that set the course for Norway's foreign and security policy. This report takes into account new security challenges that have emerged in Europe, i.e. Russia's annexation of Crimea, instability in

the southern neighbourhood of Europe and climate change. The world is more unpredictable than it used to be and cooperation among states is more crucial than it has been in decades. Norway's European and Nordic neighbours, along with the ones across the Atlantic are communities that share the same values and interests as Norway, i.e. protecting democracy, human rights and respect for international law. Norway depends on cooperation and alliances to reach security and economic stability. It will maintain close relationships with these communities and try to seek further cooperation with new partners (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, pp. 5-6).

The aim of the Norwegian security policy is to protect the state's interests and defend its values. There are three main objectives of its policy. First, Norway wants to maintain, and build on the firm principles of its security policy. It seeks to keep strong ties with the US, along with developing a long-term security cooperation. Norway supports NATO and intends to strengthen the collective defence and strengthen Norway's defence and have more Allied presence, along with repetitive exercises in the north. It seeks to maintain the international legal order, strengthen international institutions, and promote common values. Further, Norway seeks to develop cooperation with Russia built on common interests. Second, Norway wants to strengthen European and Nordic features of its security policy. It aims to increase "European civilian and military crisis management capacity" (ibid., p. 7). Moreover, it will pursue cooperation developments "with selected European allies" (ibid.) and increase Nordic security cooperation. It will promote further cooperation between the EU and NATO, along with protecting multilateral institutions that promote common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Finally, Norway seeks to enhance its efforts in the southern neighbourhood of Europe by increasing assistance in unstable areas, such as the Middle East and North Africa (ibid., pp. 6-7).

5.3.1 NATO-Membership

Norway was a founding member of NATO and has been active in the alliance ever since its foundation. It has played a part in creating NATO as it is today. Being a part of an institution, such as NATO will protect the security of Norway. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is crucial for Norway's defences. The NATO membership is, therefore, a key pillar in Norwegian foreign and security policy. It depends on its membership and the transatlantic cooperation with the US. Norway states that European members need to take more responsibility to secure the Continent for new threats. Not all members of NATO are willing to take this responsibility, resulting in closer cooperation among smaller groups of

states. Norway wants to strengthen NATO as an alliance and keep a close relationship with the US, along with building political and military cooperation with selected allies. Norway will prioritize these selected allies to enhance its security. These allies will strengthen the state's capacity to handle crises. To enhance Norway's defence capabilities, it seeks to establish closer cooperation with the US, the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 25, 31 & 33; The Permanent Delegation of Norway to NATO, n.d.).

Norway affirms that NATO is the only institution in Europe able to provide a collective defence. It wants to be an active member and seeks to ensure the alliance is effective and dependable. Ensuring NATO's core tasks, i.e. "collective, defence, crisis management and cooperative security" (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 31), is essential because of the changing security environment in Europe. Norway will contribute to NATO by providing troops in NATO missions, engaging in reform and capacity building in other NATO member states, along with supporting further cooperation between NATO and the EU. Norway will gradually increase defence spending; the goal is spending 2% of the GDP within the next decade. Norway states that European members should invest more in European security and take greater responsibility. To secure NATO members for future threats, European members must increase their defence spending. Further, it believes that by cooperating with other members, the alliance will become cohesive, which will increase its defence capabilities. Norway affirms that no other security actor (the EU, the UN or the OSCE) should replace NATO. NATO must, therefore, signify its capabilities and show it is prepared to face new security challenges (ibid., pp. 31-32).

Norway asserts that the US is the security guarantor for the European members of NATO. Relations with the US are vital for Norway, as the two states share interests and values. If the states invest in each other and the alliance, it will increase their ability to make a collective response to crises. "At a time when policy is changing … we must seek to defend our fundamental values and maintain cooperation in areas where we have common interests" (ibid., p. 32). Further, Norway supports closer cooperation between NATO and the EU, including intensified exchange of information, promotion of political dialogue and improvements of coordination of training and exercises (ibid., p. 32).

5.3.2 European Relations

Most of Norway's allies are European states. It is not an EU member, but a member of the EEA and EFTA. The EU is one of the institutions (along with NATO and the OSCE) that

make up the foundation of security in Europe. But because Norway is not a member, it does not take any part in EU decision-making or dialogues. To promote Norwegian interests in Europe, Norway has decided to contribute more resources to the Norwegian embassies in the most important EU member states. Irrespective of its NATO membership and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, Norway wishes that European allies and itself will take responsibility for security in Europe. Norway seeks to enhance European cooperation on an international level, and help find common solutions to occurring challenges, such as terrorism, climate change, organized crime and migration. The EU is an essential actor to cooperate with and find common solutions for these transnational challenges (EFTA, n.d.; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 25).

Nordic cooperation is vital for Norway. Because of the changing security environment, Norway seeks to safeguard the Nordic community and its shared values and interests. Norway affirms that Nordic cooperation can enhance Europe's peace and security. It stresses the importance of having a strong relationship with Sweden and Finland in case of crises, and because of the security issues in the neighbourhood (Baltic Sea region). Norway seeks to enhance Nordic and Baltic cooperation because of the recent events in the Baltic Sea region (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, pp. 25 & 33).

The main objective of Norwegian foreign and security policy is to protect human rights, freedom, democratic institutions and respecting the rule of law. Norway supports the promotion of democracy, along with the freedom of expression and the press. Respect for human rights and freedoms are essential for Norwegian foreign and security policy to prevent conflicts and crises in Europe (ibid., 27-28). Further, Norway seeks to strengthen crisis management in Europe. In order to prepare for crises and have important structures and resources, Norway and Europe need to coordinate and cooperate to be successful. Norway will, therefore, when it is in its interest, support EU missions on military or civilian operations, on restrictive measures and public safety (ibid., pp. 26-27).

Moreover, the EU is developing its crisis management capabilities, and Norway believes that it is in Europe's interests that these crisis management structures will be inclusive, i.e. also taking non-EU members into account. Norway wants to ensure that non-EU members that contribute to EU military operations will be allowed further opportunities to participate in planning these operations. Furthermore, Norway seeks to intensify cooperation in controls of external borders by exchanging information, which will secure the borders of the Schengen area and lessen the risk of terrorist attacks. Security and police

cooperation among European states are of great significance to fight terrorism and organised crimes. Norway wants to pursue a better exchange of information, and it would like to strengthen its cooperation with the EU in this field. The best way to protect Europe's security and economy is to stand together (ibid.).

