Why Can We Get Rid of the Western European Union?
European Collective Security and the Modified Brussels Treaty

Örvar Porri Rafnsson

Lokaverkefni til BA-gráðu í stjórnmálafræði

Félagsvísinadasvið

HÁSKÓLI ÍSLANDS
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Leiðbeinandi: Alyson J.K. Balles

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Abstract

The Western European Union is a security and defence alliance created in 1954 with the modification of the Brussels Treaty. Its main feature is the commitment to mutual defence should any of the signatories be the victim of an armed attack in Europe. By demonstrating their resolve to work together, the members of the Western European Union helped to overcome the reluctance of the United States to participate in the nascent European security arrangements. The organisation conducted and took part in various security operations in Europe and abroad in 1987-2009, in close collaboration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union. On 31 March 2010, the signatories to the Modified Brussels Treaty collectively decided to terminate the Treaty, thereby abolishing Western European Union as an organization. Final closure is to be completed by the end of June 2011. This paper will tell the story of the Western European Union, from cradle to grave, and try to explain its contribution to Europe’s security arrangements and the reasons behind its closure. It will also try to shed some light on Europe’s security today and tomorrow.
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1. Collective Security and Western Europe

In the spring of 1945 when the bombs were silenced and the fighting ceased in Europe, marking the end of World War II, Europeans were left pondering the question of how such a disastrous event could be prevented from ever happening again. This bloody and deadliest military conflict in history was a stark reminder that cooperation among the states of Europe was necessary for survival.

In his famous ‘United States of Europe’ speech in 1946 in Switzerland, Sir Winston Churchill called on the countries of Europe to work together. ‘If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, and indeed from final doom, there must be this act of faith in the European Family and this act of oblivion against all the crimes and follies of the past.’¹ At the end of his speech Churchill outlined how to re-create Europe after the war: ‘The first step in the recreation of the European Family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral and cultural leadership of Europe. There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by their contribution to the common cause.’²

The integration process in Europe developed slowly but surely in the aftermath of World War II. National governments saw the need to increase their countries security and economic well-being by pooling their efforts and assets. Britain and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty on mutual defence against a renewed German aggression already in 1947. (See Table 1)

The Dunkirk Treaty laid a firm basis for collaboration between France and Britain, and spoke of the need to conclude similar arrangements with Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; thus forming an important nucleus in Western Europe.³

In his 1948 speech in the British Parliament, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin declared that the ‘Free nations of Western Europe must now draw closely together’ and ‘I believe the time is ripe for a consolidation of Western Europe.’⁴

² Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1945</td>
<td>End of World War II in Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1946</td>
<td>Winston Churchill's ‘United States of Europe’ speech.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1947</td>
<td>Britain and France sign Dunkirk Treaty on mutual defence against Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1947</td>
<td>United States Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, announces plans for the economic rehabilitation of Europe (Marshall Plan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1947</td>
<td>United States and Latin American countries sign the Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) on mutual defence against external attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1948</td>
<td>Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg sign the Brussels Treaty on mutual defence. The Western Union is subsequently established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1948</td>
<td>Berlin blockade begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1948</td>
<td>United States Senate passes the ‘Vandenberg resolutions’ allowing the US to enter into regional defence pacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1949</td>
<td>Brussels Treaty Organization, the United States, Canada, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Norway and Iceland sign the Washington Treaty (NATO Treaty) on mutual defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1949</td>
<td>Treaty of London (Statute of the Council of Europe) establishes the Council of Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1950</td>
<td>Robert Schuman presents proposal (Schuman Declaration) to create a supranational union in Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1950</td>
<td>René Pleven presents his proposal (Pleven Plan) for a European Defence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1950</td>
<td>NATO opens itself to a German contribution. End of ‘occupied’ status of Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1951</td>
<td>Treaty of Paris establishes the European Coal and Steel Community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1952</td>
<td>Turkey and Greece join NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1952</td>
<td>European Defence Community Treaty signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1954</td>
<td>French National Assembly rejects European Defence Community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1954</td>
<td>Brussels Treaty amended to establish the Western European Union and to include membership of Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1955</td>
<td>Germany joins NATO.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mr. Bevin had already advised the United States Secretary of State of his desire to launch some form of union in Western Europe, backed by the Americans and the British Dominions. It was felt in Washington, however, that as the Dunkirk Treaty had been aimed expressly against a renewed German aggression, a more suitable model might be the Rio Treaty between the United States and the Latin American countries, a collective defence arrangement aimed against any aggression.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Ismay, 1955.
These moves gave concrete life to the theoretical notion - discussed but never fully realized after World War I - of a collective security regime. A collective security system may be defined as a plan for maintaining the peace through a permanent organization (as distinct from a traditional ad hoc alliance) of sovereign states. It is an arrangement where each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression.⁶

The first such development in post-war Europe was when five Western European countries signed the Brussels Treaty⁷ in 1948; France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The Treaty established the Western Union and committed member states to set up a joint defensive system, as well as to strengthen their economic and cultural ties.⁸ The Western Union Defence Organisation was subsequently established by the Defence Ministers of the Brussels Treaty Powers.

Article IV of the Brussels Treaty states that ‘if any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power’.⁹

Conceived largely as a response to Soviet moves to impose control over the countries of Central Europe, the Treaty represented the first attempt to translate into practical arrangements some of the ideals of the European movement and to establish broader foundations for future cooperation among Western European countries. This first historic step would in due course open the way for the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the Western European Union.¹⁰

The ink was scarcely dry on the signatures of the Brussels Treaty when the Soviet started their blockade of West Berlin. It was against this background of defiance and tension that plans for the defence of the West and negotiations for a North Atlantic Treaty were pressed forward.¹¹

In 1948, a resolution known as the Vandenberg Resolution was passed by the United States Senate. This marked a striking evolution in American foreign and defence policies in

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⁸ Ismay, 1955.
¹¹ Ismay, 1955.
time of peace, and it made it possible for the United States to enter an Atlantic Alliance. Later that year the actual drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty began in Washington between the Brussels Treaty Powers and the United States and shortly Canada joined in.

In 1949, the Brussels Treaty Powers (Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), plus Canada and the United States, formally invited Italy, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Portugal to adhere to the Treaty and on the 4th of April the twelve countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington.

A famous quote, allegedly by Lord Ismay, who was the first Secretary General of NATO, summarized the role of the new organization quite well: ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’.

The principal purpose of the Alliance is specified in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty which states that ‘an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all’ - thus making a military alliance between Western Europe and the United States a reality under a collective security system.

As the Cold War intensified and the Iron Curtain descended abruptly to divide the continent, integration became a means by which Western Europe could defend itself, in close collaboration with the United States, against external Soviet aggression and internal Communist subversion as well as any renewed war among Europeans themselves.

In 1950, French Prime Minister René Pleven announced a plan (Pleven Plan) for remilitarization of West Germany. A European Defence Community (EDC) was to be created and a European army under the supreme authority of the EDC established. The plan did not however include Britain at this stage.

Rearmament, in whatever form, faced strong domestic opposition in Germany and triggered heated debate on the constitutionality of a German military contribution. Nevertheless, the EDC and the General Treaty were duly ratified. But ratification was problematic in France where opposition to the treaties grew and in 1954 the French National Assembly rejected the European Defence Community.

