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Vinsamlegast notið þetta auðkenni þegar þið vitnið til verksins eða tengið í það: http://hdl.handle.net/1946/16789

Titill: 
  • Titill er á ensku Explanations of the Icelandic Bank Collapse
Útgáfa: 
  • Október 2013
Útdráttur: 
  • Útdráttur er á ensku

    Professors R. Wade and H.-J. Chang explain the 2008 collapse of the Icelandic
    banks as a consequence of deregulation and even a “neo-liberal experiment”.
    Wade uses the notion of a “shadow elite” to characterise power relationships
    before the collapse. Here, these explanations will be explored. Was financial
    regulation laxer in Iceland than in other EEA countries? Was a “neo-liberal
    experiment” conducted in 1991–2004? What does such a claim mean? Thirdly,
    was a “shadow elite” very powerful in the years before the bank collapse? How
    can such a “shadow elite”, and its power, be identified? The conclusion is that
    these explanations are mostly unfounded. Financial regulation was the same in
    Iceland as in other EEA countries; there was no “neo-liberal” experiment in
    Iceland 1991–2004; during that period Iceland was not ruled by any one
    “shadow elite”, although some such elites existed. However, Wade and Chang
    may be right on two counts: In Iceland, bankers and businessmen were viewed
    with a certain laxness, especially in the years 2004–2008; and even if there is
    usually a competition between different “shadow elites” in a Western democracy,
    one such elite became quite powerful in Iceland 2004–2008.

Birtist í: 
  • Þjóðarspegillinn XIV: Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum - Stjórnmálafræðideild
ISBN: 
  • 978 9935 424 17 4
Samþykkt: 
  • 25.10.2013
URI: 
  • http://hdl.handle.net/1946/16789


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