5.3.3 The Arctic

Norway considers NATO as an essential actor in the Arctic, and the military alliance should have all the information on occurring events in the area. "Norway is NATO in the north" (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 29), it has significant responsibility, and has developed valuable knowledge of the area. A lot of powerful international actors, such as the US, the EU, China and Russia, are interested in the Arctic. It is, therefore, important for Norway to have stability and security in the Arctic (ibid.).

For years, Norway has had an "Arctic policy and a policy of engagement with Russia" (ibid.). Since 2014, Norway's relationship with Russia has changed and most military cooperation with Russia has been suspended. However, Norway wants to show openness about military activities in the area. To ensure the security in the Arctic, Norway needs to have direct communication with Russia and cooperate with it. Further, Norway wants to promote its interests in the area by investing in "knowledge, industry, infrastructure and emergency preparedness" (ibid.). It is crucial to maintain close cooperation with other states of the Arctic and establish relationships that are built on trust and openness (ibid.).

5.4 Iceland

On 13 April 2016, a Parliamentary Resolution on a National Security Policy for Iceland was approved. Its main objectives are to ensure the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iceland, along with safeguarding its citizens and protecting the governmental system and the social infrastructure. The policy is based on the Icelandic values of human rights, respect for the rule of law, democracy, humanitarianism, equal rights, disarmament and peaceful solutions of conflict. It further emphasizes that international cooperation with both IGOs and/or other states based on international laws is essential. Issues should be resolved peacefully in order to ensure the security and defences of the state because Iceland is a small island state that does not have the resources or the desire to maintain a military. Iceland affirms that NATO membership is the fundamental pillar of the national defence. Iceland is dependent on the US in military and economic aspects. The defence agreement with the US from 1951 will ensure Iceland's defences and

the US is one of Iceland's biggest trading partner (Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, n.d.a; Parliamentary resolution 1166/2016; U.S. Department of State, 2019).

On 1 September 2016, a National Security Council was established in Iceland, which will promote open and democratic debates on security issues. Iceland is a small state with no military. International cooperation and collaboration, along with international law, are therefore highly important for the country. The foundation of its security and defence is the NATO membership and the defence agreement with the United States (Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2018, p. 12; Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, n.d.a).

Iceland is a part of the UN, the OSCE and NORDEFCO. It is also a member of the EEA and EFTA and, therefore, highly integrated with the EU economically (Agreement on the European Economic Area [1993] OJ L 001/3; European Commission, 2017; Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, n.d.a).

Iceland seeks to intensify Nordic cooperation in security and defence issues; this is done within the framework of NORDEFCO and is based on shared values. If the Nordic states act together, they can face challenges regarding defence and security in the North. Furthermore, Iceland wants to enhance cooperation with other neighbouring states that share common interests. The policy also emphasizes the importance to increase cybersecurity, security regarding threats such as natural disasters and epidemics, terrorism, organized crime, and economic threats. Iceland aspires to promote peace and disarmament, and does not want nuclear weapons within its territory, including its territorial waters (Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, n.d.a; Parliamentary resolution 1166/2016).

5.4.1 NATO-Membership

Iceland joined NATO in 1949 and is the only member without a military. The membership remains one of the most important pillars of Icelandic security policy. It is the main forum to ensure Iceland's security and the security of other members of NATO. Since the Cold War, the role of NATO and Iceland has changed. The geographical position of Iceland was crucial for NATO, as it was positioned in the middle between the US and the Soviet Union. To have control over the sea around Iceland meant that both Europe and North America was protected from the North Atlantic threat. After the Cold War, the emphasis has shifted to peacekeeping missions, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Iceland wants to emphasize these new NATO roles, and with its membership, Iceland seeks to come to an agreement on security and stability. It also intends to seek a common defence and determine ways to lessen tension and build trust. Iceland promotes the shared values of

NATO, i.e. democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It also stressed the significance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325(2000), which underlines the importance of women when preventing and resolving conflict, along with peacebuilding. It also stresses the significance of having women equally participating and involved in all efforts regarding the promotion of security and peace. Further, Iceland accentuates the value of NATO being open to new European members that share the same values (Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2018, pp. 4-5; Government of Iceland, n.d.; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d.).

A permanent delegation of Iceland to NATO has been operating since 1952. The delegation protects and promotes Icelandic interests in NATO, and highlights security and defence, along with political and military consultation. Iceland has contributed to NATO by participating in the Trident juncture in 2018, an enormous defence exercise in Norway led by NATO. NATO had ten naval vessels docked in Reykjavík. Other contributions to NATO have been the operation of the Icelandic air defence system, this system is a part of NATO's air defence system and the operation of 90 NATO defence structures in Iceland, along with keeping oversight of those defence structures. Iceland has also accommodated NATO personnel, and it hosted the annual NATO conference in 2018 (Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2019, pp. 12-13; Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2018, pp. 4-5; Government of Iceland, n.d.; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d.).

5.4.2 The Bilateral Defence Agreement

The bilateral defence agreement with the US was signed on 5 May 1951 and declared that Iceland does not have the means to defend itself, which brings insecurity to the state and its neighbours. The defence agreement was to both defend and preserve peace in Iceland and the North Atlantic area. The US had the responsibility to defend Iceland and its citizens, and the US should take into consideration that for ages Iceland has been unarmed. The most important aspect of the agreement for Iceland was that Iceland would with its accord give the US army the facilities it needed to defend Iceland on behalf of NATO. The downside to the agreement was that it gave the US the authority to set up a base in Iceland. Further, in case of war, the US would have been granted full permission to use Icelandic land (Ingimundarson, 1996, pp. 219-224; Varnarsamningur milli lýðveldisins Íslands og Bandaríkjanna á grundvelli Norður-Atlantshafssamningsins article 1, 2, 3, 4, 5/1951).