With the collapse of the EDC, Britain’s Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, proposed instead a new solution. Building on the Brussels Treaty's automatic assistance clause, the
treaty was developed into a system of collective security in Europe - the Western European Union - where Britain was already present and into which German rearmament could be embedded.  

The Western European Union also provided a framework for establishing limits on German rearmament and opening a way for West Germany into NATO.

In 1955 West Germany duly became a full and equal member of NATO. By the middle of 1955, as the Warsaw Pact was also formed, the Cold War European bloc system was virtually complete.

1.1 Fact and Theory
Realist theories tend to regard war as an inevitable feature of international politics and define international order in the modern period by a state of anarchy. But the absence of a legitimate global authority with the power to enforce the law does not mean we are in a state of war.

According to John Mearsheimer, a neo-realist, war is less likely under bipolarity than under a multipolar system. Mearsheimer argues that multipolarity and the absence of nuclear weapon contributed to Europe’s repeated wars before 1945. States in Europe’s multiple system frequently failed to balance against aggressors and deterrence often failed. The high number of great powers made conflict and miscalculations more likely. During the Cold War, however, the combination of bipolarity and nuclear weapons kept Europe at peace.

The alternative theory of Liberalism contains within it a set of values that seek to provide for the conditions of a just society through democratic institutions and welfare-oriented economies. After the Second World War, the European integration process developed in response to national governments efforts to increase their countries security and economic well-being in an increasingly interdependent and competitive global environment, where - moreover - they were painfully aware of the risks of zero-sum power-play.

Liberals believe that other liberal states act to preserve freedom and thus are pacific and trustworthy. Because liberal states have liberal institutional structures that allow for

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18 Ibid.
22 Baylis, 2005, p. 201.
public control of foreign policy, even illiberal leaders will be unable to lead liberal states into war against other liberal states (democratic peace theory).\textsuperscript{23}

Thus Liberalism is a useful theory to help to explain the purpose and nature of European integration and collective security, with its underlying focus on democracy, free trade and cooperative institutions.

The institution of collective security can prevent war because it facilitates the formation of overwhelming coalitions against potential aggressors. By encouraging or requiring states to join coalitions to oppose aggression, collective security systems make it likely that any aggressor will confront a preponderant opposing force. In cases where there is a basic compatibility between the aims of the great powers, collective security systems also can build trust and deepen international cooperation among their members.\textsuperscript{24}

As Wim Kok, former prime minister of the Netherlands put it: ‘The principle underpinning the European Union is well established: Europeans had better hang together or they will (most assuredly) hang separately.’\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Lynn-Jones, Brown, Cote & Miller, 1998, p. xviii.
\item Ibid. p. xxix.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
2. Western European Union

Western European Union (WEU)\textsuperscript{26} was created by the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948 (the Brussels Treaty), as amended by the Protocol signed at Paris on 23 October 1954, which modified and completed it.\textsuperscript{27}

Signatories to the Modified Brussels Treaty were seven Western European countries. In due time, three\textsuperscript{28} Southern European countries joined, and a large number of countries were granted an associate or observer status to the organization.

The Modified Brussels Treaty obliges member states to help one another with all military and other aid and assistance in their power if any of them is attacked in Europe (Article V), and gives them the right to consult with each other with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area, or a danger to economic stability (Article VIII.3).

The Treaty was thus designed to make European collective security a reality, and in fact (at least on paper) provides an even greater degree of commitment to its Member States, and stronger guarantees of military aid in case of attack, than NATOS’s Washington’s Treaty does.\textsuperscript{29}

In 1999 the European Union decided to establish a collective Security and Defence Policy for crisis management purposes and during the next year took over most of WEU’s practical functions. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the mutual defence clause of the Western European Union was reproduced (albeit with important qualifications) in Article 42.7 of that Treaty. The States Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty collectively decided to terminate their Treaty, thereby formally abolishing WEU as an organization (closure to be completed by the end of June 2011).\textsuperscript{30}

The rest of this section will tell the story of WEU in greater detail, stage by stage, to provide a basis for judging both the nature of its historical contribution and the reasons behind its 21st-century demise.

\textsuperscript{26} The institution’s name was Western Union in 1948 and took its present form in the Modified Brussels Treaty.

\textsuperscript{27} Western European Union, History of WEU.

\textsuperscript{28} Spain, Portugal and Greece.


2.1 ‘From Waking Up to Going to Sleep’ – WEU in 1954-1984

The European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty that had been signed in May 1952 by the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) would have ensured a German contribution to Western defence without the creation of a German national army or the direct admission of West Germany as a full member of NATO. The EDC was, however, a bridge too far for European integration. At a time when the ‘Six’ were setting up the ECSC, the launch of a similar supranational initiative in the much more sensitive defence sector was too ambitious. Even if it had come into existence, in all likelihood the EDC would have been unworkable.

With the collapse of the EDC following a French parliamentary veto, and the question still unanswered how to bring Germany into the European and Atlantic community, politicians and diplomats sought to find a solution in a frantic month of crisis management.

The British played a subtle diplomatic hand, and over the autumn of 1954 they steered a steady course between French hysteria, West German fury and US unpredictability.

The British compromise plan of using the Brussels Treaty was well received, as it represented a more 'European' solution than the simple entry of West Germany into NATO, yet demanded much less than the EDC and was unlikely to duplicate NATO in practice. It would provide for a European dimension to a wider security system that nevertheless remained firmly anchored within the Western Alliance. Britain also committed itself to maintaining forces on the mainland of Europe.

The significance of using the Brussels Treaty in parallel to the other steps taken to give West Germany full sovereignty and membership of NATO was that it would enable limits to be imposed upon German rearmament whilst ensuring, through NATO, that West Germany would play a full part in the defence of the West.

At a special Conference convened in London in September 1954 and attended by the Brussels Treaty powers, the United States, Canada, West Germany and Italy, it was decided to invite the latter two countries to join the Brussels Treaty.

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31 France, W-Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.
34 WEU Secretariat-General, 1998, p. 32.
35 Deighton, 1997, p. 11.
36 Ibid, p. 18.
38 Deighton, 1997, p. 17.
39 Western European Union, WEU History.
The conference consolidated Western Alliance unity and the European bloc system by embracing and reconciling each participant’s national interest, so that negotiations did not become a zero-sum game.40

The conclusions of the conference were formalised by the Paris Agreements, signed in October of that year, which amended the Brussels Treaty, created WEU as a new international organisation and provided for West Germany and Italy to join.41

Under the terms of the Paris Agreements, the three Western powers (France, Britain and the United States) agreed to terminate the occupation regime and recognise West Germany as a sovereign state.42

The Modified Brussels Treaty pledged its member states to create a Council, thus the Brussels Treaty Consultative Council became the Council of Western European Union, with the ‘purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other European organisations’. The Council was to consider matters concerning the execution of the Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.43

The main role of the Council is to be a venue for member states to consult each other with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace or a danger to economic stability. It addresses all security and defence matters within WEU’s ambit and is organised so as to be able to exercise its function on a permanent basis and can be convened at any time at the request of a Member State.44

The Council is composed of the Member States Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Council of Ministers) and from 1984 the Member States Ministers of Defence were also included, and joint meetings usually held every six months in the country holding the WEU Presidency.45 ‘Permanent’ Council meetings at Ambassadorial level where held between times and from the 1980s, at least once a week.46

