The Second Gulf War: A Constructivist Analysis of the Bush Administration's Decision-Making Process

Abstract

The goal of my thesis is to analyse the causal factors behind the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. My work is based on the assumption that the war can be considered a failure, given how its outcomes were negative for the United States, and a mistake, since the US government was able to predict said outcomes. Against this background, I examine why the behaviour of the United States was in contrast with the main tenet of the rational actor model, namely that states will assess the consequences of their decision in order to maximise their returns. My theoretical proposition, based on a constructivist understanding of international relations theory, is that the US government failed to rationally assess the situation due to the role played by ideological forces during its decision-making process. In particular, I am referring to the neo-conservative ideology, the impact of 9/11 on the US security strategy, and the unilateral position occupied by the country after the end of the Cold War. I analysed said factors through the method of process tracing, concluding that in certain circumstances states cannot be considered rational actors.