In 1994 there was an assessment of the agreement because of the relaxation of tension in the North Atlantic. It was decided to reduce the number of military forces in Iceland. In

2006, because of the changing security environment, the two states agreed to close the base in Iceland and withdraw all forces. The states decided that Iceland would continue to give the US and other NATO forces access through Iceland's territory to defend the state. Iceland would be in charge of all NATO facilities placed in Iceland, and responsible for operating, preserving and maintaining them. Further, the agreement stated that the US would retain the communication facility in the south-west of Iceland, and the US would be responsible for its maintenance and operation. Moreover, a Joint Understanding was agreed upon, where both parties affirm that they will continue to commit to the defence agreement from 1951. The states will continue to cooperate in the future. The US drafted a plan for the Icelandic defences, which Iceland agreed to. Arrangements were made in case of emergency, so communication between the states would be effective and rapid. The joint understanding stated that the US intended to use Iceland's facilities annually for exercises; this includes territorial airspace and waters of Iceland. Icelandic authorities would, however, have to authorize these exercises. Further, it says that the US and Iceland will continue to cooperate and try to deter and defend both states from a threat such as terrorism. Programs would be set up in areas of law enforcement and border security to strengthen this cooperation. They would include exercises, training and personnel exchange (Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Iceland regarding the withdrawal of U.S. forces from and the return to Iceland of certain agreed areas and facilities in Iceland, 2006; Joint Understanding, 2006; Varnarsamningur milli lýðveldisins Íslands og Bandaríkjanna á grundvelli Norður-Atlantshafssamningsins article 1, 2, 3, 4, 5/1951).

The defence agreement continues to be one of the most important pillars of the Icelandic security policy. The national security policy from 2016 affirms that Iceland wants to ensure that cooperation between the states will continue to develop and take into account new risks and threats that might emerge, where interests of both states are at risk. In 2016 a Joint Declaration between the US and Iceland was signed, where it expressed that the security environment in Europe and the North Atlantic is changing. The Joint Understanding from 2006 would still be valid, and the declaration from 2016 was to reaffirm the commitments that the states agreed to. Further, Iceland would continue to allow its use of facilities both to the US and NATO (Joint Declaration between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, 2016; Parliamentary Resolution 1166/2016).

5.5 Denmark

In November 2018 the Danish Government presented a new security policy strategy for Denmark for 2019-2020. It stated that the world is a better place than it was before with higher life expectancies, less poverty, and increased communication and technology. Denmark wants to maintain these developments and sustain Denmark's security and values and make sure that the state will be prosperous. Denmark believes that within the EU and the Nordic region, it will find states that share its values, even though they do not always agree (The Danish Government, 2018, pp. 5 & 15).

Further, the policy declares that the world is changing and becoming unpredictable. The common value of "rule-based international cooperation" (ibid., p. 5) that has guaranteed the security, prosperity, and values of Denmark, has been disputed. The new security policy strategy aims to protect the state and its interests. The most significant values for Denmark are human rights, democracy, the rule of law and international rules, and it believes that the last is the value that will protect the state and ensure that Denmark can pursue its interests. International cooperation is therefore of great importance for Denmark and it will further engage in it. The EU is the most vital actor for Denmark to gain influence both regionally and globally. NATO and Denmark's relationship with the US is critical for its security and Denmark wants to maintain the US's engagement to Europe through NATO. Because of recent threats, i.e. Russia's aggressive behaviour, terrorism, cyber-attacks and the instability in the Middle East, Denmark seeks to strengthen its security with international cooperation with its allies in Europe and across the Atlantic (ibid., pp. 5-6, 11 & 15).

Denmark believes that international cooperation within organizations such as the EU, NATO, UN and the OSCE is the key to fighting challenges such as migration, climate change, and terrorism. Denmark wants to further its cooperation in these institutions and make reforms where necessary. Denmark intends to defend liberal values and will use its membership in the UN Human Rights Council to promote them. Denmark wants to influence and reform the Human Rights Council to make it more legitimate and credible (ibid., p. 8-9).

The government of Denmark (the Liberal Party, the Social Democrats, the Danish People's Party and the Social-Liberal Party) agreed upon a Defence Agreement from 2018-2023. This agreement is to safeguard Denmark's sovereignty. Ensure the security and integrity of the state, along with the focusing on the defence budget. Denmark needs to be

prepared because threats can stem from anywhere. The Danish government seeks to strengthen contributions to NATO's collective defence, to enhance the capabilities of the Danish army when it comes to international operations. Further, it intends to increase the contributions for national security, in case of a terrorist attack, and protect the state from cyber-attacks (ibid., p. 1).

5.5.1 NATO-Membership

Denmark believes that international cooperation and coalitions are crucial to achieve security. NATO membership is the foundation of Denmark's defence and security policy. It wants to ensure that NATO remains the most powerful military alliance in the world. It believes that international cooperation and coalitions are crucial to achieve security; problems should be solved together. It intends to contribute further to NATO and take more responsibility in the alliance. NATO will guarantee security for Denmark; hence it is in Denmark's interests to contribute to the alliance. (Defence Agreement 2018-2023, p. 1; The Danish Government, 2018, p. 11).

In the Defence Agreement 2018-2023, the Danish government states that Denmark is a core member state of NATO. One of the objectives of the agreement is to meet NATO's requirements and compel the goals that NATO has for Denmark. Further, the agreement affirms the importance of increasing defence spending; Denmark is increasing its contributions to NATO and believes that by 2024 it will reach the goal of 2% of GDP spending to defence. Further contributions are strengthening defence and deterrence by placing a new brigade of 4,000 soldiers, and by fitting frigates from the Royal Danish Navy with short-range and long-range air defence missiles. Denmark seeks to improve the ability to combat threats from submarines and strengthen the Danish Defence and Home Guard to protect infrastructure. Moreover, the situation in the Baltic Sea region is vital for the security of Denmark, and it has contributed to NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in the area. Further, it will also join forces with other allies to set up a NATO Division Headquarters in Latvia (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2020; Defence Agreement 2018-2023, p. 1; The Danish Government, 2018, p. 11).

Denmark's relationship with the US is of great value to Denmark. It believes that the US is its most crucial ally in security matters and that the US will guarantee Denmark's security through NATO. This relationship is the foundation to protect the security interests of Denmark. Denmark and other European states should invest more in security matters and increase the relations with the US. Further, it is in Denmark's interests that the US

keeps its role as a global leader, and it is critical to the rule-based international order. However, the US's new reluctance to international organizations is of Denmark's concern. It disagrees with many of the decisions made by the US, e.g. withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Agreement, along with the UN Human Rights Council. Denmark wants to intensify its commitment and promote the understanding to the US that it is in the US's interest to maintain the rules-based international order (Defence Agreement 2018-2023, p. 1; The Danish Government, 2018, pp. 8 & 11).