The Council established an Agency for the Control of Armaments (Article VIII), which had responsibility for ensuring that no German manufacture of atomic, biological or

41 Western European Union, WEU History.
45 Ibid.
46 According to Alyson J.K. Bailes.
chemical (ABC) weapons, guided missiles, warships over 3000 tons or strategic bombers would be undertaken without consent of a two-thirds majority in the Council as well as a NATO recommendation.\textsuperscript{47}

The Treaty also obliges WEU member governments represented in the Council to provide national parliamentarians sitting in the WEU Assembly with a written annual report on their security and defence activities (Article IX).\textsuperscript{48} The parliamentarians examine the report and make recommendations to governments that are bound to reply. The aim is to ensure that cooperation between governments at the European level is mirrored by cooperation between national parliamentarians meeting at the same level.\textsuperscript{49}

The Secretariat-General prepares and organises the activities of the Council and give them the necessary impetus.\textsuperscript{50}

The Modified Brussels Treaty, furthermore, clearly states that any organ established by the members of Treaty shall work in close co-operation with NATO and that ‘recognising the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.’\textsuperscript{51} A distinctive line was thus drawn at the outset between the WEU and NATO concerning military matters. WEU was subsequently left with the role of having an input into decision-making about maximum forces, levels of armaments production, and standardisation of European armaments production.\textsuperscript{52}

Members of WEU are thus protected by a treaty commitment that is more far reaching than that of NATO, yet its military command structure has been integrated into that of NATO, and its own military assets are nil.\textsuperscript{53} NATO remains the essential forum for transatlantic consultation and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of allies under the Washington Treaty. WEU-NATO cooperation has been facilitated by the fact that the two institutions share a very similar culture, so a natural symbiosis exists even without double-hatting.\textsuperscript{54}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{47} Deighton, 1997, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} WEU Secretariat-General, 2000, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{51} Western European Union, 1954.
\textsuperscript{52} Deighton, 1997, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
The Treaty furthermore states that if members do not agree with one another, all disputes that may arise between Member States of the Treaty shall be referred to the International Court of Justice (Article X) and Member States may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the Treaty (Article XI). The Treaty shall remain in force for fifty years (Article XII).

After setting up WEU and making the path clear for German accession into NATO and the European Communities, the German question and armaments issues were resolved. However the Saar question continued to loom from 1947 onwards.

The Saar (Saarland) was a component state (Land) in Germany before it became part of the French occupied zone after World War II. Subsequently it was detached from the French occupied zone in Germany and became part of a customs, economic and monetary union with France. Although the Saar Regional Government did enjoy political autonomy, it remained under the authority of the High Commissioner who represented the French Government. There was, therefore, a real economic frontier between the Saar and the rest of Germany.55

A Franco-German agreement on the Saar issue was signed in Paris (Paris Agreements) in 1954 which suggested giving the Saar the opportunity of autonomy within the framework of the WEU, with a referendum to determine the final status of the territory. The ‘Europeanization’ solution was rejected by the people of Saar in 1955, when they opted in a referendum for a return to Germany; a wish that was made effective on 1 January 1957 following elections organized under the auspices of the WEU.56

The resolution of the Saar problem was thus an important task for WEU in the first years of the organization. As Alfred Cahen, former Secretary-General of the WEU has written: ‘The settlement of the Saar problem was one of the most important political achievements of the WEU during the first phase of its existence’.57

With this issue resolved and the prohibited elements of the German wartime arsenal dismantled, WEU had served its purpose for the time being and now entered a dormant period. Many of its broad-based provisions overlapped with those of other international institutions and during these years it lost some of its functions.58

57 Ibid.
When NATO established its central command of military forces: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), military planning was transferred from WEU to NATO. Also the role of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee was largely taken over by the Independent European Programme Group in NATO and WEU lost its role in the areas of economic, social and cultural cooperation to the Council of Europe.59

WEU’s next major challenge did not arise until Britain applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s. When French President Charles De Gaulle blocked Britain’s second application to join the EEC in 1967, the WEU machinery could be used, while Britain’s accession remained blocked, to further political cooperation between Britain and the ‘Six’ members of the EEC, as the WEU was the only body containing the ‘Six’ plus Britain.60

In 1965 France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structure while other countries of Western Europe continued to rely for their defence mainly on the American nuclear umbrella.61 Bridging this gap to find a way forward for collective European defence efforts remained a daunting task, certainly too great for WEU itself to solve, right up to the end of the 20th century.

Despite all the constraints WEU faced through its history, WEU did ensure post-war compliance with obligations on arms production and ceilings on armaments stocks, thus playing a significant part in German re-integration; while the WEU Assembly created a distinctive role for itself as the only European parliamentary assembly with a brief to monitor defence issues. European unity was indeed strengthened by the creation of WEU, which emphasised an Atlantic security dimension based upon cooperation rather than supranational institutions which neither Britain nor Europe most important ally, the United States, would join.62

The Modified Brussels Treaty provided evidence of European readiness to make arrangements for their own collective defence, however, with the creations of NATO and the development of its integrated command structure, the organisation became more formal than substantial.63

WEU’s activities were minimal in the period from 1954 to 1984, but it can be seen that it was treaty bound not to trespass on the clearly defined areas of both NATO and the EC.

59 Ibid.
Benign but unplanned synergy existed between NATO and the EC which ensured the peace and prosperity of the West.\textsuperscript{64}

WEU did not participate in the development of Europe’s security policy until the 1980’s when it began a new phase in its existence.

2.2 ‘Political and Operational Revival’ – WEU in 1984-1999

In 1984, thirty years after the signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty, and after a long dormant period, the WEU was once again a venue used to increase co-operation between the seven Western-European Member States in the field of security policy.

The background to this revival lay both in shifting security relationships in Europe - notably, growing US pressure for a stronger and more united ‘European pillar’ within NATO - and in new extensions of the security agenda, such as greater US activism against terrorism since the early 1980s and its sometime divisive impact on Europe.

WEU offered a potential consultation forum that, unlike the EC, had established military competence, but also covered a more exclusive circle than NATO and could legitimately meet without North American scrutiny. It was also politically acceptable to Britain, which decided to go along with the original French, German and Italian suggestions for a new start. Accordingly, the WEU’s jubilee Council of Ministers meeting in Rome in 1984 adopted a declaration that provided an official framework for the political re-vitalisation of WEU and agreed to undertake an institutional reform of the organisation.\textsuperscript{65}

At the meeting it was decided to continue strengthen western security and specifically Western European security in its geographical, political, psychological and military dimensions. In this context, it was agreed to continue efforts to preserve peace, strengthen deterrence and defence and thus consolidate stability through dialogue and co-operation. To achieve this, members were determined to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase their co-operation in the field of security policy and to encourage consensus.\textsuperscript{66}

The activation of the WEU Council was to be a central element in the efforts to make greater use of WEU. Relations between the Council and the Assembly were to be improved and the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) and the Standing Armaments

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\textsuperscript{64} Roper, 1997, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{65} The meeting was held on the initiative of French and Belgium.

