Comparative analysis of space policies for climate mitigation in a securitized Arctic : the cases of EU, Norway, and Sweden

Abstract

This thesis examines how the European Union, Norway, and Sweden deploy space-based capabilities to monitor environmental change and support climate mitigation in an increasingly securitised Arctic. It addresses a central paradox: while satellites and ground infrastructures are essential for environmental stewardship, their dual-use nature simultaneously reinforces geopolitical competition.Employing a qualitative, comparative research design, the study integrates framework analysis (governance, instruments, capabilities, participation) with discourse analysis of policy documents and stakeholder narratives from 2007 to 2025. It explores who exercises authority, which tools are prioritised—such as programmes, regulation, and ownership or operational models—and how these choices influence openness, dual-use control, and Indigenous participation.The findings show that the EU follows a programme-and-regulation model, centred on Copernicus, Galileo/EGNOS, and an evolving space governance framework that integrates climate monitoring with industrial and security objectives. This approach promotes broad data accessibility and international cooperation, yet it is increasingly shaped by research-security and dual-use controls. Norway employs an ownership-and-operations model, grounded in state-backed infrastructures such as KSAT/Svalbard and Andøya Space, which emphasise sovereign control, service reliability, and resilience against geopolitical disruption. Sweden, by contrast, acts as a strategic enabler, using the Esrange Space Centre to strengthen European launch capabilities and promote interoperability between civil and defence actors, positioning itself as a bridge between commercial innovation and national preparedness.Across the three cases, space systems provide significant climate value—supporting ice and permafrost monitoring, maritime safety, and environmental forecasting—but ongoing securitisation dynamics, including NATO–Russia tensions and tightened research-security controls, have constrained cooperation and risk marginalising principles of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and Indigenous data governance.The thesis concludes by proposing principles to preserve Arctic monitoring as a global public good. These include enhancing transparency in public–private partnerships, strengthening the resilience of ground and data infrastructures, promoting responsible space practices, and ensuring the meaningful inclusion of Arctic communities. Ultimately, it argues that climate and security objectives need not be mutually exclusive: with well-designed institutions, it is possible to uphold openness while addressing strategic vulnerabilities in the Arctic–space nexus.