5.5.2 EU-Membership

Denmark applied for EU membership in 1961 and 1967 with the United Kingdom (UK), Norway and Ireland. But because the UK was denied membership at that time, Denmark decided not to join. On 1 January 1973 Denmark, the UK, and Ireland all joined. Denmark and the UK share a lot of the same values and interests, therefore when the UK decided to leave the EU, Denmark lost a significant ally within the EU. Denmark will try to keep tight cooperation with the UK, but this cooperation cannot affect or compromise the single market, or Danish interests (The Danish Government, 2018, p. 6).

Denmark believes that the EU will provide the state the best opportunities for both European and global influence. The EU can give Denmark a voice when it comes to important international issues. Denmark seeks to further reform the EU, while focusing on results that benefit EU citizens. This includes increasing security, fighting climate change and ensuring free trade. Cooperation among member states is growing because of external pressure, which includes collaboration on defence matters. But because Denmark has opted out of the CSDP, it will not take part in this cooperation. The security policy strategy from 2018 declared that the EU must be strengthened to handle new security challenges that have or might emerge. However, due to the Danish opt-out of the CSDP, meaning it cannot participate in EU military missions, Denmark cannot collaborate on the developments of military capabilities in the EU. It will also not take part in the decision-making regarding these missions or developments. The Danish opt-out prevents Denmark from making any contributions to the EU's stabilization, military and civilian efforts within the EU framework. The government of Denmark, therefore, declares that it should be prepared to engage in debates in the future regarding the Danish opt-out of the CSDP (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2019; Folketinget, n.d.; The Danish Government, 2018, pp. 6 & 12).

The EU is the most important actor for Denmark to pursue its interests on an international level. Therefore, it is essential that the EU continues to be a global actor and

continues to reach for free trade agreements with states all over the world. These agreements will bring prosperity to the EU and Denmark, which will increase Danish influence on an international level. Cohesion within the EU is vital to uphold. New members should be well considered and not undermine the Union. Democracy, the rule of law and human rights, along with fundamental freedoms and a stable economy are values that all new members should promote. Further, the EU must present a united front and tackle the pressure from the European neighbours in the south, the external borders of the EU must be strengthened, and the Russian threat cannot go by unnoticed (The Danish Government, 2018, p. 16).

5.5.3 The Arctic

Denmark wants to ensure that the Arctic remains a peaceful environment and seeks to promote sustainable economic development. Climate change affects the Arctic extensively. Because of the changes in the climate, the Arctic has become more accessible and has attracted more attention. Activity in the area has increased, such as scientific, commercial and military activity. Since new opportunities have emerged in the area, such as maritime transport, tourism, and extraction of natural resources, Denmark wants to build equal rules for marine traffic in the area. Denmark is monitoring the developments in the area, especially Russia's military build-up. The Danish government notices these developments and affirms that keeping the Arctic as a low-tension area is one of Denmark's goals (ibid., 2018, p. 25-26).

5.6 Summary

The Nordic states share the same values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is prominent in all their security policies that they seek to promote those values and protect their interests. They have chosen different ways to secure their states; Sweden and Finland declare the EU as their primary security provider, while Norway, Iceland and Denmark affirm NATO as their main security provider. All the Nordic states rely on international cooperation. It is important to have strong relationships to ensure their military security, as well as their economic, political and societal security. They seek multilateral relations to enhance their security and defences, and to prosper. Nordic cooperation is of great importance, along with strong relations with the US, and all the states take part in the UN, the OSCE and NORDEFCO. In the next chapter, the Nordic security policies are compared and discussed, and the theory of constructivism is applied to explain the policy choices that have been made.

6 Analysis

In this chapter, the cases of the Nordic states are analysed and juxtaposed to show how they form their security policies. Recurring themes of the policies are explored. The first theme is multilateralism; all the Nordic states place a high value on multilateral cooperation, and it is prominent that they depend on other states or institutions to prosper and gain influence. The second theme is new security challenges; the security policies of the states have been shaped because of recent threats of climate change, Russia's actions in Crimea, and instability in the Southern neighbourhood of Europe. Third, is the importance of values, identity and history when forming security policies. Lastly, the relationship the states have with the EU and NATO are explained, and how they perceive the institutions as security providers. The theory of constructivism is applied to each case to explain why the states have chosen different ways to secure their state.

6.1 Multilateralism

The Nordic states are committed to multilateral cooperation (Laatikainen, 2003, p. 410). Close connections and relationships with other states and/or international institutions are of great value for all the states. Sweden pursues its security interests through the EU and the UN. Norway, Denmark and Iceland place the highest importance on NATO and look at the alliance as its main security provider. Finland's most important security actor is the EU. All states are a part of the UN, the OSCE and NORDEFCO (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, pp. 31-32; Government Offices of Sweden, 2020, pp. 1-2; Parliamentary resolution 1166/2016; Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, p. 19; The Danish Government, 2018, p. 11).

Furthermore, all states seek to strengthen and intensify relations with the US. Seeking strong relations with the US is crucial for the Nordic states because the US is one of the most powerful actors in the international system. The US is also the strongest actor within NATO. Norway places great importance on the US as the sole security provider for European members of NATO. Iceland's bilateral defence agreement with the US and NATO membership are the key pillars of its national security policy, and Iceland seeks to intensify its relations with the US. Denmark also looks at the US as the actor that will protect the security interests of the state. Finland sees the US as having the most influence in global and regional affairs that are of concern to Finland. That is why it must keep good relations with the US (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 32; Prime

Minister's Office Finland, 2016, p. 22; The Danish Government, 2018, pp. 8 & 11; Varnarsamningur milli lýðveldisins Íslands og Bandaríkjanna á grundvelli Norður-Atlantshafssamningsins).

Fierke (2016, pp. 162-163) argued that states place great weight on international institutions and alliances because of meanings they have attached to it. These institutions are all a part of their history, culture and politics. The Nordic states perceive cooperation within these institutions as valuable and have through time given intensified signification to them. International cooperation has become the norm. Not only do they believe that the EU, NATO, the UN, the OSCE and NORDEFCO, and strong relationship with the US will enhance their regional and global security, they also trust that the institutions increase their prosperity and influence in the international system. Their interests are, therefore, best served within multiple institutions that provide different aspects of security.