Committee (SAC) was to be re-activated. The WEU Council also attached great importance to liaison with those States in NATO which were not members of WEU.\textsuperscript{67}

The revival of WEU was not to be at the expense of NATO, which still remained the indivisible foundation of western security; however, better utilisation of WEU was designed not only to promote further security of Western Europe but also to improve the common security and greater solidarity among members of NATO.\textsuperscript{68} In practice, discussing contentious trans-Atlantic issues in the smaller circle of WEU helped key European members of the NATO to arrive at more united and moderate positions.

The most important decision taken at that time for the future of WEU was the presence of the Ministers of Defence in the Council.\textsuperscript{69} Their inclusion responded to the need for political-military co-operation and a joint approach at a time when Western defence efforts were moving closer to the conduct of actual operations, and their presence meant that Ministers of Defence were more involved with preparations for WEU activities.

WEU had a special working group for the representatives for the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and now it also had a defence working group for Ministers of Defence. In this way Ministers of Defence were helped to develop mutual understanding and a much more political approach to the common problems of the day.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{Table 2. Chronology of WEU Revival, 1984-1999}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1984</td>
<td>WEU Council agrees to reactivate WEU by the Rome Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1987</td>
<td>The Hague Platform on European Security Interests adopted by WEU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1990</td>
<td>Spain and Portugal become members of WEU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1991</td>
<td>WEU decides to create a Satellite Centre at Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain. The Satellite Centre is inaugurated in 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1991</td>
<td>WEU Declarations on the role of WEU and its relations with EU and NATO approved in Maastricht. WEU agrees to invite other EU member states of NATO to join WEU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1992</td>
<td>An operational role conferred on WEU by the Petersberg Declaration. Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) and a Planning Cell are established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1992</td>
<td>Turkey, Norway and Iceland become WEU Associate Members. Ireland and Denmark become WEU Observers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} According to Willem Frederik van Eekelen, Netherlands State Secretary for Defence from 1982-1986 and member of the WEU Council from 1986-1988.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>December 1992</td>
<td>The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) of NATO is incorporated into WEU, becoming the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1993</td>
<td>Transfer of WEU Council and Secretariat-General from London to Brussels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1994</td>
<td>NATO gives its support for the development of the European Security and Defence Identity and to make Alliance assets and capabilities available for WEU operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1994</td>
<td>Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania become WEU Associate Partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1994</td>
<td>WEU publishes its Preliminary Conclusion on the formulation of a Common European Defence Policy (CEDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1995</td>
<td>Following their accession to the EU; Austria, Sweden and Finland become WEU Observers. Greece becomes WEU’s tenth full member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>WEU-NATO Security Agreement signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1996</td>
<td>NATO approves Combined Joint Task Force for multinational European command arrangements for WEU led operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1996</td>
<td>The Situation Centre located at WEU’s Headquarters becomes operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1996</td>
<td>Slovenia becomes a WEU Associate Partner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1996</td>
<td>WEU sets up the Western European Armaments Organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1999</td>
<td>Following their accession to NATO; Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary become WEU Associate Members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The WEU Council was henceforth to hold two meetings a year at Ministerial level, in which Foreign and Defence Ministers were to sit at the same conference table.71

On this basis, in October 1987 in Hague, the WEU Ministerial Council adopted a ‘Platform on European Security Interests’. The Hague Platform stressed EU Member States commitment to build a Union in accordance with the Single European Act and their conviction that the construction of an integrated Europe would remain incomplete as long as it did not include security and defence.72

The Platform built a bridge between France and the other NATO members on strategic questions. The Platform recognised the need for a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons in the defence of Europe, the continued presence of American forces in the continent and the defence of member countries at their borders.73

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71 Western European Union, History of WEU.
72 Ibid.
The WEU Council saw the revitalisation of WEU as an important contribution to the broader process of European unification and the Modified Brussels Treaty, with its far reaching obligations to collective security, as an important means to this end.74

WEU’s first major task after its revival was to clear mines in the Persian Gulf during the war between Iran and Iraq (see Table 3). WEU’s mine clearance operations in the Gulf were the first example of Europe being prepared to assume such responsibilities outside its own continent. They reflected the fact that freedom of navigation in the Gulf and security of oil supplies was as much a European interest as an American one.75

WEU actions in the Persian Gulf were efficient and successful.76 After the cessation of hostilities, WEU continued its mission of co-ordinating mine-clearance operations in Gulf waters. It also contributed to the humanitarian actions for Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq.77

Table 3. Chronology of WEU Operations, 1984-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>WEU coordinated the clearance of sea mines and embargo monitoring operations during the Gulf War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1996</td>
<td>WEU and NATO joint operation in the Adriatic Sea in support of UN Security Council Resolution to monitor the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1996</td>
<td>WEU provided assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in their efforts to enforce the UN sanctions on the Danube river.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>WEU contributed a police contingent to the EU administration of the city of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>WEU sent an advisory police element to Albania to provide advice and train instructors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>WEU Satellite Centre embarked on a mission of general security surveillance of Kosovo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>WEU implemented an EU specific action providing assistance for mine clearance in Croatia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the late 1980s the WEU Council reached agreement on the accession of Spain and Portugal, who became full members of WEU in 1990. Greece became a full member in 1995,

75 Eekelen, 2006, p. 5.
77 Western European Union, History of WEU.
thus bringing the total WEU membership to 10 and bringing, for the first time, new members from outside Western Europe.\textsuperscript{78}

The Member States of the EC decided at the inter-governmental conference in Maastricht in 1991 that the Treaty on EU (Maastricht Treaty) should establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and that WEU should elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications (Article J.4).\textsuperscript{79} Later that year the WEU Council approved two declarations which marked a new starting point for the WEU.\textsuperscript{80}

The first WEU Declaration on the role of the WEU and its relations with the EU and NATO stated that ‘WEU will be developed as the defence component of the EU and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its implementation through the further development of its own operational role.’\textsuperscript{81}

Thus it was clear that Europe needed a genuine security and defence identity and, furthermore, that Europe would have a greater responsibility in its own defence matters in the post Cold War era.

The second WEU Declaration encouraged other states which were members of the EU to accede to WEU in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty or to become observers if they so wished. It was understood (though not stated) that full membership was open only to states already belonging to both the EU and NATO. Simultaneously other European Member States of NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which would enable them to participate fully in the activities of WEU.\textsuperscript{82}

Thus in 1992 three NATO members; Turkey, Norway and Iceland joined as Associate Members while two EU members; Ireland and Denmark were given status as WEU Observers (Denmark chose not to take full membership because in the EU context it had opted out of any European security and defence related issues).

The Associate Member status was significant because it gave the non-EU European members of NATO the chance to participate in the development of a European Security and

\textsuperscript{78} WEU Secretariat-General, 2000, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{80} WEU Secretariat-General, 2000, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
Defence Identity. Such an arrangement was certainly useful for the development of WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of NATO on a more solid and rational basis.\(^8^3\)

The Associate Members were however not signatories to the Modified Brussels Treaty and thus not under the collective security system (Article V) of the Treaty.

