Vinsamlegast notið þetta auðkenni þegar þið vitnið til verksins eða tengið í það: http://hdl.handle.net/1946/16505
In philosophical discussions, it is entirely traditional to accredit skepticism about practical reason to David Hume. This thesis deals with questions of what exactly one might have in mind when talking about practical reason and what skepticism about it might entail. Three accounts of practical reason are provided, as the concept is by no means clear-cut. As the thesis deals with David Hume specifically, two readings of Hume's Treatise of human nature are presented, along with an analysis of selected
sections of Hume's own work. My conclusion is that an alternative interpretation of Hume's work, as well as a careful examination of the concept of practical reason might o er reasons to doubt that Hume is in fact as skeptical about the role of reason as is often maintained. However, differences on the way in which practical reason is viewed, as well as ambiguities in Hume's own work have provided ample material for further debate. My hope is that this thesis might be a contribution to that debate.
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