In order to secure their state and keep it stable, both to protect the sovereignty and identity of the state, the states seek different connections and relations with multiple institutions. They diversify and aim to be a part of strong institutions or alliances. This way, their security is enhanced even further. Being a part of these institutions will not only strengthen the hard security of the state, i.e. the military security, but political, economic, societal and ecological security as well. Economic and political stability, along with intensified preparedness in case of environmental issues are just as important as military security and defence (Buzan, 1991, pp. 116-134).

Moreover, there are a lot of challenges, such as climate change, terrorism and migration, that the states cannot fight on their own. To keep the state secure, they need to collaborate on these issues, which is best done within the framework of institutions, such as the EU, UN and NATO. Flockhart (2016, p. 84) stated that one of the core tenets of constructivism is the constitutiveness of agent and structure, and that social facts are brought into reality through practice. The Nordic states share meanings, which influence the security policy of the states. Meaning of common threats has brought further cooperation, and the importance of this cooperation is brought into reality through practice. It is the actions of the states that make the international system, e.g. by establishing norms and institutions. Norms such as developing strong cooperation with other states or being a part of a regional or international institution, therefore, shape the security policies of the Nordic states (Agius, 2016, p. 76; Hopf, 1998, p. 173).

Cooperation is critical to secure the state and to fight new security challenges. Hopf (1998, p. 173) argued that meaningful behaviour would only be possible within an intersubjective social context. The Nordic states share common interests in a lot of security issues with each other and other members of the EU and/or NATO. Flockhart (2016, pp. 85-86) argued that it is the collective meaning of norms and rules that structure the actions taken, hence how the security policies are formed. These relationships and cooperation would, therefore, be meaningless if the states did not share norms, rules and knowledge about security issues.

6.2 New Security Challenges

New security challenges, i.e. climate change, Russia's actions in Crimea, instability in the southern European neighbourhood and migration have shaped the security policies of the Nordic states. Climate change is a security issue that affects everyone, and it is a global issue. It is a sensitive subject, and the securitization process has not been entirely successful, as many do not believe that the referent object is threatened (Emmers, 2016, p. 169). The Nordic states have made an effort to fight climate change. Denmark contributes to the fight, by continuing to make a positive reform of the EU, and cooperating intensely with institutions such as the UN, NATO and the OSCE. Sweden stresses the importance of international cooperation as well (Government Offices of Sweden, 2020, p. 5; The Danish Government, 2018, pp. 8-9). Iceland did not specify actions taken in its security policy but acknowledged that it is a threat. Norway will intensify cooperation with the EU and the Nordic states, and raise awareness. Cooperation on climate change issues is essential because it is impossible for one state to fight it alone. Having a collective group of states working together will give better results (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 42).

The lack of action and belief that some major actors in the international system have on climate change as a threat to the world is per the criticism that constructivism has received. Constructivism believes in the power of knowledge, ideas and language, which have been proven ineffective in the fight against climate change (Flockhart, 2016, p. 81). The issue is securitized among the Nordic states, and within the framework of the EU, but it has been challenging to convince the strongest actor of NATO of the severity of the threat, which can explain the lack of actions taken globally to fight the issue (Emmers, 2016, p. 171).

Russia's actions in Crimea have mainly affected the security policies of Sweden and Finland, as these states are close neighbours to the Baltic Sea region. The events have led to an intensified cooperation between the two states as well. The events in Crimea have changed the security environment of Sweden and Finland; they have increased cooperation with each other, NATO and the Baltic states. Norway and Denmark have also shaped their policies because of the events in Crimea. Norway has sought stronger Nordic cooperation to keep the Nordic community safe. Having strong relationships with the other Nordic states and collaboration on the issues in the Baltic Sea region is crucial for Norwegian security. Denmark seeks to strengthen its cooperation with both European allies and allies across the Atlantic because of these events (Government of Sweden, 2020, p. 3; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 33; The Danish Government, 2018, p. 11).

Instability in the Middle East and migration affect the Nordic states. With instability in the southern European neighbourhood comes migration, including illegal immigrants. Being in close partnership with states in the Middle East and promoting stability in the area will strengthen the security of the Nordic states, especially Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark, as these states are located on the Continent and are easier to access from the Middle East. As the Nordic states are perceived to be stable and wealthy, with strong social welfare, they are desirable for migrants to relocate (Hyde-Price, 2018, p. 435). It is, therefore, crucial to have a firm policy regarding the states in the Middle East, with the focus on increasing stability and aid. With less conflict, there will be less migration and illegal immigrants. The Nordic states seek further cooperation to find common solutions on the security challenges that have emerged because of the instability at the southern borders of Europe. The Nordics have commitments to the international system and their citizens, working together with each other or within the framework of the EU or NATO will help to honour those commitments and will protect the interests of the states (Flockhart, 2016, p. 87; Hopf, 1998, p. 174).

6.3 Nordicness

6.3.1 Common Values

The Nordic states all share the same values in their foreign and security policies, i.e. protecting democracy, human rights, and respecting the rule of law, along with seeking strong cooperation. The Nordics have also been prominent in peacekeeping missions and fighting for women's rights. These values and norms play a key role when shaping the Nordic security policies. The values are a part of the state's identity, which will help to

understand the interests of the states. The interests then give an idea of the state's goals, and behaviour (Agius, 2016, p. 71). Constructivism argues that norms and values indicate what is appropriate behaviour. The Nordic states promote these values and go by these norms in order to be a part of institutions such as the EU and NATO (Flockhart, 2016, p. 86).

How the states are perceived by others, and how they perceive themselves is essential to explore. Sweden can be considered the strongest state of the Nordic. It has the largest population, and its security policy aims not only to protect Sweden but make the world a safer place. It seeks to make the world more secure with soft power, i.e. through diplomacy, dialogue and cooperation (Government of Sweden, 2020, p. 1). Constructivism suggests that this kind of discursive power, along with material power, is essential to gain influence in the international system. Sweden has a significant amount of discursive power and can promote its values on a global level. It has material power as well, but that is on a regional level. It is the strongest state among the Nordics, but to influence on a global level, it needs to cooperate with other states or institutions (Hurd, 2008, pp. 2-7).