Cooperation between the WEU and NATO underpinned the process of the reactivation of the WEU and became progressively more intensive and more frequent. In May 1992, the Council of the WEU held its first formal meeting with the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters. Subsequently, the Secretary General of the WEU regularly attended ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council, and the NATO Secretary General likewise participated in WEU ministerial meetings.\(^8^4\)

The two WEU declarations (annexed to the Maastricht Treaty) set out the practical details of the organization’s tasks. WEU was to develop its dual relationship with the EU on the one hand and NATO on the other. The principle of including the WEU in the mechanisms of the CFSP was clearly set out, stating that the organisation would be developed as the defence component of the EU.\(^8^5\)

At the time the institutional implications looked rather complicated, particularly as the promised practical arrangements were not forthcoming. It was unclear what the European identity and the European pillar would mean for the Atlantic Alliance. NATO was not constructed on a pillar basis and there was the question of how the European identity could function without some arrangements to express itself.\(^8^6\)

The Petersberg\(^8^7\) meeting in Germany aimed to create a basis for WEU to develop its operational capacity so that could meet the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers took a major step forward in defining WEU’s operational role by the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992.\(^8^8\)

The Petersberg Declaration stated that WEU Member States were ‘to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU’ and ‘apart from contributing to the common defence


\(^8^6\) Eekelen, 2006, p. 7.

\(^8^7\) Petersberg is a hotel near Bonn, Germany.

\(^8^8\) WEU Secretariat-General, 2000, p. 10.
in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty, military units of WEU Member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management’. The generic definition of operations in the last part of this text soon became known as the Petersberg Tasks and would gain a significance stretching far beyond WEU itself.

To fulfil these aims, Member States military units could be made available to WEU on a case-by-case basis for specific operations. These Forces would be answerable to WEU, as would a number of existing European multinational formations, including; France-German Euro-corps, Britain-Netherlands Amphibious Force, (South) European Maritime Force, Spain-Italy Amphibious Force, European Air Group and more.

A decision was also made establishing a Planning Cell under the authority of the WEU Council, located with the Secretariat-General in Brussels. The site of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General was transferred from London to Brussels, facilitating contacts with both NATO and the EU, in January 1993.

Following the second WEU Declaration at the time of Maastricht, the WEU Council created the Associate Partner status and 10 new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe became WEU Associate Partners or Associate Members. Following an agreement signed with the EU that defined them as candidates for entry, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became Associate Partners of WEU in 1994 and Slovenia in 1996.

The partner status was a major step in the progress of ‘security through participation’. Being present at WEU Council meetings gave the new democracies a sense of belonging and an opportunity to make their security concerns known in a consultative and decision-making framework.

The WEU Council agreed at its April 1997 meeting that all European NATO members which had not signed the Modified Brussels Treaty could participate fully in WEU’s decision-making process when WEU mounted an operation using NATO’s operational assets. A decision could have been taken earlier, but was delayed by Greek opposition to Turkey’s

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90 Known as FAVEU (Forces Answerable to Western European Union)
91 WEU Secretariat-General, 2000, p.12.
93 Eekelen, 2006, p. 11.
request to be associated with the NATO-WEU agreement on placing NATO assets at WEU disposal.\textsuperscript{94}

Following their accession to NATO on the Alliance’s 50\textsuperscript{th} year anniversary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became WEU Associate Members in 1999, thus bringing the WEU’s countries from all four groups to a total of 28.\textsuperscript{95}

These decisions created a system of variable geometry with three different levels of membership and affiliation, as well as observer status: Members (also members of both NATO and of the EU); Associate Members (NATO but not EU members); Associate Partners (neither NATO nor EU members), and; Observers (EU but not NATO members. Denmark also opted for Observer status).\textsuperscript{96}

In principle there was an agreement that the WEU associate partners should be considered as potential candidates for joining NATO. The maintenance of the linkage of NATO and WEU membership was considered to be essential, because of the cumulative effect of security safeguards extended in the two organisations. The enlargement of both organisations should be compatible and mutually supportive.\textsuperscript{97}

The WEU developed further its relationship with NATO and the EU during the 1990s. At a time when both larger organizations were taking an intense interest in crisis management, but the EU still had no defence dimension, WEU was an important interface between the two organisations.

In practice the relationship between WEU and NATO was designed to ensure that if a crisis arose in which the WEU decided to intervene (and the NATO chose not to), it could request the use of NATO’s assets and capabilities, possibly including a CJTF headquarters, for conducting an operation under its own political control and strategic direction.\textsuperscript{98} The detailed principles for managing such cooperation, and also for WEU to receive NATO assistance in its nations’ longer-term defence planning, were set out in the communiqué of NATO’s Ministerial meeting at Berlin in July 1996.

In 1997 the revised EU Treaty (Amsterdam Treaty) incorporated the EU’s CFSP and also provided for the Union to make use of WEU for peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks (Petersberg Tasks). This formula was used, instead of a direct EU defence competence, at the

\textsuperscript{94} Cebeci, 1999.
\textsuperscript{95} WEU Secretariat-General, 2000, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{96} NATO, 2001, NATO Handbook.
\textsuperscript{97} Grunert, 1998, 102.
\textsuperscript{98} NATO, 2001, NATO Handbook.
request of Sweden and Finland because they did not want to subscribe to mutual defence guarantees such as those in the mutual assistance clause of the WEU.\textsuperscript{99}

The WEU was to support the EU in framing the defence aspects of the CFSP and the EU should, accordingly, foster closer institutional relations with the WEU.\textsuperscript{100} The revised Treaty furthermore talked about the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the EU (Article 17; J.7).

In December 1998, two important bilateral summits took place. The Franco-German summit in Potsdam mentioned for the first time a common European defence policy next to the CFSP and the need for concrete action for the prevention and management of regional crises.\textsuperscript{101}

At the Franco-British Summit in St. Malo two days later, France and Britain jointly agreed on the need to give the EU the capacity for autonomous decision-making and action, backed up by credible military forces, in order to respond to international crises when NATO was not involved. To avoid unnecessary duplication, they decided that the EU should take into account the assets of WEU.\textsuperscript{102}

The St. Malo Declaration represented a turning point in the history of European security; it introduced a new European military strategy and can be considered as the birth of the European Security and Defence Policy. The background to this can been seen as an frustration of both Britain and France with the events in Kosovo in the late 1990s and the perceived failure of the international community to intervene in time, not to mention the fear of a total breakdown in regional stability in eastern Europe and the Balkans area.\textsuperscript{103} Europe’s failure to provide worthwhile military support for the NATO campaign against Serbia was particularly galling for these two ambitious military nations.

In a new climate that prevailed after St. Malo Summit the decisions taken respectively at the NATO Summit of April and the European Council meeting of December 1999, prepared the way for a direct EU-NATO relationship. It was agreed that the EU was to have the capabilities and instruments needed to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks - in the framework of a new European Security and

\textsuperscript{99} Eekelen, 2006, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{100} NATO, 2001, NATO Handbook.
\textsuperscript{101} Eekelen, 2006, p. 28.
Defence Policy (ESDP) - and NATO was to give the EU access to its collective assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance as a whole was not military engaged in.\textsuperscript{104}

The result was that WEU’s conflict prevention and crisis management tasks (Petersberg Tasks) were incorporated into the new ESDP of the EU, thus leaving WEU with no further operational role. In itself this was a logical decision, for within the Union there should not be separate foreign, security and defence policies.\textsuperscript{105}

The Modified Brussels Treaty still remained in force with its collective security system (Article V) and also the Western European Armaments Group and the WEU Assembly, where parliamentarians from all 28 WEU countries (full members, associated members, observers and associate partners) still worked together.

