Vinsamlegast notið þetta auðkenni þegar þið vitnið til verksins eða tengið í það: http://hdl.handle.net/1946/22695
I ask: Is the will, or willing, properly understood as a cause of action? The problem at issue is the relation between will and reason, that is, practical reason.
Here, I examine Kant’s concept of free will and practical reason. I evaluate, then, Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant, specifically Kantian ethics, with regard to freedom of the will and practical reason. As will be discussed, Kant’s idea of causality, in terms of practical reason and transcendental freedom, suffers fundamental problems.
From Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant’s defence of the freedom of the will and Kant’s account of practical reason, I will come to evaluate Schopenhauer’s non-causal and non-volitionist account of the will, or willing. Schopenhauer identifies voluntary acts and acts of will (willing), presenting a notion of will dissociated from cognition or mentality. I will favor Schopenhauer’s account of the will over Kant’s; or, in any case, I shall test Kant’s by examination of, and in some cases developing, Schopenhauer’s criticism against Kant.
A non-causal account of the will, or willing, is favored over a causal account. Also, a non-volitionist account of the will, or willing, is favored over a volitionist account. Or, in any case: A causal account is tested by examination of a non-causal account, as is a volitionist account by examination of a non-volitionist account.
Practical reason, in conclusion, is separated from the concept of will. That leaves us with practical reason understood as instrumental, viz. applicable to means-end reasoning.
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hi_kapa_des14_engl_final.pdf | 195.33 kB | Opinn | Kápa | Skoða/Opna |