Iceland is the state with the lowest population of the Nordic states, has no army and is located far from the other Nordic states. It can be seen as the least powerful Nordic state and has, therefore, to work even harder for making its voice heard on international issues. Promoting strong values and sharing values with other states, along with seeking strong cooperation, gives Iceland a better chance to pursue its interests in the international system. The same goes for the other Nordic states, being a part of a collective of states that share the same values and rules will help the states present a united front when pursuing their interests. The states can both have collective interests and individual interests. The individual interests will always come first, giving weight to the theory of realism, indicating that states are self-interested and egoistic. Foreign and security policies are formed for the interest of the state itself and no one else. The Nordic states are no exception; the national interests of the state will always come before anyone else's (Wendt, 1994, pp. 386 -387).

Katzenstein (1996, p. 34) presented three layers of how states form their national security policies. The first one was the layer of formal institutions and security regimes. This layer applies to all the Nordic states, which are all a part of multiple institutions and/or security regimes. The second layer was the layer of world political culture, i.e. the norms and rules of sovereignty and the rule of law. There are specific rules on how states 'should'

behave in the international system (Agius, 2016, p. 76). All the Nordic states build their security policies on norms and rules and use soft power when shaping them. Finland joined the EU because of a possible Russian threat, as it believed that other EU members would assist if this threat would come to reality. This strong belief Finland has in the EU when it comes to security issues is per constructivist ideas. The EU would never stand by while one of its members is under attack, it must act on certain norms and has responsibilities towards its members and the world. Finland is counting on these norms in its security policy (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 53).

Furthermore, the rule of law and sovereignty are common values that all the Nordic states place a high weight on and it is vital to respect it, not only for the Nordic states but for the international system as a whole. If the sovereignty of the state is threatened, then the entire nation is threatened. States will do what they can to protect their sovereignty. The rule of law is critical to respect because, according to constructivism, it indicates states' behaviour in the international system. There is appropriate behaviour, and the rule of law implies what that is. The Nordics share knowledge about the rule of law, which makes it meaningful, forms structure and determines the actions taken (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 34).

The last layer is the layer of amity and enmity. Relationships between states shape national security policies. The behaviour towards a state differentiates, depending on whether the state in question is an ally or an enemy. All the Nordic states see the US as an ally and seek to maintain a strong relationship with it. On the other hand, because of Russia's history and recent actions in Ukraine, the relationship between Russia and the Nordic states has become more complicated. There is a balancing act on strengthening defence cooperation because of the Russian threat and keeping good relations with Russia. Relationships and state's actions on a global level have, therefore, an impact on how the Nordic states form their security policies (Agius, 2016, p. 71; Katzenstein, 1996, p. 34).

6.3.2 History and Identity

History shapes the security policies of the Nordic states. Sweden has a long history of neutrality; that policy was abandoned when the state joined the EU in 1994. EU membership was seen as an opportunity to Swedish interests at an international level. Today the EU is the primary platform for Sweden to strengthen its security and promote its interests (Government of Sweden, 2020, p. 2). The identity of neutrality is strongly embedded in the Swedish mentality, which explains why it has decided to stand out of

military alliances. Changing the security policy and joining a military alliance would be a significant change for Swedish security policy (Wieslander, 2019). Finland joined the EU because of a possible Russian threat. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Finland was quick to move from East to West and join states that share the same history and culture (Raunio & Wiberg, 2001, pp. 65 & 67). Norway is a founding member of NATO and stands outside the EU. There is no mention of EU membership in Norway's latest security policy, but it is a part of the EEA. Norway has always been an active member of NATO since its foundation. The foundation Norway has built within NATO is of great value, and Norway will not abandon the work it has made within the alliance. Iceland was also a founding member of NATO and had the bilateral defence agreement with the US from 1951, and both remain the two key pillars of Icelandic security policy (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 31; Parliamentary resolution 1166/2016).

History has shaped the identity of the states, and the identity has shaped the security policies of the states. Because the Nordic states have a certain role in the international system and an individual identity, they will behave according to those identities. The Nordic states shape their policies according to what is 'right' according to their identity (Agius, 2016, p. 71; Flockhart, 2016, p. 87). Non-NATO members could join the alliance if it were the right thing to do, all depending on the situation and context at the time. Same goes with non-EU members. Constructivism suggests that identity is how states perceive themselves; Sweden and Finland have not joined NATO because they do not see it as a part of their identity. Same goes with Iceland and EU membership, for centuries it was first under Norwegian and later Danish rule. Being a former colony and finally achieving independence in 1944 is deep-rooted in the Icelandic identity. It believes that an EU membership will undermine its sovereignty and has, because of historical reasons, a strong desire to hold on to its sovereignty and freedom (Flockhart, 2016, p. 87).

Katzenstein (1996, p. 53) argued that variations or change in a state's identity could change and shape its security policy. Therefore, because the world is ever-changing, the identity of states can develop and change over time. If the identity of the state can change, then the security policy of the state can change with it. States will act in a way that is in the best interests for their state each time. It is not only material structures that impact decision-making and actions, but ideational and historical ones as well. Although, states do seek survival, power and wealth, which then influences the security policy choices, the

security policies are also impacted by the states' identity and history, and how they perceive themselves (Hurd, 2009, pp. 4-5).

6.4 The EU or NATO?

Sweden and Finland both look at the EU as their most important actor when searching for security. Sweden believes that the EU is the guarantor for its security and asserts that Europe should take responsibility for its own security. No other actor will guarantee Sweden's peace and the economy as the EU. Within the framework of the EU, Sweden wants to promote common values to achieve security in Europe. It believes that the EU can maintain peace and security in Europe by promoting democracy and human rights. It participates actively in the EU's CFSP and CSDP, and highly supports further development on the latter to strengthen the EU and promote its values on an international level. Finland sees the EU as a security community and seeks to improve the CFSP, which will increase security in Europe. Finland places great importance on the defence clause of the TEU and the solidary clause of the TFEU. Sweden did not specify the defence clause or the solidarity clause in its statement but did state that it would not stand by if an EU member or a Nordic state suffered a disaster or was under attack and would provide aid. It would also expect the same in return (Government of Sweden, 2020, p. 1-3; Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, pp. 19-21; Prime Minister's Office Sweden, 2017, pp. 2, 6,16).

Denmark believes that the EU is the best platform to promote its interests and to gain influence on an international level. The EU can give Denmark a voice and seeks to continue to reform the EU, including cooperation on defence issues. However, because Denmark has opted out of the CSDP, it cannot participate in any decision-making or missions within the EU framework (The Danish Government, 2018, pp. 6, 12 & 16).