The political functions of the WEU Council were however taken over during 2000 by the newly created EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), with Ministerial meetings being covered by the EU’s General Affairs Council.

2.3 ‘The End of WEU’ – WEU in 1999-2009

As the new millennium approached, WEU started to see the beginning of the end of it’s nearly half of century in existence.

The mid-1999 Cologne European Council was the first official EU step taken towards an EU/WEU merger. The European Council declared its intention to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence.\textsuperscript{106}

The December 1999 European Council meeting in Helsinki agreed the ‘Headline Goals’ as a direct consequence of the groundwork laid by the Saint-Malo Summit. It was agreed that EU Member States must be able (by 2003) to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of military capabilities for crisis management operations (Petersberg Tasks) as set out in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{104} WEU Secretariat-General, 2000, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{105} Eekelen, 2006, 11.
\textsuperscript{106} Cebeci, 1999.
The EU Member States did furthermore state their intention to avoid unnecessary duplication with NATO structures and emphasised that those decisions did not imply the creation of a European army.\(^{108}\)

In the light of the decisions taken by the European Council in Helsinki, WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers recognised that the fulfilment by the EU of new responsibilities in the security field would have profound repercussions for the WEU as an organisation.\(^{109}\)

On the basis of the decisions taken at the Marseilles Ministerial meeting of the WEU in November 2000, it was emphasised that the collective security system (Article V) of the Modified Brussels Treaty would continue to reflect the mutual commitment of the member states with respect to their collective defence. Arrangements were put in place, involving a much reduced secretariat at a new office in Brussels, for carrying out the residual functions of the WEU once the EU had become operational.\(^{110}\)

A month later the European Council approved (in the Nice agreements) decision-making structures for the ESDP in the shape of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and furthermore removed all references to WEU cooperation with the EU from the Treaty framework.\(^{111}\)

The European Council also decided not to recognise non-EU European Allies as having the same access to operations and relevant decision-making as was the case in the WEU: apart from Greek opposition, this was thought impossible within the EU’s stricter legal framework. This decision went against the expectations expressed in NATO’s Ministerial statement of April 1999 and was considered especially by Turkey as insufficient, since it was no longer offered participation in decision-making.\(^{112}\)

As a result Turkey used its veto within NATO to hold up implementation of key aspects of NATO-EU cooperation for two years, until it received political assurances in a confidential deal brokered by the US, Britain and France.

The resulting deal, though not disposing of all Turkish concerns, opened the way for co-operation between the EU and NATO to grow when in 2003 a new agreement was signed between the two organisations, known as the Berlin plus arrangement - since it went even


\(^{110}\) Ibid.


further than the terms of NATO’s 1996 Berlin Ministerial meeting which saw the official start of WEU-NATO cooperation.\textsuperscript{113}

With the Berlin plus agreement the EU was given the possibility to use NATO assets in case it wanted to act independently in an international crisis, on the condition that only if NATO refused to act itself, the EU might act if it so wished.

A phrase that is often used to describe the relationship between the EU and NATO is ‘separable but not separate,’ meaning that the same forces and capabilities will form the basis of both EU and NATO efforts, but portions can be allocated to the EU if necessary. This arrangement will keep the ESDP and NATO closely linked, but could cause friction if NATO and the EU disagree on the allocation or reallocation of forces already committed.\textsuperscript{114}

With the entry of the EU’s 2007 Lisbon Treaty into force on 1 December 2009 a new phase in European security and defence began. With Article 42.7 the Treaty sets out that ‘if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power’. For the first time this creates a territorial defence guarantee within the EU framework: albeit qualified in the Treaty text by statements that NATO members will take any necessary action through the Alliance, and the policies of non-NATO states will not change. In this light the ten WEU Member States collectively decided to terminate the Treaty, acknowledging that the organisation had accomplished its historical role.\textsuperscript{115}

On the 31 March 2010 these states announced their intention to put an end to the organisation and to denounce its 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty. This will result in a winding down of the remaining parts of WEU together with its Assembly by 30 June 2011, taking into account the 12-month notice period foreseen by Article XII of the Modifies Brussels Treaty.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{115} Western European Union, 2010.
3. European Security Today and Tomorrow

3.1 Lessons of the Twentieth Century

Since the end of World War II the European integration process has evolved enormously. This regional development has brought greater security to Europe through deeper integration and as a consequence Europeans have never before been so secure nor so free and most European countries have witnessed an unprecedented era of peace and prosperity.

With the signing of the Brussels Treaty in 1948 and NATO’s Washington Treaty in 1949 the Allied powers acknowledged the need for a closer co-operation in security policy in the aftermath of the war. The 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty established the Western European Union and a collective security system where all the major European powers were included. The Member States committed themselves through the binding Treaty not to fight each other, help each other if being attacked and to establish a closer tie between themselves economically, socially and culturally.

The Cold War did however divide Europe into East and West where two opposing superpowers with different ideologies competed with each other. In face of this threat, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation along with the United States provided Western Europe with credible defence. Meanwhile the establishment of an economic union in Europe that ultimately led to a more comprehensive economic and political identity, the European Union, bound the Western European States together.

When the Berlin Wall came down and the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europeans were left in a security vacuum. In an atmosphere of hope and optimism in the post Cold War environment, some academics even saw this change as the end of history. For Europe, the last years of the 20th century did not work out so well, with the bloody conflicts in the Balkans and the genocide which followed, the first since the World War II, Europe failed to prevent this.

The European Union acknowledged, after the Balkans crisis, the need for a pan-European military forces to conduct peacekeeping and crisis management tasks. At first, nations chose to develop the Western European Union further to deal with those tasks, with political guidance and economic inputs from the EU and in close collaboration with NATO. As explained above, by the end of the 20th century, the EU chose to incorporate the role of WEU and agreement was reached to close down the organisation. WEU’s final winding-up in 2011 is only the delayed recognition that its activities have finished their historical purpose. Clearly, WEU was unable either to meet in full the challenges of the 1990s, or to provide a
useful tool for the new dawning challenges of the 21st century. However, there is still a room to ask, how much did it nevertheless achieve, and has the EU genuinely taken the place of all the purposes WEU was at first designed to achieve?

3.2 Reassessing WEU's Role and the Transition to the European Union
The Modified Brussels Treaty made a much-needed European mutual defence commitment a reality among the European powers. Without it, it is not certain whether the US would have been willing to add its own guarantees to create the Euro-Atlantic alliance in NATO. Even after NATO was launched, WEU played an important role in the construction of Europe after World War II by helping West Germany to re-integrate into the ‘European family’ while at the same time ensuring West Germany’s post-war compliance with obligations and ceilings on armaments stocks. WEU did also make significant contribution when the Saar state re-joined West Germany. WEU was also able to help the European Economic Community in its crisis in the late 1960s when France blocked Britain’s accession to the Community.

