Vinsamlegast notið þetta auðkenni þegar þið vitnið til verksins eða tengið í það: http://hdl.handle.net/1946/22589
This thesis consists of two separate studies of models of public good production. The first study is a baseline cross-cultural replication of the Group Based Meritocracy Mechanism (GBM) by Gunnthorsdottir et.al. (2010). Experimental data collected using Icelandic subjects is compared to data previously collected using US subjects. The results show that despite cultural differences, subjects from both countries respond similarly to the incentive structure of the GBM and possess the same ability to coordinate its near-efficient equilibrium (NEE). Without communicating and within very few trials, subjects from both countries are successfully able to coordinate this complex asymmetric Nash equilibrium.
In the second study a new model, based on the GBM, is proposed where players are segregated into two or more endowment classes and each endowment class has the possibility to form uniform collaborative groups. This extended mechanism and the implications of its novelties are analyzed in detail and an overall Nash equilibrium solution, called the multi-tier equilibrium (MTE), is proposed. The MTE describes possible combinations and types of social strata that players form depending on the society class structure. An experimental test of the extended mechanism reveals that even with a stratified society, subjects in a GBM social stratum continue to coordinate an NEE. However, subjects in a top tier VCM stratum collaborate considerably more than what is typically observed in VCM experiments.