Norway and Iceland are not a part of the EU but are a part of the EEA and EFTA. Norway acknowledges in its security policy that the EU is one of the main security actors, along with NATO and the OSCE. It believes that Europe should take responsibility for its own security and cooperate to find common solutions for new security challenges (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, pp. 24 & 27-28). Iceland seeks to strengthen international cooperation but does not specify in its security policy with whom. It does not mention the EU or its relations in its security policy. Iceland, not mentioning the EU or any European cooperation in its security policy, gives a clear picture of its priorities (Parliamentary resolution 1166/2016). The EU and European states are not the most important actors for Iceland when it comes to military security. For many years

Iceland has had strong relations with the US and NATO, which has led to Iceland not being as dependent on the EU as the other Nordic states on security issues. Iceland, however, depends on the EU economically (Thorhallsson, 2004).

Norway, Iceland and Denmark look at NATO as their primary security provider. Norway seeks to protect its values with its security policy and believes that NATO is the key to achieve security. Norway states that European members of NATO should take responsibility for their security and contribute more to the alliance. Norway places great importance on Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and believes that the alliance is the sole institution in Europe capable of providing collective defence. Norway affirms that no other actor should replace NATO (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, pp. 25, 31-33). NATO membership is one of the key pillars of Icelandic security policy. Iceland does not have an army; its contributions to NATO are therefore limited. It believes that NATO membership, along with the defence agreement with the US, will ensure Iceland's security (Parliamentary resolution 1166/201). Denmark prioritizes its NATO membership over EU membership when it comes to defence and security issues. NATO membership is the foundation of Danish security and defence policy and believes that NATO will guarantee Denmark's security (Defence Agreement 2018-2023, p. 1; The Danish Government, 2018, p. 11).

Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, but both states cooperate with the alliance and are also a part of the PfP. Finland believes that NATO is an important security actor in Europe to advance security and stability. Cooperating with NATO is vital for Finland because these relations with NATO will aid when developing Finnish defences. Finland, therefore, actively participates in NATO exercises (Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016, p. 23-24). Sweden has participated in many PfP programme exercises and has trained military forces of other NATO members (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2018b; Prime Minister's Office Sweden, 2017, p. 12).

Both NATO and the EU have common values; they both promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law. These are the same values that the Nordic states share. When it comes to choosing an institution to prioritize on security and defence issues, the states declare that the institution that they are a part of is the most important one to achieve security and stability. The Nordic NATO members prioritize their membership over EU membership or relations. They believe that NATO will guarantee their safety and security. Non-Nordic NATO members still place great weight on the alliance and acknowledge its

strength. There is strength in numbers; it is, therefore, essential for the security of Sweden and Finland to be in partnership with NATO because of the new global security threats (McCann, 2015, pp. 367-368; NATO, 2017; Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C 191/1).

NATO has always been a military alliance, its role has, though, developed and changed over the years. It has adapted and showed that it is still relevant today when facing new security challenges (NATO, 2017). The EU was never a military alliance, but a collective of states to keep Europe stable and peaceful. The EU established the CFSP in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, while the NATO Treaty was signed in 1949. The EU is still developing its security policy, and it is prominent that the Union is not considered as strong as NATO in military aspects. NATO is still superior in military security and defences. The EU is, nonetheless, a powerful international actor and does provide economic, societal and political security to its members and allies (Buzan, 1998, pp. 116-13; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C 202/13; Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C 191/1).

6.5 Summary

The Nordic states seek multilateral cooperation to strengthen their security and defences. By being a part of the EU, NATO, the UN, the OSCE and NORDEFCO, they increase their military, economic, political, societal and ecological security. Strong collaboration and friendship with the US are of great value for all the states. The US is the leader in NATO and one of the most powerful actors in the global system. The importance the Nordics place on cooperation is per constructivist; the institutions are a part of the states history, culture and politics and have through time given significant meaning to them through interactions.

New security challenges have shaped the security policies of the states. There is a need for intensified collaboration and NATO presence in the Baltic sea area because the security environment has changed. Climate change is an issue that all the Nordics acknowledge as a threat but has been deemed difficult to securitize, and global actions are not in accordance with the threat. Instability in the Middle East and migration bring further cooperation with the states in the southern neighbourhood of Europe. Close partnership with the states in the Middle East will strengthen the security of the Nordics.

The Nordic states share the same values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. They all seek to promote these values in their security policies. The values are

significant when forming security policies, as they are a part of the identity of the states, and the identity helps when understanding the interests of the states. Nordicness indicates the behaviour of the states in the international system; the Nordics use soft power and norms when shaping the security policies. Furthermore, the policies are formed because of historical reasons. Each state has its history, which has shaped their identity and then their security policy.

The two primary security institutions of Europe are valuable to all the Nordic states. Which institutions they choose to prioritize is based on their membership and history. Because the institutions are different, they provide various kinds of security.

7 Conclusion

In this thesis, the theory of constructivism was applied to explain how Nordic security policies are shaped. Each security policy was presented and compared to show differences and similarities. Constructivism proclaims that it is not only material power that matters when forming security policies. The power of knowledge, culture, ideas and language contribute significantly to decisions made and actions taken. Identity, norms, values, history, and relationships play a key role when forming national security policies. The states have had different histories when shaping policies, and there has been an absence in similarities among them. They share common values and interests but promote and pursue them in different ways within different institutions.

My main research questions were: how has Nordicness shaped the security policies of the Nordic states? And why have the states that share common values and are considered homogenous chosen different ways to ensure their security? I answered them by examining each state individually, later I compared them and explained why they chose a certain policy. Other subsidiary questions were: How can the EU and NATO provide security for the Nordic states? Is one institution more capable of providing security than the other? I answer the research questions now as follows.

How has Nordicness shaped the security policies of the Nordic states? Nordicness shapes the security policies of the Nordic states by indicating what is appropriate behaviour. The states have a specific role, both regionally and globally, which they play. They rely on international cooperation because that is vital for their security and prosperity. They promote common, liberal norms and values, fight climate change, and for women's rights because that is expected of them. The Nordic states believe that promoting these values and intensify cooperation will guarantee their security and prosperity.