The fact is though, that during most of the Cold War period the WEU was very weak and non-operational. Europe's hard defence needs and general political cooperation seemed to be adequately taken care of by NATO and the European Communities, respectively. It was not until 1984 that WEU Member States woke the organisation from its ‘Cinderella’ sleep. WEU Foreign Ministers, and later their fellow Defence Ministers, were able to meet together and discuss issues that had security and defence consequences for Europe - outside NATO’s ambit and without the scrutiny of the United States - at a time when the United States was pressing for Europe’s greater role within NATO. The WEU Assembly, furthermore, created a distinctive role for itself as the only European parliamentary assembly with a brief to monitor defence issues. This undoubtedly helped WEU Member States to develop mutual understanding of each other’s problems and concerns, and to move towards compromises and common fronts on key issues that also ultimately eased the US-Europe dialogue on such matters.

As world attention focussed increasingly on threats from conflicts outside the main East-West confrontation, WEU also provided a flexible European instrument to conduct various crisis management operations in Europe and abroad. WEU’s first operations were in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s in order to guarantee freedom of navigation and were - a fact that is often forgotten - very successful. WEU operations in the 1990s, apart from continuing work in the Gulf, were all in the unstable Balkans area where the organisation worked with the EU, NATO and the United Nations.
With signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU established for the first time a fully Treaty-based Common Foreign and Security Policy that placed increasing weight on security issues. WEU was to set to develop a dual relationship with the EU and NATO, at a time when these organizations where blocked from dealing with each other directly. WEU’s new military role was defined with the co-called Petersberg Tasks, which included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and other military tasks of crisis management including peace enforcement: a formulation that still provides the foundation of European external crisis management policy today.

When the Kosovo experience and changes in major nation’s attitudes drove the EU to take a more direct role in security and defence, with a new European Security and Defence Policy, the Petersberg Tasks were incorporated into the Union in 1999 and the EU took over most of WEU’s practical functions. The organisation became mostly a ‘skeleton’ preserving the Modified Brussels Treaty and looking after armaments issues for a few years until the EU’s Defence Agency was created.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, a new era in European security and defence began. The mutual defence clause (Article V) of the Modified Brussels Treaty was (mostly) reproduced in the new Lisbon Treaty (Article 42.7). The logic put forward by WEU member states for finally closing the organization at this point was that it had now lost its unique function in creating a European collective security system - and therefore a logical decision was taken to terminate the Modified Brussels Treaty. To judge how convincing this explanation was in practice, we may now look more closely at the Lisbon provisions.

The idea behind the new mutual defence clause in Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty was to commit EU member states to solidarity in the event of armed aggression, similar to Article V in the Modified Brussels Treaty. When the clause was being drafted it sparked widespread resistance, however, from the EU’s neutral states. As consequence Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Austria backed an Italian proposal stating that the clause would not prejudice ‘the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states’ nor would replace existing NATO relationships.117

Moreover, some members felt a mutual defence clause could not, and would not, leverage the full range of crisis and disaster response capacities available to the EU and a new clause was needed to supplement (or even counter) the mutual defence clause.118

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118 Myrdal & Rhinard, 2010, p. 3.
broad solidarity clause - Article 222 - was agreed upon that committed EU member states to make joint responses, with the support of the Brussels institutions, to the new complex threats confronting Europe and more specifically to any major terrorist attack or natural disaster on any EU member's territory.\footnote{A European Council meeting adapted a draft version of the solidarity clause shortly after the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid.}

Article 42.7 applies to situations of armed aggression against the territory of a member state. It is purely intergovernmental in character and creates no role for EU institutions (unlike Article 222) and an activation of the clause does not require political coordination at the EU level.\footnote{Myrdal & Rhinard, 2010, p. 9.} The Article makes no mention of how EU member states should assist one another, only that ‘member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power.’ It is not as explicit as Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty, which states that Members ‘will... afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.’\footnote{European Union. (2007). “The Treaty of Lisbon.” retrieved January 4, 2011 from http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm} In principle, the formulation of Article 42.7 allows for many forms of assistance but in practice, the explicit reference to armed aggression (‘if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory’) points most specifically to military means.\footnote{Myrdal & Rhinard, 2010, p. 10.}

In sum, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty mutual defence clause, Article 42.7, is not as direct or as strong as the mutual defence clause, Article V, in the 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty. Both Treaties contain references regarding their institutional relationship with NATO - but to significantly different effect. The Modified Brussels Treaty states that Member States and any organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with NATO and that WEU will rely on NATO for information and advice on military matters (Article IV).\footnote{Western European Union, 1954.} The Lisbon Treaty commitments in Article 42.7 however clearly states that military matters shall be consistent with NATO and for those EU states that are NATO members\footnote{The only EU Member States that are not in NATO are Austria, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus.} the Alliance remains the foundation of their collective defence and forum for implementation.\footnote{European Union, 2007.} Thus, the Modified Brussels Treaty commitments are much more independent then those that are found in the Lisbon Treaty.

The future of the North Atlantic Alliance is of paramount importance for the EU’s role as a security provider, precisely because the EU - as it looks today - is far from providing the
same guarantees as NATO does in the case of a military attack. With the abolition of the Modified Brussels Treaty, the old EU Member States have lost the earliest and strongest form of a European collective security guarantee, and the much more diverse EU of today cannot match those commitments.

The mutual defence guarantee in Article 5 of NATO’s Washington’s Treaty are - as they have been for 62 years - the foundations of ‘hard defence’ in Europe as a whole, and provide a shield from which the non-Allied states also benefit in practice. They provide the best answer to any risk of armed aggression (unlikely as this may be), at least so long as the United States are prepared to stay engaged in the Alliance. However, this by no means tells the full story about the importance of institutions for Europe’s future security, if that word is interpreted more broadly in the modern way.

3.3 Europe’s Future Collective Security and the Role of Institutions
Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, Europeans have been forced to rely less on the US for defence and more on themselves. In a new security climate with new ‘asymmetrical’ threats and opponents that are different from the old more traditional military enemies, Europeans have to make the necessary security arrangements. In the globalized world, with which Europe is very much involved and interdependent, these new threats can spread very fast in a global society where state borders matter less then before. Global terrorism and other extremists equipped with modern technology can cause great harm to European societies, if for example they get their hands on weapons of mass destruction or simply just blow up a local power plant.

With the effects of Asia’s extraordinary economic rise, especially China, and with a clear decline in US power, the world has become more multipolar than before. As a consequence Europe must be collectively united to face future challenges. The increasing need to fuel the global economy has made states give high priority to securing access to energy resources and for Europe this is a vital interest. At the same time Europeans are well aware of the need to conserve the environment and to limit the impact of future climate change - which will certainly include more and worse natural disasters. Furthermore, epidemics and mass migration could hit European countries very severely. The European Union thus must have a coordinated security strategy, to be able to secure access to energy resources, combat and adjust to climate change, keep trade routes open, stop mass immigration, control epidemics, fight terrorism, be prepared for natural disasters and so on.
The question is how to set priorities among this large collection of possible threats and risks; what institutions to use for the purpose: and which partners outside Europe are best to work with. First of all it is clear that this new complex of security challenges that Europe is confronted with cannot be solved by using ‘old style’ military means, and indeed most Europeans today do not seem to give particularly high priority to military matters. In a poll conducted in 2010 of the foreign-policy elites of all 27 EU Member States, the survey found a surprising convergence between threat perceptions of member states: besides their immediate fear of economic crisis, most states share concerns about uncontrolled migration and climate change.\textsuperscript{126}

In general, even after the shock of the Georgian war, most EU Member States claim to feel safer than they did five years ago and regard a major conflict in Europe as unthinkable. Furthermore, when the same survey asked what tasks ‘My country’s army is best able to’ perform, a majority in all countries chose ‘To undertake peace missions’. Only France and Britain added: ‘In addition to peacekeeping project power over long distances’. When asked what is currently more important to European security: 40% chose NATO, 33% the EU and 27% both NATO and the EU. The results of the survey support the hypothesis that the EU is a ‘risk-averse power’ in traditional terms of the use of force, that it accords greater importance to civilian systemic risks than military ones and that it is particularly interested in protecting public goods.\textsuperscript{127}

The European Union is best fitted to deal with the whole range of new security challenges, as they will need to be dealt with primarily with the use of civilian capabilities, regulations and financial resources, not the exclusively ‘hard’ military tools that NATO provides. The EU should therefore develop further its ability to conduct peace making and crisis management tasks both at home and abroad. The Brussels institutions can also be used with a combination of economic, socially and diplomatic instruments to deal with those challenges. As Jean Monnet, one of the great architects of the EU once said: ‘Nothing is possible without men: nothing is lasting without institutions.’

The fact is there are no hard lines any longer between security, politics and economics; or between internal and external security; or between the roles of civil society and business, governments and inter-governmental organization.\textsuperscript{128}


\textsuperscript{127} Krastev & Leonard, 2010, p. 27.

A good working relationship with other world powers is also essential for Europe’s security. The EU can do little to prevent the evolution of the world into a more multipolar world order, but it can do a lot to shape its relationships among the emerging poles. The United States has been Europe’s most important ally for a long time and a continuing co-operation with the US in NATO and elsewhere should be a priority. The US presence in Europe is still strong (though declining) and - unlike Europe - it is an Asian power too. A closer partnership with Russia is also essential: not only is it a nuclear power, but also an energy power that provides the bulk of EU’s energy needs. Chancellor Merkel of Germany has suggested an EU-Russia security forum to deal with such non-military strategic issues.

Furthermore, with the EU’s ‘big-bang’ enlargement in 2004, and Romania and Bulgaria joining in 2007, the Union’s borders are stretching more to the East and therefore it is important to build a better and more stable coexistence with Russia in the former Soviet and West Asian space. The EU’s closer consultation with Turkey is also a great value to the EU, as are relations with Norway especially on energy and the future of the Arctic, and it is in the EU’s strategic interest to open the door to both countries as future EU members. To paraphrase Lord Ismay Europeans should: ‘keep the EU united, Russia post-imperial and Turkey European.’

In the wider world, the 2003 European Security Strategy mentioned in particular that the EU should look to develop strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with ‘all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support’. In this context, China is of course very important for Europe’s security in the 21st century. China in 20 years’ time will most likely be very different from today, and great changes could also be brought for Europe by how it behaves and what it offers to, or demands from Europe itself. A good working relationship with China is thus a key European interest and can only realistically be achieved by a common approach through the EU framework.

4. Conclusion

The world has changed dramatically since the Western European Union was established in 1954. The domination of the West has come to an end and new powers are emerging. With globalization, states have become increasingly interdependent with one another, and at the same time increasingly cautious about provoking each other militarily. Mutual defence guarantees like the ones in the Modified Brussels Treaty and NATO’s Washington Treaty were necessary after the World Wars to balance and deter future conflicts between the European powers. They opened the way for decades of progress towards new relationships and new security agendas; but precisely because of these changes, the role of ‘hard’ defence has changed too.

It is against this background that the research question of this thesis should be answered: why can we afford now to get rid of the Western European Union? In brief, the answer is: firstly because of NATO and secondly because of the EU.

Of some 50 sovereign states in Europe, 26 are members of NATO and 27 are EU members. Even if there is no second ‘big bang’ enlargement as in 2004, these numbers will most assuredly increase somewhat further in coming years. Such enlargement, by the EU no less than NATO, remains a potent way of suppressing conflict in and around Europe while meeting states’ wider security needs.

NATO, along with the United States, has provided Europe with credible defence since 1949. The days of the Cold War have ended but if Europe still wants to deter Russian nuclear weapons capabilities, it cannot do so solely with British and French nuclear weapons. Furthermore, since France has now fully integrated into NATO’s military structure it has strengthened the EU’s acceptance of and respect for NATO and the Alliance as a whole. At the same time, NATO’s own policies have gone through a reappraisal since the NATO presence in Afghanistan has caused widespread public resentment and NATO’s inability to stop or settle the Georgian conflict was a further serious blow. As signalled in the new NATO Strategic Concept of 2010, the effect has been to turn more serious NATO attention back to Europe and relations with Russia, and thus Europeans can hope to benefit from the Allied and US guarantee for at least a while yet.

Further, with the economic crisis affecting many European countries very badly the focus has tended to shift more towards how to tackle European debt than European security. One result is the new bilateral agreements of 2010 between Britain and France to pool their military assets together to save money. These developments are in line with the idea of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ between limited sets of states, included in the EU’s
Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, in practice they reduce any hope that the EU can quickly increase all its members’ military capabilities or that it can generate additional resources even in the limited field of crisis management. This provides a further motive to ‘leave it all to NATO’ where the strength of the United States, and also other non-EU Allies, can still be drawn upon.

This does not prevent the EU from strengthening its strategic role in other and wider respects. The EU’s Lisbon Treaty created conditions for a much more coherent and powerful European Union in the realm of security and defence. The Treaty also established an EU representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and a President of the European Council, and those new posts should strengthen the Union’s security role in the long run both by promoting faster agreement within the EU and speaking with a stronger single voice outside. This kind of growing strategic maturity will be vital for Europe in dealing with such challenging political relationships as the one with a rising China.

The Lisbon Treaty also strengthens the legal base for the EU some day to develop its own army for real self-defence. For the reasons shown above, such a development is most unlikely any time soon. However, if the United States becomes less willing (because of tasks elsewhere, etc) or less able to intervene in situations where some kind of crisis management is needed in Europe and at its borders, then Europe will be increasingly driven to act to protect its own interests or to stabilize the situation. In the long run, the EU will most probably enhance its crisis management capabilities further, as it has been doing for the last decade or so.

To sum up: the success of the European integration process is the result of economic and political conditional along with democratisation - but none of this would have been achieved without security. They key to Europe’s security in the 21st century will be a continuing NATO presence providing Europe with real military guarantees and a stronger EU providing solidarity for Europe against the increasing non-military risks that the continent is confronted with. The best result to achieve this would of course be a good direct relationship between NATO and the EU, however complicated that goal still looks at present.

Meanwhile, the European Union has the ability to operate as a ‘force for good’ in the global security spectrum. Its values: democratic norms and institutions, the rule of law, free market economy, social and human rights, all have been a model for other geo-political regionalization in the world. The African Union, MERCOSUR in South America, and ASEAN in South-East Asia are all pursuing an EU-type model of security through integration, rather than a traditional and limited Alliance as typified by NATO. This, along
with the fact that the EU is the largest political union, single market and aid donor worldwide, can help European to export more of its values to others while protecting its own peoples’ security in a multipolar world.
Bibliography