The Nordic states have a certain identity in the international system, both as individual states and as a collective of states. The identity of being Nordic or Nordicness has shaped the security policies of the states. They have a lot of similarities and some common interests. Constructivism indicates that the Nordics develop their security policies because of their Nordic identity, and they have a particular role in the international system because of that identity. Being Nordic means intensified cooperation with influential international institutions and other states. It means to use soft power when making security policy choices by following norms and rules of the international system, and promote common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. They are the ones that stand up for

women's rights and actively fight for climate change actions. It means to use diplomacy and peaceful solutions when solving conflicts. The Nordicness shapes the security policies by implying what the right thing to do is according to the Nordic identity.

Why have these states, that share common values and are considered homogeneous, chosen different ways to ensure their security? The main reasons why they have chosen different paths to achieve their security is because of their individual history, relationships with other states and geographical position. The history shapes their identity, and the identity shapes the security policies. Sweden had a long history of neutrality, which is profound in its identity today. Finland had superpower as a neighbour, and its security policy was restrained for years. Norway, Iceland and Denmark were all founding members of NATO. Iceland has had strong relations with the US since the end of WWII and is a former colony. The states' individual history shapes how they perceive themselves, and that influences how the security policies are formed.

Sweden's decision of standing outside of military alliances stems from historical and geographical reasons. It is not in its identity to be a part of NATO, and a NATO membership would be a significant shift in the Swedish security policy. Finland, however, does not rule out NATO membership. Even though it is not part of the Finnish identity now, it will consider becoming a member of NATO if that is the right thing to do. Indicating that the identity of the states can change over time and, therefore, shape the security policies.

The geographical position of the states and the relationships they have with other actors influence the formation of the security policies; this applies especially to Iceland and Finland. The location of Iceland was important during the Cold War, which led to a strong relationship with the US. This relationship influenced the security policy of the state, and the US remains one of the most important actors for Iceland, both when it comes to defence and military aspects, and economic ones. The geographical position of Finland shaped its policy for many years because of its superpower neighbour in the East. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Finland was quick to change its security policy and joined the EU. The relationships between states and their perceptions of each other, therefore, shape the security policies of the states.

Moreover, history shapes the security policies of Norway and Denmark as well. Norway has been an active member of NATO since its foundation and made substantial contributions to the alliance over the years. Denmark has been a part of NATO for much

longer than the EU. It therefore prioritizes its NATO membership over EU membership on security and defence issues. Norway and Denmark have a profound identity of being NATO members. This identity has emerged because of history, which then influences their security policy choices.

How can the EU and NATO provide security for the Nordic states? Is one institution more capable of providing security than the other? The EU and NATO are two different security institutions, and their contributions to security for the Nordic states is diverge. They do, however, share the same values and have a lot of the same members. The EU, being much more political, is more capable than NATO in providing political, economic and societal security. The EU is the primary platform for Sweden, Finland and Denmark to promote their interests. By continuing to reform the EU and make it stronger, the interests of the states will be protected and will give them a stronger voice in the international system. Further, the EU is one of the most important economic actors for all the Nordic states.

Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark have all declared that Europe should take responsibility for its security. The EU established the CFSP and the CSDP, but these policies need to be developed further to enhance the EU's military security and defences. The mutual defence clause of the TEU gives some states confidence when forming their security policies, but it is not nearly as significant as Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. NATO is a military alliance and its primary role is to defend its members. It can provide military security to the Nordic states. NATO is considered the strongest military alliance in the world and all the Nordics place great importance on it, whether they are a member or in close cooperation with the alliance. Both institutions are, therefore, capable of providing security for the Nordic states but in different aspects.

The EU is a political institution, which provides economic, political and societal security, while NATO is a military alliance, which provides military security. The Nordic states attach great significance on these institutions as well as on cooperation. Sweden and Finland; neither are a part of NATO, but both cooperate acutely with the alliance. Collaboration is what makes the states secure. Norway and Iceland; both rely on the EU economically. Denmark prioritizes NATO when it comes to military security but relies on the EU economically and when it seeks global influence.

The EU and NATO will not replace one another, and neither should they. Reforming and making the EU stronger is vital for all members and Europe. The EU should continue

to develop the CFSP and the CDSP and make it stronger, which will make the whole EU more powerful. NATO is a robust military alliance; the Nordic members Norway, Iceland and Denmark believe that the alliance is the main actor that will secure their state and security in Europe. As these institutions provide different kinds of security for their members, the aim should be to strengthen cooperation with one another and not undermine each other, to make Europe and the Atlantic area secure and stable.

What constructivism would not explain were the changes in security policies because of the events in Crimea, Ukraine and instability in the southern European neighbourhood. The unpredictability caused by new security challenges brings uncertainty to the Nordic states. The military security is threatened, which has led to intensified cooperation among the Nordics, and with NATO. A more substantial military presence is needed in the area, giving weight to the material power rather than discursive power, i.e. the more military presence from the EU and NATO, the more power these institutions have in the areas.

Moreover, the Nordic states are self-interested in general. Throughout the research of the Nordic security policies, it was prominent that states would cooperate with other actors if it is in their interests. The Nordic states have collective interests, which they will pursue as a whole for further global influence. Still, the individual interests of states will always come first, which is in accordance with the theory of realism of states being egoistic and in search of their power. The Nordics form their security policies because of their Nordic identity, history, relationships and location. However, they are shaped because of their interests and desire for influence in the international system as well.

The conclusion shows that material, as well as ideational and historical factors, matter when forming security policies. Constructivism explains why the Nordic states have chosen different paths when searching for security, and at the same time, illustrates how they share a lot of similarities in their security policies. It is the norm of cooperation and diplomacy that enhance the military security of the states and keep them economically prosperous. It is, however, noteworthy to see the high importance all the Nordic states place on a strong relationship with the US. This desire to collaborate with the most powerful state globally can not only be explained from a constructivist perspective and indicates that material power is crucial when forming security policies.

When writing the thesis, recurring ideas came to mind about the topic. The theory of constructivism does provide a substantial explanation of how the Nordic states shape their security policies. The world is, however, not black and white, and one theory cannot

explain everything. For further research, I would suggest taking the traditional theories of IR into account, i.e. realism and liberalism, and compare the three theories to give a precise understanding on the decision-making process when forming Nordic security policies. Moreover, studying the Nordics, while bearing in mind that they are all considered small states on a global level would be another interesting perspective to analyse. Being a small state may have a significant effect on behaviour, decision-making and actions when forming security policies.

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